the prince by nicolo machiavelli translated by w. k. marriott nicolo machiavelli, born at florence on 3rd may 1469. from 1494 to 1512 held an official post at florence which included diplomatic missions to various european courts. imprisoned in florence, 1512; later exiled and returned to san casciano. died at florence on 22nd june 1527. introduction nicolo machiavelli was born at florence on 3rd may 1469. he was the second son of bernardo di nicolo machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and of bartolommea di stefano nelli, his wife. both parents were members of the old florentine nobility. his life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of florence. his youth was concurrent with the greatness of florence as an italian power under the guidance of lorenzo de' medici, il magnifico. the downfall of the medici in florence occurred in 1494, in which year machiavelli entered the public service. during his official career florence was free under the government of a republic, which lasted until 1512, when the medici returned to power, and machiavelli lost his office. the medici again ruled florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once more driven out. this was the period of machiavelli's literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion of the medici, on 22nd june 1527, in his fifty-eighth year, without having regained office. youth -aet. 1-25--1469-94 although there is little recorded of the youth of machiavelli, the florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of this representative citizen may be easily imagined. florence has been described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the fervent and austere savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving lorenzo. savonarola's influence upon the young machiavelli must have been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes of florence, he only furnished machiavelli with a subject of a gibe in "the prince," where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came to a bad end. whereas the magnificence of the medicean rule during the life of lorenzo appeared to have impressed machiavelli strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to lorenzo's grandson that he dedicates "the prince." machiavelli, in his "history of florence," gives us a picture of the young men among whom his youth was passed. he writes: "they were freer than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thought the wisest." in a letter to his son guido, machiavelli shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. he writes: "i have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than which i could have no better news; for if god grant life to you, and to me, i hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your share." then, writing of a new patron, he continues: "this will turn out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill i have. therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help you if you help yourself." office -aet. 25-43--1494-1512 the second period of machiavelli's life was spent in the service of the free republic of florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the expulsion of the medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. after serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed chancellor and secretary to the second chancery, the ten of liberty and peace. here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of machiavelli's life, for during this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the republic, and we have its decrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. a mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters which illustrate "the prince." his first mission was in 1499 to catherina sforza, "my lady of forli" of "the prince," from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses. this is a very noticeable principle in machiavelli, and is urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. in 1500 he was sent to france to obtain terms from louis xii for continuing the war against pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of affairs in italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft summarized in "the prince," and was consequently driven out. he, also, it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support to pope alexander vi; which leads machiavelli to refer those who urge that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the faith of princes. machiavelli's public life was largely occupied with events arising out of the ambitions of pope alexander vi and his son, cesare borgia, the duke valentino, and these characters fill a large space of "the prince." machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of cesare borgia's conduct, insomuch that cesare is acclaimed by some critics as the "hero" of "the prince." yet in "the prince" the duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens; and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen fatality. on the death of pius iii, in 1503, machiavelli was sent to rome to watch the election of his successor, and there he saw cesare borgia cheated into allowing the choice of the college to fall on giuliano delle rovere (julius ii), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear the duke. machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuries deceives himself. julius did not rest until he had ruined cesare. it was to julius ii that machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiff was commencing his enterprise against bologna; which he brought to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly to his impetuous character. it is in reference to pope julius that machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between fortune and women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will win and hold them both. it is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the italian states, which in 1507 were controlled by france, spain, and germany, with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they impinge on the personality of machiavelli. he had several meetings with louis xii of france, and his estimate of that monarch's character has already been alluded to. machiavelli has painted ferdinand of aragon as the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. the emperor maximilian was one of the most interesting men of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man, without force of character--ignoring the human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of his wishes. the remaining years of machiavelli's official career were filled with events arising out of the league of cambrai, made in 1508 between the three great european powers already mentioned and the pope, with the object of crushing the venetian republic. this result was attained in the battle of vaila, when venice lost in one day all that she had won in eight hundred years. florence had a difficult part to play during these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out between the pope and the french, because friendship with france had dictated the entire policy of the republic. when, in 1511, julius ii finally formed the holy league against france, and with the assistance of the swiss drove the french out of italy, florence lay at the mercy of the pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the medici should be restored. the return of the medici to florence on 1st september 1512, and the consequent fall of the republic, was the signal for the dismissal of machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining office. literature and death -aet. 43-58--1512-27 on the return of the medici, machiavelli, who for a few weeks had vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of florence, was dismissed by decree dated 7th november 1512. shortly after this he was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the medici, imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. the new medicean pope, leo x, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at san casciano, near florence, where he devoted himself to literature. in a letter to francesco vettori, dated 13th december 1513, he has left a very interesting description of his life at this period, which elucidates his methods and his motives in writing "the prince." after describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he writes: "the evening being come, i return home and go to my study; at the entrance i pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed i pass into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, i am fed with that food which is mine alone; where i do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours i feel no weariness, i forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; i am possessed entirely by those great men. and because dante says: knowledge doth come of learning well retained, unfruitful else, i have noted down what i have gained from their conversation, and have composed a small work on 'principalities,' where i pour myself out as fully as i can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore i dedicate it to his magnificence giuliano. filippo casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses i have had with him; nevertheless, i am still enriching and polishing it." the "little book" suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form in which it has reached us. various mental influences were at work during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknown reason it was finally dedicated to lorenzo de' medici. although machiavelli discussed with casavecchio whether it should be sent or presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that lorenzo ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave machiavelli any employment. although it was plagiarized during machiavelli's lifetime, "the prince" was never published by him, and its text is still disputable. machiavelli concludes his letter to vettori thus: "and as to this little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during the fifteen years i have given to the study of statecraft i have neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. and of my loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith i could not now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as i have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty." before machiavelli had got "the prince" off his hands he commenced his "discourse on the first decade of titus livius," which should be read concurrently with "the prince." these and several minor works occupied him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look after the affairs of some florentine merchants at genoa. in 1519 the medicean rulers of florence granted a few political concessions to her citizens, and machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new constitution under which the great council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it was not promulgated. in 1520 the florentine merchants again had recourse to machiavelli to settle their difficulties with lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkable for his re-entry into florentine literary society, where he was much sought after, and also for the production of his "art of war." it was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance of cardinal de' medici to write the "history of florence," a task which occupied him until 1525. his return to popular favour may have determined the medici to give him this employment, for an old writer observes that "an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play with." when the "history of florence" was finished, machiavelli took it to rome for presentation to his patron, giuliano de' medici, who had in the meanwhile become pope under the title of clement vii. it is somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, machiavelli had written "the prince" for the instruction of the medici after they had just regained power in florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the "history of florence" to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. in that year the battle of pavia destroyed the french rule in italy, and left francis i a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, charles v. this was followed by the sack of rome, upon the news of which the popular party at florence threw off the yoke of the medici, who were once more banished. machiavelli was absent from florence at this time, but hastened his return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the "ten of liberty and peace." unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached florence, where he died on 22nd june 1527. the man and his works no one can say where the bones of machiavelli rest, but modern florence has decreed him a stately cenotaph in santa croce, by the side of her most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have found in his works, italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of her renaissance among the nations of europe. whilst it is idle to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more reasonably. it is due to these inquiries that the shape of an "unholy necromancer," which so long haunted men's vision, has begun to fade. machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced retirement from affairs. he does not present himself, nor is he depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political employments. he was misled by catherina sforza, ignored by louis xii, overawed by cesare borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of results; his attempts to fortify florence failed, and the soldiery that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. in the conduct of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear by the side of soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising himself; his connection with the medici was open to suspicion, and giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when he set him to write the "history of florence," rather than employ him in the state. and it is on the literary side of his character, and there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure. although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on "the prince," its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. such as they are, its ethics are those of machiavelli's contemporaries; yet they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. its historical incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and conduct. leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish some european and eastern statesmen with principles of action, "the prince" is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. men are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days of alexander vi. the cloak of religion still conceals the vices which machiavelli laid bare in the character of ferdinand of aragon. men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be--and are ruined. in politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. then--to pass to a higher plane--machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an empire, they do not win glory. necessary wars are just wars, and the arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight. it is the cry of a far later day than machiavelli's that government should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; to this "high argument" "the prince" contributes but little. machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his work is of abiding value. but what invests "the prince" with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other and their neighbours. in translating "the prince" my aim has been to achieve at all costs an exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. "quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?" in "the prince," it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word. to an englishman of shakespeare's time the translation of such a treatise was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius of the english more nearly resembled that of the italian language; to the englishman of to-day it is not so simple. to take a single example: the word "intrattenere," employed by machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted by the roman senate towards the weaker states of greece, would by an elizabethan be correctly rendered "entertain," and every contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that "rome entertained the aetolians and the achaeans without augmenting their power." but to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that "rome maintained friendly relations with the aetolians," etc., using four words to do the work of one. i have tried to preserve the pithy brevity of the italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to the sense. if the result be an occasional asperity i can only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author's meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. the following is a list of the works of machiavelli: principal works. discorso sopra le cose di pisa, 1499; del modo di trattare i popoli della valdichiana ribellati, 1502; del modo tenuto dal duca valentino nell' ammazzare vitellozzo vitelli, oliverotto da fermo, etc., 1502; discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; ritratti delle cose dell' alemagna, 1508-12; decennale secondo, 1509; ritratti delle cose di francia, 1510; discorsi sopra la prima deca di t. livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; il principe, 1513; andria, comedy translated from terence, 1513 (?); mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; della lingua (dialogue), 1514; clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; asino d'oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; dell' arte della guerra, 1519-20; discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di firenze, 1520; sommario delle cose della citta di lucca, 1520; vita di castruccio castracani da lucca, 1520; istorie fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; frammenti storici, 1525. other poems include sonetti, canzoni, ottave, and canti carnascialeschi. editions. aldo, venice, 1546; della tertina, 1550; cambiagi, florence, 6 vols., 1782-5; dei classici, milan, 10 1813; silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2; passerini, fanfani, milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. minor works. ed. f. l. polidori, 1852; lettere familiari, ed. e. alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; credited writings, ed. g. canestrini, 1857; letters to f. vettori, see a. ridolfi, pensieri intorno allo scopo di n. machiavelli nel libro il principe, etc.; d. ferrara, the private correspondence of nicolo machiavelli, 1929. dedication to the magnificent lorenzo di piero de' medici: those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness. desiring therefore to present myself to your magnificence with some testimony of my devotion towards you, i have not found among my possessions anything which i hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, i now send, digested into a little volume, to your magnificence. and although i may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, nevertheless i trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that i have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work i have not embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their works; for i have wished either that no honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. nor do i hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be of the people. take then, your magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which i send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. and if your magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly i suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. the prince chapter i -how many kinds of principalities there are, and by what means they are acquired all states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or principalities. principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long established; or they are new. the new are either entirely new, as was milan to francesco sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of naples to that of the king of spain. such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. chapter ii -concerning hereditary principalities i will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place i have written of them at length, and will address myself only to principalities. in doing so i will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. i say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it. we have in italy, for example, the duke of ferrara, who could not have withstood the attacks of the venetians in '84, nor those of pope julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. for the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another. chapter iii -concerning mixed principalities but the difficulties occur in a new principality. and firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. this follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition. in this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound to them. for, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives. for these reasons louis the twelfth, king of france, quickly occupied milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only needed lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. it is very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. thus to cause france to lose milan the first time it was enough for the duke lodovico(*) to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and driven out of italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned. (*) duke lodovico was lodovico moro, a son of francesco sforza, who married beatrice d'este. he ruled over milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510. nevertheless milan was taken from france both the first and the second time. the general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the king of france. now i say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and language, or they are not. when they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in brittany, burgundy, gascony, and normandy, which have been bound to france for so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. he who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old principality. but when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. this would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the turk in greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to keep it. because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer remedy them. besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. he who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty. the other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. a prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. in conclusion, i say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge. but in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. for every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful. again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. the romans were brought into greece by the aetolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. and the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. so that in respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. he has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. and he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles. the romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with(*) the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. greece appears to me sufficient for an example. the achaeans and aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of macedonia was humbled, antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the achaeans and aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of philip ever induce the romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. because the romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. therefore, the romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with philip and antiochus in greece so as not to have to do it in italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:--let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. (*) see remark in the introduction on the word "intrattenere." but let us turn to france and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. i will speak of louis(*) (and not of charles)(+) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held possession of italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements. (*) louis xii, king of france, "the father of the people," born 1462, died 1515. (+) charles viii, king of france, born 1470, died 1498. king louis was brought into italy by the ambition of the venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of lombardy by his intervention. i will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold in italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of charles--he was forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. the king, however, having acquired lombardy, regained at once the authority which charles had lost: genoa yielded; the florentines became his friends; the marquess of mantua, the duke of ferrara, the bentivogli, my lady of forli, the lords of faenza, of pesaro, of rimini, of camerino, of piombino, the lucchese, the pisans, the sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. then could the venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of italy. let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in italy had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the church, some of the venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. but he was no sooner in milan than he did the contrary by assisting pope alexander to occupy the romagna. it never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. and having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of tuscany, he was himself forced to come into italy. and as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the church, and deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of naples, divided it with the king of spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, louis, out in turn. the wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame. therefore, if france could have attacked naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. and if the partition which she made with the venetians in lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity. therefore louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies. which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the church, nor brought spain into italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on lombardy, to which the venetians would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take lombardy from france in order to give it to the venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage. and if any one should say: "king louis yielded the romagna to alexander and the kingdom to spain to avoid war," i answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. and if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage(*) and for the cap to rouen,(+) to that i reply what i shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. (*) louis xii divorced his wife, jeanne, daughter of louis xi, and married in 1499 anne of brittany, widow of charles viii, in order to retain the duchy of brittany for the crown. (+) the archbishop of rouen. he was georges d'amboise, created a cardinal by alexander vi. born 1460, died 1510. thus king louis lost lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to retain them. nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. and on these matters i spoke at nantes with rouen, when valentino, as cesare borgia, the son of pope alexander, was usually called, occupied the romagna, and on cardinal rouen observing to me that the italians did not understand war, i replied to him that the french did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the church to reach such greatness. and in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the church and of spain in italy has been caused by france, and her ruin may be attributed to them. from this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power. chapter iv -why the kingdom of darius, conquered by alexander, did not rebel against the successors of alexander at his death considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that alexander the great became the master of asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions. i answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection. the examples of these two governments in our time are the turk and the king of france. the entire monarchy of the turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. but the king of france is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril. therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. the causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. this arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. hence, he who attacks the turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it. the contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of france, because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity. now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the turk, and therefore it was only necessary for alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and then to take the country from him. after which victory, darius being killed, the state remained secure to alexander, for the above reasons. and if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. but it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted like that of france. hence arose those frequent rebellions against the romans in spain, france, and greece, owing to the many principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, the romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the romans then became secure possessors. and when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the romans were acknowledged. when these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which alexander held the empire of asia, or at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as pyrrhus and many more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state. chapter v -concerning the way to govern cities or principalities which lived under their own laws before they were annexed whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way. there are, for example, the spartans and the romans. the spartans held athens and thebes, establishing there an oligarchy; nevertheless they lost them. the romans, in order to hold capua, carthage, and numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. they wished to hold greece as the spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. so to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. and he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. and whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the florentines. but when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. for this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. but in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there. chapter vi -concerning new principalities which are acquired by one's own arms and ability let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as i shall do, i adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. a wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. i say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person. but to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, i say that moses, cyrus, romulus, theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. and although one may not discuss moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of god, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with god. but in considering cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of moses, although he had so great a preceptor. and in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain. it was necessary, therefore, to moses that he should find the people of israel in egypt enslaved and oppressed by the egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of bondage. it was necessary that romulus should not remain in alba, and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become king of rome and founder of the fatherland. it was necessary that cyrus should find the persians discontented with the government of the medes, and the medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the athenians dispersed. these opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous. those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. the difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security. and it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. this coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them. it is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? in the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered. hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. and thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force. if moses, cyrus, theseus, and romulus had been unarmed they could not have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to fra girolamo savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to believe. therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. to these great examples i wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some resemblance to them, and i wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is hiero the syracusan.(*) this man rose from a private station to be prince of syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince. he was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. this man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping. (*) hiero ii, born about 307 b.c., died 216 b.c. chapter vii -concerning new principalities which are acquired either by the arms of others or by good fortune those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in greece, in the cities of ionia and of the hellespont, where princes were made by darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and unstable things. neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful. states that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and correspondencies(*) fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards. (*) "le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, i wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are francesco sforza(*) and cesare borgia. francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be duke of milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. on the other hand, cesare borgia, called by the people duke valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him. (*) francesco sforza, born 1401, died 1466. he married bianca maria visconti, a natural daughter of filippo visconti, the duke of milan, on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. machiavelli was the accredited agent of the florentine republic to cesare borgia (1478 1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations of the orsini and vitelli at sinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in florence he has left an account, written ten years before "the prince," of the proceedings of the duke in his "descritione del modo tenuto dal duca valentino nello ammazzare vitellozzo vitelli," etc., a translation of which is appended to the present work. because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. if, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and i do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, because i do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. alexander the sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. firstly, he did not see his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the church; and if he was willing to rob the church he knew that the duke of milan and the venetians would not consent, because faenza and rimini were already under the protection of the venetians. besides this, he saw the arms of italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the pope, namely, the orsini and the colonnesi and their following. it behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. this was easy for him to do, because he found the venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the french into italy; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of king louis. therefore the king came into italy with the assistance of the venetians and the consent of alexander. he was no sooner in milan than the pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the king. the duke, therefore, having acquired the romagna and beaten the colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of france: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the same. of the orsini he had a warning when, after taking faenza and attacking bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. and as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the duchy of urbino, attacked tuscany, and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. for the first thing he weakened the orsini and colonnesi parties in rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. after this he awaited an opportunity to crush the orsini, having scattered the adherents of the colonna house. this came to him soon and he used it well; for the orsini, perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the church was ruin to them, called a meeting of the magione in perugia. from this sprung the rebellion at urbino and the tumults in the romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the french. having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the french or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of signor pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at sinigalia.(*) having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the romagna and the duchy of urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. and as this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, i am not willing to leave it out. (*) sinigalia, 31st december 1502. when the duke occupied the romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. thereupon he promoted messer ramiro d'orco,(*) a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. this man in a short time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. afterwards the duke considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their advocates. and because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. under this pretence he took ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. the barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed. (*) ramiro d'orco. ramiro de lorqua. but let us return whence we started. i say that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider france, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. and from this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with france in the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of naples against the spaniards who were besieging gaeta. it was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had alexander lived. such was his line of action as to present affairs. but as to the future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the pope. secondly, by winning to himself all the gentlemen of rome, so as to be able to curb the pope with their aid, as has been observed. thirdly, by converting the college more to himself. fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first shock. of these four things, at the death of alexander, he had accomplished three. for he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. and as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of tuscany, for he already possessed perugia and piombino, and pisa was under his protection. and as he had no longer to study france (for the french were already driven out of the kingdom of naples by the spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down upon pisa. after this, lucca and siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the florentines; and the florentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability. but alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. he left the duke with the state of romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. and it is seen that his foundations were good, for the romagna awaited him for more than a month. in rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the baglioni, the vitelli, and the orsini might come to rome, they could not effect anything against him. if he could not have made pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. but if he had been in sound health at the death of alexander,(*) everything would have been different to him. on the day that julius the second(+) was elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die. (*) alexander vi died of fever, 18th august 1503. (+) julius ii was giuliano della rovere, cardinal of san pietro ad vincula, born 1443, died 1513. when all the actions of the duke are recalled, i do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to be, as i have said, that i ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, are raised to government. because he, having a lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of alexander and his own sickness frustrated his designs. therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man. only can he be blamed for the election of julius the second, in whom he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. for men injure either from fear or hatred. those whom he had injured, amongst others, were san pietro ad vincula, colonna, san giorgio, and ascanio.(*) the rest, in becoming pope, had to fear him, rouen and the spaniards excepted; the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of france having relations with him. therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have created a spaniard pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to rouen and not san pietro ad vincula. he who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived. therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. (*) san giorgio is raffaello riario. ascanio is ascanio sforza. chapter viii -concerning those who have obtained a principality by wickedness although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest to me that i must not be silent on them, although one could be more copiously treated when i discuss republics. these methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince of his country. and speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other modern--and without entering further into the subject, i consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. agathocles, the sicilian,(*) became king of syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject position. this man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous life. nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, he rose through its ranks to be praetor of syracuse. being established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose with amilcar, the carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in sicily. one morning he assembled the people and the senate of syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. and although he was twice routed by the carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked africa, and in a short time raised the siege of syracuse. the carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to terms with agathocles, and, leaving sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of africa. (*) agathocles the sicilian, born 361 b.c., died 289 b.c. therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him with many hazardous dangers. yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. still, if the courage of agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain. nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. what he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius. in our times, during the rule of alexander the sixth, oliverotto da fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his maternal uncle, giovanni fogliani, and in the early days of his youth sent to fight under pagolo vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military profession. after pagolo died, he fought under his brother vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the first man in his profession. but it appearing a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the vitelleschi, to seize fermo. so he wrote to giovanni fogliani that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and he entreated giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably by the fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of giovanni himself, who had brought him up. giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and he caused him to be honourably received by the fermians, and he lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to which he invited giovanni fogliani and the chiefs of fermo. when the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets were finished, oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of pope alexander and his son cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him. no sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered giovanni and the rest. after these murders oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. he killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only was he secure in the city of fermo, but he had become formidable to all his neighbours. and his destruction would have been as difficult as that of agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by cesare borgia, who took him with the orsini and vitelli at sinigalia, as was stated above. thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness. some may wonder how it can happen that agathocles, and his like, after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. i believe that this follows from severities(*) being badly or properly used. those may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects. the badly employed are those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than decrease. those who practise the first system are able, by aid of god or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as agathocles did. it is impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. (*) mr burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern equivalent of machiavelli's thought when he speaks of "crudelta" than the more obvious "cruelties." hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. he who does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. for injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. and above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them. chapter ix -concerning a civil principality but coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. i say then that such a principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy. a principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. the people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. he who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. but he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. it is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. the worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him. therefore, to make this point clearer, i say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. but when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him. but one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection. because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so i omit them; but, i repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. nabis,(*) prince of the spartans, sustained the attack of all greece, and of a victorious roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. and do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that "he who builds on the people, builds on the mud," for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the gracchi in rome and to messer giorgio scali(+) in florence. but granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged--such a one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well. (*) nabis, tyrant of sparta, conquered by the romans under flamininus in 195 b.c.; killed 192 b.c. (+) messer giorgio scali. this event is to be found in machiavelli's "florentine history," book iii. these principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule personally or through magistrates. in the latter case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. for such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. and so much the more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. chapter x -concerning the way in which the strength of all principalities ought to be measured it is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. and to make this quite clear i say that i consider those who are able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them; and i consider those always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. the first case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. in the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. and whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his people. the cities of germany are absolutely free, they own but little country around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating, drinking, and firing. and beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them. therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in the field without being interfered with. and whoever should reply: if the people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this i answer that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold. further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. for it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them. chapter xi -concerning ecclesiastical principalities it only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. these princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. such principalities only are secure and happy. but being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, i shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by god, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them. nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the church has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from alexander backwards the italian potentates (not only those who have been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of france trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from italy, and to ruin the venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. before charles, king of france, passed into italy,(*) this country was under the dominion of the pope, the venetians, the king of naples, the duke of milan, and the florentines. these potentates had two principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter italy under arms; the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. those about whom there was the most anxiety were the pope and the venetians. to restrain the venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the defence of ferrara; and to keep down the pope they made use of the barons of rome, who, being divided into two factions, orsini and colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of the pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. and although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. and the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one people should almost destroy the colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the orsini. this was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in italy. (*) charles viii invaded italy in 1494. alexander the sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail; and through the instrumentality of the duke valentino, and by reason of the entry of the french, he brought about all those things which i have discussed above in the actions of the duke. and although his intention was not to aggrandize the church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the church, which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours. pope julius came afterwards and found the church strong, possessing all the romagna, the barons of rome reduced to impotence, and, through the chastisements of alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised before alexander's time. such things julius not only followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain bologna, to ruin the venetians, and to drive the french out of italy. all of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the church and not any private person. he kept also the orsini and colonnesi factions within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the one, the greatness of the church, with which he terrified them; and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them. for whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster the factions in rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders and tumults among the barons. for these reasons his holiness pope leo(*) found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. (*) pope leo x was the cardinal de' medici. chapter xii -how many kinds of soldiery there are, and concerning mercenaries having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such principalities as in the beginning i proposed to discuss, and having considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence and defence which belong to each of them. we have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin. the chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. i shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms. i say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of god nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. the fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. they are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which i should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what they were. thus it was that charles, king of france, was allowed to seize italy with chalk in hand;(*) and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which i have related. and as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. (*) "with chalk in hand," "col gesso." this is one of the _bons mots_ of alexander vi, and refers to the ease with which charles viii seized italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. cf. "the history of henry vii," by lord bacon: "king charles had conquered the realm of naples, and lost it again, in a kind of a felicity of a dream. he passed the whole length of italy without resistance: so that it was true what pope alexander was wont to say: that the frenchmen came into italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight." i wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. the mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way. and if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether mercenary or not, i reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the command. and experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. rome and sparta stood for many ages armed and free. the switzers are completely armed and quite free. of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the carthaginians, who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the romans, although the carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. after the death of epaminondas, philip of macedon was made captain of their soldiers by the thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty. duke filippo being dead, the milanese enlisted francesco sforza against the venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at caravaggio,(*) allied himself with them to crush the milanese, his masters. his father, sforza, having been engaged by queen johanna(+) of naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the king of aragon, in order to save her kingdom. and if the venetians and florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, i reply that the florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. one who did not conquer was giovanni acuto,(%) and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the florentines would have stood at his discretion. sforza had the bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. francesco turned his ambition to lombardy; braccio against the church and the kingdom of naples. but let us come to that which happened a short while ago. the florentines appointed as their captain pagolo vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. if this man had taken pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. the venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. this was before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of italy. and in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under carmignuola,(#) they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the duke of milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. they had afterwards for their captains bartolomeo da bergamo, roberto da san severino, the count of pitigliano,(&) and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened afterwards at vaila,($) where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. (*) battle of caravaggio, 15th september 1448. (+) johanna ii of naples, the widow of ladislao, king of naples. (%) giovanni acuto. an english knight whose name was sir john hawkwood. he fought in the english wars in france, and was knighted by edward iii; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into italy. these became the famous "white company." he took part in many wars, and died in florence in 1394. he was born about 1320 at sible hedingham, a village in essex. he married domnia, a daughter of bernabo visconti. (#) carmignuola. francesco bussone, born at carmagnola about 1390, executed at venice, 5th may 1432. (&) bartolomeo colleoni of bergamo; died 1457. roberto of san severino; died fighting for venice against sigismund, duke of austria, in 1487. "primo capitano in italia."- machiavelli. count of pitigliano; nicolo orsini, born 1442, died 1510. ($) battle of vaila in 1509. and as with these examples i have reached italy, which has been ruled for many years by mercenaries, i wish to discuss them more seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to counteract them. you must understand that the empire has recently come to be repudiated in italy, that the pope has acquired more temporal power, and that italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became princes. from this it came to pass that italy fell partly into the hands of the church and of republics, and, the church consisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist foreigners. the first who gave renown to this soldiery was alberigo da conio,(*) the romagnian. from the school of this man sprang, among others, braccio and sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of italy. after these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been overrun by charles, robbed by louis, ravaged by ferdinand, and insulted by the switzers. the principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. they did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. they had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. they did not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. all these things were permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as i have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought italy to slavery and contempt. (*) alberigo da conio. alberico da barbiano, count of cunio in romagna. he was the leader of the famous "company of st george," composed entirely of italian soldiers. he died in 1409. chapter xiii -concerning auxiliaries, mixed soldiery, and one's own auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by pope julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with ferdinand, king of spain,(*) for his assistance with men and arms. these arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive. (*) ferdinand v (f. ii of aragon and sicily, f. iii of naples), surnamed "the catholic," born 1452, died 1516. and although ancient histories may be full of examples, i do not wish to leave this recent one of pope julius the second, the peril of which cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get ferrara, threw himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. but his good fortune brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at ravenna, and the switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs. the florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand frenchmen to take pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their troubles. the emperor of constantinople,(*) to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand turks into greece, who, on the war being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of greece to the infidels. (*) joannes cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure you. in conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. the wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others. i shall never hesitate to cite cesare borgia and his actions. this duke entered the romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only french soldiers, and with them he captured imola and forli; but afterwards, such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the orsini and vitelli; whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. and the difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the french, when he had the orsini and vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. i was not intending to go beyond italian and recent examples, but i am unwilling to leave out hiero, the syracusan, he being one of those i have named above. this man, as i have said, made head of the army by the syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens. i wish also to recall to memory an instance from the old testament applicable to this subject. david offered himself to saul to fight with goliath, the philistine champion, and, to give him courage, saul armed him with his own weapons; which david rejected as soon as he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. in conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast. charles the seventh,(*) the father of king louis the eleventh,(+) having by good fortune and valour liberated france from the english, recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. afterwards his son, king louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to fight along with switzers, it does not appear that they can now conquer without them. hence it arises that the french cannot stand against the switzers, and without the switzers they do not come off well against others. the armies of the french have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one's own forces. and this example proves it, for the kingdom of france would be unconquerable if the ordinance of charles had been enlarged or maintained. (*) charles vii of france, surnamed "the victorious," born 1403, died 1461. (+) louis xi, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. but the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as i have said above of hectic fevers. therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to few. and if the first disaster to the roman empire(*) should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting of the goths; because from that time the vigour of the roman empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others. (*) "many speakers to the house the other night in the debate on the reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of the conditions under which the british empire maintains its existence. when mr balfour replied to the allegations that the roman empire sank under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was 'wholly unhistorical.' he might well have added that the roman power was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to fight for the state, but that it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer recognized."--pall mall gazette, 15th may 1906. i conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. and it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. and one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. and the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how philip, the father of alexander the great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which rules i entirely commit myself. chapter xiv -that which concerns a prince on the subject of the art of war a prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. and, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states. and the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. francesco sforza, through being martial, from a private person became duke of milan; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. for among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants. because, there being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. and therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. he ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. as regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. which knowledge is useful in two ways. firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. and the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage. philopoemen,(*) prince of the achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "if the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? how should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? if we should wish to retreat, how ought we to pursue?" and he would set forth to them, as he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with. (*) philopoemen, "the last of the greeks," born 252 b.c., died 183 b.c. but to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said alexander the great imitated achilles, caesar alexander, scipio cyrus. and whoever reads the life of cyrus, written by xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality scipio conformed to those things which have been written of cyrus by xenophon. a wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows. chapter xv -concerning things for which men, and especially princes, are praised or blamed it remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince towards subject and friends. and as i know that many have written on this point, i expect i shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it i shall depart from the methods of other people. but, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil. hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and discussing those which are real, i say that all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. and i know that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. and again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity. chapter xvi -concerning liberality and meanness commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, i say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. nevertheless, liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. this will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly. therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. we have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have been considered mean; the rest have failed. pope julius the second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the king of france; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. the present king of spain would not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. a prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to govern. and if any one should say: caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and by being considered so, i answer: either you are a prince in fact, or in a way to become one. in the first case this liberality is dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. and if any one should reply: many have been princes, and have done great things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, i reply: either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else that of others. in the first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. and to the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. and of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you can be a ready giver, as were cyrus, caesar, and alexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you. and there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. and a prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; and liberality leads you to both. therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. chapter xvii -concerning cruelty and clemency, and whether it is better to be loved than feared coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, i say that every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. cesare borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. and if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more merciful than the florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted pistoia to be destroyed.(*) therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only. (*) during the rioting between the cancellieri and panciatichi factions in 1502 and 1503. and of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. hence virgil, through the mouth of dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new, saying: "res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt moliri, et late fines custode tueri."(*) nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable. (*) . . . against my will, my fate a throne unsettled, and an infant state, bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs, and guard with these severities my shores. christopher pitt. upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? it may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. and that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails. nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. but when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. but when a prince is with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties. among the wonderful deeds of hannibal this one is enumerated: that having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. this arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. and short-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal cause of them. that it is true his other virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in spain; this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. for this he was upbraided in the senate by fabius maximus, and called the corrupter of the roman soldiery. the locrians were laid waste by a legate of scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. insomuch that someone in the senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. this disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of scipio; but, he being under the control of the senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his glory. returning to the question of being feared or loved, i come to the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. chapter xviii(*) -concerning the way in which princes should keep faith (*) "the present chapter has given greater offence than any other portion of machiavelli's writings." burd, "il principe," p. 297. every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. you must know there are two ways of contesting,(*) the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. this has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how achilles and many other princes of old were given to the centaur chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. a prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. if men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. of this endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. (*) "contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." mr burd points out that this passage is imitated directly from cicero's "de officiis": "nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore." but it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. one recent example i cannot pass over in silence. alexander the sixth did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes,(*) because he well understood this side of mankind. (*) "nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum)." the words "ad votum" are omitted in the testina addition, 1550. alexander never did what he said, cesare never said what he did. italian proverb. therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities i have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. and i shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. and you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,(*) friendship, humanity, and religion. therefore it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as i have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it. (*) "contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede," and "tutto fede," "altogether faithful," in the next paragraph. it is noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro alla fede" and "tutto fede," were omitted in the testina edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal authorities. it may be that the meaning attached to the word "fede" was "the faith," i.e. the catholic creed, and not as rendered here "fidelity" and "faithful." observe that the word "religione" was suffered to stand in the text of the testina, being used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness "the religion," a phrase inevitably employed to designate the huguenot heresy. south in his sermon ix, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as follows: "that great patron and coryphaeus of this tribe, nicolo machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political scheme: 'that the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.'" for this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. there is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. for that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on. one prince(*) of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time. (*) ferdinand of aragon. "when machiavelli was writing 'the prince' it would have been clearly impossible to mention ferdinand's name here without giving offence." burd's "il principe," p. 308. chapter xix -that one should avoid being despised and hated now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, i have spoken of the more important ones, the others i wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. it makes him hated above all things, as i have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of which he must abstain. and when neither their property nor their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways. it makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him. that prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. for this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. from the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as i have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as i said nabis the spartan did. but concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to accomplish, as i said above at length. and one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. and as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you. and, to reduce the matter into a small compass, i say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. for whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape. endless examples could be given on this subject, but i will be content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. messer annibale bentivogli, who was prince in bologna (grandfather of the present annibale), having been murdered by the canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but messer giovanni,(*) who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and murdered all the canneschi. this sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of bentivogli enjoyed in those days in bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after the death of annibale who was able to rule the state, the bolognese, having information that there was one of the bentivogli family in florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was ruled by him until messer giovanni came in due course to the government. (*) giovanni bentivogli, born in bologna 1438, died at milan 1508. he ruled bologna from 1462 to 1506. machiavelli's strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience (february 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the boscoli conspiracy. for this reason i consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody. and well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have. among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is france, and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king. neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. from this one can draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. and further, i consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people. it may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, i will recall the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the same time i will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times. it seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from marcus the philosopher down to maximinus; they were marcus and his son commodus, pertinax, julian, severus and his son antoninus caracalla, macrinus, heliogabalus, alexander, and maximinus. there is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended with, the roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed and cruelty. hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them. from these causes it arose that marcus, pertinax, and alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except marcus; he alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised. but pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live licentiously under commodus, could not endure the honest life to which pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. and here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as i said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself--it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles--you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm. but let us come to alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army conspired against him, and murdered him. turning now to the opposite characters of commodus, severus, antoninus caracalla, and maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except severus, came to a bad end; but in severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. and because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, i wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as i said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate. knowing the sloth of the emperor julian, he persuaded the army in sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to rome and avenge the death of pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the throne, he moved the army on rome, and reached italy before it was known that he had started. on his arrival at rome, the senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed julian. after this there remained for severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two difficulties; one in asia, where niger, head of the asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. and as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack niger and to deceive albinus. to the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of caesar; and, moreover, that the senate had made albinus his colleague; which things were accepted by albinus as true. but after severus had conquered and killed niger, and settled oriental affairs, he returned to rome and complained to the senate that albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. afterwards he sought him out in france, and took from him his government and life. he who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence. but his son antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him to be beloved by the armies. nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the people of rome and all those of alexandria. he became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a centurion. and here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state. antoninus had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin. but let us come to commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold the empire, for, being the son of marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against and was killed. it remains to discuss the character of maximinus. he was a very warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of alexander, of whom i have already spoken, killed him and elected maximinus to the throne. this he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to rome and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. first africa rebelled, then the senate with all the people of rome, and all italy conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter, besieging aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. i do not wish to discuss heliogabalus, macrinus, or julian, who, being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but i will bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the armies of the roman empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all princes, except the turk and the soldan, to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful. from the above i have excepted the turk, who always keeps round him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. the kingdom of the soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his friends. but you must note that the state of the soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. and this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord. but returning to the subject of our discourse, i say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. because it would have been useless and dangerous for pertinax and alexander, being new princes, to imitate marcus, who was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to caracalla, commodus, and maximinus to have imitated severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of severus, but he ought to take from severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm. chapter xx -are fortresses, and many other things to which princes often resort, advantageous or hurtful? 1. some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and destroyed them. and although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless i will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. 2. there never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your adherents. and whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. but when you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. and because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. therefore, as i have said, a new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms. histories are full of examples. but when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. 3. our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold pistoia by factions and pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. this may have been well enough in those times when italy was in a way balanced, but i do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because i do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. the venetians, moved, as i believe, by the above reasons, fostered the guelph and ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state. such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. 4. without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. for this reason many consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher. 5. princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. pandolfo petrucci, prince of siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others. but on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; i will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. and since the matter demands it, i must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. and weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. 6. it has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first attack. i praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. notwithstanding that, messer nicolo vitelli in our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in citta di castello so that he might keep that state; guido ubaldo, duke of urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by cesare borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the bentivogli returning to bologna came to a similar decision. fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in another. and this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. the castle of milan, built by francesco sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house of sforza than any other disorder in the state. for this reason the best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. it has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the countess of forli,(*) when the count girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from milan, and thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist the people. but fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when cesare borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. all these things considered then, i shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and i shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. (*) catherine sforza, a daughter of galeazzo sforza and lucrezia landriani, born 1463, died 1509. it was to the countess of forli that machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. a letter from fortunati to the countess announces the appointment: "i have been with the signori," wrote fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and when. they tell me that nicolo machiavelli, a learned young florentine noble, secretary to my lords of the ten, is to leave with me at once." cf. "catherine sforza," by count pasolini, translated by p. sylvester, 1898. chapter xxi -how a prince should conduct himself so as to gain renown nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine example. we have in our time ferdinand of aragon, the present king of spain. he can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. in the beginning of his reign he attacked granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. he did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. he was able with the money of the church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the moors; nor could there be a more admirable example, nor one more rare. under this same cloak he assailed africa, he came down on italy, he has finally attacked france; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of them. and his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against him. again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs, similar to those which are related of messer bernabo da milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. and a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. a prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. in either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. because he who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand, court his fate. antiochus went into greece, being sent for by the aetolians to drive out the romans. he sent envoys to the achaeans, who were friends of the romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the romans urged them to take up arms. this question came to be discussed in the council of the achaeans, where the legate of antiochus urged them to stand neutral. to this the roman legate answered: "as for that which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with arms. and irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. but when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. but if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. in the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. and here it is to be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of any one. the venetians joined with france against the duke of milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been avoided. but when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the florentines when the pope and spain sent armies to attack lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the parties. never let any government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil. a prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the proficient in every art. at the same time he should encourage his citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honour his city or state. further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds or into societies,(*) he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything. (*) "guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "arti" were craft or trade guilds, cf. florio: "arte . . . a whole company of any trade in any city or corporation town." the guilds of florence are most admirably described by mr edgcumbe staley in his work on the subject (methuen, 1906). institutions of a somewhat similar character, called "artel," exist in russia to-day, cf. sir mackenzie wallace's "russia," ed. 1905: "the sons . . . were always during the working season members of an artel. in some of the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex kind- permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the individual members." the word "artel," despite its apparent similarity, has, mr aylmer maude assures me, no connection with "ars" or "arte." its root is that of the verb "rotisya," to bind oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of "rota," which now signifies a "regimental company." in both words the underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. "tribu" were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included individuals connected by marriage. perhaps our words "sects" or "clans" would be most appropriate. chapter xxii -concerning the secretaries of princes the choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. and the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. but when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them. there were none who knew messer antonio da venafro as the servant of pandolfo petrucci, prince of siena, who would not consider pandolfo to be a very clever man in having venafro for his servant. because there are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. therefore, it follows necessarily that, if pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. but to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. on the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread chances. when, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. chapter xxiii -how flatterers should be avoided i do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and discriminating. it is that of flatterers, of whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into contempt. because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates. therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. with these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. he who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt. i wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. fra luca, the man of affairs to maximilian,(*) the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: he consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. this arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. but as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. (*) maximilian i, born in 1459, died 1519, emperor of the holy roman empire. he married, first, mary, daughter of charles the bold; after her death, bianca sforza; and thus became involved in italian politics. a prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt. and if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. in this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from him. but if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite them. each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. and they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels. chapter xxiv -why the princes of italy have lost their states the previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. for the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. thus it will be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. and if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in italy in our times, such as the king of naples, the duke of milan, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the nobles. in the absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. philip of macedon, not the father of alexander the great, but he who was conquered by titus quintius, had not much territory compared to the greatness of the romans and of greece who attacked him, yet being a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom. therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. this course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore you. this again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour. chapter xxv -what fortune can effect in human affairs and how to withstand her it is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by god that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. this opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. sometimes pondering over this, i am in some degree inclined to their opinion. nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, i hold it to be true that fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,(*) but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. (*) frederick the great was accustomed to say: "the older one gets the more convinced one becomes that his majesty king chance does three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe." sorel's "eastern question." i compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. so it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain her. and if you will consider italy, which is the seat of these changes, and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open country without barriers and without any defence. for if it had been defended by proper valour, as are germany, spain, and france, either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not have come at all. and this i consider enough to say concerning resistance to fortune in general. but confining myself more to the particular, i say that a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. this, i believe, arises firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. i believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. one can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. this follows from what i have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not. changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. but a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. pope julius the second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action that he always met with success. consider his first enterprise against bologna, messer giovanni bentivogli being still alive. the venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the king of spain, and he had the enterprise still under discussion with the king of france; nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made spain and the venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the king of france, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the pope his friend so as to humble the venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. therefore julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in rome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. because the king of france would have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a thousand fears. i will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. i conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. for my part i consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. she is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. chapter xxvi -an exhortation to liberate italy from the barbarians having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new prince that i never knew a time more fit than the present. and if, as i said, it was necessary that the people of israel should be captive so as to make manifest the ability of moses; that the persians should be oppressed by the medes so as to discover the greatness of the soul of cyrus; and that the athenians should be dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of theseus: then at the present time, in order to discover the virtue of an italian spirit, it was necessary that italy should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the hebrews, more oppressed than the persians, more scattered than the athenians; without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us think he was ordained by god for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so that italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of tuscany, and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. it is seen how she entreats god to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies. it is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it. nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in your illustrious house,(*) with its valour and fortune, favoured by god and by the church of which it is now the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. this will not be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men i have named. and although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was god more their friend than he is yours. (*) giuliano de medici. he had just been created a cardinal by leo x. in 1523 giuliano was elected pope, and took the title of clement vii. with us there is great justice, because that war is just which is necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them. here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whom i have directed your attention. further than this, how extraordinarily the ways of god have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the rest. god is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory which belongs to us. and it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named italians have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in italy, and in so many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. and nothing honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. such things when they are well founded and dignified will make him revered and admired, and in italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every form. here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior the italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. but when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. hence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly italian, it has always given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is il taro, afterwards allesandria, capua, genoa, vaila, bologna, mestri.(*) (*) the battles of il taro, 1495; alessandria, 1499; capua, 1501; genoa, 1507; vaila, 1509; bologna, 1511; mestri, 1513. if, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better soldiers. and although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. therefore it is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended against foreigners by italian valour. and although swiss and spanish infantry may be considered very formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon to overthrow them. for the spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the spaniards are unable to resist french cavalry, and the switzers are overthrown by spanish infantry. and although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of ravenna, when the spanish infantry were confronted by german battalions, who follow the same tactics as the swiss; when the spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them. it is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. and these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new prince. this opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting italy at last see her liberator appear. nor can one express the love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. what door would be closed to him? who would refuse obedience to him? what envy would hinder him? what italian would refuse him homage? to all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. let, therefore, your illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that saying of petrarch: virtu contro al furore prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: che l'antico valore negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. virtue against fury shall advance the fight, and it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight: for the old roman valour is not dead, nor in th' italians' brests extinguished. edward dacre, 1640. description of the methods adopted by the duke valentino when murdering vitellozzo vitelli, oliverotto da fermo, the signor pagolo, and the duke di gravina orsini by nicolo machiavelli the duke valentino had returned from lombardy, where he had been to clear himself with the king of france from the calumnies which had been raised against him by the florentines concerning the rebellion of arezzo and other towns in the val di chiana, and had arrived at imola, whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against giovanni bentivogli, the tyrant of bologna: for he intended to bring that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his romagnian duchy. these matters coming to the knowledge of the vitelli and orsini and their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too powerful, and it was feared that, having seized bologna, he would seek to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in italy. upon this a meeting was called at magione in the district of perugia, to which came the cardinal, pagolo, and the duke di gravina orsini, vitellozzo vitelli, oliverotto da fermo, gianpagolo baglioni, the tyrant of perugia, and messer antonio da venafro, sent by pandolfo petrucci, the prince of siena. here were discussed the power and courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. and they decided not to abandon the bentivogli, but to strive to win over the florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another, promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite with them against the common enemy. this meeting was at once reported throughout all italy, and those who were discontented under the duke, among whom were the people of urbino, took hope of effecting a revolution. thus it arose that, men's minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by certain men of urbino to seize the fortress of san leo, which was held for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. the castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. upon this capture being effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the diet at magione, from whom they expected to get assistance. those who heard of the rebellion at urbino thought they would not lose the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent again to florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they ought not to wait for another opportunity. but the florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the vitelli and orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent nicolo machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against his enemies. the duke was found full of fear at imola, because, against everybody's expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. but recovering courage from the offers of the florentines, he decided to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. this latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the king of france for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money. notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the aid of the orsini and vitelli, routed them. when this happened, the duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the principality. and the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent signor pagolo to him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a standstill. but the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in separate parties to every part of the romagna. in the meanwhile there came also to him five hundred french lancers, and although he found himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of reconciliation. and that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand ducats at once; he promised not to injure the bentivogli; and he formed an alliance with giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. on the other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of urbino and other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his permission. this reconciliation being completed, guido ubaldo, the duke of urbino, again fled to venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. but the duke valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed his men throughout the romagna, set out for imola at the end of november together with his french men-at-arms: thence he went to cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the vitelli and orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing being concluded, oliverotto da fermo was sent to propose that if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against tuscany they were ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege sinigalia. to this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with tuscany, and thus become hostile to the florentines, but that he was very willing to proceed against sinigalia. it happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to come there. this appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions. and the more to reassure them, he allowed all the french men-at-arms who were with him in lombardy to depart, except the hundred lancers under mons. di candales, his brother-in-law. he left cesena about the middle of december, and went to fano, and with the utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded the vitelli and orsini to wait for him at sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the arms and councils of his friends. but vitellozzo remained very stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by pagolo orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he agreed to wait. upon this the duke, before his departure from fano, which was to be on 30th december 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most trusted followers, among whom were don michele and the monsignor d'euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as vitellozzo, pagolo orsini, the duke di gravina, and oliverotto should arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they reached sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they came to the duke's quarters, where they should be seized. the duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to assemble by daybreak at the metauro, a river five miles distant from fano, and await him there. he found himself, therefore, on the last day of december at the metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. fano and sinigalia are two cities of la marca situated on the shore of the adriatic sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who goes towards sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases of which are touched by the sea in some places. the city of sinigalia is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot and from the shore about a mile. on the side opposite to the city runs a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards fano, facing the high road. thus he who draws near to sinigalia comes for a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river which passes by sinigalia. if he turns to his left hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that leads into sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. before this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side. the vitelli and orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant from sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men of the duke; and they left in sinigalia only oliverotto and his band, which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. matters having been thus arranged, the duke valentino left for sinigalia, and when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town. vitellozzo, pagolo, and the duke di gravina on mules, accompanied by a few horsemen, went towards the duke; vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his approaching death--a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. and it is said that when he parted from his men before setting out for sinigalia to meet the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. he recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers that should be kept in mind. these three, therefore, came before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him with goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were commissioned to look after them. but the duke noticing that oliverotto, who had remained with his band in sinigalia, was missing--for oliverotto was waiting in the square before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling them--signalled with his eye to don michelle, to whom the care of oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that oliverotto should not escape. therefore don michele rode off and joined oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come himself to meet the duke. and oliverotto, having taken this advice, came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others. so the whole party entered sinigalia, dismounted at the duke's quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men of oliverotto and the orsini should be stripped of their arms. those of oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the orsini and vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the orsinian and vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the country and saved themselves. but the duke's soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men of oliverotto, began to sack sinigalia, and if the duke had not repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have completely sacked it. night having come and the tumult being silenced, the duke prepared to kill vitellozzo and oliverotto; he led them into a room and caused them to be strangled. neither of them used words in keeping with their past lives: vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of the pope full pardon for his sins; oliverotto cringed and laid the blame for all injuries against the duke on vitellozzo. pagolo and the duke di gravina orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from rome that the pope had taken the cardinal orsino, the archbishop of florence, and messer jacopo da santa croce. after which news, on 18th january 1502, in the castle of pieve, they also were strangled in the same way. the life of castruccio castracani of lucca written by nicolo machiavelli and sent to his friends zanobi buondelmonti and luigi alamanni castruccio castracani 1284-1328 it appears, dearest zanobi and luigi, a wonderful thing to those who have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; or have been aggrieved by fortune in some outrageous way. they have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to be sons of jove or of some other deity. it would be wearisome to relate who these persons may have been because they are well known to everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. i believe that these lowly beginnings of great men occur because fortune is desirous of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. castruccio castracani of lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will show. it appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because i have discerned in him such indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar to men. i think also that i ought to call your attention to his actions, because you of all men i know delight most in noble deeds. the family of castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families of lucca, but in the days of which i speak it had somewhat fallen in estate, as so often happens in this world. to this family was born a son antonio, who became a priest of the order of san michele of lucca, and for this reason was honoured with the title of messer antonio. he had an only sister, who had been married to buonaccorso cenami, but buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live with her brother. messer antonio had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have access to it without difficulty. one morning, shortly after sunrise, madonna dianora, as the sister of messer antonio was called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the cry of an infant. whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. partly wondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is customary, and showed it to messer antonio when he returned home. when he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised or compassionate than his sister. they discussed between themselves what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no children, they finally determined to bring it up. they had a nurse for it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. they baptized it, and gave it the name of castruccio after their father. as the years passed castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those lessons which messer antonio imparted to him. messer antonio intended to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with this object; but antonio discovered that the character of castruccio was quite unfitted for the priesthood. as soon as castruccio reached the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of messer antonio and madonna dianora and no longer to fear them; he left off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. in all exercises he far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty deeds of men. messer antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow. there lived in the city of lucca a gentleman of the guinigi family, named messer francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in lucca. he had often fought under the command of the visconti of milan, and as a ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in lucca. this gentleman resided in lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most mornings and evenings under the balcony of the podesta, which is at the top of the square of san michele, the finest square in lucca, and he had often seen castruccio taking part with other children of the street in those games of which i have spoken. noticing that castruccio far excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, messer francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of castruccio he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. therefore he called him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the services of the church. messer francesco could see that it pleased castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by messer francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and take up those of a soldier. this reply delighted messer francesco, and in a very short time he obtained the consent of messer antonio, who was driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not be able to hold him much longer. thus castruccio passed from the house of messer antonio the priest to the house of messer francesco guinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true gentleman. in the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others, and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. but what enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. these gifts made him beloved, not only by all the guinigi family, but by all lucca. when castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the ghibellines were driven from pavia by the guelphs, and messer francesco was sent by the visconti to assist the ghibellines, and with him went castruccio, in charge of his forces. castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in pavia, but throughout all lombardy. castruccio, having returned to lucca in far higher estimation than he left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary for that purpose. about this time messer francesco died, leaving a son thirteen years of age named pagolo, and having appointed castruccio to be his son's tutor and administrator of his estate. before he died francesco called castruccio to him, and prayed him to show pagolo that goodwill which he (francesco) had always shown to him, and to render to the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. upon the death of francesco, castruccio became the governor and tutor of pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and created a certain amount of envy against him in lucca in place of the former universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. among these the leading man was giorgio degli opizi, the head of the guelph party. this man hoped after the death of messer francesco to become the chief man in lucca, but it seemed to him that castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob castruccio of his eminence. castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that messer giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of king ruberto of naples and have him driven out of lucca. the lord of pisa at that time was uguccione of the faggiuola of arezzo, who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became their lord. there resided in paris some exiled ghibellines from lucca, with whom castruccio held communications with the object of effecting their restoration by the help of uguccione. castruccio also brought into his plans friends from lucca who would not endure the authority of the opizi. having fixed upon a plan to be followed, castruccio cautiously fortified the tower of the onesti, filling it with supplies and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few days in case of need. when the night came which had been agreed upon with uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed uguccione approached the gate of san piero and set fire to the portcullis. castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed messer giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. the governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the wishes of uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. of those who fled, part went to florence and part to pistoia, which city was the headquarters of the guelph party, and for this reason it became most hostile to uguccione and the lucchese. as it now appeared to the florentines and others of the guelph party that the ghibellines absorbed too much power in tuscany, they determined to restore the exiled guelphs to lucca. they assembled a large army in the val di nievole, and seized montecatini; from thence they marched to montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into lucca. upon this uguccione assembled his pisan and lucchese forces, and with a number of german cavalry which he drew out of lombardy, he moved against the quarters of the florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy withdrew from montecarlo, and posted themselves between montecatini and pescia. uguccione now took up a position near to montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. owing to the illness of uguccione, the pisans and lucchese delayed coming to battle with the enemy. uguccione, finding himself growing worse, went to montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army in the hands of castruccio. this change brought about the ruin of the guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. castruccio observed this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the camp to be used. on the other side, the guelphs grew more insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of castruccio. presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. first he spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. observing this order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy him. he then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the wings. thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. by this expedient the more valiant part of castruccio's men were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy's troops, and the most efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the florentines were unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance to their own flanks. so, without much difficulty, castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. the defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the guelph party in tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom were piero, the brother of king ruberto, and carlo, his nephew, and filippo, the lord of taranto. on the part of castruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was francesco, the son of uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the first onset. this victory so greatly increased the reputation of castruccio that uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it appeared to uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of power, but rather than diminished it. being of this mind, he only waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. this occurred on the death of pier agnolo micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of castruccio for refuge. on the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were driven off by castruccio, and the murderer escaped. this affair coming to the knowledge of uguccione, who was then at pisa, it appeared to him a proper opportunity to punish castruccio. he therefore sent for his son neri, who was the governor of lucca, and commissioned him to take castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. castruccio, fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. but neri, fearing to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions. ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once set out from pisa to lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created count gaddo della gherardesca their lord. before uguccione reached lucca he heard of the occurrences at pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the lucchese with the example of pisa before them should close their gates against him. but the lucchese, having heard of what had happened at pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of castruccio, notwithstanding that uguccione had arrived in their city. they first began to speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to uguccione and demanded that castruccio should be set at liberty. uguccione, fearing that worse might happen, released him from prison. whereupon castruccio gathered his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away with his friends to lombardy, to the lords of scale, where he died in poverty. but castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in lucca, and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. having obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of uguccione, and with the help of the pisans, with whom he had concluded a treaty, he marched to serezzana. to capture this place he constructed a fort against it, which is called to-day zerezzanello; in the course of two months castruccio captured the town. with the reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly seized massa, carrara, and lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the whole of lunigiana. in order to close the pass which leads from lombardy to lunigiana, he besieged pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of messer anastagio palavicini, who was the lord of it. after this victory he returned to lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. and now castruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord of lucca by the help of pazzino del poggio, puccinello dal portico, francesco boccansacchi, and cecco guinigi, all of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected prince by the people. at this time frederick of bavaria, the king of the romans, came into italy to assume the imperial crown, and castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at the head of five hundred horsemen. castruccio had left as his deputy in lucca, pagolo guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the people's love for the memory of his father. castruccio was received in great honour by frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, and he was appointed the emperor's lieutenant in tuscany. at this time the pisans were in great fear of gaddo della gherardesca, whom they had driven out of pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to frederick. frederick created castruccio the lord of pisa, and the pisans, in dread of the guelph party, and particularly of the florentines, were constrained to accept him as their lord. frederick, having appointed a governor in rome to watch his italian affairs, returned to germany. all the tuscan and lombardian ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to castruccio for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. among these exiles were matteo guidi, nardo scolari, lapo uberti, gerozzo nardi, and piero buonaccorsi, all exiled florentines and ghibellines. castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with messer matteo visconti, the prince of milan, and organized for him the forces of his city and the country districts. as lucca had five gates, he divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without those whom he could summon to his assistance from pisa. while he surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at messer matteo visconti was attacked by the guelphs of piacenza, who had driven out the ghibellines with the assistance of a florentine army and the king ruberto. messer matteo called upon castruccio to invade the florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be compelled to draw their army out of lombardy in order to defend themselves. castruccio invaded the valdarno, and seized fucecchio and san miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. whereupon the florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely reached tuscany, when castruccio was forced by other necessities to return to lucca. there resided in the city of lucca the poggio family, who were so powerful that they could not only elevate castruccio, but even advance him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited other families to rebel and to drive castruccio out of lucca. they found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the lieutenant whom castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. they endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but stefano di poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered to be their mediator with castruccio to obtain from him what they desired. therefore they laid down their arms with no greater intelligence than they had taken them up. castruccio, having heard the news of what had happened at lucca, at once put pagolo guinigi in command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home. contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. as it appeared to stefano that castruccio ought to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged castruccio to pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the obligations which castruccio was under to their house. to this castruccio graciously responded, and begged stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its inception. he encouraged stefano to bring his family to him, saying that he thanked god for having given him the opportunity of showing his clemency and liberality. upon the word of stefano and castruccio they surrendered, and with stefano were immediately thrown into prison and put to death. meanwhile the florentines had recovered san miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to castruccio to make peace, as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at lucca to leave him. he approached the florentines with the proposal of a truce, which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. a treaty was concluded with them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests they had made. castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his attention to affairs in lucca, and in order that he should not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to be trusted. then for his further security he raised a fortress in lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out of the state. whilst castruccio made peace with the florentines, and strengthened his position in lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of increasing his importance elsewhere. it appeared to him that if he could get possession of pistoia, he would have one foot in florence, which was his great desire. he, therefore, in various ways made friends with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in pistoia that both parties confided their secrets to him. pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into the bianchi and neri parties; the head of the bianchi was bastiano di possente, and of the neri, jacopo da gia. each of these men held secret communications with castruccio, and each desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many threatenings, they came to blows. jacopo fortified himself at the florentine gate, bastiano at that of the lucchese side of the city; both trusted more in castruccio than in the florentines, because they believed that castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than the florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. he gave promises to both, saying to bastiano that he would come in person, and to jacopo that he would send his pupil, pagolo guinigi. at the appointed time he sent forward pagolo by way of pisa, and went himself direct to pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and both were admitted as friends. thus the two leaders entered, and at a signal given by castruccio, one killed jacopo da gia, and the other bastiano di possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans of either faction. without further opposition pistoia passed into the hands of castruccio, who, having forced the signoria to leave the palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them many promises and remitting their old debts. the countryside flocked to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great valour. about this time great disturbances arose in rome, owing to the dearness of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at avignon. the german governor, enrico, was much blamed for what happened--murders and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an end to them. this caused enrico much anxiety lest the romans should call in ruberto, the king of naples, who would drive the germans out of the city, and bring back the pope. having no nearer friend to whom he could apply for help than castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only to give him assistance, but also to come in person to rome. castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold rome. leaving pagolo guinigi in command at lucca, castruccio set out for rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was received by enrico with the greatest distinction. in a short time the presence of castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of castruccio having sent by sea from the country round pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. when he had chastised some of the roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to enrico. castruccio received many honours, and was made a roman senator. this dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its front: "i am what god wills." whilst on the back was: "what god desires shall be." during this time the florentines, who were much enraged that castruccio should have seized pistoia during the truce, considered how they could tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult in his absence. among the exiled pistoians in florence were baldo cecchi and jacopo baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. these men kept up communications with their friends in pistoia, and with the aid of the florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out some of castruccio's officials and partisans, and killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. the news of this greatly angered castruccio, and taking leave of enrico, he pressed on in great haste to pistoia. when the florentines heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with their forces in the val di nievole, under the belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to pistoia. assembling a great army of the supporters of the guelph cause, the florentines entered the pistoian territories. on the other hand, castruccio reached montecarlo with his army; and having heard where the florentines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the pass of serravalle. he believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured, although he was informed that the florentines had thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. although he had every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. serravalle is a castle between pescia and pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the val di nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could hold it. the lord of serravalle was manfred, a german, who, before castruccio became lord of pistoia, had been allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to the lucchese and the pistoians, and unclaimed by either--neither of them wishing to displace manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. for these reasons, and also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his position. it was here that castruccio had determined to fall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they became engaged, they should not stand. as soon as this trouble with florence arose, castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle the night before the attack on the florentines, and the castellan put to death. castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away from pistoia into the val di nievole, therefore he did not move his army from montecarlo. thus the florentines hurried on until they reached their encampment under serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the following morning. in the meantime, castruccio had seized the castle at night, had also moved his army from montecarlo, and marching from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of serravalle: thus he and the florentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in the morning. castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the castle. the florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never expecting to find castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the castle. thus it happened that the florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of castruccio, and so close were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. it was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, although some few of them got through. when the noise of the fighting reached the florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. the cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were unable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought to be done or what could be done. in a short time the cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's infantry were scattered or killed without having made any effective defence because of their unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout resistance. retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their friends. when castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. these orders they carried out with such fury that the florentines could not sustain the attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. those in the rear turned towards pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man seeking only his own safety. the defeat was complete and very sanguinary. many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were bandini dei rossi, francesco brunelleschi, and giovanni della tosa, all florentine noblemen, with many tuscans and neapolitans who fought on the florentine side, having been sent by king ruberto to assist the guelphs. immediately the pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the friends of the guelphs, and surrendered to castruccio. he was not content with occupying prato and all the castles on the plains on both sides of the arno, but marched his army into the plain of peretola, about two miles from florence. here he remained many days, dividing the spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding horse races, and foot races for men and women. he also struck medals in commemoration of the defeat of the florentines. he endeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens of florence, who were to open the city gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were tommaso lupacci and lambertuccio frescobaldi. this defeat caused the florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys to king ruberto of naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the guelph cause was to him, accepted it. he agreed with the florentines to receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and he sent his son carlo to florence with four thousand horsemen. shortly after this the florentines were relieved in some degree of the pressure of castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave his positions before florence and march on pisa, in order to suppress a conspiracy that had been raised against him by benedetto lanfranchi, one of the first men in pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland should be under the dominion of the lucchese. he had formed this conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of castruccio, and drive out the garrison. as, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to castruccio. this betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to bonifacio cerchi and giovanni guidi, two florentine exiles who were suffering their banishment in pisa. thereupon castruccio seized benedetto and put him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their families into exile. it now appeared to castruccio that both pisa and pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the florentines their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of carlo, the son of the king of naples. when carlo arrived they decided to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called to their aid every guelph there was in italy. they consulted whether they should attack pistoia or pisa first, and decided that it would be better to march on the latter--a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed that the surrender of pistoia would follow the acquisition of pisa. in the early part of may 1328, the florentines put in motion this army and quickly occupied lastra, signa, montelupo, and empoli, passing from thence on to san miniato. when castruccio heard of the enormous army which the florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when fortune would deliver the empire of tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects of success, than at pisa or serravalle. he assembled twenty thousand foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to fucecchio, whilst he sent pagolo guinigi to pisa with five thousand infantry. fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers arno and gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain. moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the direction of lucca or pisa, nor could they get through to pisa, or attack castruccio's forces except at a disadvantage. in one case they would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his own command and the other under pagolo, and in the other case they would have to cross the arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, an undertaking of great hazard. in order to tempt the florentines to take this latter course, castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the river and placed them under the walls of fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of land between them and the river. the florentines, having occupied san miniato, held a council of war to decide whether they should attack pisa or the army of castruccio, and, having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the latter. the river arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the saddles of the horsemen. on the morning of 10 june 1328, the florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten thousand infantry. castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the florentines with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the arno. the infantry of the florentines were so much impeded by their arms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so fast that they could not move. when the florentine captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. these men were met at the bank by the forces which castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. the horses, alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and trampled each other in great confusion. the fight between the men of castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. the soldiers of castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river, whilst the florentines strove to get a footing on land in order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. castruccio shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had before conquered at serravalle, whilst the florentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the few. at length castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. this cleared a space of which the florentines at once took advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. but when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into the river. the cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any decisive advantage over the other, because castruccio, knowing his inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work of the cavalry. this fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. this they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. the florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of castruccio's army. but here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. thus the florentines were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them escaped, and castruccio was again covered with glory. many captains were taken prisoners, and carlo, the son of king ruberto, with michelagnolo falconi and taddeo degli albizzi, the florentine commissioners, fled to empoli. if the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. of the florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men. but fortune growing envious of the glory of castruccio took away his life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death could have stopped him. castruccio was in the thick of the battle the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and overheated, he stood at the gate of fucecchio to welcome his men on their return from victory and personally thank them. he was also on the watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. here castruccio stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. on the following night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must prove fatal. castruccio, therefore, called pagolo guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows: "if i could have believed that fortune would have cut me off in the midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my successes promised, i should have laboured less, and i should have left thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, because i should have been content with the governorships of lucca and pisa. i should neither have subjugated the pistoians, nor outraged the florentines with so many injuries. but i would have made both these peoples my friends, and i should have lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but one more secure and established on a surer foundation. but fortune, who insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time to surmount it. thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and i have never concealed it, how i entered the house of thy father whilst yet a boy--a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should feel--and how i was brought up by him, and loved as though i had been born of his blood; how under his governance i learned to be valiant and capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been witness. when thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, and i have brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with that care, which i was bound to show. and in order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained, i have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude which i owed to the children of thy father. thus i leave thee a vast estate, of which i am well content, but i am deeply concerned, inasmuch as i leave it thee unsettled and insecure. thou hast the city of lucca on thy hands, which will never rest contented under thy government. thou hast also pisa, where the men are of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under a lucchese. pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs recently inflicted upon them. thou hast for neighbours the offended florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than they would the acquisition of all tuscany. in the emperor and in the princes of milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. therefore, thou hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms with the florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. and whereas i have sought to make them my enemies, because i believed that war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring thee advantages and security. it is of the greatest important in this world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. and it will be well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what i have told thee is true. and thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that i have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it." after this there came to castruccio those citizens of pisa, pistoia, and lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he died. he left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he was. his obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried in san francesco at lucca. fortune was not so friendly to pagolo guinigi as she had been to castruccio, for he had not the abilities. not long after the death of castruccio, pagolo lost pisa, and then pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to lucca. this latter city continued in the family of guinigi until the time of the great-grandson of pagolo. from what has been related here it will be seen that castruccio was a man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, but also by those of an earlier date. in stature he was above the ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. he was of a gracious presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely left him displeased. his hair was inclined to be red, and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or snowed, he always went without a hat. he was delightful among friends, but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. no one was bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. he was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear nothing; that god is a lover of strong men, because one always sees that the weak are chastised by the strong. he was also wonderfully sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not angered with others did not show it to him. it has often happened that he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on the following occasions. he had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom castruccio had said: "you would not have given more than a penny." "that is true," answered the friend. then said castruccio to him: "a ducat is much less to me." having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: "fisherman are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that they may take a few little fishes, and i allow myself to be wetted by spittle that i may catch a whale"; and this was not only heard by castruccio with patience but rewarded. when told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, castruccio said: "if that be a vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our saints." passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen by castruccio, and said to him: "thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest into such places." a friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo and was told: "fool, do you think that i wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten." castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: "you are like the dogs who always run after those who will give them the best to eat," and was answered: "we are rather like the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest need of them." going by water from pisa to leghorn, castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear anything. castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since every man valued his soul for what is was worth. being asked by one what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: "when thou goest to a banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another." to a person who was boasting that he had read many things, castruccio said: "he knows better than to boast of remembering many things." someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. castruccio replied: "an ox does the same." castruccio was acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: "she has not taken me in, i have taken her." being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: "thou dost not spend as much as i do?" and being told that it was true, he continued: "then thou art more avaricious than i am gluttonous." being invited by taddeo bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by taddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. castruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon taddeo, and seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: "i knew not where to spit in order to offend thee less." being asked how caesar died he said: "god willing i will die as he did." being one night in the house of one of his gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual in one of his station, so he said: "he who is considered wise by day will not be considered a fool at night." a person came to demand a favour of castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by castruccio, said: "thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thy feet," whereupon he obtained double the favour he had asked. castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled blindfolded. being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous words, he said to him: "when you have another request to make, send someone else to make it." having been wearied by a similar man with a long oration who wound up by saying: "perhaps i have fatigued you by speaking so long," castruccio said: "you have not, because i have not listened to a word you said." he used to say of one who had been a beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he took the wives from their husbands. to an envious man who laughed, he said: "do you laugh because you are successful or because another is unfortunate?" whilst he was still in the charge of messer francesco guinigi, one of his companions said to him: "what shall i give you if you will let me give you a blow on the nose?" castruccio answered: "a helmet." having put to death a citizen of lucca who had been instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. castruccio praised greatly those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused when the time came. he said that it always struck him with surprise that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with only looking at her. he was once asked in what manner he would wish to be buried when he died, and answered: "with the face turned downwards, for i know when i am gone this country will be turned upside down." on being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared strange to him that fra lazerone should go to paradise and uguccione della faggiuola to the inferno. he was once asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, and replied: "if the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can." seeing one of his gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: "i pray god that you will let him feed you also." seeing that someone had written upon his house in latin the words: "may god preserve this house from the wicked," he said, "the owner must never go in." passing through one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door, and remarked: "that house will fly through the door." he was having a discussion with the ambassador of the king of naples concerning the property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. "is this king of yours a bad man or a good one?" asked castruccio, and was told that he was a good one, whereupon he said, "why should you suggest that i should be afraid of a good man?" i could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and weighty, but i think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his high qualities. he lived forty-four years, and was in every way a prince. and as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. as in his life he was inferior neither to philip of macedon, the father of alexander, nor to scipio of rome, so he died in the same year of his age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had fortune decreed that he should be born, not in lucca, but in macedonia or rome. the origin of the family private property and the state by frederick engels _translated by ernest untermann_ [illustration: logo] chicago charles h. kerr & company 1908 copyright, 1902 by charles h. kerr & company table of contents. page. translator's preface 5 author's prefaces 9-12 prehistoric stages 27 the family 35 the iroquois gens 102 the grecian gens 120 origin of the attic state 131 gens and state in rome 145 the gens among celts and germans 158 the rise of the state among germans 176 translator's preface. "an eternal being created human society as it is to-day, and submission to 'superiors' and 'authority' is imposed on the 'lower' classes by divine will." this suggestion, coming from pulpit, platform and press, has hypnotized the minds of men and proves to be one of the strongest pillars of exploitation. scientific investigation has revealed long ago that human society is not cast in a stereotyped mould. as organic life on earth assumes different shapes, the result of a succession of chemical changes, so the group life of human beings develops different social institutions as a result of increasing control over environment, especially of production of food, clothing and shelter. such is the message which the works of men like bachofen, morgan, marx, darwin, and others, brought to the human race. but this message never reached the great mass of humanity. in the united states the names of these men are practically unknown. their books are either out of print, as is the case with the fundamental works of morgan, or they are not translated into english. only a few of them are accessible to a few individuals on the dusty shelves of some public libraries. their message is dangerous to the existing order, and it will not do to give it publicity at a time when further intellectual progress of large bodies of men means the doom of the ruling class. the capitalist system has progressed so far, that all farther progress must bring danger to it and to those who are supreme through it. but the forces, which have brought about the present social order, continue their work regardless of the wishes of a few exploiters. a comprehensive work summarizing our present knowledge of the development of social institutions is, therefore, a timely contribution to socialist propaganda. in order to meet the requirements of socialists, such a summary must be written by a socialist. all the scientists who devoted themselves to the study of primeval society belonged to the privileged classes, and even the most radical of them, lewis morgan, was prevented by his environment from pointing out the one fact, the recognition of which distinguishes the socialist position from all others--the existence of a class struggle. the strongest allusion to this fact is found in the following passage of "ancient society": "property and office were the foundations upon which aristocracy planted itself. whether this principle shall live or die has been one of the great problems with which modern society has been engaged.... as a question between equal rights and unequal rights, between equal laws and unequal laws, between the rights of wealth, of rank and of official position, and the power of justice and intelligence, there can be little doubt of the ultimate result" (page 551). yet morgan held that "several thousand years have passed away without the overthrow of the privileged classes, excepting in the united states." but in the days of the trusts, of government by injunction, of sets of 400 with all the arrogance and exclusiveness of european nobility, of aristocratic branches of the daughters of the revolution, and other gifts of capitalist development, the modern american workingman will hardly share morgan's optimistic view that there are no privileged classes in the united states. it must be admitted, however, that to this day morgan's work is the most fundamental and exhaustive of any written on the subject of ancient social development. westermarck's "history of human marriage" treats the question mainly from the standpoint of ethnology and natural history. as a scientific treatise it is entirely inadequate, being simply a compilation of data from all parts of the world, arranged without the understanding of gentile organizations or of the materialistic conception of history, and used for wild speculations. kovalevsky's argument turns on the proposition that the patriarchal household is a typical stage of society, intermediate between the matriarchal and monogamic family. none of these men could discuss the matter from the proletarian point of view. for in order to do this, it is necessary to descend from the hills of class assumption into the valley of proletarian class-consciousness. this consciousness and the socialist mind are born together. the key to the philosophy of capitalism is the philosophy of socialism. with the rays of this searchlight, engels exposed the pious "deceivers," property and the state, and their "lofty" ideal, covetousness. and the monogamic family, so far from being a divinely instituted "union of souls," is seen to be the product of a series of material and, in the last analysis, of the most sordid motives. but the ethics of property are worthy of a system of production that, in its final stage, shuts the overwhelming mass of longing humanity out from the happiness of home and family life, from all evolution to a higher individuality, and even drives progress back and forces millions of human beings into irrevocable degeneration. the desire for a higher life cannot awake in a man, until he is thoroughly convinced that his present life is ugly, low, and capable of improvement by himself. the present little volume is especially adapted to assist the exploited of both sexes in recognizing the actual causes which brought about their present condition. by opening the eyes of the deluded throng and reducing the vaporings of their ignorant or selfish would-be leaders in politics and education to sober reality, it will show the way out of the darkness and mazes of slavish traditions into the light and freedom of a fuller life on earth. these are the reasons for introducing this little volume to english speaking readers. without any further apology, we leave them to its perusal and to their own conclusions. ernest untermann. chicago, august, 1902. author's preface to the first edition, 1884. the following chapters are, in a certain sense, executing a bequest. it was no less a man than karl marx who had reserved to himself the privilege of displaying the results of morgan's investigations in connection with his own materialistic conception of history--which i might call ours within certain limits. he wished thus to elucidate the full meaning of this conception. for in america, morgan had, in a manner, discovered anew the materialistic conception of history, originated by marx forty years ago. in comparing barbarism and civilization, he had arrived, in the main, at the same results as marx. and just as "capital" was zealously plagiarized and persistently passed over in silence by the professional economists in germany, so morgan's "ancient society"[1] was treated by the spokesmen of "prehistoric" science in england. my work can offer only a meager substitute for that which my departed friend was not destined to accomplish. but in his copious extracts from morgan, i have critical notes which i herewith reproduce as fully as feasible. according to the materialistic conception, the decisive element of history is pre-eminently the production and reproduction of life and its material requirements. this implies, on the one hand, the production of the means of existence (food, clothing, shelter and the necessary tools); on the other hand, the generation of children, the propagation of the species. the social institutions, under which the people of a certain historical period and of a certain country are living, are dependent on these two forms of production; partly on the development of labor, partly on that of the family. the less labor is developed, and the less abundant the quantity of its production and, therefore, the wealth of society, the more society is seen to be under the domination of sexual ties. however, under this formation based on sexual ties, the productivity of labor is developed more and more. at the same time, private property and exchange, distinctions of wealth, exploitation of the labor power of others and, by this agency, the foundation of class antagonism, are formed. these new elements of society strive in the course of time to adapt the old state of society to the new conditions, until the impossibility of harmonizing these two at last leads to a complete revolution. the old form of society founded on sexual relations is abolished in the clash with the recently developed social classes. a new society steps into being, crystallized into the state. the units of the latter are no longer sexual, but local groups; a society in which family relations are entirely subordinated to property relations, thereby freely developing those class antagonisms and class struggles that make up the contents of all written history up to the present time. morgan deserves great credit for rediscovering and re-establishing in its main outlines this foundation of our written history, and of finding in the sexual organizations of the north american indians the key that opens all the unfathomable riddles of most ancient greek, roman and german history. his book is not the work of a short day. for more than forty years he grappled with the subject, until he mastered it fully. therefore his work is one of the few epochal publications of our time. in the following demonstrations, the reader will, on the whole, easily distinguish what originated with morgan and what was added by myself. in the historical sections on greece and rome, i have not limited myself to morgan's material, but have added as much as i could supply. the sections on celts and germans essentially belong to me. morgan had only sources of minor quality at his disposal, and for german conditions--aside from tacitus--only the worthless, unbridled falsifications of freeman. the economic deductions, sufficient for morgan's purpose, but wholly inadequate for mine, were treated anew by myself. and lastly i am, of course, responsible for all final conclusions, unless morgan is expressly quoted. frederick engels. author's preface to the fourth edition, 1891. the first large editions of this work have been out of print for nearly six months, and the publisher has for some time requested of me the arrangement of a new edition. urgent duties have hitherto prevented me. seven years have passed, since the first edition made its appearance; during this time, the study of primeval forms of the family has made considerable progress. hence it became necessary to apply diligently the improving and supplementing hand, more especially, as the proposed stereotyping of the present text will make further changes impossible for some time. consequently, i have subjected the whole text to a thorough revision and made a number of additions which, i hope, will give due recognition to the present stage of scientific progress. furthermore, i give in the course of this preface a short synopsis of the history of the family as treated by various writers from bachofen to morgan. i am doing this mainly because the english prehistoric school, tinged with chauvinism, is continually doing its utmost to kill by its silence the revolution in primeval conceptions effected by morgan's discoveries. at the same time this school is not at all backward in appropriating to its own use the results of morgan's study. in certain other circles also this english example is unhappily followed rather extensively. my work has been translated into different languages. first into italian; l'origine della famiglia, della proprietá privata e dello stato, versione riveduta dall' autore, di pasquale martignetti; benevento, 1885. then into roumanian: origina familei, proprietatei private si a statului, traducere de ivan nadejde, in the jassy periodical "contemporanul," september, 1885, to may, 1886. furthermore into danish: familjens, privatejendommens og statens oprindelse, dansk, af forfatteren gennemgaaet udgave, besörget af gerson trier, kjoebenhavn, 1888. a french translation by henri ravé, founded on the present german edition, is under the press. up to the beginning of the sixties, a history of the family cannot be spoken of. this branch of historical science was then entirely under the influence of the decalogue. the patriarchal form of the family, described more exhaustively by moses than by anybody else, was not only, without further comment, considered as the most ancient, but also as identical with the family of our times. no historical development of the family was even recognized. at best it was admitted that a period of sexual license might have existed in primeval times. to be sure, aside from monogamy, oriental polygamy and indo-tibethan polyandry were known; but these three forms could not be arranged in any historical order and stood side by side without any connection. that some nations of ancient history and some savage tribes of the present day did not trace their descent to the father, but to the mother, hence considered the female lineage as alone valid; that many nations of our time prohibit intermarrying inside of certain large groups, the extent of which was not yet ascertained and that this custom is found in all parts of the globe--these facts were known, indeed, and more examples were continually collected. but nobody knew how to make use of them. even in e. b. taylor's "researches into the early history of mankind," etc. (1865), they are only mentioned as "queer customs" together with the usage of some savage tribes to prohibit the touching of burning wood with iron, tools, and similar religious absurdities. this history of the family dates from 1861, the year of the publication of bachofen's "mutterrecht" (maternal law). here the author makes the following propositions: 1. that in the beginning people lived in unrestricted sexual intercourse, which he dubs, not very felicitously, hetaerism. 2. that such an intercourse excludes any absolutely certain means of determining parentage; that consequently descent could only be traced by the female line in compliance with maternal law--and that this was universally practiced by all the nations of antiquity. 3. that consequently women as mothers, being the only well known parents of younger generations, received a high tribute of respect and deference, amounting to a complete women's rule (gynaicocracy), according to bachofen's idea. 4. that the transition to monogamy, reserving a certain woman exclusively to one man, implied the violation of a primeval religious law (i. e., practically a violation of the customary right of all other men to the same woman), which violation had to be atoned for or its permission purchased by the surrender of the women to the public for a limited time. bachofen finds the proofs of these propositions in numerous quotations from ancient classics, collected with unusual diligence. the transition from "hetaerism" to monogamy and from maternal to paternal law is accomplished according to him--especially by the greeks--through the evolution of religious ideas. new gods, the representatives of the new ideas, are added to the traditional group of gods, the representatives of old ideas; the latter are forced to the background more and more by the former. according to bachofen, therefore, it is not the development of the actual conditions of life that has effected the historical changes in the relative social positions of man and wife, but the religious reflection of these conditions in the minds of men. hence bachofen represents the oresteia of aeschylos as the dramatic description of the fight between the vanishing maternal and the paternal law, rising and victorious during the time of the heroes. klytaemnestra has killed her husband agamemnon on his return from the trojan war for the sake of her lover aegisthos; but orestes, her son by agamemnon, avenges the death of his father by killing his mother. therefore he is persecuted by the erinyes, the demonic protectors of maternal law, according to which the murder of a mother is the most horrible, inexpiable crime. but apollo, who has instigated orestes to this act by his oracle, and athene, who is invoked as arbitrator--the two deities representing the new paternal order of things--protect him. athene gives a hearing to both parties. the whole question is summarized in the ensuing debate between orestes and the erinyes. orestes claims that klytemnaestra has committed a twofold crime: by killing her husband she has killed his father. why do the erinyes persecute him and not her who is far more guilty? the reply is striking: "she was not related by blood to the man whom she slew." the murder of a man not consanguineous, even though he be the husband of the murderess, is expiable, does not concern the erinyes; it is only their duty to prosecute the murder of consanguineous relatives. according to maternal law, therefore, the murder of a mother is the most heinous and inexpiable crime. now apollo speaks in defense of orestes. athene then calls on the areopagites--the jurors of athens--to vote; the votes are even for acquittal and for condemnation. thereupon athene as president of the jury casts her vote in favor of orestes and acquits him. paternal law has gained a victory over maternal law, the deities of the "younger generation," as the erinyes call them, vanquish the latter. these are finally persuaded to accept a new office under the new order of things. this new, but decidedly accurate interpretation of the oresteia is one of the most beautiful and best passages in the whole book, but it proves at the same time that bachofen himself believes as much in the erinyes, in apollo and in athene, as aeschylos did in his day. he really believes, that they performed the miracle of securing the downfall of maternal law through paternal law during the time of the greek heroes. that a similar conception, representing religion as the main lever of the world's history, must finally lead to sheer mysticism, is evident. therefore it is a troublesome and not always profitable task to work your way through the big volume of bachofen. still, all this does not curtail the value of his fundamental work. he was the first to replace the assumption of an unknown primeval condition of licentious sexual intercourse by the demonstration that ancient classical literature points out a multitude of traces proving the actual existence among greeks and asiatics of other sexual relations before monogamy. these relations not only permitted a man to have intercourse with several women, but also left a woman free to have sexual intercourse with several men without violating good morals. this custom did not disappear without leaving as a survival the form of a general surrender for a limited time by which women had to purchase the right of monogamy. hence descent could originally only be traced by the female line, from mother to mother. the sole legality of the female line was preserved far into the time of monogamy with assured, or at least acknowledged, paternity. consequently, the original position of the mothers as the sole absolutely certain parents of their children secured for them and for all other women a higher social level than they have ever enjoyed since. although bachofen, biased by his mystic conceptions, did not formulate these propositions so clearly, still he proved their correctness. this was equivalent to a complete revolution in 1861. bachofen's big volume was written in german, i. e., in the language of a nation that cared less than any other of its time for the history of the present family. therefore he remained unknown. the man next succeeding him in the same field made his appearance in 1865 without having ever heard of bachofen. this successor was j. f. mclennan, the direct opposite of his predecessor. instead of the talented mystic, we have here the dry jurist; in place of the rank growth of poetical imagination, we find the plausible combinations of the pleading lawyer. mclennan finds among many savage, barbarian and even civilized people of ancient and modern times a type of marriage forcing the bride-groom, alone or in co-operation with his friends, to go through the form of a mock forcible abduction of the bride. this must needs be a survival of an earlier custom when men of one tribe actually secured their wives by forcible abduction from another tribe. how did this "robber marriage" originate? as long as the men could find women enough in their own tribe, there was no occasion for robbing. it so happens that we frequently find certain groups among undeveloped nations (which in 1865 were often considered identical with the tribes themselves), inside of which intermarrying was prohibited. in consequence the men (or women) of a certain group were forced to choose their wives (or husbands) outside of their group. other tribes again observe the custom of forcing their men to choose their women inside of their own group only. mclennan calls the first exogamous, the second endogamous, and construes forthwith a rigid contrast between exogamous and endogamous "tribes." and though his own investigation of exogamy makes it painfully obvious that this contrast in many, if not in most or even in all cases, exists in his own imagination only, he nevertheless makes it the basis of his entire theory. according to the latter, exogamous tribes can choose their women only from other tribes. and as in conformity with their savage state a condition of continual warfare existed among such tribes, women could only be secured by abduction. mclennan further asks: whence this custom of exogamy? the idea of consanguinity and rape could not have anything to do with it, since these conceptions were developed much later. but it was a widely spread custom among savages to kill female children immediately after their birth. this produced a surplus of males in such a tribe which naturally resulted in the condition where several men had one woman--polyandry. the next consequence was that the mother of a child could be ascertained, but not its father; hence: descent only traced by the female line and exclusion of male lineage--maternal law. and a second consequence of the scarcity of women in a certain tribe--a scarcity that was somewhat mitigated, but not relieved by polyandry--was precisely the forcible abduction of women from other tribes. "as exogamy and polyandry are referable to one and the same cause--a want of balance between the sexes--we are forced to regard all the exogamous races as having originally been polyandrous.... therefore we must hold it to be beyond dispute that among exogamous races the first system of kinship was that which recognized blood-ties through mothers only."[2] it is the merit of mclennan to have pointed out the general extent and the great importance of what he calls exogamy. however, he has by no means discovered the fact of exogamous groups; neither did he understand their presence. aside from earlier scattered notes of many observers--from which mclennan quoted--latham had accurately and correctly described this institution among the indian magars[3] and stated that it was widespread and practiced in all parts of the globe. mclennan himself quotes this passage. as early as 1847, our friend morgan had also pointed out and correctly described the same custom in his letters on the iroquois (in the american review) and in 1851 in "the league of the iroquois." we shall see, how the lawyer's instinct of mclennan has introduced more disorder into this subject than the mystic imagination of bachofen did into the field of maternal law. it must be said to mclennan's credit that he recognized the custom of tracing decent by maternal law as primeval, although bachofen has anticipated him in this respect. mclennan has admitted this later on. but here again he is not clear on the subject. he always speaks of "kinship through females only" and uses this expression, correctly applicable to former stages, in connection with later stages of development, when descent and heredity were still exclusively traced along female lines, but at the same time kinship on the male side began to be recognized and expressed. it is the narrow-mindedness of the jurist, establishing a fixed legal expression and employing it incessantly to denote conditions to which it should no longer be applied. in spite of its plausibility, mclennan's theory did not seem too well founded even in the eyes of its author. at least he finds it remarkable himself "that the form of capture is now most distinctly marked and impressive just among those races which have male kinship."[4] and again: "it is a curious fact that nowhere now, that we are aware of, is infanticide a system where exogamy and the earliest form of kinship co-exists."[5] both these facts directly disprove his method of explanation, and he can only meet them with new and still more complicated hypotheses. in spite of this, his theory found great approval and favor in england. here mclennan was generally considered as the founder of the history of the family and as the first authority on this subject. his contrast of exogamous and endogamous "tribes" remained the recognized foundation of the customary views, however much single exceptions and modifications were admitted. this antithesis became the eye-flap that rendered impossible any free view of the field under investigation and, therefore, any decided progress. it is our duty to confront this overrating of mclennan, practised in england and copied elsewhere, with the fact that he has done more harm with his ill-conceived contrast of exogamous and endogamous tribes than he has done good by his investigations. moreover, in the course of time more and more facts became known that did not fit into his neat frame. mclennan knew only three forms of marriage: polygamy, polyandry and monogamy. but once attention had been directed to this point, then more and more proofs were found that among undeveloped nations there were connubial forms in which a group of men possessed a group of women. lubbock in his "origin of civilization" (1870) recognized this "communal marriage" as a historical fact. immediately after him, in 1871, morgan appeared with fresh and, in many respects, conclusive material. he had convinced himself that the peculiar system of kinship in vogue among the iroquois was common to all the aborigines of the united states, and practised all over the continent, although it was in direct contradiction with all the degrees of relation arising from the connubial system in practice there. he prevailed on the federal government to collect information on the systems of kinship of other nations by the help of question blanks and tables drawn up by himself. the answers brought the following results: 1. the kinship system of the american indians is also in vogue in asia, and in a somewhat modified form among numerous tribes of africa and australia. 2. this system finds a complete explanation in a certain form of communal marriage now in process of decline in hawaii and some australian islands. 3. by the side of this marital form, there is in practice on the same islands a system of kinship only explicable by a still more primeval and now extinct form of communal marriage. the collected data and the conclusions of morgan were published in his "systems of consanguinity and affinity," 1871, and discussion transferred to a far more extensive field. taking his departure from the system of affinity he reconstructed the corresponding forms of the family, thereby opening a new road to scientific investigation and extending the retrospective view into prehistoric periods of human life. once this view gained recognition, then the frail structure of mclennan, would vanish into thin air. mclennan defended his theory in the new edition of "primitive marriage" (studies in ancient history, 1875). while he himself most artificially combines into a history of the family a number of hypotheses, he not only demands proofs from lubbock and morgan for every one of their propositions, but insists on proofs of such indisputable validity as is solely recognized in a scotch court. and this is done by the same man who unhesitatingly concludes that the following people practiced polyandry: the germans, on account of the intimate relation between uncle and nephew (mother's brother and sister's son); the britons, because cesar reports that the britons have ten to twelve women in common; barbarians, because all other reports of the old writers on community of women are misinterpreted by him! one is reminded of a prosecuting attorney who takes all possible liberty in making up his case, but who demands the most formal and legally valid proof for every word of the lawyer for the defense. he asserts that communal marriage is purely the outgrowth of imagination, and in so doing falls far behind bachofen. he represents morgan's systems of affinity as mere codes of conventional politeness, proven by the fact that indians address also strangers, white people, as brother or father. this is like asserting that the terms father, mother, brother, sister are simply meaningless forms of address, because catholic priests and abbesses are also addressed as father and mother, and monks and nuns, or even free-masons and members of english professional clubs in solemn session, as brother and sister. in short, mclennan's defense was extremely weak. one point still remained that had not been attacked. the contrast of exogamous and endogamous tribes, on which his whole system was founded, was not only left unchallenged, but was even generally regarded as the pivotal point of the entire history of the family. it was admitted that mclennan's attempt to explain this contrast was insufficient and in contradiction with the facts enumerated by himself. but the contrast itself, the existence of two diametrically opposed forms of independent and absolute groups, one of them marrying the women of its own group, the other strictly forbidding this habit, was considered irrefutable gospel. compare e. g. giraud-teulon's "origines de la famille" (1874) and even lubbock's "origin of civilization" (4th edition, 1882). at this point morgan's main work, "ancient society" (1877), inserts its lever. it is this work on which the present volume is based. here we find clearly demonstrated what was only dimly perceived by morgan in 1871. there is no antithesis between endogamy and exogamy; no exogamous "tribes" have been found up to the present time. but at the time when communal marriage still existed--and in all probability it once existed everywhere--a tribe was subdivided into a number of groups--"gentes"--consanguineous on the mother's side, within which intermarrying was strictly forbidden. the men of a certain "gens," therefore, could choose their wives within the tribe, and did so as a rule, but had to choose them outside of the "gens." and while thus the "gens" was strictly exogamous, the tribe comprising an aggregate of "gentes" was equally endogamous. this fact gave the final blow to mclennan's artificial structure. but morgan did not rest here. the "gens" of the american indians furthermore assisted him in gaining another important step in the field under investigation. he found that this "gens," organized in conformity with maternal law, was the original form out of which later on the "gens" by paternal law developed, such as we find it among the civilized nations of antiquity. the greek and roman "gens," an unsolved riddle to all historians up to our time, found its explanation in the indian "gens." a new foundation was discovered for the entire primeval history. the repeated discovery that the original maternal "gens" was a preliminary stage of the paternal "gens" of civilized nations has the same signification for primeval history that darwin's theory of evolution had for biology and marx's theory of surplus value for political economy. morgan was thereby enabled to sketch the outline of a history of the family, showing in bold strokes at least the classic stages of development, so far as the available material will at present permit such a thing. it is clearly obvious that this marks a new epoch in the treatment of primeval history. the maternal "gens" has become the pivot on which this whole science revolves. since its discovery we know in what direction to continue our researches, what to investigate and how to arrange the results of our studies. in consequence, progress in this field is now much more rapid than before the publication of morgan's book. the discoveries of morgan are now universally recognized, or rather appropriated, even by the archaeologists of england. but hardly one of them openly admits that we owe this revolution of thought to morgan. his book is ignored in england as much as possible, and he himself is dismissed with condescending praise for the excellence of his former works. the details of his discussion are diligently criticised, but his really great discoveries are covered up obstinately. the original edition of "ancient society" is out of print; there is no paying market for a work of this kind in america; in england, it appears, the book was systematically suppressed, and the only edition of this epochal work still circulating in the market is--the german translation. whence this reserve? we can hardly refrain from calling it a conspiracy to kill by silence, especially in view of the numerous meaningless and polite quotations and of other manifestations of fellowship in which the writings of our recognized archaeologists abound. is it because morgan is an american, and because it is rather hard on the english archaeologists to be dependent on two talented foreigners like bachofen and morgan for the outlines determining the arrangement and grouping of their material, in spite of all praiseworthy diligence in accumulating material. they could have borne with the german, but an american? in face of an american, every englishman becomes patriotic. i have seen amusing illustrations of this fact in the united states. moreover, it must be remembered that mclennan was, so to say, the official founder and leader of the english prehistoric school. it was almost a requirement of good prehistoric manners to refer in terms of highest admiration to his artificial construction of history leading from infanticide through polyandry and abduction to maternal law. the least doubt in the strictly independent existence of exogamous and endogamous tribes was considered a frivolous sacrilege. according to this view, morgan, in reducing all these sacred dogmas to thin air, committed an act of wanton destruction. and worse still, his mere manner of reducing them sufficed to show their instability, so that the admirers of mclennan, who hitherto had been stumbling about helplessly between exogamy and endogamy, were almost forced to slap their foreheads and exclaim: "how silly of us, not to have found that out long ago!" just as if morgan had not committed crimes enough against the official archaeologists to justify them in discarding all fair methods and assuming an attitude of cool neglect, he persisted in filling their cup to overflowing. not only does he criticise civilization, the society of production for profit, the fundamental form of human society, in a manner savoring of fourier, but he also speaks of a future reorganization of society in language that karl marx might have used. consequently, he receives his just deserts, when mclennan indignantly charges him with a profound antipathy against historical methods, and when professor giraud-teulon of geneva endorses the same view in 1884. for was not the same professor giraud-teulon still wandering about aimlessly in the maze of mclennan's exogamy in 1874 (origines de la famille)? and was it not morgan who finally had to set him free? it is not necessary to dwell in this preface on the other forms of progress which primeval history owes to morgan. reference to them will be found in the course of my work. during the fourteen years that have elapsed since the publication of his main work, the material contributing to the history of primeval society has been considerably enriched. anthropologists, travelers and professional historians were joined by comparative jurists who added new matter and opened up new points of view. here and there, some special hypothesis of morgan has been shaken or even become obsolete. but in no instance has the new material led to a weakening of his leading propositions. the order he established in primeval history still holds good in its main outlines to this day. we may even say that this order receives recognition in the exact degree, in which the authorship of this great progress is concealed. london, june 16th, 1891. frederick engels. footnotes: [1] ancient society or researches in the lines of human progress from savagery, through barbarism, to civilization. by lewis h. morgan. henry holt & co. 1877. the book, printed in america, was singularly difficult to obtain in london. the author died a few years ago. [2] mclennan, studies in ancient history, 1886. primitive marriage, p. 124. [3] latham, descriptive ethnology, 1859. [4] mclennan, studies in ancient history, 1886. primitive marriage, p. 140. [5] ibidem, p. 146. the origin of the family chapter i. prehistoric stages. morgan was the first to make an attempt at introducing a logical order into the history of primeval society. until considerably more material is obtained, no further changes will be necessary and his arrangement will surely remain in force. of the three main epochs--savagery, barbarism and civilization--naturally only the first two and the transition to the third required his attention. he subdivided each of these into a lower, middle and higher stage, according to the progress in the production of the means of sustenance. his reason for doing so is that the degree of human supremacy over nature is conditioned on the ability to produce the necessities of life. for of all living beings, man alone has acquired an almost unlimited control over food production. all great epochs of human progress, according to morgan, coincide more or less directly with times of greater abundance in the means that sustain life. the evolution of the family proceeds in the same measure without, however, offering equally convenient marks for sub-division. i. savagery. 1. lower stage. infancy of the human race. human beings still dwelt in their original habitation, in tropical or subtropical forests. they lived at least part of the time in trees, for only in this way they could escape the attacks of large beasts of prey and survive. fruit, nuts, and roots served as food. the formation of articulated speech is the principal result of this period. not a single one of all the nations that have become known in historic times dates back to this primeval stage. although the latter may extend over thousands of years, we have no means of proving its existence by direct evidence. but once the descent of man from the animal kingdom is acknowledged, the acceptance of this stage of transition becomes inevitable. 2. middle stage: commencing with the utilization of fish (including crabs, mollusks and other aquatic animals) and the use of fire. both these things belong together, because fish becomes thoroughly palatable by the help of fire only. with this new kind of food, human beings became completely independent of climate and locality. following the course of rivers and coastlines, they could spread over the greater part of the earth even in the savage state. the so-called palaeolithic implements of the early stone age, made of rough, unsharpened stones, belong almost entirely to this period. their wide distribution over all the continents testifies to the extent of these wanderings. the unceasing bent for discovery, together with the possession of fire gained by friction, created new products in the lately occupied regions. such were farinaceous roots and tubers, baked in hot ashes or in baking pits (ground ovens). when the first weapons, club and spear, were invented, venison was occasionally added to the bill of fare. nations subsisting exclusively by hunting, such as we sometimes find mentioned in books, have never existed; for the proceeds of hunting are too uncertain. in consequence of continued precariousness of the sources of sustenance, cannibalism seems to arise at this stage. it continues in force for a long while. even in our day, australians and polynesians still remain in this middle stage of savagery. 3. higher stage: coming with the invention of bow and arrow, this stage makes venison a regular part of daily fare and hunting a normal occupation. bow, arrow and cord represent a rather complicated instrument, the invention of which presupposes a long and accumulated experience and increased mental ability; incidentally they are conditioned on the acquaintance with a number of other inventions. in comparing the nations that are familiar with the use of bow and arrow, but not yet with the art of pottery (from which morgan dates the transition to barbarism), we find among them the beginnings of village settlements, a control of food production, wooden vessels and utensils, weaving of bast fibre by hand (without a loom), baskets made of bast or reeds, and sharpened (neolithic) stone implements. generally fire and the stone ax have also furnished the dugout and, here and there, timbers and boards for house-building. all these improvements are found, e. g., among the american indians of the northwest, who use bow and arrows, but know nothing as yet about pottery. bow and arrows were for the stage of savagery what the iron sword was for barbarism and the fire-arm for civilization; the weapon of supremacy. ii. barbarism. 1. lower stage. dates from the introduction of the art of pottery. the latter is traceable in many cases, and probably attributable in all cases, to the custom of covering wooden or plaited vessels with clay in order to render them fire-proof. it did not take long to find out that moulded clay served the same purpose without a lining of other material. hitherto we could consider the course of evolution as being equally characteristic, in a general way, for all the nations of a certain period, without reference to locality. but with the beginning of barbarism, we reach a stage where the difference in the natural resources of the two great bodies of land makes itself felt. the salient features of this stage of barbarism is the taming and raising of animals and the cultivation of plants. now the eastern body of land, the so-called old world, contained nearly all the tamable animals and all the cultivable species of grain but one; while the western continent, america, possessed only one tamable mammal, the llama (even this only in a certain part of the south), and only one, although the best, species of grain: the corn. from now on, these different conditions of nature lead the population of each hemisphere along divergent roads, and the landmarks on the boundaries of the various stages differ in both cases. 2. middle stage. commencing in the east with the domestication of animals, in the west with the cultivation and irrigation of foodplants; also with the use of adobes (bricks baked in the sun) and stones for buildings. we begin in the west, because there this stage was never outgrown up to the time of the conquest by europeans. at the time of their discovery, the indians in the lower stage of barbarism (all those living east of the mississippi) carried on cultivation on a small scale in gardens. corn, and perhaps also pumpkins, melons and other garden truck were raised. a very essential part of their sustenance was produced in this manner. they lived in wooden houses, in fortified villages. the tribes of the northwest, especially those of the region along the columbia river, were still in the higher stage of savagery, ignorant of pottery and of any cultivation of plants whatever. but the so-called pueblo indians in new mexico, the mexicans, central-americans and peruvians, were in the middle-stage of barbarism. they lived in fortlike houses of adobe or stone, cultivated corn and other plants suitable to various conditions of localities and climate in artificially irrigated gardens that represented the main source of nourishment, and even kept a few tamed animals--the mexicans the turkey and other birds, the peruvians the llama. furthermore they were familiar with the use of metals--iron excepted, and for this reason they could not get along yet without stone weapons and stone implements. the conquest by the spaniards cut short all further independent development. in the east, the middle stage of barbarism began with the taming of milk and meat producing animals, while the cultivation of plants seems to have remained unknown far into this period. it appears that the taming and raising of animals and the formation of large herds gave rise to the separation of aryans and semites from the rest of the barbarians. names of animals are still common to the languages of european and asian aryans, while this is almost never the case with the names of cultivated plants. in suitable localities, the formation of herds led to a nomadic life, as with the semites in the grassy plains of the euphrates and tigris, the aryans in the plains of india, of the oxus, jaxartes, don and dnieper. along the borders of such pasture lands, the taming of animals must have been accomplished first. but later generations conceived the mistaken idea that the nomadic tribes had their origin in regions supposed to be the cradle of humanity, while in reality their savage ancestors and even people in the lower stage of barbarism would have found these regions almost unfit for habitation. on the other hand, once these barbarians of the middle stage were accustomed to nomadic life, nothing could have induced them to return voluntarily from the grassy river plains to the forests that had been the home of their ancestors. even when semites and aryans were forced further to the north and west, it was impossible for them to occupy the forest regions of western asia and europe, until they were enabled by agriculture to feed their animals on this less favorable soil and especially to maintain them during the winter. it is more than probable that the cultivation of grain was due primarily to the demand for stock feed, and became an important factor of human sustenance at a later period. the superior development of aryans and semites is, perhaps, attributable to the copious meat and milk diet of both races, more especially to the favorable influence of such food on the growth of children. as a matter of fact, the pueblo indians of new mexico who live on an almost purely vegetarian diet, have a smaller brain than the indians in the lower stage of barbarism who eat more meat and fish. at any rate, cannibalism gradually disappears at this stage and is maintained only as a religious observance or, what is here nearly identical, as a magic remedy.[6] 3. higher stage. beginning with the melting of iron ore and merging into civilization by the invention of letter script and its utilization for writing records. this stage which is passed independently only on the eastern hemisphere, is richer in improvements of production than all preceding stages together. it is the stage of the greek heroes, the italian tribes shortly before the foundation of rome, the germans of tacitus, the norsemen of the viking age. we are here confronted for the first time with the iron ploughshare drawn by animals, rendering possible agriculture on a large scale, in fields, and hence a practically unlimited increase in the production of food for the time being. the next consequence is the clearing of forests and their transformation into arable land and meadows--which process, however, could not be continued on a larger scale without the help of the iron ax and the iron spade. naturally, these improvements brought a more rapid increase of population and a concentration of numbers into a small area. before the time of field cultivation a combination of half a million of people under one central management could have been possible only under exceptionally favorable conditions; most likely this was never the case. the greatest attainments of the higher stage of barbarism are presented in homer's poems, especially in the iliad. improved iron tools; the bellows; the hand-mill; the potter's wheel; the preparation of oil and wine; a well developed fashioning of metals verging on artisanship; the wagon and chariot; ship-building with beams and boards; the beginning of artistic architecture; towns surrounded by walls with turrets and battlements; the homeric epos and the entire mythology--these are the principal bequests transmitted by the greeks from barbarism to civilization. in comparing these attainments with the description given by cesar or even tacitus of germans, who were in the beginning of the same stage of evolution which the greeks were preparing to leave for a higher one, we perceive the wealth of productive development comprised in the higher stage of barbarism. the sketch which i have here produced after morgan of the evolution of the human race through savagery and barbarism to the beginning of civilization is even now rich in new outlines. more still, these outlines are incontrovertible, because traced directly from production. nevertheless, this sketch will appear faint and meagre in comparison to the panorama unrolled to our view at the end of our pilgrimage. not until then will it be possible to show in their true light both the transition from barbarianism to civilization and the striking contrast between them. for the present we can summarize morgan's arrangement in the following manner: savagery--time of predominating appropriation of finished natural products; human ingenuity invents mainly tools useful in assisting this appropriation. barbarism--time of acquiring the knowledge of cattle raising, of agriculture and of new methods for increasing the productivity of nature by human agency. civilization: time of learning a wider utilization, of natural products, of manufacturing and of art. footnote: [6] translator's note. advocates of vegetarianism may, of course, challenge this statement and show that all the testimony of anthropology is not in favor of the meat-eaters. it must also be admitted that diet is not the only essential factor in environment which influences the development of races. and there is no conclusive evidence to prove the absolute superiority of one diet over another. neither have we any proofs that cannibalism ever was in general practice. it rather seems to have been confined to limited groups of people in especially ill-favored localities or to times of great scarcity of food. hence we can neither refer to cannibalism as a typical stage in human history, nor are we obliged to accept the vegetarian hypothesis of a transition from a meat diet to a plant diet as a condition sine qua non of higher human development. chapter ii. the family. morgan, who spent the greater part of his life among the iroquois in the state of new york and who had been adopted into one of their tribes, the senecas, found among them a system of relationship that was in contradiction with their actual family relations. among them existed what morgan terms the syndyasmian or pairing family, a monogamous state easily dissolved by either side. the offspring of such a couple was identified and acknowledged by all the world. there could be no doubt to whom to apply the terms father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister. but the actual use of these words was not in keeping with their fundamental meaning. for the iroquois addresses as sons and daughters not only his own children, but also those of his brothers; and he is called father by all of them. but the children of his sisters he calls nephews and nieces, and they call him uncle. vice versa, an iroquois woman calls her own children as well as those of her sisters sons and daughters and is addressed as mother by them. but the children of her brothers are called nephews and nieces, and they call her aunt. in the same way, the children of brothers call one another brothers and sisters, and so do the children of sisters. but the children of a sister call those of her brother cousins, and vice versa. and these are not simply meaningless terms, but expressions of actually existing conceptions of proximity and remoteness, equality or inequality of consanguinity. these conceptions serve as the fundament of a perfectly elaborated system of relationship, capable of expressing several hundred different relations of a single individual. more still, this system is not only fully accepted by all american indians--no exception has been found so far--but it is also in use with hardly any modifications among the original inhabitants of india, among the dravidian tribes of the dekan and the gaura tribes of hindostan. the terms of relationship used by the tamils of southern india and by the seneca-iroquois of new york state are to this day identical for more than two hundred different family relations. and among these east indian tribes also, as among all american indians, the relations arising out of the prevailing form of the family are not in keeping with the system of kinship. how can this be explained? in view of the important role played by kinship in the social order of all the savage and barbarian races, the significance of such a widespread system cannot be obliterated by phrases. a system that is generally accepted in america, that also exists in asia among people of entirely different races, that is frequently found in a more or less modified form all over africa and australia, such a system requires a historical explanation and cannot be talked down, as was attempted, e. g., by mclennan. the terms father, child, brother, sister are more than mere honorary titles; they carry in their wake certain well-defined and very serious obligations, the aggregate of which comprises a very essential part of the social constitution of those nations. and the explanation was found. in the sandwich islands (hawaii) there existed up to the first half of the nineteenth century a family form producing just such fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, nephews and nieces, as the old indo-american system of kinship. but how remarkable! the hawaiian system of kinship again did not agree with the family form actually prevailing there. for there all the children of brothers and sisters, without any exception, are considered brothers and sisters, and regarded as the common children not only of their mother or her sisters, or their father and his brothers, but of all the brothers and sisters of their parents without distinction. while thus the american system of kinship presupposes an obsolete primitive form of the family, which is still actually existing in hawaii, the hawaiian system on the other hand points to a still more primitive form of the family, the actual existence of which cannot be proved any more, but which must have existed, because otherwise such a system of kinship could not have arisen. according to morgan, the family is the active element; it is never stationary, but in progression from a lower to a higher form in the same measure in which society develops from a lower to a higher stage. but the systems of kinship are passive. only in long intervals they register the progress made by the family in course of time, and only then are they radically changed, when the family has done so. "and," adds marx, "it is the same with political, juridical, religious and philosophical systems in general." while the family keeps on growing, the system of kinship becomes ossified. the latter continues in this state and the family grows beyond it. with the same certainty which enabled cuvier to conclude from some bones of marsupialia found near paris that extinct marsupialia had lived there, with this same certainty may we conclude from a system of kinship transmitted by history that the extinct form of the family corresponding to this system was once in existence. the systems of kinship and forms of the family just mentioned differ from the present systems in that every child has several fathers and mothers. under the american system to which the hawaiian system corresponds, brother and sister cannot be father and mother of the same child; but the hawaiian system presupposes a family, in which, on the contrary, this was the rule. we are here confronted by a series of family forms that are in direct contradiction with those that were currently regarded as alone prevailing. the conventional conception knows only monogamy, furthermore polygamy of one man, eventually also polyandry of one woman. but it passes in silence, as is meet for a moralizing philistine, that the practice silently but without compunction supersedes these barriers sanctioned officially by society. the study of primeval history, however, shows us conditions, where men practiced polygamy and women at the same time polyandry, so that their children were considered common to all; conditions that up to their final transition into monogamy underwent a whole series of modifications. these modifications slowly and gradually contract the circle comprised by the common tie of marriage until only the single couple remains which prevails to-day. in thus constructing backward the history of the family, morgan, in harmony with the majority of his colleagues, arrives at a primeval condition, where unrestricted sexual intercourse existed within a tribe, so that every woman belonged to every man, and vice versa. much has been said about this primeval state of affairs since the eighteenth century, but only in general commonplaces. it is one of bachofen's great merits to have taken the subject seriously and to have searched for traces of this state in historical and religious traditions. to-day we know that these traces, found by him, do not lead back to a stage of unlimited sexual intercourse, but to a much later form, the group marriage. the primeval stage, if it really ever existed, belongs to so remote a period, that we can hardly expect to find direct proofs of its former existence among these social fossils, backward savages. bachofen's merit consists in having brought this question to the fore.[7] it has lately become a fashion to deny the existence of this early stage of human sex life, in order to spare us this "shame." apart from the absence of all direct proof, the example of the rest of animal life is invoked. from the latter, letourneau (evolution du mariage et de la famille, 1888) quoted numerous facts, alleged to prove that among animals also an absolutely unlimited sexual intercourse belongs to a lower stage. but i can only conclude from all these facts that they prove absolutely nothing for man and the primeval conditions of his life. the mating of vertebrates for a lengthy term is sufficiently explained by physiological causes, e. g., among birds by the helplessness of the female during brooding time. examples of faithful monogamy among birds do not furnish any proofs for men, for we are not descended from birds. and if strict monogamy is the height of virtue, then the palm belongs to the tapeworm that carries a complete male and female sexual apparatus in each of its 50 to 200 sections and passes its whole lifetime in fertilizing itself in every one of its sections. but if we confine ourselves to mammals, we find all forms of sexual intercourse, license, suggestions of group marriage, polygamy and monogamy. only polyandry is missing;[8] that could be accomplished by men only. even our next relations, the quadrumana, exhibit all possible differences in the grouping of males and females. and if we draw the line still closer and consider only the four anthropoid apes, letourneau can only tell us, that they are now monogamous, now polygamous; while saussure contends according to giraud-teulon that they are monogamous. the recent contentions of westermarck[9] in regard to monogamy among anthropoid apes are far from proving anything. in short, the information is such that honest letourneau admits: "there exists no strict relation at all between the degree of intellectual development and the form of sexual intercourse among mammals." and espinas says frankly:[10] "the herd is the highest social group found among animals. it seems to be composed of families, but from the outset the family and the herd are antagonistic; they develop in directly opposite ratio." it is evident from the above that we know next to nothing of the family and other social groups of anthropoid apes; the reports are directly contradictory. how full of contradiction, how much in need of critical scrutiny and research are the reports even on savage human tribes! but monkey tribes are far more difficult to observe than human tribes. for the present, therefore, we must decline all final conclusions from such absolutely unreliable reports. the quotation from espinas, however, offers a better clue. among higher animals, the herd and family are not supplements of one another, but antitheses. espinas demonstrates very nicely, how the jealousy of the males loosens or temporarily dissolves every herd during mating time. "where the family is closely organized, herds are formed only in exceptional cases. but wherever free sexual intercourse or polygamy are existing, the herd appears almost spontaneously.... in order that a herd may form, family ties must be loosened and the individual be free. for this reason we so rarely find organized herds among birds.... among mammals, however, we find groups organized after a fashion, just because here the individual is not merged in the family.... the rising sense of cohesion in a herd cannot, therefore, have a greater enemy than the consciousness of family ties. let us not shrink from pronouncing it: the development of a higher form of society than the family can be due only to the fact that it admitted families which had undergone a thorough change. this does not exclude the possibility that these same families were thus enabled to reorganize later on under infinitely more favorable circumstances."[11] it becomes apparent from this, that animal societies may indeed have a certain value in drawing conclusions in regard to human life--but only negatively. the higher vertebrate knows, so far as we may ascertain, only two forms of the family: polygamy or pairs. in both of them there is only one grown male, only one husband. the jealousy of the male, at the same time tie and limit of the family, creates an opposition between the animal family and the herd. the latter, a higher social form, is here rendered impossible, there loosened or dissolved during mating time, and at best hindered in its development by the jealousy of the male. this in itself is sufficient proof that the animal family and primeval human society are irreconcilable; that ancient man, struggling upward from the animal stage, either had no family at all or at the most one that does not exist among animals. a being so defenceless as evolving man might well survive in small numbers though living in an isolated state, the highest social form of which is that of pairs such as westermarck, relying on hunter's reports, attributes to the gorilla and the chimpanzee. another element is necessary for the elevation out of the animal stage, for the realization of the highest progress found in nature: the replacing of the defencelessness of the single individual by the united strength and co-operation of the whole herd. the transition from beast to man out of conditions of the sort under which the anthropoid apes are living to-day would be absolutely unexplainable. these apes rather give the impression of stray sidelines gradually approaching extinction, and at all events in process of decline. this alone is sufficient to reject all parallels between their family forms and those of primeval man. but mutual tolerance of the grown males, freedom from jealousy, was the first condition for the formation of such large and permanent groups, within which alone the transformation from beast to man could be accomplished. and indeed, what do we find to be the most ancient and original form of the family, undeniably traceable by history and even found to-day here and there? the group marriage, that form in which whole groups of men and whole groups of women mutually belong to one another, leaving only small scope for jealousy. and furthermore we find at a later stage the exceptional form of polyandry which still more supersedes all sentiments of jealousy and hence is unknown to animals. but all the forms of the group marriage known to us are accompanied by such peculiarly complicated circumstances that they of necessity point to a preceding simpler form of sexual intercourse and, hence, in the last instance to a period of unrestricted sexual intercourse corresponding to a transition from the animal to man. therefore the references to animal marriages lead us back to precisely that point, from which they were intended to remove us forever. what does the term "unrestricted sexual intercourse" mean? simply, that the restrictions in force now were not observed formerly. we have already seen the barrier of jealousy falling. if anything is certain, it is that jealousy is developed at a comparatively late stage. the same is true of incest. not only brother and sister were originally man and wife, but also the sexual intercourse between parents and children is permitted to this day among many nations. bancroft testifies to the truth of this among the kaviats of the behring strait, the kadiaks of alaska, the tinnehs in the interior of british north america; letourneau compiled reports of the same fact in regard to the chippeway indians, the coocoos in chile, the caribeans, the carens in indo-china, not to mention the tales of ancient greeks and romans about the parthians, persians, scythians, huns and so forth. before incest was invented (and it is an invention, a really valuable one indeed), sexual intercourse between parents and children could not be any more repulsive than between other persons belonging to different generations, which takes place even in our day among the most narrow-minded nations without causing any horror. even old "maids" of more than sixty years sometimes, if they are rich enough, marry young men of about thirty. eliminating from the primeval forms of the family known to us those conceptions of incest--conceptions totally different from ours and often enough in direct contradiction with them--we arrive at a form of sexual intercourse that can only be designated as unrestricted. unrestricted in the sense that the barriers drawn later on by custom did not yet exist. this in no way necessarily implies for practical purposes an injudicious pell-mell intercourse. the separate existence of pairs for a limited time is not out of the question, and even comprises the majority of cases in the group marriage of our days. and if the latest repudiator of such a primeval state, westermarck, designates as marriage every case, where both sexes remain mated until the birth of the offspring, then this is equivalent to saying that this kind of marriage may well exist during a stage of unrestricted intercourse without contradicting license, i. e., absence of barriers drawn by custom for sexual intercourse. westermarck bases himself on the opinion that "license includes the suppression of individual affections" so that "prostitution is its most genuine form." to me it rather seems that any understanding of primeval conditions is impossible as long as we look at them through brothel spectacles. we shall return to this point in the group marriage. according to morgan, the following forms developed from this primeval state at an apparently early stage: 1. the consanguine family. the consanguine family is the first step toward the family. here the marriage groups are arranged by generations: all the grand-fathers and grand-mothers within a certain family are mutually husbands and wives; and equally their children, the fathers and mothers, whose children form a third cycle of mutual mates. the children of these again, the great-grandchildren of the first cycle, will form a fourth. in this form of the family, then, only ancestors and descendants are excluded from what we would call the rights and duties of marriage. brothers and sisters, male and female cousins of the first, second and more remote grades, are all mutually brothers and sisters and for this reason mutual husbands and wives. the relation of brother and sister quite naturally includes at this stage the practice of sexual intercourse.[12] the typical form of such a family would consist of the offspring of one pair, representing again the descendants of each grade as mutual brothers and sisters and, therefore, mutual husbands and wives. the consanguine family is extinct. even the crudest nations of history do not furnish any proofs of it. but the hawaiian system of kinship, in force to this day in all polynesia, compels us to acknowledge its former existence, for it exhibits grades of kinship that could only originate in this form of the family. and the whole subsequent development of the family compels us to admit this form as a necessary step. 2. the punaluan family. while the first step of organization consisted in excluding parents and children from mutual sexual intercourse, the second was the erection of a barrier between brother and sister. this progress was much more important on account of the greater equality in the ages of the parties concerned, but also far more difficult. it was accomplished gradually, probably beginning with the exclusion of the natural sister (i. e., on the mother's side) from sexual intercourse, first in single cases, then becoming more and more the rule (in hawaii exceptions were still noted during the nineteenth century), and finally ending with the prohibition of marriage even among collateral brothers and sisters, i. e., what we now term brother's and sister's children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren. this progress offers, according to morgan, an excellent illustration how the principle of natural selection works. without question, the tribes limiting inbreeding by this progress developed faster and more completely than those retaining the marriage between brothers and sisters as a rule and law. and how powerfully the influence of this progress was felt, is shown by the institution of the gens, directly attributable to it and passing far beyond the goal. the gens is the foundation of the social order of most, if not all, barbarian nations, and in greece and rome we step immediately from it to civilization. every primeval family necessarily had to divide after a few generations. the originally communistic and collective household existing far into the middle stage of barbarism, involved a certain maximum size of the family, variable according to conditions, but still limited in a degree. as soon as the conception of the impropriety of sexual intercourse between children of the same mother arose, it naturally became effective on such occasions as the division of old and the foundation of new household communities (which, however, did not necessarily coincide with the family group). one or more series of sisters became the center of one group, their natural brothers that of another. in this or a similar manner that form which morgan styles the punaluan family developed from the consanguine family. according to hawaiian custom, a number of sisters, natural or more remote (i. e., cousins of the first, second and more remote degrees) were the mutual wives of their mutual husbands, their natural brothers excepted. these men now no longer addressed one another as "brother"--which they no longer had to be--but as "punalua," i. e., intimate companion, associate as it were. likewise a series of natural or more remote brothers lived in mutual marriage with a number of women, not their natural sisters, and these women referred to each other as "punalua." this is the classical form of a family, which later admitted of certain variations. its fundamental characteristic was mutual community of husbands and wives within a given family with the exclusion of the natural brothers (or sisters) first, and of the more remote grades later. this form of the family, now, furnishes with complete accuracy the degrees of kinship expressed by the american system. the children of the sisters of my mother still are her children; likewise the children of the brothers of my father still his children; and all of them are my brothers and sisters. but the children of the brothers of my mother are now her nephews and nieces, the children of the sisters of my father his nephew and nieces, and they are all my cousins. for while the husbands of the sisters of my mother are still her husbands, and likewise the wives of the brothers of my father still his wives--legally, if not always in fact--the social proscription of sexual intercourse between brothers and sisters has now divided those relatives who were formerly regarded without distinction as brothers and sisters, into two classes. in one category are those who remain (more remote) brothers and sisters as before; in the other the children of the brother on one hand or the sister on the opposite, who can be brothers and sisters no longer. the latter have mutual parents no more, neither father nor mother nor both together. and for this reason the class of nephews and nieces, male and female cousins, here becomes necessary for the first time. under the former family order this would have been absurd. the american system of kinship, which appears absolutely paradoxical in any family form founded on monogamy, is rationally explained and naturally confirmed in its most minute details by the punaluan family. wherever this system of kinship was in force, there the punaluan family or at least a form akin to it must also have existed. this family form, the existence of which in hawaii was actually demonstrated, would have been transmitted probably by all polynesia, if the pious missionaries, similar to the spanish monks in america, could have looked upon such anti-christian relations as being something more than simply a "horror."[13] cesar's report to the effect that the britons, who then were in the middle stage of barbarism, "have ten or twelve women in common, mostly brothers with brothers and parents with children," is best explained by group marriage. barbarian mothers have not ten or twelve sons old enough to keep women in common, but the american system of kinship corresponding to the punaluan family furnishes many brothers, because all near and remote cousins of a certain man are his brothers. the term "parents with children" may arise from a wrong conception of cesar, but this system does not absolutely exclude the existence of father and son, mother or daughter in the same group. it does exclude, however, father and daughter or mother and son. this or a similar form of group marriage also furnishes the easiest explanation of the reports of herodotus and other ancient writers concerning community of women among savage and barbarian nations. this is true, furthermore, of watson's and kaye's[14] tale about the tikurs of audh (north of the ganges): "they live together (i. e., sexually) almost indiscriminately in large communities, and though two persons may be considered as being married, still the tie is only nominal." the institution of the gens seems to have its origin in the majority of cases in the punaluan family. true, the australian class system also offers a starting point for it; the australians have gentes, but not yet a punaluan family, only a cruder form of group marriage.[15] in all forms of the group family it is uncertain who is the father of a child, but certain, who is its mother. although she calls all the children of the aggregate family her children and has the duties of a mother toward them, still she knows her natural children from others. it is also obvious that, as far as group marriage exists, descent can only be traced on the mother's side and, hence, only female lineage be acknowledged. this is actually the case among all savage tribes and those in the lower stage of barbarism. to have discovered this first is the second great merit of bachofen. he designates this exclusive recognition of descent from the female line and the hereditary relations resulting therefrom in course of time as "maternal law." i retain this term for the sake of brevity, although it is distorted; for at this social stage there is no sign yet of any law in the juridic sense. if we now take one of the two standard groups of a punaluan family, namely that of a series of natural and remote sisters (i. e., first, second and more remote descendants of natural sisters), their children and their natural or remote brothers on the mother's side (who according to our supposition are not their husbands), we have exactly that circle of persons who later appear as members of a gens, in the original form of this institution. they all have a common ancestress, by virtue of the descent that makes the different female generations sisters. but the husbands of these sisters cannot be chosen among their brothers any more, can no longer come from the same ancestress, and do not, therefore, belong to the consanguineous group of relatives, the gens of a later time. the children of these same sisters, however, do belong to this group, because descent from the female line alone is conclusive, alone is positive. as soon as the proscription of sexual intercourse between all relatives on the mother's side, even the most remote of them, is an accomplished fact, the above named group has become a gens, i. e., constitutes a definite circle of consanguineous relatives of female lineage who are not permitted to marry one another. henceforth this circle is more and more fortified by other mutual institutions of a social or religious character and thus distinguished from other gentes of the same tribe. of this more anon. finding, as we do, that the gens not only necessarily, but also as a matter of course, develops from the punaluan family, it becomes obvious to us to assume as almost practically demonstrated the prior existence of this family form among all those nations where such gentes are traceable, i. e., nearly all barbarian and civilized nations. when morgan wrote his book, our knowledge of group marriage was very limited. we knew very little about the group marriages of the australians organized in classes, and furthermore morgan had published as early as 1871 the information he had received about the punaluan family of hawaii. this family on one hand furnished a complete explanation of the system of kinship in force among the american indians, which had been the point of departure for all the studies of morgan. on the other hand it formed a ready means for the deduction of the maternal law gens. and finally it represented a far higher stage of development than the australian classes. it is, therefore, easy to understand how morgan could regard this form as the stage necessarily preceding the pairing family and attribute general extension in former times to it. since then we have learned of several other forms of the group marriage, and we know that morgan went too far in this respect. but it was nevertheless his good fortune to encounter in his punaluan family the highest, the classical, form of group marriage, that form which gave the simplest clue for the transition to a higher stage. the most essential contribution to our knowledge of the group marriage we owe to the english missionary, lorimer fison, who studied this form of the family for years on its classical ground, australia. he found the lowest stage of development among the papuans near mount gambier in south australia. here the whole tribe is divided into two great classes, kroki and kumite.[16] sexual intercourse within each of these classes is strictly prohibited. but every man of one class is by birth the husband of every woman of the other class, and vice versa. not the individuals are married to one another, but the whole groups, class to class. and mark well, no caution is made anywhere on account of difference of age or special consanguinity, unless it is resulting from the division into two exogamous classes. a kroki has for his wife every kumite woman. and as his own daughter, being the daughter of a kumite woman, is also kumite according to maternal law, she is therefore the born wife of every kroki, including her father. at least, the class organization, as we know it, does not exclude this possibility. hence this organization either arose at a time when, in spite of all dim endeavor to limit inbreeding, sexual intercourse between parents and children was not yet regarded with any particular horror; in this case the class system would be directly evolved from a condition of unrestricted sexual relations. or the intercourse between parents and children was already proscribed by custom, when the classes were formed; and in this case the present condition points back to the consanguine family and is the first step out of it. the latter case is the more probable. so far as i know, no mention is made of any sexual intercourse between parents and children in australia. even the later form of exogamy, the maternal law gens, as a rule silently presupposes that the prohibition of this intercourse was an accomplished fact at the time of its institution. the system of two classes is not only found near mount gambier in south australia, but also farther east along darling river, and in the northeast of queensland. it is, consequently, widespread. it excludes only marriage between brothers and sisters, between brothers' children and between sisters' children of the mother's side, because these belong to the same class; but the children of a sister can marry those of a brother and vice versa. a further step for preventing inbreeding is found among the kamilaroi on the darling river in new south wales, where the two original classes are split into four, and every one of these is married as a whole to a certain other class. the first two classes are husbands and wives by birth. according to the place of the mother in the first or second class, the children belong to the third and fourth. the children of these two classes, who are also married to one another, again belong to the first and second class. so that a certain generation belongs to the first and second class, the next to the third and fourth and the following again to the first and second. hence the children of natural brothers and sisters (on the mother's side) cannot marry one another, but their grandchildren can do so. this peculiarly complicated order of things is still more entangled by the inoculation--evidently at a later stage--with maternal law gentes. but we cannot discuss this further. enough, the desire to prevent inbreeding again and again demands recognition, but feeling its way quite spontaneously, without a clear conception of the goal. the group marriage is represented in australia by class marriage, i. e., mass marriage of a whole class of men frequently scattered over the whole breadth of the continent to an equally widespread class of women. a close view of this group marriage does not offer quite such a horrible spectacle as the philistine imagination accustomed to brothel conditions generally pictures to itself. on the contrary, long years passed, before its existence was even suspected, and quite recently it is once more denied. to the casual observer it makes the impression of a loose monogamy and in certain places of polygamy, with occasional breach of faith. years are required before one can discover, like fison and howitt, the law regulating these marital conditions that rather appeal in their practicability to the average european; the law enabling the strange papuan, thousands of miles from his home and among people whose language he does not understand, to find frequently, from camp to camp and from tribe to tribe, women who will without resistance and guilelessly surrender to him; the law according to which a man with several women offers one to his guest for the night. where the european sees immorality and lawlessness, there in reality a strict law is observed. the women belong to the marriage class of the stranger and, therefore, they are his wives by birth. the same moral law assigning both to one another forbids under penalty of proscription all sexual intercourse outside of the two marriage classes. even when women are abducted, as is frequently the case in certain regions, the class law is carefully respected. in the abduction of women, by the way, a trace of transition to monogamy is found even here, at least in the form of the pairing family. if a young man has abducted a girl with the help of his friends, they hold sexual intercourse with her one after another. but after that the girl is regarded as the wife of the young man who planned the abduction. and again, if an abducted woman deserts her husband and is caught by another man, she becomes the wife of the latter and the first has lost his privilege. alongside of and within the generally existing group marriage such exclusive relations are formed, pairing for a shorter or longer term by the side of polygamy, so that here also group marriage is declining. the question is only which will first disappear under the pressure of european influence: group marriage or the papuans addicted to it. the marriage in whole classes, such as is in force in australia, is no doubt a very low and primitive form of group marriage, while the punaluan family, so far as we know, is its highest stage of development. the former seems to be corresponding to the social stage of roving savages, the latter requires relatively settled communistic bodies and leads directly to the next higher stage of development. between these two, we shall no doubt find many an intermediate stage. here lies a barely opened, hardly entered field of investigation.[17] 3. the pairing family. a certain pairing for a longer or shorter term took place even during the group marriage or still earlier. a man had his principal wife (one can hardly call it favorite wife as yet) among many women, and he was to her the principal husband among others. this fact in no small degree contributed to the confusion among missionaries, who regarded group marriage now as a disorderly community of women, now as an arbitrary adultery. such a habitual pairing would gain ground the more the gens developed and the more numerous the classes of "brothers" and "sisters" became who were not permitted to marry one another. the impulse to prevent marriage of consanguineous relatives started by the gens went still further. thus we find that among the iroquois and most of the indians in the lower stage of barbarism marriage is prohibited between all the relatives of their system of kinship, and this comprises several hundred kinds. by this increasing complication of marriage restrictions, group marriage became more and more impossible; it was displaced by the pairing family. at this stage one man lives with one woman, but in such a manner that polygamy, and occasional adultery, remain privileges of men, although the former occurs rarely for economic reasons. women, however, are generally expected to be strictly faithful during the time of living together, and adultery on their part is cruelly punished. but the marriage-tie may be easily broken by either party, and the children belong to the mother alone, as formerly. in this ever more extending restriction of marriage between consanguineous relations, natural selection also remains effective. as morgan expresses it: "marriages between gentes that were not consanguineous produced a more vigorous race, physically and mentally; two progressive tribes intermarried, and the new skulls and brains naturally expanded until they comprised the faculties of both." thus tribes composed of gentes necessarily either gained the supremacy over the backward ones or, by their example, carried them along in their wake. the development of the family, then, is founded on the continual contraction of the circle, originally comprising the whole tribe, within which marital intercourse between both sexes was general. by the continual, exclusion, first of near, then of ever remoter relatives, including finally even those who were simply related legally, all group marriage becomes practically impossible. at last only one couple, temporarily and loosely united, remains; that molecule, the dissolution of which absolutely puts an end to marriage. even from this we may infer how little the sexual love of the individual in the modern sense of the word had to do with the origin of monogamy. the practice of all nations of that stage still more proves this. while in the previous form of the family the men were never embarrassed for women, but rather had more than enough of them, women now became scarce and were sought after. with the pairing family, therefore, the abduction and barter of women began--widespread symptoms, and nothing but that, of a new and much more profound change. the pedantic scot, mclennan, however, transmuted these symptoms, mere methods of obtaining women, into separate classes of the family under the head of "marriage by capture" and "marriage by barter." moreover among american indians and other nations in the same stage, the marriage agreement is not the business of the parties most concerned, who often are not even asked, but of their mothers. frequently two persons entirely unknown to one another are thus engaged to be married and receive no information of the closing of the bargain, until the time for the marriage ceremony approaches. before the wedding, the bridegroom brings gifts to the maternal relatives of the bride (not to her father or his relatives) as an equivalent for ceding the girl to him. either of the married parties may dissolve the marriage at will. but among many tribes, as, e. g., the iroquois, public opinion has gradually become averse to such separations. in case of domestic differences the gentile relatives of both parties endeavor to bring about a reconciliation, and not until they are unsuccessful a separation takes place. in this case the woman keeps the children, and both parties are free to marry again. the pairing family, being too weak and too unstable to make an independent household necessary or even desirable, in no way dissolves the traditional communistic way of housekeeping. but household communism implies supremacy of women in the house as surely as exclusive recognition of a natural mother and the consequent impossibility of identifying the natural father signify high esteem for women, i. e., mothers. it is one of the most absurd notions derived from eighteenth century enlightenment, that in the beginning of society woman was the slave of man. among all savages and barbarians of the lower and middle stages, sometimes even of the higher stage, women not only have freedom, but are held in high esteem. what they were even in the pairing family, let arthur wright, for many years a missionary among the seneca iroquois, testify: "as to their families, at a time when they still lived in their old long houses (communistic households of several families) ... a certain clan (gens) always reigned, so that the women choose their husbands from other clans (gentes).... the female part generally ruled the house; the provisions were held in common; but woe to the luckless husband or lover who was too indolent or too clumsy to contribute his share to the common stock. no matter how many children or how much private property he had in the house, he was liable at any moment to receive a hint to gather up his belongings and get out. and he could not dare to venture any resistance; the house was made too hot for him and he had no other choice, but to return to his own clan (gens) or, as was mostly the case, to look for another wife in some other clan. the women were the dominating power in the clans (gentes) and everywhere else. occasionally they did not hesitate to dethrone a chief and degrade him to a common warrior." the communistic household, in which most or all the women belong to one and the same gens, while the husbands come from different gentes, is the cause and foundation of the general and widespread supremacy of women in primeval times. the discovery of this fact is the third merit of bachofen. by way of supplement i wish to state that the reports of travelers and missionaries concerning the overburdening of women among savages and barbarians do not in the least contradict the above statements. the division of labor between both sexes is caused by other reasons than the social condition of women. nations, where women have to work much harder than is proper for them in our opinion, often respect women more highly than europeans do. the lady of civilized countries, surrounded with sham homage and a stranger to all real work stands on a far lower social level than a hard-working barbarian woman, regarded as a real lady (frowa-lady-mistress) and having the character of such. whether or not the pairing family has in our time entirely supplanted group marriage in america, can be decided only by closer investigations among those nations of northwestern and especially of southern america that are still in the higher stage of savagery. about the latter so many reports of sexual license are current that the assumption of a complete cessation of the ancient group marriage is hardly warranted. evidently all traces of it have not yet disappeared. in at least forty north american tribes the man marrying an elder sister has the right to make all her sisters his wives as soon as they are of age, a survival of the community of men for the whole series of sisters. and bancroft relates that the indians of the californian peninsula celebrate certain festivities uniting several "tribes" for the purpose of unrestricted sexual intercourse. these are evidently gentes that have preserved in these festivities a vague recollection of the time when the women of one gens had for their common husbands all the men of another gens, and vice versa. the same custom is still observed in australia. among certain nations it sometimes happens that the older men, the chief and sorcerer-priests, exploit the community of women for their own benefits and monopolize all the women. but in their turn they must restore the old community during certain festivities and great assemblies, permitting their wives to enjoy themselves with the young men. a whole series of examples of such periodical saturnalia restoring for a short time the ancient sexual freedom is quoted by westermarck:[18] among the hos, the santals, the punjas and kotars in india, among some african nations, etc. curiously enough westermarck concludes that this is a survival, not of group marriage, the existence of which he denies, but--of a rutting season which primitive man had in common with other animals. here we touch bachofen's fourth great discovery: the widespread form of transition from group marriage to pairing family. what bachofen represents as a penance for violating the old divine laws--the penalty with which a woman redeems her right to chastity, is in fact only a mystical expression for the penalty paid by a woman for becoming exempt from the ancient community of men and acquiring the right of surrendering to one man only. this penalty consists in a limited surrender: babylonian women had to surrender once a year in the temple of mylitta; other nations of western asia sent their young women for years to the temple of anaitis, where they had to practice free love with favorites of their own choice before they were allowed to marry. similar customs in a religious disguise are common to nearly all asiatic nations between the mediterranean and the ganges. the penalty for exemption becomes gradually lighter in course of time, as bachofen remarks: "the annually repeated surrender gives place to a single sacrifice; the hetaerism of the matrons is followed by that of the maidens, the promiscuous intercourse during marriage to that before wedding, the indiscriminate intercourse with all to that with certain individuals."[19] among some nations the religious disguise is missing. among others--thracians, celts, etc., in classic times, many primitive inhabitants of india, malay nations, south sea islanders and many american indians to this day--the girls enjoy absolute sexual freedom before marriage. this is especially true almost everywhere in south america, as everybody can confirm who penetrates a little into the interior. agassiz, e. g., relates[20] an anecdote of a wealthy family of indian descent. on being introduced to the daughter he asked something about her father, presuming him to be her mother's husband, who was in the war against paraguay. but the mother replied, smiling: "nao tem pai, he filha da fortuna"--she hasn't any father; she is the daughter of chance. "it is the way the indian or half-breed women here always speak of their illegitimate children; and though they say it without an intonation of sadness or of blame, apparently as unconscious of any wrong or shame as if they said the father was absent or dead, it has the most melancholy significance; it seems to speak of such absolute desertion. so far is this from being an unusual case, that among the common people the opposite seems the exception. children are frequently quite ignorant of their parentage. they know about their mother, for all the care and responsibility falls upon her, but they have no knowledge of their father; nor does it seem to occur to the woman that she or her children have any claim upon him." what seems so strange to the civilized man, is simply the rule of maternal law and group marriage. again, among other nations the friends and relatives of the bridegroom or the wedding guests claim their traditional right to the bride, and the bridegroom comes last. this custom prevailed in ancient times on the baleares and among the african augilers; it is observed to this day by the bareas in abyssinia. in still other cases, an official person--the chief of a tribe or a gens, the cazique, shamane, priest, prince or whatever may be his title--represents the community and exercises the right of the first night. all modern romantic whitewashing notwithstanding, this jus primae noctis, is still in force among most of the natives of alaska,[21] among the tahus of northern mexico[22] and some other nations. and during the whole of the middle ages it was practiced at least in originally celtic countries, where it was directly transmitted by group marriage, e. g. in aragonia. while in castilia the peasant was never a serf, the most disgraceful serfdom existed in aragonia, until abolished by the decision of ferdinand the catholic in 1486. in this document we read: "we decide and declare that the aforesaid 'senyors' (barons) ... shall neither sleep the first night with the wife of a peasant, nor shall they in the first night after the wedding, when the woman has gone to bed, step over said woman or bed as a sign of their authority. neither shall the aforesaid senyors use the daughter or the son of any peasant, with or without pay, against their will." (quoted in the catalonian original by sugenheim, "serfdom," petersburg, 1861, page 35.) bachofen, furthermore, is perfectly right in contending that the transition from what he calls "hetaerism" or "incestuous generation" to monogamy was brought about mainly by women. the more in the course of economic development, undermining the old communism and increasing the density of population, the traditional sexual relations lost their innocent character suited to the primitive forest, the more debasing and oppressive they naturally appeared to women; and the more they consequently longed for relief by the right of chastity, of temporary or permanent marriage with one man. this progress could not be due to men for the simple reason that they never, even to this day, had the least intention of renouncing the pleasures of actual group marriage. not until the women had accomplished the transition to the pairing family could the men introduce strict monogamy--true, only for women. the pairing family arose on the boundary line between savagery and barbarism, generally in the higher stage of savagery, here and there in the lower stage of barbarism. it is the form of the family characteristic for barbarism, as group marriage is for savagery and monogamy for civilization. in order to develop it into established monogamy, other causes than those active hitherto were required. in the pairing family the group was already reduced to its last unit, its biatomic molecule: one man and one woman. natural selection, had accomplished its purpose by a continually increasing restriction of sexual intercourse. nothing remained to be done in this direction. unless new social forces became active, there was no reason why a new form of the family should develop out of the pairing family. but these forces did become active. we now leave america, the classic soil of the pairing family. no sign permits the conclusion that a higher form of the family was developed here, that any established form of monogamy ever existed anywhere in the new world before the discovery and conquest. not so in the old world. in the latter, the domestication of animals and the breeding of flocks had developed a hitherto unknown source of wealth and created entirely new social conditions. up to the lower stage of barbarism, fixed wealth was almost exclusively represented by houses, clothing, rough ornaments and the tools for obtaining and preparing food: boats, weapons and household articles of the simplest kind. nourishment had to be secured afresh day by day. but now, with their herds of horses, camels, donkeys, cattle, sheep, goats and hogs, the advancing nomadic nations--the aryans in the indian punjab, in the region of the ganges and the steppes of the oxus and jaxartes, then still more rich in water-veins than now; the semites on the euphrates and tigris--had acquired possessions demanding only the most crude attention and care in order to propagate themselves in ever increasing numbers and yield the most abundant store of milk and meat. all former means of obtaining food were now forced to the background. hunting, once a necessity, now became a sport. but who was the owner of this new wealth? doubtless it was originally the gens. however, private ownership of flocks must have had an early beginning. it is difficult to say whether to the author of the so-called first book of moses father abraham appeared as the owner of his flocks by virtue of his privilege as head of a communistic family or of his capacity as gentile chief by actual descent. so much is certain: we must not regard him as a proprietor in the modern sense of the word. it is furthermore certain that everywhere on the threshold of documentary history we find the flocks in the separate possession of chiefs of families, exactly like the productions of barbarian art, such as metal ware, articles of luxury and, finally, the human cattle--the slaves. for now slavery was also invented. to the barbarian of the lower stage a slave was of no use. the american indians, therefore, treated their vanquished enemies in quite a different way from nations of a higher stage. the men were tortured or adopted as brothers into the tribe of the victors. the women were married or likewise adopted with their surviving children. the human labor power at this stage does not yet produce a considerable amount over and above its cost of subsistence. but the introduction of cattle raising, metal industry, weaving and finally agriculture wrought a change. just as the once easily obtainable wives now had an exchange value and were bought, so labor power was now procured, especially since the flocks had definitely become private property. the family did not increase as rapidly as the cattle. more people were needed for superintending; for this purpose the captured enemy was available and, besides, he could be increased by breeding like the cattle. such riches, once they had become the private property of certain families and augmented rapidly, gave a powerful impulse to society founded on the pairing family and the maternal gens. the pairing family had introduced a new element. by the side of the natural mother it had placed the authentic natural father who probably was better authenticated than many a "father" of our day. according to the division of labor in those times, the task of obtaining food and the tools necessary for this purpose fell to the share of the man; hence he owned the latter and kept them in case of a separation, as the women did the household goods. according to the social custom of that time, the man was also the owner of the new source of existence, the cattle, and later on of the new labor power, the slaves. but according to the same custom, his children could not inherit his property, for the following reasons: by maternal law, i. e., while descent was traced only along the female line, and by the original custom of inheriting in the gens, the gentile relatives inherited the property of their deceased gentile relative. the wealth had to remain in the gens. in view of the insignificance of the objects, the property may have gone in practice to the closest gentile relatives, i. e., the consanguine relatives on the mother's side. the children of the dead man, however, did not belong to his gens, but to that of their mother. they inherited first together with the other consanguine relatives of the mother, later on perhaps in preference to the others. but they could not inherit from their father, because they did not belong to his gens, where his property had to remain. hence, after the death of a cattle owner, the cattle would fall to his brothers, sisters and the children of his sisters, or to the offspring of the sisters of his mother. his own children were disinherited. in the measure of the increasing wealth man's position in the family became superior to that of woman, and the desire arose to use this fortified position for the purpose of overthrowing the traditional law of inheritance in favor of his children. but this was not feasible as long as maternal law was valid. this law had to be abolished, and it was. this was by no means as difficult as it appears to us to-day. for this revolution--one of the most radical ever experienced by humanity--did not have to touch a single living member of the gens. all its members could remain what they had always been. the simple resolution was sufficient, that henceforth the offspring of the male members should belong to the gens, while the children of the female members should be excluded by transferring them to the gens of their father. this abolished the tracing of descent by female lineage and the maternal right of inheritance, and instituted descent by male lineage and the paternal right of inheritance. how and when this revolution was accomplished by the nations of the earth, we do not know. it belongs entirely to prehistoric times. that it was accomplished is proven more than satisfactorily by the copious traces of maternal law collected especially by bachofen. how easily it is accomplished we may observe in a whole series of indian tribes, that recently passed through or are still engaged in it, partly under the influence of increasing wealth and changed modes of living (transfer from forests to the prairie), partly through the moral pressure of civilization and missionaries. six out of eight missouri tribes have male descent and inheritance, while only two retain female descent and inheritance. the shawnees, miamis and delawares follow the custom of placing their children into the male gens by giving them a gentile name belonging to the father's gens, so that they may be entitled to inherit. "innate casuistry of man, to change the objects by changing their names, and to find loopholes for breaking tradition inside of tradition where a direct interest was a sufficient motive." (marx.) this made confusion worse confounded, which could be and partially was remedied alone by paternal law. "this seems to be the most natural transition." (marx.) as to the opinion of the comparative jurists, how this transition took place among the civilized nations of the old world--although only in hypotheses--compare m. kovalevsky, tableau des origines et de l'évolution de la famille et de la propriété, stockholm, 1890. the downfall of maternal law was the historic defeat of the female sex. the men seized the reins also in the house, the women were stripped of their dignity, enslaved, tools of men's lust and mere machines for the generation of children. this degrading position of women, especially conspicuous among the greeks of heroic and still more of classic times, was gradually glossed over and disguised or even clad in a milder form. but it is by no means obliterated. the first effect of the established supremacy of men became now visible in the reappearance of the intermediate form of the patriarchal family. its most significant feature is not polygamy, of which more anon, but "the organization of a certain number of free and unfree persons into one family under the paternal authority of the head of the family. in the semitic form this head of the family lives in polygamy, the unfree members have wife and children, and the purpose of the whole organization is the tending of herds in a limited territory." the essential points are the assimilation of the unfree element and the paternal authority. hence the ideal type of this form of the family is the roman family. the word familia did not originally signify the composite ideal of sentimentality and domestic strife in the present day philistine mind. among the romans it did not even apply in the beginning to the leading couple and its children, but to the slaves alone. famulus means domestic slave, and familia is the aggregate number of slaves belonging to one man. at the time of gajus, the familia, id est patrimonium (i. e., paternal legacy), was still bequeathed by testament. the expression was invented by the romans in order to designate a new social organism, the head of which had a wife, children and a number of slaves under his paternal authority and according to roman law the right of life and death over all of them. "the word is, therefore, not older than the ironclad family system of the latin tribes, which arose after the introduction of agriculture and of lawful slavery, and after the separation of the aryan itali from the greeks." marx adds: "the modern family contains the germ not only of slavery (servitus), but also of serfdom, because it has from the start a relation to agricultural service. it comprises in miniature all those contrasts that later on develop more broadly in society and the state." such a form of the family shows the transition from the pairing family to monogamy. in order to secure the faithfulness of the wife, and hence the reliability of paternal lineage, the women are delivered absolutely into the power of the men; in killing his wife, the husband simply exercises his right. with the patriarchal family we enter the domain of written history, a field in which comparative law can render considerable assistance. and here it has brought about considerable progress indeed. we owe to maxim kovalevsky (tableau etc. de la famille et de la propriété, stockholm, 1890, p. 60-100) the proof, that the patriarchal household community, found to this day among serbians and bulgarians under the names of zádruga (friendly bond) and bratstvo (fraternity), and in a modified form among oriental nations, formed the stage of transition between the maternal family derived from group marriage and the monogamous family of the modern world. this seems at least established for the historic nations of the old world, for aryans and semites. the zádruga of southern slavonia offers the best still existing illustration of such a family communism. it comprises several generations of the father's descendants, together with their wives, all living together on the same farm, tilling their fields in common, living and clothing themselves from the same stock, and possessing collectively the surplus of their earnings. the community is managed by the master of the house (domácin), who acts as its representative, may sell inferior objects, has charge of the treasury and is responsible for it as well as for a proper business administration. he is chosen by vote and is not necessarily the oldest man. the women and their work are directed by the mistress of the house (domácica), who is generally the wife of the domácin. she also has an important, and often final, voice in choosing a husband for the girls. but the highest authority is vested in the family council, the assembly of all grown companions, male and female. the domácin is responsible to this council. it takes all important resolutions, sits in judgment on the members of the household, decides the question of important purchases and sales, especially of land, etc. it is only about ten years since the existence of such family communism in the russia of to-day was proven. at present it is generally acknowledged to be rooted in popular russian custom quite as much as the obscina or village community. it is found in the oldest russian code, the pravda of jaroslav, under the same name (vervj) as in the dalmatian code, and may also be traced in polish and czech historical records. likewise among germans, the economic unit according to heussler (institutions of german law) is not originally the single family, but the "collective household," comprising several generations or single families and, besides, often enough unfree individuals. the roman family is also traced to this type, and hence the absolute authority of the master of the house and the defenselessness of the other members in regard to him is strongly questioned of late. similar communities are furthermore said to have existed among the celts of ireland. in france they were preserved up to the time of the revolution in nivernais under the name of "parçonneries," and in the franche comté they are not quite extinct yet. in the region of louhans (saône et loire) we find large farmhouses with a high central hall for common use reaching up to the roof and surrounded by sleeping rooms accessible by the help of stairs with six to eight steps. several generations of the same family live together in such a house. in india, the household community with collective agriculture is already mentioned by nearchus at the time of alexander the great, and it exists to this day in the same region, in the punjab and the whole northwest of the country. in the caucasus it was located by kovalevski himself. in algeria it is still found among the kabyles. even in america it is said to have existed. it is supposed to be identical with the "calpullis" described by zurita in ancient mexico. in peru, however, cunow (ausland, 1890, no. 42-44) has demonstrated rather clearly that at the time of the conquest a sort of a constitution in marks (called curiously enough marca), with a periodical allotment of arable soil, and consequently individual tillage, was in existence. at any rate, the patriarchal household community with collective tillage and ownership of land now assumes an entirely different meaning than heretofore. we can no longer doubt that it played an important role among the civilized and some other nations of the old world in the transition from the maternal to the single family. later on we shall return to kovaleski's further conclusion that it was also the stage of transition from which developed the village or mark community with individual tillage and first periodical, then permanent allotment of arable and pasture lands. in regard to the family life within these household communities it must be remarked that at least in russia the master of the house has the reputation of strongly abusing his position against the younger women of the community, especially his daughters-in-law, and of transforming them into a harem for himself. russian popular songs are very eloquent on this point. before taking up monogamy, which rapidly developed after the downfall of maternal law, let me say a few words about polygamy and polyandry. both forms of the family can only be exceptions, historical products of luxury so to speak, unless they could be found side by side in the same country, which is apparently not the case. as the men excluded from polygamy cannot find consolation in the women left over by polyandry, the number of men and women being hitherto approximately equal without regard to social institutions, it becomes of itself impossible to confer on any one of these two forms the distinction of general preference. indeed, the polygamy of one man was evidently the product of slavery, confined to certain exceptional positions. in the semitic patriarchal family, only the patriarch himself, or at best a few of his sons, practice polygamy, the others must be satisfied with one wife. this is the case to-day in the whole orient. polygamy is a privilege of the wealthy and distinguished, and is mainly realized by purchase of female slaves. the mass of the people live in monogamy. polyandry in india and thibet is likewise an exception. its surely not uninteresting origin from group marriage requires still closer investigation. in its practice it seems, by the way, much more tolerant than the jealous harem establishment of the mohammedans. at least among the nairs of india, three, four or more men have indeed one woman in common; but every one of them may have a second woman in common with three or more other men; and in the same way a third, fourth, etc. it is strange that mclennan did not discover the new class of "club marriage" in these marital clubs, in several of which one may be a member and which he himself describes. this marriage club business is, however, by no means actual polyandry. it is on the contrary, as giraud-teulon already remarks, a specialized form of group marriage. the men live in polygamy, the women in polyandry. 4. the monogamous family. it develops from the pairing family, as we have already shown, during the time of transition from the middle to the higher stage of barbarism. its final victory is one of the signs of beginning civilization. it is founded on male supremacy for the pronounced purpose of breeding children of indisputable paternal lineage. the latter is required, because these children shall later on inherit the fortune of their father. the monogamous family is distinguished from the pairing family by the far greater durability of wedlock, which can no longer be dissolved at the pleasure of either party. as a rule, it is only the man who can still dissolve it and cast off his wife. the privilege of conjugal faithlessness remains sanctioned for men at least by custom (the code napoleon concedes it directly to them, as long as they do not bring their concubines into the houses of their wives). this privilege is more and more enjoyed with the increasing development of society. if the woman remembers the ancient sexual practices and attempts to revive them, she is punished more severely than ever. the whole severity of this new form of the family confronts us among the greeks. while, as marx observes, the position of the female gods in mythology shows an earlier period, when women still occupied a freer and more respected plane, we find woman already degraded by the supremacy of man and the competition of slaves during the time of the heroes. read in the odysseia how telemachos reproves and silences his mother. the captured young women, according to homer, are delivered to the sensual lust of the victors. the leaders in the order of their rank select the most beautiful captives. the whole iliad notoriously revolves around the quarrel between achilles and agamemnon about such a captured woman. in mentioning any hero of importance, the captured girl sharing his tent and bed is never omitted. these girls are also taken into the hero's home country and his house, as kassandra by agamemnon in aeschylos. boys born by these female slaves receive a small share of the paternal heirloom and are regarded as free men. teukros is such an illegitimate son and may use his father's name. the wife is expected to put up with everything, while herself remaining chaste and faithful. although the greek woman of heroic times is more highly respected than she of the civilized period, still she is for her husband only the mother of his legal heirs, his first housekeeper and the superintendent of the female slaves, whom he can and does make his concubines at will. it is this practice of slavery by the side of monogamy, the existence of young and beautiful female slaves belonging without any restriction to their master, which from the very beginning gives to monogamy the specific character of being monogamy for women only, but not for men. and this character remains to this day. for the greeks of later times we must make a distinction between dorians and ionians. the former, with sparta as their classic example, have in many respects still more antiquated marriage customs than even homer illustrates. in sparta existed a form of the pairing family modified by the contemporaneous ideas of the state and still recalling group marriage in many ways. sterile marriages were dissolved. king anaxandridas (about 650 before christ) took another wife besides his childless one and kept two households. about the same time king ariston added another wife to two childless ones, one of which he dismissed. furthermore, several brothers could have one wife in common; a friend who liked his friend's wife better than his own could share her with him, and it was not considered indecent to place a wife at the disposal of a sturdy "stallion," as bismarck would have said, even though he might not be a citizen. a certain passage in plutarch, where a spartan matron refers a lover, who persists in making offers to her, to her husband, seems to indicate--according to schoemann--even a still greater sexual freedom. also adultery, faithlessness of a wife behind her husband's back, was unheard of. on the other hand, domestic slavery in sparta, at least during the best time, was unknown, and the serf helots lived on separate country seats. hence there was less temptation for a spartan to hold intercourse with other women. as was to be expected under such circumstances, the women of sparta occupied a more highly respected place than those of other greeks. spartan women and the athenian hetaerae were the only greek women of whom the ancients speak respectfully and whose remarks they considered worthy of notice. quite a different condition among ionians, whose representative is athens. the girls learned only to spin, weave and sew, at the most a little reading and writing. they were practically shut in and had only the company of other women. the women's room formed a separate part of the house, on the upper floor or in a rear building, where men, especially strangers, did not easily enter and whither the women retreated when male visitors came. the women did not leave the house without being accompanied by a female slave. at home they were strictly guarded. aristophanes speaks of molossian dogs that were kept to frighten off adulterers. and at least in the asiatic towns, eunuchs were kept for guarding women. even at herodotus' time these eunuchs were manufactured for the trade, and according to wachsmuth not for barbarians alone. by euripides woman is designated as "oikurema," a neuter signifying an object for housekeeping, and beside the business of breeding children she served to the athenian for nothing but his chief house maid. the man had his gymnastic exercises, his public meetings, from which the women were excluded. besides, the man very often had female slaves at his disposal, and during the most flourishing time of athens an extensive prostitution which was at least patronized by the state. it was precisely on the basis of this prostitution that the unique type of ionic women developed; the hetaerae. they rose by esprit and artistic taste as far above the general level of antique womanhood as the spartan women by their character. but that it was necessary to become a hetaera before one could be a woman, constitutes the severest denunciation of the athenian family. the athenian family became in the course of time the model after which not only the rest of the ionians, but gradually all the greeks at home and abroad molded their domestic relations. nevertheless, in spite of all seclusion and watching, the grecian ladies found sufficient opportunity for deceiving their husbands. the latter who would have been ashamed of betraying any love for their wives, found recreation in all kinds of love affairs with hetaerae. but the degradation of the women was avenged in the men and degraded them also, until they sank into the abomination of boy-love. they degraded their gods and themselves by the myth of ganymedes. such was the origin of monogamy, as far as we may trace it in the most civilized and most highly developed nation of antiquity. it was by no means a fruit of individual sex-love and had nothing to do with the latter, for the marriages remained as conventional as ever. monogamy was the first form of the family not founded on natural, but on economic conditions, viz.: the victory of private property over primitive and natural collectivism. supremacy of the man in the family and generation of children that could be his offspring alone and were destined to be the heirs of his wealth--these were openly avowed by the greeks to be the sole objects of monogamy. for the rest it was a burden to them, a duty to the gods, the state and their own ancestors, a duty to be fulfilled and no more. in athens the law enforced not only the marriage, but also the fulfillment of a minimum of the so-called matrimonial duties on the man's part. monogamy, then, does by no means enter history as a reconciliation of man and wife and still less as the highest form of marriage. on the contrary, it enters as the subjugation of one sex by the other, as the proclamation of an antagonism between the sexes unknown in all preceding history. in an old unpublished manuscript written by marx and myself in 1846, i find the following passage: "the first division of labor is that of man and wife in breeding children." and to-day i may add: the first class antagonism appearing in history coincides with the development of the antagonism of man and wife in monogamy, and the first class oppression with that of the female by the male sex. monogamy was a great historical progress. but by the side of slavery and private property it marks at the same time that epoch which, reaching down to our days, takes with all progress also a step backwards, relatively speaking, and develops the welfare and advancement of one by the woe and submission of the other. it is the cellular form of civilized society which enables us to study the nature of its now fully developed contrasts and contradictions. the old relative freedom of sexual intercourse by no means disappeared with the victory of the pairing or even of the monogamous family. "the old conjugal system, now reduced to narrower limits by the gradual disappearance of the punaluan groups, still environed the advancing family, which it was to follow to the verge of civilization.... it finally disappeared in the new form of hetaerism, which still follows mankind in civilization as a dark shadow upon the family."[23] by hetaerism morgan designates sexual intercourse of men with unmarried women outside of the monogamous family, flourishing, as is well known, during the whole period of civilization in many different forms and tending more and more to open prostitution. this hetaerism is directly derived from group marriage, from the sacrificial surrender of women for the purpose of obtaining the right to chastity. the surrender for money was at first a religious act; it took place in the temple of the goddess of love and the money flowed originally into the treasury of the temple. the hierodulae of anaitis in armenia, of aphrodite in corinth and the religious dancing girls of india attached to the temples, the so-called bajaderes (derived from the portuguese "bailadera," dancing girl), were the first prostitutes. the surrender, originally the duty of every woman, was later on practiced by these priestesses alone in representation of all others. among other nations, hetaerism is derived from the sexual freedom permitted to girls before marriage--also a survival of the group marriage, only transmitted by another route. with the rise of different property relations, in the higher stage of barbarism, wage labor appears sporadically by the side of slavery, and at the same time its unavoidable companion, professional prostitution of free women by the side of the forced surrender of female slaves. it is the heirloom bequeathed by group marriage to civilization, a gift as ambiguous as everything else produced by ambiguous, double-faced, schismatic and contradictory civilization. here monogamy, there hetaerism and its most extreme form, prostitution. hetaerism is as much a social institution as all others. it continues the old sexual freedom--for the benefit of the men. in reality not only permitted, but also assiduously practised by the ruling class, it is denounced only nominally. still in practice this denunciation strikes by no means the men who indulge in it, but only the women. these are ostracised and cast out by society, in order to proclaim once more the fundamental law of unconditional male supremacy over the female sex. however, a second contradiction is thereby developed within monogamy itself. by the side of the husband, who is making his life pleasant by hetaerism, stands the neglected wife. and you cannot have one side of the contradiction without the other, just as you cannot have the whole apple after eating half of it. nevertheless this seems to have been the idea of the men, until their wives taught them a lesson. monogamy introduces two permanent social characters that were formerly unknown: the standing lover of the wife and the cuckold. the men had gained the victory over the women, but the vanquished magnanimously provided the coronation. in addition to monogamy and hetaerism, adultery became an unavoidable social institution--denounced, severely punished, but irrepressible. the certainty of paternal parentage rested as of old on moral conviction at best, and in order to solve the unreconcilable contradiction, the code napoléon decreed in its article 312: "l'enfant conçu pendant le mariage a pour père le mari;" the child conceived during marriage has for its father--the husband. this is the last result of three thousand years of monogamy. thus we have in the monogamous family, at least in those cases that remain true to historical development and clearly express the conflict between man and wife created by the exclusive supremacy of men, a miniature picture of the contrasts and contradictions of society at large. split by class-differences since the beginning of civilization, society has been unable to reconcile and overcome these antitheses. of course, i am referring here only to those cases of monogamy, where matrimonial life actually remains in accord with the original character of the whole institution, but where the wife revolts against the rule of the man. nobody knows better than your german philistine that not all marriages follow such a course. he does not understand how to maintain the control of his own home any better than that of the state, and his wife is, therefore, fully entitled to wearing the trousers, which he does not deserve. but he thinks himself far superior to his french companion in misery, who more frequently fares far worse. the monogamous family, by the way, did not everywhere and always appear in the classic severe form it had among the greeks. among the romans, who as future conquerors of the world had a sharper although less refined eye than the greeks, the women were freer and more respected. a roman believed that the conjugal faith of his wife was sufficiently safeguarded by his power over her life and death. moreover, the women could voluntarily dissolve the marriage as well as the men. but the highest progress in the development of monogamy was doubtless due to the entrance of the germans into history, probably because on account of their poverty their monogamy had not yet fully outgrown the pairing family. three facts mentioned by tacitus favor this conclusion: in the first place, although marriage was held very sacred--"they are satisfied with one wife, the women are protected by chastity"--still polygamy was in use among the distinguished and the leaders of the tribes, as was the case in the pairing families of the american indians. secondly, the transition from maternal to paternal law could have taken place only a short while before, because the mother's brother--the next male relative in the gens by maternal law--was still considered almost a closer relative than the natural father, also in accordance with the standpoint of the american indians. the latter furnished to marx, according to his own testimony, the key to the comprehension of german primeval history. and thirdly, the german women were highly respected and also influenced public affairs, a fact directly opposed to monogamic male supremacy. in all these things the germans almost harmonize with the spartans, who, as we saw, also had not fully overcome the pairing family. hence in this respect an entirely new element succeeded to the world's supremacy with the germans. the new monogamy now developing the ruins of the roman world from the mixture of nations endowed male rule with a milder form and accorded to women a position that was at least outwardly far more respected and free than classical antiquity ever knew. not until now was there a possibility of developing from monogamy--in it, by the side of it or against it, as the case might be--the highest ethical progress we owe to it: the modern individual sexlove, unknown to all previous ages. this progress doubtless arose from the fact that the germans still lived in the pairing family and inoculated monogamy as far as possible with the position of women corresponding to the former. it was in no way due to the legendary and wonderfully pure natural qualities of the germans. these qualities were limited to the simple fact that the pairing family indeed does not create the marked moral contrasts of monogamy. on the contrary, the germans, especially those who wandered southeast among the nomadic nations of the black sea, had greatly degenerated morally. beside the equestrian tricks of the inhabitants of the steppe they had also acquired some very unnatural vices. this is expressly confirmed of the thaifali by ammianus and of the heruli by prokop. although monogamy was the only one of all known forms of the family in which modern sexlove could develop, this does not imply that it developed exclusively or even principally as mutual love of man and wife. the very nature of strict monogamy under man's rule excluded this. among all historically active, i. e., ruling, classes matrimony remained what it had been since the days of the pairing family--a conventional matter arranged by the parents. and the first historical form of sexlove as a passion, as an attribute of every human being (at least of the ruling classes), the specific character of the highest form of the sexual impulse, this first form, the love of the knights in the middle ages, was by no means matrimonial love, but quite the contrary. in its classic form, among the provençals, it heads with full sails for adultery and their poets extol the latter. the flower of provençal love poetry, the albas, describe in glowing colors how the knight sleeps with his adored--the wife of another--while the watchman outside calls him at the first faint glow of the morning (alba) and enables him to escape unnoticed. the poems culminate in the parting scene. likewise the frenchmen of the north and also the honest germans adopted this style of poetry and the manner of knightly love corresponding to it. old wolfram von eschenbach has left us three wonderful "day songs" treating this same questionable subject, and i like them better than his three heroic epics. civil matrimony in our day is of two kinds. in catholic countries, the parents provide a fitting spouse for their son as of old, and the natural consequence is the full development of the contradictions inherent to monogamy: voluptuous hetaerism on the man's part, voluptuous adultery of the woman. probably the catholic church has abolished divorce for the simple reason that it had come to the conclusion, there was as little help for adultery as for death. in protestant countries, again, it is the custom to give the bourgeois son more or less liberty in choosing his mate. hence a certain degree of love may be at the bottom of such a marriage and for the sake of propriety this is always assumed, quite in keeping with protestant hypocrisy. in this case hetaerism is carried on less strenuously and adultery on the part of the woman is not so frequent. but as human beings remain under any form of marriage what they were before marrying, and as the citizens of protestant countries are mostly philistines, this protestant monogamy on the average of the best cases confines itself to the community of a leaden ennui, labeled wedded bliss. the best mirror of these two species of marriage is the novel, the french novel for the catholic, the german novel for the protestant brand. in both of these novels they "get one another:" in the german novel the man gets the girl, in the french novel the husband gets the horns. it does not always go without saying which of the two deserves the most pity. for this reason the tediousness of the german novels is abhorred as much by the french bourgeois as the "immorality" of the french novels by the german philistine. of late, since berlin became cosmopolitan, the german novel begins to treat somewhat timidly of the hetaerism and adultery that a long time ago became familiar features of that city. in both cases the marriage is influenced by the class environment of the participants, and in this respect it always remains conventional. this conventionalism often enough results in the most pronounced prostitution--sometimes of both parties, more commonly of the woman. she is distinguished from a courtisane only in that she does not offer her body for money by the hour like a commodity, but sells it into slavery for once and all. fourier's words hold good with respect to all conventional marriages: "as in grammar two negatives make one affirmative, so in matrimonial ethics, two prostitutions are considered as one virtue." sexual love in man's relation to woman becomes and can become the rule among the oppressed classes alone, among the proletarians of our day--no matter whether this relation is officially sanctioned or not. here all the fundamental conditions of classic monogamy have been abolished. here all property is missing and it was precisely for the protection and inheritance of this that monogamy and man rule were established. hence all incentive to make this rule felt is wanting here. more still, the funds are missing. civil law protecting male rule applies only to the possessing classes and their intercourse with proletarians. law is expensive and therefore the poverty of the laborer makes it meaningless for his relation to his wife. entirely different personal and social conditions decide in this case. and finally, since the great industries have removed women from the home to the labor market and to the factory, the last remnant of man rule in the proletarian home has lost its ground--except, perhaps, a part of the brutality against women that has become general since the advent of monogamy. thus the family of the proletarian is no longer strictly monogamous, even with all the most passionate love and the most unalterable loyalty of both parties, and in spite of any possible clerical or secular sanction. consequently the eternal companions of monogamy, hetaerism and adultery, play an almost insignificant role here. the woman has practically regained the right of separation, and if a couple cannot agree, they rather separate. in short, the proletarian marriage is monogamous in the etymological sense of the word, but by no means in a historical sense. true, our jurists hold that the progress of legislation continually lessens all cause of complaint for women. the modern systems of civil law recognize, first that marriage, in order to be legal, must be a contract based on voluntary consent of both parties, and secondly that during marriage the relations of both parties shall be founded on equal rights and duties. these two demands logically enforced will, so they claim, give to women everything they could possibly ask. this genuinely juridical argumentation is exactly the same as that used by the radical republican bourgeois to cut short and dismiss the proletarian. the labor contract is said to be voluntarily made by both parties. but it is considered as voluntary when the law places both parties on equal terms on paper. the power conferred on one party by the division of classes, the pressure thereby exerted on the other party, the actual economic relation of the two--all this does not concern the law. again, during the term of the contract both parties are held to have equal rights, unless one has expressly renounced his right. that the economic situation forces the laborer to give up even the last semblance of equality, that is not the fault of the law. in regard to marriage, even the most advanced law is completely satisfied after both parties have formally declared their willingness. what passes behind the juridical scenes where the actual process of living is going on, and how this willingness is brought about, that cannot be the business of the law and the jurist. yet the simplest legal comparison should show to the jurist what this willingness really means. in those countries where a legitimate portion of the parental wealth is assured to children and where these cannot be disinherited--in germany, in countries with french law, etc.--the children are bound to secure the consent of their parents for marrying. in countries with english law, where the consent of the parents is by no means a legal qualification of marriage, the parents have full liberty to bequeath their wealth to anyone and may disinherit their children at will. hence it is clear that among classes having any property to bequeath the freedom to marry is not a particle greater in england and america than in france and germany. the legal equality of man and woman in marriage is by no means better founded. their legal inequality inherited from earlier stages of society is not the cause, but the effect of the economic oppression of women. in the ancient communistic household comprising many married couples and their children, the administration of the household entrusted to women was just as much a public function, a socially necessary industry, as the procuring of food by men. in the patriarchal and still more in the monogamous family this was changed. the administration of the household lost its public character. it was no longer a concern of society. it became a private service. the woman became the first servant of the house, excluded from participation in social production. only by the great industries of our time the access to social production was again opened for women--for proletarian women alone, however. this is done in such a manner that they remain excluded from public production and cannot earn anything, if they fulfill their duties in the private service of the family; or that they are unable to attend to their family duties, if they wish to participate in public industries and earn a living independently. as in the factory, so women are situated in all business departments up to the medical and legal professions. the modern monogamous family is founded on the open or disguised domestic slavery of women, and modern society is a mass composed of molecules in the form of monogamous families. in the great majority of cases the man has to earn a living and to support his family, at least among the possessing classes. he thereby obtains a superior position that has no need of any legal special privilege. in the family, he is the bourgeois, the woman represents the proletariat. in the industrial world, however, the specific character of the economic oppression weighing on the proletariat appears in its sharpest outlines only after all special privileges of the capitalist class are abolished and the full legal equality of both classes is established. a democratic republic does not abolish the distinction between the two classes. on the contrary, it offers the battleground on which this distinction can be fought out. likewise the peculiar character of man's rule over woman in the modern family, the necessity and the manner of accomplishing the real social equality of the two, will appear in broad daylight only then, when both of them will enjoy complete legal equality. it will then be seen that the emancipation of women is primarily dependent on the re-introduction of the whole female sex into the public industries. to accomplish this, the monogamous family must cease to be the industrial unit of society. * * * * * we have, then, three main forms of the family, corresponding in general to the three main stages of human development. for savagery group marriage, for barbarism the pairing family, for civilization monogamy supplemented by adultery and prostitution. between the pairing family and monogamy, in the higher stage of barbarism, the rule of men over female slaves and polygamy is inserted. as we proved by our whole argument, the progress visible in this chain of phenomena is connected with the peculiarity of more and more curtailing the sexual freedom of the group marriage for women, but not for men. and group marriage is actually practised by men to this day. what is considered a crime for women and entails grave legal and social consequences for them, is considered honorable for men or in the worst case a slight moral blemish born with pleasure. but the more traditional hetaerism is changed in our day by capitalistic production and conforms to it, the more hetaerism is transformed into undisguised prostitution, the more demoralizing are its effects. and it demoralizes men far more than women. prostitution does not degrade the whole female sex, but only the luckless women that become its victims, and even those not to the extent generally assumed. but it degrades the character of the entire male world. especially a long engagement is in nine cases out of ten a perfect training school of adultery. we are now approaching a social revolution, in which the old economic foundations of monogamy will disappear just as surely as those of its complement, prostitution. monogamy arose through the concentration of considerable wealth in one hand--a man's hand--and from the endeavor to bequeath this wealth to the children of this man to the exclusion of all others. this necessitated monogamy on the woman's, but not on the man's part. hence this monogamy of women in no way hindered open or secret polygamy of men. now, the impending social revolution will reduce this whole care of inheritance to a minimum by changing at least the overwhelming part of permanent and inheritable wealth--the means of production--into social property. since monogamy was caused by economic conditions, will it disappear when these causes are abolished? one might reply, not without reason: not only will it not disappear, but it will rather be perfectly realized. for with the transformation of the means of production into collective property, wage labor will also disappear, and with it the proletariat and the necessity for a certain, statistically ascertainable number of women to surrender for money. prostitution disappears and monogamy, instead of going out of existence, at last becomes a reality--for men also. at all events, the situation will be very much changed for men. but also that of women, and of all women, will be considerably altered. with the transformation of the means of production into collective property the monogamous family ceases to be the economic unit of society. the private household changes to a social industry. the care and education of children becomes a public matter. society cares equally well for all children, legal or illegal. this removes the care about the "consequences" which now forms the essential social factor--moral and economic--hindering a girl to surrender unconditionally to the beloved man. will not this be sufficient cause for a gradual rise of a more unconventional intercourse of the sexes and a more lenient public opinion regarding virgin honor and female shame? and finally, did we not see that in the modern world monogamy and prostitution, though antitheses, are inseparable and poles of the same social condition? can prostitution disappear without engulfing at the same time monogamy? here a new element becomes active, an element which at best existed only in the germ at the time when monogamy developed: individual sexlove. before the middle ages we cannot speak of individual sexlove. it goes without saying that personal beauty, intimate intercourse, harmony of inclinations, etc., awakened a longing for sexual intercourse in persons of different sex, and that it was not absolutely immaterial to men and women, with whom they entered into such most intimate intercourse. but from such a relation to our sexlove there is a long way yet. all through antiquity marriages were arranged for the participants by the parents, and the former quietly submitted. what little matrimonial love was known to antiquity was not subjective inclination, but objective duty; not cause, but corollary of marriage. love affairs in a modern sense occurred in classical times only outside of official society. the shepherds whose happiness and woe in love is sung by theocritos and moschus, such as daphnis and chloë of longos, all these were slaves who had no share in the state and in the daily sphere of the free citizen. outside of slave circles we find love affairs only as products of disintegration of the sinking old world. their objects are women who also are standing outside of official society, hetaerae that are either foreigners or liberated slaves: in athens since the beginning of its decline, in rome at the time of the emperors. if love affairs really occurred between free male and female citizens, it was only in the form of adultery. and to the classical love poet of antiquity, the old anakreon, sexlove in our sense was so immaterial, that he did not even care a fig for the sex of the beloved being. our sexlove is essentially different from the simple sexual craving, the eros, of the ancients. in the first place it presupposes mutual love. in this respect woman is the equal of man, while in the antique eros her permission is by no means always asked. in the second place our sexlove has such a degree of intensity and duration that in the eyes of both parties lack of possession and separation appear as a great, if not the greatest, calamity. in order to possess one another they play for high stakes, even to the point of risking their lives, a thing heard of only in adultery during the classical age. and finally a new moral standard is introduced for judging sexual intercourse. we not only ask: "was it legal or illegal?" but also: "was it caused by mutual love or not?" of course, this new standard meets with no better fate in feudal or bourgeois practice than all other moral standards--it is simply ignored. but neither does it fare worse. it is recognized just as much as the others--in theory, on paper. and that is all we can expect at present. where antiquity left off with its attempts at sexual love, there the middle ages resumed the thread: with adultery. we have already described the love of the knights that invented the day songs. from this love endeavoring to break through the bonds of marriage to the love destined to found marriage, there is a long distance which was never fully traversed by the knights. even in passing on from the frivolous romanic race to the virtuous germans, we find in the nibelungen song kriemhild, who secretly is no less in love with siegfried than he with her, meekly replying to gunther's announcement that he has pledged her in troth to a certain knight whom he does not name: "you need not beg for my consent; as you will demand, so i shall ever be; whomever you, sir, will select for my husband, i shall willingly take in troth." it does not enter her head at all that her love could find any consideration. gunther asks for brunhild, etzel for kriemhild without ever having seen one another. the same is true of the suit of gutrun sigebant of ireland for the norwegian ute and of hetel of hegelingen for hilda of ireland. when siegfried of morland, hartmut of oranien and herwig of sealand court gutrun, then it happens for the first time that the lady voluntarily decides, favoring the last named knight. as a rule the bride of the young prince is selected by his parents. only when the latter are no longer alive, he chooses his own bride with the advice of the great feudal lords who in all cases of this kind have a decisive voice. nor could it be otherwise. for the knight and the baron as well as for the ruler of the realm himself, marriage is a political act, an opportunity for increasing their power by new federations. the interest of the house must decide, not the arbitrary inclination of the individual. how could love have a chance to decide the question of marriage in the last instance under such conditions? the same held good for the bourgeois of the medieval towns, the members of the guilds. precisely the privileges protecting them, the clauses and restrictions of the guild charters, the artificial lines of division separating them legally, here from the other guilds, there from their journeymen and apprentices, drew a sufficiently narrow circle for the selection of a fitting bourgeois spouse. under such a complicated system, the question of fitness was unconditionally decided, not by individual inclination, but by family interests. in the overwhelming majority of cases the marriage contract thus remained to the end of the middle ages what it had been from the outset: a matter that was not decided by the parties most interested. in the beginning one was already married from his birth--married to a whole group of the other sex. in the later forms of group marriage, a similar relation was probably maintained, only under a continual narrowing of the group. in the pairing family it is the rule for mothers to exchange mutual pledges for the marriage of their children. here also the main consideration is given to new ties of relationship that will strengthen the position of the young couple in the gens and the tribe. and when with the preponderance of private property over collective property and with the interest for inheritance paternal law and monogamy assumed the supremacy, then marriage became still more dependent on economic considerations. the form of purchase marriage disappears, but the essence of the transaction is more and more intensified, so that not only the woman, but also the man have a fixed price--not according to his qualities, but to his wealth. that mutual fondness of the marrying parties should be the one factor dominating all others had always been unheard of in the practice of the ruling classes. such a thing occurred at best in romances or--among the oppressed classes that were not counted. this was the situation encountered by capitalist production when it began to prepare, since the epoch of geographical discoveries, for the conquest of the world by international trade and manufacture. one would think that this mode of making the marriage contract would have been extremely acceptable to capitalism, and it was. and yet--the irony of fate is inexplicable--capitalist production had to make the decisive breach through this mode. by changing all things into commodities, it dissolved all inherited and traditional relations and replaced time hallowed custom and historical right by purchase and sale, by the "free contract." and the english jurist, h. s. maine, thought he had made a stupendous discovery by saying that our whole progress over former epochs consisted in arriving from status to contract, from inherited to voluntarily contracted conditions. so far as this is correct, it had already been mentioned in the communist manifesto. but in order to make contracts, people must have full freedom over their persons, actions and possessions. they must furthermore be on terms of mutual equality. the creation of these "free" and "equal" people was precisely one of the main functions of capitalistic production. what though this was done at first in a half-conscious way and, moreover, in a religious disguise? since the lutheran and calvinist reformation the thesis was accepted that a human being is fully responsible for his actions only then, when these actions were due to full freedom of will. and it was held to be a moral duty to resist any compulsion for an immoral action. how did this agree with the prevailing practice of match-making? marriage according to bourgeois conception was a contract, a legal business affair, and the most important one at that, because it decided the weal and woe of body and spirit of two beings for life. at that time the agreement was formally voluntary; without the consent of the contracting parties nothing could be done. but it was only too well known how this consent was obtained and who were really the contracting parties. if, however, perfect freedom of decision is demanded for all other contracts, why not for this one? did not the two young people who were to be coupled together have the right freely to dispose of themselves, of their bodies and the organs of these? had not sexual love become the custom through the knights and was not, in opposition to knightly adultery, the love of married couples its proper bourgeois form? and if it was the duty of married couples to love one another, was it not just as much the duty of lovers to marry each other and nobody else? stood not the right of lovers higher than the right of parents, relatives and other customary marriage brokers and matrimonial agents? if the right of free personal investigation made its way unchecked into the church and religion, how could it bear with the insupportable claims of the older generation on the body, soul, property, happiness and misfortune of the younger generation? these questions had to be raised at a time when all the old ties of society were loosened and all traditional conceptions tottering. the size of the world had increased tenfold at a bound. instead of one quadrant of one hemisphere, the whole globe now spread before the eyes of west europeans who hastened to take possession of the other seven quadrants. and the thousand-year-old barriers of conventional medieval thought fell like the old narrow obstacles to marriage. an infinitely wider horizon opened out before the outer and inner eyes of humanity. what mattered the well-meaning propriety, what the honorable privilege of the guild overcome through generations to the young man tempted by the gold and silver mines of mexico and potosi? it was the knight errant time of the bourgeoisie. it had its own romances and love dreams, but on a bourgeois footing and, in the last instance, with bourgeois aims. thus it came about that the rising bourgeoisie more and more recognized the freedom of contracting in marriage and carried it through in the manner described above, especially in protestant countries, where existing institutions were most strongly shaken. marriage remained class marriage, but within the class a certain freedom of choice was accorded to the contracting parties. and on paper, in moral theory as in poetical description, nothing was more unalterably established than the idea that every marriage was immoral unless founded on mutual sex-love and perfectly free agreement of husband and wife. in short, the love match was proclaimed as a human right, not only as droit de l'homme--man's right--but also for once as droit de femme--woman's right. however, this human right differed from all other so-called human rights in one respect. while in practice other rights remained the privileges of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, and were directly or indirectly curtailed for proletarians, the irony of history once more asserted itself in this case. the ruling class remains subject to well-known economic influences and, therefore, shows marriage by free selection only in exceptional cases. but among the oppressed class, love matches are the rule, as we have seen. hence the full freedom of marriage can become general only after all minor economic considerations, that still exert such a powerful influence on the choice of a mate for life, have been removed by the abolition of capitalistic production and of the property relations created by it. then no other motive will remain but mutual fondness. since sexlove is exclusive by its very nature--although this exclusiveness is at present realized for women alone--marriage founded on sexlove must be monogamous. we have seen that bachofen was perfectly right in regarding the progress from group marriage to monogamy mainly as the work of women. only the advance from the pairing family to monogamy must be charged to the account of men. this advance implied, historically, a deterioration in the position of women and a greater opportunity for men to be faithless. remove the economic considerations that now force women to submit to the customary disloyalty of men, and you will place women on a equal footing with men. all present experiences prove that this will tend much more strongly to make men truly monogamous, than to make women polyandrous. however, those peculiarities that were stamped upon the face of monogamy by its rise through property relations, will decidedly vanish, namely the supremacy of men and the indissolubility of marriage. the supremacy of man in marriage is simply the consequence of his economic superiority and will fall with the abolition of the latter. the indissolubility of marriage is partly the consequence of economic conditions, under which monogamy arose, partly tradition from the time where the connection between this economic situation and monogamy, not yet clearly understood, was carried to extremes by religion. to-day, it has been perforated a thousand times. if marriage founded on love is alone moral, then it follows that marriage is moral only as long as love lasts. the duration of an attack of individual sexlove varies considerably according to individual disposition, especially in men. a positive cessation of fondness or its replacement by a new passionate love makes a separation a blessing for both parties and for society. but humanity will be spared the useless wading through the mire of a divorce case. what we may anticipate about the adjustment of sexual relations after the impending downfall of capitalist production is mainly of a negative nature and mostly confined to elements that will disappear. but what will be added? that will be decided after a new generation has come to maturity: a race of men who never in their lives have had any occasion for buying with money or other economic means of power the surrender of a woman; a race of women who have never had any occasion for surrendering to any man for any other reason but love, or for refusing to surrender to their lover from fear of economic consequences. once such people are in the world, they will not give a moment's thought to what we to-day believe should be their course. they will follow their own practice and fashion their own public opinion about the individual practice of every person--only this and nothing more. but let us return to morgan from whom we moved away a considerable distance. the historical investigation of social institutions developed during the period of civilization exceeds the limits of his book. hence the vicissitudes of monogamy during this epoch occupy him very briefly. he also sees in the further development of the monogamous family a progress, an approach to perfect equality of the sexes, without considering this aim fully realized. but he says: "when the fact is accepted that the family has passed through four successive forms, and is now in a fifth, the question at once arises whether this form can be permanent in the future. the only answer that can be given is that it must advance as society advances, and change as society changes, even as it has done in the past. it is the creature of the social system, and will reflect its culture. as the monogamian family has improved greatly since the commencement of civilization, and very sensibly in modern times, it is at least supposable that it is capable of still farther improvement until the equality of the sexes is attained. should the monogamian family in the distant future fail to answer the requirements of society, assuming the continuous progress of civilization, it is impossible to predict the nature of its successor." footnotes: [7] author's note. how little bachofen understood what he had discovered, or rather guessed, is proved by the term "hetaerism," which he applies to this primeval stage. hetaerism designated among the greeks an intercourse of men, single or living in monogamy, with unmarried women. it always presupposes the existence of a well defined form of marriage, outside of which this intercourse takes place, and includes the possibility of prostitution. in another sense this word was never used, and i use it in this sense with morgan. bachofen's very important discoveries are everywhere mystified in the extreme by his idea that the historical relations of man and wife have their source in the religious conceptions of a certain period, not in the economic conditions of life. [8] translator's note. the female of the european cuckoo (cuculus canorus) keeps intercourse with several males in different districts during the same season. still, this is far from the human polyandry, in which the men and one women all live together in the same place, the men mutually tolerating one another, which male cuckoos do not. [9] westermarck, the history of human marriage, london, 1891. [10] espinas, des societes animales, 1877. [11] espinas, l. c., quoted by giraud-teulon, origines du mariage et de la famille, 1884, p. 518-20. [12] author's note. in the spring of 1882, marx expressed himself in the strongest terms on the total misrepresentation of primeval times by wagner's nibelungen text: "who ever heard of a brother embracing his sister as a bride?" to these lascivious wagnerian gods who in truly modern style are rendering their love quarrels more spicy by a little incest, marx replies: "in primeval times the sister was the wife and that was moral." (to the fourth edition.) a french friend and admirer of wagner does not consent to this foot note, and remarks that even in the oegisdrecka, the more ancient edda on which wagner built, loki denounces freya: "before the gods you embraced your own brother." this, he says, proves that marriage between brother and sister was interdicted even then. but the oegisdrecka is the expression of a time when the belief in the old myths was totally shaken; it is a truly lucian satire on the gods. if loki as mephisto denounces freya in this manner, then it is rather a point against wagner. loki also says, a few verses further on, to niordhr: "with your sister you generated (such) a son" ("vidh systur thinni gatzu slikan mog"). niordhr is not an asa, but a vana, and says in the ynglinga saga that marriages between brothers and sisters are sanctioned in vanaland, which is not the case among the asas. this would indicate that the vanas are older gods than the asas. at any rate niordhr lived on equal terms with the asas, and the oegisdrecka is thus rather a proof that at the time of the origin of the norwegian mythology the marriage of brother and sister was not yet repulsive, at least not to the gods. in trying to excuse wagner it might be better to quote goethe instead of the edda. this poet commits a similar error in his ballad of the god and the bajadere in regard to the religious surrender of women and approaches modern prostitution far too closely. [13] there is no longer any doubt that the traces of unrestricted sexual intercourse, which bachofen alleges to have found--called "incestuous generation" by him--are traceable to group marriage. if bachofen considers those punaluan marriages "lawless," a man of that period would look upon most of our present marriages between near and remote cousins on the father's or mother's side as incestuous, being marriages between consanguineous relatives.--marx. [14] the people of india. [15] see translator's note, p. 55. [16] translator's note. according to cunow, kroki and kumite are phratries. see "die verwandschaftsorganizationen der australneger," by heinrich cunow. stuttgart, dietz verlag, 1894. [17] translator's note. heinrich cunow has given us the results of his most recent investigations in his "verwandschaftsorganisationen der australneger." he sums up his studies in these words: "while morgan and fison regard the system of marriage classes as an original organization preceding the so-called punaluan family, i have found that the class is indeed older than the gens, having its origin in the different strata of generations characteristic of the "consanguine family" of morgan; but the present mode of classification in force among kamilaroi, kabi, yuipera, etc., cannot have arisen until a much later time, when the gentile institution had already grown out of the horde. this system of classification does not represent the first timid steps of evolution; it is not the most primitive of any known forms of social organization, but an intermediate form that takes shape together with the gentile society, a stage of transition to a pure gentile organization. in this stage, the generic classification in strata of different ages belonging to the so-called consanguine family runs parallel for a while with the gentile order.... it would have been easy for me to quote the testimony of travelers and ethnologists in support of the conclusions drawn by me from the forms of relationship among australian negroes. but i purposely refrain from doing this, with a few exceptions, first because i do not wish to write a general history of the primitive family, and, secondly, because i consider all references of this kind as very doubtful testimony, unless they are accompanied by an analysis of the entire organization. we frequently find analogies to the institutions of a lower stage in a high stage, and yet they are founded on radically different premises and causes. the evolution of the australian aborigines shows that. among the australians of the lower stage, e. g., the hordes are endogamous, among those of the middle stage they are exogamous, and in the higher stage they are again endogamous. but while in the one instance the marriage in the horde is conditioned on the fact that the more remote relatives are not yet excluded from sexual intercourse, it is founded in the other case on the difference between local and sexual organization. furthermore, the marriage between daughter and father is permitted in the lower stage, and again in that higher stage, where the class organization of the kamilaroi is on the verge of dissolution. but in both cases the circle of those who are regarded as fathers is entirely different. the character of an institution can only be perfectly understood, if we examine its connection with the entire organization, and, if possible, trace its metamorphoses in the preceding stages.... the characteristic feature of the class system is that by the side of the gentile order, such as is found among the north american indians, there is always another system of four marriage classes for the purpose of limiting sexual intercourse between certain groups of relatives. neither the phratry nor the gens of the kamilaroi forms a distinct territorial community. their members are scattered among different roving hordes, and they only meet occasionally, e. g., to celebrate a feast or dance.... the origin of gentile systems out of punaluan groups has never been proven, while we see among the australian negroes that the classes are clearly and irrefutably in existence among the first traces of gentilism.... the class system in its original form is a conclusive proof of morgan's theory, that the first step in the formation of systems of relationship consisted in prohibiting sexual intercourse between parents and children (in a wider sense).... it has been often disputed that the punaluan family ever existed outside of the sandwich islands. but the marriage institutions of certain australian tribes named by me prove the contrary. the pirrauru of the dieyerie is absolutely identical with the punalua of the hawaiians; and these institutions were not described by travelers who rushed through the territories of those tribes without knowing their language, but by men who lived among them for decades and fully mastered their dialects.... i have shown how far the class system corresponds to the hawaiian system. it is and remains a fact, that it contains a long series of terms that cannot be explained by the relations in the so-called consanguine family, and the use of which creates confusion, if applied to this family. but that simply shows that morgan was mistaken about the age and present structure of the hawaiian system. it does not prove that it could not have grown on the basis assumed by him.... if the opponents of morgan dispute that the so-called consanguine family is based on blood kinship, they are right, unless we wish to assign an exceptional position to the australian strata of generations. but if they go further and declare that the subsequent restrictions of inbreeding and the gentile order have arisen independently of relationships, they commit a far greater mistake than morgan. they block their way to an understanding of subsequent organizations and force themselves to all sorts of queer assumptions that at once appear as the fruits of imagination, when compared with the actual institutions of primitive peoples. this explanation of the phases of development of family institutions contradicts present day views on the matter. since the scientific investigations of the last decade have demonstrated beyond doubt that the so-called patriarchal family was preceded by the matriarchal family, it has become the custom to regard descent by females as a natural institution belonging to the very first stages of development which is explained by the modes of existence and thought among savages. paternity being a matter of speculation, maternity of actual observation, it is supposed to follow that descent by females was always recognized. but the development of the australian systems of relationship shows that this is not true, at least not in regard to australians. the fact cannot be disputed away, that we find female lineage among all those higher developed tribes that have progressed to the formation of gentile organizations, but male lineage among all those that have no gentile organizations or where these are only in process of formation. not a single tribe has been discovered so far, where female lineage was not combined with gentile organization, and i doubt that any will ever be found." [18] the history of human marriage, p. 28-29. [19] mutterrecht, p. xix. [20] a journey in brazil. boston and new york, 1886. page 266. [21] bancroft, native races, i., 81. [22] ibidem, p. 584. [23] morgan, ancient society, p. 504. chapter iii. the iroquois gens. we now come to another discovery of morgan that is at least as important as the reconstruction of the primeval form of the family from the systems of kinship. it is the proof that the sex organizations within the tribe of north american indians, designated by animal names, are essentially identical with the genea of the greeks and the gentes of the romans; that the american form is the original from which the greek and roman forms were later derived; that the whole organization of greek and roman society during primeval times in gens, phratry and tribe finds its faithful parallel in that of the american indians; that the gens is an institution common to all barbarians up to the time of civilization--at least so far as our present sources of information reach. this demonstration has cleared at a single stroke the most difficult passages of remotest ancient greek and roman history. at the same time it has given us unexpected information concerning the fundamental outlines of the constitution of society in primeval times--before the introduction of the state. simple as the matter is after we have once found it out, still it was only lately discovered by morgan. in his work of 1871 he had not yet unearthed this mystery. its revelation has completely silenced for the time being those generally so overconfident english authorities on primeval history. the latin word gens, used by morgan generally for the designation of this sex organization, is derived, like the equivalent greek word genos, from the common aryan root gan, signifying to beget. gens, genos, sanskrit dschanas, gothic kuni, ancient norse and anglesaxon kyn, english kin, middle high german künne, all signify lineage, descent. gens in latin, genos in greek, specially designate that sex organization which boasted of common descent (from a common sire) and was united into a separate community by certain social and religious institutions, but the origin and nature of which nevertheless remained obscure to all our historians. elsewhere, in speaking of the punaluan family, we saw how the gens was constituted in its original form. it consisted of all individuals who by means of the punaluan marriage and in conformity with the conceptions necessarily arising in it made up the recognized offspring of a certain ancestral mother, the founder of that gens. since fatherhood is uncertain in this form of the family, female lineage is alone valid. and as brothers must not marry their sisters, but only women of foreign descent, the children bred from these foreign women do not belong to the gens, according to maternal law. hence only the offspring of the daughters of every generation remain in the same sex organization. the descendants of the sons are transferred to the gentes of the new mothers. what becomes of this group of kinship when it constitutes itself a separate group, distinct from similar groups in the same tribe? as the classical form of this original gens morgan selects that of the iroquois, more especially that of the seneca tribe. this tribe has eight gentes named after animals: 1. wolf. 2. bear. 3. turtle. 4. beaver. 5. deer. 6. snipe. 7. heron. 8. hawk. every gens observes the following customs: 1. the gens elects its sachem (official head during peace) and its chief (leader in war). the sachem must be selected within the gens and his office was in a sense hereditary. it had to be filled immediately after a vacancy occurred. the chief could be selected outside of the gens, and his office could even be temporarily vacant. the son never followed his father in the office of sachem, because the iroquois observed maternal law, in consequence of which the son belonged to another gens. but the brother or the son of a sister was often elected as a successor. men and women both voted in elections. the election, however, had to be confirmed by the other seven gentes, and then only the sachem-elect was solemnly invested, by the common council of the whole iroquois federation. the significance of this will be seen later. the power of the sachem within the tribe was of a paternal, purely moral nature. he had no means of coercion at his command. he was besides by virtue of his office a member of the tribal council of the senecas and of the federal council of the whole iroquois nation. the chief had the right to command only in times of war. 2. the gens can retire the sachem and the chief at will. this again is done by men and women jointly. the retired men are considered simple warriors and private persons like all others. the tribal council, by the way, can also retire the sachems, even against the will of the tribe. 3. no member is permitted to marry within the gens. this is the fundamental rule of the gens, the tie that holds it together. it is the negative expression of the very positive blood relationship, by virtue of which the individuals belonging to it become a gens. by the discovery of this simple fact morgan for the first time revealed the nature of the gens. how little the gens had been understood before him is proven by former reports on savages and barbarians, in which the different organizations of which the gentile order is composed are jumbled together without understanding and distinction as tribe, clan, thum, etc. sometimes it is stated that intermarrying within these organizations is forbidden. this gave rise to the hopeless confusion, in which mclennan could pose as napoleon and establish order by the decree: all tribes are divided into those that forbid intermarrying (exogamous) and those that permit it (endogamous). and after he had thus made confusion worse confounded, he could indulge in deep meditations which of his two preposterous classes was the older: exogamy or endogamy. by the discovery of the gens founded on affinity of blood and the resulting impossibility of its members to intermarry, this nonsense found a natural end. it is self understood that the marriage interdict within the gens was strictly observed at the stage in which we find the iroquois. 4. the property of deceased members fell to the share of the other gentiles; it had to remain in the gens. in view of the insignificance of the objects an iroquois could leave behind, the nearest gentile relations divided the heritage. was the deceased a man, then his natural brothers, sisters and the brothers of the mother shared in his property. was it a woman, then her children and natural sisters shared, but not her brothers. for this reason husband and wife could not inherit from one another, nor the children from the father. 5. the gentile members owed to each other help, protection and especially assistance in revenging injury inflicted by strangers. the individual relied for his protection on the gens and could be assured of it. whoever injured the individual, injured the whole gens. from this blood kinship arose the obligation to blood revenge that was unconditionally recognized by the iroquois. if a stranger killed a gentile member, the whole gens of the slain man was pledged to revenge his death. first mediation was tried. the gens of the slayer deliberated and offered to the gentile council of the slain propositions for atonement, consisting generally in expressions of regret and presents of considerable value. if these were accepted, the matter was settled. in the opposite case the injured gens appointed one or more avengers who were obliged to pursue the slayer and to kill him. if they succeeded, the gens of the slayer had no right to complain. the account was squared. 6. the gens had certain distinct names or series of names, which no other gens in the whole tribe could use, so that the name of the individual indicated to what gens he belonged. a gentile name at the same time bestowed gentile rights. 7. the gens may adopt strangers who thereby are adopted into the whole tribe. the prisoners of war who were not killed became by adoption into a gens tribal members of the senecas and thus received full gentile and tribal rights. the adoption took place on the motion of some gentile members, of men who accepted the stranger as a brother or sister, of women who accepted him as a child. the solemn introduction into the gens was necessary to confirm the adoption. frequently certain gentes that had shrunk exceptionally were thus strengthened by mass adoptions from another gens with the consent of the latter. among the iroquois the solemn introduction into the gens took place in a public meeting of the tribal council, whereby it actually became a religious ceremony. the existence of special religious celebrations among indian gentes can hardly be demonstrated. but the religious rites of the indians are more or less connected with the gens. at the six annual religious festivals of the iroquois the sachems and chiefs of the different gentes were added to the "keepers of the faith" and had the functions of priests. 9. the gens had a common burial place. among the iroquois of the state of new york, who are crowded by white men all around them, the burial place has disappeared, but it existed formerly. among other indians it is still in existence, e. g., among the tuscaroras, near relatives of the iroquois, where every gens has a row by itself in the burial place, although they are christians. the mother is buried in the same row as her children, but not the father. and among the iroquois the whole gens of the deceased attends the funeral, prepares the grave and provides the addresses, etc. 10. the gens had a council, the democratic assembly of all male and female gentiles of adult age, all with equal suffrage. this council elected and deposed its sachems and chiefs; likewise the other "keepers of the faith." it deliberated on gifts of atonement or blood revenge for murdered gentiles and it adopted strangers into the gens. in short, it was the sovereign power in the gens. the following are the rights and privileges of the typical indian gens, according to morgan: "all the members of an iroquois gens were personally free, and they were bound to defend each other's freedom; they were equal in privileges and in personal rights, the sachems and chiefs claiming no superiority; and they were a brotherhood bound together by ties of kin. liberty, equality and fraternity, though never formulated, were cardinal principles of the gens. these facts are material, because the gens was the unit of a social and governmental system, the foundation upon which indian society was organized. a structure composed of such units would of necessity bear the impress of their character, for as the unit, so the compound. it serves to explain that sense of independence and personal dignity universally an attribute of indian character." at the time of the discovery the indians of entire north america were organized in gentes by maternal law. only "in some tribes, as among the dakotas, the gentes had fallen out; in others as among the ojibwas, the omahas and the mayas of yucatan, descent had been changed from the female to the male line." among many indian tribes with more than five or six gentes we find three, four or more gentes united into a separate group, called phratry by morgan in accurate translation of the indian name by its greek equivalent. thus the senecas have two phratries, the first comprising gentes one to four, the second gentes five to eight. closer investigation shows that these phratries generally represent the original gentes that formed the tribe in the beginning. for the marriage interdict necessitated the existence of at least two gentes in a tribe in order to realize its separate existence. as the tribe increased, every gens segmented into two or more new gentes, while the original gens comprising all the daughter gentes, lived on in the phratry. among the senecas and most of the other indians "the gentes in the same phratry are brother gentes to each other, and cousin gentes to those of the other phratry"--terms that have a very real and expressive meaning in the american system of kinship, as we have seen. originally no seneca was allowed to marry within his phratry, but this custom has long become obsolete and is now confined to the gens. according to the tradition among the senecas, the bear and the deer were the two original gentes, from which the others were formed by segmentation. after this new institution had become well established it was modified according to circumstances. if certain gentes became extinct, it sometimes happened that by mutual consent the members of one gens were transferred in a body from other phratries. hence we find the gentes of the same name differently grouped in the phratries of the different tribes. "the phratry, among the iroquois, was partly for social and partly for religious objects." 1. in the ball game one phratry plays against another. each one sends its best players, the other members, upon different sides of the field, watch the game and bet against one another on the result. 2. in the tribal council the sachems and chiefs of each phratry are seated opposite one another, every speaker addressing the representatives of each phratry as separate bodies. 3. when a murder had been committed in the tribe, the slayer and the slain belonging to different phratries, the injured gens often appealed to its brother gentes. these held a phratry council which in a body addressed itself to the other phratry, in order to prevail on the latter to assemble in council and effect a condonation of the matter. in this case the phratry re-appears in its original gentile capacity, and with a better prospect of success than the weaker gens, its daughter. 4. at the funeral of prominent persons the opposite phratry prepared the interment and the burial rites, while the phratry of the deceased attended the funeral as mourners. if a sachem died, the opposite phratry notified the central council of the iroquois that the office of the deceased had become vacant. 5. in electing a sachem the phratry council also came into action. endorsement by the brother gentes was generally considered a matter of fact, but the gentes of the other phratry might oppose. in such a case the council of this phratry met, and if it maintained its opposition, the election was null and void. 6. formerly the iroquois had special religious mysteries, called medicine lodges by the white men. these mysteries were celebrated among the senecas by two religious societies that had a special form of initiation for new members; each phratry was represented by one of these societies. 7. if, as is almost certain, the four lineages occupying the four quarters of tlascalá at the time of the conquest were four phratries, then it is proved that the phratries were at the same time military units, as were the greek phratries and similar sex organizations of the germans. each of these four lineages went into battle as a separate group with its special uniform and flag and its own leader. just as several genres form a phratry so in the classical form several phratries form a tribe. in some cases the middle group, the phratry, is missing in strongly decimated tribes. what constitutes an indian tribe in america? 1. a distinct territory and a distinct name. every tribe had a considerable hunting and fishing ground beside the place of its actual settlement. beyond this territory there was a wide neutral strip of land reaching over to the boundaries of the next tribe; a smaller strip between tribes of related languages, a larger between tribes of foreign languages. this corresponds to the boundary forest of the germans, the desert created by caesar's suevi around their territory, the isârnholt (danish jarnved, latin limei danicus) between danes and germans, the sachsen wald (saxon forest) and the slavish branibor between slavs and germans giving the province of brandenburg its name. the territory thus surrounded by neutral ground was the collective property of a certain tribe, recognized as such by other tribes and defended against the invasion of others. the disadvantage of undefined boundaries became of practical importance only after the population had increased considerably. the tribal names generally seem to be more the result of chance than of intentional selection. in course of time it frequently happened that a tribe designated a neighboring tribe by another name than that chosen by itself. in this manner the germans received their first historical name from the celts. 2. a distinct dialect peculiar to this tribe. as a matter of fact the tribe and the dialect are co-extensive. in america, the formation of new tribes and dialects by segmentation was in progress until quite recently, and doubtless it is still going on. where two weak tribes amalgamated into one, there it exceptionally happened that two closely related dialects were simultaneously spoken in the same tribe. the average strength of american tribes is less than 2,000 members. the cherokees, however, number about 26,000, the greatest number of indians in the united states speaking the same dialect. 3. the right to solemnly invest the sachems and chiefs elected by the gentes, and 4. the right to depose them, even against the will of the gens. as these sachems and chiefs are members of the tribal council, these rights of the tribe explain themselves. where a league of tribes had been formed and all the tribes were represented in a feudal council, the latter exercised these rights. 5. the possession of common religious conceptions (mythology) and rites. "after the fashion of barbarians the american indians were a religious people." their mythology has not yet been critically investigated. they materialized their religious conceptions--spirits of all sorts--in human shapes, but the lower stage of barbarism in which they lived, knows nothing as yet of so-called idols. it is a cult of nature and of the elements, in process of evolution to pantheism. the different tribes had regular festivals with prescribed forms of worship, mainly dances and games. especially dancing was an essential part of all religious celebrations. every tribe celebrated by itself. 6. a tribal council for public affairs. it was composed of all the sachems and chiefs of the different gentes, real representatives because they could be deposed at any moment. it deliberated in public, surrounded by the rest of the tribal members, who had a right to take part in the discussions and claim attention. the council decided. as a rule any one present gained a hearing on his demand. the women could also present their views by a speaker of their choice. among the iroquois the final resolution had to be passed unanimously, as was also the case in some resolutions of german mark (border) communities. it was the special duty of the tribal council to regulate the relations with foreign tribes. the council received and despatched legations, declared war and made peace. war was carried on principally by volunteers. "theoretically, each tribe was at war with every other tribe with which it had not formed a treaty of peace." expeditions against such enemies were generally organized by certain prominent warriors. they started a war dance, and whoever took part in it thereby declared his intention to join the expedition. ranks were formed and the march began immediately. the defense of the attacked tribal territory was also generally carried on by volunteers. the exodus and the return of such columns was always the occasion of public festivities. the consent of the tribal council for such expeditions was not required, and was neither asked nor given. this corresponds to the private war expeditions of german followers described by tacitus. only these german groups of followers had already assumed a more permanent character, forming a standing center organized during peace, around which the other volunteers gathered in case of war. such war columns were rarely strong in numbers. the most important expeditions of the indians, even for long distances, were undertaken by insignificant forces. if more than one group joined for a great expedition, every group obeyed its own leader. the uniformity of the campaign plan was secured as well as possible by a council of these leaders. this is the mode of warfare among the allemani in the fourth century on the upper rhine, as described by ammianus marcellinus. 7. in some tribes we find a head chief, whose power, however, is limited. he is one of the sachems who has to take provisional measures in cases requiring immediate action, until the council can assemble and decide. he represents a feeble, but generally undeveloped prototype of an official with executive power. the latter, as we shall see, developed in most cases out of the highest war chief. the great majority of american indians did not go beyond the league of tribes. with a few tribes of small membership, separated by wide boundary tracts, weakened by unceasing warfare, they occupied an immense territory. leagues were now and then formed by kindred tribes as the result of momentary necessity and dissolved again under more favorable conditions. but in certain districts, tribes of the same kin had again found their way out of disbandment into permanent federations, making the first step towards the formation of nations. in the united states we find the highest form of such a league among the iroquois. emigrating from their settlements west of the mississippi, where they probably formed a branch of the great dakota family, they settled at last after long wanderings in the present state of new york. they had five tribes: senecas, cayugas, onondagas, oneidas and mohawks. they lived on fish, venison, and the products of rough gardening, inhabiting villages protected by stockades. their number never exceeded 20,000, and certain gentes were common to all five tribes. they spoke closely related dialects of the same language and occupied territories contiguous to one another. as this land was won by conquest, it was natural for these tribes to stand together against the expelled former inhabitants. this led, not later than the beginning of the fifteenth century, to a regular "eternal league," a sworn alliance that immediately assumed an aggressive character, relying on its newly won strength. about 1675, at the summit of its power, it had conquered large districts round about and partly expelled the inhabitants, partly made them tributary. the iroquois league represented the most advanced social organization attained by indians that had not passed the lower stage of barbarism. this excludes only the mexicans, new mexicans and peruvians. the fundamental provisions of the league were: 1. eternal federation of the five consanguineous tribes on the basis of perfect equality and independence in all internal tribal matters. this consanguinity formed the true fundament of the league. three of these tribes, called father tribes, were brothers to one another; the other two, also mutual brothers, were called son tribes. the three oldest gentes were represented by living members in all five tribes, and these members were all regarded as brothers. three other gentes were still alive in three tribes, and all of their members called one another brothers. the common language, only modified by variations of dialect, was the expression and proof of their common descent. 2. the official organ of the league was a federal council of fifty sachems, all equal in rank and prominence. this council had the supreme decision in all federal matters. 3. on founding this league the fifty sachems had been assigned to the different tribes and gentes as holders of new offices created especially for federal purposes. vacancies were filled by new elections in the gens, and the holders of these offices could be deposed at will. but the right of installation belonged to the federal council. 4. these federal sachems were at the same time sachems of their tribe and had a seat and a vote in the tribal council. 5. all decisions of the federal council had to be unanimous. 6. the votes were cast by tribes, so that every tribe and the council members of each tribe had to vote together in order to adopt a final resolution. 7. any one of the five tribes could convoke the federal council, but the council could not convene itself. 8. federal meetings were held publicly in the presence of the assembled people. every iroquois could have the word, but the final decision rested with the council. 9. the league had no official head, no executive chief. 10. it had, however, two high chiefs of war, both with equal functions and power (the two "kings" of sparta, the two consuls of rome). this was the whole constitution, under which the iroquois lived over four hundred years and still live. i have described it more fully after morgan, because we have here an opportunity for studying the organization of a society that does not yet know a state. the state presupposes a public power of coërcion separated from the aggregate body of its members. maurer, with correct intuition, recognized the constitution of the german mark as a purely social institution, essentially different from that of a state, though furnishing the fundament on which a state constitution could be erected later on. hence in all of his writings, he traced the gradual rise of the public power of coërcion from and by the side of primordial constitutions of marks, villages, farms and towns. the north american indians show how an originally united tribe gradually spreads over an immense continent; how tribes by segmentation become nations, whole groups of tribes; how languages change so that they not only become unintelligible to one another, but also lose every trace of former unity; how at the same time one gens splits up into several gentes, how the old mother gentes are preserved in the phratries and how the names of these oldest gentes still remain the same in widely distant and long separated tribes. wolf and bear still are gentile names in a majority of all indian tribes. and the above named constitution is essentially applicable to all of them, except that many did not reach the point of forming leagues of related tribes. but once the gens was given as a social unit, we also see how the whole constitution of gentes, phratries and tribes developed with almost unavoidable necessity--because naturally--from the gens. all three of them are groups of differentiated consanguine relations. each is complete in itself, arranges its own local affairs and supplements the other groups. and the cycle of functions performed by them includes the aggregate of the public affairs of men in the lower stage of barbarism. wherever we find the gens as the social unit of a nation, we are justified in searching for a tribal organization similar to the one described above. and whenever sufficient material is at hand, as in greek and roman history, there we shall not only find such an organization, but we may also be assured, that the comparison with the american sex organizations will assist us in solving the most perplexing doubts and riddles in places where the material forsakes us. how wonderful this gentile constitution is in all its natural simplicity! no soldiers, gendarmes and policemen, no nobility, kings, regents, prefects or judges, no prisons, no lawsuits, and still affairs run smoothly. all quarrels and disputes are settled by the entire community involved in them, either the gens or the tribe or the various gentes among themselves. only in very rare cases the blood revenge is threatened as an extreme measure. our capital punishment is simply a civilized form of it, afflicted with all the advantages and drawbacks of civilization. not a vestige of our cumbersome and intricate system of administration is needed, although there are more public affairs to be settled than nowadays: the communistic household is shared by a number of families, the land belongs to the tribe, only the gardens are temporarily assigned to the households. the parties involved in a question settle it and in most cases the hundred-year-old traditions have settled everything beforehand. there cannot be any poor and destitute--the communistic households and the gentes know their duties toward the aged, sick and disabled. all are free and equal--the women included. there is no room yet for slaves, nor for the subjugation of foreign tribes. when about 1651 the iroquois had vanquished the eries and the "neutral nation," they offered to adopt them into the league on equal terms. only when the vanquished declined this offer they were driven out of their territory. what splendid men and women were produced by such a society! all the white men who came into contact with unspoiled indians admired the personal dignity, straightforwardness, strength of character and bravery of these barbarians. we lately received proofs of such bravery in africa. a few years ago the zulus, and some months ago the nubians, both of which tribes still retain the gentile organization, did what no european army can do. armed only with lances and spears, without any firearms, they advanced under a hail of bullets from breechloaders up to the bayonets of the english infantry--the best of the world for fighting in closed ranks--and threw them into confusion more than once, yea, even forced them to retreat in spite of the immense disparity of weapons, and in spite of the fact that they have no military service and don't know anything about drill. how enduring and able they are, is proved by the complaints of the english who admit that a kaffir can cover a longer distance in twenty-four hours than a horse. the smallest muscle springs forth, hard and tough like a whiplash, says an english painter. such was human society and its members, before the division into classes had taken place. and a comparison of that social condition with the condition of the overwhelming majority of present day society shows the enormous chasm that separates our proletarian and small farmer from the free gentile of old. that is one side of the question. we must not overlook, however, that this organization was doomed. it did not pass beyond the tribe. the league of tribes marked the beginning of its downfall, as we shall see, and as the attempts of the iroquois at subjugating others showed. whatever went beyond the tribe, went outside of gentilism. where no direct peace treaty existed, there war reigned from tribe to tribe. and this war was carried on with the particular cruelty that distinguishes man from other animals, and that was modified later on simply by self-interest. the gentile constitution in its most flourishing time, such as we saw it in america, presupposed a very undeveloped state of production, hence a population thinly scattered over a wide area. man was almost completely dominated by nature, a strange and incomprehensible riddle to him. his simple religious conceptions clearly reflect this. the tribe remained the boundary line for man, as well in regard to himself as to strangers outside. the gens, the tribe and their institutions were holy and inviolate. they were a superior power instituted by nature, and the feelings, thoughts and actions of the individual remained unconditionally subject to them. commanding as the people of this epoch appear to us, nothing distinguishes one from another. they are still attached, as marx has it, to the navel string of the primordial community. the power of these natural and spontaneous communities had to be broken, and it was. but it was done by influences that from the very beginning bear the mark of degradation, of a downfall from the simple moral grandeur of the old gentile society. the new system of classes is inaugurated by the meanest impulses: vulgar covetousness, brutal lust, sordid avarice, selfish robbery of common wealth. the old gentile society without classes is undermined and brought to fall by the most contemptible means: theft, violence, cunning, treason. and during all the thousands of years of its existence, the new society has never been anything else but the development of the small minority at the expense of the exploited and oppressed majority. more than ever this is true at present. chapter iv. the grecian gens. greeks, pelasgians and other nations of the same tribal origin were constituted since prehistoric times on the same systematic plan as the americans: gens, phratry, tribe, league of tribes. the phratry might be missing, as e. g. among the dorians; the league of tribes might not be fully developed in every case; but the gens was everywhere the unit. at the time of their entrance into history, the greeks were on the threshold of civilization. two full periods of evolution are stretching between the greeks and the above named american tribes. the greeks of the heroic age are by so much ahead of the iroquois. for this reason the grecian gens no longer retains the archaic character of the iroquois gens. the stamp of group marriage is becoming rather blurred. maternal law had given way to paternal lineage. rising private property had thus made its first opening in the gentile constitution. a second opening naturally followed the first: paternal law being now in force, the fortune of a wealthy heiress would have fallen to her husband in the case of her marriage. that would have meant the transfer of her wealth from her own gens to that of her husband. in order to avoid this, the fundament of gentile law was shattered. in such a case, the girl was not only permitted, but obliged to intermarry within the gens, in order to retain the wealth in the latter. according to grote's history of greece, the gens of attica was held together by the following bonds: 1. common religious rites and priests installed exclusively in honor of a certain divinity, the alleged gentile ancestor, who was designated by a special by-name in this capacity. 2. a common burial ground. (see demosthenes' eubulides.) 3. right of mutual inheritance. 4. obligation to mutually help, protect and assist one another in case of violence. 5. mutual right and duty to intermarry in the gens in certain cases, especially for orphaned girls or heiresses. 6. possession of common property, at least in some cases, and an archon (supervisor) and treasurer elected for this special case. the phratry united several gentes, but rather loosely. still we find in it similar rights and duties, especially common religious rites and the right of avenging the death of a phrator. again, all the phratries of a tribe had certain religious festivals in common that recurred at regular intervals and were celebrated under the guidance of a phylobasileus (tribal head) selected from the ranks of the nobles (eupatrides). so far grote. and marx adds: "the savage (e. g. the iroquois) is still plainly visible in the grecian gens." on further investigation we find additional proofs of this. for the grecian gens has also the following attributes: 7. paternal lineage. 8. prohibition of intermarrying in the gens except in the case of heiresses. this exception formulated as a law clearly proves the validity of the old rule. this is further substantiated by the universally accepted custom that a woman in marrying renounced the religious rites of her gens and accepted those of her husband's gens. she was also registered in his phratry. according to this custom and to a famous quotation in dikaearchos, marriage outside of the gens was the rule. becker in "charikles" directly assumes that nobody was permitted to intermarry in the gens. 9. the right to adopt strangers in the gens. it was exercised by adoption into the family under public formalities; but it was used sparingly. 10. the right to elect and depose the archons. we know that every gens had its archon. as to the heredity of the office, there is no reliable information. until the end of barbarism, the probability is always against strict heredity. for it is absolutely incompatible with conditions where rich and poor had perfectly equal rights in the gens. not alone grote, but also niebuhr, mommsen and all other historians of classical antiquity, were foiled by the gens. though they chronicled many of its distinguishing marks correctly, still they always regarded it as a group of families and thus prevented their understanding the nature and origin of gentes. under the gentile constitution, the family never was a unit of organization, nor could it be so, because man and wife necessarily belonged to two different gentes. the gens was wholly comprised in the phratry, the phratry in the tribe. but the family belonged half to the gens of the man, and half to that of the woman. nor does the state recognize the family in public law. to this day, the family has only a place in private law. yet all historical records take their departure from the absurd supposition, which was considered almost inviolate during the eighteenth century, that the monogamous family, an institution scarcely older than civilization, is the nucleus around which society and state gradually crystallized. "mr. grote will also please note," throws in marx, "that the gentes, which the greeks traced to their mythologies, are older than the mythologies. the latter together with their gods and demi-gods were created by the gentes." grote is quoted with preference by morgan as a prominent and quite trustworthy witness. he relates that every attic gens had a name derived from its alleged ancestor; that before solon's time, and even after, it was customary for the gentiles (gennêtes) to inherit the fortunes of their intestate deceased; and that in case of murder first the relatives of the victim had the duty and the right to prosecute the criminal, after them the gentiles and finally the phrators. "whatever we may learn about the oldest attic laws is founded on the organization in gentes and phratries." the descent of the gentes from common ancestors has caused the "schoolbred philistines," as marx has it, much worry. representing this descent as purely mythical, they are at a loss to explain how the gentes developed out of independent and wholly unrelated families. but this explanation must be given, if they wish to explain the existence of the gentes. they then turn around in a circle of meaningless gibberish and do not get beyond the phrase: the pedigree is indeed a fable, but the gens is a reality. grote finally winds up--the parenthetical remarks are by marx: "we rarely hear about this pedigree, because it is used in public only on certain very festive occasions. but the less prominent gentes had their common religious rites (very peculiar, mr. grote!) and their common superhuman ancestor and pedigree just like the more prominent gentes (how very peculiar this, mr. grote, in less prominent gentes!); and the ground plan and the ideal fundament (my dear sir! not ideal, but carnal, anglice "fleshly") was the same in all of them." marx sums up morgan's reply to this as follows: "the system of consanguinity corresponding to the archaic form of the gens--which the greeks once possessed like other mortals--preserved the knowledge of the mutual relation of all members of the gens. they learned this important fact by practice from early childhood. with the advent of the monogamous family this was gradually forgotten. the gentile name created a pedigree by the side of which that of the monogamous family seemed insignificant. this name had now the function of preserving the memory of the common descent of its bearers. but the pedigree of the gens went so far back that the gentiles could no longer actually ascertain their mutual kinship, except in a limited number of more recent common ancestors. the name itself was the proof of a common descent and sufficed always except in cases of adoption. to actually dispute all kinship between gentiles after the manner of grote and niebuhr, who thus transform the gens into a purely hypothetical and fictitious creation of the brain, is indeed worthy of "ideal" scientists, that is book worms. because the relation of the generations, especially on the advent of monogamy, is removed to the far distance, and the reality of the past seems reflected in phantastic imaginations, therefore the brave old philistines concluded and conclude that the imaginary pedigree created real gentes!" the phratry was, as among the americans, a mother-gens comprising several daughter gentes, and often traced them all to the same ancestor. according to grote "all contemporaneous members of the phratry of hekataeos were descendants in the sixteenth degree of one and the same divine ancestor." all the gentes of this phratry were therefore literally brother gentes. the phratry is mentioned by homer as a military unit in that famous passage where nestor advises agamemnon: "arrange the men by phratries and tribes so that phratry may assist phratry, and tribe the tribe." the phratry has the right and the duty to prosecute the death of a phrator, hence in former times the duty of blood revenge. it has, furthermore, common religious rites and festivals. as a matter of fact, the development of the entire grecian mythology from the traditional old aryan cult of nature was essentially due to the gentes and phratries and took place within them. the phratry had an official head (phratriarchos) and also, according to de coulanges, meetings and binding resolutions, a jurisdiction and administration. even the state of a later period, while ignoring the gens, left certain public functions to the phratry. the tribe consisted of several kindred phratries. in attica there were four tribes of three phratries each; the number of gentes in each phratry was thirty. such an accurate division of groups reveals the fact of a conscious and well-planned interference with the natural order. how, when and why this was done is not disclosed by grecian history. the historical memory of the greeks themselves does not reach beyond the heroic age. closely packed in a comparatively small territory as the greeks were, their dialectic differences were less conspicuous than those developed in the wide american forests. yet even here we find only tribes of the same main dialect united in a larger organization. little attica had its own dialect which later on became the prevailing language in grecian prose. in the epics of homer we generally find the greek tribes combined into small nations, but so that their gentes, phratries and tribes retained their full independence. they already lived in towns fortified by walls. the population increased with the growth of the herds, with agriculture and the beginnings of the handicrafts. at the same time the differences in wealth became more marked and gave rise to an aristocratic element within the old primordial democracy. the individual little nations carried on an unceasing warfare for the possession of the best land and also for the sake of looting. slavery of the prisoners of war was already well established. the constitution of these tribes and nations was as follows: 1. a permanent authority was the council (bule), originally composed of the gentile archons, but later on, when their number became too great, recruited by selection in such a way that the aristocratic element was developed and strengthened. dionysios openly speaks of the council at the time of the heroes as being composed of nobles (kratistoi). the council had the final decision in all important matters. in aeschylos, e. g. the council of thebes decides that the body of eteokles be buried with full honors, the body of polynikes, however, thrown out to be devoured by the dogs. with the rise of the state this council was transformed into the senate. 2. the public meeting (agora). we saw how the iroquois, men and women, attended the council meetings, taking an orderly part in the discussions and influencing them. among the homeric greeks, this attendance had developed to a complete public meeting. this was also the case with the germans of the archaic period. the meeting was called by the council. every man could demand the word. the final vote was taken by hand raising (aeschylos in "the suppliants," 607), or by acclamation. the decision of the meeting was supreme and final. "whenever a matter is discussed," says schoemann in "antiquities of greece," "which requires the participation of the people for its execution, homer does not indicate any means by which the people could be forced to it against their will." it is evident that at a time when every able-bodied member of the tribe was a warrior, there existed as yet no public power apart from the people that might have been used against them. the primordial democracy was still in full force, and by this standard the influence and position of the council and of the basileus must be judged. 3. the military chief (basileus). marx makes the following comment: "the european scientists, mostly born servants of princes, represent the basileus as a monarch in the modern sense. the yankee republican morgan objects to this. very ironically but truthfully he says of the oily gladstone and his "juventus mundi": 'mr. gladstone, who presents to his readers the grecian chiefs of the heroic age as kings and princes, with the superadded qualities of gentlemen, is forced to admit that, on the whole we seem to have the custom or law of primogeniture sufficiently, but not oversharply defined.' as a matter of fact, mr. gladstone himself must have perceived that a primogeniture resting on a clause of 'sufficient but not oversharp' definition is as bad as none at all." we saw how the law of heredity was applied to the offices of sachems and chiefs among the iroquois and other indians. all offices were subject to the vote of the gentiles and for this reason hereditary in the gens. a vacancy was filled preferably by the next gentile relative--the brother or the sister's son--unless good reasons existed for passing him. that in greece, under paternal law, the office of basileus was generally transmitted to the son or one of the sons, indicates only that the probability of succession by public election was in favor of the sons. it implies by no means a legal succession without a vote of the people. we here perceive simply the first rudiments of segregated families of aristocrats among iroquois and greeks, which led to a hereditary leadership or monarchy in greece. hence the facts are in favor of the opinion that among greeks the basileus was either elected by the people or at last was subject to the indorsement of their appointed organs, the council or agora, as was the case with the roman king (rex). in the iliad the ruler of men, agamemnon, does not appear as the supreme king of the greeks, but as general in chief of a federal army besieging a city. and when dissensions had broken out among the greeks, it is this quality which odysseus points out in a famous passage: "evil is the rule of the many; let one be the ruler, one the chief" (to which the popular verse about the scepter was added later on). odysseus does not lecture on the form of government, but demands obedience to the general in chief. considering that the greeks before troy appear only in the character of an army, the proceedings of the agora are sufficiently democratic. in referring to presents, that is the division of the spoils, achilles always leaves the division, not to agamemnon or some other basileus, but to the "sons of the achaeans," the people. the attributes, descendant of zeus, bred by zeus, do not prove anything, because every gens is descended from some god--the gens of the leader of the tribe from a "prominent" god, in this case zeus. even those who are without personal freedom, as the swineherd eumaeos and others, are "divine" (dioi or theioi), even in the odyssey, which belongs to a much later period than the iliad. in the same odyssey, the name of "heros" is given to the herald mulios as well as to the blind bard demodokos. in short, the word "basileia," with which the greek writers designate the so-called monarchy of homer (because the military leadership is its distinguishing mark, by the side of which the council and the agorâ are existing), means simply--military democracy (marx). the basileus had also sacerdotal and judiciary functions beside those of a military leader. the judiciary functions are not clearly defined, but the functions of priesthood are due to his position of chief representative of the tribe or of the league of tribes. there is never any mention of civil, administrative functions. but it seems that he was ex-officio a member of the council. the translation of basileus by king is etymologically quite correct, because king (kuning) is derived from kuni, künne, and signifies chief of a gens. but the modern meaning of the word king in no way designates the functions of the grecian basileus. thucydides expressly refers to the old basileia as patrikê, that is "derived from the gens," and states that it had well defined functions. and aristotle says that the basileia of heroic times was a leadership of free men and that the basileus was a military chief, a judge and a high priest. hence the basileus had no governmental power in a modern sense.[24] in the grecian constitution of heroic times, then, we still find the old gentilism fully alive, but we also perceive the beginnings of the elements that undermine it; paternal law and inheritance of property by the father's children, favoring accumulation of wealth in the family and giving to the latter a power apart from the gens; influence of the difference of wealth on the constitution by the formation of the first rudiments of hereditary nobility and monarchy; slavery, first limited to prisoners of war, but already paving the way to the enslavement of tribal and gentile associates; degeneration of the old feuds between tribes a regular mode of existing by systematic plundering on land and sea for the purpose of acquiring cattle, slaves, and treasures. in short, wealth is praised and respected as the highest treasure, and the old gentile institutions are abused in order to justify the forcible robbery of wealth. only one thing was missing: an institution that not only secured the newly acquired property of private individuals against the communistic traditions of the gens, that not only declared as sacred the formerly so despised private property and represented the protection of this sacred property as the highest purpose of human society, but that also stamped the gradually developing new forms of acquiring property, of constantly increasing wealth, with the universal sanction of society. an institution that lent the character of perpetuity not only to the newly rising division into classes, but also to the right of the possessing classes to exploit and rule the non-possessing classes. and this institution was found. the state arose. footnote: [24] author's note. just as the grecian basileus, so the aztec military chief was misrepresented as a modern prince. morgan was the first to submit to historical criticism the reports of the spaniards who first misapprehended and exaggerated, and later on consciously misrepresented the functions of this office. he showed that the mexicans were in the middle stage of barbarism, but on a higher plane than the new mexican pueblo indians, and that their constitution, so far as the garbled accounts show, corresponded to this stage: a league of three tribes which had made a number of others tributary and was administered by a federal council and a federal chief of war, whom the spaniards construed into an "emperor." chapter v. origin of the attic state. how the state gradually developed by partly transforming the organs of the gentile constitution, partly replacing them by new organs and finally installing real state authorities; how the place of the nation in arms defending itself through its gentes, phratries and tribes, was taken by an armed public power of coërcion in the hands of these authorities and available against the mass of the people; nowhere can we observe the first act of this drama so well as in ancient athens. the essential stages of the various transformations are outlined by morgan, but the analysis of the economic causes producing them is largely added by myself. in the heroic period, the four tribes of the athenians were still installed in separate parts of attica. even the twelve phratries composing them seem to have had separate seats in the twelve different towns of cecrops. the constitution was in harmony with the period: a public meeting (agorâ), a council (bûlê) and a basileus. as far back as we can trace written history we find the land divided up and in the possession of private individuals. for during the last period of the higher stage of barbarism the production of commodities and the resulting trade had well advanced. grain, wine and oil were staple articles. the sea trade on the aegean sea drifted more and more out of the hands of the phoenicians into those of the athenians. by the purchase and sale of land, by continued division of labor between agriculture and industry, trade and navigation, the members of gentes, phratries and tribes very soon intermingled. the districts of the phratry and the tribe received inhabitants who did not belong to these bodies and, therefore, were strangers in their own homes, although they were countrymen. for during times of peace, every phratry and every tribe administered its own affairs without consulting the council of athens or the basileus. but inhabitants not belonging to the phratry or the tribe could not take part in the administration of these bodies. thus the well-regulated functions of the gentile organs became so disarranged that relief was already needed during the heroic period. a constitution attributed to theseus was introduced. the main feature of this change was the institution of central administration in athens. a part of the affairs that had so long been conducted autonomously by the tribes was declared collective business and transferred to a general council in athens. this step of the athenians went farther than any ever taken by the nations of america. for the simple federation of autonomous tribes was now replaced by the conglomeration of all tribes into one single body. the next result was a common athenian law, standing above the legal traditions of the tribes and gentes. it bestowed on the citizens of athens certain privileges and legal protection, even in a territory that did not belong to their tribe. this meant another blow to the gentile constitution; for it opened the way to the admission of citizens who were not members of any attic tribe and stood entirely outside of the athenian gentile constitution. a second institution attributed to theseus was the division of the entire nation into three classes regardless of the gentes, phratries and tribes: eupatrides or nobles, geomoroì or farmers, and demiurgoi or tradesmen. the exclusive privilege of the nobles to fill the offices was included in this innovation. apart from this privilege the new division remained ineffective, as it did not create any legal distinctions between the classes. but it is important, because it shows us the new social elements that had developed in secret. it shows that the habitual holding of gentile offices by certain families had already developed into a practically uncontested privilege; that these families, already powerful through their wealth, began to combine outside of their gentes into a privileged class; and that the just arising state sanctioned this assumption. it shows furthermore that the division of labor between farmers and tradesmen had grown strong enough to contest the supremacy of the old gentile and tribal division of society. and finally it proclaims the irreconcilable opposition of gentile society to the state. the first attempt to form a state broke up the gentes by dividing their members against one another and opposing a privileged class to a class of disowned belonging to two different branches of production. the ensuing political history of athens up to the time of solon is only incompletely known. the office of basileus became obsolete. archons elected from the ranks of the nobility occupied the leading position in the state. the power of the nobility increased continually, until it became unbearable about the year 600 before christ. the principal means for stifling the liberty of the people were--money and usury. the main seat of the nobility was in and around athens. there the sea trade and now and then a little convenient piracy enriched them and concentrated the money into their hands. from this point the gradually arising money power penetrated like corrugating acid into the traditional modes of rural existence founded on natural economy. the gentile constitution is absolutely irreconcilable with money rule. the ruin of the attic farmers coïncided with the loosening of the old gentile bonds that protected them. the debtor's receipt and the pawning of the property--for the mortgage was also invented by the athenians--cared neither for the gens nor for the phratry. but the old gentile constitution knew nothing of money, advance and debt. hence the ever more virulently spreading money rule of the nobility developed a new legal custom, securing the creditor against the debtor and sanctioning the exploitation of the small farmer by the wealthy. all the rural districts of attica were crowded with mortgage columns bearing the legend that the lot on which they stood was mortgaged to such and such for so much. the fields that were not so designated had for the most part been sold on account of overdue mortgages or interest and transferred to the aristocratic usurers. the farmer could thank his stars, if he was granted permission to live as a tenant on one-sixth of the product of his labor and to pay five-sixths to his new master in the form of rent. worse still, if the sale of the lot did not bring sufficient returns to cover the debt, or if such a debt had been contracted without a lien, then the debtor had to sell his children into slavery abroad in order to satisfy the claim of the creditor. the sale of the children by the father--that was the first fruit of paternal law and monogamy! and if that did not satisfy the bloodsuckers, they could sell the debtor himself into slavery. such was the pleasant dawn of civilization among the people of attica. formerly, while the condition of the people was in keeping with gentile traditions, a similar downfall would have been impossible. but here it had come about, nobody knew how. let us return for a moment to the iroquois. the state of things that had imposed itself on the athenians almost without their doing, so to say, and assuredly against their will, was inconceivable among the indians. there the ever unchanging mode of production could at no time generate such conflicts as a distinction between rich and poor, exploiters and exploited, caused by external conditions. the iroquois were far from controlling the forces of nature, but within the limits drawn for them by nature they dominated their own production. apart from a failure of the crops in their little gardens, the exhaustion of the fish supply in their lakes and rivers or of the game stock in their forests, they always knew what would be the outcome of their mode of gaining a living. a more or less abundant supply of food, that would come of it. but the outcome could never be any unpremeditated social upheavals, breaking of gentile bonds or division of the gentiles against one another by conflicting class interests. production was carried on in the most limited manner; but--the producers controlled their own product. this immense advantage of barbarian production was lost in the transition to civilization. to win it back on the basis of man's present gigantic control of nature and of the free association rendered possible by it, that will be the task of the next generations. not so among the greeks. the advent of private property in herds of cattle and articles of luxury led to an exchange between individuals, to a transformation of products into commodities. here is the root of the entire revolution that followed. when the producers did no longer consume their own product, but released their hold of it in exchange for another's product, then they lost the control of it. they did not know any more what became of it. there was a possibility that the product might be turned against the producers for the purpose of exploiting and oppressing them. no society can, therefore, retain for any length of time the control of its own production and of the social effects of the mode of production, unless it abolishes exchange between individuals. how rapidly after the establishment of individual exchange and after the transformation of products into commodities the product manifests its rule over the producer, the athenians were soon to learn. along with the production of marketable commodities came the tilling of the soil by individual cultivators for their own account, soon followed by individual ownership of the land. along came also the money, that general commodity for which all others could be exchanged. but when men invented money they little suspected that they were creating a new social power, that one universal power before which the whole of society must bow down. it was this new power, suddenly sprung into existence without the forethought and intention of its own creators, that vented its rule on the athenians with the full brutality of youth. what was to be done? the old gentile organization had not only proved impotent against the triumphant march of money: it was also absolutely incapable of containing within its confines any such thing as money, creditors, debtors and forcible collection of debts. but the new social power was upon them and neither pious wishes nor a longing for the return of the good old times could drive money and usury from the face of the earth. moreover, gentile constitution had suffered a number of minor defeats. the indiscriminate mingling of the gentiles and phrators in the whole of attica, and especially in athens, had assumed larger proportions from generation to generation. still even now a citizen of athens was not allowed to sell his residence outside of his gens, although he could do so with plots of land. the division of labor between the different branches of production--agriculture, trades, numberless specialties within the trades, commerce, navigation, etc.--had developed more fully with the progress of industry and traffic. the population was now divided according to occupations into rather well defined groups, everyone of which had separate interests not guarded by the gens or phratry and therefore necessitating the creation of new offices. the number of slaves had increased considerably and must have surpassed by far that of the free athenians even at this early stage. gentile society originally knew no slavery and was, therefore, ignorant of any means to hold this mass of bondsmen in check. and finally, commerce had attracted a great many strangers who settled in athens for the sake of the easier living it afforded. according to the old constitution, the strangers had neither civil rights nor the protection of the law. though tacitly admitted by tradition, they remained a disturbing and foreign element. in short, gentile constitution approached its doom. society was daily growing more and more beyond it. it was powerless to stop or allay even the most distressing evils that had grown under its very eyes. but in the meantime the state had secretly developed. the new groups formed by division of labor, first between city and country, then between the various branches of city industry, had created new organs for the care of their interests. public offices of every description had been instituted. and above all the young state needed its own fighting forces. among the seafaring athenians this had to be at first only a navy, for occasional short expeditions and the protection of the merchant vessels. at some uncertain time before solon, the naukrariai were instituted, little territorial districts, twelve in each tribe. every naukraria had to furnish, equip and man a war vessel and to detail two horsemen. this arrangement was a twofold attack on the gentile constitution. in the first place it created a public power of coërcion that did no longer absolutely coincide with the entirety of the armed nation. in the second place it was the first division of the people for public purposes, not by groups of kinship, but by local residence. we shall soon see what that signified. as the gentile constitution could not come to the assistance of the exploited people, they could look only to the rising state. and the state brought help in the form of the constitution of solon. at the same time it added to its own strength at the expense of the old constitution. solon opened the series of so-called political revolutions by an infringement on private property. we pass over the means by which this reform was accomplished in the year 594 b. c. or thereabout. ever since, all revolutions have been revolutions for the protection of one kind of property against another kind of property. they cannot protect one kind without violating another. in the great french revolution the feudal property was sacrificed for the sake of saving bourgeois property. in solon's revolution, the property of the creditors had to make concessions to the property of the debtors. the debts were simply declared illegal. we are not acquainted with the accurate details, but solon boasts in his poëms that he removed the mortgage columns from the indented lots and enabled all who had fled or been sold abroad for debts to return home. this was only feasible by an open violation of private property. and indeed, all so-called political revolutions were started for the protection of one kind of property by the confiscation, also called theft, of another kind of property. it is absolutely true that for more than 2,500 years private property could only be protected by the violation of private property. but now a way had to be found to avoid the return of such an enslavement of the free athenians. this was first attempted by general measures, e. g., the prohibition of contracts giving the person of the debtor in lien. furthermore a maximum limit was fixed for the amount of land any one individual could own, in order to keep the craving of the nobility for the land of the farmers within reasonable bounds. constitutional amendments were next in order. the following deserve special consideration: the council was increased to four hundred members, one hundred from each tribe. here, then, the tribe still served as a basis. but this was the only remnant of the old constitution that was transferred to the new body politic. for otherwise solon divided the citizens into four classes according to their property in land and its yield. five hundred, three hundred and one hundred and fifty medimnoi of grain (1 medimnos equals 1.16 bushels) were the minimum yields of the first three classes. whoever had less land or none at all belonged to the fourth class. only members of the first three classes could hold office; the highest offices were filled by the first class. the fourth class had only the right to speak and vote in the public council. but here all officials were elected, here they had to give account, here all the laws were made, and here the fourth class was in the majority. the aristocratic privileges were partly renewed in the form of privileges of wealth, but the people retained the decisive power. the four classes also formed the basis for the reorganization of the fighting forces. the first two classes furnished the horsemen; the third had to serve as heavy infantry; the fourth was employed as light unarmored infantry and had to man the navy. probably the last class also received wages in this case. an entirely new element is thus introduced into the constitution: private property. the rights and duties of the citizens are graduated according to their property in land. wherever the classification by property gains ground, there the old groups of blood relationship give way. gentile constitution has suffered another defeat. however, the gradation of political rights according to private property was not one of those institutions without which a state cannot exist. it may have been ever so important in the constitutional development of some states. still a good many others, and the most completely developed at that, had no need of it. even in athens it played only a passing role. since the time of aristides, all offices were open to all the citizens. during the next eighty years the athenian society gradually drifted into the course on which it further developed in the following centuries. the outrageous land speculation of the time before solon had been fettered, likewise the excessive concentration of property in land. commerce, trades and artisan handicrafts, which were carried on in an ever larger scale as slave labor increased, became the ruling factors in gaining a living. public enlightenment advanced. instead of exploiting their own fellow citizens in the old brutal style, the athenians now exploited mainly the slaves and the customers outside. movable property, wealth in money, slaves and ships, increased more and more. but instead of being a simple means for the purchase of land, as in the old stupid times, it had now become an end in itself. the new class of industrial and commercial owners of wealth now waged a victorious competition against the old nobility. the remnants of the old gentile constitution lost their last hold. the gentes, phratries and tribes, the members of which now were dispersed all over attica and completely intermixed, had thus become unavailable as political groups. a great many citizens of athens did not belong to any gens. they were immigrants who had been adopted into citizenship, but not into any of the old groups of kinship. besides, there was a steadily increasing number of foreign immigrants who were only protected by traditional sufferance. meanwhile the struggles of the parties proceeded. the nobility tried to regain their former privileges and for a short time recovered their supremacy, until the revolution of kleisthenes (509 b. c.) brought their final downfall and completed the ruin of gentile law. in his new constitution, kleisthenes ignored the four old tribes founded on the gentes and phratries. their place was taken by an entirely new organization based on the recently attempted division of the citizens into naukrariai according to residence. no longer was membership in a group of kindred the dominant fact, but simply local residence. not the nation, but the territory was now divided; the inhabitants became mere political fixtures of the territory. the whole of attica was divided into one hundred communal districts, so-called demoi, every one of which was autonomous. the citizens living in a demos (demotoi) elected their official head (demarchos), treasurer and thirty judges with jurisdiction in minor cases. they also received their own temple and divine guardian or heros, whose priest they elected. the control of the demos was in the hands of the council of demotoì. this is, as morgan correctly remarks, the prototype of the autonomous american township. the modern state in its highest development ended in the same unit with which the rising state began its career in athens. ten of these units (demoi) formed a tribe, which, however, was now designated as local tribe in order to distinguish it from the old sex tribe. the local tribe was not only an autonomous political, but also a military group. it elected the phylarchos or tribal head who commanded the horsemen, the taxiarchos commanding the infantry and the strategic leader, who was in command of the entire contingent raised in the tribal territory by conscription. the local tribe furthermore furnished, equipped and fully manned five war vessels. it was designated by the name of the attic hero who was its guardian deity. it elected fifty councilmen into the council of athens. thus we arrive at the athenian state, governed by a council of five hundred elected by and representing the ten tribes and subject to the vote of the public meeting, where every citizen could enter and vote. archons and other officials attended to the different departments of administration and justice. by this new constitution and by the admission of a large number of aliens, partly freed slaves, partly immigrants, the organs of gentile constitution were displaced in public affairs. they became mere private and religious clubs. but their moral influence, the traditional conceptions and views of the old gentile period, survived for a long time and expired only gradually. this was evident in another state institution. we have seen that an essential mark of the state consists in a public power of coërcion divorced from the mass of the people. athens possessed at that time only a militia and a navy equipped and manned directly by the people. these afforded protection against external enemies and held the slaves in check, who at that time already made up the large majority of the population. for the citizens, this coërcive power at first only existed in the shape of the police, which is as old as the state. the innocent frenchmen of the 18th century, therefore, had the habit of speaking not of civilized, but of policed nations (nations policées). the athenians, then, provided for a police in their new state, a veritable "force" of bowmen on foot and horseback. this police force consisted--of slaves. the free athenian regarded this police duty as so degrading that he preferred being arrested by an armed slave rather than lending himself to such an ignominious service. that was still a sign of the old gentile spirit. the state could not exist without a police, but as yet it was too young and did not command sufficient moral respect to give prestige to an occupation that necessarily appeared ignominious to the old gentiles. how well this state, now completed in its main outlines, suited the social condition of the athenians was apparent by the rapid growth of wealth, commerce and industry. the distinction of classes on which the social and political institutions are resting was no longer between nobility and common people, but between slaves and freemen, aliens and citizens. at the time of the greatest prosperity the whole number of free athenian citizens, women and children included, amounted to about 90,000; the slaves of both sexes numbered 365,000 and the aliens--foreigners and freed slaves--45,000. per capita of each adult citizen there were, therefore, at least eighteen slaves and more than two aliens. the great number of slaves is explained by the fact that many of them worked together in large factories under supervision. the development of commerce and industry brought about an accumulation and concentration of wealth in a few hands. the mass of the free citizens were impoverished and had to face the choice of either competing with their own labor against slave labor, which was considered ignoble and vile, besides promising little success, or to be ruined. under the prevailing circumstances they necessarily chose the latter course and being in the majority they ruined the whole attic state. not democracy caused the downfall of athens, as the european glorifiers of princes and lickspittle schoolmasters would have us believe, but slavery ostracizing the labor of the free citizen. the origin of the state among the athenians presents a very typical form of state organization. for it took place without any marring external interference or internal obstruction--the usurpation of pisistratos left no trace of its short duration. it shows the direct rise of a highly developed form of a state, the democratic republic, out of gentile society. and finally, we are sufficiently acquainted with all the essential details of the process. chapter vi. gens and state in rome. the legend of the foundation of rome sets forth that the first colonization was undertaken by a number of latin gentes (one hundred, so the legend says) united into one tribe. a sabellian tribe (also said to consist of one hundred gentes) soon followed, and finally a third tribe of various elements, but again numbering one hundred gentes, joined them. the whole tale reveals at the first glance that little more than the gens was borrowed from reality, and that the gens itself was in certain cases only an offshoot of an old mother gens still existing at home. the tribes bear the mark of artificial composition on their foreheads; still they were made up of kindred elements and after the model of the old spontaneous, not artificial tribe. at the same time it is not impossible that a genuine old tribe formed the nucleus of every one of these three tribes. the connecting link, the phratry, contained ten gentes and was called curia. hence there were thirty curiae. the roman gens is recognized as an institution identical with the grecian gens. the grecian gens being a continuation of the same social unit, the primordial form of which we found among the american indians, the same holds naturally good of the roman gens, and we can be more concise in its treatment. at least during the most ancient times of the city, the roman gens had the following constitution: 1. mutual right of inheritance for gentiles; the wealth remained in the gens. paternal law being already in force in the roman the same as in the grecian gens, the offspring of female lineage were excluded. according to the law of the twelve tablets, the oldest written law of rome known to us, the natural children had the first title to the estate; in case no natural children existed, the agnati (kin of male lineage) took their place; and last in line came the gentiles. in all cases the property remained in the gens. here we observe the gradual introduction of new legal provisions, caused by increased wealth and monogamy, into the gentile practice. the originally equal right of inheritance of the gentiles was first limited in practice to the agnati, no doubt at a very remote date, and afterwards to the natural children and their offspring of male lineage. of course this appears in the reverse order on the twelve tablets. 2. possession of a common burial ground. the patrician gens claudia, on immigrating into rome from regilli, was assigned to a separate lot of land and received its own burial ground in the city. as late as the time of augustus, the head of varus, who had been killed in the teutoburger wald, was brought to rome and interred in the gentilitius tumulus; hence his gens (quinctilia) still had its own tomb. 3. common religious rites. these are well-known under the name of sacra gentilitia. 4. obligation not to intermarry in the gens. it seems that this was never a written law in rome, but the custom remained. among the innumerable names of roman couples preserved for us there is not a single case, where husband and wife had the same gentile name. the law of inheritance proves the same rule. by marrying, a woman loses her agnatic privileges, discards her gens, and neither she nor her children have any title to her father's estate nor to that of his brothers, because otherwise the gens of her father would lose his property. this rule has a meaning only then when the woman is not permitted to marry a gentile. 5. a common piece of land. in primeval days this was always obtained when the tribal territory was first divided. among the latin tribes we find the land partly in the possession of the tribe, partly of the gens, and partly of the households that could hardly represent single families at such an early date. romulus is credited with being the first to assign land to single individuals, about 2.47 acres (two jugera) per head. but later on we still find some land in the hands of the gentes, not to mention the state land, around which turns the whole internal history of the republic. 6. duty of the gentiles to mutually protect and assist one another. written history records only remnants of this law. the roman state from the outset manifested such superior power, that the duty of protection against injury devolved upon it. when appius claudius was arrested, his whole gens, including his personal enemies, dressed in mourning. at the time of the second punic war the gentes united for the purpose of ransoming their captured gentiles. the senate vetoed this. 7. right to bear the gentile name. this was in force until the time of the emperors. freed slaves were permitted to assume the gentile name of their former master, but this did not bestow any gentile rights on them. 8. right of adopting strangers into the gens. this was done by adoption into the family (the same as among the indians) which brought with it the adoption into the gens. 9. the right to elect and depose chiefs is not mentioned anywhere. but inasmuch as during the first years of rome's existence all offices were filled by election or nomination, from the king downward, and as the curiae elected also their own priests, we are justified in assuming the same in regard to gentile chiefs (principes)--no matter how well established the rule of choosing the candidates from the same family have been. such were the constitutional rights of a roman gens. with the exception of the completed transition to paternal law, they are the true image of the rights and duties of an iroquois gens. here, also, "the iroquois is still plainly visible." how confused the ideas of our historians, even the most prominent of them, are when it comes to a discussion of the roman gens, is shown by the following example: in mommsen's treatise on the roman family names of the republican and augustinian era (römische forschungen, berlin, 1864, vol. i.) he writes: "the gentile name was not only borne by all male gentiles including all adopted and wards, except, of course, the slaves, but also by the women.... the tribe (so mommsen translates gens) is a common organization resulting from a common--actual, assumed or even invented--ancestor and united by common rites, burial grounds and customs of inheritance. all free individuals, hence women also, may and must claim membership in them. but the definition of the gentile name of the married women offers some difficulty. this is indeed obviated, as long as women were not permitted to marry any one but their gentiles. and we have proofs that for a long time the women found it much more difficult to marry outside than inside of the gens. this right of marrying outside, the gentis enuptio, was still bestowed as a personal privilege and reward during the sixth century.... but wherever such outside marriages occurred in primeval times, the woman must have been transferred to the tribe of her husband. nothing is more certain than that by the old religious marriage woman was completely adopted into the legal and sacramental group of her husband and divorced from her own. who does not know that the married woman releases her active and passive right of inheritance in favor of her gentiles, but enters the legal group of her husband, her children and his gentiles? and if her husband adopts her as his child into his family, how can she remain separated from his gens?" (pages 9-11.) here mommsen asserts that the roman women belonging to a certain gens were originally free to marry only within their gens; the roman gens, according to him, was therefore endogamous, not exogamous. this opinion which contradicts the evidence of all other nations, is principally, if not exclusively, founded on a single much disputed passage of livy (book xxxix, c. 19). according to this passage, the senate decreed in the year 568 of the city, i. e., 186 b. c., (uti feceniae hispallae datió, deminutio, gentis enuptio, tutoris optio idem esset quasi ei vir testamento dedisset; utique ei ingenuo nubere liceret, neu quid ei qui eam duxisset, ob id fraudi ignominiaeve esset)--that fecenia hispalla shall have the right to dispose of her property, to diminish it, to marry outside of the gens, to choose a guardian, just as if her (late) husband had conferred this right on her by testament; that she shall be permitted to marry a freeman and that for the man who marries her this shall not constitute a misdemeanor or a shame. without a doubt fecenia, a freed slave, here obtains permission to marry outside of the gens. and equally doubtless the husband here has the right to confer on his wife by testament the right to marry outside of the gens after his death. but outside of which gens? if a woman had to intermarry in the gens, as mommsen assumes, then she remained in this gens after her marriage. but in the first place, this assertion of an endogamous gens must be proven. and in the second place, if the women had to intermarry in the gens, then the men had to do the same, otherwise there could be no marriage. then we arrive at the conclusion that the man could bequeath a right to his wife, which he did not have for himself. this is a legal impossibility. mommsen feels this very well, and hence he supposes: "the marriage outside of the gens most probably required not only the consent of the testator, but of all gentiles." (page 10, footnote.) this is not only a very daring assertion, but contradicts also the clear wording of the passage. the senate gives her this right as a proxy of her husband; they expressly give her no more and no less than her husband could have given her, but what they do give is an absolute right, independent of all limitations, so that, if she should make use of it, her new husband shall not suffer in consequence. the senate even instructs the present and future consuls and praetors to see that no inconvenience arise to her from the use of this right. mommsen's supposition is therefore absolutely inadmissible. then again: suppose a woman married a man from another gens, but remained in her own gens. according to the passage quoted above, her husband would then have had the right to permit his wife to marry outside of her own gens. that is, he would have had the right to make provisions in regard to the affairs of a gens to which he did not belong at all. the thing is so utterly unreasonable that we need not lose any words about it. nothing remains but to assume that the woman in her first marriage wedded a man from another gens and thereby became a member of her husband's gens. mommsen admits this for such cases. then the whole matter at once explains itself. the woman, torn away from her old gens by her marriage and adopted into the gentile group of her husband, occupies a peculiar position in the new gens. she is now a gentile, but not a kin by blood. the manner of her entrance from the outset excludes all prohibition of intermarrying in the gens, into which she has come by marriage. she is adopted into the family relations of the gens and inherits some of the property of her husband when he dies, the property of a gentile. what is more natural than that this property should remain in the gens and that she should be obliged to marry a gentile of her husband and no other? if, however, an exception is to be made, who is so well entitled to authorize her as her first husband who bequeathed his property to her? at the moment when he bequeathes on her a part of his property and simultaneously gives her permission to transfer this property by marriage or as a result of marriage to a strange gens, he still is the owner of this property, hence he literally disposes of his personal property. as for the woman and her relation to the gens of her husband, it is he who by an act of his own free will--the marriage--introduced her into his gens. therefore it seems quite natural that he should be the proper person to authorize her to leave this gens by another marriage. in short, the matter appears simple and obvious, as soon as we discard the absurd conception of an endogamous roman gens and accept morgan's originally exogamous gens. there is still another view which has probably found the greatest number of advocates. according to them the passage in livy only means "that freed slave girls (libertae) cannot without special permission, e gente enubere (marry outside of the gens) or undertake any of the steps which, together with capitis deminutio minima[25] (the loss of family rights) would lead to a transfer of the liberta to another gens." (lange, römische alterthümer, berlin, 1856, i, p. 185, where our passage from livy is explained by a reference to huschke.) if this view is correct, then the passage proves still less for the relations of free roman women, and there is so much less ground for speaking of their obligation to intermarry in the gens. the expression enuptio gentis (marriage outside of the gens) occurs only in this single passage and is not found anywhere else in the entire roman literature. the word enubere (to marry outside) is found only three times likewise in livy, and not in reference to the gens. the phantastic idea that roman women had to intermarry in the gens owes its existence only to this single passage. but it cannot be maintained. for either the passage refers to special restrictions for freed slave women, in which case it proves nothing for free women (ingenuae). or it applies also to free women, in which case it rather proves that the women as a rule married outside of the gens and were transferred by their marriage to their husbands' gens. this would be a point for morgan against mommsen. almost three hundred years after the foundation of rome the gentile bonds were still so strong that a patrician gens, the fabians, could obtain permission from the senate to undertake all by itself a war expedition against the neighboring town of veii. three hundred and six fabians are said to have marched and to have been killed from ambush. only one boy was left behind to propagate the gens. ten gentes, we said, formed a phratry, named curia. it was endowed with more important functions than the grecian phratry. every curia had its own religious rites, sacred possessions and priests. the priests of one curia in a body formed one of the roman clerical collegiums. ten curiae formed a tribe which probably had originally its own elected chief--leader in war and high priest--like the rest of the latin tribes. the three tribes together formed the populus romanus, the roman people. hence nobody could belong to the roman people, unless he was a member of a roman gens, and thus a member of a curia and tribe. the first constitution of the roman people was as follows. public affairs were conducted by the senate composed, as niebuhr was the first to state correctly, of the chiefs of the three hundred gentes. because they were the elders of the gentes they were called patres, fathers, and as a body senatus, council of elders, from senex, old. here also the customary choice of men from the same family of the gens brought to life the first hereditary nobility. these families were called patricians and claimed the exclusive right to the seats in the senate and to all other offices. the fact that in the course of time the people admitted this claim so that it became an actual privilege is confirmed by the legendary report that romulus bestowed the rank of patrician and its privileges on the first senators. the senate, like the athenian boulê, had to make the final decision in many affairs and to undertake the preliminary discussion of more important matters, especially of new laws. these were settled by the public meeting, the so-called comitia curiata (assembly of curiae.) the people met in curiae, probably grouped by gentes, and every one of the thirty curiae had one vote. the assembly of curiae adopted or rejected all laws, elected all higher officials including the rex (so-called king), declared war (but the senate concluded peace), and decided as a supreme court, on appeal, all cases involving capital punishment of roman citizens. by the side of the senate and the public meeting stood the rex, corresponding to the grecian basileus, and by no means, such an almost absolute king as mommsen would have it.[26] the rex was also a military leader, a high priest and a chairman of certain courts. he had no other functions, nor any power over life, liberty and property of the citizens, except such as resulted from his disciplinary power as military leader or from his executive power as president of a court. the office of rex was not hereditary. on the contrary, he was elected, probably on the suggestion of his predecessor, by the assembly of curiae and then solemnly invested by a second assembly. that he could also be deposed is proved by the fate of tarquinius superbus. as the greeks at the time of the heroes, so the romans at the time of the so-called kings lived in a military democracy based on and developed from a constitution of gentes, phratries and tribes. what though the curiae and tribes were partly artificial formations, they were moulded after the genuine and spontaneous models of a society from which they originated and that still surrounded them on all sides. and though the sturdy patrician nobility had already gained ground, though the reges attempted gradually to enlarge the scope of their functions--all this does not change the elementary and fundamental character of the constitution, and this alone is essential. meantime the population of the city of rome and of the roman territory, enlarged by conquest, increased partly by immigration, partly through the inhabitants of the annexed districts, latins most of them. all these new members of the state (we disregard here the clients) stood outside of the old gentes, curiae and tribes and so did not form a part of the populus romanus, the roman people proper. they were personally free, could own land, had to pay taxes and were subject to military service. but they were not eligible to office and could neither take part in the assembly of curiae nor in the distribution of conquered state lands. they made up the mass of people excluded from all public rights, the plebs. by their continually growing numbers, their military training and armament they became a threat for the old populus who now closed their ranks hermetically against all new elements. the land seems to have been about evenly divided between populus and plebs, while the mercantile and industrial wealth, though as yet not very considerable, may have been mainly in the hands of the plebs. in view of the utter darkness that enwraps the whole legendary origin of rome's historical beginning--a darkness that was rendered still more intense by the rationalistic and overofficious interpretations and reports of the juristically trained authors that wrote on the subject--it is impossible to make any definite statements about the time, the course and the motive of the revolution that put an end to the old gentile constitution. we are certain only that the causes arose out of the fights between the plebs and the populus. the new constitution, attributed to rex servius tullius and following the grecian model, more especially that of solon, created a new public assembly including or excluding all the members of populus and plebs according to whether they rendered military service or not. the whole population, subject to enlistment, was divided into six classes according to wealth. the lowest limitis in the five highest classes were: i., 100,000 ass; ii., 75,000; iii., 50,000; iv., 25,000; v., 11,000; which according to dureau de la malle is equal to about $3,155, $2,333, $1,555, $800, and $388. the sixth class, the proletarians, consisted of those who possessed less and were exempt from military service and taxes. in this new assembly of centuriae (comitia centuriata) the citizens formed ranks after the manner of soldiers, in companies of one hundred (centuria), and every centuria had one vote. now the first class placed 80 centuriae in the field; the second 22, the third 20, the fourth 22, the fifth 30 and the sixth, for propriety's sake, one. to this were added 18 centuriae of horsemen composed of the most wealthy. hence, there were 193 centuriae, giving a lowest majority vote of 97. now the horsemen and the first class alone had together 98 votes. being in the majority, they had only to agree, and they could pass any resolution without asking the consent of the other classes. this new assembly of centuriae assumed all the political rights of the former assembly of curiae, a few nominal privileges excepted. the curiae and the gentes composing them now were degraded to mere private and religious congregations, analogous to their attic prototypes, and as such they vegetated on for a long time. but the assembly of curiae soon became obsolete. in order to drive also the three old tribes out of existence, a system of four local tribes was introduced. every tribe was assigned to one quarter of the city and received certain political rights. thus the old social order of blood kinship was destroyed also in rome even before the abolition of the so-called royalty. a new constitution, founded on territorial division and difference of wealth took its place and virtually created the state. the public power of coërcion consisted here of citizens liable to military duty, to be used against the slaves and the so-called proletarians who were excluded from military service and general armament. after the expulsion of the last rex, tarquinius superbus, who had really usurped royal power, the new constitution was further improved by the institution of two military leaders (consuls) with equal powers, analogous to the custom of the iroquois. the whole history of the roman republic moves inside of this constitution: the struggles between patricians and plebs for admission to office and participation in the allotment of state lands, the merging of the patrician nobility in the new class of large property and money owners; the gradual absorption by the latter of all the land of the small holders who had been ruined by military service; the cultivation of these enormous new tracts by slaves; the resulting depopulation of italy which not only opened the doors to the imperial tyrants, but also to their successors, the german barbarians. footnotes: [25] translator's note. the term caput received the meaning of legal right of a person from the legal status of the head of a family.... legal science extended the meaning of the term so that it related not alone to slaves, but also to minors and women. this legal right, so conceived, could be curtailed in three ways: capitis deminutio maxima was the loss of the status libertatis (personal liberty), which included the loss of the status civitatis and familiae (civil and family rights); the capitis deminutio minor or media was the loss of the status civitatis (civil rights), including the loss of the status familiae (family rights); the capitis deminutio minima was the loss of the status familiae (family rights). lange, römische alterthümer, berlin, 1876, vol. i., p. 204. [26] author's note. the latin rex is equivalent to the celtic-irish righ (tribal chief) and the gothic reiks. that this, like the german fürst, english first and danish forste, originally signified gentile or tribal chief is evident from the fact that the goths in the fourth century already had a special term for the king of later times, the military chief of a whole nation, viz., thiudans. in ulfila's translation of the bible artaxerxes and herod are never called reiks, but thiudans, and the empire of the emperor tiberius not reiki, but thiudinassus. in the name of the gothic thiudans, or king as we inaccurately translate, thiudareiks (theodoric, german dietrich), both names flow together. chapter vii. the gens among celts and germans. space forbids a consideration of the gentile institutions found in a more or less pure form among the savage and barbarian races of the present day; or of the traces of such institutions, discovered in the ancient history of civilized nations in asia. one or the other are met everywhere. a few illustrations may suffice: even before the gens had been recognized, it was pointed out and accurately described in its main outlines by the man who took the greatest pains to misunderstand it, mclennan, who wrote of this institution among the kalmucks, the circassians, the samoyeds and three indian nations: the warals, the magars and the munnipurs. recently it was described by m. kovalevsky, who discovered it among the pshavs, shevsurs, svanets and other caucasian tribes. a few short notes about the existence of the gens among celts and germans may find a place here. the oldest celtic laws preserved for us still show the gens in full bloom. in ireland, it is alive in the popular instinct to this day, after it has been forced out of actual existence by the english. it was in full force in scotland until the middle of the eighteenth century, and here it also succumbed only to the weapons, laws and courts of the english. the old welsh laws, written several centuries before the english invasion, not later than the 11th century, still show collective agriculture of whole villages, although only exceptionally and as the survival of a former universal custom. every family had five acres for its special use; another lot was at the same time cultivated collectively and its yield divided among the different families. in view of irish and scotch analogies it cannot be doubted that these village communities represent gentes or subdivisions of gentes, even though a repeated investigation of the welsh laws, which i cannot undertake from lack of time (my notes are from 1869), should not directly corroborate this. one thing, however, is plainly proven by the welsh and irish laws, namely that the pairing family had not yet given way to monogamy among the celts of the 11th century. in wales, marriage did not become indissoluble by divorce, or rather by notification, until after seven years. even if no more than three nights were lacking to make up the seven years, a married couple could still separate. their property was divided among them: the woman made the division, the man selected his share. the furniture was divided according to certain very funny rules. if the marriage was dissolved by the man, he had to return the woman's dowry and a few other articles; if the woman wished a separation, then she received less. of three children the man took two, the woman one, viz., the second child. if the woman married again after her divorce, and her first husband claimed her back, she was obliged to follow him, even if she had one foot in her new husband's bed. but if two had lived together for seven years, they were considered man and wife, even without the preliminaries of a formal marriage. chasteness of the girls before marriage was by no means strictly observed, nor was it required. the regulations regarding this subject are of an extremely frivolous nature and in contradiction with civilized morals. when a woman committed adultery, her husband had a right to beat her--this was one of three cases when he could do so without incurring a penalty--but after that he could not demand any other satisfaction, for "the same crime shall either be atoned for or avenged, but not both." the reasons that entitled a woman to a divorce without curtailing her claims to a fair settlement were of a very diverse nature: bad breath of the man was sufficient. the ransom to be paid to the chief or king for the right of the first night (gobr merch, hence the medieval name marcheta, french marquette) plays a conspicuous part in the code of laws. the women had the right to vote in the public meetings. add to this that similar conditions are vouched for in ireland; that marriage on time was also quite the custom there, and that the women were assured of liberal and well defined privileges in case of divorce, even to the point of remuneration for domestic services; that a "first wife" existed by the side of others, and that legal and illegal children without distinction received a share of their deceased parent's property--and we have a picture of the pairing family among the celts. the marriage laws of the american indians seem strict in comparison to the celtic, but this is not surprising when we remember that the celts were still living in group marriage at cesar's time. the irish gens (sept; the tribe was called clainne, clan) is confirmed and described not alone by the ancient law codes, but also by the english jurists of the 17th century who were sent across for the purpose of transforming the clan lands into royal dominions. up to this time, the soil had been the collective property of the gens or the clan, except where the chiefs had already claimed it as their private dominion. when a gentile died, and a household was thus dissolved, the gentile chief (called caput cognationis by the english jurists) made a new assignment of the whole gentile territory to the rest of the household. this division of land probably took place according to such rules as were observed in germany. until about fifty years ago, village marks were quite frequent, and some of these so-called rundales may be found to this day. the farmers of a rundale, individual tenants on the soil that once was the collective property of the gens, but had been confiscated by the english conquerors, each pay the rent for his respective parcel. but they all combine their lands and parcel it off according to situation and quality. these parcels, called "gewanne" on the german river mosel, are cultivated collectively and their yield is divided into shares. marshland and pastures are used in common. fifty years ago, new divisions were still made occasionally, sometimes annually. the field map of such a rundale village looks exactly like that of a german "gehöferschaft" (farming commune) on the mosel or in the hochwald. the gens also survives in the "factions." the irish farmers often form parties that seem to be founded on absolutely contradictory or senseless distinctions, quite incomprehensible to englishmen. the only purpose of these factions is apparently to rally for the popular sport of hammering the life out of one another. they are artificial reincarnations, modern substitutes for the dispersed gentes that demonstrate the continuation of the old gentile instinct in their own peculiar manner. by the way, in some localities the gentiles are still living together on what is practically their old territory. during the thirties, for instance, the great majority of the inhabitants of the old county of monaghan had only four family names, i. e., they were descended from four gentes or tribes (clans).[27] the downfall of the gentile order in scotland dates from the suppression of the revolt in 1745. what link of this order the scotch clan represented remains to be investigated; that it is a link, is beyond doubt. walter scott's novels bring this scotch highland clan vividly before our eyes. it is, as morgan says, "an excellent type of the gens in organization and in spirit, and an extraordinary illustration of the power of the gentile life over its members.... we find in their feuds and blood revenge, in their localization by gentes, in their use of lands in common, in the fidelity of the clansman to his chief and of the members of the clan to each other, the usual and persistent features of gentile society.... descent was in the male line, the children of the males remaining members of the clan, while the children of its female members belonged to the clans of their respective fathers." the fact that matriarchal law was formerly in force in scotland is proved by the royal family of the picts, who according to beda observed female lineage. even a survival of the punaluan family had been preserved among the scots, as among the welsh. for until the middle ages, the chief of the clan or king, the last representatives of the former common husbands, had the right to claim the first night with every bride, unless a ransom was given. it is an indisputable fact, that the germans were organized in gentes up to the time of the great migrations. the territory between the danube, the rhine, the vistula and the northern seas was evidently occupied by them only a few centuries before christ. the cimbri and teutons were then still in full migration, and the suebi did not settle down until cesar's time. cesar expressly states that they settled down in gentes and kins (gentibus cognatibusque), and in the mouth of a roman of the gens julia this term gentibus has a definite meaning, that no amount of disputation can obliterate. this holds good for all germans. it seems that even the provinces taken by them from the romans were settled by distribution to gentes. the alemanian code of laws affirms that the people settled in gentes (genealogiae) on the conquered land south of the danube. genealogia is used in exactly the same sense as was later on mark--or dorfgenossenschaft (mark or village community). kovalevsky recently maintained that these genealogiae were the great household communities among which the land was divided, and from which the village communities developed later on. the same may be true of the fara, by which term the burgundians and langobards--a gothic and a herminonian or high german tribe--designated nearly, if not exactly, the same thing as the alemanian genealogiae. whether this is really the gens or the household community, must be settled by further investigation. the language records leave us in doubt, whether all the germans had a common expression for gens or not, and as to what this term was. etymologically, the gothic, kuni, middle high german künne, corresponds to the grecian genos and the latin gens, and is used in the same sense. we are led back to the time of matriarchy by the terms for "woman" which are derived from the same root: greek gynê, slav zenâ, gothic qvino, norse kona, kuna. among langobards and burgundians, i repeat, we find the term fara which grimm derives from the hypothetical root fisan, to beget. i should prefer to trace it to the more obvious root faran, german fahren, to ride or to wander, in order to designate a certain well defined section of the wandering corps, composed quite naturally of relatives. as a result of centuries of wanderings from west to east and back again, this term was gradually applied to the sex group itself. there is furthermore the gothic sibja, anglosaxon sib, old high german sippia, sippa, high german sippe. old norse has only the plural sifjar, the relatives; the singular occurs only as the name of a goddess, sif. finally, another expression occurs in the hildebrand song, where hildebrand asks hadubrand "who is your father among the men of the nation ... or what is your kin?" (eddo huêllihhes cnuosles du sîs). if there was a common german term for gens, it was presumably the gothic kuni. this is not only indicated by its identity with the corresponding term in related languages, but also by the fact that the word kuning, german könig, english king, is derived from it, all of which originally signified chief of gens or tribe. sibja, german sippe (relationship), does not appear worthy of consideration. in old norse, at least, sifjar signifies not alone kin by blood, but also kin through marriage; hence it comprises the members of at least two gentes, and the term sif cannot have been applied to the gens itself. in the order of battle, the germans, like the mexicans and greeks, arranged the horsemen as well as the wedge-like columns of the troops on foot by gentes. tacitus' indefinite expression, "by families and kinships," is explained by the fact that at his time the gens had long ceased to be a living body in rome. another passage of tacitus is decisive. there he says: "the mother's brother regards his nephew as his son; some even hold that the bond of blood between the maternal uncle and the nephew is more sacred and close than that between father and son, so that when persons are demanded as securities, the sister's son is considered a better security than the natural son of the man whom they desire to place under bonds." here we have a living proof of the matriarchal, and hence natural, gens, and it is described as a characteristic mark of the germans.[28] if a member of such a gens gave his own son as a security for the fulfillment of a vow and this son became the victim of his father's breach of faith, that was the concern of the father alone. but when the son of a sister was sacrificed, then the most sacred gentile law was violated. the next relative who was bound above all others to protect the boy or young man, was held responsible for his death; either he should not have given the boy in bail or he should have kept the contract. if we had no other trace of gentile law among the germans, this one passage would be sufficient proof of its existence. but there is another passage in the old norse song of the "dawn of the gods" and the "end of the world," the völuspâ, which is still stronger evidence, because it is 800 years younger. in this "vision of the seeress," in which bang and bugge have now demonstrated the existence of christian elements, also, the description of the time of general degeneration and corruption inaugurating the great catastrophe contains this passage: broedbr munu berjask ok at bönum verdask munu systrungar sifjum spilla. "brothers will wage war against one another and become each other's murderers, and sisters' children will break the bonds of blood." systrungr means the son of the mother's sister, and an abnegation of the blood kinship from that side surpasses in the eyes of the poet even the crime of fratricide. there is a deliberate climax in that systrungar, emphasizing the maternal kinship. if the term syskina-börn, brother's and sister's children, or syskina-synir, brother's and sister's sons, had been used, there would have been a weakening of the effect, instead of a climax. that shows that even at the time of the vikings, when the völuspâ was composed, the recollection of maternal law was not yet blotted out. among the germans with whom tacitus was familiar maternal law had already given way to paternal lineage. the children were the next heirs of the father; in the absence of children, the brothers and uncles on both sides were next in line. the admission of the mother's brother to the inheritance is a relic of maternal law and proves that paternal law had only recently been introduced by the germans. traces of maternal law were preserved until late in the middle ages. it seems that even at this late date people still felt certain misgivings about the reliability of fatherhood, especially among serfs. for when a feudal lord demanded the return of a fugitive serf from a city, it was first required, for instance in augsburg, basel and kaiserslautern, that the fact of his serfdom should be established by the oaths of six of his next blood relations, all of whom had to belong to his mother's kin. (maurer, städteverfassung, i, page 381.) another relic of declining matriarchy was the (from the roman standpoint) almost inexplicable respect of the germans for the female sex. young girls of noble family were considered the safest bonds to secure the keeping of contracts with germans. in battle, nothing stimulated their courage so much as the horrible thought that their wives and daughters might be captured and carried into slavery. a woman was to them something holy and prophetical, and they listened to her advice in the most important matters. veleda, the bructerian priestess on the river lippe, was the soul of the insurrection of the batavians, in which civilis at the head of german and belgian tribes shook the foundations of roman rule in gaul. the women held undisputed sway in the house. if we may believe tacitus, they, together with the old men and children, had to do all the work, for the men went hunting, drank and loafed. but as tacitus does not say who cultivated the fields, and as according to his explicit statement the slaves paid only tithes, but did not work under compulsion, it seems that the adult men would have had to do what little agricultural work was required. the form of marriage, as stated above, was the pairing family in gradual transition to monogamy. it was not yet strict monogamy, for polygamy was permitted for the wealthy. chasteness of the girls was in general carefully maintained, different from the custom of the celts. tacitus speaks with special ardor of the sacredness of the matrimonial bond among the germans. adultery of the woman is alone quoted by him as a reason for a divorce. but his treatment of this subject leaves many a flaw and besides, it too openly holds up the mirror of virtue to the dissipated romans. so much is certain: granted that the germans were such exceptional models of virtue in their forests, it required only a short contact with the outer world to bring them down to the level of the other average europeans. in the whirl of roman life the last trace of pure morals disappeared even faster than the german language. just read gregorius of tours. it is obvious that in the primeval forests of germany no such hyper-refined voluptuousness could exist as in rome. that implies fully enough superiority of the germans over the roman world, and there is no necessity for ascribing to them a moderation and chastity that have never been the qualities of any nation as a whole. a result of gentile law is the obligation to inherit the enmities as well as the friendships of one's father and relatives; so is furthermore the displacement of blood revenge by the wergeld, a fine to be paid in atonement of manslaughter and injuries. a generation ago this wergeld was considered a specifically german institution, but it has since been found that hundreds of nations introduced this mitigation of gentile blood revenge. like the obligatory hospitality, it is found, for instance, among the american indians. tacitus' description of the manner in which hospitality was observed (germania, chapt. 21) is almost identical with morgan's. the hot and ceaseless controversy as to whether or not the germans had already made a definite repartition of the cultivated land at tacitus' time, and how the passages relating to this question should be interpreted, is now a thing of the past. after the following facts had been established: that the cultivated land of nearly all nations was tilled collectively by the gens and later on by communistic family groups, a practice which cesar still found among the suebi; that as a result of this practice the land was re-apportioned periodically; and that this periodical repartition of the cultivated land was preserved in germany down to our days--after such evidence we need not waste any more breath on the subject. a transition within 150 years from collective cultivation, such as cesar expressly attributes to the suebi, to individual cultivation with annual repartition of the soil, such as tacitus found among the germans, is surely progress enough for any one. the further transition from this stage to complete private ownership of land during such a short period and without any external intervention would involve an absolute impossibility. hence i can only read in tacitus what he states in so many words: they change (or re-divide) the cultivated land every year, and enough land is left for common use. it is the stage of agriculture and appropriation of the soil which exactly tallies with the contemporaneous gentile constitution of the germans. i leave the preceding paragraph unchanged, just as it stood in former editions. meantime the question has assumed another aspect. since kovalevsky has demonstrated that the patriarchal household community existed nearly everywhere, perhaps even everywhere, as the connecting link between the matriarchal communistic and the modern isolated family, the question is no longer "collective property or private property?" as discussed between maurer and waitz, but "what was the form of that collective property?" not alone is there no doubt whatever, that the suebi were the collective owners of their land at cesar's time, but also that they tilled the soil collectively. the questions, whether their economic unit was the gens, or the household, or an intermediate communistic group, or whether all three of these groups existed at the same time as a result of different local conditions, may remain undecided for a long while yet. kovalevsky maintains that the conditions described by tacitus were not founded on the mark or village community, but on the household community, which developed much later into the village community by the growth of the population. hence the settlements of the germans on the territory they occupied at the time of the romans, and on territory later taken by them from the romans, would not have consisted of villages, but of large co-operative families comprising several generations, who cultivated a sufficient piece of land and used the surrounding wild land in common with their neighbors. if this was the case, then the passage in tacitus regarding the changing of the cultivated land would indeed have an agronomic meaning, viz., that the co-operative household cultivated a different piece of land every year, and the land cultivated during the previous year was left untilled or entirely abandoned. the scarcity of the population would have left enough spare wild lands to make all dispute about land unnecessary. only after the lapse of centuries, when the members of the family had increased so that the collective cultivation became incompatible with the prevailing conditions of production, the household communities were dissolved. the former common fields and meadows were then divided in the well-known manner among the various individual families that had now formed. the division of farm lands was first periodical, but later final, while forest, pasture and watercourses remained common property. it seems that this process of development has been fully established for russia by historical investigation. as for germany and, in the second place, for other german countries, it cannot be denied that this view affords in many instances a better interpretation of historical authorities and a readier solution of difficulties than the idea of tracing the village community to the time of tacitus. the oldest documents, e. g. of the codex laureshamensis, are easier explained by the help of the household than of the village community. on the other hand, new difficulties now arise and new questions pose themselves. it will require further investigations to arrive at definite conclusions. however, i cannot deny that the probability is very much in favor of the intermediate stage of the household community.[29] while the germans of cesar's time had either just taken up settled abodes, or were still looking for them, they had been settled for a full century at the time of tacitus. as a result there is a manifest progress in the production of necessities. the germans lived in block houses; their clothing was still as primitive as their forests, consisting of rough woolen cloaks, animal skins and linen underclothing for the women and the wealthy. they lived on milk, meat, wild fruit and, as pliny adds, oatmeal porridge which is the celtic national dish in ireland and scotland to-day. their wealth consisted in cattle of an inferior race. the kine were small, of unattractive appearance and without horns; the horses, little ponies, were not fast runners. money, roman coin only, was rarely used. they did not make ornaments of gold and silver, nor did they value these metals. iron was scarce and, at least among the tribes on the rhine and the danube, was apparently only imported, not mined by themselves. the runen script (imitations of greek and latin letters) was only used as a cipher and exclusively for religious sorcery. human sacrifices were still in vogue. in short, they were a nation just emerged out of the middle stage of barbarism into the upper stage. but while the tribes whose immediate contact with the romans facilitated the import of roman products, were thereby prevented from acquiring a metal and textile industry of their own, there is not the least doubt that the tribes of the northeast, on the baltic, developed these industries. the pieces of armor found in the bogs of sleswick--a long iron sword, a coat of mail, a silver helmet, etc., together with roman coins from the close of the second century--, and the german metal ware spread by the migrations represent a peculiar type of a superior finish, even such as were modeled after roman originals. with the exception of england, the emigration into the civilized roman empire everywhere put an end to this home industry. how simultaneously this industry arose and developed, is shown e. g. by the bronze spangles. the specimens found in burgundy, in roumania and on the sea of asow, might have been manufactured in the same shop with those found in england or sweden and are of undoubted german origin. the german constitution was also in keeping with the upper stage of barbarism. according to tacitus, the council of chiefs (principes) universally decided matters of minor importance and prepared important matters for the decision of the public meetings. so far as we know anything of the public meeting in the lower stage of barbarism, viz., among the american indians, it was only held by gentes, not by tribes or leagues of tribes. the chiefs of peace (principes) were still sharply distinguished from the chiefs of war (duces), just as among the iroquois. the peace chiefs were already living in part on honorary donations of the gentiles, such as cattle, grain, etc. they were generally elected from the same family, analogous to america. the transition to paternal law favored, as in greece and rome, the gradual transformation of office by election into hereditary office. a "noble" family was thus gradually raised in each gens. most of this hereditary nobility came to grief during the migrations or shortly after. the military leaders were elected solely on their merits. they had little power and were obliged to rely on the force of their example. the actual disciplinary power in the army was held by the priests, as tacitus implicitly states. the public meeting was the real executive. the king or chief of the tribe presided. the people decided. a murmur signified "no," acclamation and clanging of weapons meant "yes." the public meeting was at the same time a court of justice. complaints were here brought forth and decided, and death sentences pronounced. only cowardice, treason and unnatural lust were capital crimes. the gentes and other subdivisions decided in a body under the chairmanship of the chief, who in all original german courts was only the manager of the transactions and questioner. among germans, the sentence has ever and everywhere been pronounced by the community. leagues of tribes came into existence since cesar's time. some of them already had kings. the first chief of war began to covet the usurper's place, as among greeks and romans, and sometimes succeeded in obtaining it. such successful usurpers were by no means absolute rulers. but still they began to break through the bonds of the gens. while freed slaves generally occupied an inferior position, because they could not be members of any gens, they often gained rank, wealth and honors as favorites of the new kings. the same thing took place after the conquest of the roman empire by those military leaders who had now become kings of great countries. among the frankons, slaves and freed slaves of the king played a leading role first at the court, then in the state. a large part of the new nobility were descended from them. there was one institution that especially favored the rise of royalty: the military following. we have already seen, how among the american redskins private war groups were formed independently of the gens. among the germans, these private groups had developed into standing bodies. the military leader who had acquired fame, gathered around his person a host of booty loving young warriors. they were pledged to personal faithfulness by their leader who in return pledged himself to them. he fed them, gave them presents and organized them on hierarchic principles: a body guard and a troop for immediate emergencies and short expeditions, a trained corps of officers for larger enterprises. these followings must have been rather insignificant, in fact we find them so later under odoaker in italy, still they portended the decay of the old gentile liberty, and the events during and after the migrations proved that military retainers were heralds of evil. for in the first place, they fostered the growth of royalty. in the second place, tacitus affirms that they could only be held together by continual warfare and plundering expeditions. robbery became their life purpose. if the leader found nothing to do in his neighborhood, he marched his troops to other countries, where a prospect of war and booty allured him. the german auxiliaries, many of whom fought under the roman standard even against germans, had been largely recruited among such followings. they represent the first germs of the "landsknecht" profession, the shame and curse of the germans. after the conquest of the roman empire, these retainers of kings together with the unfree roman courtiers formed the other half of the nobility of later days. in general, then, the german tribes combined into nations had the same constitution that had developed among the greeks of the heroic era and the romans at the time of the so-called kings: public meetings, councils of gentile chiefs and military leaders who coveted actual royal power. it was the highest constitution which the gentile order could produce; it was the standard constitution of the higher stage of barbarism. if society passed the limits for which this constitution sufficed, then the end of the gentile order had come. it collapsed and the state took its place. footnotes: [27] author's note to the fourth edition. during a few days passed in ireland, i once more became conscious to what extent the rural population is still living in the conceptions of the gentile period. the great landholder, whose tenant the farmer is, still enjoys a position similar to that of a clan chief, who has to supervise the cultivation of the soil in the interest of all, who is entitled to a tribute from the farmer in the form of rent, but who also has to assist the farmer in cases of need. likewise everyone in comfortable circumstances is considered under obligation to help his poorer neighbors whenever they are in need. such assistance is not charity, it is simply the prerogative of the poor gentile, which the rich gentile or the chief of the clan must respect. this explains why the professors of political economy and the jurists complain of the impossibility of imparting the idea of the modern private property to the irish farmers. property that has only rights, but no duties, is absolutely beyond the ken of the irishman. no wonder that so many irishmen who are suddenly cast into one of the modern great cities of england and america, among a population with entirely different moral and legal standards, despair of all morals and justice, lose all hold and become an easy prey to demoralization. [28] author's note. the greeks know this special sacredness of the bond between the mother's brother and his nephew, a relic of maternal law found among many nations, only in the mythology of heroic times. according to diodorus iv., 34, meleagros kills the sons of thestius, the brother of his mother althaia. the latter regards this deed as such a heinous crime that she curses the murderer, her own son, and prays for his death. "it is said that the gods fulfilled her wish and ended the life of meleagros." according to the same diordorus, iv., 44, the argonauts under herakles land in thracia and there find that phineus, at the instigation of his second wife, shamefully maltreats his two sons, the offspring of his first deserted wife, the boread kleopatra. but among the argonauts there are also some boreads, the brothers of kleopatra, the uncles of the maltreated boys. they at once champion their nephews, set them free and kill their guards. [29] translator's note. the household community is still a distinct stage of production in georgia (south russia). the northern boundary of georgia is the caucasus. the georgians, a people of high intelligence, have for centuries maintained their independence against persians, arabs, turcs and tartars. dr. philipp gogitshayshvili gives the following interesting description of their condition in an article, entitled "das gewerbe in georgien" (zeitschrift für die gesammte staatswissenschaft, ergänzungsheft i., tübingen, 1901). "the swanians (a district of georgia is called swania) have all the necessities of life. they weave their own clothing, make their own weapons, powder and even silver, and gold ornaments. there is no modern trading.... they are acquainted with exchange, but only of products for products. money does not circulate and there are neither shops nor markets.... there is not a single beggar, not a single man who asks for charity. with the exception of iron, salt and chintz, the swanians produce all they need themselves. they prepare their linen from hemp, their clothing from skins of wild animals and wool, their footwear from hides and leather. they make feltcaps, household goods, weapons, saddles, bridles and agricultural implements." chapter viii. the rise of the state among germans. according to tacitus the german nation was very strong in numbers. an approximate idea of the strength of individual german nations is given by caesar. he states that the number of usipetans and tencterans who crossed over to the left bank of the rhine amounted to 180,000, including women and children. about 100,000[30] members to a single nation is considerably more than e. g. the iroquois numbered in their prime, when 20,000 of them became the terror of the whole country, from the great lakes to the ohio and potomac. if we attempt to place the better known nations of the rhine country by the help of historical reports, we find that a single nation occupies on the map the average area of a prussian government district, about 10,000 square kilometers[31] or 182 german geographical square miles.[32] the germania magna of the romans, reaching to the vistula, comprised about 500,000 square kilometers. counting an average of 100,000 for any single nation, the total population of germania magna would have amounted to five millions. this is a rather high figure for a barbarian group of nations, although 10 inhabitants to the square kilometer or 550 to the geographical square mile is very little when compared to present conditions. but this does not include the whole number of germans then living. we know that german nations of the gothic race, bastarnians, peukinians and others, lived all along the carpathian mountains away down to the mouth of the danube. they were so numerous that pliny designated them as the fifth main division of the germans. as much as 180 years b. c. they were mercenaries of the macedonian king perseus, and during the first years of augustus they were still pushing their way as far as the vicinity of adrianople. assuming them to have been one million strong we find that at least six millions was the probable population of germany at the beginning of the christian era. after the final settlement in germany, the population must have grown with increasing rapidity. the industrial progress mentioned above would be sufficient to prove it. the objects found in the bogs of sleswick, to judge by the roman coins found with them, are from the third century. hence at that time the metal and textile industry was already well developed on the baltic, a lively traffic with the roman empire was carried on, and the wealthier class enjoyed a certain luxury--all of which indicates that the population had increased. but at the same time the general war of aggression against the romans commenced along the whole line of the rhine, of the roman wall and of the danube, a line stretching from the north sea to the black sea. this is another proof of the ever growing outward pressure of the population. during the struggle which lasted three centuries, the whole main body of the gothic nations, with the exception of the scandinavian goths and the burgundians, marched to the southeast and formed the left wing of the long line of attack. the high germans (herminonians) on the upper danube fought in the center, and the iskaevonians on the rhine, now called franks, advanced on the right wing. the conquest of brittany fell to the lot of the ingaevonians.[33] at the end of the fifth century, the exhausted, bloodless, and helpless roman empire lay open to the germans. in former chapters we stood at the cradle of antique greek and roman civilization. now we are standing at its grave. the equalizing plane of roman world power had been gliding for centuries over all the mediterranean countries. where the greek language did not offer any resistance, all national idioms had been crushed by a corrupted latin. there were no longer any distinctions of nationality, no more gauls, iberians, ligurians, noricans; they had all become romans. roman administration and roman law had everywhere dissolved the old gentile bodies and thus crushed the last remnant of local and national independence. the new type of romans offered no compensation for this loss, for it did not express any nationality, but only the lack of a nationality. the elements for the formation of new nations were present everywhere. the latin dialects of the different provinces differentiated more and more. but the natural boundaries that had once made italy, gaul, spain, africa independent territories, were still present and made themselves felt. yet there was no strength anywhere for combining these elements into new nations. nowhere was there the least trace of any capacity for development, nor any power of resistance, much less any creative power. the immense human throng of that enormous territory was held together by one bond alone: the roman state. but this state had in time become the worst enemy and oppressor of its subjects. the provinces had ruined rome. it had become a provincial town like all others, privileged, but no longer ruling, no longer the center of the world empire, no longer even the seat of the emperors and subregents who lived in constantinople, treves and milan. the roman state had become an immense complicated machine, designed exclusively for the exploitation of its subjects. taxes, state imposts and tithes of all sorts drove the mass of the people deeper and deeper into poverty. by the blackmailing practices of the regents, tax collectors and soldiers, the pressure was increased to such a point that it became insupportable. this was the outcome of rome's world power. the right of the state to existence was founded on the preservation of order in the interior and the protection against the barbarians outside. but this order was worse than the most disgusting disorder, and the barbarians against whom the state pretended to protect its citizens, were hailed by them as saviors. the condition of society was no less desperate. during the last years of the republic, the roman rulers had already contrived the pitiless exploitation of the conquered provinces. the emperors had not abolished, but organized this exploitation. the more the empire fell to pieces, the higher rose the taxes and tithes, and the more shamelessly did the officials rob and blackmail. commerce and industry had never been a strong point of the domineering romans. only in usury they had excelled all other nations before and after them. what commerce had managed to exist, had been ruined by official extortion. only in the east, in the grecian part of the empire, some commerce still vegetated, but this is outside of the scope of our study. universal reduction to poverty, decrease of traffic, of handicrafts, of art, of population, decay of the towns, return of agriculture to a lower stage--that had been the final result of roman world supremacy. but now agriculture, the most prominent branch of production in the whole old world, was again supreme, and more than ever. in italy, the immense estates (latifundiae) that comprised nearly the whole country since the end of the republic, had been utilized in two ways: either as pastures on which the population had been replaced by sheep and oxen, the care of which required only a few slaves; or as country seats, on which masses of slaves carried on horticulture on a large scale, partly for the luxury of the owner, partly for sale on the markets of the towns. the great pastures had been preserved and even extended in certain parts. but the country seats and their horticulture had gone to ruin through the impoverishment of their owners and the decay of the towns. latifundian economy based on slave labor was no longer profitable; but in its time it had been the only possible form of agriculture on a large scale. now, however, small production had again become the only lucrative form. one country seat after the other was parceled and leased in small lots to hereditary tenants who paid a fixed rent, or to partiarii, more administrators than tenants who received one-sixth or even only one-ninth of a year's product in remuneration for their work. but these little lots were principally disposed of to colonists who paid a fixed sum annually and could be transferred by sale together with their lots. although no slaves, still these colonists were not free; they could not marry free citizens, and marriages with members of their own class were not regarded as valid, but as mere concubinages like those of the slaves. the colonists were the prototypes of the medieval serfs. the ancient slavery had lost its vitality. neither in the country in large scale agriculture, nor in the manufactories of the towns did it yield any more returns--the market for its products had disappeared. and small scale production and artisanship, to which the gigantic production of the flourishing time of the empire was now reduced, did not leave any room for numerous slaves. only house and luxury slaves of the rich were still retained by society. but this declining slavery was as yet sufficiently strong to brand productive labor as slave work, as below the dignity of free romans; and everybody was now a free roman. an increasing number of superfluous slaves who had become a drug on their owners were dismissed, while on the other hand the number of colonists and of beggared free men (similar to the poor whites in the slave states of america) grew continuously. christianity is perfectly innocent of this gradual decline of ancient slavery. for it had taken part in the slavery of the roman empire for centuries. it never prevented the slave trade of christians later on, neither of the germans in the north, nor of the venetians on the mediterranean, nor the negro traffic of later years.[34] slavery died, because it did not pay any longer. but it left behind its poisonous sting by branding as ignoble the productive labor of free men. this brought the roman world into a closed alley from which it could not escape. slave labor was economically impossible and the labor of free men was under a moral ban. the one could exist no longer, the other could not yet be the fundamental form of social production. there was no other help but a complete revolution. the provinces were not any better off. the most complete reports on this subject are from gaul. by the side of the colonists, free farmers still existed there. in order to protect themselves against the brutal blackmail of the officials, judges and usurers, they frequently placed themselves under the protectorate of a man of influence and power. not only single individuals did so, but whole communities, so that the emperors of the fourth century often issued decrees prohibiting this practice. but what good did protection do to the clients? the patron imposed the condition that they should transfer the title of their lots to him, and in return he assured them of the free enjoyment of their land for life--a trick which the holy church remembered and freely imitated during the ninth and tenth century, for the greater glory of god. in the fifth century, however, about the year 475, bishop salvianus of marseilles still vehemently denounced such robbery and relates that the methods of the roman officials and great landlords became so oppressive that many "romans" fled to the districts occupied by the barbarians and feared nothing so much as a return under roman rule. that poor parents frequently sold their children into slavery, is proved by a law forbidding this practice. in return for liberating the romans from their own state, the barbarians appropriated two-thirds of the entire land and divided it among themselves. the distribution was made by gentile rules. as the number of the conquerors was relatively small, large tracts remained undivided in the possession of the nation, the tribe or the gens. every gens distributed the land for cultivation and pastures to the individual households by drawing lots. we do not know whether repeated divisions took place at that time. at any rate, this practice was soon discarded in the roman provinces, and the individual lot became salable private property, a so-called freehold (allodium). forests and pastures remained undivided for collective use. this use and the mode of cultivating the divided land was regulated by tradition and the will of the community. the longer the gens lived in its village, and the better germans and romans became amalgamated in the course of time, the more did the character of kinship lose ground before territorial bounds. the gens disappeared in the mark commune, the members of which, however, still exhibited traces of kinship. in the countries where mark communes were still preserved--in the north of france, in england, germany and scandinavia--the gentile constitution gradually merged into a local constitution and thus acquired the capacity of being fitted into a state. nevertheless this local constitution retained some of the primeval democratic character which distinguishes the whole gentile order, and thus preserved a piece of gentilism even in its enforced degeneration of later times. this left a weapon in the hands of the oppressed, ready to be wielded by them even in the present time. the rapid loss of the bonds of blood in the gens as a result of conquest caused the degeneration of the tribal and national organs of gentilism. we know that the rule over subjugated people does not agree with the gentile constitution. here we have an opportunity to observe this on a large scale. the german nations, masters of the roman provinces, had to organize their conquests. but they could neither adopt the romans as a body into their gentes, nor rule them by the help of gentile organs. a substitute for them had to be placed at the head of the roman administrative bodies that were largely retained in local affairs, and this substitute could only be another state. hence the organs of the gentile constitution had to become organs of the state, and under the pressure of the moment this took place very rapidly. now the first representative of the conquering nation was the military leader. the internal and external security of the conquered territory demanded that his power should be strengthened. the moment had arrived for the transition from war leadership to monarchy. and the change took place. take e. g. the realm of the franks. the victorious salians had not only come into possession of the extensive roman state dominions, but also of all the large tracts that had not been assigned to the more or less small mark communities, especially of all large forest tracts. the first thing which the king of the franks, now a real monarch, did was to change this national property into royal property, to steal it from the people and to donate or give it in lien to his retainers. this retinue, originally composed of his personal war followers and of the subcommanders of the army, was increased by romans, i. e., romanized gauls who quickly became invaluable to the king through their knowledge of writing, their education and their familiarity with the language and laws of the country, and with the language of latin literature. but slaves, serfs and freed slaves also became his courtiers. from among all these he chose his favorites. at first they received donations of public land, and later on these benefits were generally conferred for the lifetime of the king. the foundation of a new nobility was thus laid at the expense of the people. but this was not all. the wide expanse of the empire could not be governed by means of the old gentile constitution. the council of chiefs, if it had not become obsolete long ago, could not have held any more meetings. it was soon displaced by the standing retinue of the king. a pretense at the old public meeting was still kept up, but it also was more and more limited to the meeting of the subcommanders of the army and the rising nobles. just as formerly, the roman farmers during the last period of the republic, so now the free land-owning peasants, the mass of the frank people, were exhausted and reduced to penury by continual civil feuds and wars of conquest. they who once had formed the whole army and, after the conquest of france, its picked body, were so impoverished at the end of the ninth century that hardly more than every fifth man could go to war. the former army of free peasants, convoked directly by the king, was replaced by an army composed of dependents of the new nobles. among these servants were also villeins, the descendants of the peasants who had acknowledged no master but the king and a little earlier not even a king. under charlemagne's successors the ruin of the frank peasantry was aggravated by internal wars, weakness of the royal power and corresponding overbearance of the nobles. the latter had received another addition to their ranks through the installation by charlemagne of "gau"[35] (district) counts who strove to make their offices hereditary. the invasions of the normans completed the wreck of the peasantry. fifty years after the death of charlemagne, france lay as resistless at the feet of the normans, as four hundred years previous the roman empire had lain at the feet of the franks. not only was the external impotence almost the same, but also the internal order or rather disorder of society. the free frank peasants found themselves in a similar position as their predecessors, the roman colonists. ruined by wars and robberies, they had been forced to seek the protection of the nobles or the church, because the royal power was too weak to shield them. but they had to pay dearly for this protection. like the gallic farmers, they had to transfer the titles of their land to their patrons, and received it back from them as tenants in different and varying forms, but always only in consideration of services and tithes. once driven into this form of dependence, they gradually lost their individual liberty. after a few generations most of them became serfs. how rapidly the free peasants sank from their level is shown by the land records of the abbey saint germain des prés, then near, now in, paris. on the vast holdings of this abbey in the surrounding country 2788 households, nearly all of them franks with german names, were living at charlemagne's time; 2080 of them were colonists, 35 lites,[36] 220 slaves and only 8 freeholders. the practice of the patrons to demand the transfer of the land titles to themselves and give the former owners the use of the land for life, denounced as ungodly by salvianus, was now universally practiced by the church in its dealings with the peasants. the compulsory labor that now came more and more into vogue, had been moulded as much after the roman angariae, compulsory service for the state, as after the services of the german mark men in bridge and road building and other work for common purposes. by all appearances, then, the mass of the population had arrived at the same old goal after four hundred years. that proved two things: firstly, that the social differentiation and the division of property in the sinking roman empire corresponded perfectly to the contemporaneous stage of production in agriculture and industry, and hence was unavoidable; secondly, that this stage of production had not been essentially altered for better or worse during four hundred years, and therefore had necessarily produced the same division of property and the same classes of population. the town had lost its supremacy over the country during the last centuries of the roman empire, and had not regained it during the first centuries of german rule. this presupposes a low stage of agriculture and industry. such a general condition produces of necessity the domination of great proprietors and the dependence of small farmers. how impossible it was to graft either the slave labor of roman latifundian economy or the compulsory labor of the new large scale production into such a society, is proved by charlemagne's very extensive experiments with his famous imperial country residences that left hardly a trace. these experiments were continued only by the convents and brought results only for them. but the convents were abnormal social institutions, founded on celibacy. they could do exceptional work, but they had to remain exceptions themselves for this very reason. yet some progress had been made during these four hundred years. although in the end we find the same main classes as in the beginning, still the human beings that made up these classes had changed. the ancient slavery had disappeared; gone were also the beggared freemen who had despised work as slavish. between the roman colonist and the new serf, there had been the free frank peasant. the "useless remembrance and the vain feud" of the decaying roman nation was dead and gone. the social classes of the ninth century had been formed during the travail of a new civilization, not in the demoralization of a sinking one. the new race, masters and servants, were a race of men as compared to their roman predecessors. the relation of powerful landlords to serving peasants, which had been the unavoidable result of collapse in the antique world, was for the franks the point of departure on a new line of development. moreover, unproductive as these four hundred years may appear, they left behind one great product: the modern nationalities, the reorganization and differentiation of west european humanity for the coming history. the germans had indeed infused a new life into europe. therefore the dissolution of the states in the german period did not end in a subjugation after the norse-saracene plan, but in a continued development of the estate of the royal beneficiaries and an increasing submission (commendatio) to feudalism, and in such a tremendous increase of the population, that no more than two centuries later the bloody drain of the crusades could be sustained without injury. what was the mysterious charm by which the germans infused a new life into decrepit europe? was it an innate magic power of the german race, as our jingo historians would have it? by no means. of course, the germans were a highly gifted aryan branch and, especially at that time, in full process of vigorous development. they did not, however, rejuvenate europe by their specific national properties, but simply by their barbarism, their gentile constitution. their personal efficiency and bravery, their love of liberty, and their democratic instinct which regarded all public affairs as its own affairs, in short all those properties which the romans had lost and which were alone capable of forming new states and raising new nationalities out of the muck of the roman world--what were they but characteristic marks of the barbarians in the upper stage, fruits of the gentile constitution? if they transformed the antique form of monogamy, mitigated the male rule in the family and gave a higher position to women than the classic world had ever known, what enabled them to do so, unless it was their barbarism, their gentile customs, their living inheritance of the time of maternal law? if they could safely transmit a trace of the genuine gentile order, the mark communes, to the feudal states of at least three of the most important countries--germany, north of france, and england--and thus give a local coherence and the means of resistance to the oppressed class, the peasants, even under the hardest medieval serfdom; means which neither the slaves of antiquity nor the modern proletarian found ready at hand--to whom did they owe this, unless it was again their barbarism, their exclusively barbarian mode of settling in gentes? and in conclusion, if they could develop and universally introduce the mild form of servitude which they had been practicing at home, and which more and more displaced slavery also in the roman empire--to whom was it due, unless it was again their barbarism, thanks to which they had not yet arrived at complete slavery, neither in the form of the ancient labor slaves, nor in that of the oriental house slaves? this milder form of servitude, as fourier first stated, gave to the oppressed the means of their gradual emancipation as a class (fournit aux cultivateurs des moyens d'affranchissement collectif et progressif) and is therefore far superior to slavery, which permits only the immediate enfranchisement of the individual without any transitory stage. antiquity did not know any abolition of slavery by rebellion, but the serfs of the middle ages gradually enforced their liberation as a class. every vital and productive germ with which the germans inoculated the roman world, was due to barbarism. indeed, only barbarians are capable of rejuvenating a world laboring under the death throes of unnerved civilization. and the higher stage of barbarism, to which and in which the germans worked their way up previous to the migrations, was best calculated to prepare them for this work. that explains everything. footnotes: [30] author's note. the number assumed here is confirmed by a passage of diodorus on the celts of gaul: "many nations of unequal strength are living in gaul. the strongest of them numbers about 200,000, the weakest 50,000." (diodorus siculus, v., 25.) that gives an average of 125,000. the individual nations of gaul, being more highly developed, should be gauged more numerous than those of germany. [31] translator's note. 3861 square statute miles. [32] a german geographical mile contains 7,420.44 meters, or 7.42044 kilometers; hence a german geographical square mile contains 55.0629 square kilometers, equal to 21.2598 square statute miles. [33] translator's note. the ingaevonians comprised the friesians, the saxons, the jutes and the angles, living on the coast of the north sea from the zuider zee to denmark. [34] author's note. according to bishop liutprand of cremona, the main industry of verdun in the tenth century, in the so-called holy german empire, was the manufacture of eunuchs, who were exported with great profit to spain for the harems of the moors. [35] translator's note. the "gau" is a larger territory than the "mark." caesar and tacitus called it pagus. [36] translator's note. the name given in ancient law to dependent farmers. chapter ix. barbarism and civilization. having observed the dissolution of the gentile order in the three concrete cases of the greek, roman, and german nations, we may now investigate in conclusion the general economic conditions that began by undermining the gentile organization of society during the upper stage of barbarism and ended by doing away with it entirely at the advent of civilization. marx's "capital" will be as necessary for the successful completion of this task as morgan's "ancient society." a growth of the middle stage and a product of further development during the upper stage of savagery, the gens reached its prime, as near as we can judge from our sources of information, in the lower stage of barbarism. with this stage, then, we begin our investigation. in our standard example, the american redskins of that time, we find the gentile constitution fully developed. a tribe had differentiated into several gentes, generally two. through the increase of the population, these original gentes again divided into several daughter gentes, making the mother gens a phratry. the tribe itself split up into several tribes, in each of which we again meet a large number of representatives of the old gentes. in certain cases a federation united the related tribes. this simple organization fully sufficed for the social conditions out of which it had grown. it was nothing else than the innate, spontaneous expression of those conditions, and it was well calculated to smooth over all internal difficulties that could arise in this social organization. external difficulties were settled by war. such a war could end in the annihilation of a tribe, but never in its subjugation. it is the grandeur and at the same time the limitation of the gentile order that it has no room either for masters or servants. there were as yet no distinctions between rights and duties. the question whether he had a right to take part in public affairs, to practice blood revenge or to demand atonement for injuries would have appeared as absurd to an indian, as the question whether it was his duty to eat, sleep, and hunt. nor could any division of a tribe or gens into different classes take place. this leads us to the investigation of the economic basis of those conditions. the population was very small in numbers. it was collected only on the territory of the tribe. next to this territory was the hunting ground surrounding it in a wide circle. a neutral forest formed the line of demarcation from other tribes. the division of labor was quite primitive. the work was simply divided between the two sexes. the men went to war, hunted, fished, provided the raw material for food and the tools necessary for these pursuits. the women cared for the house, and prepared food and clothing; they cooked, weaved and sewed. each sex was master of its own field of activity; the men in the forest, the women in the house. each sex also owned the tools made and used by it; the men were the owners of the weapons, of the hunting and fishing tackle, the women of the household goods and utensils. the household was communistic, comprising several, and often many, families.[37] whatever was produced and used collectively, was regarded as common property: the house, the garden, the long boat. here, and only here, then, do we find the "self-earned property" which jurists and economists have falsely attributed to civilized society, the last deceptive pretext of legality on which modern capitalist property is leaning. but humanity did not everywhere remain in this stage. in asia they found animals that could be tamed and propagated in captivity. the wild buffalo cow had to be hunted down; the tame cow gave birth to a calf once a year, and also furnished milk. some of the most advanced tribes--aryans, semites, perhaps also turanians--devoted themselves mainly to taming, and later to raising and tending, domestic animals. the segregation of cattle raising tribes from the rest of the barbarians constitutes the first great division of social labor. these stock raising tribes did not only produce more articles of food than the rest of the barbarians, but also different kinds of products. they were ahead of the others by having at their disposal not alone milk, milk products, and a greater abundance of meat, but also skins, wool, goat's hair, and the spun and woven goods which the growing abundance of the raw material brought into common use. this for the first time made a regular exchange of products possible. in former stages, exchange could only take place occasionally, and an exceptional ability in manufacturing weapons and tools may have led to a transient division of labor. for example, unquestionable remains of workshops for stone implements of the neolithic period have been found in many places. the artists who developed their ability in those shops, most probably worked for the collectivity, as did the artisans of the indian gentile order. at any rate, no other exchange than that within the tribe could exist in that stage, and even that was an exception. but after the segregation of the stock raising tribes we find all the conditions favorable to an exchange between groups of different tribes, and to a further development of this mode of trading into a fixed institution. originally, tribe exchanged with tribe through the agency of their tribal heads. but when the herds drifted into the hands of private individuals, then the exchange between individuals prevailed more and more, until it became the established form. the principal article of exchange which the stock raising tribes offered to their neighbors was in the form of domestic animals. cattle became the favorite commodity by which all other commodities were measured in exchange. in short, cattle assumed the functions of money and served in this capacity as early as that stage. with such necessity and rapidity was the demand for a money commodity developed at the very beginning of the exchange of commodities. horticulture, probably unknown to the asiatic barbarians of the lower stage, arose not later than the middle stage of barbarism, as the forerunner of agriculture. the climate of the turanian highland does not admit of a nomadic life without a supply of stock feed for the long and hard winter. hence the cultivation of meadows and grain was indispensable. the same is true of the steppes north of the black sea. once grain had been grown for cattle, it soon became human food. the cultivated land belonged as yet to the tribe and was assigned first to the gens, which in its turn distributed it to the households, and finally to individuals; always for use only, not for possession. the users may have had certain claims to the land, but that was all. two of the industrial acquisitions of this stage are especially important. the first is the weaving loom, the second the melting of metal ore and the use of metals in manufacture. copper, tin, and their alloy, bronze, were the most essential of them. bronze furnished tools and weapons, but could not displace stone implements. only iron could have done that, but the production of iron was as yet unknown. gold and silver were already used for ornament and decoration, and must have been far more precious than copper and bronze. the increase of production in all branches--stock raising, agriculture, domestic handicrafts--enabled human labor power to produce more than was necessary for its maintenance. it increased at the same time the amount of daily work that fell to the lot of every member of a gens, a household, or a single family. the addition of more labor power became desirable. it was furnished by war; the captured enemies were transformed into slaves. under the given historical conditions, the first great division of social labor, by increasing the productivity of labor, adding to the wealth, and enlarging the field of productive activity, necessarily carried slavery in its wake. out of the first great division of social labor arose the first great division of society into two classes: masters and servants, exploiters and exploited. how and when the herds were transferred from the collective ownership of the tribe or gens to the proprietorship of the heads of the families, is not known to us. but it must have been practically accomplished in this stage. the herds and the other new objects of wealth brought about a revolution in the family. procuring the means of existence had always been the man's business. the tools of production were manufactured and owned by him. the herds were the new tools of production, and their taming and tending was his work. hence he owned the cattle and the commodities and slaves obtained in exchange for them. all the surplus now resulting from production fell to the share of the man. the woman shared in its fruition, but she could not claim its ownership. the "savage" warrior and hunter had been content to occupy the second place in the house, to give precedence to the woman. the "gentler" shepherd, standing on his wealth, assumed the first place and forced the woman back into the second place. and she had no occasion to complain. the division of labor in the family had regulated the distribution of property between man and wife. this division of labor remained unchanged. yet the former domestic relation was now reversed, simply because the division of labor outside of the family had been altered. the same cause that once had secured the supremacy in the house for women, viz., the confining of women's activity to domestic labor, now assured the supremacy of the men in the households. the domestic labor of women was considered insignificant in comparison to men's work for a living. the latter was everything, the former a negligible quantity. at this early stage we can already see that the emancipation of women and their equality with men are impossible and remain so, as long as women are excluded from social production and restricted to domestic labor. the emancipation of women becomes feasible only then when women are enabled to take part extensively in social production, and when domestic duties require their attention in a minor degree. this state of things was brought about by the modern great industries, which not only admit of women's liberal participation in production, but actually call for it and, besides, endeavor to transform domestic work also into a public industry. man's advent to practical supremacy in the household marked the removal of the last barrier to his universal supremacy. his unlimited rule was emphasized and endowed with continuity by the downfall of matriarchy, the introduction of patriarchy, and the gradual transition from the pairing family to the monogamic family. this made a breach in the old gentile order. the monogamic family became a power and lifted a threatening hand against the gens. the next step brings us to the upper stage of barbarism, that period in which all nations of civilization go through their heroic era. it is the time of the iron sword, but also of the iron plow share and axe. the iron had become the servant of man. it is the last and most important of all raw products that play a revolutionary role in history; the last--if we except the potato. iron brought about agriculture on a larger scale and the clearing of extensive forest tracts for cultivation. it gave to the craftsman a tool of such hardness and sharpness that no stone, no other known metal, could withstand it. all this came about gradually. the first iron was often softer than bronze. therefore stone implements disappeared very slowly. not only in the hildebrand song, but also at hastings in 1066, stone axes were still used in fighting. but progress was now irresistible, less interrupted and more rapid. the town, inclosing houses of stone or tiles within its turreted and crested stone walls, became the central seat of the tribe or federation of tribes. it showed an astounding progress of architecture, but also an increase of danger and of the demand for protection. wealth increased rapidly, but it was the wealth of private individuals. weaving, metal work and other more and more differentiating industries developed an increasing variety and display of art in production. agriculture furnished not alone grain, peas, beans and fruit, but also oil and wine, the preparation of which had now been learned. such a diversity of action could not be displayed by any single individual. the second great division of labor took place: handicrafts separated from agriculture. the growing intensity of production and the increased productivity enhanced the value of human labor power. slavery, which had been a rising and sporadic factor in the preceding stage, now became an essential part of the social system. the slaves ceased to be simple assistants. they were now driven in scores to the work in the fields and shops. the division of production into two great branches, agriculture and handicrafts, gave rise to production for exchange, the production of commodities. trade arose at the same time, not only in the interior and on the tribal boundaries, but also in the form of maritime exchange. all this was as yet in a very undeveloped state. the precious metals gained preference as a universal money commodity, but still uncoined and exchanged merely by dead weight. the distinction between rich and poor was added to that between free men and slaves. this and the new division of labor constitute a new division of society into classes. the differences in the amount of property belonging to the several family heads broke up the old communistic households one by one, wherever they might have been preserved thus far. this made an end to the collective cultivation of the soil for the account of the community. the cultivated land was assigned for use to the several families, first for a limited time, later for once and all. the transition to full private property was accomplished gradually and simultaneously with the transition from the pairing family to monogamy. the monogamous family began to be the economic unit of society. the increase of population necessitated a closer consolidation against internal and external foes. the federation of related tribes became unavoidable. their amalgamation, and thence the amalgamation of the separate tribal territories to one national territory, was the following step. the military leader--rex, basileus, thiudans--became an indispensable and standing official. the public meeting was introduced wherever it did not yet exist. the military leader, the council of chiefs, and the public meeting formed the organs of the military democracy that had grown out of the gentile constitution. military democracy--for now war and organization for war were regular functions of social life. the wealth of the neighbors excited the greed of nations that began to regard the acquisition of wealth as one of the main purposes of their life. they were barbarians: robbing appeared to them easier and more honorable than producing. war, once simply a revenge for transgressions or a means for enlarging a territory that had become too narrow, was now waged for the sake of plunder alone and became a regular profession. not in vain did threatening walls cast a rigid stare all around the new fortified towns: their yawning ditches were the tomb of the gentile constitution, and their turrets already reached up into civilization. the internal affairs underwent a similar change. the plundering wars increased the power of the military leader and of the subcommanders. the habitual election of the successors from the same family was gradually transformed into hereditary succession, first by sufferance, then by claim, and finally by usurpation. thus the foundation of hereditary royalty and nobility was laid. in this manner the organs of the gentile constitution were gradually torn away from their roots in the nation, tribe, phratry and gens, and the whole gentile order reversed into its antithesis. the organization of tribes for the purpose of the free administration of affairs was turned into an organization for plundering and oppressing their neighbors. the organs of gentilism changed from servants of the public will to independent organs of rule oppressing their own people. this could not have happened, if the greed for wealth had not divided the gentiles into rich and poor; if the "difference of property in a gens had not changed the community of interest into antagonism of the gentiles" (karl marx); and if the extension of slavery had not begun by branding work for a living as slavish and more ignominious than plundering. * * * * * we have now reached the threshold of civilization. this stage is inaugurated by a new progress in the division of labor. in the lower stage of barbarism production was carried on for use only; any acts of exchange were confined to single cases when a surplus was accidentally realized. in the middle stage of barbarism we find that the possession of cattle gave a regular surplus to the nomadic nations with sufficiently large herds. at the same time there was a division of labor between nomadic nations and backward nations without herds. the existence of two different stages of production side by side furnished the conditions necessary for a regular exchange. the upper stage of barbarism introduced a new division of labor between agriculture and handicrafts, resulting in the production of a continually increasing amount of commodities for the special purpose of exchange, so that exchange between individuals became a vital function of society. civilization strengthened and intensified all the established divisions of labor, especially by rendering the contrast between city and country more pronounced. either the town may have the economic control over the country, as during antiquity, or vice versa, as in the middle ages. a third division of labor was added by civilization: it created a class that did not take part in production, but occupied itself merely with the exchange of products--the merchants. all former attempts at class formation were exclusively concerned with production. they divided the producers into directors and directed, or into producers on a more or less extensive scale. but here a class appears for the first time that captures the control of production in general and subjugates the producers to its rule, without taking the least part in production. a class that makes itself the indispensable mediator between two producers and exploits them both under the pretext of saving them the trouble and risk of exchange, of extending the markets for their products to distant regions, and of thus becoming the most useful class in society; a class of parasites, genuine social ichneumons, that skim the cream off production at home and abroad as a reward for very insignificant services; that rapidly amass enormous wealth and gain social influence accordingly; that for this reason reap ever new honors and ever greater control of production during the period of civilization, until they at last bring to light a product of their own--periodical crises in industry. at the stage of production under discussion, our young merchant class had no inkling as yet of the great future that was in store for them. but they continued to organize, to make themselves invaluable, and that was sufficient for the moment. at the same time metal coins came into use, and through them a new device for controlling the producers and their products. the commodity of commodities that was hiding all other commodities in its mysterious bosom had been discovered, a charm that could be transformed at will into any desirable or coveted thing. whoever held it in his possession had the world of production at his command. and who had it above all others? the merchant. in his hands the cult of money was safe. he took care to make it plain that all commodities, and hence all producers, must prostrate themselves in adoration before money. he proved by practice that all other forms of wealth are reduced to thin wraiths before this personification of riches. never again did the power of money show itself in such primordial brutality and violence as in its youthful days. after the sale of commodities for money came the borrowing of money, resulting in interest and usury. and no legislation of any later period stretches the debtor so mercilessly at the feet of the speculating creditor as the antique grecian and roman codes--both of them spontaneous products of habit, without any other than economic pressure. the wealth in commodities and slaves was now further increased by large holdings in land. the titles of the individuals to the lots of land formerly assigned to them by the gens or tribe had become so well established, that these lots were now owned and inherited. what the individuals had most desired of late was the liberation from the claim of the gentiles to their lots, a claim which had become a veritable fetter for them. they were rid of this fetter--but soon after they were also rid of their lots. the full, free ownership of the soil implied not only the possibility of uncurtailed possession, but also of selling the soil. as long as the soil belonged to the gens, this was impossible. but when the new land owner shook off the chains of the priority claim of the gens and tribe, he also tore the bond that had so long tied him indissolubly to the soil. what that meant was impressed on him by the money invented simultaneously with the advent of private property in land. the soil could now become a commodity to be bought and sold. hardly had private ownership of land been introduced, when the mortgage put in its appearance (see athens). as hetaerism and prostitution clung to the heels of monogamy, so does from now on the mortgage to private ownership in land. you have clamored for free, full, saleable land. well, then, there you have it--tu l'as voulu, georges dandin; it was your own wish, george dandin. industrial expansion, money, usury, private land, and mortgage thus progressed with the concentration and centralization of wealth in the hands of a small class, accompanied by the increasing impoverishment of the masses and the increasing mass of paupers. the new aristocracy of wealth, so far as it did not coincide with the old tribal nobility, forced the latter permanently into the background (in athens, in rome, among the germans). and this division of free men into classes according to their wealth was accompanied, especially in greece, by an enormous increase in the number of slaves[38] whose forced labor formed the basis on which the whole superstructure of society was reared. let us now see what became of the gentile constitution through this revolution of society. gentilism stood powerless in the face of the new elements that had grown without its assistance. it was dependent on the condition that the members of a gens, or of a tribe, should live together in the same territory and be its exclusive inhabitants. that had long ceased to be the case. gentes and tribes were everywhere hopelessly intermingled, slaves, clients, and foreigners lived among citizens. the capacity for settling down permanently which had only been acquired near the end of the middle stage of barbarism, was time and again sidetracked by the necessity of changing the abode according to the dictates of commerce, different occupations and the transfer of land. the members of the gentile organizations could no longer meet for the purpose of taking care of their common interests. only matters of little importance, such as religious festivals, were still observed in an indifferent way. beside the wants and interests for the care of which the gentile organs were appointed and fitted, new wants and interests had arisen from the revolution of the conditions of existence and the resulting change in social classification. these new wants and interests were not only alien to the old gentile order, but thwarted it in every way. the interests of the craftsmen created by division of labor, and the special necessities of a town differing from those of the country, required new organs. but every one of these groups was composed of people from different gentes, phratries, and tribes; they included even strangers. hence the new organs necessarily had to form outside of the gentile constitution. but by the side of it meant against it. and again, in every gentile organization the conflict of interests made itself felt and reached its climax by combining rich and poor, usurers and debtors, in the same gens and tribe. there was furthermore the mass of inhabitants who were strangers to the gentiles. these strangers could become very powerful, as in rome, and they were too numerous to be gradually absorbed by the gentes and tribes. the gentiles confronted these masses as a compact body of privileged individuals. what had once been a natural democracy, had been transformed into an odious aristocracy. the gentile constitution had grown out of a society that did not know any internal contradictions, and it was only adapted to such a society. it had no coërcive power except public opinion. but now a society had developed that by force of all its economic conditions of existence divided humanity into freemen and slaves, and exploiting rich and exploited poor. a society that not only could never reconcile these contradictions, but drove them ever more to a climax. such a society could only exist by a continual open struggle of all classes against one another, or under the supremacy of a third power that under a pretense of standing above the struggling classes stifled their open conflict and permitted a class struggle only on the economic field, in a so-called "legal" form. gentilism had ceased to live. it was crushed by the division of labor and by its result, the division of society into classes. it was replaced by the state. * * * * * in preceding chapters we have shown by three concrete examples the three main forms in which the state was built up on the ruins of gentilism. athens represented the simplest, the classic type: the state grew directly and mainly out of class divisions that developed within gentile society. in rome the gentile organization became an exclusive aristocracy amid a numerous plebs of outsiders who had only duties, but no rights. the victory of the plebs burst the old gentile order asunder and erected on its remains the state which soon engulfed both gentile aristocracy and plebs. finally, among the german conquerors of the roman empire, the state grew as a direct result of the conquest of large foreign territories which the gentile constitution was powerless to control. but this conquest did not necessitate either a serious fight with the former population or a more advanced division of labor. conquerors and conquered were almost in the same stage of economic development, so that the economic basis of society remained undisturbed. hence gentilism could preserve for many centuries an unchanged territorial character in the form of mark communes, and even rejuvenate itself in the nobility and patrician families of later years, or in the peasantry, as e. g. in dithmarsia.[39] the state, then, is by no means a power forced on society from outside; neither is it the "realization of the ethical idea," "the image and the realization of reason," as hegel maintains. it is simply a product of society at a certain stage of evolution. it is the confession that this society has become hopelessly divided against itself, has entangled itself in irreconcilable contradictions which it is powerless to banish. in order that these contradictions, these classes with conflicting economic interests, may not annihilate themselves and society in a useless struggle, a power becomes necessary that stands apparently above society and has the function of keeping down the conflicts and maintaining "order." and this power, the outgrowth of society, but assuming supremacy over it and becoming more and more divorced from it, is the state. the state differs from gentilism in that it first divides its members by territories. as we have seen, the old bonds of blood kinship uniting the gentile bodies had become inefficient, because they were dependent on the condition, now no longer a fact, that all gentiles should live on a certain territory. the territory was the same; but the human beings had changed. hence the division by territories was chosen as the point of departure, and citizens had to exercise their rights and duties wherever they chose their abode without regard to gens and tribe. this organization of inhabitants by localities is a common feature of all states. it seems natural to us now. but we have seen what long and hard fighting was required before it could take, in athens and rome, the place of the old organization by blood kinship. in the second place, the state created a public power of coërcion that did no longer coincide with the old self-organized and armed population. this special power of coërcion is necessary, because a self-organized army of the people has become impossible since the division of society into classes took place. for the slaves belonged also to society. the 90,000 citizens of athens formed only a privileged class compared to the 365,000 slaves. the popular army of the athenian democracy was an aristocratic public power designed to keep the slaves down. but we have seen that a police force became also necessary to maintain order among the citizens. this public power of coërcion exists in every state. it is not composed of armed men alone, but has also such objects as prisons and correction houses attached to it, that were unknown to gentilism. it may be very small, almost infinitesimal, in societies with feebly developed class antagonisms and in out of the way places, as was once the case in certain regions of the united states. but it increases in the same ratio in which the class antagonisms become more pronounced, and in which neighboring states become larger and more populous. a conspicuous example is modern europe, where the class struggles and wars of conquest have nursed the public power to such a size that it threatens to swallow the whole society and the state itself. in order to maintain this public power, contributions of the citizens become necessary--the taxes. these were absolutely unknown in gentile society. but to-day we get our full measure of them. as civilization makes further progress, these taxes are no longer sufficient to cover public expenses. the state makes drafts on the future, contracts loans, public debts. old europe can tell a story of them. in possession of the public power and of the right of taxation, the officials in their capacity as state organs are now exalted above society. the free and voluntary respect that was accorded to the organs of gentilism does not satisfy them any more, even if they might have it. representatives of a power that is divorced from society, they must enforce respect by exceptional laws that render them specially sacred and inviolable.[40] the lowest police employee of the civilized state has more "authority" than all the organs of gentilism combined. but the mightiest prince and the greatest statesman or general of civilization may look with envy on the spontaneous and undisputed esteem that was the privilege of the least gentile sachem. the one stands in the middle of society, the other is forced to assume a position outside and above it. the state is the result of the desire to keep down class conflicts. but having arisen amid these conflicts, it is as a rule the state of the most powerful economic class that by force of its economic supremacy becomes also the ruling political class and thus acquires new means of subduing and exploiting the oppressed masses. the antique state was, therefore, the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding the slaves in check. the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for the oppression of the serfs and dependent farmers. the modern representative state is the tool of the capitalist exploiters of wage labor. at certain periods it occurs exceptionally that the struggling classes balance each other so nearly that the public power gains a certain degree of independence by posing as the mediator between them. the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth century was in such a position, balancing the nobles and the burghers against one another. so was the bonapartism of the first, and still more of the second, empire, playing the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and vice versa. the latest performance of this kind, in which ruler and ruled appear equally ridiculous, is the new german empire of bismarckian make, in which capitalists and laborers are balanced against one another and equally cheated for the benefit of the degenerate prussian cabbage junkers.[41] in most of the historical states, the rights of the citizens are differentiated according to their wealth. this is a direct confirmation of the fact that the state is organized for the protection of the possessing against the non-possessing classes. the athenian and roman classification by incomes shows this. it is also seen in the medieval state of feudalism in which the political power depended on the quantity of real estate. it is again seen in the electoral qualifications of the modern representative state. the political recognition of the differences in wealth is by no means essential. on the contrary, it marks a low stage of state development. the highest form of the state, the democratic republic, knows officially nothing of property distinctions.[42] it is that form of the state which under modern conditions of society becomes more and more an unavoidable necessity. the last decisive struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie can only be fought out under this state form.[43] in such a state, wealth exerts its power indirectly, but all the more safely. this is done partly in the form of direct corruption of officials, after the classical type of the united states, or in the form of an alliance between government and bankers which is established all the more easily when the public debt increases and when corporations concentrate in their hands not only the means of transportation, but also production itself, using the stock exchange as a center. the united states and the latest french republic are striking examples, and good old switzerland has contributed its share to illustrate this point. that a democratic republic is not necessary for this fraternal bond between stock exchange and government is proved by england and last, not least, germany, where it is doubtful whether bismarck or bleichroeder was more favored by the introduction of universal suffrage.[44] the possessing class rules directly through universal suffrage. for as long as the oppressed class, in this case the proletariat, is not ripe for its economic emancipation, just so long will its majority regard the existing order of society as the only one possible, and form the tail, the extreme left wing, of the capitalist class. but the more the proletariat matures toward its self-emancipation, the more does it constitute itself as a separate class and elect its own representatives in place of the capitalists. universal suffrage is the gauge of the maturity of the working class. it can and will never be anything else but that in the modern state. but that is sufficient. on the day when the thermometer of universal suffrage reaches its boiling point among the laborers, they as well as the capitalists will know what to do. the state, then, did not exist from all eternity. there have been societies without it, that had no idea of any state or public power. at a certain stage of economic development, which was of necessity accompanied by a division of society into classes, the state became the inevitable result of this division. we are now rapidly approaching a stage of evolution in production, in which the existence of classes has not only ceased to be a necessity, but becomes a positive fetter on production. hence these classes must fall as inevitably as they once arose. the state must irrevocably fall with them. the society that is to reorganize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers, will transfer the machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum of antiquities by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze ax. * * * * * civilization is, as we have seen, that stage of society, in which the division of labor, the resulting exchange between individuals, and the production of commodities combining them, reach their highest development and revolutionize the whole society. the production of all former stages of society was mainly collective, and consumption was carried on by direct division of products within more or less small communes. this collective production was confined within the narrowest limits. but it implied the control of production and of the products by the producers. they knew what became of their product: it did not leave their hands until it was consumed by them. as long as production moved on this basis, it could not grow beyond the control of the producers, and it could not create any strange ghostly forces against them. under civilization, however, this is the inevitable rule. into the simple process of production, the division of labor was gradually interpolated. it undermined the communism of production and consumption, it made the appropriation of products by single individuals the prevailing rule, and thus introduced the exchange between individuals, in the manner mentioned above. gradually, the production of commodities became the rule. this mode of production for exchange, not for home consumption, necessarily passes the products on from hand to hand. the producer gives his product away in exchange. he does no longer know what becomes of it. with the advent of money and of the trader who steps in as a middleman between the producers, the process of exchange becomes still more complicated. the fate of the products becomes still more uncertain. the number of merchants is great and one does not know what the other is doing. the products now pass not only from hand to hand, but also from market to market. the producers have lost the control of the aggregate production in their sphere of life, and the merchants have not yet acquired this control. products and production become the victims of chance. but chance is only one pole of an interrelation, the other pole of which is called necessity. in nature, where chance seems to reign also, we have long ago demonstrated the innate necessity and law that determines the course of chance on every line. but what is true of nature, holds also good of society. whenever a social function or a series of social processes become too powerful for the control of man, whenever they grow beyond the grasp of man and seem to be left to mere chance, then the peculiar and innate laws of such processes shape the course of chance with increased elementary necessity. such laws also control the vicissitudes of the production and exchange of commodities. for the individual producer and exchanger, these laws are strange, and often unknown, forces, the nature of which must be laboriously investigated and ascertained. these economic laws of production are modified by the different stages of this form of production. but generally speaking, the entire period of civilization is dominated by these laws. to this day, the product controls the producer. to this day, the aggregate production of society is managed, not on a uniform plan, but by blind laws, that rule with elementary force and find their final expression in the storms of periodical commercial crises. we have seen that human labor power is enabled at a very early stage of production to produce considerably more than is needed to maintain the producer. we have found that this stage coïncided in general with the first appearance of the division of labor and of exchange between individuals. now, it was not long before the great truth was discovered that man may himself be a commodity, and that human labor power may be exchanged and exploited by transforming a man into a slave. hardly had exchange between men been established, when men themselves were also exchanged. the active asset became a passive liability, whether man wanted it or not. slavery, which reaches its highest development in civilization, introduced the first great division of an exploited and an exploiting class into society. this division continued during the whole period of civilization. slavery is the first form of exploitation, characteristic of the antique world. then followed feudalism in the middle ages, and wage labor in recent times. these are the three great forms of servitude, characteristic of the three great epochs of civilization. their invariable mark is either open or, in modern times, disguised slavery. the stage of commodity production introducing civilization is marked economically by the introduction of (1) metal coins and, thus, of money as capital, of interest, and of usury; (2) merchants as middlemen between producers; (3) private property and mortgage; (4) slave labor as the prevailing form of production. the form of the family corresponding to civilization and becoming its pronounced custom is monogamy, the supremacy of man over woman, and the monogamous family as the economic unit of society. the aggregation of civilized society is the state, which throughout all typical periods is the state of the ruling class, and in all cases mainly a machine for controlling the oppressed and exploited class. civilization is furthermore characterized on one side by the permanent introduction of the contrast between city and country as the basis of the entire division of social labor; on the other side by the introduction of the testament by which the property holder is enabled to dispose of his property beyond the hour of his death. this institution is a direct blow at the gentile constitution, and was unknown in athens until the time of solon. in rome it was introduced very early, but we do not know when.[45] in germany it was originated by the priests in order that the honest german might bequeath his property to the church without any interference. with this fundamental constitution, civilization had accomplished things for which the old gentile society was no match whatever. but these exploits were accomplished by playing on the most sordid passions and instincts of man, and by developing them at the expense of all his other gifts. barefaced covetousness was the moving spirit of civilization from its first dawn to the present day; wealth, and again wealth, and for the third time wealth; wealth, not of society, but of the puny individual, was its only and final aim. if nevertheless the advanced development of science, and at repeated times the highest flower of art, fell into its lap, this was only due to the fact that without them the highest emoluments of modern wealth would have been missing. exploitation of one class by another being the basis of civilization, its whole development involves a continual contradiction. every progress of production is at the same time a retrogression in the condition of the oppressed class, that is of the great majority. every benefit for one class is necessarily an evil for the other, every new emancipation of one class a new oppression for the other. the most drastic proof of this is furnished by the introduction of machinery, the effects of which are well known to-day. and while there is hardly any distinction between rights and duties among barbarians, as we have seen, civilization makes the difference between these two plain even to the dullest mind. for now one class has nearly all the rights, the other class nearly all the duties. but this is not admitted. what is good for the ruling class, is alleged to be good for the whole of society with which the ruling class identifies itself. the more civilization advances, the more it is found to cover with the cloak of charity the evils necessarily created by it, to excuse them or to deny their existence, in short to introduce a conventional hypocrisy that culminates in the declaration: the exploitation of the oppressed class is carried on by the exploiting class solely in the interest of the exploited class itself. and if the latter does not recognize this, but even becomes rebellious, it is simply the worst ingratitude to its benefactors, the exploiters.[46] and now, in conclusion, let me add morgan's judgment of civilization (ancient society, page 552): "since the advent of civilization, the outgrowth of property has been so immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding and its management so intelligent in the interest of its owners that it has become, on the part of the people, an unmanageable power. the human mind stands bewildered in the presence of its own creation. the time will come, nevertheless, when human intelligence will rise to the mastery over property, and define the relations of the state to the property it protects, as well as the obligations and the limits of the rights of its owners. the interests of society are paramount to individual interests, and the two must be brought into just and harmonious relations. a mere property career is not the final destiny of mankind, if progress is to be the law of the future as it has been of the past. the time which has passed away since civilization began is but a fragment of the past duration of man's existence; and but a fragment of the ages yet to come. the dissolution of society bids fair to become the termination of a career of which property is the end and aim, because such a career contains the elements of self-destruction. democracy in government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and privileges, and universal education, foreshadow the next higher plane of society to which experience, intelligence and knowledge are steadily tending. it will be a revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes." the end. footnotes: [37] author's note. especially on the northwest coast of america; see bancroft. among the haidahs of the queen charlotte islands some households gather as many as 700 members under one roof. among the nootkas whole tribes lived under one roof. [38] author's note. the number of slaves in athens was 365,000. in corinth it was 460,000 at the most flourishing time, and 470,000 in aegina; in both cases ten times the number of free citizens. [39] author's note. the first historian who had at least a vague conception of the nature of the gens was niebuhr, thanks to his familiarity with the dithmarsian families. the same source, however, is also responsible for his errors. [40] translator's note. the recent demand for a law declaring the person of the u. s. president sacred above all other representatives of the public power and making an assault on him an exceptional crime is a very good case in point. [41] translator's note. "junker" is a contemptuous term for the land-owning nobility. [42] translator's note. in the united states, the poll tax is an indirect property qualification, as it strikes those who, through lack of employment, sickness or invalidity, are unable to spare the amount, however small, of this tax. furthermore, the laws requiring a continuous residence in the precinct, the town, the county, and the state as a qualification for voters have the effect of disqualifying a great number of workingmen who are forced to change their abode according to their opportunities for employment. and the educational qualifications which especially the southern states are rigidly enforcing tend to disfranchise the great mass of the negroes, who form the main body of the working class in those states. [43] translator's note. in belgium, where the proletariat is now on the verge of gaining political supremacy, the battle cry is: "s. u. et r. p." (suffrage universelle et representation proportionelle). [44] translator's note. suffrage in germany, though universal for men is by no means equal, but founded on property qualifications. in prussia, e. g., a three class system of voting is in force which is best illustrated by the following figures: in 1898 there were 6,447,253 voters; 3.26 per cent belonged to the first class, 11.51 per cent to the second class, and 85.35 per cent to the third class. but the 947,218 voters of the first and second classes had twice as many votes as the five and a half millions of the third class. [45] author's note. lassalle's "system of acquired rights" argues in its second part mainly the proposition that the roman testament is as old as rome itself, and that there has never been in roman history "a time without a testament." according to him, the testament had its origin in pre-roman times in the cult of the departed. lassalle, as a convinced hegelian of the old school, derives the provisions of the roman law, not from the social condition of the romans, but from the "speculative conception" of will, and thus arrives at this totally anti-historic conclusion. this is not to be wondered at in a book that draws from the same speculative conception the conclusion that the transfer of property was purely a side issue in roman inheritance. lassalle not only believed in the illusions of roman jurists, especially of the earlier ones, but he outstripped their fancy. [46] author's note. i first intended to place the brilliant critique of civilization, scattered through the works of fourier, by the side of morgan's and of my own. unluckily i cannot spare the time. i only wish to remark that fourier already considers monogamy and private property in land the main characteristics of civilization, and that he calls them a war of the rich against the poor. we also find with him the deep perception that the individual families (les families incoherentes) are the economic units of all faulty societies divided by opposing interests. proofreading team. cicero's tusculan disputations; also, treatises on the nature of the gods, and on the commonwealth. literally translated, chiefly by c. d. yonge. new york: harper & brothers, publishers, franklin square. 1877. harper's new classical library. comprising literal translations of cæsar. virgil. sallust. horace. cicero's orations. cicero's offices &c. cicero on oratory and orators. cicero's tusculan disputations, the republic, and the nature of the gods. terence. tacitus. livy. 2 vols. juvenal. xenophon. homer's iliad. homer's odyssey. herodotus. demosthenes. 2 vols. thucidides. æschylus. sophocles. euripides. 2 vols. plato. [select dialogues.] 12mo, cloth, $1.50 per volume. harper & brothers _will send either of the above works by mail, postage prepaid, to any part of the united states, on receipt of the price_. note. the greater portion of the republic was previously translated by francis barham, esq., and published in 1841. although ably performed, it was not sufficiently close for the purpose of the "classical library," and was therefore placed in the hands of the present editor for revision, as well as for collation with recent texts. this has occasioned material alterations and additions. the treatise "on the nature of the gods" is a revision of that usually ascribed to the celebrated benjamin franklin. contents. _tusculan disputations_ _on the nature of the gods_ _on the commonwealth_ the tusculan disputations. introduction. in the year a.u.c. 708, and the sixty-second year of cicero's age, his daughter, tullia, died in childbed; and her loss afflicted cicero to such a degree that he abandoned all public business, and, leaving the city, retired to asterra, which was a country house that he had near antium; where, after a while, he devoted himself to philosophical studies, and, besides other works, he published his treatise de finibus, and also this treatise called the tusculan disputations, of which middleton gives this concise description: "the first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil; "the second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude; "the third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the accidents of life; "the fourth, to moderate all our other passions; "and the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy." it was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some friends with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative, tending to improve the mind and enlarge the understanding. in this manner he now spent five days at his tusculan villa in discussing with his friends the several questions just mentioned. for, after employing the mornings in declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to retire in the afternoon into a gallery, called the academy, which he had built for the purpose of philosophical conferences, where, after the manner of the greeks, he held a school, as they called it, and invited the company to call for any subject that they desired to hear explained, which being proposed accordingly by some of the audience became immediately the argument of that day's debate. these five conferences, or dialogues, he collected afterward into writing in the very words and manner in which they really passed; and published them under the title of his tusculan disputations, from the name of the villa in which they were held. * * * * * book i. on the contempt of death. i. at a time when i had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself from my labors as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, i had recourse again, brutus, principally by your advice, to those studies which never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and which after a long interval i resumed; and now, since the principles and rules of all arts which relate to living well depend on the study of wisdom, which is called philosophy, i have thought it an employment worthy of me to illustrate them in the latin tongue, not because philosophy could not be understood in the greek language, or by the teaching of greek masters; but it has always been my opinion that our countrymen have, in some instances, made wiser discoveries than the greeks, with reference to those subjects which they have considered worthy of devoting their attention to, and in others have improved upon their discoveries, so that in one way or other we surpass them on every point; for, with regard to the manners and habits of private life, and family and domestic affairs, we certainly manage them with more elegance, and better than they did; and as to our republic, that our ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better customs and laws. what shall i say of our military affairs; in which our ancestors have been most eminent in valor, and still more so in discipline? as to those things which are attained not by study, but nature, neither greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us; for what people has displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of soul, probity, faith--such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be equal to our ancestors. in learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature, greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no competition; for while among the greeks the poets were the most ancient species of learned men--since homer and hesiod lived before the foundation of rome, and archilochus[1] was a contemporary of romulus--we received poetry much later. for it was about five hundred and ten years after the building of rome before livius[2] published a play in the consulship of c. claudius, the son of cæcus, and m. tuditanus, a year before the birth of ennius, who was older than plautus and nævius. ii. it was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received among us; though we find in cato de originibus that the guests used, at their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of the flute; but a speech of cato's shows this kind of poetry to have been in no great esteem, as he censures marcus nobilior for carrying poets with him into his province; for that consul, as we know, carried ennius with him into ætolia. therefore the less esteem poets were in, the less were those studies pursued; though even then those who did display the greatest abilities that way were not very inferior to the greeks. do we imagine that if it had been considered commendable in fabius,[3] a man of the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had many polycleti and parrhasii? honor nourishes art, and glory is the spur with all to studies; while those studies are always neglected in every nation which are looked upon disparagingly. the greeks held skill in vocal and instrumental music as a very important accomplishment, and therefore it is recorded of epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the greatest man among the greeks, that he played excellently on the flute; and themistocles, some years before, was deemed ignorant because at an entertainment he declined the lyre when it was offered to him. for this reason musicians flourished in greece; music was a general study; and whoever was unacquainted with it was not considered as fully instructed in learning. geometry was in high esteem with them, therefore none were more honorable than mathematicians. but we have confined this art to bare measuring and calculating. iii. but, on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the orator; though he was not at first a man of learning, but only quick at speaking: in subsequent times he became learned; for it is reported that galba, africanus, and lælius were men of learning; and that even cato, who preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then succeeded the lepidi, carbo, and gracchi, and so many great orators after them, down to our own times, that we were very little, if at all, inferior to the greeks. philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this present time, and has had no assistance from our own language, and so now i have undertaken to raise and illustrate it, in order that, as i have been of service to my countrymen, when employed on public affairs, i may, if possible, be so likewise in my retirement; and in this i must take the more pains, because there are already many books in the latin language which are said to be written inaccurately, having been composed by excellent men, only not of sufficient learning; for, indeed, it is possible that a man may think well, and yet not be able to express his thoughts elegantly; but for any one to publish thoughts which he can neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so as to entertain his reader, is an unpardonable abuse of letters and retirement: they, therefore, read their books to one another, and no one ever takes them up but those who wish to have the same license for careless writing allowed to themselves. wherefore, if oratory has acquired any reputation from my industry, i shall take the more pains to open the fountains of philosophy, from which all my eloquence has taken its rise. iv. but, as aristotle,[4] a man of the greatest genius, and of the most various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician isocrates,[5] commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined philosophy with eloquence: so it is my design not to lay aside my former study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in this greater and more fruitful art; for i have always thought that to be able to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important questions was the most perfect philosophy. and i have so diligently applied myself to this pursuit, that i have already ventured to have a school like the greeks. and lately when you left us, having many of my friends about me, i attempted at my tusculan villa what i could do in that way; for as i formerly used to practise declaiming, which nobody continued longer than myself, so this is now to be the declamation of my old age. i desired any one to propose a question which he wished to have discussed, and then i argued that point either sitting or walking; and so i have compiled the scholæ, as the greeks call them, of five days, in as many books. we proceeded in this manner: when he who had proposed the subject for discussion had said what he thought proper, i spoke against him; for this is, you know, the old and socratic method of arguing against another's opinion; for socrates thought that thus the truth would more easily be arrived at. but to give you a better notion of our disputations, i will not barely send you an account of them, but represent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let the introduction be thus: v. _a._ to me death seems to be an evil. _m._ what, to those who are already dead? or to those who must die? _a._ to both. _m._ it is a misery, then, because an evil? _a._ certainly. _m._ then those who have already died, and those who have still got to die, are both miserable? _a._ so it appears to me. _m._ then all are miserable? _a._ every one. _m._ and, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already born, or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so; for should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not except any one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of misery in death. but seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to eternal misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a hundred thousand years ago; or rather, all that have ever been born. _a._ so, indeed, i think. _m._ tell me, i beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed cerberus in the shades below, and the roaring waves of cocytus, and the passage over acheron, and tantalus expiring with thirst, while the water touches his chin; and sisyphus, who sweats with arduous toil in vain the steepy summit of the mount to gain? perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, minos and rhadamanthus; before whom neither l. crassus nor m. antonius can defend you; and where, since the cause lies before grecian judges, you will not even be able to employ demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a very great assembly. these things perhaps you dread, and therefore look on death as an eternal evil. vi. _a._ do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such things? _m._ what, do you not believe them? _a._ not in the least. _m._ i am sorry to hear that. _a._ why, i beg? _m._ because i could have been very eloquent in speaking against them. _a._ and who could not on such a subject? or what trouble is it to refute these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters?[6] _m._ and yet you have books of philosophers full of arguments against these. _a._ a great waste of time, truly! for who is so weak as to be concerned about them? _m._ if, then, there is no one miserable in the infernal regions, there can be no one there at all. _a._ i am altogether of that opinion. _m._ where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they inhabit? for, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere. _a._ i, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere. _m._ then they have no existence at all. _a._ even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that they have no existence. _m._ i had rather now have you afraid of cerberus than speak thus inaccurately. _a._ in what respect? _m._ because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the same breath. where now is your sagacity? when you say any one is miserable, you say that he who does not exist, does exist. _a._ i am not so absurd as to say that. _m._ what is it that you do say, then? _a._ i say, for instance, that marcus crassus is miserable in being deprived of such great riches as his by death; that cn. pompey is miserable in being taken from such glory and honor; and, in short, that all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life. _m._ you have returned to the same point, for to be miserable implies an existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence: if, then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not even miserable. _a._ perhaps i do not express what i mean, for i look upon this very circumstance, not to exist after having existed, to be very miserable. _m._ what, more so than not to have existed at all? therefore, those who are not yet born are miserable because they are not; and we ourselves, if we are to be miserable after death, were miserable before we were born: but i do not remember that i was miserable before i was born; and i should be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you recollect of yourself before you were born. vii. _a._ you are pleasant: as if i had said that those men are miserable who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead. _m._ you say, then, that they are so? _a._ yes; i say that because they no longer exist after having existed they are miserable. _m._ you do not perceive that you are asserting contradictions; for what is a greater contradiction, than that that should be not only miserable, but should have any existence at all, which does not exist? when you go out at the capene gate and see the tombs of the calatini, the scipios, servilii, and metelli, do you look on them as miserable? _a._ because you press me with a word, henceforward i will not say they are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they have no existence. _m._ you do not say, then, "m. crassus is miserable," but only "miserable m. crassus." _a._ exactly so. _m._ as if it did not follow that whatever you speak of in that manner either is or is not. are you not acquainted with the first principles of logic? for this is the first thing they lay down, whatever is asserted (for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of rendering the greek term [greek: axiôma]; if i can think of a more accurate expression hereafter, i will use it), is asserted as being either true or false. when, therefore, you say, "miserable m. crassus," you either say this, "m. crassus is miserable," so that some judgment may be made whether it is true or false, or you say nothing at all. _a._ well, then, i now own that the dead are not miserable, since you have drawn from me a concession that they who do not exist at all can not be miserable. what then? we that are alive, are we not wretched, seeing we must die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we must night and day reflect that, at some time or other, we must die? viii. _m._ do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which you have delivered human nature? _a._ by what means? _m._ because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a kind of infinite and eternal misery. now, however, i see a goal, and when i have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared; but you seem to me to follow the opinion of epicharmus,[7] a man of some discernment, and sharp enough for a sicilian. _a._ what opinion? for i do not recollect it. _m._ i will tell you if i can in latin; for you know i am no more used to bring in latin sentences in a greek discourse than greek in a latin one. _a._ and that is right enough. but what is that opinion of epicharmus? _m._ i would not die, but yet am not concerned that i shall be dead. _a._ i now recollect the greek; but since you have obliged me to grant that the dead are not miserable, proceed to convince me that it is not miserable to be under a necessity of dying. _m._ that is easy enough; but i have greater things in hand. _a._ how comes that to be so easy? and what are those things of more consequence? _m._ thus: because, if there is no evil after death, then even death itself can be none; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state where you grant that there is no evil: so that even to be obliged to die can be no evil, for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a place where we allow that no evil is. _a._ i beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. but what are those more important things about which you say that you are occupied? _m._ to teach you, if i can, that death is not only no evil, but a good. _a._ i do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it, for even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove that death is no evil. but i will not interrupt you; i would rather hear a continued discourse. _m._ what, if i should ask you a question, would you not answer? _a._ that would look like pride; but i would rather you should not ask but where necessity requires. ix. _m._ i will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as i can what you require; but not with any idea that, like the pythian apollo, what i say must needs be certain and indisputable, but as a mere man, endeavoring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for i have no ground to proceed further on than probability. those men may call their statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived by the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession. _a._ do as you please: we are ready to hear you. _m._ the first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be so well understood, really is; for some imagine death to be the departure of the soul from the body; others think that there is no such departure, but that soul and body perish together, and that the soul is extinguished with the body. of those who think that the soul does depart from the body, some believe in its immediate dissolution; others fancy that it continues to exist for a time; and others believe that it lasts forever. there is great dispute even what the soul is, where it is, and whence it is derived: with some, the heart itself (_cor_) seems to be the soul, hence the expressions, _excordes_, _vecordes_, _concordes;_ and that prudent nasica, who was twice consul, was called corculus, _i.e._, wise-heart; and ælius sextus is described as _egregie_ cordatus _homo, catus æliu' sextus_--that great _wise-hearted_ man, sage ælius. empedocles imagines the blood, which is suffused over the heart, to be the soul; to others, a certain part of the brain seems to be the throne of the soul; others neither allow the heart itself, nor any portion of the brain, to be the soul, but think either that the heart is the seat and abode of the soul, or else that the brain is so. some would have the soul, or spirit, to be the _anima_, as our schools generally agree; and indeed the name signifies as much, for we use the expressions _animam agere_, to live; _animam efflare_, to expire; _animosi_, men of spirit; _bene animati_, men of right feeling; _exanimi sententia_, according to our real opinion; and the very word _animus_ is derived from _anima_. again, the soul seems to zeno the stoic to be fire. x. but what i have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or fire being the soul, are common opinions: the others are only entertained by individuals; and, indeed, there were many among the ancients who held singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest was aristoxenus, a man who was both a musician and a philosopher. he maintained a certain straining of the body, like what is called harmony in music, to be the soul, and believed that, from the figure and nature of the whole body, various motions are excited, as sounds are from an instrument. he adhered steadily to his system, and yet he said something, the nature of which, whatever it was, had been detailed and explained a great while before by plato. xenocrates denied that the soul had any figure, or anything like a body; but said it was a number, the power of which, as pythagoras had fancied, some ages before, was the greatest in nature: his master, plato, imagined a threefold soul, a dominant portion of which--that is to say, reason--he had lodged in the head, as in a tower; and the other two parts--namely, anger and desire--he made subservient to this one, and allotted them distinct abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the præcordia. but dicæarchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, held at corinth, which he details to us in three books--in the first book introduces many speakers; and in the other two he introduces a certain pherecrates, an old man of phthia, who, as he said, was descended from deucalion; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a soul, but that it is a name without a meaning; and that it is idle to use the expression "animals," or "animated beings;" that neither men nor beasts have minds or souls, but that all that power by which we act or perceive is equally infused into every living creature, and is inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor is there anything whatever really existing except body, which is a single and simple thing, so fashioned as to live and have its sensations in consequence of the regulations of nature. aristotle, a man superior to all others, both in genius and industry (i always except plato), after having embraced these four known sorts of principles, from which all things deduce their origin, imagines that there is a certain fifth nature, from whence comes the soul; for to think, to foresee, to learn, to teach, to invent anything, and many other attributes of the same kind, such as to remember, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be pleased or displeased--these, and others like them, exist, he thinks, in none of those first four kinds: on such account he adds a fifth kind, which has no name, and so by a new name he calls the soul [greek: endelecheia], as if it were a certain continued and perpetual motion. xi. if i have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the principal opinions concerning the soul. i have omitted democritus, a very great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous concourse of small, light, and round substances; for, if you believe men of his school, there is nothing which a crowd of atoms cannot effect. which of these opinions is true, some god must determine. it is an important question for us, which has the most appearance of truth? shall we, then, prefer determining between them, or shall we return to our subject? _a._ i could wish both, if possible; but it is difficult to mix them: therefore, if without a discussion of them we can get rid of the fears of death, let us proceed to do so; but if this is not to be done without explaining the question about souls, let us have that now, and the other at another time. _m._ i take that plan to be the best, which i perceive you are inclined to; for reason will demonstrate that, whichever of the opinions which i have stated is true, it must follow, then, that death cannot be an evil; or that it must rather be something desirable; for if either the heart, or the blood, or the brain, is the soul, then certainly the soul, being corporeal, must perish with the rest of the body; if it is air, it will perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will be extinguished; if it is aristoxenus's harmony, it will be put out of tune. what shall i say of dicæarchus, who denies that there is any soul? in all these opinions, there is nothing to affect any one after death; for all feeling is lost with life, and where there is no sensation, nothing can interfere to affect us. the opinions of others do indeed bring us hope; if it is any pleasure to you to think that souls, after they leave the body, may go to heaven as to a permanent home. _a._ i have great pleasure in that thought, and it is what i most desire; and even if it should not be so, i should still be very willing to believe it. _m._ what occasion have you, then, for my assistance? am i superior to plato in eloquence? turn over carefully his book that treats of the soul; you will have there all that you can want. _a._ i have, indeed, done that, and often; but, i know not how it comes to pass, i agree with it while i am reading it; but when i have laid down the book, and begin to reflect with myself on the immortality of the soul, all that agreement vanishes. _m._ how comes that? do you admit this--that souls either exist after death, or else that they also perish at the moment of death? _a._ i agree to that. and if they do exist, i admit that they are happy; but if they perish, i cannot suppose them to be unhappy, because, in fact, they have no existence at all. you drove me to that concession but just now. _m._ how, then, can you, or why do you, assert that you think that death is an evil, when it either makes us happy, in the case of the soul continuing to exist, or, at all events, not unhappy, in the case of our becoming destitute of all sensation? xii. _a._ explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first, if you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail in that (and it is a very difficult thing to establish), that death is free from all evil; for i am not without my fears that this itself is an evil: i do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact that we shall hereafter suffer deprivation. _m._ i have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all cases. and, first, i have all antiquity on that side, which the more near it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps, on that account, did it discern the truth in these matters. this very doctrine, then, was adopted by all those ancients whom ennius calls in the sabine tongue casci; namely, that in death there was a sensation, and that, when men departed this life, they were not so entirely destroyed as to perish absolutely. and this may appear from many other circumstances, and especially from the pontifical rites and funeral obsequies, which men of the greatest genius would not have been so solicitous about, and would not have guarded from any injury by such severe laws, but from a firm persuasion that death was not so entire a destruction as wholly to abolish and destroy everything, but rather a kind of transmigration, as it were, and change of life, which was, in the case of illustrious men and women, usually a guide to heaven, while in that of others it was still confined to the earth, but in such a manner as still to exist. from this, and the sentiments of the romans, in heaven romulus with gods now lives, as ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too, hercules is considered so great and propitious a god among the greeks, and from them he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to the very ocean itself. this is how it was that bacchus was deified, the offspring of semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive castor and pollux as gods, who are reported not only to have helped the romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the messengers of their success. what shall we say of ino, the daughter of cadmus? is she not called leucothea by the greeks, and matuta by us? nay, more; is not the whole of heaven (not to dwell on particulars) almost filled with the offspring of men? should i attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what the greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who are called their principal gods were taken from among men up into heaven. xiii. examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in greece; recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. but they who were not acquainted with natural philosophy (for it did not begin to be in vogue till many years later) had no higher belief than what natural reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the principles and causes of things; they were often induced by certain visions, and those generally in the night, to think that those men who had departed from this life were still alive. and this may further be brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are gods--that there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in the world so savage, as to be without some notion of gods. many have wrong notions of the gods, for that is the nature and ordinary consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain divine nature and energy. nor does this proceed from the conversation of men, or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion established by institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case the consent of all nations is to be looked on as a law of nature. who is there, then, that does not lament the loss of his friends, principally from imagining them deprived of the conveniences of life? take away this opinion, and you remove with it all grief; for no one is afflicted merely on account of a loss sustained by himself. perhaps we may be sorry, and grieve a little; but that bitter lamentation and those mournful tears have their origin in our apprehensions that he whom we loved is deprived of all the advantages of life, and is sensible of his loss. and we are led to this opinion by nature, without any arguments or any instruction. xiv. but the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a silent judgment in favor of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as all are anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which concern futurity: one plants what future ages shall enjoy, as statius saith in his synephebi. what is his object in doing so, except that he is interested in posterity? shall the industrious husbandman, then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see? and shall not the great man found laws, institutions, and a republic? what does the procreation of children imply, and our care to continue our names, and our adoptions, and our scrupulous exactness in drawing up wills, and the inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that our thoughts run on futurity? there is no doubt but a judgment may be formed of nature in general, from looking at each nature in its most perfect specimens; and what is a more perfect specimen of a man than those are who look on themselves as born for the assistance, the protection, and the preservation of others? hercules has gone to heaven; he never would have gone thither had he not, while among men, made that road for himself. these things are of old date, and have, besides, the sanction of universal religion. xv. what will you say? what do you imagine that so many and such great men of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good, expected? do you believe that they thought that their names should not continue beyond their lives? none ever encountered death for their country but under a firm persuasion of immortality! themistocles might have lived at his ease; so might epaminondas; and, not to look abroad and among the ancients for instances, so might i myself. but, somehow or other there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages; and this both exists most firmly, and appears most clearly, in men of the loftiest genius and greatest souls. take away this, and who would be so mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers? i speak of those in power. what are the poet's views but to be ennobled after death? what else is the object of these lines, behold old ennius here, who erst thy fathers' great exploits rehearsed? he is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he himself had ennobled by his poetry. and in the same spirit he says, in another passage, let none with tears my funeral grace, for i claim from my works an immortality. why do i mention poets? the very mechanics are desirous of fame after death. why did phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? what do our philosophers think on the subject? do not they put their names to those very books which they write on the contempt of glory? if, then, universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general opinion everywhere that those who have quitted this life are still interested in something, we also must subscribe to that opinion. and if we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtues see most clearly into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most perfect work, it is very probable that, as every great man is especially anxious to benefit posterity, there is something of which he himself will be sensible after death. xvi. but as we are led by nature to think there are gods, and as we discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent of all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but where their habitation is, and of what character they eventually are, must be learned from reason. the want of any certain reason on which to argue has given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those fears which you seem, not without reason, to despise; for as our bodies fall to the ground, and are covered with earth (_humus_), from whence we derive the expression to be interred (_humari_), that has occasioned men to imagine that the dead continue, during the remainder of their existence, under ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors, which the poets have increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a large crowd, among which are women and children, is wont to be greatly affected on hearing such pompous verses as these, lo! here i am, who scarce could gain this place, through stony mountains and a dreary waste; through cliffs, whose sharpen'd stones tremendous hung, where dreadful darkness spread itself around. and the error prevailed so much, though indeed at present it seems to me to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead had been burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the infernal regions as could not be executed or imagined without a body; for they could not conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and, therefore, they looked out for some shape or figure. this was the origin of all that account of the dead in homer. this was the idea that caused my friend appius to frame his necromancy; and this is how there got about that idea of the lake of avernus, in my neighborhood, from whence the souls of undistinguish'd shape, clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate of acheron, vain phantoms of the dead. and they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs and sides, and without some shape or figure; for they could see nothing by their mind alone--they referred all to their eyes. to withdraw the mind from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are accustomed to, is an attribute of great genius. i am persuaded, indeed, that there were many such men in former ages; but pherecydes[8] the syrian is the first on record who said that the souls of men were immortal, and he was a philosopher of great antiquity, in the reign of my namesake tullius. his disciple pythagoras greatly confirmed this opinion, who came into italy in the reign of tarquin the proud; and all that country which is called great greece was occupied by his school, and he himself was held in high honor, and had the greatest authority; and the pythagorean sect was for many ages after in such great credit, that all learning was believed to be confined to that name. xvii. but i return to the ancients. they scarcely ever gave any reason for their opinion but what could be explained by numbers or definitions. it is reported of plato that he came into italy to make himself acquainted with the pythagoreans; and that when there, among others, he made an acquaintance with archytas[9] and timæus,[10] and learned from them all the tenets of the pythagoreans; and that he not only was of the same opinion with pythagoras concerning the immortality of the soul, but that he also brought reasons in support of it; which, if you have nothing to say against it, i will pass over, and say no more at present about all this hope of immortality. _a._ what, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so high? i had rather, so help me hercules! be mistaken with plato, whom i know how much you esteem, and whom i admire myself, from what you say of him, than be in the right with those others. _m._ i commend you; for, indeed, i could myself willingly be mistaken in his company. do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases (though i think here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the mathematicians prove the facts to us), that the earth is placed in the midst of the world, being, as it were, a sort of point, which they call a [greek: kentron], surrounded by the whole heavens; and that such is the nature of the four principles which are the generating causes of all things, that they have equally divided among them the constituents of all bodies; moreover, that earthy and humid bodies are carried at equal angles by their own weight and ponderosity into the earth and sea; that the other two parts consist, one of fire, and the other of air? as the two former are carried by their gravity and weight into the middle region of the world, so these, on the other hand, ascend by right lines into the celestial regions, either because, owing to their intrinsic nature, they are always endeavoring to reach the highest place, or else because lighter bodies are naturally repelled by heavier; and as this is notoriously the case, it must evidently follow that souls, when once they have departed from the body, whether they are animal (by which term i mean capable of breathing) or of the nature of fire, must mount upward. but if the soul is some number, as some people assert, speaking with more subtlety than clearness, or if it is that fifth nature, for which it would be more correct to say that we have not given a name to than that we do not correctly understand it--still it is too pure and perfect not to go to a great distance from the earth. something of this sort, then, we must believe the soul to be, that we may not commit the folly of thinking that so active a principle lies immerged in the heart or brain; or, as empedocles would have it, in the blood. xviii. we will pass over dicæarchus,[11] with his contemporary and fellow-disciple aristoxenus,[12] both indeed men of learning. one of them seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not perceive that he had a soul; while the other is so pleased with his musical compositions that he endeavors to show an analogy betwixt them and souls. now, we may understand harmony to arise from the intervals of sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies; but i do not see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body without a soul, can occasion harmony. he had better, learned as he is, leave these speculations to his master aristotle, and follow his own trade as a musician. good advice is given him in that greek proverb, apply your talents where you best are skill'd. i will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourse of individual light and round bodies, notwithstanding democritus insists on their being warm and having breath, that is to say, life. but this soul, which is compounded of either of the four principles from which we assert that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems particularly to have been the opinion of panætius, and must necessarily mount upward; for air and fire have no tendency downward, but always ascend; so should they be dissipated that must be at some distance from the earth; but should they remain, and preserve their original state, it is clearer still that they must be carried heavenward, and this gross and concrete air, which is nearest the earth, must be divided and broken by them; for the soul is warmer, or rather hotter, than that air, which i just now called gross and concrete: and this may be made evident from this consideration--that our bodies, being compounded of the earthy class of principles, grow warm by the heat of the soul. xix. we may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this air, which i have often named, and break through it, because nothing is swifter than the soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of the soul, which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration, must necessarily be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and divide all this atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are formed, which, in consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is moist and dark: but, when the soul has once got above this region, and falls in with, and recognizes, a nature like its own, it then rests upon fires composed of a combination of thin air and a moderate solar heat, and does not aim at any higher flight; for then, after it has attained a lightness and heat resembling its own, it moves no more, but remains steady, being balanced, as it were, between two equal weights. that, then, is its natural seat where it has penetrated to something like itself, and where, wanting nothing further, it may be supported and maintained by the same aliment which nourishes and maintains the stars. now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus of the body, and the more so as we endeavor to rival those who are in possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these desires and this rivalry. and that which we do at present, when, dismissing all other cares, we curiously examine and look into anything, we shall then do with greater freedom; and we shall employ ourselves entirely in the contemplation and examination of things; because there is naturally in our minds a certain insatiable desire to know the truth, and the very region itself where we shall arrive, as it gives us a more intuitive and easy knowledge of celestial things, will raise our desires after knowledge. for it was this beauty of the heavens, as seen even here upon earth, which gave birth to that national and hereditary philosophy (as theophrastus calls it), which was thus excited to a desire of knowledge. but those persons will in a most especial degree enjoy this philosophy, who, while they were only inhabitants of this world and enveloped in darkness, were still desirous of looking into these things with the eye of their mind. xx. for if those men now think that they have attained something who have seen the mouth of the pontus, and those straits which were passed by the ship called argo, because, from argos she did chosen men convey, bound to fetch back the golden fleece, their prey; or those who have seen the straits of the ocean, where the swift waves divide the neighboring shores of europe, and of afric; what kind of sight do you imagine that will be when the whole earth is laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form, and boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but those also that lie uncultivated, through the extremities of heat and cold to which they are exposed; for not even now is it with our eyes that we view what we see, for the body itself has no senses; but (as the naturalists, ay, and even the physicians assure us, who have opened our bodies, and examined them) there are certain perforated channels from the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose; so that frequently, when either prevented by meditation, or the force of some bodily disorder, we neither hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are open and in good condition; so that we may easily apprehend that it is the soul itself which sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as it were, but windows to the soul, by means of which, however, she can perceive nothing, unless she is on the spot, and exerts herself. how shall we account for the fact that by the same power of thinking we comprehend the most different things--as color, taste, heat, smell, and sound--which the soul could never know by her five messengers, unless every thing were referred to her, and she were the sole judge of all? and we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear and perfect degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has arrived at that goal to which nature leads her; for at present, notwithstanding nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those channels which lead from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some way or other, stopped up with earthy and concrete bodies; but when we shall be nothing but soul, then nothing will interfere to prevent our seeing everything in its real substance and in its true character. xxi. it is true, i might expatiate, did the subject require it, on the many and various objects with which the soul will be entertained in those heavenly regions; when i reflect on which, i am apt to wonder at the boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at the knowledge of nature as to thank, in an exulting manner, the first inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a god; for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from the greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them by night and day. what is this dread--this fear? what old woman is there so weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not been acquainted with natural philosophy, would stand in awe of? the hallow'd roofs of acheron, the dread of orcus, the pale regions of the dead. and does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of these things, and that he has discovered them to be false? and from this we may perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they had been left without any instruction, would have believed in these things. but now they have certainly made a very fine acquisition in learning that when the day of their death arrives, they will perish entirely. and if that really is the case--for i say nothing either way--what is there agreeable or glorious in it? not that i see any reason why the opinion of pythagoras and plato may not be true; but even although plato were to have assigned no reason for his opinion (observe how much i esteem the man), the weight of his authority would have borne me down; but he has brought so many reasons, that he appears to me to have endeavored to convince others, and certainly to have convinced himself. xxii. but there are many who labor on the other side of the question, and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so fine a texture that it would escape their sight. let those consider this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate idea of what it is when it is in the body. for my own part, when i reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the body--a place which, as it were, does not belong to it--than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free æther, which is, if i may so say, its proper, its own habitation. for unless we are to say that we cannot apprehend the character or nature of anything which we have never seen, we certainly may be able to form some notion of god, and of the divine soul when released from the body. dicæarchus, indeed, and aristoxenus, because it was hard to understand the existence and substance and nature of the soul, asserted that there was no such thing as a soul at all. it is, indeed, the most difficult thing imaginable to discern the soul by the soul. and this, doubtless, is the meaning of the precept of apollo, which advises every one to know himself. for i do not apprehend the meaning of the god to have been that we should understand our members, our stature, and form; for we are not merely bodies; nor, when i say these things to you, am i addressing myself to your body: when, therefore, he says, "know yourself," he says this, "inform yourself of the nature of your soul;" for the body is but a kind of vessel, or receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does is your own act. to know the soul, then, unless it had been divine, would not have been a precept of such excellent wisdom as to be attributed to a god; but even though the soul should not know of what nature itself is, will you say that it does not even perceive that it exists at all, or that it has motion? on which is founded that reason of plato's, which is explained by socrates in the phædrus, and inserted by me, in my sixth book of the republic. xxiii. "that which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives motion to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause, when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. that, therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by itself, can never cease to be moved. besides, it is the beginning and principle of motion to everything else; but whatever is a principle has no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a principle did it proceed from anything else. but if it has no beginning, it never will have any end; for a principle which is once extinguished cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it produce anything else from itself; inasmuch as all things must necessarily arise from some first cause. and thus it comes about that the first principle of motion must arise from that thing which is itself moved by itself; and that can neither have a beginning nor an end of its existence, for otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be overset, and all nature would stand still, and not be able to acquire any force by the impulse of which it might be first set in motion. seeing, then, that it is clear that whatever moves itself is eternal, can there be any doubt that the soul is so? for everything is inanimate which is moved by an external force; but everything which is animate is moved by an interior force, which also belongs to itself. for this is the peculiar nature and power of the soul; and if the soul be the only thing in the whole world which has the power of self-motion, then certainly it never had a beginning, and therefore it is eternal." now, should all the lower order of philosophers (for so i think they may be called who dissent from plato and socrates and that school) unite their force, they never would be able to explain anything so elegantly as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this conclusion is drawn. the soul, then, perceives itself to have motion, and at the same time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that it derives that motion from its own power, and not from the agency of another; and it is impossible that it should ever forsake itself. and these premises compel you to allow its eternity, unless you have something to say against them. _a._ i should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought arise in my mind against them, so much am i inclined to that opinion. xxiv. _m._ well, then, i appeal to you, if the arguments which prove that there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally strong? but if i could account for the origin of these divine properties, then i might also be able to explain how they might cease to exist; for i think i can account for the manner in which the blood, and bile, and phlegm, and bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the limbs, and the shape of the whole body, were put together and made; ay, and even as to the soul itself, were there nothing more in it than a principle of life, then the life of a man might be put upon the same footing as that of a vine or any other tree, and accounted for as caused by nature; for these things, as we say, live. besides, if desires and aversions were all that belonged to the soul, it would have them only in common with the beasts; but it has, in the first place, memory, and that, too, so infinite as to recollect an absolute countless number of circumstances, which plato will have to be a recollection of a former life; for in that book which is inscribed menon, socrates asks a child some questions in geometry, with reference to measuring a square; his answers are such as a child would make, and yet the questions are so easy, that while answering them, one by one, he comes to the same point as if he had learned geometry. from whence socrates would infer that learning is nothing more than recollection; and this topic he explains more accurately in the discourse which he held the very day he died; for he there asserts that, any one, who seeming to be entirely illiterate, is yet able to answer a question well that is proposed to him, does in so doing manifestly show that he is not learning it then, but recollecting it by his memory. nor is it to be accounted for in any other way, how children come to have notions of so many and such important things as are implanted, and, as it were, sealed up, in their minds (which the greeks call [greek: ennoiai]), unless the soul, before it entered the body, had been well stored with knowledge. and as it had no existence at all (for this is the invariable doctrine of plato, who will not admit anything to have a real existence which has a beginning and an end, and who thinks that that alone does really exist which is of such a character as what he calls [greek: eidea], and we species), therefore, being shut up in the body, it could not while in the body discover what it knows; but it knew it before, and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are no longer surprised at its extensive and multifarious knowledge. nor does the soul clearly discover its ideas at its first resort to this abode to which it is so unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a state; but after having refreshed and recollected itself, it then by its memory recovers them; and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more than to recollect. but i am in a particular manner surprised at memory. for what is that faculty by which we remember? what is its force? what its nature? i am not inquiring how great a memory simonides[13] may be said to have had, or theodectes,[14] or that cineas[15] who was sent to rome as ambassador from pyrrhus; or, in more modern times, charmadas;[16] or, very lately, metrodorus[17] the scepsian, or our own contemporary hortensius[18]: i am speaking of ordinary memory, and especially of those men who are employed in any important study or art, the great capacity of whose minds it is hard to estimate, such numbers of things do they remember. xxv. should you ask what this leads to, i think we may understand what that power is, and whence we have it. it certainly proceeds neither from the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms; whether it be air or fire, i know not, nor am i, as those men are, ashamed, in cases where i am ignorant, to own that i am so. if in any other obscure matter i were able to assert anything positively, then i would swear that the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. just think, i beseech you: can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and gloomy atmosphere? though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see what kind of thing it is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you certainly see how great it is. what, then? shall we imagine that there is a kind of measure in the soul, into which, as into a vessel, all that we remember is poured? that indeed is absurd; for how shall we form any idea of the bottom, or of the shape or fashion of such a soul as that? and, again, how are we to conceive how much it is able to contain? shall we imagine the soul to receive impressions like wax, and memory to be marks of the impressions made on the soul? what are the characters of the words, what of the facts themselves? and what, again, is that prodigious greatness which can give rise to impressions of so many things? what, lastly, is that power which investigates secret things, and is called invention and contrivance? does that man seem to be compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing nature who first invented names for everything; which, if you will believe pythagoras, is the highest pitch of wisdom? or he who collected the dispersed inhabitants of the world, and united them in the bonds of social life? or he who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to seem infinite, to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the courses of the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? these were all great men. but they were greater still who invented food, and raiment, and houses; who introduced civilization among us, and armed us against the wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished, and so proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments. for we have provided great entertainments for the ears by inventing and modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learned to survey the stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are improperly called wandering; and the man who has acquainted himself with all their revolutions and motions is fairly considered to have a soul resembling the soul of that being who has created those stars in the heavens: for when archimedes described in a sphere the motions of the moon, sun, and five planets, he did the very same thing as plato's god, in his timæus, who made the world, causing one revolution to adjust motions differing as much as possible in their slowness and velocity. now, allowing that what we see in the world could not be effected without a god, archimedes could not have imitated the same motions in his sphere without a divine soul. xxvi. to me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so that i do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime poem without some divine impulse working on his mind; nor do i think that eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences, can flow thus without something beyond mere human power. but as to philosophy, that is the parent of all the arts: what can we call that but, as plato says, a gift, or, as i express it, an invention, of the gods? this it was which first taught us the worship of the gods; and then led us on to justice, which arises from the human race being formed into society; and after that it imbued us with modesty and elevation of soul. this it was which dispersed darkness from our souls, as it is dispelled from our eyes, enabling us to see all things that are above or below, the beginning, end, and middle of everything. i am convinced entirely that that which could effect so many and such great things must be a divine power. for what is memory of words and circumstances? what, too, is invention? surely they are things than which nothing greater can be conceived in a god! for i do not imagine the gods to be delighted with nectar and ambrosia, or with juventas presenting them with a cup; nor do i put any faith in homer, who says that ganymede was carried away by the gods on account of his beauty, in order to give jupiter his wine. too weak reasons for doing laomedon such injury! these were mere inventions of homer, who gave his gods the imperfections of men. i would rather that he had given men the perfections of the gods! those perfections, i mean, of uninterrupted health, wisdom, invention, memory. therefore the soul (which is, as i say, divine) is, as euripides more boldly expresses it, a god. and thus, if the divinity be air or fire, the soul of man is the same; for as that celestial nature has nothing earthly or humid about it, in like manner the soul of man is also free from both these qualities: but if it is of that fifth kind of nature, first introduced by aristotle, then both gods and souls are of the same. xxvii. as this is my opinion, i have explained it in these very words, in my book on consolation.[19] the origin of the soul of man is not to be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out of the earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery. for what is there in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding, or thought? which can recollect the past, foresee the future, and comprehend the present? for these capabilities are confined to divine beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could derive them, but from god. there is therefore a peculiar nature and power in the soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar to us. whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can god himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion, acquainted with everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself endued with perpetual motion. xxviii. of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. where, then, is this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your own, and what is its character? are you able to tell? if i have not faculties for knowing all that i could desire to know, will you not even allow me to make use of those which i have? the soul has not sufficient capacity to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye, though it has no distinct view of itself, sees other things: it does not see (which is of least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not, though it possibly may; but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees that it has vigor, sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are all great, divine, eternal properties. what its appearance is, or where it dwells, it is not necessary even to inquire. as when we behold, first of all, the beauty and brilliant appearance of the heavens; secondly, the vast velocity of its revolutions, beyond power of our imagination to conceive; then the vicissitudes of nights and days, the fourfold division of the seasons, so well adapted to the ripening of the fruits of the earth, and the temperature of our bodies: and after that we look up to the sun, the moderator and governor of all these things; and view the moon, by the increase and decrease of its light, marking, as it were, and appointing our holy days; and see the five planets, borne on in the same circle, divided into twelve parts, preserving the same course with the greatest regularity, but with utterly dissimilar motions among themselves; and the nightly appearance of the heaven, adorned on all sides with stars; then, the globe of the earth, raised above the sea, and placed in the centre of the universe, inhabited and cultivated in its two opposite extremities, one of which, the place of our habitation, is situated towards the north pole, under the seven stars: where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound, harden to ice the snowy cover'd ground; the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us, but is called by the greeks [greek: antichthona]: the other parts are uncultivated, because they are either frozen with cold, or burned up with heat; but where we dwell, it never fails, in its season, to yield a placid sky, to bid the trees assume the lively verdure of their leaves: the vine to bud, and, joyful, in its shoots, foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits: the ripen'd corn to sing, while all around full riv'lets glide; and flowers deck the ground: then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for tilling the ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself, made, as it were, on purpose to contemplate the heavens and the gods, and to pay adoration to them: lastly, the whole earth, and wide extending seas, given to man's use. when we view these and numberless other things, can we doubt that they have some being who presides over them, or has made them (if, indeed, they have been made, as is the opinion of plato, or if, as aristotle thinks, they are eternal), or who at all events is the regulator of so immense a fabric and so great a blessing to men? thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see not the deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to acknowledge a god, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its motion, and from all the beauty of virtue. where, then, is it seated, you will say? xxix. in my opinion, it is seated in the head, and i can bring you reasons for my adopting that opinion. at present, let the soul reside where it will, you certainly have one in you. should you ask what its nature is? it has one peculiarly its own; but admitting it to consist of fire, or air, it does not affect the present question. only observe this, that as you are convinced there is a god, though you are ignorant where he resides, and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to feel assured that you have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself of the place of its residence, nor its form. in our knowledge of the soul, unless we are grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot but be satisfied that it has nothing but what is simple, unmixed, uncompounded, and single; and if this is admitted, then it cannot be separated, nor divided, nor dispersed, nor parted, and therefore it cannot perish; for to perish implies a parting-asunder, a division, a disunion, of those parts which, while it subsisted, were held together by some band. and it was because he was influenced by these and similar reasons that socrates neither looked out for anybody to plead for him when he was accused, nor begged any favor from his judges, but maintained a manly freedom, which was the effect not of pride, but of the true greatness of his soul; and on the last day of his life he held a long discourse on this subject; and a few days before, when he might have been easily freed from his confinement, he refused to be so; and when he had almost actually hold of that deadly cup, he spoke with the air of a man not forced to die, but ascending into heaven. xxx. for so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke: "that there were two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the body, took different roads; for those which were polluted with vices that are common to men, and which had given themselves up entirely to unclean desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have habituated themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to have laid detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road wide of that which led to the assembly of the gods; but they who had preserved themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest contagion of the body, and had always kept themselves as far as possible at a distance from it, and while on earth had proposed to themselves as a model the life of the gods, found the return to those beings from whom they had come an easy one." therefore, he argues, that all good and wise men should take example from the swans, who are considered sacred to apollo, not without reason, but particularly because they seem to have received the gift of divination from him, by which, foreseeing how happy it is to die, they leave this world with singing and joy. nor can any one doubt of this, unless it happens to us who think with care and anxiety about the soul (as is often the case with those who look earnestly at the setting sun), to lose the sight of it entirely; and so the mind's eye, viewing itself, sometimes grows dull, and for that reason we become remiss in our contemplation. thus our reasoning is borne about, harassed with doubts and anxieties, not knowing how to proceed, but measuring back again those dangerous tracts which it has passed, like a boat tossed about on the boundless ocean. but these reflections are of long standing, and borrowed from the greeks. but cato left this world in such a manner as if he were delighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that god who presides in us forbids our departure hence without his leave. but when god himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to socrates, and lately to cato, and often to many others--in such a case, certainly every man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness for that light: not that he would forcibly break from the chains that held him, for that would be against the law; but, like a man released from prison by a magistrate or some lawful authority, so he too would walk away, being released and discharged by god. for the whole life of a philosopher is, as the same philosopher says, a meditation on death. xxxi. for what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant of the body, or from duties of a public nature, or from all other serious business whatever? what else is it, i say, that we do, but invite the soul to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with itself, and, as far as possible, break off its acquaintance with the body? now, to separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and nothing else whatever. wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on this, and separate ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is to say, let us accustom ourselves to die. this will be enjoying a life like that of heaven even while we remain on earth; and when we are carried thither and released from these bonds, our souls will make their progress with more rapidity; for the spirit which has always been fettered by the bonds of the body, even when it is disengaged, advances more slowly, just as those do who have worn actual fetters for many years: but when we have arrived at this emancipation from the bonds of the body, then indeed we shall begin to live, for this present life is really death, which i could say a good deal in lamentation for if i chose. _a._ you have lamented it sufficiently in your book on consolation; and when i read that, there is nothing which i desire more than to leave these things; but that desire is increased a great deal by what i have just heard. _m._ the time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty, whether you hang back or press forward; for time flies. but death is so far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that i am inclined to suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil to man, but rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to him; if, at least, it is true that we become thereby either gods ourselves, or companions of the gods. however, this is not of so much consequence, as there are some of us here who will not allow this. but i will not leave off discussing this point till i have convinced you that death can, upon no consideration whatever, be an evil. _a._ how can it, after what i now know? _m._ do you ask how it can? there are crowds of arguers who contradict this; and those not only epicureans, whom i regard very little, but, somehow or other, almost every man of letters; and, above all, my favorite dicæarchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of the soul: for he has written three books, which are entitled lesbiacs, because the discourse was held at mitylene, in which he seeks to prove that souls are mortal. the stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long a time for enjoyment as the life of a raven; they allow the soul to exist a great while, but are against its eternity. xxxii. are you willing to hear then why, even allowing this, death cannot be an evil. _a._ as you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in mortality. _m._ i commend you, indeed, for that; though we should not be too confident in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by some subtle conclusion. we give way and change our opinions even in things that are more evident than this; for in this there certainly is some obscurity. therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is well to be on our guard. _a._ you are right in that; but i will provide against any accident. _m._ have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the stoics--those, i mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have left the body, but yet deny that they exist forever? _a._ we certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit that which is the most difficult point in the whole question, namely, that a soul can exist independently of the body, and yet refuse to grant that which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even the natural consequence of the concession which they have made--that if they can exist for a length of time; they most likely do so forever. _m._ you take it right; that is the very thing. shall we give, therefore, any credit to pauæstius, when he dissents from his master, plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men, the homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this single opinion of the soul's immortality: for he maintains what nobody denies, that everything which has been generated will perish, and that even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their resemblance to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as apparent in the turn of their minds as in their bodies. but he brings another reason--that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which is not also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must be liable to death. the soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is liable to perish. xxxiii. these arguments may be refuted; for they proceed from his not knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid motion; but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders, anger and lust, have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. now this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of reason. but the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul is lodged; for there are many things which depend on the body that give an edge to the soul, many which blunt it. aristotle, indeed, says that all men of great genius are melancholy; so that i should not have been displeased to have been somewhat duller than i am. he instances many, and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. but if the power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that occasion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a similitude of souls should be generated. i say nothing about cases of unlikeness. i wish panætius could be here: he lived with africanus. i would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of africanus's brother was like? possibly he may in person have resembled his father; but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that it was impossible to be more so. whom did the grandson of p. crassus, that wise and eloquent and most distinguished man, resemble? or the relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no occasion to mention? but what are we doing? have we forgotten that our purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish, there would be, even then, no evil in death? _a._ i remembered it very well; but i had no dislike to your digressing a little from your original design, while you were talking of the soul's immortality. _m._ i perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to heaven. xxxiv. i am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. but admit what they assert--that the soul does not continue to exist after death. _a._ should it be so, i see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a happier life. _m._ but what is there of evil in that opinion? for let the soul perish as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all, in the body after death? no one, indeed asserts that; though epicurus charges democritus with saying so; but the disciples of democritus deny it. no sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere. where, then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. is it because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected without pain? but even should that be granted, how small a pain must that be! yet i think that it is false, and that it is very often unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with pleasure; but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is, for it is instantaneous. what makes us uneasy, or rather gives us pain, is the leaving all the good things of life. but just consider if i might not more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is no reason for my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and yet i might, with very good reason. but what occasion is there, when what i am laboring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to make life more miserable by lamenting over it? i have done that in the book which i wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as i could. if, then, our inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not from good. this subject is indeed so copiously handled by hegesias, the cyrenaic philosopher, that he is said to have been forbidden by ptolemy from delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him made away with themselves. there is, too, an epigram of callimachus[20] on cleombrotus of ambracia, who, without any misfortune having befallen him, as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had read a book of plato's. the book i mentioned of that hegesias is called [greek: apokarterterôn], or "a man who starves himself," in which a man is represented as killing himself by starvation, till he is prevented by his friends, in reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of human life. i might do the same, though not so fully as he, who thinks it not worth any man's while to live. i pass over others. was it even worth my while to live, for, had i died before i was deprived of the comforts of my own family, and of the honors which i received for my public services, would not death have taken me from the evils of life rather than from its blessings? xxxv. mention, therefore, some one, who never knew distress; who never received any blow from fortune. the great metellus had four distinguished sons; but priam had fifty, seventeen of whom were born to him by his lawful wife. fortune had the same power over both, though she exercised it but on one; for metellus was laid on his funeral pile by a great company of sons and daughters, grandsons, and granddaughters; but priam fell by the hand of an enemy, after having fled to the altar, and having seen himself deprived of all his numerous progeny. had he died before the death of his sons and the ruin of his kingdom, with all his mighty wealth elate, under rich canopies of state; would he then have been taken from good or from evil? it would indeed, at that time, have appeared that he was being taken away from good; yet surely it would have turned out advantageous for him; nor should we have had these mournful verses, lo! these all perish'd in one flaming pile; the foe old priam did of life beguile, and with his blood, thy altar, jove, defile. as if anything better could have happened to him at that time than to lose his life in that manner; but yet, if it had befallen him sooner, it would have prevented all those consequences; but even as it was, it released him from any further sense of them. the case of our friend pompey[21] was something better: once, when he had been very ill at naples, the neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as did those of puteoli; the people flocked from the country to congratulate him--it is a grecian custom, and a foolish one; still it is a sign of good fortune. but the question is, had he died, would he have been taken from good, or from evil? certainly from evil. he would not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law;[22] he would not have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his own house, nor fled from italy; he would not, after the loss of his army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors. did not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life at that time? xxxvi. these calamities are avoided by death, for even though they should never happen, there is a possibility that they may; but it never occurs to a man that such a disaster may befall him himself. every one hopes to be as happy as metellus: as if the number of the happy exceeded that of the miserable; or as if there were any certainty in human affairs; or, again, as if there were more rational foundation for hope than fear. but should we grant them even this, that men are by death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that account? certainly they must necessarily say so. can he who does not exist be in need of anything? to be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this--he had, but he has not; he regrets, he looks back upon, he wants. such are, i suppose, the distresses of one who is in need of. is he deprived of eyes? to be blind is misery. is he destitute of children? not to have them is misery. these considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. but when i am speaking of the dead, i am speaking of those who have no existence. but would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want horns or wings? certainly not. should it be asked, why not? the answer would be, that not to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted you for would not imply a want of them, even though you were sensible that you had them not. this argument should be pressed over and over again, after that point has once been established, which, if souls are mortal, there can be no dispute about--i mean, that the destruction of them by death is so entire as to remove even the least suspicion of any sense remaining. when, therefore, this point is once well grounded and established, we must correctly define what the term to want means; that there may be no mistake in the word. to want, then, signifies this: to be without that which you would be glad to have; for inclination for a thing is implied in the word want, excepting when we use the word in an entirely different sense, as we do when we say that a fever is wanting to any one. for it admits of a different interpretation, when you are without a certain thing, and are sensible that you are without it, but yet can easily dispense with having it. "to want," then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead; nor is the mere fact of wanting something necessarily lamentable. the proper expression ought to be, "that they want a good," and that is an evil. but a living man does not want a good, unless he is distressed without it; and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without a kingdom. but this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy: it might have been asserted of tarquin, when he was driven from his kingdom. but when such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is absolutely unintelligible. for to want implies to be sensible; but the dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want. xxxvii. but what occasion is there to philosophize here in a matter with which we see that philosophy is but little concerned? how often have not only our generals but whole armies, rushed on certain death! but if it had been a thing to be feared, l. brutus would never have fallen in fight, to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had expelled; nor would decius the father have been slain in fighting with the latins; nor would his son, when engaged with the etruscans, nor his grandson with pyrrhus have exposed themselves to the enemy's darts. spain would never have seen, in one campaign, the scipios fall fighting for their country; nor would the plains of cannæ have witnessed the death of paulus and geminus, or venusia that of marcellus; nor would the latins have beheld the death of albinus, nor the leucanians that of gracchus. but are any of these miserable now? nay, they were not so even at the first moment after they had breathed their last; nor can any one be miserable after he has lost all sensation. oh, but the mere circumstance of being without sensation is miserable. it might be so if being without sensation were the same thing as wanting it; but as it is evident there can be nothing of any kind in that which has no existence, what can there be afflicting to that which can neither feel want nor be sensible of anything? we might be said to have repeated this over too often, only that here lies all that the soul shudders at from the fear of death. for whoever can clearly apprehend that which is as manifest as the light--that when both soul and body are consumed, and there is a total destruction, then that which was an animal becomes nothing--will clearly see that there is no difference between a hippocentaur, which never had existence, and king agamemnon, and that m. camillus is no more concerned about this present civil war than i was at the sacking of rome, when he was living. xxxviii. why, then, should camillus be affected with the thoughts of these things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time? and why should i be uneasy it i were to expect that some nation might possess itself of this city ten thousand years hence? because so great is our regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own feeling, but by its own actual safety. death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and which, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does not deter a wise man from making such provision for his country and his family as he hopes may last forever; and from regarding posterity, of which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself. wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that his soul is mortal; not, indeed, from a desire of glory, which he will be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will inevitably attend, though that is not his object. the process, indeed, of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were noways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we be after we are dead. and in this state of things where can the evil be, since death has no connection with either the living or the dead? the one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it. they who make the least of death consider it as having a great resemblance to sleep; as if any one would choose to live ninety years on condition that, at the expiration of sixty, he should sleep out the remainder. the very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much less i. endymion, indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time on latmus, a mountain of caria, and for such a length of time that i imagine he is not as yet awake. do you think that he is concerned at the moon's being in difficulties, though it was by her that he was thrown into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while sleeping. for what should he be concerned for who has not even any sensation? you look on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on you daily; and have you, then, any doubt that there is no sensation in death, when you see there is none in sleep, which is its near resemblance? xxxix. away, then, with those follies, which are little better than the old women's dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. what time do you mean? that of nature? but she has only lent you life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she recalls it at her pleasure? for you received it on these terms. they that complain thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors ought to bear his loss with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle dies, they ought not even to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been more severe with them in demanding back what she gave. they answer by saying that such have not tasted the sweets of life; while the other had begun to conceive hopes of great happiness, and, indeed, had begun to realize them. men judge better in other things, and allow a part to be preferable to none. why do they not admit the same estimate in life? though callimachus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had flowed from priam than his son; yet they are thought happier who die after they have reached old age. it would be hard to say why; for i do not apprehend that any one, if a longer life were granted to him, would find it happier. there is nothing more agreeable to a man than prudence, which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may strip him of everything else. but what age is long, or what is there at all long to a man? does not old age, though unregarded, still attend on childhood's pastimes, as the cares of men? but because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion of time they were given us for. artistotle saith there is a kind of insect near the river hypanis, which runs from a certain part of europe into the pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially when the days are at the longest. compare our longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals. xl. let us, then, despise all these follies--for what softer name can i give to such levities?--and let us lay the foundation of our happiness in the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard of all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. for at present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, so that, should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great advantages, and seem disappointed and forlorn. but if, through life, we are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in continual pain and torture, good gods! how pleasant must that journey be which ends in security and ease! how pleased am i with theramenes! of how exalted a soul does he appear! for, although we never read of him without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in his death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the thirty tyrants, drank off, at one draught, as if he had been thirsty, the poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force that it sounded as it fell; and then, on hearing the sound of the drops, he said, with a smile, "i drink this to the most excellent critias," who had been his most bitter enemy; for it is customary among the greeks, at their banquets, to name the person to whom they intend to deliver the cup. this celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even when he had received the poison into his bowels, and truly foretold the death of that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that death soon followed. who that thinks death an evil could approve of the evenness of temper in this great man at the instant of dying? socrates came, a few years after, to the same prison and the same cup by as great iniquity on the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when they executed theramenes. what a speech is that which plato makes him deliver before his judges, after they had condemned him to death! xli. "i am not without hopes, o judges, that it is a favorable circumstance for me that i am condemned to die; for one of these two things must necessarily happen--either that death will deprive me entirely of all sense, or else that, by dying, i shall go from hence into some other place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished, and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to be even without the visions of dreams--in that case, o ye good gods! what gain is it to die? or what length of days can be imagined which would be preferable to such a night? and if the constant course of future time is to resemble that night, who is happier than i am? but if on the other hand, what is said be true, namely, that death is but a removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell, then that state must be more happy still to have escaped from those who call themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so--minos, rhadamanthus, æacus, triptolemus--and to meet with those who have lived with justice and probity![23] can this change of abode appear otherwise than great to you? what bounds can you set to the value of conversing with orpheus, and musæus, and homer, and hesiod? i would even, were it possible, willingly die often, in order to prove the certainty of what i speak of. what delight must it be to meet with palamedes, and ajax, and others, who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges! then, also, should i experience the wisdom of even that king of kings, who led his vast troops to troy, and the prudence of ulysses and sisyphus: nor should i then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries on such subjects in the same way in which i have done here on earth. and even you, my judges, you, i mean, who have voted for my acquittal, do not you fear death, for nothing bad can befall a good man, whether he be alive or dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the gods; nor in my case either has this befallen me by chance; and i have nothing to charge those men with who accused or condemned me but the fact that they believed that they were doing me harm." in this manner he proceeded. there is no part of his speech which i admire more than his last words: "but it is time," says he, "for me now to go hence, that i may die; and for you, that you may continue to live. which condition of the two is the best, the immortal gods know; but i do not believe that any mortal man does." xlii. surely i would rather have had this man's soul than all the fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him; although that very thing which he says no one except the gods know, namely, whether life or death is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously stated his opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that favorite maxim of his, of affirming nothing. and let us, too, adhere to this rule of not thinking anything an evil which is a general provision of nature; and let us assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an eternal evil, for death seems to be the end of a miserable life; but if death is a misery, there can be no end of that. but why do i mention socrates, or theramenes, men distinguished by the glory of virtue and wisdom? when a certain lacedæmomian, whose name is not so much as known, held death in such contempt, that, when led to it by the ephori, he bore a cheerful and pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by one of his enemies whether he despised the laws of lycurgus, "on the contrary," answered he, "i am greatly obliged to him, for he has amerced me in a fine which i can pay without borrowing, or taking up money at interest." this was a man worthy of sparta. and i am almost persuaded of his innocence because of the greatness of his soul. our own city has produced many such. but why should i name generals, and other men of high rank, when cato could write that legions have marched with alacrity to that place from whence they never expected to return? with no less greatness of soul fell the lacedæmonians at thermopylæ, on whom simonides wrote the following epitaph: go, stranger, tell the spartans, here we lie, who to support their laws durst boldly die.[24] what was it that leonidas, their general, said to them? "march on with courage, my lacedæmonians. to-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the regions below." this was a brave nation while the laws of lycurgus were in force. one of them, when a persian had said to him in conversation, "we shall hide the sun from your sight by the number of our arrows and darts," replied, "we shall fight, then in the shade." do i talk of their men? how great was that lacedæmonian woman, who had sent her son to battle, and when she heard that he was slain, said, "i bore him for that purpose, that you might have a man who durst die for his country!" however, it is a matter of notoriety that the spartans were bold and hardy, for the discipline of a republic has great influence. xliii. what, then, have we not reason to admire theodorus the cyrenean, a philosopher of no small distinction, who, when lysimachus threatened to crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers? "to theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or underground." by which saying of the philosopher i am reminded to say something of the custom of funerals and sepulture, and of funeral ceremonies, which is, indeed, not a difficult subject, especially if we recollect what has been before said about insensibility. the opinion of socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by criton how he would be buried, "i have taken a great deal of pains," saith he, "my friends, to no purpose, for i have not convinced our criton that i shall fly from hence, and leave no part of me behind. notwithstanding, criton, if you can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please: but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when i have flown away from hence." that was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about anything of this kind. diogenes was rougher, though of the same opinion; but in his character of a cynic he expressed himself in a somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being buried. and when his friends replied, "what! to the birds and beasts?" "by no means," saith he; "place my staff near me, that i may drive them away." "how can you do that," they answer, "for you will not perceive them?" "how am i then injured by being torn by those animals, if i have no sensation?" anaxagoras, when he was at the point of death at lampsacus, and was asked by his friends, whether, if anything should happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to clazomenæ, his country, made this excellent answer, "there is," says he, "no occasion for that, for all places are at an equal distance from the infernal regions." there is one thing to be observed with respect to the whole subject of burial, that it relates to the body, whether the soul live or die. now, with regard to the body, it is clear that, whether the soul live or die, that has no sensation. xliv. but all things are full of errors. achilles drags hector, tied to his chariot; he thinks, i suppose, he tears his flesh, and that hector feels the pain of it; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he imagines. but hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune: i saw (a dreadful sight) great hector slain, dragg'd at achilles' car along the plain. what hector? or how long will he be hector? accius is better in this, and achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable: i hector's body to his sire convey'd, hector i sent to the infernal shade. it was not hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been hector's. here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his mother to sleep: to thee i call, my once-loved parent, hear, nor longer with thy sleep relieve thy care; thine eye which pities not is closed--arise; ling'ring i wait the unpaid obsequies. when these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking those unhappy that are unburied: ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures... he is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are torn to pieces, but is under no such apprehensions if they are burned: nor leave my naked bones, my poor remains, to shameful violence and bloody stains. i do not understand what he could fear who could pour forth such excellent verses to the sound of the flute. we must, therefore, adhere to this, that nothing is to be regarded after we are dead, though many people revenge themselves on their dead enemies. thyestes pours forth several curses in some good lines of ennius, praying, first of all, that atreus may perish by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very terrible thing, for such a death is not free from very grievous sensations. then follow these unmeaning expressions: may on the sharp rock his mangled carcass lie, his entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey! may he convulsive writhe his bleeding side, and with his clotted gore the stones be dyed! the rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was hanging to them by his side; though thyestes imagines he is wishing him the greatest torture. it would be torture, indeed, if he were sensible; but as he is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this: let him, still hovering o'er the stygian wave, ne'er reach the body's peaceful port, the grave! you see under what mistaken notions all this is said. he imagines the body has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves. pelops was greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son what regard was due to everything. xlv. but what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of individuals, when we may observe whole nations to fall into all sorts of errors? the egyptians embalm their dead, and keep them in their houses; the persians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that they may preserve their bodies as long as possible. it is customary with the magi to bury none of their order, unless they have been first torn by wild beasts. in hyrcania, the people maintain dogs for the public use; the nobles have their own--and we know that they have a good breed of dogs; but every one, according to his ability, provides himself with some, in order to be torn by them; and they hold that to be the best kind of interment. chrysippus, who is curious in all kinds of historical facts, has collected many other things of this kind; but some of them are so offensive as not to admit of being related. all that has been said of burying is not worth our regard with respect to ourselves, though it is not to be neglected as to our friends, provided we are thoroughly aware that the dead are insensible. but the living, indeed, should consider what is due to custom and opinion; only they should at the same time consider that the dead are noways interested in it. but death truly is then met with the greatest tranquillity when the dying man can comfort himself with his own praise. no one dies too soon who has finished the course of perfect virtue. i myself have known many occasions when i have seemed in danger of immediate death; oh! how i wish it had come to me! for i have gained nothing by the delay. i had gone over and over again the duties of life; nothing remained but to contend with fortune. if reason, then, cannot sufficiently fortify us to enable us to feel a contempt for death, at all events let our past life prove that we have lived long enough, and even longer than was necessary; for notwithstanding the deprivation of sense, the dead are not without that good which peculiarly belongs to them, namely, the praise and glory which they have acquired, even though they are not sensible of it. for although there be nothing in glory to make it desirable, yet it follows virtue as its shadow; and the genuine judgment of the multitude on good men, if ever they form any, is more to their own praise than of any real advantage to the dead. yet i cannot say, however it may be received, that lycurgus and solon have no glory from their laws, and from the political constitution which they established in their country; or that themistocles and epaminondas have not glory from their martial virtue. xlvi. for neptune shall sooner bury salamis itself with his waters than the memory of the trophies gained there; and the boeotian leuctra shall perish sooner than the glory of that great battle. and longer still shall fame be before it deserts curius, and fabricius, and calatinus, and the two scipios, and the two africani, and maximus, and marcellus, and paulus, and cato, and lælius, and numberless other heroes; and whoever has caught any resemblance of them, not estimating it by common fame, but by the real applause of good men, may with confidence, when the occasion requires, approach death, on which we are sure that even if the chief good is not continued, at least no evil is. such a man would even wish to die while in prosperity; for all the favors that could be heaped on him would not be so agreeable to him as the loss of them would be painful. that speech of the lacedæmonian seems to have the same meaning, who, when diagoras the rhodian, who had himself been a conqueror at the olympic games, saw two of his own sons conquerors there on the same day, approached the old man, and, congratulating him, said, "you should die now, diagoras, for no greater happiness can possibly await you." the greeks look on these as great things; perhaps they think too highly of them, or, rather, they did so then. and so he who said this to diagoras, looking on it as something very glorious, that three men out of one family should have been conquerors there, thought it could answer no purpose to him to continue any longer in life, where he could only be exposed to a reverse of fortune. i might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to any positive evil; but i have spoken at greater length on the subject for this reason, because this is our greatest consolation in the losing and bewailing of our friends. for we ought to bear with moderation any grief which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account, lest we should seem to be too much influenced by self-love. but should we suspect our departed friends to be under those evils, which they are generally imagined to be, and to be sensible of them, then such a suspicion would give us intolerable pain; and accordingly i wished, for my own sake, to pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account i have been perhaps somewhat more prolix than was necessary. xlvii. _a._ more prolix than was necessary? certainty not, in my opinion. for i was induced, by the former part of your speech, to wish to die; but, by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at others to be wholly indifferent about it. but the effect of your whole argument is, that i am convinced that death ought not to be classed among the evils. _m._ do you, then, expect that i am to give you a regular peroration, like the rhetoricians, or shall i forego that art? _a._ i would not have you give over an art which you have set off to such advantage; and you were in the right to do so, for, to speak the truth, it also has set you off. but what is that peroration? for i should be glad to hear it, whatever it is. _m._ it is customary, in the schools, to produce the opinions of the immortal gods on death; nor are these opinions the fruits of the imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of herodotus and many others. cleobis and biton are the first they mention, sons of the argive priestess; the story is a well-known one. as it was necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain annual sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable distance from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot had not arrived, those two young men whom i have just mentioned, pulling off their garments, and anointing their bodies with oil, harnessed themselves to the yoke. and in this manner the priestess was conveyed to the temple; and when the chariot had arrived at the proper place, she is said to have entreated the goddess to bestow on them, as a reward for their piety, the greatest gift that a god could confer on man. and the young men, after having feasted with their mother, fell asleep; and in the morning they were found dead. trophonius and agamedes are said to have put up the same petition, for they, having built a temple to apollo at delphi, offered supplications to the god, and desired of him some extraordinary reward for their care and labor, particularizing nothing, but asking for whatever was best for men. accordingly, apollo signified to them that he would bestow it on them in three days, and on the third day at daybreak they were found dead. and so they say that this was a formal decision pronounced by that god to whom the rest of the deities have assigned the province of divining with an accuracy superior to that of all the rest. xlviii. there is also a story told of silenus, who, when taken prisoner by midas, is said to have made him this present for his ransom--namely, that he informed him[25] that never to have been born was by far the greatest blessing that could happen to man; and that the next best thing was to die very soon; which very opinion euripides makes use of in his cresphontes, saying, when man is born, 'tis fit, with solemn show, we speak our sense of his approaching woe; with other gestures and a different eye, proclaim our pleasure when he's bid to die.[26] there is something like this in crantor's consolation; for he says that terinæsus of elysia, when he was bitterly lamenting the loss of his son, came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited with so great affliction, and received in his tablet these three verses: thou fool, to murmur at euthynous' death! the blooming youth to fate resigns his breath: the fate, whereon your happiness depends, at once the parent and the son befriends.[27] on these and similar authorities they affirm that the question has been determined by the gods. nay, more; alcidamas, an ancient rhetorician of the very highest reputation, wrote even in praise of death, which he endeavored to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it; but he was unacquainted with the more refined arguments of the philosophers. by the orators, indeed, to die for our country is always considered not only as glorious, but even as happy: they go back as far as erechtheus,[28] whose very daughters underwent death, for the safety of their fellow-citizens: they instance codrus, who threw himself into the midst of his enemies, dressed like a common man, that his royal robes might not betray him, because the oracle had declared the athenians conquerors, if their king was slain. menoeceus[29] is not overlooked by them, who, in compliance with the injunctions of an oracle, freely shed his blood for his country. iphigenia ordered herself to be conveyed to aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood might be the cause of spilling that of her enemies. xlix. from hence they proceed to instances of a fresher date. harmodius and aristogiton are in everybody's mouth; the memory of leonidas the lacedæmonian and epaminondas the theban is as fresh as ever. those philosophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our country--to give a list of whom would take up too much time--who, we see, considered death desirable as long as it was accompanied with honor. but, notwithstanding this is the correct view of the case, we must use much persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher authority, in order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to be afraid of death. for if that last day does not occasion an entire extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable? and if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us, what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to eternity? and, should this really be the case, then ennius's language is more consistent with wisdom than solon's; for our ennius says, let none bestow upon my passing bier one needless sigh or unavailing tear. but the wise solon says, let me not unlamented die, but o'er my bier burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.[30] but let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is appointed by the gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it with a cheerful and grateful mind, thinking ourselves like men who are delivered from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose of going back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically called our own; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. if, on the other hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet let us cultivate such a disposition as to look on that formidable hour of death as happy for us, though shocking to our friends; and let us never imagine anything to be an evil which is an appointment of the immortal gods, or of nature, the common parent of all. for it is not by hazard or without design that we have been born and situated as we have. on the contrary, beyond all doubt there is a certain power which consults the happiness of human nature; and this would neither have produced nor provided for a being which, after having gone through the labors of life, was to fall into eternal misery by death. let us rather infer that we have a retreat and haven prepared for us, which i wish we could crowd all sail and arrive at; but though the winds should not serve, and we should be driven back, yet we shall to a certainty arrive at that point eventually, though somewhat later. but how can that be miserable for one which all must of necessity undergo? i have given you a peroration, that you might not think i had overlooked or neglected anything. _a._ i am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has confirmed me. _m._ i am glad it has had that effect. but it is now time to consult our health. to-morrow, and all the time we continue in this tusculan villa, let us consider this subject; and especially those portions of it which may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our desires, which is the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of philosophy. * * * * * book ii. on bearing pain. i. neoptolemus, in ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy was expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects, for that to give himself up entirely to it was what he did not approve of. and for my part, brutus, i am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient for me to philosophize; for what can i do better, especially as i have no regular occupation? but i am not for limiting my philosophy to a few subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in which it is difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few subjects without selecting them out of a great number; nor can any one, who has acquired the knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with the same eagerness to understand more. but still, in a busy life, and in one mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of neoptolemus was at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance with philosophy may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps so plentiful as a thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but yet such as in some degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of our desires, our sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that discussion which we lately maintained in my tusculan villa seemed to be that a great contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no small efficacy towards delivering the mind from fear; for whoever dreads what cannot be avoided can by no means live with a quiet and tranquil mind. but he who is under no fear of death, not only because it is a thing absolutely inevitable but also because he is persuaded that death itself hath nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a very great resource towards a happy life. however, i am not tolerant that many will argue strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a thing which can never be avoided, except by abstaining from writing at all. for if my orations, which were addressed to the judgment and approbation of the people (for that is a popular art, and the object of oratory is popular applause), have been criticised by some people who are inclined to withhold their praise from everything but what they are persuaded they can attain to themselves, and who limit their ideas of good speaking by the hopes which they conceive of what they themselves may attain to, and who declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow of words and sentences, that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought and expression to that plenty and copiousness (from which arose the attic kind of oratory, which they who professed it were strangers to, though they have now been some time silenced, and laughed out of the very courts of justice), what may i not expect, when at present i cannot have the least countenance from the people by whom i used to be upheld before? for philosophy is satisfied with a few judges, and of her own accord industriously avoids the multitude, who are jealous of it, and utterly displeased with it; so that, should any one undertake to cry down the whole of it, he would have the people on his side; while, if he should attack that school which i particularly profess, he would have great assistance from those of the other philosophers. ii. but i have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my hortensius. and what i had to say in favor of the academics, is, i think, explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the academic question. but yet i am so far from desiring that no one should write against me, that it is what i most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have been in such esteem in greece itself, if it had not been for the strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the most learned men; and therefore i recommend all men who have abilities to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining greece, and to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having. thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at such perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. let philosophy, then, derive its birth in latin language from this time, and let us lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves without resentment. besides, if these studies are ever brought home to us, we shall not want even greek libraries, in which there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of authors among them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the same things which have been written by others, which serves no purpose but to stuff their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many apply themselves to this study. iii. but let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize with reason and method. for there is a certain class of them who would willingly be called philosophers, whose books in our language are said to be numerous, and which i do not despise; for, indeed, i never read them: but still, because the authors themselves declare that they write without any regularity, or method, or elegance, or ornament, i do not care to read what must be so void of entertainment. there is no one in the least acquainted with literature who does not know the style and sentiments of that school; wherefore, since they are at no pains to express themselves well, i do not see why they should be read by anybody except by one another. let them read them, if they please, who are of the same opinions; for in the same manner as all men read plato and the other socratics, with those who sprung from them, even those who do not agree with their opinions, or are very indifferent about them; but scarcely any one except their own disciples take epicurus or metrodorus into their hands; so they alone read these latin books who think that the arguments contained in them are sound. but, in my opinion, whatever is published should be recommended to the reading of every man of learning; and though we may not succeed in this ourselves, yet nevertheless we must be sensible that this ought to be the aim of every writer. and on this account i have always been pleased with the custom of the peripatetics and academics, of disputing on both sides of the question; not solely from its being the only method of discovering what is probable on every subject, but also because it affords the greatest scope for practising eloquence; a method that aristotle first made use of, and afterward all the aristotelians; and in our own memory plilo, whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the precepts of the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to which custom i was brought to conform by my friends at my tusculum; and accordingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. and therefore, as yesterday before noon we applied ourselves to speaking, and in the afternoon went down into the academy, the discussions which were held there i have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but in almost the very same words which were employed in the debate. iv. the discourse, then, was introduced in this manner while we were walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this: _a._ it is not to be expressed how much i was delighted, or rather edified, by your discourse of yesterday. for although i am conscious to myself that i have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when i have considered that there would be an end to this life, and that i must some time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread and uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe me, i am so freed from that kind of uneasiness that there is nothing that i think less worth any regard. _m._ i am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls; it banishes all groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears: but it has not the same influence over all men; it is of very great influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. for not only does fortune, as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but reason does so in a still greater degree; for it, by certain precepts, as it were, strengthens even courage itself. you were born naturally great and soaring, and with a contempt for all things which pertain to man alone; therefore a discourse against death took easy possession of a brave soul. but do you imagine that these same arguments have any force with those very persons who have invented, and canvassed, and published them, excepting indeed some very few particular persons? for how few philosophers will you meet with whose life and manners are conformable to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession, not as a means of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their own practice! who follow their own precepts, and comply with their own decrees! you may see some of such levity and such vanity, that it would have been better for them to have been ignorant; some covetous of money, some others eager for glory, many slaves to their lusts; so that their discourses and their actions are most strangely at variance; than which nothing in my opinion can be more unbecoming: for just as if one who professed to teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a master of music sing out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance in these men, because they blunder in the very particular with which they profess that they are well acquainted. so a philosopher who errs in the conduct of his life is the more infamous because he is erring in the very thing which he pretends to teach, and, while he lays down rules to regulate life by, is irregular in his own life. v. _a._ should this be the case, is it not to be feared that you are dressing up philosophy in false colors? for what stronger argument can there be that it is of little use than that some very profound philosophers live in a discreditable manner? _m._ that, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which are cultivated are not fruitful (and this sentiment of accius is false, and asserted without any foundation, the ground you sow on is of small avail; to yield a crop good seed can never fail), it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may be naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing, so neither can the mind without education; such is the weakness of either without the other. whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this it is which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, as i may say, sows them, in the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest. let us proceed, then, as we began. say, if you please, what shall be the subject of our disputation. _a._ i look on pain to be the greatest of all evils. _m._ what, even greater than infamy? _a._ i dare not indeed assert that; and i blush to think i am so soon driven from my ground. _m._ you would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered in it; for what is so unbecoming--what can appear worse to you, than disgrace, wickedness, immorality? to avoid which, what pain is there which we ought not (i will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court? _a._ i am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil. _m._ do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have given up on a small hint? _a._ i see that plainly; but i should be glad to give up more of it. _m._ i will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great undertaking, and i must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to offer any obstacles. _a._ you shall have such: for as i behaved yesterday, so now i will follow reason wherever she leads. vi. _m._ first, then, i will speak of the weakness of many philosophers, and those, too, of various sects; the head of whom, both in authority and antiquity, was aristippus, the pupil of socrates, who hesitated not to say that pain was the greatest of all evils. and after him epicurus easily gave in to this effeminate and enervated doctrine. after him hieronymus the rhodian said, that to be without pain was the chief good, so great an evil did pain appear to him to be. the rest, with the exceptions of zeno, aristo, pyrrho, were pretty much of the same opinion that you were of just now--that it was indeed an evil, but that there were many worse. when, then, nature herself, and a certain generous feeling of virtue, at once prevents you from persisting in the assertion that pain is the chief evil, and when you were driven from such an opinion when disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall philosophy, the preceptress of life, cling to this idea for so many ages? what duty of life, what praise, what reputation, would be of such consequence that a man should be desirous of gaining it at the expense of submitting to bodily pain, when he has persuaded himself that pain is the greatest evil? on the other side, what disgrace, what ignominy, would he not submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it was the greatest of evils? besides, what person, if it be only true that pain is the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not only when he actually feels pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may befall him. and who is there whom pain may not befall? so that it is clear that there is absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. metrodorus, indeed, thinks that man perfectly happy whose body is free from all disorders, and who has an assurance that it will always continue so; but who is there who can be assured of that? vii. but epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that his design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere that if a wise man were to be burned or put to the torture--you expect, perhaps, that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support himself under it with resolution, he would not yield to it (and that by hercules! would be very commendable, and worthy of that very hercules whom i have just invoked): but even this will not satisfy epicurus, that robust and hardy man! no; his wise man, even if he were in phalaris's bull, would say, how sweet it is! how little do i regard it! what, sweet? is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable? but those very men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying that it is agreeable to any one to be tormented; they rather say that it is cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an evil: while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very worst of all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it sweet. i do not require of you to speak of pain in the same words which epicurus uses--a man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he may make no difference, if he pleases, between phalaris's bull and his own bed; but i cannot allow the wise man to be so indifferent about pain. if he bears it with courage, it is sufficient: that he should rejoice in it, i do not expect; for pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter, against nature, hard to submit to and to bear. observe philoctetes: we may allow him to lament, for he saw hercules himself groaning loudly through extremity of pain on mount oeta. the arrows with which hercules presented him were then no consolation to him, when the viper's bite, impregnating his veins with poison, rack'd him with its bitter pains. and therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die, oh that some friendly hand its aid would lend, my body from this rock's vast height to send into the briny deep! i'm all on fire, and by this fatal wound must soon expire. it is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this manner was not oppressed with evil, and great evil too. viii. but let us observe hercules himself, who was subdued by pain at the very time when he was on the point of attaining immortality by death. what words does sophocles here put in his mouth, in his trachiniæ? who, when deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the centaur's blood, and it stuck to his entrails, says, what tortures i endure no words can tell, far greater these, than those which erst befell from the dire terror of thy consort, jove- e'en stern eurystheus' dire command above; this of thy daughter, oeneus, is the fruit, beguiling me with her envenom'd suit, whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey, consuming life; my lungs forbid to play; the blood forsakes my veins; my manly heart forgets to beat; enervated, each part neglects its office, while my fatal doom proceeds ignobly from the weaver's loom. the hand of foe ne'er hurt me, nor the fierce giant issuing from his parent earth. ne'er could the centaur such a blow enforce, no barbarous foe, nor all the grecian force; this arm no savage people could withstand, whose realms i traversed to reform the land. thus, though i ever bore a manly heart, i fall a victim to a woman's art. ix. assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear, my groans preferring to thy mother's tear: convey her here, if, in thy pious heart, thy mother shares not an unequal part: proceed, be bold, thy father's fate bemoan, nations will join, you will not weep alone. oh, what a sight is this same briny source, unknown before, through all my labors' course! that virtue, which could brave each toil but late, with woman's weakness now bewails its fate. approach, my son; behold thy father laid, a wither'd carcass that implores thy aid; let all behold: and thou, imperious jove, on me direct thy lightning from above: now all its force the poison doth assume, and my burnt entrails with its flame consume. crestfallen, unembraced, i now let fall listless, those hands that lately conquer'd all; when the nemæan lion own'd their force, and he indignant fell a breathless corse; the serpent slew, of the lernean lake, as did the hydra of its force partake: by this, too, fell the erymanthian boar: e'en cerberus did his weak strength deplore. this sinewy arm did overcome with ease that dragon, guardian of the golden fleece. my many conquests let some others trace; it's mine to say, i never knew disgrace.[31] can we then, despise pain, when we see hercules himself giving vent to his expressions of agony with such impatience? x. let us see what æschylus says, who was not only a poet but a pythagorean philosopher also, for that is the account which you have received of him; how doth he make prometheus bear the pain he suffered for the lemnian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial fire, and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by jupiter for the theft. fastened to mount caucasus, he speaks thus: thou heav'n-born race of titans here fast bound, behold thy brother! as the sailors sound with care the bottom, and their ships confine to some safe shore, with anchor and with line; so, by jove's dread decree, the god of fire confines me here the victim of jove's ire. with baneful art his dire machine he shapes; from such a god what mortal e'er escapes? when each third day shall triumph o'er the night, then doth the vulture, with his talons light, seize on my entrails; which, in rav'nous guise, he preys on! then with wing extended flies aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore: but when dire jove my liver doth restore, back he returns impetuous to his prey, clapping his wings, he cuts th' ethereal way. thus do i nourish with my blood this pest, confined my arms, unable to contest; entreating only that in pity jove would take my life, and this cursed plague remove. but endless ages past unheard my moan, sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone.[32] and therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is suffering, miserable; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil. xi. _a._ hitherto you are on my side; i will see to that by-and-by; and, in the mean while, whence are those verses? i do not remember them. _m._ i will inform you, for you are in the right to ask. do you see that i have much leisure? _a._ what, then? _m._ i imagine, when you were at athens, you attended frequently at the schools of the philosophers. _a._ yes, and with great pleasure. _m._ you observed, then, that though none of them at that time were very eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues. _a._ yes, and particularly dionysius the stoic used to employ a great many. _m._ you say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or elegance. but our friend philo used to give a few select lines and well adapted; and in imitation of him, ever since i took a fancy to this kind of elderly declamation, i have been very fond of quoting our poets; and where i cannot be supplied from them, i translate from the greek, that the latin language may not want any kind of ornament in this kind of disputation. but, do you not see how much harm is done by poets? they introduce the bravest men lamenting over their misfortunes: they soften our minds; and they are, besides, so entertaining, that we do not only read them, but get them by heart. thus the influence of the poets is added to our want of discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of living, so that between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigor and energy. plato, therefore, was right in banishing them from his commonwealth, where he required the best morals, and the best form of government. but we, who have all our learning from greece, read and learn these works of theirs from our childhood; and look on this as a liberal and learned education. xii. but why are we angry with the poets? we may find some philosophers, those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was the greatest of evils. but you, young man, when you said but just now that it appeared so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared greater than infamy, gave up that opinion at a word. suppose i ask epicurus the same question. he will answer that a trifling degree of pain is a greater evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no evil in infamy itself, unless attended with pain. what pain, then, attends epicurus, when he says that very thing, that pain is the greatest evil! and yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a philosopher than to talk thus. therefore, you allowed enough when you admitted that infamy appeared to you to be a greater evil than pain. and if you abide by this admission, you will see how far pain should be resisted; and that our inquiry should be not so much whether pain be an evil, as how the mind may be fortified for resisting it. the stoics infer from some petty quibbling arguments that it is no evil, as if the dispute were about a word, and not about the thing itself. why do you impose upon me, zeno? for when you deny what appears very dreadful to me to be an evil, i am deceived, and am at a loss to know why that which appears to me to be a most miserable thing should be no evil. the answer is, that nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. you return to your trifling, for you do not remove what made me uneasy. i know that pain is not vice--you need not inform me of that: but show me that it makes no difference to me whether i am in pain or not. it has never anything to do, say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon virtue alone; but yet pain is to be avoided. if i ask, why? it is disagreeable, against nature, hard to bear, woful and afflicting. xiii. here are many words to express that by so many different forms which we call by the single word evil. you are defining pain, instead of removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely possible to be endured or borne, nor are you wrong in saying so: but the man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and nothing evil but what is disgraceful. this would be wishing, not proving. this argument is a better one, and has more truth in it--that all things which nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil; that those which she approves of are to be considered as good: for when this is admitted, and the dispute about words removed, that which they with reason embrace, and which we call honest, right, becoming, and sometimes include under the general name of virtue, appears so far superior to everything else that all other things which are looked upon as the gifts of fortune, or the good things of the body, seem trifling and insignificant; and no evil whatever, nor all the collective body of evils together, appears to be compared to the evil of infamy. wherefore, if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than pain, pain is certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and unmanly to groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain; while you cherish notions of probity, dignity, honor, and, keeping your eye on them, refrain yourself, pain will certainly yield to virtue, and, by the influence of imagination, will lose its whole force.--for you must either admit that there is no such thing as virtue, or you must despise every kind of pain. will you allow of such a virtue as prudence, without which no virtue whatever can even be conceived? what, then? will that suffer you to labor and take pains to no purpose? will temperance permit you to do anything to excess? will it be possible for justice to be maintained by one who through the force of pain discovers secrets, or betrays his confederates, or deserts many duties of life? will you act in a manner consistently with courage, and its attendants, greatness of soul, resolution, patience, and contempt for all worldly things? can you hear yourself called a great man when you lie grovelling, dejected, and deploring your condition with a lamentable voice; no one would call you even a man while in such a condition. you must therefore either abandon all pretensions to courage, or else pain must be put out of the question. xiv. you know very well that, even though part of your corinthian furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if you lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still if, i say, you should acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you would be stripped of all. can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of a great soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of fortune? or philoctetes? for i choose to instance him, rather than yourself, for he certainly was not a brave man, who lay in his bed, which was watered with his tears, whose groans, bewailings, and whose bitter cries, with grief incessant rent the very skies. i do not deny pain to be pain--for were that the case, in what would courage consist?--but i say it should be assuaged by patience, if there be such a thing as patience: if there be no such thing, why do we speak so in praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? does pain annoy us? let it sting us to the heart: if you are without defensive armor, bare your throat to it; but if you are secured by vulcanian armor, that is to say by resolution, resist it. should you fail to do so, that guardian of your honor, your courage, will forsake and leave you.--by the laws of lycurgus, and by those which were given to the cretans by jupiter, or which minos established under the direction of jupiter, as the poets say, the youths of the state are trained by the practice of hunting, running, enduring hunger and thirst, cold and heat. the boys at sparta are scourged so at the altars that blood follows the lash in abundance; nay, sometimes, as i used to hear when i was there, they are whipped even to death; and yet not one of them was ever heard to cry out, or so much as groan. what, then? shall men not be able to bear what boys do? and shall custom have such great force, and reason none at all? xv. there is some difference between labor and pain; they border upon one another, but still there is a certain difference between them. labor is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp motion in the body, disagreeable to our senses.--both these feelings, the greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the common name of [greek: ponos]: therefore they call industrious men painstaking, or, rather, fond of labor; we, more conveniently, call them laborious; for laboring is one thing, and enduring pain another. you see, o greece! your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you think you are always so rich in them. i say, then, that there is a difference between laboring and being in pain. when caius marius had an operation performed for a swelling in his thigh, he felt pain; when he headed his troops in a very hot season, he labored. yet these two feelings bear some resemblance to one another; for the accustoming ourselves to labor makes the endurance of pain more easy to us. and it was because they were influenced by this reason that the founders of the grecian form of government provided that the bodies of their youth should be strengthened by labor, which custom the spartans transferred even to their women, who in other cities lived more delicately, keeping within the walls of their houses; but it was otherwise with the spartans. the spartan women, with a manly air, fatigues and dangers with their husbands share; they in fantastic sports have no delight, partners with them in exercise and fight. and in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. they are thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the labor itself produces a sort of callousness to pain. xvi. as to military service (i speak of our own, not of that of the spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and scarce a word of command was given without an anapæst), you may see, in the first place, whence the very name of an army (_exercitus_[33]) is derived; and, secondly, how great the labor is of an army on its march: then consider that they carry more than a fortnight's provision, and whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the stakes,[34] for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no more encumbrance than their own limbs, for they say that arms are the limbs of a soldier, and those, indeed, they carry so commodiously that, when there is occasion, they throw down their burdens, and use their arms as readily as their limbs. why need i mention the exercises of the legions? and how great the labor is which is undergone in the running, encounters, shouts! hence it is that their minds are worked up to make so light of wounds in action. take a soldier of equal bravery, but undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. why is it that there is this sensible difference between a raw recruit and a veteran soldier? the age of the young soldiers is for the most part in their favor; but it is practice only that enables men to bear labor and despise wounds. moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off the field, the raw, untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out most shamefully; but the more brave, experienced veteran only inquires for some one to dress his wounds, and says, patroclus, to thy aid i must appeal ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal; the sons of æsculapius are employ'd, no room for me, so many are annoy'd. xvii. this is certainly eurypylus himself. what an experienced man!--while his friend is continually enlarging on his misfortunes, you may observe that he is so far from weeping that he even assigns a reason why he should bear his wounds with patience. who at his enemy a stroke directs, his sword to light upon himself expects. patroclus, i suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his wounds, at least if he be a man: but not a word of that; he only inquires how the battle went: say how the argives bear themselves in fight? and yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and visible sufferings. peace! and my wounds bind up; but though eurypylus could bear these afflictions, æsopus could not, where hector's fortune press'd our yielding troops; and he explains the rest, though in pain. so unbounded is military glory in a brave man! shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave in this manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? surely the latter might be able to bear pain better, and in no small degree either. at present, however, i am confining myself to what is engendered by practice and discipline. i am not yet come to speak of reason and philosophy. you may often hear of old women living without victuals for three or four days; but take away a wrestler's provisions but for one day, and he will implore the aid of jupiter olympius, the very god for whom he exercises himself: he will cry out that he cannot endure it. great is the force of custom! sportsmen will continue whole nights in the snow; they will bear being almost frozen upon the mountains. from practice boxers will not so much as utter a groan, however bruised by the cestus. but what do you think of those to whom a victory in the olympic games seemed almost on a par with the ancient consulships of the roman people? what wounds will the gladiators bear, who are either barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind! how do they, who are trained to it, prefer being wounded to basely avoiding it! how often do they prove that they consider nothing but the giving satisfaction to their masters or to the people! for when covered with wounds, they send to their masters to learn their pleasure: if it is their will, they are ready to lie down and die. what gladiator, of even moderate reputation, ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? who ever disgraced himself either in the actual combat, or even when about to die? who that had been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the stroke of death? so great is the force of practice, deliberation, and custom! shall this, then, be done by a samnite rascal, worthy of his trade; and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to be able to fortify it by reason and reflection? the sight of the gladiators' combats is by some looked on as cruel and inhuman, and i do not know, as it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the guilty fought, we might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by our eyes we could not) better training to harden us against pain and death. xviii. i have now said enough about the effects of exercise, custom, and careful meditation. proceed we now to consider the force of reason, unless you have something to reply to what has been said. _a._ that i should interrupt you! by no means; for your discourse has brought me over to your opinion. let the stoics, then, think it their business to determine whether pain be an evil or not, while they endeavor to show by some strained and trifling conclusions, which are nothing to the purpose, that pain is no evil. my opinion is, that whatever it is, it is not so great as it appears; and i say, that men are influenced to a great extent by some false representations and appearance of it, and that all which is really felt is capable of being endured. where shall i begin, then? shall i superficially go over what i said before, that my discourse may have a greater scope? this, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but also by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous--those that have patience and a spirit above this world--not to give way to pain. nor has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who bore it in this manner. that, then, which is expected from a brave man, and is commended when it is seen, it must surely be base in any one to be afraid of at its approach, or not to bear when it comes. but i would have you consider whether, as all the right affections of the soul are classed under the name of virtues, the truth is that this is not properly the name of them all, but that they all have their name from that leading virtue which is superior to all the rest: for the name "virtue" comes from _vir_, a man, and courage is the peculiar distinction of a man: and this virtue has two principal duties, to despise death and pain. we must, then, exert these, if we would be men of virtue, or, rather, if we would be men, because virtue (_virtus_) takes its very name from _vir_, man. xix. you may inquire, perhaps, how? and such an inquiry is not amiss, for philosophy is ready with her assistance. epicurus offers himself to you, a man far from a bad--or, i should rather say, a very good man: he advises no more than he knows. "despise pain," says he. who is it saith this? is it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? it is not, indeed, very consistent in him. let us hear what he says: "if the pain is excessive, it must needs be short." i must have that over again, for i do not apprehend what you mean exactly by "excessive" or "short." that is excessive than which nothing can be greater; that is short than which nothing is shorter. i do not regard the greatness of any pain from which, by reason of the shortness of its continuance, i shall be delivered almost before it reaches me. but if the pain be as great as that of philoctetes, it will appear great indeed to me, but yet not the greatest that i am capable of bearing; for the pain is confined to my foot. but my eye may pain me, i may have a pain in the head, or sides, or lungs, or in every part of me. it is far, then, from being excessive. therefore, says he, pain of a long continuance has more pleasure in it than uneasiness. now, i cannot bring myself to say so great a man talks nonsense; but i imagine he is laughing at us. my opinion is that the greatest pain (i say the greatest, though it may be ten atoms less than another) is not therefore short, because acute. i could name to you a great many good men who have been tormented many years with the acutest pains of the gout. but this cautious man doth not determine the measure of that greatness or of duration, so as to enable us to know what he calls excessive with regard to pain, or short with respect to its continuance. let us pass him by, then, as one who says just nothing at all; and let us force him to acknowledge, notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under his colic and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from him who looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. we must apply, then, for relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in honesty, and the greatest evil in infamy. you dare not so much as groan, or discover the least uneasiness in their company, for virtue itself speaks to you through them. xx. will you, when you may observe children at lacedæmon, and young men at olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest wounds, and bear them without once opening their mouths--will you, i say, if any pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman? will you not rather bear it with resolution and constancy? and not cry, it is intolerable; nature cannot bear it! i hear what you say: boys bear this because they are led thereto by glory; some bear it through shame, many through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear what is borne by many, and in such different circumstances? nature not only bears it, but challenges it, for there is nothing with her preferable, nothing which she desires more than credit, and reputation, and praise, and honor, and glory. i choose here to describe this one thing under many names, and i have used many that you may have the clearer idea of it; for what i mean to say is, that whatever is desirable of itself, proceeding from virtue, or placed in virtue, and commendable on its own account (which i would rather agree to call the only good than deny it to be the chief good) is what men should prefer above all things. and as we declare this to be the case with respect to honesty, so we speak in the contrary manner of infamy; nothing is so odious, so detestable, nothing so unworthy of a man. and if you are thoroughly convinced of this (for, at the beginning of this discourse, you allowed that there appeared to you more evil in infamy than in pain), it follows that you ought to have the command over yourself, though i scarcely know how this expression may seem an accurate one, which appears to represent man as made up of two natures, so that one should be in command and the other be subject to it. xxi. yet this division does not proceed from ignorance; for the soul admits of a twofold division, one of which partakes of reason, the other is without it. when, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness. there is in the soul of every man something naturally soft, low, enervated in a manner, and languid. were there nothing besides this, men would be the greatest of monsters; but there is present to every man reason, which presides over and gives laws to all; which, by improving itself, and making continual advances, becomes perfect virtue. it behooves a man, then, to take care that reason shall have the command over that part which is bound to practise obedience. in what manner? you will say. why, as a master has over his slave, a general over his army, a father over his son. if that part of the soul which i have called soft behaves disgracefully, if it gives itself up to lamentations and womanish tears, then let it be restrained, and committed to the care of friends and relations, for we often see those persons brought to order by shame whom no reasons can influence. therefore, we should confine those feelings, like our servants, in safe custody, and almost with chains. but those who have more resolution, and yet are not utterly immovable, we should encourage with our exhortations, as we would good soldiers, to recollect themselves, and maintain their honor. that wisest man of all greece, in the niptræ, does not lament too much over his wounds, or, rather, he is moderate in his grief: move slow, my friends; your hasty speed refrain, lest by your motion you increase my pain. pacuvius is better in this than sophocles, for in the one ulysses bemoans his wounds too vehemently; for the very people who carried him after he was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering the dignity of the man, did not scruple to say, and thou, ulysses, long to war inured, thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured. the wise poet understood that custom was no contemptible instructor how to bear pain. but the same hero complains with more decency, though in great pain: assist, support me, never leave me so; unbind my wounds, oh! execrable woe! he begins to give way, but instantly checks himself: away! begone! but cover first the sore; for your rude hands but make my pains the more. do you observe how he constrains himself? not that his bodily pains were less, but because he checks the anguish of his mind. therefore, in the conclusion of the niptræ, he blames others, even when he himself is dying: complaints of fortune may become the man, none but a woman will thus weeping stand. and so that soft place in his soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed soldier does his stern commander. xxii. the man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man, indeed, we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described in their writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist); such a man, or at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists in him, will have the same authority over the inferior part as a good parent has over his dutiful children: he will bring it to obey his nod without any trouble or difficulty. he will rouse himself, prepare and arm himself, to oppose pain as he would an enemy. if you inquire what arms he will provide himself with, they will be contention, encouragement, discourse with himself. he will say thus to himself: take care that you are guilty of nothing base, languid, or unmanly. he will turn over in his mind all the different kinds of honor. zeno of elea will occur to him, who suffered everything rather than betray his confederates in the design of putting an end to the tyranny. he will reflect on anaxarchus, the pupil of democritus, who, having fallen into the hands of nicocreon, king of cyprus, without the least entreaty for mercy or refusal, submitted to every kind of torture. calanus the indian will occur to him, an ignorant man and a barbarian, born at the foot of mount caucasus, who committed himself to the flames by his own free, voluntary act. but we, if we have the toothache, or a pain in the foot, or if the body be anyways affected, cannot bear it. for our sentiments of pain as well as pleasure are so trifling and effeminate, we are so enervated and relaxed by luxuries, that we cannot bear the sting of a bee without crying out. but caius marius, a plain countryman, but of a manly soul, when he had an operation performed on him, as i mentioned above, at first refused to be tied down; and he is the first instance of any one's having had an operation performed on him without being tied down. why, then, did others bear it afterward? why, from the force of example. you see, then, that pain exists more in opinion than in nature; and yet the same marius gave a proof that there is something very sharp in pain for he would not submit to have the other thigh cut. so that he bore his pain with resolution as a man; but, like a reasonable person, he was not willing to undergo any greater pain without some necessary reason. the whole, then, consists in this--that you should have command over yourself. i have already told you what kind of command this is; and by considering what is most consistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul, a man not only restrains himself, but, somehow or other, mitigates even pain itself. xxiii. even as in a battle the dastardly and timorous soldier throws away his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast as he can, and on that account loses his life sometimes, though he has never received even one wound, when he who stands his ground has nothing of the sort happen to him, so they who cannot bear the appearance of pain throw themselves away, and give themselves up to affliction and dismay. but they that oppose it, often come off more than a match for it. for the body has a certain resemblance to the soul: as burdens are more easily borne the more the body is exerted, while they crush us if we give way, so the soul by exerting itself resists the whole weight that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is so pressed that it cannot support itself. and if we consider things truly, the soul should exert itself in every pursuit, for that is the only security for its doing its duty. but this should be principally regarded in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or dastardly, or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and, above all things, we must dismiss and avoid that philoctetean sort of outcry. a man is allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom; but it is not permissible even in a woman to howl; for such a noise as this is forbidden, by the twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. nor does a wise or brave man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his resolution greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much noise as they can. the wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; and the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary, give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sinking of their spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the throwing-out of these groans, and the blow comes the stronger. xxiv. what! they who would speak louder than ordinary are they satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue or stretching the common organs of speech and utterance? the whole body and every muscle is at full stretch if i may be allowed the expression; every nerve is exerted to assist their voice. i have actually seen the knees of marcus antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for himself, with relation to the varian law. for, as the engines you throw stones or darts with throw them out with the greater force the more they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or boxing--the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence--if in a moment of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then i should scarcely call him a man who yielded to them. for even supposing that such groaning could give any ease, it still should be considered whether it were consistent with a brave and resolute man. but if it does not ease our pain, why should we debase ourselves to no purpose? for what is more unbecoming in a man than to cry like a woman? but this precept which is laid down with respect to pain is not confined to it. we should apply this exertion of the soul to everything else. is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we must have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms. but since it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the other subjects alone. to bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of great use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it is to do so, for we are naturally desirous (as i said before, but it cannot be too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is honorable, of which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is nothing which we are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it. from this impulse of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and honorable conduct, it is that such dangers are supported in war, and that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in action, or, if they are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but the least step from their honor. the decii saw the shining swords of their enemies when they were rushing into the battle. but the honorable character and the glory of the death which they were seeking made all fear of death of little weight. do you imagine that epaminondas groaned when he perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? no; for he left his country triumphing over the lacedæmonians, whereas he had found it in subjection to them. these are the comforts, these are the things that assuage the greatest pain. xxv. you may ask, how the case is in peace? what is to be done at home? how we are to behave in bed? you bring me back to the philosophers, who seldom go to war. among these, dionysius of heraclea, a man certainly of no resolution, having learned fortitude of zeno, quitted it on being in pain; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing himself he cried out that those things were false which he had formerly conceived of pain. and when his fellow-disciple, cleanthes, asked him why he had changed his opinion, he answered, "that the case of any man who had applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear pain, might be a sufficient proof that pain is an evil; that he himself had spent many years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain: it followed, therefore, that pain was an evil." it is reported that cleanthes on that struck his foot on the ground, and repeated a verse out of the epigonæ: amphiaraus, hear'st thou this below? he meant zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him. but it was not so with our friend posidonius, whom i have often seen myself; and i will tell you what pompey used to say of him: that when he came to rhodes, after his departure from syria, he had a great desire to hear posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a severe fit of the gout; yet he had great inclination to pay a visit to so famous a philosopher. accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid his compliments, and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he was very sorry that he could not hear him lecture. "but indeed you may," replied the other, "nor will i suffer any bodily pain to occasion so great a man to visit me in vain." on this pompey relates that, as he lay on his bed, he disputed with great dignity and fluency on this very subject: that nothing was good but what was honest; and that in his paroxysms he would often say, "pain, it is to no purpose; notwithstanding you are troublesome, i will never acknowledge you an evil." and in general all celebrated and notorious afflictions become endurable by disregarding them. xxvi. do we not observe that where those exercises called gymnastic are in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about dangers? that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly esteemed, they who practice these arts decline no pain? what shall i say of our own ambitious pursuits or desire of honors? what fire have not candidates run through to gain a single vote? therefore africanus had always in his hands xenophon, the pupil of socrates, being particularly pleased with his saying, that the same labors were not equally heavy to the general and to the common man, because the honor itself made the labor lighter to the general. but yet, so it happens, that even with the illiterate vulgar an idea of honor is of great influence, though they cannot understand what it is. they are led by report and common opinion to look on that as honorable which has the general voice. not that i would have you, should the multitude be ever so fond of you, rely on their judgment, nor approve of everything which they think right: you must use your own judgment. if you are satisfied with yourself when you have approved of what is right, you will not only have the mastery over yourself (which i recommended to you just now), but over everybody, and everything. lay this down, then, as a rule, that a great capacity, and lofty elevation of soul, which distinguishes itself most by despising and looking down with contempt on pain, is the most excellent of all things, and the more so if it does not depend on the people and does not aim at applause, but derives its satisfaction from itself. besides, to me, indeed, everything seems the more commendable the less the people are courted, and the fewer eyes there are to see it. not that you should avoid the public, for every generous action loves the public view; yet no theatre for virtue is equal to a consciousness of it. xxvii. and let this be principally considered: that this bearing of pain, which i have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of the soul, should be the same in everything. for you meet with many who, through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights, or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a disease; for they did not support themselves under their former sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory. therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly spirit; and the cimbrians and celtiberians are very alert in battle, but bemoan themselves in sickness. for nothing can be consistent which has not reason for its foundation. but when you see those who are led by inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an evil whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by virtue as quite to disappear. and i would have you think of this night and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune, especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in our yesterday's discussion; for, as if some god had advised a man who was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, "there is something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as it did arion of methymna; or those horses sent by neptune to pelops (who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. cast away all fear." so, though your pains be ever so sharp and disagreeable, if the case is not such that it is worth your while to endure them, you see whither you may betake yourself. i think this will do for the present. but perhaps you still abide by your opinion. _a._ not in the least, indeed; and i hope i am freed by these two days' discourses from the fear of two things that i greatly dreaded. _m._ to-morrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. but i see we must not drop our philosophy. _a._ no, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the usual time. _m._ it shall be so, and i will comply with your very laudable inclinations. * * * * * book iii. on grief of mind. i. what reason shall i assign, o brutus, why, as we consist of mind and body, the art of curing and preserving the body should be so much sought after, and the invention of it, as being so useful, should be ascribed to the immortal gods; but the medicine of the mind should not have been so much the object of inquiry while it was unknown, nor so much attended to and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well received or approved of by some, and accounted actually disagreeable, and looked upon with an envious eye by many? is it because we, by means of the mind, judge of the pains and disorders of the body, but do not, by means of the body, arrive at any perception of the disorders of the mind? hence it comes that the mind only judges of itself when that very faculty by which it is judged is in a bad state. had nature given us faculties for discerning and viewing herself, and could we go through life by keeping our eye on her--our best guide--there would be no reason certainly why any one should be in want of philosophy or learning; but, as it is, she has furnished us only with some feeble rays of light, which we immediately extinguish so completely by evil habits and erroneous opinions that the light of nature is nowhere visible. the seeds of virtues are natural to our constitutions, and, were they suffered to come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a happy life; but now, as soon as we are born and received into the world, we are instantly familiarized with all kinds of depravity and perversity of opinions; so that we may be said almost to suck in error with our nurse's milk. when we return to our parents, and are put into the hands of tutors and governors, we are imbued with so many errors that truth gives place to falsehood, and nature herself to established opinion. ii. to these we may add the poets; who, on account of the appearance they exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart, and make a deep impression on our minds. but when to these are added the people, who are, as it were, one great body of instructors, and the multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from nature; so that they seem to deprive us of our best guide who have decided that there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of being desired by him, nothing more excellent, than honors and commands, and a high reputation with the people; which indeed every excellent man aims at; but while he pursues that only true honor which nature has in view above all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant trifles, and in pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some shadowy representation of glory. for glory is a real and express substance, not a mere shadow. it consists in the united praise of good men, the free voice of those who form a true judgment of pre-eminent virtue; it is, as it were, the very echo of virtue; and being generally the attendant on laudable actions, should not be slighted by good men. but popular fame, which would pretend to imitate it, is hasty and inconsiderate, and generally commends wicked and immoral actions, and throws discredit upon the appearance and beauty of honesty by assuming a resemblance of it. and it is owing to their not being able to discover the difference between them that some men ignorant of real excellence, and in what it consists, have been the destruction of their country and of themselves. and thus the best men have erred, not so much in their intentions as by a mistaken conduct. what? is no cure to be attempted to be applied to those who are carried away by the love of money, or the lust of pleasures, by which they are rendered little short of madmen, which is the case of all weak people? or is it because the disorders of the mind are less dangerous than those of the body? or because the body will admit of a cure, while there is no medicine whatever for the mind? iii. but there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and they are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the more offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the mind, when disordered, is, as ennius says, in a constant error: it can neither bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence of desires. now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two distempers of the mind (for i overlook others), weakness and desire? but how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe for itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body, when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit to the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state? philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure. but as to philosophy in general, i have, i think, in my hortensius, sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves: since that, indeed, i have been continually either disputing or writing on its most material branches; and i have laid down in these books all the discussions which took place between myself and my particular friends at my tusculan villa. but as i have spoken in the two former of pain and death, this book shall be devoted to the account of the third day of our disputations. we came down into the academy when the day was already declining towards afternoon, and i asked one of those who were present to propose a subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on in this manner: iv. _a._ my opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief. _m._ what, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts, anger? for these are pretty much like what the greeks call [greek: pathê]. i might call them diseases, and that would be a literal translation, but it is not agreeable to our way of speaking. for envy, delight, and pleasure are all called by the greeks diseases, being affections of the mind not in subordination to reason; but we, i think, are right in calling the same motions of a disturbed soul perturbations, and in very seldom using the term diseases; though, perhaps, it appears otherwise to you. _a._ i am of your opinion. _m._ and do you think a wise man subject to these? _a._ entirely, i think. _m._ then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so little from madness? _a._ what? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness? _m._ not to me only; but i apprehend, though i have often been surprised at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before socrates; from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to life and morals. _a._ how so? _m._ because the name madness[35] implies a sickness of the mind and disease; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind, which they call madness. but the philosophers call all perturbations of the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from these; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all fools are diseased; therefore all fools are mad. for they held that soundness of the mind depends on a certain tranquillity and steadiness; and a mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane, because soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much as with a disordered body. v. nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid of the light of the mind, "a being out of one's mind," "a being beside one's self." from whence we may understand that they who gave these names to things were of the same opinion with socrates, that all silly people were unsound, which the stoics have carefully preserved as being derived from him; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as i just now said, the philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness. hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one's mind: and these are much better expressed by the latin words than the greek, which you will find the case also in many other topics. but we will discuss that point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject. the very meaning of the word describes the whole thing about which we are inquiring, both as to its substance and character. for we must necessarily understand by "sound" those whose minds are under no perturbation from any motion as if it were a disease. they who are differently affected we must necessarily call "unsound." so that nothing is better than what is usual in latin, to say that they who are run away with by their lust or anger have quitted the command over themselves; though anger includes lust, for anger is defined to be the lust of revenge. they, then, who are said not to be masters of themselves, are said to be so because they are not under the government of reason, to which is assigned by nature the power over the whole soul. why the greeks should call this mania, i do not easily apprehend; but we define it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness (_insania_), which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what we call _furor_, or raving. the greeks, indeed, would do so too, but they have no one word that will express it: what we call _furor_, they call [greek: melancholia], as if the reason were affected only by a black bile, and not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or grief. thus we say athamas, alcmæon, ajax, and orestes were raving (_furere_); because a person affected in this manner was not allowed by the twelve tables to have the management of his own affairs; therefore the words are not, if he is mad (_insanus_), but if he begins to be raving (_furiosus_). for they looked upon madness to be an unsettled humor that proceeded from not being of sound mind; yet such a person might perform his ordinary duties, and discharge the usual and customary requirements of life: but they considered one that was raving as afflicted with a total blindness of the mind, which, notwithstanding it is allowed to be greater than madness, is nevertheless of such a nature that a wise man may be subject to raving (_furor_), but cannot possibly be afflicted by insanity (_insania_). but this is another question: let us now return to our original subject. vi. i think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was liable to grief. _a._ and so, indeed, i think. _m._ it is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls, which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did that crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our academy has ever produced, say this amiss: "i am by no means of their opinion who talk so much in praise of i know not what insensibility, which neither can exist, nor ought to exist. "i would choose," says he, "never to be ill; but should i be so, still i should choose to retain my sensation, whether there was to be an amputation or any other separation of anything from my body. for that insensibility cannot be but at the expense of some unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of body." but let us consider whether to talk in this manner be not allowing that we are weak, and yielding to our softness. notwithstanding, let us be hardy enough, not only to lop off every arm of our miseries, but even to pluck up every fibre of their roots. yet still something, perhaps, may be left behind, so deep does folly strike its roots: but whatever may be left it will be no more than is necessary. but let us be persuaded of this, that unless the mind be in a sound state, which philosophy alone can effect, there can be no end of our miseries. wherefore, as we began, let us submit ourselves to it for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to be. i shall advance something further. i shall not treat of grief alone, though that indeed is the principal thing; but, as i originally proposed, of every perturbation of the mind, as i termed it; disorder, as the greeks call it: and first, with your leave, i shall treat it in the manner of the stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into a very small space; afterward i shall enlarge more in my own way. vii. a man of courage is also full of faith. i do not use the word confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from confiding, which is commendable. but he who is full of faith is certainly under no fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith and fear. now, whoever is subject to grief is subject to fear; for whatever things we grieve at when present we dread when hanging over us and approaching. thus it comes about that grief is inconsistent with courage: it is very probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to grief is also liable to fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and sinking. now, whenever these befall a man, he is in a servile state, and must own that he is overpowered; for whoever admits these feelings, must admit timidity and cowardice. but these cannot enter into the mind of a man of courage; neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of courage is the only wise man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise man. it is, besides, necessary that whoever is brave should be a man of great soul; that whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible; whoever is invincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and considers them, beneath him. but no one can despise those things on account of which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows that a wise man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are brave; therefore a wise man is not subject to grief. and as the eye, when disordered, is not in a good condition for performing its office properly; and as the other parts, and the whole body itself, when unsettled, cannot perform their office and business; so the mind, when disordered, is but ill-fitted to perform its duty. the office of the mind is to use its reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in condition to make the best use of his reason, and therefore is never out of order. but grief is a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man will be always free from it. viii. and from these considerations we may get at a very probable definition of the temperate man, whom the greeks call [greek: sôphrôn]: and they call that virtue [greek: sôphrosynên], which i at one time call temperance, at another time moderation, and sometimes even modesty; but i do not know whether that virtue may not be properly called frugality, which has a more confined meaning with the greeks; for they call frugal men [greek: chrêsimous], which implies only that they are useful; but our name has a more extensive meaning: for all abstinence, all innocency (which the greeks have no ordinary name for, though they might use the word [greek: ablabeia], for innocency is that disposition of mind which would offend no one) and several other virtues are comprehended under frugality; but if this quality were of less importance, and confined in as small a compass as some imagine, the surname of piso[36] would not have been in so great esteem. but as we allow him not the name of a frugal man (_frugi_), who either quits his post through fear, which is cowardice; or who reserves to his own use what was privately committed to his keeping, which is injustice; or who fails in his military undertakings through rashness, which is folly--for that reason the word frugality takes in these three virtues of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though it is indeed common to all virtues, for they are all connected and knit together. let us allow, then, frugality itself to be another and fourth virtue; for its peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all tendencies to too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and to preserve a decent steadiness in everything. the vice in contrast to this is called prodigality (_nequitia_). frugality, i imagine, is derived from the word _fruge_, the best thing which the earth produces; _nequitia_ is derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained; still, let us try it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if there is nothing in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no purpose (_nequicquam_) in such a man; from which circumstance he is called also _nihil_, nothing. whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more agreeable to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of course be consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet man must be free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise: and these are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be free from grief. ix. so that dionysius of heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of achilles in homer, well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant's name my rage rekindles, and my soul's in flame: 'tis just resentment, and becomes the brave, disgraced, dishonor'd like the vilest slave[37]-he reasons thus: is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with a swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? must not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of order? but the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of disorder: it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in anger is in a different state. a wise man, therefore, is never angry; for when he is angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry naturally has a longing desire to give all the pain he can to the person who he thinks has injured him; and whoever has this earnest desire must necessarily be much pleased with the accomplishment of his wishes; hence he is delighted with his neighbor's misery; and as a wise man is not capable of such feelings as these, he is therefore not capable of anger. but should a wise man be subject to grief, he may likewise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must likewise be free from grief. again, could a wise man be subject to grief, he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a disposition towards envy (_invidentia_); i do not say to envy (_invidia_), for that can only exist by the very act of envying: but we may fairly form the word _invidentia_ from _invidendo_, and so avoid the doubtful name _invidia;_ for this word is probably derived from _in_ and _video_, looking too closely into another's fortune; as it is said in the melanippus, who envies me the flower of my children? where the latin is _invidit florem._ it may appear not good latin, but it is very well put by accius; for as _video_ governs an accusative case, so it is more correct to say _invideo florem_ than _flori._ we are debarred from saying so by common usage. the poet stood in his own right, and expressed himself with more freedom. x. therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity is also uneasy at another's prosperity: as theophrastus, while he laments the death of his companion callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of alexander; and therefore he says that callisthenes met with man of the greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make use of his good fortune. and as pity is an uneasiness which arises from the misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from the good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is capable of envy. but a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently incapable of pity. but were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also would be familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot affect a wise man. now, though these reasonings of the stoics, and their conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and manly turn of thought and sentiment. for our friends the peripatetics, notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language, do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases of the soul which they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is in its nature great. but our object is to make out that the wise man is free from all evil; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so slightly affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its soundness; therefore the romans have, with their usual accuracy of expression, called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of the analogy between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. the greeks call all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name; for they name every turbid motion of the soul [greek: pathos], that is to say, a distemper. but we have given them a more proper name; for a disorder of the mind is very like a disease of the body. but lust does not resemble sickness; neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated and exulting pleasure of the mind. fear, too, is not very like a distemper, though it is akin to grief of mind, but properly, as is also the case with sickness of the body, so too sickness of mind has no name separated from pain. and therefore i must explain the origin of this pain, that is to say, the cause that occasions this grief in the mind, as if it were a sickness of the body. for as physicians think they have found out the cure when they have discovered the cause of the distemper, so we shall discover the method of curing melancholy when the cause of it is found out. xi. the whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which are of four sorts, but consisting of many parts. for as every disorder or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations are divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say, a joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present great good; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a lust, and is an immoderate inclination after some conceived great good without any obedience to reason. therefore these two kinds, the exulting pleasure and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of good, as the other two, fear and grief, have from an opinion of evil. for fear is an opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief is an opinion of some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freshly conceived opinion of an evil so great that to grieve at it seems right: it is of that kind that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good reason to be so. now we should exert, our utmost efforts to oppose these perturbations--which are, as it were, so many furies let loose upon us and urged on by folly--if we are desirous to pass this share of life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction. but of the other feelings i shall speak elsewhere: our business at present is to drive away grief if we can, for that shall be the object of our present discussion, since you have said that it was your opinion that a wise man might be subject to grief, which i can by no means allow of; for it is a frightful, miserable, and detestable thing, which we should fly from with our utmost efforts--with all our sails and oars, as i may say. xii. that descendant of tantalus, how does he appear to you--he who sprung from pelops, who formerly stole hippodamia from her father-in-law, king oenomaus, and married her by force?--he who was descended from jupiter himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does he not seem! stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade, that no pollutions your sound hearts pervade, so foul a stain my body doth partake. will you condemn yourself, thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on account of the greatness of another's crime? what do you think of that son of phoebus? do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own father's light? hollow his eyes, his body worn away, his furrow'd cheeks his frequent tears betray; his beard neglected, and his hoary hairs rough and uncomb'd, bespeak his bitter cares. o foolish æetes! these are evils which you yourself have been the cause of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has visited you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured to your distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had subsided!--whereas grief consists (as i shall show) in the notion of some recent evil--but your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the loss of your kingdom, not of your daughter, for you hated her, and perhaps with reason, but you could not calmly bear to part with your kingdom. but surely it is an impudent grief which preys upon a man for not being able to command those that are free. dionysius, it is true, the tyrant of syracuse, when driven from his country, taught a school at corinth; so incapable was he of living without some authority. but what could be more impudent than tarquin, who made war upon those who could not bear his tyranny; and, when he could not recover his kingdom by the aid of the forces of the veientians and the latins, is said to have betaken himself to cuma, and to have died in that city of old age and grief! xiii. do you, then, think that it can befall a wise man to be oppressed with grief, that is to say, with misery? for, as all perturbation is misery, grief is the rack itself. lust is attended with heat, exulting joy with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater than these; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man; it tears him, preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him: if we do not so divest ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be free from misery. and it is clear that there must be grief where anything has the appearance of a present sore and oppressing evil. epicurus is of opinion that grief arises naturally from the imagination of any evil; so that whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune, if he conceives that the like may possibly befall himself, becomes sad instantly from such an idea. the cyrenaics think that grief is not engendered by every kind of evil, but only by unexpected, unforeseen evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, of no small effect on the heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a sudden appears more formidable. hence these lines are deservedly commended: i knew my son, when first he drew his breath, destined by fate to an untimely death; and when i sent him to defend the greeks, war was his business, not your sportive freaks. xiv. therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon future evils which you see at a distance makes their approach more tolerable; and on this account what euripides makes theseus say is much commended. you will give me leave to translate them, as is usual with me: i treasured up what some learn'd sage did tell, and on my future misery did dwell; i thought of bitter death, of being drove far from my home by exile, and i strove with every evil to possess my mind, that, when they came, i the less care might find.[38] but euripides says that of himself, which theseus said he had heard from some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of anaxagoras, who, as they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, "i knew that my son was mortal;" which speech seems to intimate that such things afflict those men who have not thought on them before. therefore, there is no doubt but that all those things which are considered evils are the heavier from not being foreseen. though, notwithstanding this is not the only circumstance which occasions the greatest grief, still, as the mind, by foreseeing and preparing for it, has great power to make all grief the less, a man should at all times consider all the events that may befall him in this life; and certainly the excellence and divine nature of wisdom consists in taking a near view of, and gaining a thorough acquaintance with, all human affairs, in not being surprised when anything happens, and in thinking, before the event, that there is nothing but what may come to pass. wherefore ev'ry man, when his affairs go on most swimmingly, e'en then it most behooves to arm himself against the coming storm: loss, danger, exile, returning ever, let him look to meet; his son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick; all common accidents, and may have happen'd that nothing shall seem new or strange. but if aught has fall'n out beyond his hopes, all that let him account clear gain.[39] xv. therefore, as terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same thing in a better manner, and abide by it with more steadiness? hence came that steady countenance, which, according to xantippe, her husband socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any difference in his looks when he went out and when he came home. yet the look of that old roman, m. crassus, who, as lucilius says, never smiled but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene, for so we are told. he, indeed, might well have had the same look at all times who never changed his mind, from which the countenance derives its expression. so that i am ready to borrow of the cyrenaics those arms against the accidents and events of life by means of which, by long premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils; and at the same time i think that those very evils themselves arise more from opinion than nature, for if they were real, no forecast could make them lighter. but i shall speak more particularly on these matters after i have first considered epicurus's opinion, who thinks that all people must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any evils, let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them; for with him evils are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor the lighter for having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on evils to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come: every evil is disagreeable enough when it does come; but he who is constantly considering that some evil may befall him is loading himself with a perpetual evil; and even should such evil never light on him, he voluntarily takes upon himself unnecessary misery, so that he is under constant uneasiness, whether he actually suffers any evil, or only thinks of it. but he makes the alleviation of grief depend on two things--a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to the contemplation of pleasure. for he thinks that the mind may possibly be under the power of reason, and follow her directions: he forbids us, therefore, to mind trouble, and calls us off from sorrowful reflections; he throws a mist over our eyes to hinder us from the contemplation of misery. having sounded a retreat from this statement, he drives our thoughts on again, and encourages them to view and engage the whole mind in the various pleasures with which he thinks the life of a wise man abounds, either from reflecting on the past, or from the hope of what is to come. i have said these things in my own way; the epicureans have theirs. however, let us examine what they say; how they say it is of little consequence. xvi. in the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to premeditate on futurity and blaming their wish to do so; for there is nothing that breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more than considering, during one's whole life, that there is nothing which it is impossible should happen, or than, considering what human nature is, on what conditions life was given, and how we may comply with them. the effect of which is that we are always grieving, but that we never do so; for whoever reflects on the nature of things, the various turns of life, and the weakness of human nature, grieves, indeed, at that reflection; but while so grieving he is, above all other times, behaving as a wise man, for he gains these two things by it: one, that while he is considering the state of human nature he is performing the especial duties of philosophy, and is provided with a triple medicine against adversity--in the first place, because he has long reflected that such things might befall him, and this reflection by itself contributes much towards lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and, secondly, because he is persuaded that we should bear all the accidents which can happen to man with the feelings and spirit of a man; and, lastly, because he considers that what is blamable is the only evil. but it is not your fault that something has happened to you which it was impossible for man to avoid. for that withdrawing of our thoughts which he recommends when he calls us off from contemplating our misfortunes is an imaginary action; for it is not in our power to dissemble or to forget those evils which lie heavy on us; they tear, vex, and sting us--they burn us up, and leave no breathing time. and do you order us to forget them (for such forgetfulness is contrary to nature), and at the same time deprive us of the only assistance which nature affords, the being accustomed to them? for that, though it is but a slow medicine (i mean that which is brought by lapse of time), is still a very effectual one. you order me to employ my thoughts on something good, and forget my misfortunes. you would say something worthy a great philosopher if you thought those things good which are best suited to the dignity of human nature. xvii. should pythagoras, socrates, or plato say to me, why are you dejected or sad? why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which, perhaps, may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite unman you? there is great power in the virtues; rouse them, if they chance to droop. take fortitude for your guide, which will give you such spirits that you will despise everything that can befall man, and look on it as a trifle. add to this temperance, which is moderation, and which was just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to do anything base or bad--for what is worse or baser than an effeminate man? not even justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she seems to have the least weight in this affair; but still, notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are doubly unjust when you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch as though you who have been born mortal demand to be placed in the condition of the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart that you are to restore what was lent you. what answer will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one? and, indeed, if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent on others, and if she did not originate in herself and return to herself, and also embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no adventitious aid from any quarter, i cannot imagine why she should appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought after with such excessive eagerness. now, epicurus, if you call me back to such goods as these, i will obey you, and follow you, and use you as my guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and i will do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be ranked among evils at all. but you are for bringing my thoughts over to pleasure. what pleasures? pleasures of the body, i imagine, or such as are recollected or imagined on account of the body. is this all? do i explain your opinion rightly? for your disciples are used to deny that we understand at all what epicurus means. this is what he says, and what that subtle fellow, old zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them, used, when i was attending lectures at athens, to enforce and talk so loudly of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy it without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his life; or if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it must be short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more of what was sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these things would be happy, especially if satisfied with the good things which he had already enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or of the gods. xviii. you have here a representation of a happy life according to epicurus, in the words of zeno, so that there is no room for contradiction in any point. what, then? can the proposing and thinking of such a life make thyestes's grief the less, or æetes's, of whom i spoke above, or telamon's, who was driven from his country to penury and banishment? in wonder at whom men exclaimed thus: is this the man surpassing glory raised? is this that telamon so highly praised by wondering greece, at whose sight, like the sun, all others with diminish'd lustre shone? now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink with the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers of antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great abundance of good do they promise? suppose that we allow that to be without pain is the chief good? yet that is not called pleasure. but it is not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is, to what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? grant that to be in pain is the greatest evil: whosoever, then, has proceeded so far as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of the greatest good? why, epicurus, do we use any evasions, and not allow in our own words the same feeling to be pleasure which you are used to boast of with such assurance? are these your words or not? this is what you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school; for i will perform on this occasion the office of a translator, lest any one should imagine that i am inventing anything. thus you speak: "nor can i form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those pleasures which are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing music, or abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to the eye, or by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which are perceived by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can it possibly be said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by what is good, for i have perceived men's minds to be pleased with the hopes of enjoying those things which i mentioned above, and with the idea that it should enjoy them without any interruption from pain." and these are his exact words, so that any one may understand what were the pleasures with which epicurus was acquainted. then he speaks thus, a little lower down: "i have often inquired of those who have been called wise men what would be the remaining good if they should exclude from consideration all these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing but words. i could never learn anything from them; and unless they choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing, they must say with me that the only road to happiness lies through those pleasures which i mentioned above." what follows is much the same, and his whole book on the chief good everywhere abounds with the same opinions. will you, then, invite telamon to this kind of life to ease his grief? and should you observe any one of your friends under affliction, would you rather prescribe him a sturgeon than a treatise of socrates? or advise him to listen to the music of a water organ rather than to plato? or lay before him the beauty and variety of some garden, put a nosegay to his nose, burn perfumes before him, and bid him crown himself with a garland of roses and woodbines? should you add one thing more, you would certainly wipe out all his grief. xix. epicurus must admit these arguments, or he must take out of his book what i just now said was a literal translation; or, rather, he must destroy his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. we must inquire, then, how we can ease him of his grief who speaks in this manner: my present state proceeds from fortune's stings; by birth i boast of a descent from kings; hence may you see from what a noble height i'm sunk by fortune to this abject plight. what! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or something of that kind? lo! the same poet presents us with another sentiment somewhere else: i, hector, once so great, now claim your aid. we should assist her, for she looks out for help: where shall i now apply, where seek support? where hence betake me, or to whom resort?" no means remain of comfort or of joy, in flames my palace, and in ruins troy; each wall, so late superb, deformed nods, and not an altar's left t' appease the gods. you know what should follow, and particularly this: of father, country, and of friends bereft, not one of all these sumptuous temples left; which, while the fortune of our house did stand, with rich wrought ceilings spoke the artist's hand. o excellent poet! though despised by those who sing the verses of euphorion. he is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are harder to be borne. therefore, when he had set off the riches of priam to the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance, what does he add? lo! these all perish'd in one blazing pile; the foe old priam of his life beguiled, and with his blood, thy altar, jove, defiled. admirable poetry! there is something mournful in the subject, as well as in the words and measure. we must drive away this grief of hers: how is that to be done? shall we lay her on a bed of down; introduce a singer; shall we burn cedar, or present here with some pleasant liquor, and provide her something to eat? are these the good things which remove the most afflicting grief? for you but just now said you knew of no other good. i should agree with epicurus that we ought to be called off from grief to contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon what was good. xx. it may be said, what! do you imagine epicurus really meant this, and that he maintained anything so sensual? indeed i do not imagine so, for i am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments, and delivered maxims of great weight. therefore, as i said before, i am speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. though he should hold those pleasures in contempt which he just now commended, yet i must remember wherein he places the chief good. for he was not contented with barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant: he says that taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. have i invented this? have i misrepresented him? i should be glad to be confuted; for what am i endeavoring at but to clear up truth in every question? well, but the same man says that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. here are three very great mistakes in a very few words. one is, that he contradicts himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good unless the senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says that to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. can any one contradict himself more? the next mistake is, that where there is naturally a threefold division--the first, to be pleased; next, to be in pain; the last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor pain--he imagines the first and the last to be the same, and makes no difference between pleasure and a cessation of pain. the last mistake he falls into in common with some others, which is this: that as virtue is the most desirable thing, and as philosophy has been investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he has separated the chief good from virtue. but he commends virtue, and that frequently; and indeed c. gracchus, when he had made the largest distributions of the public money, and had exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke much of defending the treasury. what signifies what men say when we see what they do? that piso, who was surnamed frugal, had always harangued against the law that was proposed for distributing the corn; but when it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to receive the corn. gracchus observed piso standing in the court, and asked him, in the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take corn by a law he had himself opposed. "it was," said he, "against your distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you do so, i claim my share." did not this grave and wise man sufficiently show that the public revenue was dissipated by the sempronian law? read gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the treasury. epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise man; he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise man is always happy. all these things become a philosopher to say, but they are not consistent with pleasure. but the reply is, that he doth not mean _that_ pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a one as makes no part of virtue. but suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure; are we so, too, as to his pain? i maintain, therefore, the impropriety of language which that man uses, when talking of virtue, who would measure every great evil by pain. xxi. and indeed the epicureans, those best of men--for there is no order of men more innocent--complain that i take great pains to inveigh against epicurus. we are rivals, i suppose, for some honor or distinction. i place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; i in virtue, he in pleasure; and the epicureans are up in arms, and implore the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their aid. but as for my part, i declare that i am very indifferent about the matter, and that i consider the whole discussion which they are so anxious about at an end. for what! is the contention about the punic war? on which very subject, though m. cato and l. lentulus were of different opinions, still there was no difference between them. but these men behave with too much heat, especially as the opinions which they would uphold are no very spirited ones, and such as they dare not plead for either in the senate or before the assembly of the people, or before the army or the censors. but, however, i will argue with them another time, and with such a disposition that no quarrel shall arise between us; for i shall be ready to yield to their opinions when founded on truth. only i must give them this advice: that were it ever so true, that a wise man regards nothing but the body, or, to express myself with more decency, never does anything except what is expedient, and views all things with exclusive reference to his own advantage, as such things are not very commendable, they should confine them to their own breasts, and leave off talking with that parade of them. xxii. what remains is the opinion of the cyrenaics, who think that men grieve when anything happens unexpectedly. and that is indeed, as i said before, a great aggravation of a misfortune; and i know that it appeared so to chrysippus--"whatever falls out unexpected is so much the heavier." but the whole question does not turn on this; though the sudden approach of an enemy sometimes occasions more confusion than it would if you had expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the sailors into a greater fright than one which they have foreseen; and it is the same in many other cases. but when you carefully consider the nature of what was expected, you will find nothing more than that all things which come on a sudden appear greater; and this upon two accounts: first of all, because you have not time to consider how great the accident is; and, secondly, because you are probably persuaded that you could have guarded against it had you foreseen if, and therefore the misfortune, having been seemingly encountered by your own fault, makes your grief the greater. that it is so, time evinces; which, as it advances, brings with it so much mitigation that though the same misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the less, but in some cases is entirely removed. many carthaginians were slaves at rome, and many macedonians, when perseus their king was taken prisoner. i saw, too, when i was a young man, some corinthians in the peloponnesus. they might all have lamented with andromache, all these i saw......; but they had perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their countenances, and speech, and other gestures you might have taken them for argives or sicyonians. and i myself was more concerned at the ruined walls of corinth than the corinthians themselves were, whose minds by frequent reflection and time had become callous to such sights. i have read a book of clitomachus, which he sent to his fellow-citizens who were prisoners, to comfort them after the destruction of carthage. there is in it a treatise written by carneades, which, as clitomachus says, he had inserted into his book; the subject was, "that it appeared probable that a wise man would grieve at the state of subjection of his country," and all the arguments which carneades used against this proposition are set down in the book. there the philosopher applies such a strong medicine to a fresh grief as would be quite unnecessary in one of any continuance; nor, if this very book had been sent to the captives some years after, would it have found any wounds to cure, but only scars; for grief, by a gentle progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. not that the circumstances which gave rise to it are altered, or can be, but that custom teaches what reason should--that those things which before seemed to be of some consequence are of no such great importance, after all. xxiii. it may be said, what occasion is there to apply to reason, or to any sort of consolation such as we generally make use of, to mitigate the grief of the afflicted? for we have this argument always at hand, that nothing ought to appear unexpected. but how will any one be enabled to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is unavoidable that such things should happen to man? saying this subtracts nothing from the sum of the grief: it only asserts that nothing has fallen out but what might have been anticipated; and yet this manner of speaking has some little consolation in it, though i apprehend not a great deal. therefore those unlooked-for things have not so much force as to give rise to all our grief; the blow perhaps may fall the heavier, but whatever happens does not appear the greater on that account. no, it is the fact of its having happened lately, and not of its having befallen us unexpectedly, that makes it seem the greater. there are two ways, then, of discerning the truth, not only of things that seem evil, but of those that have the appearance of good. for we either inquire into the nature of the thing, of what description, and magnitude, and importance it is--as sometimes with regard to poverty, the burden of which we may lighten when by our disputations we show how few things nature requires, and of what a trifling kind they are--or, without any subtle arguing, we refer them to examples, as here we instance a socrates, there a diogenes, and then again that line in cæcilius, wisdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire. for as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given why what was borne by fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as unsupportable when it falls upon themselves? of a piece with this is that other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that nothing has happened but what is common to human nature; for this argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that all things are tolerable which others have borne and are bearing. xxiv. is poverty the subject? they tell you of many who have submitted to it with patience. is it the contempt of honors? they acquaint you with some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of those who have preferred a private retired life to public employment, mentioning their names with respect; they tell you of the verse[40] of that most powerful king who praises an old man, and pronounces him happy because he was unknown to fame and seemed likely to arrive at the hour of death in obscurity and without notice. thus, too, they have examples for those who are deprived of their children: they who are under any great grief are comforted by instances of like affliction; and thus the endurance of every misfortune is rendered more easy by the fact of others having undergone the same, and the fate of others causes what has happened to appear less important than it has been previously thought, and reflection thus discovers to us how much opinion had imposed on us. and this is what the telamon declares, "i, when my son was born," etc.; and thus theseus, "i on my future misery did dwell;" and anaxagoras, "i knew my son was mortal." all these men, by frequently reflecting on human affairs, had discovered that they were by no means to be estimated by the opinion of the multitude; and, indeed, it seems to me to be pretty much the same case with those who consider beforehand as with those who derive their remedies from time, excepting that a kind of reason cures the one, and the other remedy is provided by nature; by which we discover (and this contains the whole marrow of the matter) that what was imagined to be the greatest evil is by no means so great as to defeat the happiness of life. and the effect of this is, that the blow is greater by reason of its not having been foreseen, and not, as they suppose, that when similar misfortunes befall two different people, that man only is affected with grief whom this calamity has befallen unexpectedly. so that some persons, under the oppression of grief, are said to have borne it actually worse for hearing of this common condition of man, that we are born under such conditions as render it impossible for a man to be exempt from all evil. xxv. for this reason carneades, as i see our friend antiochus writes, used to blame chrysippus for commending these verses of euripides: man, doom'd to care, to pain, disease, and strife, walks his short journey thro' the vale of life: watchful attends the cradle and the grave, and passing generations longs to save: last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn? for man must to his kindred dust return; submit to the destroying hand of fate, as ripen'd ears the harvest-sickle wait.[41] he would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself that we were fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like that, preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a comfort adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. but to me it appears far otherwise; for the necessity of bearing what is the common condition of humanity forbids your resisting the will of the gods, and reminds you that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates grief; and the enumeration of these examples is not produced with a view to please those of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any one in affliction may be induced to bear what he observes many others have previously borne with tranquillity and moderation. for they who are falling to pieces, and cannot hold together through the greatness of their grief, should be supported by all kinds of assistance. from whence chrysippus thinks that grief is called [greek: lypê], as it were [greek: lysis], that is to say, a dissolution of the whole man--the whole of which i think may be pulled up by the roots by explaining, as i said at the beginning, the cause of grief; for it is nothing else but an opinion and judgment formed of a present acute evil. and thus any bodily pain, let it be ever so grievous, may be endurable where any hopes are proposed of some considerable good; and we receive such consolation from a virtuous and illustrious life that they who lead such lives are seldom attacked by grief, or but slightly affected by it. xxvi. but as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other added also--that we ought to lament what has happened, that it is right so to do, and part of our duty, then is brought about that terrible disorder of mind, grief. and it is to this opinion that we owe all those various and horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our persons, that womanish tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our thighs, breasts, and heads. thus agamemnon, in homer and in accius, tears in his grief his uncomb'd locks;[42] from whence comes that pleasant saying of bion, that the foolish king in his sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief would be alleviated by baldness. but men do all these things from being persuaded that they ought to do so. and thus æschines inveighs against demosthenes for sacrificing within seven days after the death of his daughter. but with what eloquence, with what fluency, does he attack him! what sentiments does he collect! what words does he hurl against him! you may see by this that an orator may do anything; but nobody would approve of such license if it were not that we have an idea innate in our minds that every good man ought to lament the loss of a relation as bitterly as possible. and it is owing to this that some men, when in sorrow, betake themselves to deserts, as homer says of bellerophon: distracted in his mind, forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind, wide o'er the aleïan field he chose to stray, a long, forlorn, uncomfortable way![43] and thus niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her never speaking, i suppose, in her grief. but they imagine hecuba to have been converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind. there are others who love to converse with solitude itself when in grief, as the nurse in ennius, fain would i to the heavens find earth relate medea's ceaseless woes and cruel fate.[44] xxvii. now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of their truth and propriety and necessity; and it is plain that those who behave thus do so from a conviction of its being their duty; for should these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for a moment in a more calm or cheerful manner, they presently check themselves and return to their lamentations again, and blame themselves for having been guilty of any intermissions from their grief; and parents and masters generally correct children not by words only, but by blows, if they show any levity by either word or deed when the family is under affliction, and, as it were, oblige them to be sorrowful. what! does it not appear, when you have ceased to mourn, and have discovered that your grief has been ineffectual, that the whole of that mourning was voluntary on your part? what does that man say in terence who punishes himself, the self-tormentor? i think i do my son less harm, o chremes, as long as i myself am miserable. he determines to be miserable: and can any one determine on anything against his will? i well might think that i deserved all evil. he would think he deserved any misfortune were he otherwise than miserable! therefore, you see, the evil is in opinion, not in nature. how is it when some things do of themselves prevent your grieving at them? as in homer, so many died and were buried daily that they had not leisure to grieve: where you find these lines- the great, the bold, by thousands daily fall, and endless were the grief to weep for all. eternal sorrows what avails to shed? greece honors not with solemn fasts the dead: enough when death demands the brave to pay the tribute of a melancholy day. one chief with patience to the grave resign'd, our care devolves on others left behind.[45] therefore it is in our own power to lay aside grief upon occasion; and is there any opportunity (seeing the thing is in our own power) that we should let slip of getting rid of care and grief? it was plain that the friends of cnæus pompeius, when they saw him fainting under his wounds, at the very moment of that most miserable and bitter sight were under great uneasiness how they themselves, surrounded by the enemy as they were, should escape, and were employed in nothing but encouraging the rowers and aiding their escape; but when they reached tyre, they began to grieve and lament over him. therefore, as fear with them, prevailed over grief, cannot reason and true philosophy have the same effect with a wise man? xxviii. but what is there more effectual to dispel grief than the discovery that it answers no purpose, and has been undergone to no account? therefore, if we can get rid of it, we need never have been subject to it. it must be acknowledged, then, that men take up grief wilfully and knowingly; and this appears from the patience of those who, after they have been exercised in afflictions and are better able to bear whatever befalls them, suppose themselves hardened against fortune; as that person in euripides, had this the first essay of fortune been, and i no storms thro' all my life had seen, wild as a colt i'd broke from reason's sway; but frequent griefs have taught me to obey.[46] as, then, the frequent bearing of misery makes grief the lighter, we must necessarily perceive that the cause and original of it does not lie in the calamity itself. your principal philosophers, or lovers of wisdom, though they have not yet arrived at perfect wisdom, are not they sensible that they are in the greatest evil? for they are foolish, and foolishness is the greatest of all evils, and yet they lament not. how shall we account for this? because opinion is not fixed upon that kind of evil, it is not our opinion that it is right, meet, and our duty to be uneasy because we are not all wise men. whereas this opinion is strongly affixed to that uneasiness where mourning is concerned, which is the greatest of all grief. therefore aristotle, when he blames some ancient philosophers for imagining that by their genius they had brought philosophy to the highest perfection, says, they must be either extremely foolish or extremely vain; but that he himself could see that great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that philosophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. and theophrastus is reported to have reproached nature at his death for giving to stags and crows so long a life, which was of no use to them, but allowing only so short a span to men, to whom length of days would have been of the greatest use; for if the life of man could have been lengthened, it would have been able to provide itself with all kinds of learning, and with arts in the greatest perfection. he lamented, therefore, that he was dying just when he had begun to discover these. what! does not every grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge himself ignorant of many things, and confess that there are many things which he must learn over and over again? and yet, though these men are sensible that they are standing still in the very midway of folly, than which nothing can be worse, they are under no great affliction, because no opinion that it is their duty to lament is ever mingled with this knowledge. what shall we say of those who think it unbecoming in a man to grieve? among whom we may reckon q. maximus, when he buried his son that had been consul, and l. paulus, who lost two sons within a few days of one another. of the same opinion was m. cato, who lost his son just after he had been elected prætor, and many others, whose names i have collected in my book on consolation. now what made these men so easy, but their persuasion that grief and lamentation was not becoming in a man? therefore, as some give themselves up to grief from an opinion that it is right so to do, they refrained themselves, from an opinion that it was discreditable; from which we may infer that grief is owing more to opinion than nature. xxix. it may be said, on the other side, who is so mad as to grieve of his own accord? pain proceeds from nature, which you must submit to, say they, agreeably to what even your own crantor teaches, for it presses and gains upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be resisted. so that the very same oileus, in sophocles, who had before comforted telamon on the death of ajax, on hearing of the death of his own son, is broken-hearted. on this alteration of his mind we have these lines: show me the man so well by wisdom taught that what he charges to another's fault, when like affliction doth himself betide, true to his own wise counsel will abide.[47] now, when they urge these things, their endeavor is to prove that nature is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people allow that we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires. what madness is it, then, in us to require the same from others? but there are many reasons for our taking grief on us. the first is from the opinion of some evil, on the discovery and certainty of which grief comes of course. besides, many people are persuaded that they are doing something very acceptable to the dead when they lament bitterly over them. to these may be added a kind of womanish superstition, in imagining that when they have been stricken by the afflictions sent by the gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and humbled by them is the readiest way of appeasing them. but most men appear to be unaware what contradictions these things are full of. they commend those who die calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of another with the same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be true, as is occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love another more than himself. there is, indeed, something excellent in this, and, if you examine it, something no less just than true, that we love those who ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to love them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it desirable in friendship that i should love my friend more than myself, or that he should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in life, and break in upon all the duties of it. xxx. but we will speak of this another time: at present it is sufficient not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor to love them more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our conduct, they would approve of, or at least not more than we do ourselves. now as to what they say, that some are not at all appeased by our consolations; and, moreover, as to what they add, that the comforters themselves acknowledge they are miserable when fortune varies the attack and falls on them--in both these cases the solution is easy: for the fault here is not in nature, but in our own folly; and much may be said against folly. but men who do not admit of consolation seem to bespeak misery for themselves; and they who cannot bear their misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to others are not more faulty in this particular than most other persons; for we see that covetous men find fault with others who are covetous, as do the vainglorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the pursuit of glory. for it is the peculiar characteristic of folly to perceive the vices of others, but to forget its own. but since we find that grief is removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that the strength of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily consideration of it. for if the cause continues the same, and the man be the same, how can there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? therefore it is from daily reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance for which you grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a remedy for your grief. xxxi. here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural, what occasion is there for consolation? for nature herself will determine, the measure of it: but if it depends on and is caused by opinion, the whole opinion should be destroyed. i think that it has been sufficiently said, that grief arises from an opinion of some present evil, which includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to grieve. to this definition zeno has added, very justly, that the opinion of this present evil should be recent. now this word recent they explain thus: those are not the only recent things which happened a little while ago; but as long as there shall be any force, or vigor, or freshness in that imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name of recent. take the case of artemisia, the wife of mausolus, king of caria, who made that noble sepulchre at halicarnassus; while she lived, she lived in grief, and died of it, being worn out by it, for that opinion was always recent with her: but you cannot call that recent which has already begun to decay through time. now the duty of a comforter is, to remove grief entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as much as you can, or else to keep it under, and prevent its spreading any further, and to divert one's attention to other matters. there are some who think, with cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to prove that what one is lamenting is by no means an evil. others, as the peripatetics, prefer urging that the evil is not great. others, with epicurus, seek to divert your attention from the evil to good: some think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened but what you had reason to expect; and this is the practice of the cyrenaics. but chrysippus thinks that the main thing in comforting is, to remove the opinion from the person who is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden duty. there are others who bring together all these various kinds of consolations, for people are differently affected; as i have done myself in my book on consolation; for as my own mind was much disordered, i have attempted in that book to discover every method of cure. but the proper season is as much to be attended to in the cure of the mind as of the body; as prometheus in æschylus, on its being said to him, i think, prometheus, you this tenet hold, that all men's reason should their rage control? answers, yes, when one reason properly applies; ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.[48] xxxii. but the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconsiderable one: the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort particularly. the third is, that it is folly to wear one's self out with grief which can avail nothing. for the comfort of cleanthes is suitable only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all; for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. but the time for such precepts is not well chosen. besides, cleanthes does not seem to me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that very thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. for what shall we say? when socrates had convinced alcibiades, as we are told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him, though a man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when alcibiades became uneasy at this, and entreated socrates, with tears in his eyes, to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position; what shall we say to this, cleanthes? was there no evil in what afflicted alcibiades thus? what strange things does lycon say? who, making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind. what, then? did not the grief of alcibiades proceed from the defects and evils of the mind? i have already said enough of epicurus's consolation. xxxiii. nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, "that you are not alone in this." it has its effect, as i said, but not always, nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne them. as to chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth; but it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. it is a work of no small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves merely because he thinks it right so to do. certainly, then, as in pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if i may adopt the language of lawyers for a moment), but adapt what we have to say to the time, to the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person; so, too, in alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party to be comforted can admit of. but, somehow or other, we have rambled from what you originally proposed. for your question was concerning a wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil that is not dishonorable; or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it as to make it wholly disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his grief through opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure, nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest thing imaginable. reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated (though it was not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can be called an evil except what is base) that it is in our power to discern that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it, and the error of opinion. xxxiv. but the kind of affliction of which i have treated is that which is the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it may appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for the others. for there are certain things which are usually said about poverty; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and undistinguished life. there are particular treatises on banishment, on the ruin of one's country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and on every incident that can come under the name of an evil. the greeks divide these into different treatises and distinct books; but they do it for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are full of entertainment. and yet, as physicians, in curing the whole body, attend to even the most insignificant part of the body which is at all disordered, so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief in general; still, if any other deficiency exists--should poverty bite, should ignominy sting, should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or should any of those things which i have just mentioned appear, there is for each its appropriate consolation, which you shall hear whenever you please. but we must have recourse again to the same original principle, that a wise man is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it answers no purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion and prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve, when once men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. when, then, we have subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful uneasiness will be removed; yet some little anxiety, some slight pricking, will still remain. they may indeed call this natural, provided they give it not that horrid, solemn, melancholy name of grief, which can by no means consist with wisdom. but how various and how bitter are the roots of grief! whatever they are, i propose, after having felled the trunk, to destroy them all; even if it should be necessary, by allotting a separate dissertation to each, for i have leisure enough to do so, whatever time it may take up. but the principle of every uneasiness is the same, though they may appear under different names. for envy is an uneasiness; so are emulation, detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness, tribulation, lamentation, vexation, grief, trouble, affliction, and despair. the stoics define all these different feelings; and all those words which i have mentioned belong to different things, and do not, as they seem, express the same ideas; but they are to a certain extent distinct, as i shall make appear perhaps in another place. these are those fibres of the roots which, as i said at first, must be traced back and cut off and destroyed, so that not one shall remain. you say it is a great and difficult undertaking: who denies it? but what is there of any excellency which has not its difficulty? yet philosophy undertakes to effect it, provided we admit its superintendence. but enough of this. the other books, whenever you please, shall be ready for you here or anywhere else. * * * * * book iv. on other perturbations of the mind. i. i have often wondered, brutus, on many occasions, at the ingenuity and virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has surprised me more than their development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat late to us, have been transported into this city from greece. for the system of auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice, and appeals to the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of cavalry and infantry, and the whole military discipline, were instituted as early as the foundation of the city by royal authority, partly too by laws, not without the assistance of the gods. then with what a surprising and incredible progress did our ancestors advance towards all kind of excellence, when once the republic was freed from the regal power! not that this is a proper occasion to treat of the manners and customs of our ancestors, or of the discipline and constitution of the city; for i have elsewhere, particularly in the six books i wrote on the republic, given a sufficiently accurate account of them. but while i am on this subject, and considering the study of philosophy, i meet with many reasons to imagine that those studies were brought to us from abroad, and not merely imported, but preserved and improved; for they had pythagoras, a man of consummate wisdom and nobleness of character, in a manner, before their eyes, who was in italy at the time that lucius brutus, the illustrious founder of your nobility, delivered his country from tyranny. as the doctrine of pythagoras spread itself on all sides, it seems probable to me that it reached this city; and this is not only probable of itself, but it does really appear to have been the case from many remains of it. for who can imagine that, when it flourished so much in that part of italy which was called magna græcia, and in some of the largest and most powerful cities, in which, first the name of pythagoras, and then that of those men who were afterward his followers, was in so high esteem; who can imagine, i say, that our people could shut their ears to what was said by such learned men? besides, it is even my opinion that it was the great esteem in which the pythagoreans were held, that gave rise to that opinion among those who came after him, that king numa was a pythagorean. for, being acquainted with the doctrine and principles of pythagoras, and having heard from their ancestors that this king was a very wise and just man, and not being able to distinguish accurately between times and periods that were so remote, they inferred, from his being so eminent for his wisdom, that he had been a pupil of pythagoras. ii. so far we proceed on conjecture. as to the vestiges of the pythagoreans, though i might collect many, i shall use but a few; because they have no connection with our present purpose. for, as it is reported to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in a more abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe thought to a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so cato, a writer of the very highest authority, says in his origins, that it was customary with our ancestors for the guests at their entertainments, every one in his turn, to celebrate the praises and virtues of illustrious men in song to the sound of the flute; from whence it is clear that poems and songs were then composed for the voice. and, indeed, it is also clear that poetry was in fashion from the laws of the twelve tables, wherein it is provided that no song should be made to the injury of another. another argument of the erudition of those times is, that they played on instruments before the shrines of their gods, and at the entertainments of their magistrates; but that custom was peculiar to the sect i am speaking of. to me, indeed, that poem of appius cæcus, which panætius commends so much in a certain letter of his which is addressed to quintus tubero, has all the marks of a pythagorean author. we have many things derived from the pythagoreans in our customs, which i pass over, that we may not seem to have learned that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the inventors of. but to return to our purpose. how many great poets as well as orators have sprung up among us! and in what a short time! so that it is evident that our people could arrive at any learning as soon as they had an inclination for it. but of other studies i shall speak elsewhere if there is occasion, as i have already often done. iii. the study of philosophy is certainly of long standing with us; but yet i do not find that i can give you the names of any philosopher before the age of lælius and scipio, in whose younger days we find that diogenes the stoic, and carneades the academic, were sent as ambassadors by the athenians to our senate. and as these had never been concerned in public affairs, and one of them was a cyrenean, the other a babylonian, they certainly would never have been forced from their studies, nor chosen for that employment, unless the study of philosophy had been in vogue with some of the great men at that time; who, though they might employ their pens on other subjects--some on civil law, others on oratory, others on the history of former times--yet promoted this most extensive of all arts, the principle of living well, even more by their life than by their writings. so that of that true and elegant philosophy (which was derived from socrates, and is still preserved by the peripatetics and by the stoics, though they express themselves differently in their disputes with the academics) there are few or no latin records; whether this proceeds from the importance of the thing itself, or from men's being otherwise employed, or from their concluding that the capacity of the people was not equal to the apprehension of them. but, during this silence, c. amafinius arose and took upon himself to speak; on the publishing of whose writings the people were moved, and enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect, either because the doctrine was more easily understood, or because they were invited thereto by the pleasing thoughts of amusement, or that, because there was nothing better, they laid hold of what was offered them. and after amafinius, when many of the same sentiments had written much about them, the pythagoreans spread over all italy: but that these doctrines should be so easily understood and approved of by the unlearned is a great proof that they were not written with any great subtlety, and they think their establishment to be owing to this. iv. but let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at liberty to choose what he likes: i shall keep to my old custom; and, being under no restraint from the laws of any particular school, which in philosophy every one must necessarily confine himself to, i shall always inquire what has the most probability in every question, and this system, which i have often practised on other occasions, i have adhered closely to in my tusculan disputations. therefore, as i have acquainted you with the disputations of the three former days, this book shall conclude the discussion of the fourth day. when we had come down into the academy, as we had done the former days, the business was carried on thus: _m._ let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have discussed. _a._ i do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every perturbation of mind. _m._ he seemed by yesterday's discourse to be free from grief; unless you agreed with us only to avoid taking up time. _a._ not at all on that account, for i was extremely satisfied with your discourse. _m._ you do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief? _a._ no, by no means. _m._ but if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else can. for what--can such a man be disturbed by fear? fear proceeds from the same things when absent which occasion grief when present. take away grief, then, and you remove fear. the two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and lust; and if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be always at rest. _a._ i am entirely of that opinion. _m._ which, then, shall we do? shall i immediately crowd all my sails? or shall i make use of my oars, as if i were just endeavoring to get clear of the harbor? _a._ what is it that you mean, for i do not exactly comprehend you? v. _m._ because, chrysippus and the stoics, when they discuss the perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist in definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the subject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered. whereas the peripatetics bring a great many things to promote the cure of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions. my question, then, was, whether i should instantly unfold the sails of my eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way with the oars of logic? _a._ let it be so; for by the employment of both these means the subject of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed. _m._ it is certainly the better way; and should anything be too obscure, you may examine that afterward. _a._ i will do so; but those very obscure points you will, as usual, deliver with more clearness than the greeks. _m._ i will, indeed, endeavor to do so; but it well requires great attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. what the greeks call [greek: pathê] we choose to name perturbations (or disorders) rather than diseases; in explaining which, i shall follow, first, that very old description of pythagoras, and afterward that of plato; for they both divide the mind into two parts, and make one of these partake of reason, and the other they represent without it. in that which partakes of reason they place tranquillity, that is to say, a placid and undisturbed constancy; to the other they assign the turbid motions of anger and desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason. let this, then, be our principle, the spring of all our reasonings. but notwithstanding, i shall use the partitions and definitions of the stoics in describing these perturbations; who seem to me to have shown very great acuteness on this question. vi. zeno's definition, then, is this: "a perturbation" (which he calls a [greek: pathos]) "is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reason, and against nature." some of them define it even more briefly, saying that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; but by too vehement they mean an appetite that recedes further from the constancy of nature. but they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise from two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils; and thus they become four: from the good proceed lust and joy--joy having reference to some present good, and lust to some future one. they suppose fear and grief to proceed from evils: fear from something future, grief from something present; for whatever things are dreaded as approaching always occasion grief when present. but joy and lust depend on the opinion of good; as lust, being inflamed and provoked, is carried on eagerly towards what has the appearance of good; and joy is transported and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary. wherefore, as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. now, where this strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the stoics called [greek: boulêsis], and the name which we give it is volition; and this they allow to none but their wise man, and define it thus: volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust, or an unbridled desire, which is discoverable in all fools. and, therefore, when we are affected so as to be placed in any good condition, we are moved in two ways; for when the mind is moved in a placid and calm motion, consistent with reason, that is called joy; but when it exults with a vain, wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, then that feeling may be called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they define to be an elation of the mind without reason. and as we naturally desire good things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is evil; and this avoidance of which, if conducted in accordance with reason, is called caution; and this the wise man alone is supposed to have: but that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is attended with a base and low dejection, is called fear. fear is, therefore, caution destitute of reason. but a wise man is not affected by any present evil; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being affected with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and sunk, since it is not under the dominion of reason. this, then, is the first definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the mind contrary to the dictates of reason. thus, there are four perturbations, and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no exact opposite. vii. but they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much they are in our power. grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be dejected. joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems to be right that the mind should be elated. fear is an opinion of an impending evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. lust is an opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already come, and present with us. but however i have named the judgments and opinions of perturbations, their meaning is, not that merely the perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these perturbations do so; as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandonment of the mind, joy gives rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit of coveting. but that imagination, which i have included in all the above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without warrantable grounds. now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts annexed to it of the same kind. grief is attended with enviousness (_invidentia_)--i use that word for instruction's sake, though it is not so common; because envy (_invidia_) takes in not only the person who envies, but the person, too, who is envied--emulation, detraction, pity, vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation, solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar feelings are so too. under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror, cowardice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. in pleasure they comprehend malevolence--that is, pleased at another's misfortune--delight, boastfulness, and the like. to lust they associate anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings of that kind. but they define these in this manner: viii. enviousness (_invidentia_), they say, is a grief arising from the prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injurious to the person who envies; for where any one grieves at the prosperity of another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to envy--as when agamemnon grieves at hector's success; but where any one, who is in no way hurt by the prosperity of another, is in pain at his success, such a one envies indeed. now the name "emulation" is taken in a double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and dispraise: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation (however, that sense of it i shall have no occasion for here, for that carries praise with it); but emulation is also a term applied to grief at another's enjoying what i desired to have, and am without. detraction (and i mean by that, jealousy) is a grief even at another's enjoying what i had a great inclination for. pity is a grief at the misery of another who suffers wrongfully; for no one is moved by pity at the punishment of a parricide or of a betrayer of his country. vexation is a pressing grief. mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who was dear to you. sadness is a grief attended with tears. tribulation is a painful grief. sorrow, an excruciating grief. lamentation, a grief where we loudly bewail ourselves. solicitude, a pensive grief. trouble, a continued grief. affliction, a grief that harasses the body. despair, a grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. but those feelings which are included under fear, they define thus: there is sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labor; shame and terror, which affect the body--hence blushing attends shame; a paleness, and tremor, and chattering of the teeth attend terror--cowardice, which is an apprehension of some approaching evil; dread, a fear that unhinges the mind, whence comes that line of ennius, then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind; fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread; confusion, a fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear. ix. the different species into which they divide pleasure come under this description; so that malevolence is a pleasure in the misfortunes of another, without any advantage to yourself; delight, a pleasure that soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. what is said of the ear may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste. all feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves the mind. boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an appearance, and setting off yourself with insolence.--the subordinate species of lust they define in this manner: anger is a lust of punishing any one who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause. heat is anger just forming and beginning to exist, which the greeks call [greek: thymôsis]. hatred is a settled anger. enmity is anger waiting for an opportunity of revenge. discord is a sharper anger conceived deeply in the mind and heart. want an insatiable lust. regret is when one eagerly wishes to see a person who is absent. now here they have a distinction; so that with them regret is a lust conceived on hearing of certain things reported of some one, or of many, which the greeks call [greek: katêgorêmata], or predicaments; as that they are in possession of riches and honors: but want is a lust for those very honors and riches. but these definers make intemperance the fountain of all these perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from the mind and right reason--a state so averse to all rules of reason that the appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained. as, therefore, temperance appeases these desires, making them obey right reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so intemperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and puts every state of the mind into a violent motion. thus, grief and fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their rise from intemperance. x. just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile, so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with sickness, from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition to one another. from these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which they call [greek: nosêmata]; and also those feelings which are in opposition to these diseases, and which admit certain faulty distastes or loathings; then come sicknesses, which are called [greek: arrhôstêmata] by the stoics, and these two have their opposite aversions. here the stoics, especially chrysippus, give themselves unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of the mind have to those of the body: but, overlooking all that they say as of little consequence, i shall treat only of the thing itself. let us, then, understand perturbation to imply a restlessness from the variety and confusion of contradictory opinions; and that when this heat and disturbance of the mind is of any standing, and has taken up its residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence diseases and sickness, and those aversions which are in opposition to these diseases and sicknesses. xi. what i say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy. for should money be the object of our desire, and should we not instantly apply to reason, as if it were a kind of socratic medicine to heal this desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our bowels, and from thence proceeds a distemper or sickness, which, when it is of any continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is covetousness. it is the same with other diseases; as the desire of glory, a passion for women, to which the greeks give the name of [greek: philogyneia]: and thus all other diseases and sicknesses are generated. but those feelings which are the contrary of these are supposed to have fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, such as is displayed in the woman-hater of atilius; or the hatred of the whole human species, as timon is reported to have done, whom they call the misanthrope. of the same kind is inhospitality. and all these diseases proceed from a certain dread of such things as they hate and avoid. but they define sickness of mind to be an overweening opinion, and that fixed and deeply implanted in the heart, of something as very desirable which is by no means so. what proceeds from aversion, they define thus: a vehement idea of something to be avoided, deeply implanted, and inherent in our minds, when there is no reason for avoiding it; and this kind of opinion is a deliberate belief that one understands things of which one is wholly ignorant. now, sickness of the mind has all these subordinate divisions: avarice, ambition, fondness for women, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness, covetousness, and other similar vices. but avarice is a violent opinion about money, as if it were vehemently to be desired and sought after, which opinion is deeply implanted and inherent in our minds; and the definition of all the other similar feelings resembles these. but the definitions of aversions are of this sort: inhospitality is a vehement opinion, deeply implanted and inherent in your mind, that you should avoid a stranger. thus, too, the hatred of women, like that felt by hippolytus, is defined; and the hatred of the human species like that displayed by timon. xii. but to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which i shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the stoics. some men are more inclined to particular disorders than others; and, therefore, we say that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not because they are so at present, but because they are often so: some are inclined to fear, others to some other perturbation. thus in some there is a continual anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a hastiness of temper, which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from anguish: for all are not anxious who are sometimes vexed, nor are they who are anxious always uneasy in that manner: as there is a difference between being drunk and drunkenness; and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be given to women. and this disposition of particular people to particular disorders is very common: for it relates to all perturbations; it appears in many vices, though it has no name. some are, therefore, said to be envious, malevolent, spiteful, fearful, pitiful, from a propensity to those perturbations, not from their being always carried away by them. now this propensity to these particular disorders may be called a sickness from analogy with the body; meaning, that is to say, nothing more than a propensity towards sickness. but with regard to whatever is good, as some are more inclined to different good qualities than others, we may call this a facility or tendency: this tendency to evil is a proclivity or inclination to falling; but where anything is neither good nor bad, it may have the former name. xiii. even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a sickness, and a defect, so it is with the mind. they call that a disease where the whole body is corrupted; they call that sickness where a disease is attended with a weakness, and that a defect where the parts of the body are not well compacted together; from whence it follows that the members are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. so that these two, a disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion and perturbation of the health of the whole body; but a defect discovers itself even when the body is in perfect health. but a disease of the mind is distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. but a viciousness is a habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with itself through life. thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease and sickness may arise from a corruption of opinions; in the other case, the consequence may be inconstancy and inconsistency. for every vice of the mind does not imply a disunion of parts; as is the case with those who are not far from being wise men. with them there is that affection which is inconsistent with itself while it is foolish; but it is not distorted, nor depraved. but diseases and sicknesses are parts of viciousness; but it is a question whether perturbations are parts of the same, for vices are permanent affections: perturbations are such as are restless; so that they cannot be parts of permanent ones. as there is some analogy between the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is there in good; for the distinctions of the body are beauty, strength, health, firmness, quickness of motion: the same may be said of the mind. the body is said to be in a good state when all those things on which health depends are consistent: the same may be said of the mind when its judgments and opinions are not at variance with one another. and this union is the virtue of the mind, which, according to some people, is temperance itself; others make it consist in an obedience to the precepts of temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it to be any distinct species of itself. but, be it one or the other, it is to be found only in a wise man. but there is a certain soundness of mind, which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is removed by the care and management of his physicians. and as what is called beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together with a certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind consists in an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined to a certain firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing within itself the very essence of virtue. besides, we give the very same names to the faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the body, the nerves, and other powers of action. thus the velocity of the body is called swiftness: a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from its running over in its thoughts so many things in so short a time. xiv. herein, indeed, the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind when in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet the body may be disordered without our fault; the mind cannot. for all the disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of reason; these disorders, therefore, are confined to men: the beasts are not subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they had reason. there is a difference, too, between ingenious and dull men; the ingenious, like the corinthian brass, which is long before it receives rust, are longer before they fall into these perturbations, and are recovered sooner: the case is different with the dull. nor does the mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for it never yields to any that are brutish and savage; and some of their perturbations have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy, grief, and fear. but the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are thought to be harder to eradicate than those leading vices which are in opposition to virtues; for vices may be removed, though the diseases of the mind should continue, which diseases are not cured with that expedition with which vices are removed. i have now acquainted you with the arguments which the stoics put forth with such exactness; which they call logic, from their close arguing: and since my discourse has got clear of these rocks, i will proceed with the remainder of it, provided i have been sufficiently clear in what i have already said, considering the obscurity of the subject i have treated. _a._ clear enough; but should there be occasion for a more exact inquiry, i shall take another opportunity of asking you. i expect you now to hoist your sails, as you just now called them, and proceed on your course. xv. _m._ since i have spoken before of virtue in other places, and shall often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions that relate to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue); and since, as i say, virtue consists in a settled and uniform affection of mind, making those persons praiseworthy who are possessed of her, she herself also, independent of anything else, without regard to any advantage, must be praiseworthy; for from her proceed good inclinations, opinions, actions, and the whole of right reason; though virtue may be defined in a few words to be right reason itself. the opposite to this is viciousness (for so i choose to translate what the greeks call [greek: kakia], rather than by perverseness; for perverseness is the name of a particular vice; but viciousness includes all), from whence arise those perturbations which, as i just now said, are turbid and violent motions of the mind, repugnant to reason, and enemies in a high degree to the peace of the mind and a tranquil life, for they introduce piercing and anxious cares, and afflict and debilitate the mind through fear; they violently inflame our hearts with exaggerated appetite, which is in reality an impotence of mind, utterly irreconcilable with temperance and moderation, which we sometimes call desire, and sometimes lust, and which, should it even attain the object of its wishes, immediately becomes so elated that it loses all its resolution, and knows not what to pursue; so that he was in the right who said "that exaggerated pleasure was the very greatest of mistakes." virtue, then, alone can effect the cure of these evils. xvi. for what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid, than a man afflicted, weakened, and oppressed with grief? and little short of this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who, through faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. the poets, to express the greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to hang over the head of tantalus, as a punishment for his wickedness, his pride, and his boasting. and this is the common punishment of folly; for there hangs over the head of every one whose mind revolts from reason some similar fear. and as these perturbations of the mind, grief and fear, are of a most wasting nature, so those two others, though of a more merry cast (i mean lust, which is always coveting something with eagerness, and empty mirth, which is an exulting joy), differ very little from madness. hence you may understand what sort of person he is whom we call at one time moderate, at another modest or temperate, at another constant and virtuous; while sometimes we include all these names in the word frugality, as the crown of all; for if that word did not include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say that a frugal man does everything rightly. but when the stoics apply this saying to their wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and to speak of him with too much admiration. xvii. whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in his mind, and in calm possession of himself, so as neither to pine with care, nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire, coveting something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth--such a man is that identical wise man whom we are inquiring for: he is the happy man, to whom nothing in this life seems intolerable enough to depress him; nothing exquisite enough to transport him unduly. for what is there in this life that can appear great to him who has acquainted himself with eternity and the utmost extent of the universe? for what is there in human knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can appear great to a wise man? whose mind is always so upon its guard that nothing can befall him which is unforeseen, nothing which is unexpected, nothing, in short, which is new. such a man takes so exact a survey on all sides of him, that he always knows the proper place and spot to live in free from all the troubles and annoyances of life, and encounters every accident that fortune can bring upon him with a becoming calmness. whoever conducts himself in this manner will be free from grief, and from every other perturbation; and a mind free from these feelings renders men completely happy; whereas a mind disordered and drawn off from right and unerring reason loses at once, not only its resolution, but its health.--therefore the thoughts and declarations of the peripatetics are soft and effeminate, for they say that the mind must necessarily be agitated, but at the same time they lay down certain bounds beyond which that agitation is not to proceed. and do you set bounds to vice? or is it no vice to disobey reason? does not reason sufficiently declare that there is no real good which you should desire too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow to transport you? and that there is no evil that should be able to overwhelm you, or the suspicion of which should distract you? and that all these things assume too melancholy or too cheerful an appearance through our own error? but if fools find this error lessened by time, so that, though the cause remains the same, they are not affected, in the same manner, after some time, as they were at first, why, surely a wise man ought not to be influenced at all by it. but what are those degrees by which we are to limit it? let us fix these degrees in grief, a difficult subject, and one much canvassed.--fannius writes that p. rutilius took it much to heart that his brother was refused the consulship; but he seems to have been too much affected by this disappointment, for it was the occasion of his death: he ought, therefore, to have borne it with more moderation. but let us suppose that while he was bearing this with moderation, the death of his children had intervened; here would have started a fresh grief, which, admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet still must have been a great addition to the other. now, to these let us add some acute pains of body, the loss of his fortune, blindness, banishment. supposing, then, each separate misfortune to occasion a separate additional grief, the whole would be too great to be supportable. xviii. the man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who should throw himself headlong from leucate, persuaded that he could stop himself whenever he pleased. now, as that is impossible, so a perturbed and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it pleases. certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth. now grief and all other perturbations are doubtless baneful in their progress, and have, therefore, no small share of evil at the beginning; for they go on of themselves when once they depart from reason, for every weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and does not know where to stop. so that it makes no difference whether you approve of moderate perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice, moderate cowardice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes bounds to vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself, becomes the more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once set forward, glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped. xix. why should i say more? why should i add that the peripatetics say that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated, are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good purpose? they usually talk in this manner. in the first place, they say much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and they say that angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or against a bad citizen: that those reasons are of little weight which are the motives of men who think thus, as--it is a just war; it becomes us to fight for our laws, our liberties, our country: they will allow no force to these arguments unless our courage is warmed by anger.--nor do they confine their argument to warriors; but their opinion is that no one can issue any rigid commands without some bitterness and anger. in short, they have no notion of an orator either accusing or even defending a client without he is spurred on by anger. and though this anger should not be real, still they think his words and gestures ought to wear the appearance of it, so that the action of the orator may excite the anger of his hearer. and they deny that any man has ever been seen who does not know what it is to be angry; and they name what we call lenity by the bad appellation of indolence. nor do they commend only this lust (for anger is, as i defined it above, the lust of revenge), but they maintain that kind of lust or desire to be given us by nature for very good purposes, saying that no one can execute anything well but what he is in earnest about. themistocles used to walk in the public places in the night because he could not sleep; and when asked the reason, his answer was, that miltiades's trophies kept him awake. who has not heard how demosthenes used to watch, who said that it gave him pain if any mechanic was up in a morning at his work before him? lastly, they urge that some of the greatest philosophers would never have made that progress in their studies without some ardent desire spurring them on.--we are informed that pythagoras, democritus, and plato visited the remotest parts of the world; for they thought that they ought to go wherever anything was to be learned. now, it is not conceivable that these things could be effected by anything but by the greatest ardor of mind. xx. they say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not without some good purpose, in order that men should lament when they had committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to correction, rebuke, and ignominy; for they think that those who can bear ignominy and infamy without pain have acquired a complete impunity for all sorts of crimes; for with them reproach is a stronger check than conscience. from whence we have that scene in afranius borrowed from common life; for when the abandoned son saith, "wretched that i am!" the severe father replies, let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. and they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity incites us to hasten to the assistance of others, and to alleviate the calamities of men who have undeservedly fallen into them; that even envy and detraction are not without their use, as when a man sees that another person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be equally successful with himself; that he who should take away fear would take away all industry in life, which those men exert in the greatest degree who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who dread poverty, ignominy, death, and pain. but while they argue thus, they allow indeed of these feelings being retrenched, though they deny that they either can or should be plucked up by the roots; so that their opinion is that mediocrity is best in everything. when they reason in this manner, what think you--is what they say worth attending to or not? _a._ i think it is. i wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in reply to them. xxi. _m._ perhaps i may find something to say; but i will make this observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the academics behave themselves? for they speak plainly to the purpose. the peripatetics are answered by the stoics; they have my leave to fight it out, who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what may seem to be most probable. our present business is, then, to see if we can meet with anything in this question which is the probable, for beyond such approximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed. the definition of a perturbation, as zeno, i think, has rightly determined it, is thus: that a perturbation is a commotion of the mind against nature, in opposition to right reason; or, more briefly, thus, that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he says somewhat too vehement, he means such as is at a greater distance from the constant course of nature. what can i say to these definitions? the greater part of them we have from those who dispute with sagacity and acuteness: some of them expressions, indeed, such as the "ardors of the mind," and "the whetstones of virtue," savoring of the pomp of rhetoricians. as to the question, if a brave man can maintain his courage without becoming angry, it may be questioned with regard to the gladiators; though we often observe much resolution even in them: they meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they agree about terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. but let us admit a man of the name of placideianus, who was one of that trade, to be in such a mind, as lucilius relates of him, if for his blood you thirst, the task be mine; his laurels at my feet he shall resign; not but i know, before i reach his heart, first on myself a wound he will impart. i hate the man; enraged i fight, and straight in action we had been, but that i wait till each his sword had fitted to his hand. my rage i scarce can keep within command. xxii. but we see ajax in homer advancing to meet hector in battle cheerfully, without any of this boisterous wrath. for he had no sooner taken up his arms than the first step which he made inspired his associates with joy, his enemies with fear; so that even hector, as he is represented by homer,[49] trembling, condemned himself for having challenged him to fight. yet these heroes conversed together, calmly and quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or outrageous behavior during the combat. nor do i imagine that torquatus, the first who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plundered the gaul of his collar; or that marcellus's courage at clastidium was only owing to his anger. i could almost swear that africanus, with whom we are better acquainted, from our recollection of him being more recent, was noways inflamed by anger when he covered alienus pelignus with his shield, and drove his sword into the enemy's breast. there may be some doubt of l. brutus, whether he was not influenced by extraordinary hatred of the tyrant, so as to attack aruns with more than usual rashness; for i observe that they mutually killed each other in close fight. why, then, do you call in the assistance of anger? would courage, unless it began to get furious, lose its energy? what! do you imagine that hercules, whom the very courage which you would try to represent as anger raised to heaven, was angry when he engaged the erymanthian boar, or the nemæan lion? or was theseus in a passion when he seized on the horns of the marathonian bull? take care how you make courage to depend in the least on rage. for anger is altogether irrational, and that is not courage which is void of reason. xxiii. we ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be looked on with indifference; pains and labors must be considered as easily supportable. and when these sentiments are established on judgment and conviction, then will that stout and firm courage take place; unless you attribute to anger whatever is done with vehemence, alacrity, and spirit. to me, indeed, that very scipio[50] who was chief priest, that favorer of the saying of the stoics, "that no private man could be a wise man," does not seem to be angry with tiberius gracchus, even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though a private man himself, commanded, with the authority of a consul, that all who meant well to the republic should follow him. i do not know whether i have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of courage; but if i have, i certainly did not do it in wrath. doth anything come nearer madness than anger? and indeed ennius has well defined it as the beginning of madness. the changing color, the alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how little do all these things indicate a sound mind! what can make a worse appearance than homer's achilles, or agamemnon, during the quarrel? and as to ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the occasion of his death. courage, therefore, does not want the assistance of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself. we may as well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to courage, because those who are mad or drunk often do a great many things with unusual vehemence. ajax was always brave; but still he was most brave when he was in that state of frenzy: the greatest feat that ajax e'er achieved was, when his single arm the greeks relieved. quitting the field; urged on by rising rage, forced the declining troops again t'engage. shall we say, then, that madness has its use? xxiv. examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not require the assistance of passion. courage is, then, an affection of mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance, or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or despise them; or, in fewer words, according to chrysippus (for the above definitions are sphærus's, a man of the first ability as a layer-down of definitions, as the stoics think. but they are all pretty much alike: they give us only common notions, some one way, and some another). but what is chrysippus's definition? fortitude, says he, is the knowledge of all things that are bearable, or an affection of the mind which bears and supports everything in obedience to the chief law of reason without fear. now, though we should attack these men in the same manner as carneades used to do, i fear they are the only real philosophers; for which of these definitions is there which does not explain that obscure and intricate notion of courage which every man conceives within himself? and when it is thus explained, what can a warrior, a commander, or an orator want more? and no one can think that they will be unable to behave themselves courageously without anger. what! do not even the stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make the same inferences? for, take away perturbations, especially a hastiness of temper, and they will appear to talk very absurdly. but what they assert is this: they say that all fools are mad, as all dunghills stink; not that they always do so, but stir them, and you will perceive it. and in like manner, a warm-tempered man is not always in a passion; but provoke him, and you will see him run mad. now, that very warlike anger, which is of such service in war, what is the use of it to him when he is at home with his wife, children, and family? is there, then, anything that a disturbed mind can do better than one which is calm and steady? or can any one be angry without a perturbation of mind? our people, then, were in the right, who, as all vices depend on our manners, and nothing is worse than a passionate disposition, called angry men the only morose men.[51] xxv. anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss to affect it. do you imagine that i am angry when in pleading i use any extraordinary vehemence and sharpness? what! when i write out my speeches after all is over and past, am i then angry while writing? or do you think æsopus was ever angry when he acted, or accius was so when he wrote? those men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better than the player, provided he be really an orator; but, then, they carry it on without passion, and with a composed mind. but what wantonness is it to commend lust! you produce themistocles and demosthenes; to these you add pythagoras, democritus, and plato. what! do you then call studies lust? but these studies of the most excellent and admirable things, such as those were which you bring forward on all occasions, ought to be composed and tranquil; and what kind of philosophers are they who commend grief, than which nothing is more detestable? afranius has said much to this purpose: let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. but he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. but we are inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. we may even allow a centurion or standard-bearer to be angry, or any others, whom, not to explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, i shall not mention here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come at, may have its use; but my inquiry, as i often repeat, is about a wise man. xxvi. but even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. why should you pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? is it because you cannot be liberal without pity? we should not take sorrows on ourselves upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of their grief if we can. but to detract from another's reputation, or to rival him with that vicious emulation which resembles an enmity, of what use can that conduct be? now, envy implies being uneasy at another's good because one does not enjoy it one's self; but detraction is the being uneasy at another's good, merely because he enjoys it. how can it be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take the trouble of acquiring what you want to have? for it is madness in the highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular happiness. but who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity of evils? can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful? do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which i could speak very copiously and diffusely, but i wish to be as concise as possible. and so i will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. hence it is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns as inferior to virtue. did you, then, say that it was your opinion that such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is exposed to winds? what is there that can discompose such gravity and constancy? anything sudden or unforeseen? how can anything of this kind befall one to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to man? now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and only what is natural remain, what, i pray you, can be natural which may be too exuberant? xxvii. all these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. but as i suspect that your inquiry is not so much respecting the wise man as concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the diseases of the mind. there is certainly some remedy; nor has nature been so unkind to the human race as to have discovered so many things salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. she has even been kinder to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must seek abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind has all that it requires within itself. but in proportion as the excellency of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more diligence does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well applied, discovers what is best, but when it is neglected, it becomes involved in many errors. i shall apply, then, all my discourse to you; for though you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry may possibly be about yourself. various, then, are the cures of those perturbations which i have expounded, for every disorder is not to be appeased the same way. one medicine must be applied to the man who mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies; for there is this difference to be maintained in all the four perturbations: we are to consider whether our discourse had better be directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason, or a somewhat too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust, and the rest, and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove that which has occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to eradicate every kind of grief. as, should any one grieve that he is poor, the question is, would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? certainly this last is the best course; for should you not convince him with regard to poverty, you must allow him to grieve; but if you remove grief by particular arguments, such as i used yesterday, the evil of poverty is in some manner removed. xxviii. but any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it were, wiped away by the method of appeasing the mind, if you succeed in showing that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and lust, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. but certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or necessary in them. as we see, grief itself is easily softened when we charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when we commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable; and, indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as real evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. one imagines pleasure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be called off from intemperance, the other from covetousness. the other method and address, which, at the same time that it removes the false opinion, withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom succeeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some diseases which that medicine can by no means remove. for, should any one be uneasy because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute of a sense of duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil; and yet we must apply another method of cure to him, and such a one as all the philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree in. for they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the mind in opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting those things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be goods which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is vicious; for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who is resolute, sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life; but one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as things with which their minds are unequal to contend. xxix. wherefore, as i before said, the philosophers have all one method of cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is which disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the perturbation itself. thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when the business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether that thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is to be removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or in the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too vehement an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. but human nature, when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for appeasing the mind, and, to make this the more distinct, the laws and conditions of life should be explained in our discourse. therefore, it was not without reason that socrates is reported, when euripides was exhibiting his play called orestes, to have repeated the first three verses of that tragedy- what tragic story men can mournful tell, whate'er from fate or from the gods befell, that human nature can support--[52] but, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened that they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before them an enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities. indeed, the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of yesterday, and in my book on consolation, which i wrote in the midst of my own grief; for i was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to grief, and i used this, notwithstanding chrysippus's advice to the contrary, who is against applying a medicine to the agitations of the mind while they are fresh; but i did it, and committed a violence on nature, that the greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness of the medicine. xxx. but fear borders upon grief, of which i have already said enough; but i must say a little more on that. now, as grief proceeds from what is present, so does fear from future evil; so that some have said that fear is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger of trouble, which, as it were, introduces the ensuing evil. now, the reasons that make what is present supportable, make what is to come very contemptible; for, with regard to both, we should take care to do nothing low or grovelling, soft or effeminate, mean or abject. but, notwithstanding we should speak of the inconstancy, imbecility, and levity of fear itself, yet it is of very great service to speak contemptuously of those very things of which we are afraid. so that it fell out very well, whether it was by accident or design, that i disputed the first and second day on death and pain--the two things that are the most dreaded: now, if what i then said was approved of, we are in a great degree freed from fear. and this is sufficient, as far as regards the opinion of evils. xxxi. proceed we now to what are goods--that is to say, to joy and desire. to me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of all that relates to the perturbations of the mind--the fact, namely, that all perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up upon opinion, and are voluntary. this error, then, must be got rid of; this opinion must be removed; and, as with regard to imagined evils, we are to make them more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to lessen the violent effects of those things which are called great and joyous. but one thing is to be observed, that equally relates both to good and evil: that, should it be difficult to persuade any one that none of those things which disturb the mind are to be looked on as good or evil, yet a different cure is to be applied to different feelings; and the malevolent person is to be corrected by one way of reasoning, the lover by another, the anxious man by another, and the fearful by another: and it would be easy for any one who pursues the best approved method of reasoning, with regard to good and evil, to maintain that no fool can be affected with joy, as he never can have anything good. but, at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common received notions. let, then, honors, riches, pleasures, and the rest be the very good things which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and exulting joy on the possession of them is unbecoming; just as, though it might be allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. thus, a mind enlarged by joy is as blamable as a contraction of it by grief; and eager longing is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy is in possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be effeminate, so they who are too elated with joy are properly called volatile; and as feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased with another's misfortune is a kind of joy, both these feelings are usually corrected by showing the wildness and insensibility of them: and as it becomes a man to be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to be fearful, so to be pleased is proper, but to be joyful improper. i have, in order that i might be the better understood, distinguished pleasure from joy. i have already said above, that a contraction of the mind can never be right, but that an elation of it may; for the joy of hector in nævius is one thing- 'tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung by you, who are the theme of honor's tongue-but that of the character in trabea another: "the kind procuress, allured by my money, will observe my nod, will watch my desires, and study my will. if i but move the door with my little finger, instantly it flies open; and if chrysis should unexpectedly discover me, she will run with joy to meet me, and throw herself into my arms." now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this: not even fortune herself is so fortunate. xxxii. any one who attends the least to the subject will be convinced how unbecoming this joy is. and as they are very shameful who are immoderately delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleasures, so are they very scandalous who lust vehemently after them. and all that which is commonly called love (and, believe me, i can find out no other name to call it by) is of such a trivial nature that nothing, i think, is to be compared to it: of which cæcilius says, i hold the man of every sense bereaved who grants not love to be of gods the chief: whose mighty power whate'er is good effects, who gives to each his beauty and defects: hence, health and sickness; wit and folly, hence, the god that love and hatred doth dispense! an excellent corrector of life this same poetry, which thinks that love, the promoter of debauchery and vanity, should have a place in the council of the gods! i am speaking of comedy, which could not subsist at all without our approving of these debaucheries. but what said that chief of the argonauts in tragedy? my life i owe to honor less than love. what, then, are we to say of this love of medea?--what a train of miseries did it occasion! and yet the same woman has the assurance to say to her father, in another poet, that she had a husband dearer by love than ever fathers were. xxxiii. however, we may allow the poets to trifle, in whose fables we see jupiter himself engaged in these debaucheries: but let us apply to the masters of virtue--the philosophers who deny love to be anything carnal; and in this they differ from epicurus, who, i think, is not much mistaken. for what is that love of friendship? how comes it that no one is in love with a deformed young man, or a handsome old one? i am of opinion that this love of men had its rise from the gymnastics of the greeks, where these kinds of loves are admissible and permitted; therefore ennius spoke well: the censure of this crime to those is due who naked bodies first exposed to view. now, supposing them chaste, which i think is hardly possible, they are uneasy and distressed, and the more so because they contain and refrain themselves. but, to pass over the love of women, where nature has allowed more liberty, who can misunderstand the poets in their rape of ganymede, or not apprehend what laius says, and what he desires, in euripides? lastly, what have the principal poets and the most learned men published of themselves in their poems and songs? what doth alcæus, who was distinguished in his own republic for his bravery, write on the love of young men? and as for anacreon's poetry, it is wholly on love. but ibycus of rhegium appears, from his writings, to have had this love stronger on him than all the rest. xxxiv. now we see that the loves of all these writers were entirely libidinous. there have arisen also some among us philosophers (and plato is at the head of them, whom dicæarchus blames not without reason) who have countenanced love. the stoics, in truth, say, not only that their wise man may be a lover, but they even define love itself as an endeavor to originate friendship out of the appearance of beauty. now, provided there is any one in the nature of things without desire, without care, without a sigh, such a one may be a lover; for he is free from all lust: but i have nothing to say to him, as it is lust of which i am now speaking. but should there be any love--as there certainly is--which is but little, or perhaps not at all, short of madness, such as his is in the leucadia- should there be any god whose care i am-it is incumbent on all the gods to see that he enjoys his amorous pleasure. wretch that i am! nothing is more true, and he says very appropriately, what, are you sane, who at this rate lament? he seems even to his friends to be out of his senses: then how tragical he becomes! thy aid, divine apollo, i implore, and thine, dread ruler of the wat'ry store! oh! all ye winds, assist me! he thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to help his love: he excludes venus alone, as unkind to him. thy aid, o venus, why should i invoke? he thinks venus too much employed in her own lust to have regard to anything else, as if he himself had not said and committed these shameful things from lust. xxxv. now, the cure for one who is affected in this manner is to show how light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he desires; how he may turn his affections to another object, or accomplish his desires by some other means; or else to persuade him that he may entirely disregard it: sometimes he is to be led away to objects of another kind, to study, business, or other different engagements and concerns: very often the cure is effected by change of place, as sick people, that have not recovered their strength, are benefited by change of air. some people think an old love may be driven out by a new one, as one nail drives out another: but, above all things, the man thus afflicted should be advised what madness love is: for of all the perturbations of the mind, there is not one which is more vehement; for (without charging it with rapes, debaucheries, adultery, or even incest, the baseness of any of these being very blamable; not, i say, to mention these) the very perturbation of the mind in love is base of itself, for, to pass over all its acts of downright madness, what weakness do not those very things which are looked upon as indifferent argue? affronts and jealousies, jars, squabbles, wars, then peace again. the man who seeks to fix these restless feelings, and to subjugate them to some regular law, is just as wise as one who'd try to lay down rules by which men should go mad.[53] now, is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to deter any one by its own deformity? we are to demonstrate, as was said of every perturbation, that there are no such feelings which do not consist entirely of opinion and judgment, and are not owing to ourselves. for if love were natural, all would be in love, and always so, and all love the same object; nor would one be deterred by shame, another by reflection, another by satiety. xxxvi. anger, too, when it disturbs the mind any time, leaves no room to doubt its being madness: by the instigation of which we see such contention as this between brothers: where was there ever impudence like thine? who on thy malice ever could refine?[54] you know what follows: for abuses are thrown out by these brothers with great bitterness in every other verse; so that you may easily know them for the sons of atreus, of that atreus who invented a new punishment for his brother: i who his cruel heart to gall am bent, some new, unheard-of torment must invent. now, what were these inventions? hear thyestes: my impious brother fain would have me eat my children, and thus serves them up for meat. to what length now will not anger go? even as far as madness. therefore we say, properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that is, they are out of the power of advice, reason, and understanding; for these ought to have power over the whole mind. now, you should put those out of the way whom they endeavor to attack till they have recollected themselves; but what does recollection here imply but getting together again the dispersed parts of their mind into their proper place? or else you must beg and entreat them, if they have the means of revenge, to defer it to another opportunity, till their anger cools. but the expression of cooling implies, certainly, that there was a heat raised in their minds in opposition to reason; from which consideration that saying of archytas is commended, who being somewhat provoked at his steward, "how would i have treated you," said he, "if i had not been in a passion?" xxxvii. where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? can madness be of any use? but still it is natural. can anything be natural that is against reason? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one person is more inclined to anger than another? or that the lust of revenge should cease before it has revenged itself? or that any one should repent of what he had done in a passion? as we see that alexander the king did, who could scarcely keep his hands from himself, when he had killed his favorite clytus, so great was his compunction. now who that is acquainted with these instances can doubt that this motion of the mind is altogether in opinion and voluntary? for who can doubt that disorders of the mind, such as covetousness and a desire of glory, arise from a great estimation of those things by which the mind is disordered? from whence we may understand that every perturbation of the mind is founded in opinion. and if boldness--that is to say, a firm assurance of mind--is a kind of knowledge and serious opinion not hastily taken up, then diffidence is a fear of an expected and impending evil; and if hope is an expectation of good, fear must, of course, be an expectation of evil. thus fear and other perturbations are evils. therefore, as constancy proceeds from knowledge, so does perturbation from error. now, they who are said to be naturally inclined to anger, or to pity, or to envy, or to any feeling of this kind, their minds are constitutionally, as it were, in bad health; yet they are curable, as the disposition of socrates is said to have been; for when zopyrus, who professed to know the character of every one from his person, had heaped a great many vices on him in a public assembly, he was laughed at by others, who could perceive no such vices in socrates; but socrates kept him in countenance by declaring that such vices were natural to him, but that he had got the better of them by his reason. therefore, as any one who has the appearance of the best constitution may yet appear to be naturally rather inclined to some particular disorder, so different minds may be more particularly inclined to different diseases. but as to those men who are said to be vicious, not by nature, but their own fault, their vices proceed from wrong opinions of good and bad things, so that one is more prone than another to different motions and perturbations. but, just as it is in the case of the body, an inveterate disease is harder to be got rid of than a sudden disorder; and it is more easy to cure a fresh tumor in the eyes than to remove a defluxion of any continuance. xxxviii. but as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, for all of them arise from the judgment or opinion, or volition, i shall put an end to this discourse. but we ought to be assured, since the boundaries of good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by man, that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater or more useful than the discussions which we have held these four days. for besides instilling a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men to bear it, we have added the appeasing of grief, than which there is no greater evil to man. for though every perturbation of mind is grievous, and differs but little from madness, yet we are used to say of others when they are under any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or desire, that they are agitated and disturbed; but of those who give themselves up to grief, that they are miserable, afflicted, wretched, unhappy. so that it doth not seem to be by accident, but with reason proposed by you, that i should discuss grief, and the other perturbations separately; for there lies the spring and head of all our miseries; but the cure of grief, and of other disorders, is one and the same in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion; we take them on ourselves because it seems right so to do. philosophy undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of all our evils: let us therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by it, and suffer ourselves to be cured; for while these evils have possession of us, we not only cannot be happy, but cannot be right in our minds. we must either deny that reason can effect anything, while, on the other hand, nothing can be done right without reason, or else, since philosophy depends on the deductions of reason, we must seek from her, if we would be good or happy, every help and assistance for living well and happily. book v. whether virtue alone be sufficient for a happy life. i. this fifth day, brutus, shall put an end to our tusculan disputations: on which day we discussed your favorite subject. for i perceive from that book which you wrote for me with the greatest accuracy, as well as from your frequent conversation, that you are clearly of this opinion, that virtue is of itself sufficient for a happy life: and though it may be difficult to prove this, on account of the many various strokes of fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature that we should endeavor to facilitate the proof of it. for among all the topics of philosophy, there is not one of more dignity or importance. for as the first philosophers must have had some inducement to neglect everything for the search of the best state of life: surely, the inducement must have been the hope of living happily, which impelled them to devote so much care and pains to that study. now, if virtue was discovered and carried to perfection by them, and if virtue is a sufficient security for a happy life, who can avoid thinking the work of philosophizing excellently recommended by them, and undertaken by me? but if virtue, as being subject to such various and uncertain accidents, were but the slave of fortune, and were not of sufficient ability to support herself, i am afraid that it would seem desirable rather to offer up prayers, than to rely on our own confidence in virtue as the foundation for our hope of a happy life. and, indeed, when i reflect on those troubles with which i have been so severely exercised by fortune, i begin to distrust this opinion; and sometimes even to dread the weakness and frailty of human nature, for i am afraid lest, when nature had given us infirm bodies, and had joined to them incurable diseases and intolerable pains, she perhaps also gave us minds participating in these bodily pains, and harassed also with troubles and uneasinesses, peculiarly their own. but here i correct myself for forming my judgment of the power of virtue more from the weakness of others, or of myself perhaps, than from virtue itself: for she herself (provided there is such a thing as virtue; and your uncle brutus has removed all doubt of it) has everything that can befall mankind in subjection to her; and by disregarding such things, she is far removed from being at all concerned at human accidents; and, being free from every imperfection, she thinks that nothing which is external to herself can concern her. but we, who increase every approaching evil by our fear, and every present one by our grief, choose rather to condemn the nature of things than our own errors. ii. but the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and offences, is to be sought for in philosophy: and as my own inclination and desire led me, from my earliest youth upward, to seek her protection, so, under my present misfortunes, i have had recourse to the same port from whence i set out, after having been tossed by a violent tempest. o philosophy, thou guide of life! thou discoverer of virtue and expeller of vices! what had not only i myself, but the whole life of man, been without you? to you it is that we owe the origin of cities; you it was who called together the dispersed race of men into social life; you united them together, first, by placing them near one another, then by marriages, and lastly, by the communication of speech and languages. you have been the inventress of laws; you have been our instructress in morals and discipline; to you we fly for refuge; from you we implore assistance; and as i formerly submitted to you in a great degree, so now i surrender up myself entirely to you. for one day spent well, and agreeably to your precepts, is preferable to an eternity of error. whose assistance, then, can be of more service to me than yours, when you have bestowed on us tranquillity of life, and removed the fear of death? but philosophy is so far from being praised as much as she has deserved by mankind, that she is wholly neglected by most men, and actually evil spoken of by many. can any person speak ill of the parent of life, and dare to pollute himself thus with parricide, and be so impiously ungrateful as to accuse her whom he ought to reverence, even were he less able to appreciate the advantages which he might derive from her? but this error, i imagine, and this darkness has spread itself over the minds of ignorant men, from their not being able to look so far back, and from their not imagining that those men by whom human life was first improved were philosophers; for though we see philosophy to have been of long standing, yet the name must be acknowledged to be but modern. iii. but, indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either in fact or name? for it acquired this excellent name from the ancients, by the knowledge of the origin and causes of everything, both divine and human. thus those seven [greek: sophoi], as they were considered and called by the greeks, have always been esteemed and called wise men by us; and thus lycurgus many ages before, in whose time, before the building of this city, homer is said to have lived, as well as ulysses and nestor in the heroic ages, are all handed down to us by tradition as having really been what they were called, wise men; nor would it have been said that atlas supported the heavens, or that prometheus was bound to caucasus, nor would cepheus, with his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter have been enrolled among the constellations, but that their more than human knowledge of the heavenly bodies had transferred their names into an erroneous fable. from whence all who occupied themselves in the contemplation of nature were both considered and called wise men; and that name of theirs continued to the age of pythagoras, who is reported to have gone to phlius, as we find it stated by heraclides ponticus, a very learned man, and a pupil of plato, and to have discoursed very learnedly and copiously on certain subjects with leon, prince of the phliasii; and when leon, admiring his ingenuity and eloquence, asked him what art he particularly professed, his answer was, that he was acquainted with no art, but that he was a philosopher. leon, surprised at the novelty of the name, inquired what he meant by the name of philosopher, and in what philosophers differed from other men; on which pythagoras replied, "that the life of man seemed to him to resemble those games which were celebrated with the greatest possible variety of sports and the general concourse of all greece. for as in those games there were some persons whose object was glory and the honor of a crown, to be attained by the performance of bodily exercises, so others were led thither by the gain of buying and selling, and mere views of profit; but there was likewise one class of persons, and they were by far the best, whose aim was neither applause nor profit, but who came merely as spectators through curiosity, to observe what was done, and to see in what manner things were carried on there. and thus, said he, we come from another life and nature unto this one, just as men come out of some other city, to some much frequented mart; some being slaves to glory, others to money; and there are some few who, taking no account of anything else, earnestly look into the nature of things; and these men call themselves studious of wisdom, that is, philosophers: and as there it is the most reputable occupation of all to be a looker-on without making any acquisition, so in life, the contemplating things, and acquainting one's self with them, greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life." iv. nor was pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged also the thing itself, and, when he came into italy after this conversation at phlius, he adorned that greece, which is called great greece, both privately and publicly, with the most excellent institutions and arts; but of his school and system i shall, perhaps, find another opportunity to speak. but numbers and motions, and the beginning and end of all things, were the subjects of the ancient philosophy down to socrates, who was a pupil of archelaus, who had been the disciple of anaxagoras. these made diligent inquiry into the magnitude of the stars, their distances, courses, and all that relates to the heavens. but socrates was the first who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. and his different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by the memory and writings of plato, gave rise to many sects of philosophers of different sentiments, of all which i have principally adhered to that one which, in my opinion, socrates himself followed; and argue so as to conceal my own opinion, while i deliver others from their errors, and so discover what has the greatest appearance of probability in every question. and the custom carneades adopted with great copiousness and acuteness, and i myself have often given in to it on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too, i disputed lately, in my tusculan villa; indeed, i have sent you a book of the four former days' discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated ourselves as before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus: v. _a._ i do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy life. _m._ but my friend brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, i greatly prefer to yours. _a._ i make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business now: the question is now, what is the real character of that quality of which i have declared my opinion. i wish you to dispute on that. _m._ what! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy life? _a._ it is what i entirely deny. _m._ what! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought, honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well? _a._ certainly sufficient. _m._ can you, then, help calling any one miserable who lives ill? or will you deny that any one who you allow lives well must inevitably live happily? _a._ why may i not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest, praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well. provided you understand what i mean by well; for when i say well, i mean with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man may display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is inconsistent with a happy life. _m._ what, then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison, while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without reluctance? _a._ you must look out for something new if you would do any good. these things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being common, but principally because, like certain light wines that will not bear water, these arguments of the stoics are pleasanter to taste than to swallow. as when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes that happiness seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her. but when you take your attention off from this picture and these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in torment? wherefore let us now examine that point, and not be under any apprehensions, lest the virtues should expostulate, and complain that they are forsaken by happiness. for if prudence is connected with every virtue, then prudence itself discovers this, that all good men are not therefore happy; and she recollects many things of marcus atilius[55], quintus cæpio[56], marcus aquilius[57]; and prudence herself, if these representations are more agreeable to you than the things themselves, restrains happiness when it is endeavoring to throw itself into torments, and denies that it has any connection with pain and torture. vi. _m._ i can easily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it is not fair in you to prescribe to me how you would have me carry on this discussion. but i ask you if i have effected anything or nothing in the preceding days? _a._ yes; something was done, some little matter indeed. _m._ but if that is the case, this question is settled, and almost put an end to. _a._ how so? _m._ because turbulent motions and violent agitations of the mind, when it is raised and elated by a rash impulse, getting the better of reason, leave no room for a happy life. for who that fears either pain or death, the one of which is always present, the other always impending, can be otherwise than miserable? now, supposing the same person--which is often the case--to be afraid of poverty, ignominy, infamy, or weakness, or blindness, or, lastly, slavery, which doth not only befall individual men, but often even the most powerful nations; now can any one under the apprehension of these evils be happy? what shall we say of him who not only dreads these evils as impending, but actually feels and bears them at present? let us unite in the same person banishment, mourning, the loss of children; now, how can any one who is broken down and rendered sick in body and mind by such affliction be otherwise than very miserable indeed? what reason, again, can there be why a man should not rightly enough be called miserable whom we see inflamed and raging with lust, coveting everything with an insatiable desire, and, in proportion as he derives more pleasure from anything, thirsting the more violently after them? and as to a man vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy, and boasting of himself without reason, is not he so much the more miserable in proportion as he thinks himself happier? therefore, as these men are miserable, so, on the other hand, those are happy who are alarmed by no fears, wasted by no griefs, provoked by no lusts, melted by no languid pleasures that arise from vain and exulting joys. we look on the sea as calm when not the least breath of air disturbs its waves; and, in like manner, the placid and quiet state of the mind is discovered when unmoved by any perturbation. now, if there be any one who holds the power of fortune, and everything human, everything that can possibly befall any man, as supportable, so as to be out of the reach of fear or anxiety, and if such a man covets nothing, and is lifted up by no vain joy of mind, what can prevent his being happy? and if these are the effects of virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men happy? vii. _a._ but the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that they who are under no apprehensions, who are noways uneasy, who covet nothing, who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore i grant you that. but as for the other, that is not now in a fit state for discussion; for it has been proved by your former arguments that a wise man is free from every perturbation of mind. _m._ doubtless, then, the dispute is over; for the question appears to have been entirely exhausted. _a._ i think, indeed, that that is almost the case. _m._ but yet that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than philosophers. for when the geometricians teach anything, if what they have before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for granted which has been already proved, and explain only what they had not written on before. but the philosophers, whatever subject they have in hand, get together everything that relates to it, notwithstanding they may have dilated on it somewhere else. were not that the case, why should the stoics say so much on that question, whether virtue was abundantly sufficient to a happy life? when it would have been answer enough that they had before taught that nothing was good but what was honorable; for, as this had been proved, the consequence must be that virtue was sufficient to a happy life; and each premise may be made to follow from the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that virtue is sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred that nothing is good except what is honorable. they, however, do not proceed in this manner; for they would separate books about what is honorable, and what is the chief good; and when they have demonstrated from the one that virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they treat this point separately; for everything, and especially a subject of such great consequence, should be supported by arguments and exhortations which belong to that alone. for you should have a care how you imagine philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she has promised anything more fruitful or of greater consequence, for, good gods! doth she not engage that she will render him who submits to her laws so accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to have every assurance within himself of living well and happily--that he shall, in short, be forever happy? but let us see what she will perform? in the mean while, i look upon it as a great thing that she has even made such a promise. for xerxes, who was loaded with all the rewards and gifts of fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse and foot, nor the multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of gold, offered a reward to any one who could find out a new pleasure; and yet, when it was discovered, he was not satisfied with it; nor can there ever be an end to lust. i wish we could engage any one by a reward to produce something the better to establish us in this belief. viii. _a._ i wish that, indeed, myself; but i want a little information. for i allow that in what you have stated the one proposition is the consequence of the other; that as, if what is honorable be the only good, it must follow that a happy life is the effect of virtue: so that if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing can be good but virtue. but your friend brutus, on the authority of aristo and antiochus, does not see this; for he thinks the case would be the same even if there were anything good besides virtue. _m._ what, then? do you imagine that i am going to argue against brutus? _a._ you may do what you please; for it is not for me to prescribe what you shall do. _m._ how these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else; for i frequently discussed that point with antiochus, and lately with aristo, when, during the period of my command as general, i was lodging with him at athens. for to me it seemed that no one could possibly be happy under any evil; but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if there are any things arising from body or fortune deserving the name of evils. these things were said, which antiochus has inserted in his books in many places--that virtue itself was sufficient to make life happy, but yet not perfectly happy; and that many things derive their names from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which qualities are determined by their kind, not their number. thus a happy life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it should fall short in some point. to clear this up is not absolutely necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great consistency; for i cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him, he cannot be so much as happy; and as to what they say, that everything is named and estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some things. but when they allow three kinds of evils--when any one is oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and harassed with all sorts of pains--shall we say that such a one is but little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest possible life? ix. this is the point which theophrastus was unable to maintain; for after he had once laid down the position that stripes, torments, tortures, the ruin of one's country, banishment, the loss of children, had great influence on men's living miserably and unhappily, he durst not any longer use any high and lofty expressions when he was so low and abject in his opinion. how right he was is not the question; he certainly was consistent. therefore, i am not for objecting to consequences where the premises are admitted. but this most elegant and learned of all the philosophers is not taken to task very severely when he asserts his three kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many arguments why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. for in that book he is supposed to say that a man who is placed on the wheel (that is a kind of torture in use among the greeks) cannot attain to a completely happy life. he nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely; but what he says amounts to the same thing. can i, then, find fault with him, after having allowed that pains of the body are evils, that the ruin of a man's fortunes is an evil, if he should say that every good man is not happy, when all those things which he reckons as evils may befall a good man? the same theophrastus is found fault with by all the books and schools of the philosophers for commending that sentence in his callisthenes, fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man. they say never did philosopher assert anything so languid. they are right, indeed, in that; but i do not apprehend anything could be more consistent, for if there are so many good things that depend on the body, and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is it inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both what is foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than counsel. or would we rather imitate epicurus? who is often excellent in many things which he speaks, but quite indifferent how consistent he may be, or how much to the purpose he is speaking. he commends spare diet, and in that he speaks as a philosopher; but it is for socrates or antisthenes to say so, and not for one who confines all good to pleasure. he denies that any one can live pleasantly unless he lives honestly, wisely, and justly. nothing is more dignified than this assertion, nothing more becoming a philosopher, had he not measured this very expression of living honestly, justly, and wisely by pleasure. what could be better than to assert that fortune interferes but little with a wise man? but does he talk thus, who, after he has said that pain is the greatest evil, or the only evil, might himself be afflicted with the sharpest pains all over his body, even at the time he is vaunting himself the most against fortune? and this very thing, too, metrodorus has said, but in better language: "i have anticipated you, fortune; i have caught you, and cut off every access, so that you cannot possibly reach me." this would be excellent in the mouth of aristo the chian, or zeno the stoic, who held nothing to be an evil but what was base; but for you, metrodorus, to anticipate the approaches of fortune, who confine all that is good to your bowels and marrow--for you to say so, who define the chief good by a strong constitution of body, and well-assured hope of its continuance--for you to cut off every access of fortune! why, you may instantly be deprived of that good. yet the simple are taken with these propositions, and a vast crowd is led away by such sentences to become their followers. x. but it is the duty of one who would argue accurately to consider not what is said, but what is said consistently. as in that very opinion which we have adopted in this discussion, namely, that every good man is always happy, it is clear what i mean by good men: i call those both wise and good men who are provided and adorned with every virtue. let us see, then, who are to be called happy. i imagine, indeed, that those men are to be called so who are possessed of good without any alloy of evil; nor is there any other notion connected with the word that expresses happiness but an absolute enjoyment of good without any evil. virtue cannot attain this, if there is anything good besides itself. for a crowd of evils would present themselves, if we were to allow poverty, obscurity, humility, solitude, the loss of friends, acute pains of the body, the loss of health, weakness, blindness, the ruin of one's country, banishment, slavery, to be evils; for a wise man may be afflicted by all these evils, numerous and important as they are, and many others also may be added, for they are brought on by chance, which may attack a wise man; but if these things are evils, who can maintain that a wise man is always happy when all these evils may light on him at the same time? i therefore do not easily agree with my friend brutus, nor with our common masters, nor those ancient ones, aristotle, speusippus, xenocrates, polemon, who reckon all that i have mentioned above as evils, and yet they say that a wise man is always happy; nor can i allow them, because they are charmed with this beautiful and illustrious title, which would very well become pythagoras, socrates, and plato, to persuade my mind that strength, health, beauty, riches, honors, power, with the beauty of which they are ravished, are contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of these are not to be regarded. then might they declare openly, with a loud voice, that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the multitude, nor pain, nor poverty, occasions them any apprehensions; and that they have everything within themselves, and that there is nothing whatever which they consider as good but what is within their own power. nor can i by any means allow the same person who falls into the vulgar opinion of good and evil to make use of these expressions, which can only become a great and exalted man. struck with which glory, up starts epicurus, who, with submission to the gods, thinks a wise man always happy. he is much charmed with the dignity of this opinion, but he never would have owned that, had he attended to himself; for what is there more inconsistent than for one who could say that pain was the greatest or the only evil to think also that a wise man can possibly say in the midst of his torture, how sweet is this! we are not, therefore, to form our judgment of philosophers from detached sentences, but from their consistency with themselves, and their ordinary manner of talking. xi. _a._ you compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you are not inconsistent yourself. _m._ in what respect? _a._ because i have lately read your fourth book on good and evil: and in that you appeared to me, while disputing against cato, to be endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that zeno and the peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow that, what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of zeno that virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that the peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? for, in my opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words. _m._ what! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me what i had said or written elsewhere. you may act in that manner with those who dispute by established rules. we live from hand to mouth, and say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the only people who are really at liberty. but, since i just now spoke of consistency, i do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the opinion of zeno and his pupil aristo be true that nothing is good but what is honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life can be rested on virtue alone. wherefore, if we certainly grant brutus this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he is, is his own business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself of the glory of that opinion? still, we may maintain that such a man is more happy than any one else. xii. though zeno the cittiæan, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner of words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy; still, the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of plato, who often makes use of this expression, "that nothing but virtue can be entitled to the name of good," agreeably to what socrates says in plato's gorgias; for it is there related that when some one asked him if he did not think archelaus the son of perdiccas, who was then looked upon as a most fortunate person, a very happy man, "i do not know," replied he, "for i never conversed with him." "what! is there no other way you can know it by?" "none at all." "you cannot, then, pronounce of the great king of the persians whether he is happy or not?" "how can i, when i do not know how learned or how good a man he is?" "what! do you imagine that a happy life depends on that?" "my opinion entirely is, that good men are happy, and the wicked miserable." "is archelaus, then, miserable?" "certainly, if unjust." now, does it not appear to you that he is here placing the whole of a happy life in virtue alone? but what does the same man say in his funeral oration? "for," saith he, "whoever has everything that relates to a happy life so entirely dependent on himself as not to be connected with the good or bad fortune of another, and not to be affected by, or made in any degree uncertain by, what befalls another; and whoever is such a one has acquired the best rule of living; he is that moderate, that brave, that wise man, who submits to the gain and loss of everything, and especially of his children, and obeys that old precept; for he will never be too joyful or too sad, because he depends entirely upon himself." xiii. from plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if from some sacred and hallowed fountain. whence can i, then, more properly begin than from nature, the parent of all? for whatsoever she produces (i am not speaking only of animals, but even of those things which have sprung from the earth in such a manner as to rest on their own roots) she designed it to be perfect in its respective kind. so that among trees and vines, and those lower plants and trees which cannot advance themselves high above the earth, some are evergreen, others are stripped of their leaves in winter, and, warmed by the spring season, put them out afresh, and there are none of them but what are so quickened by a certain interior motion, and their own seeds enclosed in every one, so as to yield flowers, fruit, or berries, that all may have every perfection that belongs to it; provided no violence prevents it. but the force of nature itself may be more easily discovered in animals, as she has bestowed sense on them. for some animals she has taught to swim, and designed to be inhabitants of the water; others she has enabled to fly, and has willed that they should enjoy the boundless air; some others she has made to creep, others to walk. again, of these very animals, some are solitary, some gregarious, some wild, others tame, some hidden and buried beneath the earth, and every one of these maintains the law of nature, confining itself to what was bestowed on it, and unable to change its manner of life. and as every animal has from nature something that distinguishes it, which every one maintains and never quits; so man has something far more excellent, though everything is said to be excellent by comparison. but the human mind, being derived from the divine reason, can be compared with nothing but with the deity itself, if i may be allowed the expression. this, then, if it is improved, and when its perception is so preserved as not to be blinded by errors, becomes a perfect understanding, that is to say, absolute reason, which is the very same as virtue. and if everything is happy which wants nothing, and is complete and perfect in its kind, and that is the peculiar lot of virtue, certainly all who are possessed of virtue are happy. and in this i agree with brutus, and also with aristotle, xenocrates, speusippus, polemon. xiv. to me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what can he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good qualities, or how can he be happy who does not rely on them? but he who makes a threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for how can he depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall continue? but no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and permanent good. what, then, is this opinion of theirs? so that i think that saying of the spartan may be applied to them, who, on some merchant's boasting before him that he had despatched ships to every maritime coast, replied that a fortune which depended on ropes was not very desirable. can there be any doubt that whatever may be lost cannot be properly classed in the number of those things which complete a happy life? for of all that constitutes a happy life, nothing will admit of withering, or growing old, or wearing out, or decaying; for whoever is apprehensive of any loss of these things cannot be happy: the happy man should be safe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the reach of all annoyance, not like a man under trifling apprehensions, but free from all such. as he is not called innocent who but slightly offends, but he who offends not at all, so it is he alone who is to be considered without fear who is free from all fear, not he who is but in little fear. for what else is courage but an affection of mind that is ready to undergo perils, and patient in the endurance of pain and labor without any alloy of fear? now, this certainly could not be the case if there were anything else good but what depended on honesty alone. but how can any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted security (for i now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of evils attending him? how can he be brave and undaunted, and hold everything as trifles which can befall a man? for so a wise man should do, unless he be one who thinks that everything depends on himself. could the lacedæmonians without this, when philip threatened to prevent all their attempts, have asked him if he could prevent their killing themselves? is it not easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as we are inquiring after, than to meet with a whole city of such men? now, if to this courage i am speaking of we add temperance, that it may govern all our feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete his happiness who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear, and is prevented from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of joy by temperance? i could easily show that virtue is able to produce these effects, but that i have explained on the foregoing days. xv. but as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you hesitate to pronounce such a one a happy man? now, the wise man is always in such a disposition; therefore the wise man is always happy. besides, every good is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted and talked of; whatever may be boasted of is glorious; but whatever is glorious is certainly laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless, also, honorable: whatever, then, is good is honorable (but the things which they reckon as goods they themselves do not call honorable); therefore what is honorable alone is good. hence it follows that a happy life is comprised in honesty alone. such things, then, are not to be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of them, and yet be most miserable. is there any doubt but that a man who enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his senses flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection--suppose him likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches, honors, authority, power, glory--now, i say, should this person, who is in possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or an idiot--could you hesitate to call such a one miserable? what, then, are those goods in the possession of which you may be very miserable? let us see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature, as a heap implies a quantity of grain of the same kind. and if this be once admitted, happiness must be compounded of different good things, which alone are honorable; if there is any mixture of things of another sort with these, nothing honorable can proceed from such a composition: now, take away honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? for whatever is good is desirable on that account; whatever is desirable must certainly be approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked on as acceptable and welcome. you must consequently impute dignity to this; and if so, it must necessarily be laudable: therefore, everything that is laudable is good. hence it follows that what is honorable is the only good. and should we not look upon it in this light, there will be a great many things which we must call good. xvi. i forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so unworthy, may have them, i do not reckon among goods; for what is good is not attainable by all. i pass over notoriety and popular fame, raised by the united voice of knaves and fools. even things which are absolute nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome eyes, a good complexion, and what was commended by euryclea, when she was washing ulysses's feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness of his discourse. if you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums can the gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion of the vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? the stoics give the name of excellent and choice to what the others call good: they call them so, indeed; but they do not allow them to complete a happy life. but these others think that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it to be happy, they deny it to be the most happy. but our opinion is, that it is the most happy; and we prove it from that conclusion of socrates. for thus that author of philosophy argued: that as the disposition of a man's mind is, so is the man; such as the man is, such will be his discourse; his actions will correspond with his discourse, and his life with his actions. but the disposition of a good man's mind is laudable; the life, therefore, of a good man is laudable; it is honorable, therefore, because laudable; the unavoidable conclusion from which is that the life of good men is happy. for, good gods! did i not make it appear, by my former arguments--or was i only amusing myself and killing time in what i then said?--that the mind of a wise man was always free from every hasty motion which i call a perturbation, and that the most undisturbed peace always reigned in his breast? a man, then, who is temperate and consistent, free from fear or grief, and uninfluenced by any immoderate joy or desire, cannot be otherwise than happy; but a wise man is always so, therefore he is always happy. moreover, how can a good man avoid referring all his actions and all his feelings to the one standard of whether or not it is laudable? but he does refer everything to the object of living happily: it follows, then, that a happy life is laudable; but nothing is laudable without virtue: a happy life, then, is the consequence of virtue. and this is the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from these arguments. xvii. a wicked life has nothing which we ought to speak of or glory in; nor has that life which is neither happy nor miserable. but there is a kind of life that admits of being spoken of, and gloried in, and boasted of, as epaminondas saith, the wings of sparta's pride my counsels clipp'd. and africanus boasts, who, from beyond mæotis to the place where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace? if, then, there is such a thing as a happy life, it is to be gloried in, spoken of, and commended by the person who enjoys it; for there is nothing excepting that which can be spoken of or gloried in; and when that is once admitted, you know what follows. now, unless an honorable life is a happy life, there must, of course, be something preferable to a happy life; for that which is honorable all men will certainly grant to be preferable to anything else. and thus there will be something better than a happy life: but what can be more absurd than such an assertion? what! when they grant vice to be effectual to the rendering life miserable, must they not admit that there is a corresponding power in virtue to make life happy? for contraries follow from contraries. and here i ask what weight they think there is in the balance of critolaus, who having put the goods of the mind into one scale, and the goods of the body and other external advantages into the other, thought the goods of the mind outweighed the others so far that they would require the whole earth and sea to equalize the scale. xviii. what hinders critolaus, then, or that gravest of philosophers, xenocrates (who raises virtue so high, and who lessens and depreciates everything else), from not only placing a happy life, but the happiest possible life, in virtue? and, indeed, if this were not the case, virtue would be absolutely lost. for whoever is subject to grief must necessarily be subject to fear too, for fear is an uneasy apprehension of future grief; and whoever is subject to fear is liable to dread, timidity, consternation, cowardice. therefore, such a person may, some time or other, be defeated, and not think himself concerned with that precept of atreus, and let men so conduct themselves in life, as to be always strangers to defeat. but such a man, as i have said, will be defeated; and not only defeated, but made a slave of. but we would have virtue always free, always invincible; and were it not so, there would be an end of virtue. but if virtue has in herself all that is necessary for a good life, she is certainly sufficient for happiness: virtue is certainly sufficient, too, for our living with courage; if with courage, then with a magnanimous spirit, and indeed so as never to be under any fear, and thus to be always invincible. hence it follows that there can be nothing to be repented of, no wants, no lets or hinderances. thus all things will be prosperous, perfect, and as you would have them, and, consequently, happy; but virtue is sufficient for living with courage, and therefore virtue is able by herself to make life happy. for as folly, even when possessed of what it desires, never thinks it has acquired enough, so wisdom is always satisfied with the present, and never repents on her own account. xix. look but on the single consulship of lælius, and that, too, after having been set aside (though when a wise and good man like him is outvoted, the people are disappointed of a good consul, rather than be disappointed by a vain people); but the point is, would you prefer, were it in your power, to be once such a consul as lælius, or be elected four times, like cinna? i have no doubt in the world what answer you will make, and it is on that account i put the question to you. i would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might answer that he would not only prefer four consulates to one, but even one day of cinna's life to whole ages of many famous men. lælius would have suffered had he but touched any one with his finger; but cinna ordered the head of his colleague consul, cn. octavius, to be struck off; and put to death p. crassus[58], and l. cæsar[59], those excellent men, so renowned both at home and abroad; and even m. antonius[60], the greatest orator whom i ever heard; and c. cæsar, who seems to me to have been the pattern of humanity, politeness, sweetness of temper, and wit. could he, then, be happy who occasioned the death of these men? so far from it, that he seems to be miserable, not only for having performed these actions, but also for acting in such a manner that it was lawful for him to do it, though it is unlawful for any one to do wicked actions; but this proceeds from inaccuracy, of speech, for we call whatever a man is allowed to do lawful. was not marius happier, i pray you, when he shared the glory of the victory gained over the cimbrians with his colleague catulus (who was almost another lælius; for i look upon the two men as very like one another), than when, conqueror in the civil war, he in a passion answered the friends of catulus, who were interceding for him, "let him die?" and this answer he gave, not once only, but often. but in such a case, he was happier who submitted to that barbarous decree than he who issued it. and it is better to receive an injury than to do one; and so it was better to advance a little to meet that death that was making its approaches, as catulus did, than, like marius, to sully the glory of six consulships, and disgrace his latter days, by the death of such a man. xx. dionysius exercised his tyranny over the syracusans thirty-eight years, being but twenty-five years old when he seized on the government. how beautiful and how wealthy a city did he oppress with slavery! and yet we have it from good authority that he was remarkably temperate in his manner of living, that he was very active and energetic in carrying on business, but naturally mischievous and unjust; from which description every one who diligently inquires into truth must inevitably see that he was very miserable. neither did he attain what he so greatly desired, even when he was persuaded that he had unlimited power; for, notwithstanding he was of a good family and reputable parents (though that is contested by some authors), and had a very large acquaintance of intimate friends and relations, and also some youths attached to him by ties of love after the fashion of the greeks, he could not trust any one of them, but committed the guard of his person to slaves, whom he had selected from rich men's families and made free, and to strangers and barbarians. and thus, through an unjust desire of governing, he in a manner shut himself up in a prison. besides, he would not trust his throat to a barber, but had his daughters taught to shave; so that these royal virgins were forced to descend to the base and slavish employment of shaving the head and beard of their father. nor would he trust even them, when they were grown up, with a razor; but contrived how they might burn off the hair of his head and beard with red-hot nutshells. and as to his two wives, aristomache, his countrywoman, and doris of locris, he never visited them at night before everything had been well searched and examined. and as he had surrounded the place where his bed was with a broad ditch, and made a way over it with a wooden bridge, he drew that bridge over after shutting his bedchamber door. and as he did not dare to stand on the ordinary pulpits from which they usually harangued the people, he generally addressed them from a high tower. and it is said that when he was disposed to play at ball--for he delighted much in it--and had pulled off his clothes, he used to give his sword into the keeping of a young man whom he was very fond of. on this, one of his intimates said pleasantly, "you certainly trust your life with him;" and as the young man happened to smile at this, he ordered them both to be slain, the one for showing how he might be taken off, the other for approving of what had been said by smiling. but he was so concerned at what he had done that nothing affected him more during his whole life; for he had slain one to whom he was extremely partial. thus do weak men's desires pull them different ways, and while they indulge one, they act counter to another. xxi. this tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was; for once, when damocles, one of his flatterers, was dilating in conversation on his forces, his wealth, the greatness of his power, the plenty he enjoyed, the grandeur of his royal palaces, and maintaining that no one was ever happier, "have you an inclination," said he, "damocles, as this kind of life pleases you, to have a taste of it yourself, and to make a trial of the good fortune that attends me?" and when he said that he should like it extremely, dionysius ordered him to be laid on a bed of gold with the most beautiful covering, embroidered and wrought with the most exquisite work, and he dressed out a great many sideboards with silver and embossed gold. he then ordered some youths, distinguished for their handsome persons, to wait at his table, and to observe his nod, in order to serve him with what he wanted. there were ointments and garlands; perfumes were burned; tables provided with the most exquisite meats. damocles thought himself very happy. in the midst of this apparatus, dionysius ordered a bright sword to be let down from the ceiling, suspended by a single horse-hair, so as to hang over the head of that happy man. after which he neither cast his eye on those handsome waiters, nor on the well-wrought plate; nor touched any of the provisions: presently the garlands fell to pieces. at last he entreated the tyrant to give him leave to go, for that now he had no desire to be happy[61]. does not dionysius, then, seem to have declared there can be no happiness for one who is under constant apprehensions? but it was not now in his power to return to justice, and restore his citizens their rights and privileges; for, by the indiscretion of youth, he had engaged in so many wrong steps and committed such extravagances, that, had he attempted to have returned to a right way of thinking, he must have endangered his life. xxii. yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time he dreaded the treachery of friends, appears from the story of those two pythagoreans: one of these had been security for his friend, who was condemned to die; the other, to release his security, presented himself at the time appointed for his dying: "i wish," said dionysius," you would admit me as the third in your friendship." what misery was it for him to be deprived of acquaintance, of company at his table, and of the freedom of conversation! especially for one who was a man of learning, and from his childhood acquainted with liberal arts, very fond of music, and himself a tragic poet--how good a one is not to the purpose, for i know not how it is, but in this way, more than any other, every one thinks his own performances excellent. i never as yet knew any poet (and i was very intimate with aquinius), who did not appear to himself to be very admirable. the case is this: you are pleased with your own works; i like mine. but to return to dionysius. he debarred himself from all civil and polite conversation, and spent his life among fugitives, bondmen, and barbarians; for he was persuaded that no one could be his friend who was worthy of liberty, or had the least desire of being free. xxiii. shall i not, then, prefer the life of plato and archytas, manifestly wise and learned men, to his, than which nothing can possibly be more horrid, or miserable, or detestable? i will present you with an humble and obscure mathematician of the same city, called archimedes, who lived many years after; whose tomb, overgrown with shrubs and briers, i in my quæstorship discovered, when the syracusans knew nothing of it, and even denied that there was any such thing remaining; for i remembered some verses, which i had been informed were engraved on his monument, and these set forth that on the top of the tomb there was placed a sphere with a cylinder. when i had carefully examined all the monuments (for there are a great many tombs at the gate achradinæ), i observed a small column standing out a little above the briers, with the figure of a sphere and a cylinder upon it; whereupon i immediately said to the syracusans--for there were some of their principal men with me there--that i imagined that was what i was inquiring for. several men, being sent in with scythes, cleared the way, and made an opening for us. when we could get at it, and were come near to the front of the pedestal, i found the inscription, though the latter parts of all the verses were effaced almost half away. thus one of the noblest cities of greece, and one which at one time likewise had been very celebrated for learning, had known nothing of the monument of its greatest genius, if it had not been discovered to them by a native of arpinum. but to return to the subject from which i have been digressing. who is there in the least degree acquainted with the muses, that is, with liberal knowledge, or that deals at all in learning, who would not choose to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant? if we look into their methods of living and their employments, we shall find the mind of the one strengthened and improved with tracing the deductions of reason, amused with his own ingenuity, which is the one most delicious food of the mind; the thoughts of the other engaged in continual murders and injuries, in constant fears by night and by day. now imagine a democritus, a pythagoras, and an anaxagoras; what kingdom, what riches, would you prefer to their studies and amusements? for you must necessarily look for that excellence which we are seeking for in that which is the most perfect part of man; but what is there better in man than a sagacious and good mind? the enjoyment, therefore, of that good which proceeds from that sagacious mind can alone make us happy; but virtue is the good of the mind: it follows, therefore, that a happy life depends on virtue. hence proceed all things that are beautiful, honorable, and excellent, as i said above (but this point must, i think, be treated of more at large), and they are well stored with joys. for, as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual and unexhausted pleasures, it follows, too, that a happy life must arise from honesty. xxiv. but that what i propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on mere words only, i must set before you the picture of something, as it were, living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. let us, then, pitch upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts; let us present him for awhile to our own thoughts, and figure him to our own imaginations. in the first place, he must necessarily be of an extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull minds. secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from whence will arise that threefold production of the mind; one of which depends on knowing things, and explaining nature; the other, in defining what we ought to desire and what to avoid; the third, in judging of consequences and impossibilities, in which consists both subtlety in disputing and also clearness of judgment. now, with what pleasure must the mind of a wise man be affected which continually dwells in the midst of such cares and occupations as these, when he views the revolutions and motions of the whole world, and sees those innumerable stars in the heavens, which, though fixed in their places, have yet one motion in common with the whole universe, and observes the seven other stars, some higher, some lower, each maintaining their own course, while their motions, though wandering, have certain defined and appointed spaces to run through! the sight of which doubtless urged and encouraged those ancient philosophers to exercise their investigating spirit on many other things. hence arose an inquiry after the beginnings, and, as it were, seeds from which all things were produced and composed; what was the origin of every kind of thing, whether animate or inanimate, articulately speaking or mute; what occasioned their beginning and end, and by what alteration and change one thing was converted into another; whence the earth originated, and by what weights it was balanced; by what caverns the seas were supplied; by what gravity all things being carried down tend always to the middle of the world, which in any round body is the lowest place. xxv. a mind employed on such subjects, and which night and day contemplates them, contains in itself that precept of the delphic god, so as to "know itself," and to perceive its connection with the divine reason, from whence it is filled with an insatiable joy. for reflections on the power and nature of the gods raise in us a desire of imitating their eternity. nor does the mind, that sees the necessary dependences and connections that one cause has with another, think it possible that it should be itself confined to the shortness of this life. those causes, though they proceed from eternity to eternity, are governed by reason and understanding. and he who beholds them and examines them, or rather he whose view takes in all the parts and boundaries of things, with what tranquillity of mind does he look on all human affairs, and on all that is nearer him! hence proceeds the knowledge of virtue; hence arise the kinds and species of virtues; hence are discovered those things which nature regards as the bounds and extremities of good and evil; by this it is discovered to what all duties ought to be referred, and which is the most eligible manner of life. and when these and similar points have been investigated, the principal consequence which is deduced from them, and that which is our main object in this discussion, is the establishment of the point, that virtue is of itself sufficient to a happy life. the third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered, which goes through and spreads itself over every part of wisdom; it is that whereby we define each particular thing, distinguish the genus from its species, connect consequences, draw just conclusions, and distinguish truth from falsehood, which is the very art and science of disputing; which is not only of the greatest use in the examination of what passes in the world, but is likewise the most rational entertainment, and that which is most becoming to true wisdom. such are its effects in retirement. now, let our wise man be considered as protecting the republic; what can be more excellent than such a character? by his prudence he will discover the true interests of his fellow-citizens; by his justice he will be prevented from applying what belongs to the public to his own use; and, in short, he will be ever governed by all the virtues, which are many and various. to these let us add the advantage of his friendships; in which the learned reckon not only a natural harmony and agreement of sentiments throughout the conduct of life, but the utmost pleasure and satisfaction in conversing and passing our time constantly with one another. what can be wanting to such a life as this to make it more happy than it is? fortune herself must yield to a life stored with such joys. now, if it be a happiness to rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say, in such virtues, and if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must necessarily be granted that all such are happy. xxvi. _a._ what, when in torments and on the rack? _m._ do you imagine i am speaking of him as laid on roses and violets? is it allowable even for epicurus (who only puts on the appearance of being a philosopher, and who himself assumed that name for himself) to say (though, as matters stand, i commend him for his saying) that a wise man might at all times cry out, though he be burned, tortured, cut to pieces, "how little i regard it!" shall this be said by one who defines all evil as pain, and measures every good by pleasure; who could ridicule whatever we call either honorable or base, and could declare of us that we were employed about words, and uttering mere empty sounds; and that nothing is to be regarded by us but as it is perceived to be smooth or rough by the body? what! shall such a man as this, as i said, whose understanding is little superior to the beasts', be at liberty to forget himself; and not only to despise fortune, when the whole of his good and evil is in the power of fortune, but to say that he is happy in the most racking torture, when he had actually declared pain to be not only the greatest evil, but the only one? nor did he take any trouble to provide himself with those remedies which might have enabled him to bear pain, such as firmness of mind, a shame of doing anything base, exercise, and the habit of patience, precepts of courage, and a manly hardiness; but he says that he supports himself on the single recollection of past pleasures, as if any one, when the weather was so hot as that he was scarcely able to bear it, should comfort himself by recollecting that he was once in my country, arpinum, where he was surrounded on every side by cooling streams. for i do not apprehend how past pleasures can allay present evils. but when he says that a wise man is always happy who would have no right to say so if he were consistent with himself, what may they not do who allow nothing to be desirable, nothing to be looked on as good but what is honorable? let, then, the peripatetics and old academics follow my example, and at length leave off muttering to themselves; and openly and with a clear voice let them be bold to say that a happy life may not be inconsistent with the agonies of phalaris's bull. xxvii. but to dismiss the subtleties of the stoics, which i am sensible i have employed more than was necessary, let us admit of three kinds of goods; and let them really be kinds of goods, provided no regard is had to the body and to external circumstances, as entitled to the appellation of good in any other sense than because we are obliged to use them: but let those other divine goods spread themselves far in every direction, and reach the very heavens. why, then, may i not call him happy, nay, the happiest of men, who has attained them? shall a wise man be afraid of pain? which is, indeed, the greatest enemy to our opinion. for i am persuaded that we are prepared and fortified sufficiently, by the disputations of the foregoing days, against our own death or that of our friends, against grief, and the other perturbations of the mind. but pain seems to be the sharpest adversary of virtue; that it is which menaces us with burning torches; that it is which threatens to crush our fortitude, and greatness of mind, and patience. shall virtue, then, yield to this? shall the happy life of a wise and consistent man succumb to this? good. gods! how base would this be! spartan boys will bear to have their bodies torn by rods without uttering a groan. i myself have seen at lacedæmon troops of young men, with incredible earnestness contending together with their hands and feet, with their teeth and nails, nay, even ready to expire, rather than own themselves conquered. is any country of barbarians more uncivilized or desolate than india? yet they have among them some that are held for wise men, who never wear any clothes all their life long, and who bear the snow of caucasus, and the piercing cold of winter, without any pain; and who if they come in contact with fire endure being burned without a groan. the women, too, in india, on the death of their husbands have a regular contest, and apply to the judge to have it determined which of them was best beloved by him; for it is customary there for one man to have many wives. she in whose favor it is determined exults greatly, and being attended by her relations, is laid on the funeral pile with her husband; the others, who are postponed, walk away very much dejected. custom can never be superior to nature, for nature is never to be got the better of. but our minds are infected by sloth and idleness, and luxury, and languor, and indolence: we have enervated them by opinions and bad customs. who is there who is unacquainted with the customs of the egyptians? their minds being tainted by pernicious opinions, they are ready to bear any torture rather than hurt an ibis, a snake, a cat, a dog, or a crocodile; and should any one inadvertently have hurt any of these animals, he will submit to any punishment. i am speaking of men only. as to the beasts, do they not bear cold and hunger, running about in woods, and on mountains and deserts? will they not fight for their young ones till they are wounded? are they afraid of any attacks or blows? i mention not what the ambitious will suffer for honor's sake, or those who are desirous of praise on account of glory, or lovers to gratify their lust. life is full of such instances. xxviii. but let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather let us return to our subject. i say, and say again, that happiness will submit even to be tormented; and that in pursuit of justice, and temperance, and still more especially and principally fortitude, and greatness of soul, and patience, it will not stop short at sight of the executioner; and when all other virtues proceed calmly to the torture, that one will never halt, as i said, on the outside and threshold of the prison; for what can be baser, what can carry a worse appearance, than to be left alone, separated from those beautiful attendants? not, however, that this is by any means possible; for neither can the virtues hold together without happiness, nor happiness without the virtues; so that they will not suffer her to desert them, but will carry her along with them, to whatever torments, to whatever pain they are led. for it is the peculiar quality of a wise man to do nothing that he may repent of, nothing against his inclination, but always to act nobly, with constancy, gravity, and honesty; to depend on nothing as certainty; to wonder at nothing, when it falls out, as if it appeared strange and unexpected to him; to be independent of every one, and abide by his own opinion. for my part, i cannot form an idea of anything happier than this. the conclusion of the stoics is indeed easy; for since they are persuaded that the end of good is to live agreeably to nature, and to be consistent with that--as a wise man should do so, not only because it is his duty, but because it is in his power--it must, of course, follow that whoever has the chief good in his power has his happiness so too. and thus the life of a wise man is always happy. you have here what i think may be confidently said of a happy life; and as things now stand, very truly also, unless you can advance something better. xxix. _a._ indeed i cannot; but i should be glad to prevail on you, unless it is troublesome (as you are under no confinement from obligations to any particular sect, but gather from all of them whatever strikes you most as having the appearance of probability), as you just now seemed to advise the peripatetics and the old academy boldly to speak out without reserve, "that wise men are always the happiest"--i should be glad to hear how you think it consistent for them to say so, when you have said so much against that opinion, and the conclusions of the stoics. _m._ i will make use, then, of that liberty which no one has the privilege of using in philosophy but those of our school, whose discourses determine nothing, but take in everything, leaving them unsupported by the authority of any particular person, to be judged of by others, according to their weight. and as you seem desirous of knowing how it is that, notwithstanding the different opinions of philosophers with regard to the ends of goods, virtue has still sufficient security for the effecting of a happy life--which security, as we are informed, carneades used indeed to dispute against; but he disputed as against the stoics, whose opinions he combated with great zeal and vehemence. i, however, shall handle the question with more temper; for if the stoics have rightly settled the _ends_ of goods, the affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily be always happy. but let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of the others, that so this excellent decision, if i may so call it, in favor of a happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of all. xxx. these, then, are the opinions, as i think, that are held and defended--the first four are simple ones: "that nothing is good but what is honest," according to the stoics; "nothing good but pleasure," as epicurus maintains; "nothing good but a freedom from pain," as hieronymus[62] asserts; "nothing good but an enjoyment of the principal, or all, or the greatest goods of nature," as carneades maintained against the stoics--these are simple, the others are mixed propositions. then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being those of the mind; the next best those of the body; the third are external goods, as the peripatetics call them, and the old academics differ very little from them. dinomachus[63] and callipho[64] have coupled pleasure with honesty; but diodorus[65] the peripatetic has joined indolence to honesty. these are the opinions that have some footing; for those of aristo,[66] pyrrho,[67] herillus,[68] and of some others, are quite out of date. now let us see what weight these men have in them, excepting the stoics, whose opinion i think i have sufficiently defended; and indeed i have explained what the peripatetics have to say; excepting that theophrastus, and those who followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner. the others may go on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity of virtue, as usual; and then, after they have extolled it to the skies, with the usual extravagance of good orators, it is easy to reduce the other topics to nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to contempt. they who think that praise deserves to be sought after, even at the expense of pain, are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy who have obtained it. though they may be under some evils, yet this name of happy has a very wide application. xxxi. for even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming advantageous, not because the one never meets with any loss, nor the other with any damage from the inclemency of the weather, but because they succeed in general; so life may be properly called happy, not from its being entirely made up of good things, but because it abounds with these to a great and considerable degree. by this way of reasoning, then, a happy life may attend virtue even to the moment of execution; nay, may descend with her into phalaris's bull, according to aristotle, xenocrates, speusippus, polemon; and will not be gained over by any allurements to forsake her. of the same opinion will calliphon and diodorus be; for they are both of them such friends to virtue as to think that all things should be discarded and far removed that are incompatible with it. the rest seem to be more hampered with these doctrines, but yet they get clear of them; such as epicurus, hieronymus, and whoever else thinks it worth while to defend the deserted carneades: for there is not one of them who does not think the mind to be judge of those goods, and able sufficiently to instruct him how to despise what has the appearance only of good or evil. for what seems to you to be the case with epicurus is the case also with hieronymus and carneades, and, indeed, with all the rest of them; for who is there who is not sufficiently prepared against death and pain? i will begin, with your leave, with him whom we call soft and voluptuous. what! does he seem, to you to be afraid of death or pain when he calls the day of his death happy; and who, when he is afflicted by the greatest pains, silences them all by recollecting arguments of his own discovering? and this is not done in such a manner as to give room for imagining that he talks thus wildly from some sudden impulse; but his opinion of death is, that on the dissolution of the animal all sense is lost; and what is deprived of sense is, as he thinks, what we have no concern at all with. and as to pain, too, he has certain rules to follow then: if it be great, the comfort is that it must be short; if it be of long continuance, then it must be supportable. what, then? do those grandiloquent gentlemen state anything better than epicurus in opposition to these two things which distress us the most? and as to other things, do not epicurus and the rest of the philosophers seem sufficiently prepared? who is there who does not dread poverty? and yet no true philosopher ever can dread it. xxxii. but with how little is this man himself satisfied! no one has said more on frugality. for when a man is far removed from those things which occasion a desire of money, from love, ambition, or other daily extravagance, why should he be fond of money, or concern himself at all about it? could the scythian anacharsis[69] disregard money, and shall not our philosophers be able to do so? we are informed of an epistle of his in these words: "anacharsis to hanno, greeting. my clothing is the same as that with which the scythians cover themselves; the hardness of my feet supplies the want of shoes; the ground is my bed, hunger my sauce, my food milk, cheese, and flesh. so you may come to me as to a man in want of nothing. but as to those presents you take so much pleasure in, you may dispose of them to your own citizens, or to the immortal gods." and almost all philosophers, of all schools, excepting those who are warped from right reason by a vicious disposition, might have been of this same opinion. socrates, when on one occasion he saw a great quantity of gold and silver carried in a procession, cried out, "how many things are there which i do not want!" xenocrates, when some ambassadors from alexander had brought him fifty talents, which was a very large sum of money in those times, especially at athens, carried the ambassadors to sup in the academy, and placed just a sufficiency before them, without any apparatus. when they asked him, the next day, to whom he wished the money which they had for him to be paid: "what!" said he, "did you not perceive by our slight repast of yesterday that i had no occasion for money?" but when he perceived that they were somewhat dejected, he accepted of thirty minas, that he might not seem to treat with disrespect the king's generosity. but diogenes took a greater liberty, like a cynic, when alexander asked him if he wanted anything: "just at present," said he, "i wish that you would stand a little out of the line between me and the sun," for alexander was hindering him from sunning himself. and, indeed, this very man used to maintain how much he surpassed the persian king in his manner of life and fortune; for that he himself was in want of nothing, while the other never had enough; and that he had no inclination for those pleasures of which the other could never get enough to satisfy himself; and that the other could never obtain his. xxxiii. you see, i imagine, how epicurus has divided his kinds of desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they are "partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary; partly neither. that those which are necessary may be supplied almost for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily obtained." as to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that any one may easily either enjoy or go without them. and with regard to the third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted out. on this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of them; for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within any one's reach; and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be of any use. and the assertions which epicurus makes with respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it is pain. so that a wise man will always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it while it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away. so that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has already tasted. the like notions are applied by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense. xxxiv. for who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce? when darius, in his flight from the enemy, had drunk some water which was muddy and tainted with dead bodies, he declared that he had never drunk anything more pleasant; the fact was, that he had never drunk before when he was thirsty. nor had ptolemy ever eaten when he was hungry; for as he was travelling over egypt, his company not keeping up with him, he had some coarse bread presented him in a cottage, upon which he said, "nothing ever seemed to him pleasanter than that bread." they relate, too, of socrates, that, once when he was walking very fast till the evening, on his being asked why he did so, his reply was that he was purchasing an appetite by walking, that he might sup the better. and do we not see what the lacedæmonians provide in their phiditia? where the tyrant dionysius supped, but told them he did not at all like that black broth, which was their principal dish; on which he who dressed it said, "it was no wonder, for it wanted seasoning." dionysius asked what that seasoning was; to which it was replied, "fatigue in hunting, sweating, a race on the banks of eurotas, hunger and thirst," for these are the seasonings to the lacedæmonian banquets. and this may not only be conceived from the custom of men, but from the beasts, who are satisfied with anything that is thrown before them, provided it is not unnatural, and they seek no farther. some entire cities, taught by custom, delight in parsimony, as i said but just now of the lacedæmonians. xenophon has given an account of the persian diet, who never, as he saith, use anything but cresses with their bread; not but that, should nature require anything more agreeable, many things might be easily supplied by the ground, and plants in great abundance, and of incomparable sweetness. add to this strength and health, as the consequence of this abstemious way of living. now, compare with this those who sweat and belch, being crammed with eating, like fatted oxen; then will you perceive that they who pursue pleasure most attain it least; and that the pleasure of eating lies not in satiety, but appetite. xxxv. they report of timotheus, a famous man at athens, and the head of the city, that having supped with plato, and being extremely delighted with his entertainment, on seeing him the next day, he said, "your suppers are not only agreeable while i partake of them, but the next day also." besides, the understanding is impaired when we are full with overeating and drinking. there is an excellent epistle of plato to dion's relations, in which there occurs as nearly as possible these words: "when i came there, that happy life so much talked of, devoted to italian and syracusan entertainments, was noways agreeable to me; to be crammed twice a day, and never to have the night to yourself, and the other things which are the accompaniments of this kind of life, by which a man will never be made the wiser, but will be rendered much less temperate; for it must be an extraordinary disposition that can be temperate in such circumstances." how, then, can a life be pleasant without prudence and temperance? hence you discover the mistake of sardanapalus, the wealthiest king of the assyrians, who ordered it to be engraved on his tomb, i still have what in food i did exhaust; but what i left, though excellent, is lost. "what less than this," says aristotle, "could be inscribed on the tomb, not of a king, but an ox?" he said that he possessed those things when dead, which, in his lifetime, he could have no longer than while he was enjoying them. why, then, are riches desired? and wherein doth poverty prevent us from being happy? in the want, i imagine, of statues, pictures, and diversions. but if any one is delighted with these things, have not the poor people the enjoyment of them more than they who are the owners of them in the greatest abundance? for we have great numbers of them displayed publicly in our city. and whatever store of them private people have, they cannot have a great number, and they but seldom see them, only when they go to their country seats; and some of them must be stung to the heart when they consider how they came by them. the day would fail me, should i be inclined to defend the cause of poverty. the thing is manifest; and nature daily informs us how few things there are, and how trifling they are, of which she really stands in need. xxxvi. let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even the being unpopular, can prevent a wise man from being happy. observe if popular favor, and this glory which they are so fond of, be not attended with more uneasiness than pleasure. our friend demosthenes was certainly very weak in declaring himself pleased with the whisper of a woman who was carrying water, as is the custom in greece, and who whispered to another, "that is he--that is demosthenes." what could be weaker than this? and yet what an orator he was! but although he had learned to speak to others, he had conversed but little with himself. we may perceive, therefore, that popular glory is not desirable of itself; nor is obscurity to be dreaded. "i came to athens," saith democritus, "and there was no one there that knew me:" this was a moderate and grave man who could glory in his obscurity. shall musicians compose their tunes to their own tastes? and shall a philosopher, master of a much better art, seek to ascertain, not what is most true, but what will please the people? can anything be more absurd than to despise the vulgar as mere unpolished mechanics, taken singly, and to think them of consequence when collected into a body? these wise men would contemn our ambitious pursuits and our vanities, and would reject all the honors which the people could voluntarily offer to them; but we know not how to despise them till we begin to repent of having accepted them. there is an anecdote related by heraclitus, the natural philosopher, of hermodorus, the chief of the ephesians, that he said "that all the ephesians ought to be punished with death for saying, when they had expelled hermodorus out of their city, that they would have no one among them better than another; but that if there were any such, he might go elsewhere to some other people." is not this the case with the people everywhere? do they not hate every virtue that distinguishes itself? what! was not aristides (i had rather instance in the greeks than ourselves) banished his country for being eminently just? what troubles, then, are they free from who have no connection whatever with the people? what is more agreeable than a learned retirement? i speak of that learning which makes us acquainted with the boundless extent of nature and the universe, and which even while we remain in this world discovers to us both heaven, earth, and sea. xxxvii. if, then, honor and riches have no value, what is there else to be afraid of? banishment, i suppose; which is looked on as the greatest evil. now, if the evil of banishment proceeds not from ourselves, but from the froward disposition of the people, i have just now declared how contemptible it is. but if to leave one's country be miserable, the provinces are full of miserable men, very few of the settlers in which ever return to their country again. but exiles are deprived of their property! what, then! has there not been enough said on bearing poverty? but with regard to banishment, if we examine the nature of things, not the ignominy of the name, how little does it differ from constant travelling! in which some of the most famous philosophers have spent their whole life, as xenocrates, crantor, arcesilas, lacydes, aristotle, theophrastus, zeno, cleanthes, chrysippus, antipater, carneades, panætius, clitomachus, philo, antiochus, posidonius, and innumerable others, who from their first setting-out never returned home again. now, what ignominy can a wise man be affected with (for it is of such a one that i am speaking) who can be guilty of nothing which deserves it? for there is no occasion to comfort one who is banished for his deserts. lastly, they can easily reconcile themselves to every accident who measure all their objects and pursuits in life by the standard of pleasure; so that in whatever place that is supplied, there they may live happily. thus what teucer said may be applied to every case: "wherever i am happy is my country." socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, "the world;" for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the whole world. how was it with t. altibutius? did he not follow his philosophical studies with the greatest satisfaction at athens, although he was banished? which, however, would not have happened to him if he had obeyed the laws of epicurus and lived peaceably in the republic. in what was epicurus happier, living in his own country, than metrodorus, who lived at athens? or did plato's happiness exceed that of xenocrates, or polemo, or arcesilas? or is that city to be valued much that banishes all her good and wise men? demaratus, the father of our king tarquin, not being able to bear the tyrant cypselus, fled from corinth to tarquinii, settled there, and had children. was it, then, an unwise act in him to prefer the liberty of banishment to slavery at home? xxxviii. besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs and anxieties are assuaged by forgetting them, and turning our thoughts to pleasure. therefore, it was not without reason that epicurus presumed to say that a wise man abounds with good things, because he may always have his pleasures; from whence it follows, as he thinks, that that point is gained which is the subject of our present inquiry, that a wise man is always happy. what! though he should be deprived of the senses of seeing and hearing? yes; for he holds those things very cheap. for, in the first place, what are the pleasures of which we are deprived by that dreadful thing, blindness? for though they allow other pleasures to be confined to the senses, yet the things which are perceived by the sight do not depend wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive; as is the case when we taste, smell, touch, or hear; for, in respect of all these senses, the organs themselves are the seat of pleasure; but it is not so with the eyes. for it is the mind which is entertained by what we see; but the mind may be entertained in many ways, even though we could not see at all. i am speaking of a learned and a wise man, with whom to think is to live. but thinking in the case of a wise man does not altogether require the use of his eyes in his investigations; for if night does not strip him of his happiness, why should blindness, which resembles night, have that effect? for the reply of antipater the cyrenaic to some women who bewailed his being blind, though it is a little too obscene, is not without its significance. "what do you mean?" saith he; "do you think the night can furnish no pleasure?" and we find by his magistracies and his actions that old appius,[70] too, who was blind for many years, was not prevented from doing whatever was required of him with respect either to the republic or his own affairs. it is said that c. drusus's house was crowded with clients. when they whose business it was could not see how to conduct themselves, they applied to a blind guide. xxxix. when i was a boy, cn. aufidius, a blind man, who had served the office of prætor, not only gave his opinion in the senate, and was ready to assist his friends, but wrote a greek history, and had a considerable acquaintance with literature. diodorus the stoic was blind, and lived many years at my house. he, indeed, which is scarcely credible, besides applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and playing on the flute, agreeably to the custom of the pythagoreans, and having books read to him night and day, in all which he did not want eyes, contrived to teach geometry, which, one would think, could hardly be done without the assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and where to draw every line. they relate of asclepiades, a native of eretria, and no obscure philosopher, when some one asked him what inconvenience he suffered from his blindness, that his reply was, "he was at the expense of another servant." so that, as the most extreme poverty may be borne if you please, as is daily the case with some in greece, so blindness may easily be borne, provided you have the support of good health in other respects. democritus was so blind he could not distinguish white from black; but he knew the difference between good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and base, the useful and useless, great and small. thus one may live happily without distinguishing colors; but without acquainting yourself with things, you cannot; and this man was of opinion that the intense application of the mind was taken off by the objects that presented themselves to the eye; and while others often could not see what was before their feet, he travelled through all infinity. it is reported also that homer[71] was blind, but we observe his painting as well as his poetry. what country, what coast, what part of greece, what military attacks, what dispositions of battle, what array, what ship, what motions of men and animals, can be mentioned which he has not described in such a manner as to enable us to see what he could not see himself? what, then! can we imagine that homer, or any other learned man, has ever been in want of pleasure and entertainment for his mind? were it not so, would anaxagoras, or this very democritus, have left their estates and patrimonies, and given themselves up to the pursuit of acquiring this divine pleasure? it is thus that the poets who have represented tiresias the augur as a wise man and blind never exhibit him as bewailing his blindness. and homer, too, after he had described polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking with his ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go wherever he pleased and touch what he would. and so far he was right, for that cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his ram. xl. now, as to the evil of being deaf. m. crassus was a little thick of hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. our epicureans cannot understand greek, nor the greeks latin: now, they are deaf reciprocally as to each other's language, and we are all truly deaf with regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand. they do not hear the voice of the harper; but, then, they do not hear the grating of a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when his throat is being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are desirous of rest. and if they should chance to be fond of singing, they ought, in the first place, to consider that many wise men lived happily before music was discovered; besides, they may have more pleasure in reading verses than in hearing them sung. then, as i before referred the blind to the pleasures of hearing, so i may the deaf to the pleasures of sight: moreover, whoever can converse with himself doth not need the conversation of another. but suppose all these misfortunes to meet in one person: suppose him blind and deaf--let him be afflicted with the sharpest pains of body, which, in the first place, generally of themselves make an end of him; still, should they continue so long, and the pain be so exquisite, that we should be unable to assign any reason for our being so afflicted--still, why, good gods! should we be under any difficulty? for there is a retreat at hand: death is that retreat--a shelter where we shall forever be insensible. theodorus said to lysimachus, who threatened him with death, "it is a great matter, indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a spanish fly!" when perses entreated paulus not to lead him in triumph, "that is a matter which you have in your own power," said paulus. i said many things about death in our first day's disputation, when death was the subject; and not a little the next day, when i treated of pain; which things if you recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as undesirable, or, at least, it will not be dreadful. that custom which is common among the grecians at their banquets should, in my opinion, be observed in life: drink, say they, or leave the company; and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the pleasure of drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with affronts from those that are in liquor. thus, those injuries of fortune which you cannot bear you should flee from. xli. this is the very same which is said by epicurus and hieronymus. now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no power of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate honorable and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty circumstance set off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain that a wise man is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the socratic and platonic philosophers? some of these allow such superiority to the goods of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns the body and all external circumstances. but others do not admit these to be goods; they make everything depend on the mind: whose disputes carneades used, as a sort of honorary arbitrator, to determine. for, as what seemed goods to the peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by the stoics, and as the peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good health; and other things of that sort than the stoics, when these things were considered according to their reality, and not by mere names, his opinion was that there was no ground for disagreeing. therefore, let the philosophers of other schools see how they can establish this point also. it is very agreeable to me that they make some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a philosopher with regard to a wise man's having always the means of living happily. xlii. but as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these five days' discussions; though, indeed, i think i shall commit them to writing: for how can i better employ the leisure which i have, of whatever kind it is, and whatever it be owing to? and i will send these five books also to my friend brutus, by whom i was not only incited to write on philosophy, but, i may say, provoked. and by so doing it is not easy to say what service i may be of to others. at all events, in my own various and acute afflictions, which surround me on all sides, i cannot find any better comfort for myself. the nature of the gods. * * * * * book i. i. there are many things in philosophy, my dear brutus, which are not as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know) that most obscure and difficult question concerning the nature of the gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind and the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men are so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly to the inference that ignorance[72] is the cause, or origin, of philosophy, and that the academic philosophers have been prudent in refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of the gravity and stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false opinions, or, without the least hesitation, to support and defend what he has not thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend? in the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by nature led to suppose, namely, that there are gods. protagoras[73] doubted whether there were any. diagoras the melian and theodorus of cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. but they who have affirmed that there are gods, have expressed such a variety of sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they give us many statements respecting the forms of the gods, and their places of abode, and the employment of their lives. and these are matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding earnestness. but the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care and administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things were made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they will continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. this is one of the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided, mankind must necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant of what is most important to be known. ii. for there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have conceived that the gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs. but if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are offered to the gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground that men are the objects of the attention of the gods, and that many benefits are conferred by the immortal gods on the human race. but if the gods have neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they take no care of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is no single advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then what reason can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to prefer any prayers to them? piety, like the other virtues, cannot have any connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety, neither sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of which must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life. i do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the gods, but that faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent of all virtues, justice, may perish with it. there are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and illustrious men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and governed by the will and wisdom of the gods; nor do they stop here, but conceive likewise that the deities consult and provide for the preservation of mankind. for they think that the fruits, and the produce of the earth, and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and the change of climates, by which all the productions of the earth are brought to maturity, are designed by the immortal gods for the use of man. they instance many other things, which shall be related in these books; and which would almost induce us to believe that the immortal gods had made them all expressly and solely for the benefit and advantage of men. against these opinions carneades has advanced so much that what he has said should excite a desire in men who are not naturally slothful to search after truth; for there is no subject on which the learned as well as the unlearned differ so strenuously as in this; and since their opinions are so various, and so repugnant one to another, it is possible that none of them may be, and absolutely impossible that more than one should be, right. iii. now, in a cause like this, i may be able to pacify well-meaning opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the latter to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to be glad to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should be instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. but i observe that the several books which i have lately published[74] have occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people wondering what the reason has been why i have applied myself so suddenly to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing what my opinion is on such subjects. i likewise perceive that many people wonder at my following that philosophy[75] chiefly which seems to take away the light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of artificial night, and that i should so unexpectedly have taken up the defence of a school that has been long neglected and forsaken. but it is a mistake to suppose that this application to philosophical studies has been sudden on my part. i have applied myself to them from my youth, at no small expense of time and trouble; and i have been in the habit of philosophizing a great deal when i least seemed to think about it; for the truth of which i appeal to my orations, which are filled with quotations from philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very learned men who frequented my house and conversed daily with me, particularly diodorus, philo, antiochus, and posidonius,[76] under whom i was bred; and if all the precepts of philosophy are to have reference to the conduct of life, i am inclined to think that i have advanced, both in public and private affairs, only such principles as may be supported by reason and authority. iv. but if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for when i found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the direction and care of one man,[77] i thought it becoming, for the sake of the public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it would be of importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our city, to have such great and excellent subjects introduced in the latin tongue. i the less repent of my undertaking, since i plainly see that i have excited in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing; for we have had several romans well grounded in the learning of the greeks who were unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had learned, because they looked upon it as impossible to express that in latin which they had received from the greeks. in this point i think i have succeeded so well that what i have done is not, even in copiousness of expression, inferior to that language. another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if i could have found any surer remedy, i would not have sought relief in this pursuit. but i could procure ease by no means better than by not only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself to the examination of the whole body of philosophy. and every part and branch of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked together and united. v. now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. for the force of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority, since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and rely implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. nor could i ever approve this custom of the pythagoreans, who, when they affirmed anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to give this answer: "he himself has said it;" and this "he himself," it seems, was pythagoras. such was the force of prejudice and opinion that his authority was to prevail even without argument or reason. they who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may find a satisfactory answer in my four books of academical questions. but i deny that i have undertaken the protection of what is neglected and forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they may perhaps want the author's explanation. this manner of philosophizing, of disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly, was begun by socrates, revived by arcesilaus, confirmed by carneades, and has descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but i am informed that it is now almost exploded even in greece. however, i do not impute that to any fault in the institution of the academy, but to the negligence of mankind. if it is difficult to know all the doctrines of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every sect! which, however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve, for the sake of discovering truth, to dispute for or against all philosophers without partiality. i do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble faculty; but i do assert that i have endeavored to make myself so; and it is impossible that they who choose this manner of philosophizing should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. i have spoken more fully on this head in another place. but as some are too slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual need of caution. for we are not people who believe that there is nothing whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so blended with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that there is no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions; from which this maxim also follows, that many things are probable, which, though they are not evident to the senses, have still so persuasive and beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct his conduct by them. vi. now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, i propose to lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the nature of the gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall be found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, i will then give up the academy as vain and arrogant. so i may cry out, in the words of statius, in the synephebi, ye gods, i call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and implore the attention of my countrymen all, both young and old; yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play complains that, in this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity: here is a professed courtesan, who refuses money from her lover; but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith, oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to think of the auspices over which i preside;[78] for all these have relation to the present question. the manifest disagreement among the most learned on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they have some certain knowledge of the subject. which fact i have often taken notice of elsewhere, and i did so more especially at the discussion that was held at my friend c. cotta's concerning the immortal gods, and which was carried on with the greatest care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time of the latin holidays,[79] according to his own invitation and message from him, i found him sitting in his study,[80] and in a discourse with c. velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the epicureans the ablest of our countrymen. q. lucilius balbus was likewise there, a great proficient in the doctrine of the stoics, and esteemed equal to the most eminent of the greeks in that part of knowledge. as soon as cotta saw me, you are come, says he, very seasonably; for i am having a dispute with velleius on an important subject, which, considering the nature of your studies, is not improper for you to join in. vii. indeed, says i, i think i am come very seasonably, as you say; for here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. if m. piso[81] was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would want an advocate. if antiochus's book, replies cotta, which he lately sent to balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend piso; for antiochus is of the opinion that the stoics do not differ from the peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and i should be glad to know what you think of that book, balbus. i? says he. i wonder that antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what a vast difference there is between the stoics, who distinguish the honest and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind, and the peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in kind. this is not a little difference in words, but a great one in things; but of this hereafter. now, if you think fit, let us return to what we began with. with all my heart, says cotta. but that this visitor (looking at me), who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, i will inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the gods; concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure to me, i prevailed on velleius to give us the sentiments of epicurus. therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, velleius, repeat what you have already stated to us. i will, says he, though this new-comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both, adds he, with a smile, learned from the same philo to be certain of nothing.[82] what we have learned from him, replied i, cotta will discover; but i would not have you think i am come as an assistant to him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not bound by any obligation to defend any particular principle, whether i like or dislike it. viii. after this, velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect, dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if he had just then descended from the council of the gods, and epicurus's intervals of worlds. do not attend, says he, to these idle and imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the world, the god of plato's timæus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the [greek: pronoia] of the stoics, which the latins call providence; nor to that round, that burning, revolving deity, the world, endowed with sense and understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive philosophers, but of dreamers! for with what eyes of the mind was your plato able to see that workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modelled and built by god? what materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? how could the air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the architect? from whence arose those five forms,[83] of which the rest were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? it is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort that they look more like things to be desired than to be discovered. but, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not only created, but, if i may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning? for what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end? if your providence, lucilius, is the same as plato's god, i ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? if it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like plato's god? ix. but i would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? for we are not to conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. i do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses; for i acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. i desire, therefore, to know, balbus, why this providence of yours was idle for such an immense space of time? did she avoid labor? but that could have no effect on the deity; nor could there be any labor, since all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. what was it that incited the deity to act the part of an ædile, to illuminate and decorate the world? if it was in order that god might be the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. but do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? what entertainment could that be to the deity? if it was any, he would not have been without it so long. or were these things made, as you almost assert, by god for the sake of men? was it for the wise? if so, then this great design was adopted for the sake of a very small number. or for the sake of fools? first of all, there was no reason why god should consult the advantage of the wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because they are fools? for what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly? besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn to think lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or to bear when they are come. x. they who affirm the world to be an animated and intelligent being have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that i shall speak more hereafter. at present i must express my surprise at the weakness of those who endeavor to make it out to be not only animated and immortal, but likewise happy, and round, because plato says that is the most beautiful form; whereas i think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a pyramid more beautiful. but what life do they attribute to that round deity? truly it is a being whirled about with a celerity to which nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can i imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion, the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. why, therefore, should it not be considered troublesome also to the deity? for the earth itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the deity. we see vast tracts of land barren and uninhabitable; some, because they are scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they are bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the sun is from them. therefore, if the world is a deity, as these are parts of the world, some of the deity's limbs must be said to be scorched, and some frozen. these are your doctrines, lucilius; but what those of others are i will endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient philosophers. thales the milesian, who first inquired after such subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that god was that mind which formed all things from water. if the gods can exist without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why did he annex a mind to water? it was anaximander's opinion that the gods were born; that after a great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. but what conception can we possibly have of a deity who is not eternal? anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is god, and that he was generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if air, which has no form, could possibly be god; for the deity must necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful form. besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject to mortality? xi. anaxagoras, who received his learning from anaximenes, was the first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself could feel no impulse. if he would have this mind to be a sort of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence that animal should receive its appellation. but what can be more internal than the mind? let it, therefore, be clothed with an external body. but this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed to it. alcmæon of crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he was ascribing immortality to mortal beings. pythagoras, who supposed the deity to be one soul, mixing with and pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider that the deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part of the deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. if the human mind were a deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? besides, how could that deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused into, the world? then xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any existence, with the addition of intellect, was god, is as liable to exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite. parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a crown. (he names it stephane.) it is an orb of constant light and heat around the heavens; this he calls god; in which there is no room to imagine any divine form or sense. and he uttered many other absurdities on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. the same honor he gives to the stars; but i shall forbear making any objections to his system here, having already done it in another place. xii. empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in his notion of the gods. he lays down four natures[84] as divine, from which he thinks that all things were made. yet it is evident that they have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense. protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the gods; for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there are or are not any, or what they are. what shall i say of democritus, who classes our images of objects, and their orbs, in the number of the gods; as he does that principle through which those images appear and have their influence? he deifies likewise our knowledge and understanding. is he not involved in a very great error? and because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely destroy the deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him? diogenes of apollonia looks upon the air to be a deity. but what sense can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it? it would be tedious to show the uncertainty of plato's opinion; for, in his timæus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of laws, he thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the deity. and as for his statement when he asserts that god is a being without any body--what the greeks call [greek: asômatos]--it is certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; for such a god must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the gods. he likewise asserts in his timæus, and in his laws, that the world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those gods which are delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the deity. these opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each other. xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. in those sayings which he has related of socrates, he introduces him disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the deity, and makes him assert the sun and the mind to be deities: he represents him likewise as affirming the being of one god only, and at another time of many; which are errors of almost the same kind which i before took notice of in plato. xiii. antisthenes, in his book called the natural philosopher, says that there are many national and one natural deity; but by this saying he destroys the power and nature of the gods. speusippus is not much less in the wrong; who, following his uncle plato, says that a certain incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out of our minds the knowledge of the gods. aristotle, in his third book of philosophy, confounds many things together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master plato. at one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another he asserts that the world is god. soon afterward he makes some other essence preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which, with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it. then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be god; not perceiving the firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had described as god. how can that divine sense of the firmament be preserved in so rapid a motion? and where do the multitude of gods dwell, if heaven itself is a deity? but when this philosopher says that god is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being. besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? or how, if it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy? xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head, for in his books concerning the nature of the gods no divine form is described; but he says the number of them is eight. five are moving planets;[85] the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which, dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are one single deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. but in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood. from the same school of plato, heraclides of pontus stuffed his books with puerile tales. sometimes he thinks the world a deity, at other times the mind. he attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars. he deprives the deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the same book again, he makes earth and heaven deities. the unsteadiness of theophrastus is equally intolerable. at one time he attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations. nor is his disciple strato, who is called the naturalist, any more worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution, but that it has no sense nor form. xiv. zeno (to come to your sect, balbus) thinks the law of nature to be the divinity, and that it has the power to force us to what is right, and to restrain us from what is wrong. how this law can be an animated being i cannot conceive; but that god is so we would certainly maintain. the same person says, in another place, that the sky is god; but can we possibly conceive that god is a being insensible, deaf to our prayers, our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us? in other books he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading all nature, indued with divine efficacy. he attributes the same power to the stars, to the years, to the months, and to the seasons. in his interpretation of hesiod's theogony,[86] he entirely destroys the established notions of the gods; for he excludes jupiter, juno, and vesta, and those esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his doctrine is that these are names which by some kind of allusion are given to mute and inanimate beings. the sentiments of his disciple aristo are not less erroneous. he thought it impossible to conceive the form of the deity, and asserts that the gods are destitute of sense; and he is entirely dubious whether the deity is an animated being or not. cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of zeno at the same time with aristo, in one place says that the world is god; in another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called the sky, is most certainly the deity. in the books he wrote against pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the gods to have a certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars; and, lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. so that this god, whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from which traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible form at all. xv. persæus, another disciple of zeno, says that they who have made discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as gods; and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have derived their names from those of the gods; so that he thinks it not sufficient to call them the discoveries of gods, but he urges that they themselves should be deemed divine. what can be more absurd than to ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among the gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss? chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the dreams of the stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown gods; and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts. for he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the spirit and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal effusion of its spirit, is god; that the superior part of that spirit, which is the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature, containing and preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is the power of fate, and the necessity of future events. he deifies fire also, and what i before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements which naturally proceed from it--water, earth, and air. he attributes divinity to the sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand container of all things, and to those men likewise who have obtained immortality. he maintains the sky to be what men call jupiter; the air, which pervades the sea, to be neptune; and the earth, ceres. in like manner he goes through the names of the other deities. he says that jupiter is that immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us in our manners; and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting verity of future events. but none of these are of such a nature as to seem to carry any indication of divine virtue in them. these are the doctrines contained in his first book of the nature of the gods. in the second, he endeavors to accommodate the fables of orpheus, musæus, hesiod, and homer to what he has advanced in the first, in order that the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of these things, may seem to have been stoics. diogenes the babylonian was a follower of the doctrine of chrysippus; and in that book which he wrote, entitled "a treatise concerning minerva," he separates the account of jupiter's bringing-forth, and the birth of that virgin, from the fabulous, and reduces it to a natural construction. xvi. thus far have i been rather exposing the dreams of dotards than giving the opinions of philosophers. not much more absurd than these are the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to the sweetness of their language; who have represented the gods as enraged with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our eyes their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions, discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their indulgences in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals. to these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the prodigious stories invented by the magi, and by the egyptians also, which were of the same nature, together with the extravagant notions of the multitude at all times, who, from total ignorance of the truth, are always fluctuating in uncertainty. now, whoever reflects on the rashness and absurdity of these tenets must inevitably entertain the highest respect and veneration for epicurus, and perhaps even rank him in the number of those beings who are the subject of this dispute; for he alone first founded the idea of the existence of the gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men. for what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a deity? epicurus calls this [greek: prolêpsis]; that is, an antecedent conception of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be understood, inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage of which reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of epicurus concerning the rule and judgment of things. xvii. here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. that opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. it must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as i said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the gods. as new things require new names, so that prenotion was called [greek: prolêpsis] by epicurus; an appellation never used before. on the same principle of reasoning, we think that the gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what epicurus hath declared in these words is true: "that which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail." we have said enough to prove that we should worship the gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question. for the superior and excellent nature of the gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. these apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. to confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the deity. xviii. with regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason. all men are told by nature that none but a human form can be ascribed to the gods; for under what other image did it ever appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having recourse to our first notions,[87] reason itself declares the same; for as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either because of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful, what composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form, what aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? your sect, lucilius (not like my friend cotta, who sometimes says one thing and sometimes another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. therefore, if the human form excels that of all other animal beings, as god himself is an animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most beautiful. besides, the gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the gods, therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood. though these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, i shall be more brief on the subject than otherwise i should be. epicurus, who not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and nature of the gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or reducible to number, like those things which, because of their firmness, he calls [greek: steremnia];[88] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition. as infinite kinds of those images result from innumerable individuals, and centre in the gods, our minds and understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is. xix. surely the mighty power of the infinite being is most worthy our great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part. this is called by epicurus [greek: isonomia]; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of things. from hence he draws this inference, that, as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved ought also to be countless. your sect, balbus, frequently ask us how the gods live, and how they pass their time? their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be conceived. they do nothing. they are embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. they rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. they are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures. xx. such a deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most laborious god. for let us suppose the world a deity--what can be a more uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? but nothing can be happy that is not at ease. or let us suppose a deity residing in the world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage and necessities of man. truly this deity is embarrassed with a very troublesome and laborious office. we make a happy life to consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from all employment. the philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. but, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have recourse to a deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. in this immensity of breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of bellows and anvils. thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom we must dread day and night. for who can be free from fear of a deity who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks all things his own; a curious, ever-busy god? hence first arose your [greek: heimarmenê], as you call it, your fatal necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal chain and continuance of causes. of what value is this philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate? then follows your [greek: mantikê], in latin called _divinatio_, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your prophets, and your fortune-tellers. epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty, we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others. we pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence which is above all excellence and perfection. but i fear my zeal for this doctrine has made me too prolix. however, i could not easily leave so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though i must confess i should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long. xxi. cotta, with his usual courtesy, then began. velleius, says he, were it not for something which you have advanced, i should have remained silent; for i have often observed, as i did just now upon hearing you, that i cannot so easily conceive why a proposition is true as why it is false. should you ask me what i take the nature of the gods to be, i should perhaps make no answer. but if you should ask whether i think it to be of that nature which you have described, i should answer that i was as far as possible from agreeing with you. however, before i enter on the subject of your discourse and what you have advanced upon it, i will give you my opinion of yourself. your intimate friend, l. crassus, has been often heard by me to say that you were beyond all question superior to all our learned romans; and that few epicureans in greece were to be compared to you. but as i knew what a wonderful esteem he had for you, i imagined that might make him the more lavish in commendation of you. now, however, though i do not choose to praise any one when present, yet i must confess that i think you have delivered your thoughts clearly on an obscure and very intricate subject; that you are not only copious in your sentiments, but more elegant in your language than your sect generally are. when i was at athens, i went often to hear zeno, by the advice of philo, who used to call him the chief of the epicureans; partly, probably, in order to judge more easily how completely those principles could be refuted after i had heard them stated by the most learned of the epicureans. and, indeed, he did not speak in any ordinary manner; but, like you, with clearness, gravity, and elegance; yet what frequently gave me great uneasiness when i heard him, as it did while i attended to you, was to see so excellent a genius falling into such frivolous (excuse my freedom), not to say foolish, doctrines. however, i shall not at present offer anything better; for, as i said before, we can in most subjects, especially in physics, sooner discover what is not true than what is. xxii. if you should ask me what god is, or what his character and nature are, i should follow the example of simonides, who, when hiero the tyrant proposed the same question to him, desired a day to consider of it. when he required his answer the next day, simonides begged two days more; and as he kept constantly desiring double the number which he had required before instead of giving his answer, hiero, with surprise, asked him his meaning in doing so: "because," says he, "the longer i meditate on it, the more obscure it appears to me." simonides, who was not only a delightful poet, but reputed a wise and learned man in other branches of knowledge, found, i suppose, so many acute and refined arguments occurring to him, that he was doubtful which was the truest, and therefore despaired of discovering any truth. but does your epicurus (for i had rather contend with him than with you) say anything that is worthy the name of philosophy, or even of common-sense? in the question concerning the nature of the gods, his first inquiry is, whether there are gods or not. it would be dangerous, i believe, to take the negative side before a public auditory; but it is very safe in a discourse of this kind, and in this company. i, who am a priest, and who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the gods, which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but proved to a demonstration; for many notions flow into and disturb the mind which sometimes seem to convince us that there are none. but see how candidly i will behave to you: as i shall not touch upon those tenets you hold in common with other philosophers, consequently i shall not dispute the existence of the gods, for that doctrine is agreeable to almost all men, and to myself in particular; but i am still at liberty to find fault with the reasons you give for it, which i think are very insufficient. xxiii. you have said that the general assent of men of all nations and all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge the being of the gods. this is not only a weak, but a false, argument; for, first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? i really believe there are many people so savage that they have no thoughts of a deity. what think you of diagoras, who was called the atheist; and of theodorus after him? did not they plainly deny the very essence of a deity? protagoras of abdera, whom you just now mentioned, the greatest sophist of his age, was banished by order of the athenians from their city and territories, and his books were publicly burned, because these words were in the beginning of his treatise concerning the gods: "i am unable to arrive at any knowledge whether there are, or are not, any gods." this treatment of him, i imagine, restrained many from professing their disbelief of a deity, since the doubt of it only could not escape punishment. what shall we say of the sacrilegious, the impious, and the perjured? if tubulus lucius, lupus, or carbo the son of neptune, as lucilius says, had believed that there were gods, would either of them have carried his perjuries and impieties to such excess? your reasoning, therefore, to confirm your assertion is not so conclusive as you think it is. but as this is the manner in which other philosophers have argued on the same subject, i will take no further notice of it at present; i rather choose to proceed to what is properly your own. i allow that there are gods. instruct me, then, concerning their origin; inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they have, and what is their course of life; for these i am desirous of knowing. you attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms. out of them you pretend that everything is made. but there are no atoms, for there is nothing without body; every place is occupied by body, therefore there can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom. xxiv. i advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which democritus, or before him leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain light corpuscles--some smooth, some rough, some round, some square, some crooked and bent as bows--which by a fortuitous concourse made heaven and earth, without the influence of any natural power. this opinion, c. velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you would sooner be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of that authority; for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you thought that you ought to profess yourself an epicurean; so that it was necessary that you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the philosophical character which you had taken upon you; and what could bribe you to renounce the epicurean opinion? nothing, you say, can prevail on you to forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life. but is that the truth? for i shall not contest your happy life, which you think the deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in idleness. but where is truth? is it in your innumerable worlds, some of which are rising, some falling, at every moment of time? or is it in your atomical corpuscles, which form such excellent works without the direction of any natural power or reason? but i was forgetting my liberality, which i had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding the bounds which i at first proposed to myself. granting, then, everything to be made of atoms, what advantage is that to your argument? for we are searching after the nature of the gods; and allowing them to be made of atoms, they cannot be eternal, because whatever is made of atoms must have had a beginning: if so, there were no gods till there was this beginning; and if the gods have had a beginning, they must necessarily have an end, as you have before contended when you were discussing plato's world. where, then, is your beatitude and immortality, in which two words you say that god is expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to the greatest perplexities? for you said that god had no body, but something like body; and no blood, but something like blood. xxv. it is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order that it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which has been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting you on every point: like epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms were allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary, invented an expedient, which escaped democritus, to avoid necessity. he says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they move a little obliquely. surely, to make such an assertion as this is what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves unable to defend the proposition. his practice is the same against the logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were granted, then, in such a proposition as "epicurus will be alive or dead to-morrow," either one or the other must necessarily be admitted; therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no. can anything show stupidity in a greater degree? zeno,[89] being pressed by arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. epicurus was afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible directors of truth. nothing can be more rash than this; for by endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. on the subject of the nature of the gods, he falls into the same errors. while he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the gods have body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no blood, but something like blood. xxvi. it seems an unaccountable thing how one soothsayer can refrain from laughing when he sees another. it is yet a greater wonder that you can refrain from laughing among yourselves. it is no body, but something like body! i could understand this if it were applied to statues made of wax or clay; but in regard to the deity, i am not able to discover what is meant by a quasi-body or quasi-blood. nor indeed are you, velleius, though you will not confess so much. for those precepts are delivered to you as dictates which epicurus carelessly blundered out; for he boasted, as we see in his writings, that he had no instructor, which i could easily believe without his public declaration of it, for the same reason that i could believe the master of a very bad edifice if he were to boast that he had no architect but himself: for there is nothing of the academy, nothing of the lyceum, in his doctrine; nothing but puerilities. he might have been a pupil of xenocrates. o ye immortal gods, what a teacher was he! and there are those who believe that he actually was his pupil; but he says otherwise, and i shall give more credit to his word than to another's. he confesses that he was a pupil of a certain disciple of plato, one pamphilus, at samos; for he lived there when he was young, with his father and his brothers. his father, neocles, was a farmer in those parts; but as the farm, i suppose, was not sufficient to maintain him, he turned school-master; yet epicurus treats this platonic philosopher with wonderful contempt, so fearful was he that it should be thought he had ever had any instruction. but it is well known he had been a pupil of nausiphanes, the follower of democritus; and since he could not deny it, he loaded him with insults in abundance. if he never heard a lecture on these democritean principles, what lectures did he ever hear? what is there in epicurus's physics that is not taken from democritus? for though he altered some things, as what i mentioned before of the oblique motions of the atoms, yet most of his doctrines are the same; his atoms--his vacuum--his images--infinity of space--innumerable worlds, their rise and decay--and almost every part of natural learning that he treats of. now, do you understand what is meant by quasi-body and quasi-blood? for i not only acknowledge that you are a better judge of it than i am, but i can bear it without envy. if any sentiments, indeed, are communicated without obscurity, what is there that velleius can understand and cotta not? i know what body is, and what blood is; but i cannot possibly find out the meaning of quasi-body and quasi-blood. not that you intentionally conceal your principles from me, as pythagoras did his from those who were not his disciples; or that you are intentionally obscure, like heraclitus. but the truth is (which i may venture to say in this company), you do not understand them yourself. xxvii. this, i perceive, is what you contend for, that the gods have a certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure, smooth, and transparent. let us suppose the same with the venus of cos, which is not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red, which is drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a certain resemblance of blood; so in epicurus's deity there is no real substance, but the resemblance of substance. let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then tell me what are the lineaments and figures of these sketched-out deities. here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the gods to be in human form. the first is, that our minds are so anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a deity the human shape occurs to us. the next is, that as the divine nature excels all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason cannot reside in any other shape. first, let us consider each argument separately. you seem to me to assume a principle, despotically i may say, that has no manner of probability in it. who was ever so blind, in contemplating these subjects, as not to see that the gods were represented in human form, either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of manners to the worship of the gods; or through superstition, which was the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to these images they were approaching the gods themselves. these conceits were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for it would not have been very easy to represent the gods planning and executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. but do not you, who are so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a sort of procuress, nature is to herself? do you think there is any creature on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with its own form? if it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored of a mare, or a horse of a cow? do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a dolphin prefers any shape to its own? if nature, therefore, has instructed us in the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than man, what wonder is it that we, for that reason, should imagine the gods are of the human form? do you suppose if beasts were endowed with reason that every one would not give the prize of beauty to his own species? xxviii. yet, by hercules (i speak as i think)! though i am fond enough of myself, i dare not say that i excel in beauty that bull which carried europa. for the question here is not concerning our genius and elocution, but our species and figure. if we could make and assume to ourselves any form, would you be unwilling to resemble the sea-triton as he is painted supported swimming on sea-monsters whose bodies are partly human? here i touch on a difficult point; for so great is the force of nature that there is no man who would not choose to be like a man, nor, indeed, any ant that would not be like an ant. but like what man? for how few can pretend to beauty! when i was at athens, the whole flock of youths afforded scarcely one. you laugh, i see; but what i tell you is the truth. nay, to us who, after the examples of ancient philosophers, delight in boys, defects are often pleasing. alcæus was charmed with a wart on a boy's knuckle; but a wart is a blemish on the body; yet it seemed a beauty to him. q. catulus, my friend and colleague's father, was enamored with your fellow-citizen roscius, on whom he wrote these verses: as once i stood to hail the rising day, roscius appearing on the left i spied: forgive me, gods, if i presume to say the mortal's beauty with th' immortal vied. roscius more beautiful than a god! yet he was then, as he now is, squint-eyed. but what signifies that, if his defects were beauties to catulus? xxix. i return to the gods. can we suppose any of them to be squint-eyed, or even to have a cast in the eye? have they any warts? are any of them hook-nosed, flap-eared, beetle-browed, or jolt-headed, as some of us are? or are they free from imperfections? let us grant you that. are they all alike in the face? for if they are many, then one must necessarily be more beautiful than another, and then there must be some deity not absolutely most beautiful. or if their faces are all alike, there would be an academy[90] in heaven; for if one god does not differ from another, there is no possibility of knowing or distinguishing them. what if your assertion, velleius, proves absolutely false, that no form occurs to us, in our contemplations on the deity, but the human? will you, notwithstanding that, persist in the defence of such an absurdity? supposing that form occurs to us, as you say it does, and we know jupiter, juno, minerva, neptune, vulcan, apollo, and the other deities, by the countenance which painters and statuaries have given them, and not only by their countenances, but by their decorations, their age, and attire; yet the egyptians, the syrians, and almost all barbarous nations,[91] are without such distinctions. you may see a greater regard paid by them to certain beasts than by us to the most sacred temples and images of the gods; for many shrines have been rifled, and images of the deities have been carried from their most sacred places by us; but we never heard that an egyptian offered any violence to a crocodile, an ibis, or a cat. what do you think, then? do not the egyptians esteem their sacred bull, their apis, as a deity? yes, by hercules! as certainly as you do our protectress juno, whom you never behold, even in your dreams, without a goat-skin, a spear, a shield, and broad sandals. but the grecian juno of argos and the roman juno are not represented in this manner; so that the grecians, the lanuvinians, and we, ascribe different forms to juno; and our capitoline jupiter is not the same with the jupiter ammon of the africans. xxx. therefore, ought not a natural philosopher--that is, an inquirer into the secrets of nature--to be ashamed of seeking a testimony to truth from minds prepossessed by custom? according to the rule you have laid down, it may be said that jupiter is always bearded, apollo always beardless; that minerva has gray and neptune azure eyes; and, indeed, we must then honor that vulcan at athens, made by alcamenes, whose lameness through his thin robes appears to be no deformity. shall we, therefore, receive a lame deity because we have such an account of him? consider, likewise, that the gods go by what names we give them. now, in the first place, they have as many names as men have languages; for vulcan is not called vulcan in italy, africa, or spain, as you are called velleius in all countries. besides, the gods are innumerable, though the list of their names is of no great length even in the records of our priests. have they no names? you must necessarily confess, indeed, they have none; for what occasion is there for different names if their persons are alike? how much more laudable would it be, velleius, to acknowledge that you do not know what you do not know than to follow a man whom you must despise! do you think the deity is like either me or you? you do not really think he is like either of us. what is to be done, then? shall i call the sun, the moon, or the sky a deity? if so, they are consequently happy. but what pleasures can they enjoy? and they are wise too. but how can wisdom reside in such shapes? these are your own principles. therefore, if they are not of human form, as i have proved, and if you cannot persuade yourself that they are of any other, why are you cautious of denying absolutely the being of any gods? you dare not deny it--which is very prudent in you, though here you are not afraid of the people, but of the gods themselves. i have known epicureans who reverence[92] even the least images of the gods, though i perceive it to be the opinion of some that epicurus, through fear of offending against the athenian laws, has allowed a deity in words and destroyed him in fact; so in those his select and short sentences, which are called by you [greek: kyriai doxai],[93] this, i think, is the first: "that being which is happy and immortal is not burdened with any labor, and does not impose any on any one else." xxxi. in his statement of this sentence, some think that he avoided speaking clearly on purpose, though it was manifestly without design. but they judge ill of a man who had not the least art. it is doubtful whether he means that there is any being happy and immortal, or that if there is any being happy, he must likewise be immortal. they do not consider that he speaks here, indeed, ambiguously; but in many other places both he and metrodorus explain themselves as clearly as you have done. but he believed there are gods; nor have i ever seen any one who was more exceedingly afraid of what he declared ought to be no objects of fear, namely, death and the gods, with the apprehensions of which the common rank of people are very little affected; but he says that the minds of all mortals are terrified by them. many thousands of men commit robberies in the face of death; others rifle all the temples they can get into: such as these, no doubt, must be greatly terrified, the one by the fears of death, and the others by the fear of the gods. but since you dare not (for i am now addressing my discourse to epicurus himself) absolutely deny the existence of the gods, what hinders you from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or some eternal mind? i never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in any but a human form. what! did you ever observe anything like the sun, the moon, or the five moving planets? the sun, terminating his course in two extreme parts of one circle,[94] finishes his annual revolutions. the moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the same course in the space of a month.[95] the five planets in the same circle, some nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same courses together, and finish them in different spaces of time. did you ever observe anything like this, epicurus? so that, according to you, there can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist but what we have touched or seen.[96] what! have you ever seen the deity himself? why else do you believe there is any? if this doctrine prevails, we must reject all that history relates or reason discovers; and the people who inhabit inland countries must not believe there is such a thing as the sea. this is so narrow a way of thinking that if you had been born in seriphus, and never had been from out of that island, where you had frequently been in the habit of seeing little hares and foxes, you would not, therefore, believe that there are such beasts as lions and panthers; and if any one should describe an elephant to you, you would think that he designed to laugh at you. xxxii. you indeed, velleius, have concluded your argument, not after the manner of your own sect, but of the logicians, to which your people are utter strangers. you have taken it for granted that the gods are happy. i allow it. you say that without virtue no one can be happy. i willingly concur with you in this also. you likewise say that virtue cannot reside where reason is not. that i must necessarily allow. you add, moreover, that reason cannot exist but in a human form. who, do you think, will admit that? if it were true, what occasion was there to come so gradually to it? and to what purpose? you might have answered it on your own authority. i perceive your gradations from happiness to virtue, and from virtue to reason; but how do you come from reason to human form? there, indeed, you do not descend by degrees, but precipitately. nor can i conceive why epicurus should rather say the gods are like men than that men are like the gods. you ask what is the difference; for, say you, if this is like that, that is like this. i grant it; but this i assert, that the gods could not take their form from men; for the gods always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the immortal gods are, must have had existence before mankind; consequently, the gods should not be said to be of human form, but our form should be called divine. however, let this be as you will. i now inquire how this extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny that reason had any share in the formation of things. but still, what was this extraordinary fortune? whence proceeded that happy concourse of atoms which gave so sudden a rise to men in the form of gods? are we to suppose the divine seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men sprung up in the likeness of their celestial sires? i wish you would assert it; for i should not be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to the gods. but you say nothing like it; no, our resemblance to the gods, it seems, was by chance. must i now seek for arguments to refute this doctrine seriously? i wish i could as easily discover what is true as i can overthrow what is false. xxxiii. you have enumerated with so ready a memory, and so copiously, the opinions of philosophers, from thales the milesian, concerning the nature of the gods, that i am surprised to see so much learning in a roman. but do you think they were all madmen who thought that a deity could by some possibility exist without hands and feet? does not even this consideration have weight with you when you consider what is the use and advantage of limbs in men, and lead you to admit that the gods have no need of them? what necessity can there be of feet, without walking; or of hands, if there is nothing to be grasped? the same may be asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain, nothing useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer that no art can imitate the skill of nature. shall the deity, then, have a tongue, and not speak--teeth, palate, and jaws, though he will have no use for them? shall the members which nature has given to the body for the sake of generation be useless to the deity? nor would the internal parts be less superfluous than the external. what comeliness is there in the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the rest of them, abstracted from their use? i mention these because you place them in the deity on account of the beauty of the human form. depending on these dreams, not only epicurus, metrodorus, and hermachus declaimed against pythagoras, plato, and empedocles, but that little harlot leontium presumed to write against theophrastus: indeed, she had a neat attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against theophrastus! so much did the garden of epicurus[97] abound with these liberties, and, indeed, you are always complaining against them. zeno wrangled. why need i mention albutius? nothing could be more elegant or humane than phædrus; yet a sharp expression would disgust the old man. epicurus treated aristotle with great contumely. he foully slandered phædo, the disciple of socrates. he pelted timocrates, the brother of his companion metrodorus, with whole volumes, because he disagreed with him in some trifling point of philosophy. he was ungrateful even to democritus, whose follower he was; and his master nausiphanes, from whom he learned nothing, had no better treatment from him. xxxiv. zeno gave abusive language not only to those who were then living, as apollodorus, syllus, and the rest, but he called socrates, who was the father of philosophy, the attic buffoon, using the latin word _scurra_. he never called chrysippus by any name but chesippus. and you yourself a little before, when you were numbering up a senate, as we may call them, of philosophers, scrupled not to say that the most eminent men talked like foolish, visionary dotards. certainly, therefore, if they have all erred in regard to the nature of the gods, it is to be feared there are no such beings. what you deliver on that head are all whimsical notions, and not worthy the consideration even of old women. for you do not seem to be in the least aware what a task you draw on yourselves, if you should prevail on us to grant that the same form is common to gods and men. the deity would then require the same trouble in dressing, and the same care of the body, that mankind does. he must walk, run, lie down, lean, sit, hold, speak, and discourse. you need not be told the consequence of making the gods male and female. therefore i cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to entertain these strange opinions. but you constantly insist on the certainty of this tenet, that the deity is both happy and immortal. supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not two feet? or cannot that blessedness or beatitude--call it which you will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)--can it not, i say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal mind that has not human shape or limbs? all you say against it is, that you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. what, then? did you ever see any world but this? no, you will say. why, therefore, do you presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand worlds, but that they are innumerable? reason tells you so. will not reason tell you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most excellent nature, we find none but the divine nature can be happy and eternal, so the same divine nature surpasses us in excellence of mind; and as in mind, so in body? why, therefore, as we are inferior in all other respects, should we be equal in form? for human virtue approaches nearer to the divinity than human form. xxxv. to return to the subject i was upon. what can be more childish than to assert that there are no such creatures as are generated in the red sea or in india? the most curious inquirer cannot arrive at the knowledge of all those creatures which inhabit the earth, sea, fens, and rivers; and shall we deny the existence of them because we never saw them? that similitude which you are so very fond of is nothing to the purpose. is not a dog like a wolf? and, as ennius says, the monkey, filthiest beast, how like to man! yet they differ in nature. no beast has more sagacity than an elephant; yet where can you find any of a larger size? i am speaking here of beasts. but among men, do we not see a disparity of manners in persons very much alike, and a similitude of manners in persons unlike? if this sort of argument were once to prevail, velleius, observe what it would lead to. you have laid it down as certain that reason cannot possibly reside in any but the human form. another may affirm that it can exist in none but a terrestrial being; in none but a being that is born, that grows up, and receives instruction, and that consists of a soul, and an infirm and perishable body; in short, in none but a mortal man. but if you decline those opinions, why should a single form disturb you? you perceive that man is possessed of reason and understanding, with all the infirmities which i have mentioned interwoven with his being; abstracted from which, you nevertheless know god, you say, if the lineaments do but remain. this is not talking considerately, but at a venture; for surely you did not think what an encumbrance anything superfluous or useless is, not only in a man, but a tree. how troublesome it is to have a finger too much! and why so? because neither use nor ornament requires more than five; but your deity has not only a finger more than he wants, but a head, a neck, shoulders, sides, a paunch, back, hams, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. are these parts necessary to immortality? are they conducive to the existence of the deity? is the face itself of use? one would rather say so of the brain, the heart, the lights, and the liver; for these are the seats of life. the features of the face contribute nothing to the preservation of it. xxxvi. you censured those who, beholding those excellent and stupendous works, the world, and its respective parts--the heaven, the earth, the seas--and the splendor with which they are adorned; who, contemplating the sun, moon, and stars; and who, observing the maturity and changes of the seasons, and vicissitudes of times, inferred from thence that there must be some excellent and eminent essence that originally made, and still moves, directs, and governs them. suppose they should mistake in their conjecture, yet i see what they aim at. but what is that great and noble work which appears to you to be the effect of a divine mind, and from which you conclude that there are gods? "i have," say you, "a certain information of a deity imprinted in my mind." of a bearded jupiter, i suppose, and a helmeted minerva. but do you really imagine them to be such? how much better are the notions of the ignorant vulgar, who not only believe the deities have members like ours, but that they make use of them; and therefore they assign them a bow and arrows, a spear, a shield, a trident, and lightning; and though they do not behold the actions of the gods, yet they cannot entertain a thought of a deity doing nothing. the egyptians (so much ridiculed) held no beasts to be sacred, except on account of some advantage which they had received from them. the ibis, a very large bird, with strong legs and a horny long beak, destroys a great number of serpents. these birds keep egypt from pestilential diseases by killing and devouring the flying serpents brought from the deserts of lybia by the south-west wind, which prevents the mischief that may attend their biting while alive, or any infection when dead. i could speak of the advantage of the ichneumon, the crocodile, and the cat; but i am unwilling to be tedious; yet i will conclude with observing that the barbarians paid divine honors to beasts because of the benefits they received from them; whereas your gods not only confer no benefit, but are idle, and do no single act of any description whatever. xxxvii. "they have nothing to do," your teacher says. epicurus truly, like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some sportive exercise. but we are to suppose the deity in such an inactive state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer happy. this doctrine divests the gods of motion and operation; besides, it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity. but let it be as you would have it, that the deity is in the form and image of a man. where is his abode? where is his habitation? where is the place where he is to be found? what is his course of life? and what is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys? for it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and enjoy what belongs to him. and with regard to place, even those natures which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all allotted to it. some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. there are some, also, which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering in burning furnaces. in the first place, therefore, i ask you, where is the habitation of your deity? secondly, what motive is it that stirs him from his place, supposing he ever moves? and, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their several natures, what is it that the deity affects, and to what purpose does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? in short, how is he happy? how eternal? whichever of these points you touch upon, i am afraid you will come lamely off. for there is never a proper end to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted likewise that the form of the deity is perceptible by the mind, but not by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be happy and everlasting. xxxviii. what, in the name of those deities concerning whom we are now disputing, is the meaning of all this? for if they exist only in thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there be between thinking of a hippocentaur and thinking of a deity? other philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion; but you term it "the approach and entrance of images into the mind." thus, when i imagine that i behold t. gracchus haranguing the people in the capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning m. octavius, i call that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of gracchus and octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind when they have arrived at the capitol. the case is the same, you say, in regard to the deity, with the frequent representation of which the mind is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that the gods[98] are happy and eternal. let it be granted that there are images by which the mind is affected, yet it is only a certain form that occurs; and why must that form be pronounced happy? why eternal? but what are those images you talk of, or whence do they proceed? this loose manner of arguing is taken from democritus; but he is reproved by many people for it; nor can you derive any conclusions from it: the whole system is weak and imperfect. for what can be more improbable than that the images of homer, archilochus, romulus, numa, pythagoras, and plato should come into my mind, and yet not in the form in which they existed? how, therefore, can they be those persons? and whose images are they? aristotle tells us that there never was such a person as orpheus the poet;[99] and it is said that the verse called orphic verse was the invention of cercops, a pythagorean; yet orpheus, that is to say, the image of him, as you will have it, often runs in my head. what is the reason that i entertain one idea of the figure of the same person, and you another? why do we image to ourselves such things as never had any existence, and which never can have, such as scyllas and chimæras? why do we frame ideas of men, countries, and cities which we never saw? how is it that the very first moment that i choose i can form representations of them in my mind? how is it that they come to me, even in my sleep, without being called or sought after? xxxix. the whole affair, velleius, is ridiculous. you do not impose images on our eyes only, but on our minds. such is the privilege which you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. but there is, you say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way that out of many some one at least must be perceived! i should be ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are continued in uninterrupted motion? or, if uninterrupted, still how do you prove them to be eternal? there is a constant supply, you say, of innumerable atoms. but must they, for that reason, be all eternal? to elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, i will call your [greek: isonomia]),[100] and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. by the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence themselves. i cannot conceive these your gods to have any. but how does all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? were there any such atoms (as there are not), they might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the immortality of your deity. xl. let us now inquire into his happiness. it is certain that without virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now your deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and consequently cannot be happy. what sort of life does he lead? he has a constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of bad. what are those good things? sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns to it. i do not suppose, velleius, that you are like some of the epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of epicurus,[101] in which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names distinctly. what food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to the gods to fill them with pleasures? the poets indeed provide them with banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a hebe or a ganymede to serve up the cup. but what is it, epicurus, that you do for them? for i do not see from whence your deity should have those things, nor how he could use them. therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a happy life than the nature of the gods, because men enjoy various kinds of pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which delight the senses only by a titillation, as epicurus calls it. where is to be the end of this trifling? even philo, who followed the academy, could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the epicureans despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly remembered and used to repeat many sentences of epicurus in the very words in which they were written. he likewise used to quote many, which were more gross, from metrodorus, the sage colleague of epicurus, who blamed his brother timocrates because he would not allow that everything which had any reference to a happy life was to be measured by the belly; nor has he said this once only, but often. you grant what i say, i perceive; for you know it to be true. i can produce the books, if you should deny it; but i am not now reproving you for referring all things to the standard of pleasure: that is another question. what i am now showing is, that your gods are destitute of pleasure; and therefore, according to your own manner of reasoning, they are not happy. xli. but they are free from pain. is that sufficient for beings who are supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? the deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. consider a little; reflect what a figure the deity would make if he were to be idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but "it is very well with me, and i am happy;" nor do i see why this happy deity should not fear being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are constantly floating off from him. your deity, therefore, is neither happy nor eternal. epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety towards the gods. but how does he speak on these subjects? you would say that you were listening to coruncanius or scævola, the high-priests, and not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots, and who overthrew the temples and altars of the immortal gods; not, indeed, with hands, like xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is there for your saying that men ought to worship the gods, when the gods not only do not regard men, but are entirely careless of everything, and absolutely do nothing at all? but they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a wise man is induced by their excellence to adore them. can there be any glory or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own happiness, and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything? besides, what piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? or how can you, or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no benefits? for piety is only justice towards the gods; but what right have they to it, when there is no communication whatever between the gods and men? and sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship them; but i do not understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are neither to receive nor expect any good from them. xlii. and why should we worship them from an admiration only of that nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced all belief in the power of the gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that diagoras or theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the gods, could possibly be superstitious. i do not suppose that even protagoras could, who doubted whether there were gods or not. the opinions of these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which arises from a vain fear of the gods, but of religion also, which consists in a pious adoration of them. what think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine concerning the immortal gods was the invention of politicians, whose view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason could not influence? are not their opinions subversive of all religion? or what religion did prodicus the chian leave to men, who held that everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the gods? were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the deities, at present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant, illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death? euhemerus, whom our ennius translated, and followed more than other authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the deaths and burials of the gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? i shall say nothing of that sacred and august eleusina, into whose mysteries the most distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in samothrace, or in lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things than discover the knowledge of the gods. xliii. even that great man democritus, from whose fountains epicurus watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual acuteness when speaking about the nature of the gods. for at one time he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds contained in the universe are gods; then he attributes divinity to animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and, lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are more worthy of the country[102] of democritus than of democritus himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration? but epicurus, when he divests the gods of the power of doing good, extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. for what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? to refuse your gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of their favor, and no gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, but even look on each other with the greatest indifference. xliv. how much more reasonable is the doctrine of the stoics, whom you censure? it is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country he belongs. but what evils do your principles bring, when you make good actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! for, not to mention the power and nature of the gods, you hold that even men, if they had no need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor beneficent. is there no natural charity in the dispositions of good men? the very name of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear to men;[103] and if friendship is to centre in our own advantage only, without regard to him whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called friendship, but a sort of traffic for our own profit. pastures, lands, and herds of cattle are valued in the same manner on account of the profit we gather from them; but charity and friendship expect no return. how much more reason have we to think that the gods, who want nothing, should love each other, and employ themselves about us! if it were not so, why should we pray to or adore them? why do the priests preside over the altars, and the augurs over the auspices? what have we to ask of the gods, and why do we prefer our vows to them? but epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. a trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for what sanctity can there be if the gods take no care of human affairs? or how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor performs anything? therefore our friend posidonius has well observed, in his fifth book of the nature of the gods, that epicurus believed there were no gods, and that what he had said about the immortal gods was only said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. he could not be so weak as to imagine that the deity has only the outward features of a simple mortal, without any real solidity; that he has all the members of a man, without the least power to use them--a certain unsubstantial pellucid being, neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither regarding nor doing anything. there can be no such being in nature; and as epicurus said this plainly, he allows the gods in words, and destroys them in fact; and if the deity is truly such a being that he shows no favor, no benevolence to mankind, away with him! for why should i entreat him to be propitious? he can be propitious to none, since, as you say, all his favor and benevolence are the effects of imbecility. * * * * * book ii. i. when cotta had thus concluded, velleius replied: i certainly was inconsiderate to engage in argument with an academician who is likewise a rhetorician. i should not have feared an academician without eloquence, nor a rhetorician without that philosophy, however eloquent he might be; for i am never puzzled by an empty flow of words, nor by the most subtle reasonings delivered without any grace of oratory. but you, cotta, have excelled in both. you only wanted the assembly and the judges. however, enough of this at present. now, let us hear what lucilius has to say, if it is agreeable to him. i had much rather, says balbus, hear cotta resume his discourse, and demonstrate the true gods with the same eloquence which he made use of to explode the false; for, on such a subject, the loose, unsettled doctrine of the academy does not become a philosopher, a priest, a cotta, whose opinions should be, like those we hold, firm and certain. epicurus has been more than sufficiently refuted; but i would willingly hear your own sentiments, cotta. do you forget, replies cotta, what i at first said--that it is easier for me, especially on this point, to explain what opinions those are which i do not hold, rather than what those are which i do? nay, even if i did feel some certainty on any particular point, yet, after having been so diffuse myself already, i would prefer now hearing you speak in your turn. i submit, says balbus, and will be as brief as i possibly can; for as you have confuted the errors of epicurus, my part in the dispute will be the shorter. our sect divide the whole question concerning the immortal gods into four parts. first, they prove that there are gods; secondly, of what character and nature they are; thirdly, that the universe is governed by them; and, lastly, that they exercise a superintendence over human affairs. but in this present discussion let us confine ourselves to the first two articles, and defer the third and fourth till another opportunity, as they require more time to discuss. by no means, says cotta, for we have time enough on our hands; besides that, we are now discussing a subject which should be preferred even to serious business. ii. the first point, then, says lucilius, i think needs no discourse to prove it; for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed? were it otherwise, ennius would not, with a universal approbation, have said, look up to the refulgent heaven above, which all men call, unanimously, jove. this is jupiter, the governor of the world, who rules all things with his nod, and is, as the same ennius adds, ----of gods and men the sire,[104] an omnipresent and omnipotent god. and if any one doubts this, i really do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is a sun or not. for what can possibly be more evident than this? and if it were not a truth universally impressed on the minds of men, the belief in it would never have been so firm; nor would it have been, as it is, increased by length of years, nor would it have gathered strength and stability through every age. and, in truth, we see that other opinions, being false and groundless, have already fallen into oblivion by lapse of time. who now believes in hippocentaurs and chimæras? or what old woman is now to be found so weak and ignorant as to stand in fear of those infernal monsters which once so terrified mankind? for time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it confirms the determinations of nature and of truth. and therefore it is that, both among us and among other nations, sacred institutions and the divine worship of the gods have been strengthened and improved from time to time. and this is not to be imputed to chance or folly, but to the frequent appearance of the gods themselves. in the war with the latins, when a. posthumius, the dictator, attacked octavius mamilius, the tusculan, at regillus, castor and pollux were seen fighting in our army on horseback; and since that the same offspring of tyndarus gave notice of the defeat of perses; for as p. vatienus, the grandfather of the present young man of that name, was coming in the night to rome from his government of reate, two young men on white horses appeared to him, and told him that king[105] perses was that day taken prisoner. this news he carried to the senate, who immediately threw him into prison for speaking inconsiderately on a state affair; but when it was confirmed by letters from paullus, he was recompensed by the senate with land and immunities.[106] nor do we forget when the locrians defeated the people of crotone, in a great battle on the banks of the river sagra, that it was known the same day at the olympic games. the voices of the fauns have been often heard, and deities have appeared in forms so visible that they have compelled every one who is not senseless, or hardened in impiety, to confess the presence of the gods. iii. what do predictions and foreknowledge of future events indicate, but that such future events are shown, pointed out, portended, and foretold to men? from whence they are called omens, signs, portents, prodigies. but though we should esteem fabulous what is said of mopsus,[107] tiresias,[108] amphiaraus,[109] calchas,[110] and helenus[111] (who would not have been delivered down to us as augurs even in fable if their art had been despised), may we not be sufficiently apprised of the power of the gods by domestic examples? will not the temerity of p. claudius, in the first punic war, affect us? who, when the poultry were let out of the coop and would not feed, ordered them to be thrown into the water, and, joking even upon the gods, said, with a sneer, "let them drink, since they will not eat;" which piece of ridicule, being followed by a victory over his fleet, cost him many tears, and brought great calamity on the roman people. did not his colleague junius, in the same war, lose his fleet in a tempest by disregarding the auspices? claudius, therefore, was condemned by the people, and junius killed himself. coelius says that p. flaminius, from his neglect of religion, fell at thrasimenus; a loss which the public severely felt. by these instances of calamity we may be assured that rome owes her grandeur and success to the conduct of those who were tenacious of their religious duties; and if we compare ourselves to our neighbors, we shall find that we are infinitely distinguished above foreign nations by our zeal for religious ceremonies, though in other things we may be only equal to them, and in other respects even inferior to them. ought we to contemn attius navius's staff, with which he divided the regions of the vine to find his sow?[112] i should despise it, if i were not aware that king hostilius had carried on most important wars in deference to his auguries; but by the negligence of our nobility the discipline of the augury is now omitted, the truth of the auspices despised, and only a mere form observed; so that the most important affairs of the commonwealth, even the wars, on which the public safety depends, are conducted without any auspices; the peremnia[113] are discussed; no part of the acumina[114] performed; no select men are called to witness to the military testaments;[115] our generals now begin their wars as soon as they have arranged the auspicia. the force of religion was so great among our ancestors that some of their commanders have, with their faces veiled, and with the solemn, formal expressions of religion, sacrificed themselves to the immortal gods to save their country.[116] i could mention many of the sibylline prophecies, and many answers of the haruspices, to confirm those things, which ought not to be doubted. iv. for example: our augurs and the etrurian haruspices saw the truth of their art established when p. scipio and c. figulus were consuls; for as tiberius gracchus, who was a second time consul, wished to proceed to a fresh election, the first rogator,[117] as he was collecting the suffrages, fell down dead on the spot. gracchus nevertheless went on with the assembly, but perceiving that this accident had a religious influence on the people, he brought the affair before the senate. the senate thought fit to refer it to those who usually took cognizance of such things. the haruspices were called, and declared that the man who had acted as rogator of the assembly had no right to do so; to which, as i have heard my father say, he replied with great warmth, have i no right, who am consul, and augur, and favored by the auspicia? and shall you, who are tuscans and barbarians, pretend that you have authority over the roman auspicia, and a right to give judgment in matters respecting the formality of our assemblies? therefore, he then commanded them to withdraw; but not long afterward he wrote from his province[118] to the college of augurs, acknowledging that in reading the books[119] he remembered that he had illegally chosen a place for his tent in the gardens of scipio, and had afterward entered the pomoerium, in order to hold a senate, but that in repassing the same pomoerium he had forgotten to take the auspices; and that, therefore, the consuls had been created informally. the augurs laid the case before the senate. the senate decreed that they should resign their charge, and so they accordingly abdicated. what greater example need we seek for? the wisest, perhaps the most excellent of men, chose to confess his fault, which he might have concealed, rather than leave the public the least atom of religious guilt; and the consuls chose to quit the highest office in the state, rather than fill it for a moment in defiance of religion. how great is the reputation of the augurs! and is not the art of the soothsayers divine? and must not every one who sees what innumerable instances of the same kind there are confess the existence of the gods? for they who have interpreters must certainly exist themselves; now, there are interpreters of the gods; therefore we must allow there are gods. but it may be said, perhaps, that all predictions are not accomplished. we may as well conclude there is no art of physic, because all sick persons do not recover. the gods show us signs of future events; if we are occasionally deceived in the results, it is not to be imputed to the nature of the gods, but to the conjectures of men. all nations agree that there are gods; the opinion is innate, and, as it were, engraved in the minds of all men. the only point in dispute among us is, what they are. v. their existence no one denies. cleanthes, one of our sect, imputes the way in which the idea of the gods is implanted in the minds of men to four causes. the first is that which i just now mentioned--the foreknowledge of future things. the second is the great advantages which we enjoy from the temperature of the air, the fertility of the earth, and the abundance of various benefits of other kinds. the third cause is deduced from the terror with which the mind is affected by thunder, tempests, storms, snow, hail, devastation, pestilence, earthquakes often attended with hideous noises, showers of stones, and rain like drops of blood; by rocks and sudden openings of the earth; by monstrous births of men and beasts; by meteors in the air, and blazing stars, by the greeks called _cometæ_, by us _crinitæ_, the appearance of which, in the late octavian war,[120] were foreboders of great calamities; by two suns, which, as i have heard my father say, happened in the consulate of tuditanus and aquillius, and in which year also another sun (p. africanus) was extinguished. these things terrified mankind, and raised in them a firm belief of the existence of some celestial and divine power. his fourth cause, and that the strongest, is drawn from the regularity of the motion and revolution of the heavens, the distinctness, variety, beauty, and order of the sun, moon, and all the stars, the appearance only of which is sufficient to convince us they are not the effects of chance; as when we enter into a house, or school, or court, and observe the exact order, discipline, and method of it, we cannot suppose that it is so regulated without a cause, but must conclude that there is some one who commands, and to whom obedience is paid. it is quite impossible for us to avoid thinking that the wonderful motions, revolutions, and order of those many and great bodies, no part of which is impaired by the countless and infinite succession of ages, must be governed and directed by some supreme intelligent being. vi. chrysippus, indeed, had a very penetrating genius; yet such is the doctrine which he delivers, that he seems rather to have been instructed by nature than to owe it to any discovery of his own. "if," says he, "there is anything in the universe which no human reason, ability, or power can make, the being who produced it must certainly be preferable to man. now, celestial bodies, and all those things which proceed in any eternal order, cannot be made by man; the being who made them is therefore preferable to man. what, then, is that being but a god? if there be no such thing as a deity, what is there better than man, since he only is possessed of reason, the most excellent of all things? but it is a foolish piece of vanity in man to think there is nothing preferable to him. there is, therefore, something preferable; consequently, there is certainly a god." when you behold a large and beautiful house, surely no one can persuade you it was built for mice and weasels, though you do not see the master; and would it not, therefore, be most manifest folly to imagine that a world so magnificently adorned, with such an immense variety of celestial bodies of such exquisite beauty, and that the vast sizes and magnitude of the sea and land were intended as the abode of man, and not as the mansion of the immortal gods? do we not also plainly see this, that all the most elevated regions are the best, and that the earth is the lowest region, and is surrounded with the grossest air? so that as we perceive that in some cities and countries the capacities of men are naturally duller, from the thickness of the climate, so mankind in general are affected by the heaviness of the air which surrounds the earth, the grossest region of the world. yet even from this inferior intelligence of man we may discover the existence of some intelligent agent that is divine, and wiser than ourselves; for, as socrates says in xenophon, from whence had man his portion of understanding? and, indeed, if any one were to push his inquiries about the moisture and heat which is diffused through the human body, and the earthy kind of solidity existing in our entrails, and that soul by which we breathe, and to ask whence we derived them, it would be plain that we have received one thing from the earth, another from liquid, another from fire, and another from that air which we inhale every time that we breathe. vii. but where did we find that which excels all these things--i mean reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding, thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? shall the world be possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one, which is the most important and valuable of all? but certainly there is nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world; and not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive anything superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be the most excellent. who is not compelled to admit the truth of what i assert by that agreeable, uniform, and continued agreement of things in the universe? could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be covered with snow? or, if such a number of things regulated their own changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? could the flux and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the increase or wane of the moon? could the different courses of the stars be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? could these things subsist, i say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit? if these points are handled in a free and copious manner, as i purpose to do, they will be less liable to the cavils of the academics; but the narrow, confined way in which zeno reasoned upon them laid them more open to objection; for as running streams are seldom or never tainted, while standing waters easily grow corrupt, so a fluency of expression washes away the censures of the caviller, while the narrow limits of a discourse which is too concise is almost defenceless; for the arguments which i am enlarging upon are thus briefly laid down by zeno: viii. "that which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing is superior to the world; the world, therefore, reasons." by the same rule the world may be proved to be wise, happy, and eternal; for the possession of all these qualities is superior to the want of them; and nothing is superior to the world; the inevitable consequence of which argument is, that the world, therefore, is a deity. he goes on: "no part of anything void of sense is capable of perception; some parts of the world have perception; the world, therefore, has sense." he proceeds, and pursues the argument closely. "nothing," says he, "that is destitute itself of life and reason can generate a being possessed of life and reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of life and reason; the world, therefore, is not itself destitute of life and reason." he concludes his argument in his usual manner with a simile: "if well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the slightest doubt that there was in the olive-tree itself some kind of skill and knowledge? or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious lutes, surely you would infer, on the same principle, that music was contained in the plane-tree. why, then, should we not believe the world is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings out of itself?" ix. but as i have been insensibly led into a length of discourse beyond my first design (for i said that, as the existence of the gods was evident to all, there was no need of any long oration to prove it), i will demonstrate it by reasons deduced from the nature of things. for it is a fact that all beings which take nourishment and increase contain in themselves a power of natural heat, without which they could neither be nourished nor increase. for everything which is of a warm and fiery character is agitated and stirred up by its own motion. but that which is nourished and grows is influenced by a certain regular and equable motion. and as long as this motion remains in us, so long does sense and life remain; but the moment that it abates and is extinguished, we ourselves decay and perish. by arguments like these, cleanthes shows how great is the power of heat in all bodies. he observes that there is no food so gross as not to be digested in a night and a day; and that even in the excrementitious parts, which nature rejects, there remains a heat. the veins and arteries seem, by their continual quivering, to resemble the agitation of fire; and it has often been observed when the heart of an animal is just plucked from the body that it palpitates with such visible motion as to resemble the rapidity of fire. everything, therefore, that has life, whether it be animal or vegetable, owes that life to the heat inherent in it; it is this nature of heat which contains in itself the vital power which extends throughout the whole world. this will appear more clearly on a more close explanation of this fiery quality, which pervades all things. every division, then, of the world (and i shall touch upon the most considerable) is sustained by heat; and first it may be observed in earthly substances that fire is produced from stones by striking or rubbing one against another; that "the warm earth smokes"[121] when just turned up, and that water is drawn warm from well-springs; and this is most especially the case in the winter season, because there is a great quantity of heat contained in the caverns of the earth; and this becomes more dense in the winter, and on that account confines more closely the innate heat which is discoverable in the earth. x. it would require a long dissertation, and many reasons would require to be adduced, to show that all the seeds which the earth conceives, and all those which it contains having been generated from itself, and fixed in roots and trunks, derive all their origin and increase from the temperature and regulation of heat. and that even every liquor has a mixture of heat in it is plainly demonstrated by the effusion of water; for it would not congeal by cold, nor become solid, as ice or snow, and return again to its natural state, if it were not that, when heat is applied to it, it again becomes liquefied and dissolved, and so diffuses itself. therefore, by northern and other cold winds it is frozen and hardened, and in turn it dissolves and melts again by heat. the seas likewise, we find, when agitated by winds, grow warm, so that from this fact we may understand that there is heat included in that vast body of water; for we cannot imagine it to be external and adventitious heat, but such as is stirred up by agitation from the deep recesses of the seas; and the same thing takes place with respect to our bodies, which grow warm with motion and exercise. and the very air itself, which indeed is the coldest element, is by no means void of heat; for there is a great quantity, arising from the exhalations of water, which appears to be a sort of steam occasioned by its internal heat, like that of boiling liquors. the fourth part of the universe is entirely fire, and is the source of the salutary and vital heat which is found in the rest. from hence we may conclude that, as all parts of the world are sustained by heat, the world itself also has such a great length of time subsisted from the same cause; and so much the more, because we ought to understand that that hot and fiery principle is so diffused over universal nature that there is contained in it a power and cause of generation and procreation, from which all animate beings, and all those creatures of the vegetable world, the roots of which are contained in the earth, must inevitably derive their origin and their increase. xi. it is nature, consequently, that continues and preserves the world, and that, too, a nature which is not destitute of sense and reason; for in every essence that is not simple, but composed of several parts, there must be some predominant quality--as, for instance, the mind in man, and in beasts something resembling it, from which arise all the appetites and desires for anything. as for trees, and all the vegetable produce of the earth, it is thought to be in their roots. i call that the predominant quality,[122] which the greeks call [greek: hêgemonikon]; which must and ought to be the most excellent quality, wherever it is found. that, therefore, in which the prevailing quality of all nature resides must be the most excellent of all things, and most worthy of the power and pre-eminence over all things. now, we see that there is nothing in being that is not a part of the universe; and as there are sense and reason in the parts of it, there must therefore be these qualities, and these, too, in a more energetic and powerful degree, in that part in which the predominant quality of the world is found. the world, therefore, must necessarily be possessed of wisdom; and that element, which embraces all things, must excel in perfection of reason. the world, therefore, is a god, and the whole power of the world is contained in that divine element. the heat also of the world is more pure, clear, and lively, and, consequently, better adapted to move the senses than the heat allotted to us; and it vivifies and preserves all things within the compass of our knowledge. it is absurd, therefore, to say that the world, which is endued with a perfect, free, pure, spirituous, and active heat, is not sensitive, since by this heat men and beasts are preserved, and move, and think; more especially since this heat of the world is itself the sole principle of agitation, and has no external impulse, but is moved spontaneously; for what can be more powerful than the world, which moves and raises that heat by which it subsists? xii. for let us listen to plato, who is regarded as a god among philosophers. he says that there are two sorts of motion, one innate and the other external; and that that which is moved spontaneously is more divine than that which is moved by another power. this self-motion he places in the mind alone, and concludes that the first principle of motion is derived from the mind. therefore, since all motion arises from the heat of the world, and that heat is not moved by the effect of any external impulse, but of its own accord, it must necessarily be a mind; from whence it follows that the world is animated. on such reasoning is founded this opinion, that the world is possessed of understanding, because it certainly has more perfections in itself than any other nature; for as there is no part of our bodies so considerable as the whole of us, so it is clear that there is no particular portion of the universe equal in magnitude to the whole of it; from whence it follows that wisdom must be an attribute of the world; otherwise man, who is a part of it, and possessed of reason, would be superior to the entire world. and thus, if we proceed from the first rude, unfinished natures to the most superior and perfect ones, we shall inevitably come at last to the nature of the gods. for, in the first place, we observe that those vegetables which are produced out of the earth are supported by nature, and she gives them no further supply than is sufficient to preserve them by nourishing them and making them grow. to beasts she has given sense and motion, and a faculty which directs them to what is wholesome, and prompts them to shun what is noxious to them. on man she has conferred a greater portion of her favor; inasmuch as she has added reason, by which he is enabled to command his passions, to moderate some, and to subdue others. xiii. in the fourth and highest degree are those beings which are naturally wise and good, who from the first moment of their existence are possessed of right and consistent reason, which we must consider superior to man and deserving to be attributed to a god; that is to say, to the world, in which it is inevitable that that perfect and complete reason should be inherent. nor is it possible that it should be said with justice that there is any arrangement of things in which there cannot be something entire and perfect. for as in a vine or in beasts we see that nature, if not prevented by some superior violence, proceeds by her own appropriate path to her destined end; and as in painting, architecture, and the other arts there is a point of perfection which is attainable, and occasionally attained, so it is even much more necessary that in universal nature there must be some complete and perfect result arrived at. many external accidents may happen to all other natures which may impede their progress to perfection, but nothing can hinder universal nature, because she is herself the ruler and governor of all other natures. that, therefore, must be the fourth and most elevated degree to which no other power can approach. but this degree is that on which the nature of all things is placed; and since she is possessed of this, and she presides over all things, and is subject to no possible impediment, the world must necessarily be an intelligent and even a wise being. but how marvellously great is the ignorance of those men who dispute the perfection of that nature which encircles all things; or who, allowing it to be infinitely perfect, yet deny it to be, in the first place, animated, then reasonable, and, lastly, prudent and wise! for how without these qualities could it be infinitely perfect? if it were like vegetables, or even like beasts, there would be no more reason for thinking it extremely good than extremely bad; and if it were possessed of reason, and had not wisdom from the beginning, the world would be in a worse condition than man; for man may grow wise, but the world, if it were destitute of wisdom through an infinite space of time past, could never acquire it. thus it would be worse than man. but as that is absurd to imagine, the world must be esteemed wise from all eternity, and consequently a deity: since there is nothing existing that is not defective, except the universe, which is well provided, and fully complete and perfect in all its numbers and parts. xiv. for chrysippus says, very acutely, that as the case is made for the buckler, and the scabbard for the sword, so all things, except the universe, were made for the sake of something else. as, for instance, all those crops and fruits which the earth produces were made for the sake of animals, and animals for man; as, the horse for carrying, the ox for the plough, the dog for hunting and for a guard. but man himself was born to contemplate and imitate the world, being in no wise perfect, but, if i may so express myself, a particle of perfection; but the world, as it comprehends all, and as nothing exists that is not contained in it, is entirely perfect. in what, therefore, can it be defective, since it is perfect? it cannot want understanding and reason, for they are the most desirable of all qualities. the same chrysippus observes also, by the use of similitudes, that everything in its kind, when arrived at maturity and perfection, is superior to that which is not--as, a horse to a colt, a dog to a puppy, and a man to a boy--so whatever is best in the whole universe must exist in some complete and perfect being. but nothing is more perfect than the world, and nothing better than virtue. virtue, therefore, is an attribute of the world. but human nature is not perfect, and nevertheless virtue is produced in it: with how much greater reason, then, do we conceive it to be inherent in the world! therefore the world has virtue, and it is also wise, and consequently a deity. xv. the divinity of the world being now clearly perceived, we must acknowledge the same divinity to be likewise in the stars, which are formed from the lightest and purest part of the ether, without a mixture of any other matter; and, being altogether hot and transparent, we may justly say they have life, sense, and understanding. and cleanthes thinks that it may be established by the evidence of two of our senses--feeling and seeing--that they are entirely fiery bodies; for the heat and brightness of the sun far exceed any other fire, inasmuch as it enlightens the whole universe, covering such a vast extent of space, and its power is such that we perceive that it not only warms, but often even burns: neither of which it could do if it were not of a fiery quality. since, then, says he, the sun is a fiery body, and is nourished by the vapors of the ocean (for no fire can continue without some sustenance), it must be either like that fire which we use to warm us and dress our food, or like that which is contained in the bodies of animals. and this fire, which the convenience of life requires, is the devourer and consumer of everything, and throws into confusion and destroys whatever it reaches. on the contrary, the corporeal heat is full of life, and salutary; and vivifies, preserves, cherishes, increases, and sustains all things, and is productive of sense; therefore, says he, there can be no doubt which of these fires the sun is like, since it causes all things in their respective kinds to flourish and arrive to maturity; and as the fire of the sun is like that which is contained in the bodies of animated beings, the sun itself must likewise be animated, and so must the other stars also, which arise out of the celestial ardor that we call the sky, or firmament. as, then, some animals are generated in the earth, some in the water, and some in the air, aristotle[123] thinks it ridiculous to imagine that no animal is formed in that part of the universe which is the most capable to produce them. but the stars are situated in the ethereal space; and as this is an element the most subtle, whose motion is continual, and whose force does not decay, it follows, of necessity, that every animated being which is produced in it must be endowed with the quickest sense and the swiftest motion. the stars, therefore, being there generated, it is a natural inference to suppose them endued with such a degree of sense and understanding as places them in the rank of gods. xvi. for it may be observed that they who inhabit countries of a pure, clear air have a quicker apprehension and a readier genius than those who live in a thick, foggy climate. it is thought likewise that the nature of a man's diet has an effect on the mind; therefore it is probable that the stars are possessed of an excellent understanding, inasmuch as they are situated in the ethereal part of the universe, and are nourished by the vapors of the earth and sea, which are purified by their long passage to the heavens. but the invariable order and regular motion of the stars plainly manifest their sense and understanding; for all motion which seems to be conducted with reason and harmony supposes an intelligent principle, that does not act blindly, or inconsistently, or at random. and this regularity and consistent course of the stars from all eternity indicates not any natural order, for it is pregnant with sound reason, not fortune (for fortune, being a friend to change, despises consistency). it follows, therefore, that they move spontaneously by their own sense and divinity. aristotle also deserves high commendation for his observation that everything that moves is either put in motion by natural impulse, or by some external force, or of its own accord; and that the sun, and moon, and all the stars move; but that those things which are moved by natural impulse are either borne downward by their weight, or upward by their lightness; neither of which things could be the case with the stars, because they move in a regular circle and orbit. nor can it be said that there is some superior force which causes the stars to be moved in a manner contrary to nature. for what superior force can there be? it follows, therefore, that their motion must be voluntary. and whoever is convinced of this must discover not only great ignorance, but great impiety likewise, if he denies the existence of the gods; nor is the difference great whether a man denies their existence, or deprives them of all design and action; for whatever is wholly inactive seems to me not to exist at all. their existence, therefore, appears so plain that i can scarcely think that man in his senses who denies it. xvii. it now remains that we consider what is the character of the gods. nothing is more difficult than to divert our thoughts and judgment from the information of our corporeal sight, and the view of objects which our eyes are accustomed to; and it is this difficulty which has had such an influence on the unlearned, and on philosophers[124] also who resembled the unlearned multitude, that they have been unable to form any idea of the immortal gods except under the clothing of the human figure; the weakness of which opinion cotta has so well confuted that i need not add my thoughts upon it. but as the previous idea which we have of the deity comprehends two things--first of all, that he is an animated being; secondly, that there is nothing in all nature superior to him--i do not see what can be more consistent with this idea and preconception than to attribute a mind and divinity to the world,[125] the most excellent of all beings. epicurus may be as merry with this notion as he pleases; a man not the best qualified for a joker, as not having the wit and sense of his country.[126] let him say that a voluble round deity is to him incomprehensible; yet he shall never dissuade me from a principle which he himself approves, for he is of opinion there are gods when he allows that there must be a nature excellently perfect. but it is certain that the world is most excellently perfect: nor is it to be doubted that whatever has life, sense, reason, and understanding must excel that which is destitute of these things. it follows, then, that the world has life, sense, reason, and understanding, and is consequently a deity. but this shall soon be made more manifest by the operation of these very things which the world causes. xviii. in the mean while, velleius, let me entreat you not to be always saying that we are utterly destitute of every sort of learning. the cone, you say, the cylinder, and the pyramid, are more beautiful to you than the sphere. this is to have different eyes from other men. but suppose they are more beautiful to the sight only, which does not appear to me, for i can see nothing more beautiful than that figure which contains all others, and which has nothing rough in it, nothing offensive, nothing cut into angles, nothing broken, nothing swelling, and nothing hollow; yet as there are two forms most esteemed,[127] the globe in solids (for so the greek word [greek: sphaira], i think, should be construed), and the circle, or orb, in planes (in greek, [greek: kyklos]); and as they only have an exact similitude of parts in which every extreme is equally distant from the centre, what can we imagine in nature to be more just and proper? but if you have never raked into this learned dust[128] to find out these things, surely, at all events, you natural philosophers must know that equality of motion and invariable order could not be preserved in any other figure. nothing, therefore, can be more illiterate than to assert, as you are in the habit of doing, that it is doubtful whether the world is round or not, because it may possibly be of another shape, and that there are innumerable worlds of different forms; which epicurus, if he ever had learned that two and two are equal to four, would not have said. but while he judges of what is best by his palate, he does not look up to the "palace of heaven," as ennius calls it. xix. for as there are two sorts of stars,[129] one kind of which measure their journey from east to west by immutable stages, never in the least varying from their usual course, while the other completes a double revolution with an equally constant regularity; from each of these facts we demonstrate the volubility of the world (which could not possibly take place in any but a globular form) and the circular orbits of the stars. and first of all the sun, which has the chief rank among all the stars, is moved in such a manner that it fills the whole earth with its light, and illuminates alternately one part of the earth, while it leaves the other in darkness. the shadow of the earth interposing causes night; and the intervals of night are equal to those of day. and it is the regular approaches and retreats of the sun from which arise the regulated degrees of cold and heat. his annual circuit is in three hundred and sixty-five days, and nearly six hours more.[130] at one time he bends his course to the north, at another to the south, and thus produces summer and winter, with the other two seasons, one of which succeeds the decline of winter, and the other that of summer. and so to these four changes of the seasons we attribute the origin and cause of all the productions both of sea and land. the moon completes the same course every month which the sun does in a year. the nearer she approaches to the sun, the dimmer light does she yield, and when most remote from it she shines with the fullest brilliancy; nor are her figure and form only changed in her wane, but her situation likewise, which is sometimes in the north and sometimes in the south. by this course she has a sort of summer and winter solstices; and by her influence she contributes to the nourishment and increase of animated beings, and to the ripeness and maturity of all vegetables. xx. but most worthy our admiration is the motion of those five stars which are falsely called wandering stars; for they cannot be said to wander which keep from all eternity their approaches and retreats, and have all the rest of their motions, in one regular constant and established order. what is yet more wonderful in these stars which we are speaking of is that sometimes they appear, and sometimes they disappear; sometimes they advance towards the sun, and sometimes they retreat; sometimes they precede him, and sometimes follow him; sometimes they move faster, sometimes slower, and sometimes they do not stir in the least, but for a while stand still. from these unequal motions of the planets, mathematicians have called that the "great year"[131] in which the sun, moon, and five wandering stars, having finished their revolutions, are found in their original situation. in how long a time this is effected is much disputed, but it must be a certain and definite period. for the planet saturn (called by the greeks [greek: phainon]), which is farthest from the earth, finishes his course in about thirty years; and in his course there is something very singular, for sometimes he moves before the sun, sometimes he keeps behind it; at one time lying hidden in the night, at another again appearing in the morning; and ever performing the same motions in the same space of time without any alteration, so as to be for infinite ages regular in these courses. beneath this planet, and nearer the earth, is jupiter, called [greek: phaethôn], which passes the same orbit of the twelve signs[132] in twelve years, and goes through exactly the same variety in its course that the star of saturn does. next to jupiter is the planet mars (in greek, [greek: pyroeis]), which finishes its revolution through the same orbit as the two previously mentioned,[133] in twenty-four months, wanting six days, as i imagine. below this is mercury (called by the greeks [greek: stilbôn]), which performs the same course in little less than a year, and is never farther distant from the sun than the space of one sign, whether it precedes or follows it. the lowest of the five planets, and nearest the earth, is that of venus (called in greek [greek: phôsphoros]). before the rising of the sun, it is called the morning-star, and after the setting, the evening-star. it has the same revolution through the zodiac, both as to latitude and longitude, with the other planets, in a year, and never is more than two[134] signs from the sun, whether it precedes or follows it. xxi. i cannot, therefore, conceive that this constant course of the planets, this just agreement in such various motions through all eternity, can be preserved without a mind, reason, and consideration; and since we may perceive these qualities in the stars, we cannot but place them in the rank of gods. those which are called the fixed stars have the same indications of reason and prudence. their motion is daily, regular, and constant. they do not move with the sky, nor have they an adhesion to the firmament, as they who are ignorant of natural philosophy affirm. for the sky, which is thin, transparent, and suffused with an equal heat, does not seem by its nature to have power to whirl about the stars, or to be proper to contain them. the fixed stars, therefore, have their own sphere, separate and free from any conjunction with the sky. their perpetual courses, with that admirable and incredible regularity of theirs, so plainly declare a divine power and mind to be in them, that he who cannot perceive that they are also endowed with divine power must be incapable of all perception whatever. in the heavens, therefore, there is nothing fortuitous, unadvised, inconstant, or variable: all there is order, truth, reason, and constancy; and all the things which are destitute of these qualities are counterfeit, deceitful, and erroneous, and have their residence about the earth[135] beneath the moon, the lowest of all the planets. he, therefore, who believes that this admirable order and almost incredible regularity of the heavenly bodies, by which the preservation and entire safety of all things is secured, is destitute of intelligence, must be considered to be himself wholly destitute of all intellect whatever. i think, then, i shall not deceive myself in maintaining this dispute upon the principle of zeno, who went the farthest in his search after truth. xxii. zeno, then, defines nature to be "an artificial fire, proceeding in a regular way to generation;" for he thinks that to create and beget are especial properties of art, and that whatever may be wrought by the hands of our artificers is much more skilfully performed by nature, that is, by this artificial fire, which is the master of all other arts. according to this manner of reasoning, every particular nature is artificial, as it operates agreeably to a certain method peculiar to itself; but that universal nature which embraces all things is said by zeno to be not only artificial, but absolutely the artificer, ever thinking and providing all things useful and proper; and as every particular nature owes its rise and increase to its own proper seed, so universal nature has all her motions voluntary, has affections and desires (by the greeks called [greek: hormas]) productive of actions agreeable to them, like us, who have sense and understanding to direct us. such, then, is the intelligence of the universe; for which reason it may be properly termed prudence or providence (in greek, [greek: pronoia]), since her chiefest care and employment is to provide all things fit for its duration, that it may want nothing, and, above all, that it may be adorned with all perfection of beauty and ornament. xxiii. thus far have i spoken concerning the universe, and also of the stars; from whence it is apparent that there is almost an infinite number of gods, always in action, but without labor or fatigue; for they are not composed of veins, nerves, and bones; their food and drink are not such as cause humors too gross or too subtle; nor are their bodies such as to be subject to the fear of falls or blows, or in danger of diseases from a weariness of limbs. epicurus, to secure his gods from such accidents, has made them only outlines of deities, void of action; but our gods being of the most beautiful form, and situated in the purest region of the heavens, dispose and rule their course in such a manner that they seem to contribute to the support and preservation of all things. besides these, there are many other natures which have with reason been deified by the wisest grecians, and by our ancestors, in consideration of the benefits derived from them; for they were persuaded that whatever was of great utility to human kind must proceed from divine goodness, and the name of the deity was applied to that which the deity produced, as when we call corn ceres, and wine bacchus; whence that saying of terence,[136] without ceres and bacchus, venus starves. and any quality, also, in which there was any singular virtue was nominated a deity, such as faith and wisdom, which are placed among the divinities in the capitol; the last by æmilius scaurus, but faith was consecrated before by atilius calatinus. you see the temple of virtue and that of honor repaired by m. marcellus, erected formerly, in the ligurian war, by q. maximus. need i mention those dedicated to help, safety, concord, liberty, and victory, which have been called deities, because their efficacy has been so great that it could not have proceeded from any but from some divine power? in like manner are the names of cupid, voluptas, and of lubentine venus consecrated, though they were things vicious and not natural, whatever velleius may think to the contrary, for they frequently stimulate nature in too violent a manner. everything, then, from which any great utility proceeded was deified; and, indeed, the names i have just now mentioned are declaratory of the particular virtue of each deity. xxiv. it has been a general custom likewise, that men who have done important service to the public should be exalted to heaven by fame and universal consent. thus hercules, castor and pollux, æsculapius, and liber became gods (i mean liber[137] the son of semele, and not him[138] whom our ancestors consecrated in such state and solemnity with ceres and libera; the difference in which may be seen in our mysteries.[139] but because the offsprings of our bodies are called "liberi" (children), therefore the offsprings of ceres are called liber and libera (libera[140] is the feminine, and liber the masculine); thus likewise romulus, or quirinus--for they are thought to be the same--became a god. they are justly esteemed as deities, since their souls subsist and enjoy eternity, from whence they are perfect and immortal beings. there is another reason, too, and that founded on natural philosophy, which has greatly contributed to the number of deities; namely, the custom of representing in human form a crowd of gods who have supplied the poets with fables, and filled mankind with all sorts of superstition. zeno has treated of this subject, but it has been discussed more at length by cleanthes and chrysippus. all greece was of opinion that coelum was castrated by his son saturn,[141] and that saturn was chained by his son jupiter. in these impious fables, a physical and not inelegant meaning is contained; for they would denote that the celestial, most exalted, and ethereal nature--that is, the fiery nature, which produces all things by itself--is destitute of that part of the body which is necessary for the act of generation by conjunction with another. xxv. by saturn they mean that which comprehends the course and revolution of times and seasons; the greek name for which deity implies as much, for he is called [greek: kronos,] which is the same with [greek: chronos], that is, a "space of time." but he is called saturn, because he is filled (_saturatur_) with years; and he is usually feigned to have devoured his children, because time, ever insatiable, consumes the rolling years; but to restrain him from immoderate haste, jupiter has confined him to the course of the stars, which are as chains to him. jupiter (that is, _juvans pater_) signifies a "helping father," whom, by changing the cases, we call jove,[142] _a juvando_. the poets call him "father of gods and men;"[143] and our ancestors "the most good, the most great;" and as there is something more glorious in itself, and more agreeable to others, to be good (that is, beneficent) than to be great, the title of "most good" precedes that of "most great." this, then, is he whom ennius means in the following passage, before quoted- look up to the refulgent heaven above, which all men call, unanimously, jove: which is more plainly expressed than in this other passage[144] of the same poet- on whose account i'll curse that flood of light, whate'er it is above that shines so bright. our augurs also mean the same, when, for the "thundering and lightning heaven," they say the "thundering and lightning jove." euripides, among many excellent things, has this: the vast, expanded, boundless sky behold, see it with soft embrace the earth enfold; this own the chief of deities above, and this acknowledge by the name of jove. xxvi. the air, according to the stoics, which is between the sea and the heaven, is consecrated by the name of juno, and is called the sister and wife of jove, because it resembles the sky, and is in close conjunction with it. they have made it feminine, because there is nothing softer. but i believe it is called juno, _a juvando_ (from helping). to make three separate kingdoms, by fable, there remained yet the water and the earth. the dominion of the sea is given, therefore, to neptune, a brother, as he is called, of jove; whose name, neptunus--as _portunus, a portu_, from a port--is derived _a nando_ (from swimming), the first letters being a little changed. the sovereignty and power over the earth is the portion of a god, to whom we, as well as the greeks, have given a name that denotes riches (in latin, _dis_; in greek, [greek: ploutôn]), because all things arise from the earth and return to it. he forced away proserpine (in greek called [greek: persephonê]), by which the poets mean the "seed of corn," from whence comes their fiction of ceres, the mother of proserpine, seeking for her daughter, who was hidden from her. she is called ceres, which is the same as geres--_a gerendis frugibus_[145]--"from bearing fruit," the first letter of the word being altered after the manner of the greeks, for by them she is called [greek: dêmêtêr], the same as [greek: gêmêtêr].[146] again, he (_qui magna vorteret_) "who brings about mighty changes" is called mavors; and minerva is so called because (_minueret_, or _minaretur_) she diminishes or menaces. xxvii. and as the beginnings and endings of all things are of the greatest importance, therefore they would have their sacrifices to begin with janus.[147] his name is derived _ab eundo_, from passing; from whence thorough passages are called _jani_, and the outward doors of common houses are called _januæ_. the name of vesta is, from the greeks, the same with their [greek: hestia]. her province is over altars and hearths; and in the name of this goddess, who is the keeper of all things within, prayers and sacrifices are concluded. the _dii penates_, "household gods," have some affinity with this power, and are so called either from _penus_, "all kind of human provisions," or because _penitus insident_ (they reside within), from which, by the poets, they are called _penetrales_ also. apollo, a greek name, is called _sol_, the sun; and diana, _luna_, the moon. the sun (_sol_) is so named either because he is _solus_ (alone), so eminent above all the stars; or because he obscures all the stars, and appears alone as soon as he rises. _luna_, the moon, is so called _a lucendo_ (from shining); she bears the name also of lucina: and as in greece the women in labor invoke diana lucifera, so here they invoke juno lucina. she is likewise called diana _omnivaga_, not _a venando_ (from hunting), but because she is reckoned one of the seven stars that seem to wander.[148] she is called diana because she makes a kind of day of the night;[149] and presides over births, because the delivery is effected sometimes in seven, or at most in nine, courses of the moon; which, because they make _mensa spatia_ (measured spaces), are called _menses_ (months). this occasioned a pleasant observation of timæus (as he has many). having said in his history that "the same night in which alexander was born, the temple of diana at ephesus was burned down," he adds, "it is not in the least to be wondered at, because diana, being willing to assist at the labor of olympias,[150] was absent from home." but to this goddess, because _ad res omnes veniret_--"she has an influence upon all things"--we have given the appellation of venus,[151] from whom the word _venustas_ (beauty) is rather derived than venus from _venustas_. xxviii. do you not see, therefore, how, from the productions of nature and the useful inventions of men, have arisen fictitious and imaginary deities, which have been the foundation of false opinions, pernicious errors, and wretched superstitions? for we know how the different forms of the gods--their ages, apparel, ornaments; their pedigrees, marriages, relations, and everything belonging to them--are adapted to human weakness and represented with our passions; with lust, sorrow, and anger, according to fabulous history: they have had wars and combats, not only, as homer relates, when they have interested themselves in two different armies, but when they have fought battles in their own defence against the titans and giants. these stories, of the greatest weakness and levity, are related and believed with the most implicit folly. but, rejecting these fables with contempt, a deity is diffused in every part of nature; in earth under the name of ceres, in the sea under the name of neptune, in other parts under other names. yet whatever they are, and whatever characters and dispositions they have, and whatever name custom has given them, we are bound to worship and adore them. the best, the chastest, the most sacred and pious worship of the gods is to reverence them always with a pure, perfect, and unpolluted mind and voice; for our ancestors, as well as the philosophers, have separated superstition from religion. they who prayed whole days and sacrificed, that their children might survive them (_ut superstites essent_), were called superstitious, which word became afterward more general; but they who diligently perused, and, as we may say, read or practised over again, all the duties relating to the worship of the gods, were called _religiosi_--religious, from _relegendo_--"reading over again, or practising;" as _elegantes_, elegant, _ex eligendo_, "from choosing, making a good choice;" _diligentes_, diligent, _ex diligendo_, "from attending on what we love;" _intelligentes_, intelligent, from understanding--for the signification is derived in the same manner. thus are the words superstitious and religious understood; the one being a term of reproach, the other of commendation. i think i have now sufficiently demonstrated that there are gods, and what they are. xxix. i am now to show that the world is governed by the providence of the gods. this is an important point, which you academics endeavor to confound; and, indeed, the whole contest is with you, cotta; for your sect, velleius, know very little of what is said on different subjects by other schools. you read and have a taste only for your own books, and condemn all others without examination. for instance, when you mentioned yesterday[152] that prophetic old dame [greek: pronoia], providence, invented by the stoics, you were led into that error by imagining that providence was made by them to be a particular deity that governs the whole universe, whereas it is only spoken in a short manner; as when it is said "the commonwealth of athens is governed by the council," it is meant "of the areopagus;"[153] so when we say "the world is governed by providence," we mean "by the providence of the gods." to express ourselves, therefore, more fully and clearly, we say, "the world is governed by the providence of the gods." be not, therefore, lavish of your railleries, of which your sect has little to spare: if i may advise you, do not attempt it. it does not become you, it is not your talent, nor is it in your power. this is not applied to you in particular who have the education and politeness of a roman, but to all your sect in general, and especially to your leader[154]--a man unpolished, illiterate, insulting, without wit, without reputation, without elegance. xxx. i assert, then, that the universe, with all its parts, was originally constituted, and has, without any cessation, been ever governed by the providence of the gods. this argument we stoics commonly divide into three parts; the first of which is, that the existence of the gods being once known, it must follow that the world is governed by their wisdom; the second, that as everything is under the direction of an intelligent nature, which has produced that beautiful order in the world, it is evident that it is formed from animating principles; the third is deduced from those glorious works which we behold in the heavens and the earth. first, then, we must either deny the existence of the gods (as democritus and epicurus by their doctrine of images in some sort do), or, if we acknowledge that there are gods, we must believe they are employed, and that, too, in something excellent. now, nothing is so excellent as the administration of the universe. the universe, therefore, is governed by the wisdom of the gods. otherwise, we must imagine that there is some cause superior to the deity, whether it be a nature inanimate, or a necessity agitated by a mighty force, that produces those beautiful works which we behold. the nature of the gods would then be neither supreme nor excellent, if you subject it to that necessity or to that nature, by which you would make the heaven, the earth, and the seas to be governed. but there is nothing superior to the deity; the world, therefore, must be governed by him: consequently, the deity is under no obedience or subjection to nature, but does himself rule over all nature. in effect, if we allow the gods have understanding, we allow also their providence, which regards the most important things; for, can they be ignorant of those important things, and how they are to be conducted and preserved, or do they want power to sustain and direct them? ignorance is inconsistent with the nature of the gods, and imbecility is repugnant to their majesty. from whence it follows, as we assert, that the world is governed by the providence of the gods. xxxi. but supposing, which is incontestable, that there are gods, they must be animated, and not only animated, but endowed with reason--united, as we may say, in a civil agreement and society, and governing together one universe, as a republic or city. thus the same reason, the same verity, the same law, which ordains good and prohibits evil, exists in the gods as it does in men. from them, consequently, we have prudence and understanding, for which reason our ancestors erected temples to the mind, faith, virtue, and concord. shall we not then allow the gods to have these perfections, since we worship the sacred and august images of them? but if understanding, faith, virtue, and concord reside in human kind, how could they come on earth, unless from heaven? and if we are possessed of wisdom, reason, and prudence, the gods must have the same qualities in a greater degree; and not only have them, but employ them in the best and greatest works. the universe is the best and greatest work; therefore it must be governed by the wisdom and providence of the gods. lastly, as we have sufficiently shown that those glorious and luminous bodies which we behold are deities--i mean the sun, the moon, the fixed and wandering stars, the firmament, and the world itself, and those other things also which have any singular virtue, and are of any great utility to human kind--it follows that all things are governed by providence and a divine mind. but enough has been said on the first part. xxxii. it is now incumbent on me to prove that all things are subjected to nature, and most beautifully directed by her. but, first of all, it is proper to explain precisely what that nature is, in order to come to the more easy understanding of what i would demonstrate. some think that nature is a certain irrational power exciting in bodies the necessary motions. others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by order and method, designing some end in every cause, and always aiming at that end, whose works express such skill as no art, no hand, can imitate; for, they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, however small it is, if it falls into a place proper for its reception, and meets with matter conducive to its nourishment and increase, it forms and produces everything in its respective kind; either vegetables, which receive their nourishment from their roots; or animals, endowed with motion, sense, appetite, and abilities to beget their likeness. some apply the word nature to everything; as epicurus does, who acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a vacuum, and their accidents. but when we[155] say that nature forms and governs the world, we do not apply it to a clod of earth, or piece of stone, or anything of that sort, whose parts have not the necessary cohesion,[156] but to a tree, in which there is not the appearance of chance, but of order and a resemblance of art. xxxiii. but if the art of nature gives life and increase to vegetables, without doubt it supports the earth itself; for, being impregnated with seeds, she produces every kind of vegetable, and embracing their roots, she nourishes and increases them; while, in her turn, she receives her nourishment from the other elements, and by her exhalations gives proper sustenance to the air, the sky, and all the superior bodies. if nature gives vigor and support to the earth, by the same reason she has an influence over the rest of the world; for as the earth gives nourishment to vegetables, so the air is the preservation of animals. the air sees with us, hears with us, and utters sounds with us; without it, there would be no seeing, hearing, or sounding. it even moves with us; for wherever we go, whatever motion we make, it seems to retire and give place to us. that which inclines to the centre, that which rises from it to the surface, and that which rolls about the centre, constitute the universal world, and make one entire nature; and as there are four sorts of bodies, the continuance of nature is caused by their reciprocal changes; for the water arises from the earth, the air from the water, and the fire from the air; and, reversing this order, the air arises from fire, the water from the air, and from the water the earth, the lowest of the four elements, of which all beings are formed. thus by their continual motions backward and forward, upward and downward, the conjunction of the several parts of the universe is preserved; a union which, in the beauty we now behold it, must be eternal, or at least of a very long duration, and almost for an infinite space of time; and, whichever it is, the universe must of consequence be governed by nature. for what art of navigating fleets, or of marshalling an army, and--to instance the produce of nature--what vine, what tree, what animated form and conformation of their members, give us so great an indication of skill as appears in the universe? therefore we must either deny that there is the least trace of an intelligent nature, or acknowledge that the world is governed by it. but since the universe contains all particular beings, as well as their seeds, can we say that it is not itself governed by nature? that would be the same as saying that the teeth and the beard of man are the work of nature, but that the man himself is not. thus the effect would be understood to be greater than the cause. xxxiv. now, the universe sows, as i may say, plants, produces, raises, nourishes, and preserves what nature administers, as members and parts of itself. if nature, therefore, governs them, she must also govern the universe. and, lastly, in nature's administration there is nothing faulty. she produced the best possible effect out of those elements which existed. let any one show how it could have been better. but that can never be; and whoever attempts to mend it will either make it worse, or aim at impossibilities. but if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that nothing could be better for use or beauty, let us consider whether this is the effect of chance, or whether, in such a state they could possibly cohere, but by the direction of wisdom and divine providence. nature, therefore, cannot be void of reason, if art can bring nothing to perfection without it, and if the works of nature exceed those of art. how is it consistent with common-sense that when you view an image or a picture, you imagine it is wrought by art; when you behold afar off a ship under sail, you judge it is steered by reason and art; when you see a dial or water-clock,[157] you believe the hours are shown by art, and not by chance; and yet that you should imagine that the universe, which contains all arts and the artificers, can be void of reason and understanding? but if that sphere which was lately made by our friend posidonius, the regular revolutions of which show the course of the sun, moon, and five wandering stars, as it is every day and night performed, were carried into scythia or britain, who, in those barbarous countries, would doubt that that sphere had been made so perfect by the exertion of reason? xxxv. yet these people[158] doubt whether the universe, from whence all things arise and are made, is not the effect of chance, or some necessity, rather than the work of reason and a divine mind. according to them, archimedes shows more knowledge in representing the motions of the celestial globe than nature does in causing them, though the copy is so infinitely beneath the original. the shepherd in attius,[159] who had never seen a ship, when he perceived from a mountain afar off the divine vessel of the argonauts, surprised and frighted at this new object, expressed himself in this manner: what horrid bulk is that before my eyes, which o'er the deep with noise and vigor flies? it turns the whirlpools up, its force so strong, and drives the billows as it rolls along. the ocean's violence it fiercely braves; runs furious on, and throws about the waves. swiftly impetuous in its course, and loud, like the dire bursting of a show'ry cloud; or, like a rock, forced by the winds and rain, now whirl'd aloft, then plunged into the main. but hold! perhaps the earth and neptune jar, and fiercely wage an elemental war; or triton with his trident has o'erthrown his den, and loosen'd from the roots the stone; the rocky fragment, from the bottom torn, is lifted up, and on the surface borne. at first he is in suspense at the sight of this unknown object; but on seeing the young mariners, and hearing their singing, he says, like sportive dolphins, with their snouts they roar;[160] and afterward goes on, loud in my ears methinks their voices ring, as if i heard the god sylvanus sing. as at first view the shepherd thinks he sees something inanimate and insensible, but afterward, judging by more trustworthy indications, he begins to figure to himself what it is; so philosophers, if they are surprised at first at the sight of the universe, ought, when they have considered the regular, uniform, and immutable motions of it, to conceive that there is some being that is not only an inhabitant of this celestial and divine mansion, but a ruler and a governor, as architect of this mighty fabric. xxxvi. now, in my opinion, they[161] do not seem to have even the least suspicion that the heavens and earth afford anything marvellous. for, in the first place, the earth is situated in the middle part of the universe, and is surrounded on all sides by the air, which we breathe, and which is called "aer,"[162] which, indeed, is a greek word; but by constant use it is well understood by our countrymen, for, indeed, it is employed as a latin word. the air is encompassed by the boundless ether (sky), which consists of the fires above. this word we borrow also, for we use _æther_ in latin as well as _aer;_ though pacuvius thus expresses it, --this, of which i speak, in latin's _coelum_, _æther_ call'd in greek. as though he were not a greek into whose mouth he puts this sentence; but he is speaking in latin, though we listen as if he were speaking greek; for, as he says elsewhere, his speech discovers him a grecian born. but to return to more important matters. in the sky innumerable fiery stars exist, of which the sun is the chief, enlightening all with his refulgent splendor, and being by many degrees larger than the whole earth; and this multitude of vast fires are so far from hurting the earth, and things terrestrial, that they are of benefit to them; whereas, if they were moved from their stations, we should inevitably be burned through the want of a proper moderation and temperature of heat. xxxvii. is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made by their fortuitous concourse? he who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as legibly to form the annals of ennius. i doubt whether fortune could make a single verse of them. how, therefore, can these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, which have no color, no quality--which the greeks call [greek: poiotês], no sense? or that there are innumerable worlds, some rising and some perishing, in every moment of time? but if a concourse of atoms can make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city, which are works of less labor and difficulty? certainly those men talk so idly and inconsiderately concerning this lower world that they appear to me never to have contemplated the wonderful magnificence of the heavens; which is the next topic for our consideration. well, then, did aristotle[163] observe: "if there were men whose habitations had been always underground, in great and commodious houses, adorned with statues and pictures, furnished with everything which they who are reputed happy abound with; and if, without stirring from thence, they should be informed of a certain divine power and majesty, and, after some time, the earth should open, and they should quit their dark abode to come to us, where they should immediately behold the earth, the seas, the heavens; should consider the vast extent of the clouds and force of the winds; should see the sun, and observe his grandeur and beauty, and also his generative power, inasmuch as day is occasioned by the diffusion of his light through the sky; and when night has obscured the earth, they should contemplate the heavens bespangled and adorned with stars, the surprising variety of the moon in her increase and wane, the rising and setting of all the stars, and the inviolable regularity of their courses; when," says he, "they should see these things, they would undoubtedly conclude that there are gods, and that these are their mighty works." xxxviii. thus far aristotle. let us imagine, also, as great darkness as was formerly occasioned by the irruption of the fires of mount ætna, which are said to have obscured the adjacent countries for two days to such a degree that no man could recognize his fellow; but on the third, when the sun appeared, they seemed to be risen from the dead. now, if we should be suddenly brought from a state of eternal darkness to see the light, how beautiful would the heavens seem! but our minds have become used to it from the daily practice and habituation of our eyes, nor do we take the trouble to search into the principles of what is always in view; as if the novelty, rather than the importance, of things ought to excite us to investigate their causes. is he worthy to be called a man who attributes to chance, not to an intelligent cause, the constant motion of the heavens, the regular courses of the stars, the agreeable proportion and connection of all things, conducted with so much reason that our intellect itself is unable to estimate it rightly? when we see machines move artificially, as a sphere, a clock, or the like, do we doubt whether they are the productions of reason? and when we behold the heavens moving with a prodigious celerity, and causing an annual succession of the different seasons of the year, which vivify and preserve all things, can we doubt that this world is directed, i will not say only by reason, but by reason most excellent and divine? for without troubling ourselves with too refined a subtlety of discussion, we may use our eyes to contemplate the beauty of those things which we assert have been arranged by divine providence. xxxix. first, let us examine the earth, whose situation is in the middle of the universe,[164] solid, round, and conglobular by its natural tendency; clothed with flowers, herbs, trees, and fruits; the whole in multitudes incredible, and with a variety suitable to every taste: let us consider the ever-cool and running springs, the clear waters of the rivers, the verdure of their banks, the hollow depths of caves, the cragginess of rocks, the heights of impending mountains, and the boundless extent of plains, the hidden veins of gold and silver, and the infinite quarries of marble. what and how various are the kinds of animals, tame or wild? the flights and notes of birds? how do the beasts live in the fields and in the forests? what shall i say of men, who, being appointed, as we may say, to cultivate the earth, do not suffer its fertility to be choked with weeds, nor the ferocity of beasts to make it desolate; who, by the houses and cities which they build, adorn the fields, the isles, and the shores? if we could view these objects with the naked eye, as we can by the contemplation of the mind, nobody, at such a sight, would doubt there was a divine intelligence. but how beautiful is the sea! how pleasant to see the extent of it! what a multitude and variety of islands! how delightful are the coasts! what numbers and what diversity of inhabitants does it contain; some within the bosom of it, some floating on the surface, and others by their shells cleaving to the rocks! while the sea itself, approaching to the land, sports so closely to its shores that those two elements appear to be but one. next above the sea is the air, diversified by day and night: when rarefied, it possesses the higher region; when condensed, it turns into clouds, and with the waters which it gathers enriches the earth by the rain. its agitation produces the winds. it causes heat and cold according to the different seasons. it sustains birds in their flight; and, being inhaled, nourishes and preserves all animated beings. xl. add to these, which alone remaineth to be mentioned, the firmament of heaven, a region the farthest from our abodes, which surrounds and contains all things. it is likewise called ether, or sky, the extreme bounds and limits of the universe, in which the stars perform their appointed courses in a most wonderful manner; among which, the sun, whose magnitude far surpasses the earth, makes his revolution round it, and by his rising and setting causes day and night; sometimes coming near towards the earth, and sometimes going from it, he every year makes two contrary reversions[165] from the extreme point of its course. in his retreat the earth seems locked up in sadness; in his return it appears exhilarated with the heavens. the moon, which, as mathematicians demonstrate, is bigger than half the earth, makes her revolutions through the same spaces[166] as the sun; but at one time approaching, and at another receding from, the sun, she diffuses the light which she has borrowed from him over the whole earth, and has herself also many various changes in her appearance. when she is found under the sun, and opposite to it, the brightness of her rays is lost; but when the earth directly interposes between the moon and sun, the moon is totally eclipsed. the other wandering stars have their courses round the earth in the same spaces,[167] and rise and set in the same manner; their motions are sometimes quick, sometimes slow, and often they stand still. there is nothing more wonderful, nothing more beautiful. there is a vast number of fixed stars, distinguished by the names of certain figures, to which we find they have some resemblance. xli. i will here, says balbus, looking at me, make use of the verses which, when you were young, you translated from aratus,[168] and which, because they are in latin, gave me so much delight that i have many of them still in my memory. as then, we daily see, without any change or variation, --the rest[169] swiftly pursue the course to which they're bound; and with the heavens the days and nights go round; the contemplation of which, to a mind desirous of observing the constancy of nature, is inexhaustible. the extreme top of either point is call'd the pole.[170] about this the two [greek: arktoi] are turned, which never set; of these, the greeks one cynosura call, the other helice.[171] the brightest stars,[172] indeed, of helice are discernible all night, which are by us septentriones call'd. cynosura moves about the same pole, with a like number of stars, and ranged in the same order: this[173] the phoenicians choose to make their guide when on the ocean in the night they ride. adorned with stars of more refulgent light, the other[174] shines, and first appears at night. though this is small, sailors its use have found; more inward is its course, and short its round. xlii. the aspect of those stars is the more admirable, because, the dragon grim between them bends his way, as through the winding banks the currents stray, and up and down in sinuous bending rolls.[175] his whole form is excellent; but the shape of his head and the ardor of his eyes are most remarkable. various the stars which deck his glittering head; his temples are with double glory spread; from his fierce eyes two fervid lights afar flash, and his chin shines with one radiant star; bow'd is his head; and his round neck he bends, and to the tail of helice[176] extends. the rest of the dragon's body we see[177] at every hour in the night. here[178] suddenly the head a little hides itself, where all its parts, which are in sight, and those unseen in the same place unite. near to this head is placed the figure of a man that moves weary and sad, which the greeks engonasis do call, because he's borne[179] about with bended knee. near him is placed the crown with a refulgent lustre graced. this indeed is at his back; but anguitenens (the snake-holder) is near his head:[180] the greeks him ophiuchus call, renown'd the name. he strongly grasps the serpent round with both his hands; himself the serpent folds beneath his breast, and round his middle holds; yet gravely he, bright shining in the skies, moves on, and treads on nepa's[181] breast and eyes. the septentriones[182] are followed by- arctophylax,[183] that's said to be the same which we boötes call, who has the name, because he drives the greater bear along yoked to a wain. besides, in boötes, a star of glittering rays about his waist, arcturus called, a name renown'd, is placed.[184] beneath which is the virgin of illustrious form, whose hand holds a bright spike. xliii. and truly these signs are so regularly disposed that a divine wisdom evidently appears in them: beneath the bear's[185] head have the twins their seat, under his chest the crab, beneath his feet the mighty lion darts a trembling flame.[186] the charioteer on the left side of gemini we see,[187] and at his head behold fierce helice; on his left shoulder the bright goat appears. but to proceed- this is indeed a great and glorious star, on th' other side the kids, inferior far, yield but a slender light to mortal eyes. under his feet the horned bull,[188] with sturdy limbs, is placed: his head is spangled with a number of stars; these by the greeks are called the hyades, from raining; for [greek: hyein] is to rain: therefore they are injudiciously called _suculæ_ by our people, as if they had their name from [greek: hys], a sow, and not from [greek: hyô]. behind the lesser bear, cepheus[189] follows with extended hands, for close behind the lesser bear he comes. before him goes cassiopea[190] with a faintish light; but near her moves (fair and illustrious sight!) andromeda,[191] who, with an eager pace, seems to avoid her parent's mournful face.[192] with glittering mane the horse[193] now seems to tread, so near he comes, on her refulgent head; with a fair star, that close to him appears, a double form[194] and but one light he wears; by which he seems ambitious in the sky an everlasting knot of stars to tie. near him the ram, with wreathed horns, is placed; by whom the fishes[195] are; of which one seems to haste somewhat before the other, to the blast of the north wind exposed. xliv. perseus is described as placed at the feet of andromeda: and him the sharp blasts of the north wind beat. near his left knee, but dim their light, their seat the small pleiades[196] maintain. we find, not far from them, the lyre[197] but slightly join'd. next is the winged bird,[198] that seems to fly beneath the spacious covering of the sky. near the head of the horse[199] lies the right hand of aquarius, then all aquarius himself.[200] then capricorn, with half the form of beast, breathes chill and piercing colds from his strong breast, and in a spacious circle takes his round; when him, while in the winter solstice bound, the sun has visited with constant light, he turns his course, and shorter makes the night.[201] not far from hence is seen the scorpion[202] rising lofty from below; by him the archer,[203] with his bended bow; near him the bird, with gaudy feathers spread; and the fierce eagle[204] hovers o'er his head. next comes the dolphin;[205] then bright orion,[206] who obliquely moves; he is followed by the fervent dog,[207] bright with refulgent stars: next the hare follows[208] unwearied in his course. at the dog's tail argo[209] moves on, and moving seems to sail; o'er her the ram and fishes have their place;[210] the illustrious vessel touches, in her pace, the river's banks;[211] which you may see winding and extending itself to a great length. the fetters[212] at the fishes' tails are hung. by nepa's[213] head behold the altar stand,[214] which by the breath of southern winds is fann'd; near which the centaur[215] hastens his mingled parts to join beneath the serpent,[216] there extending his right hand, to where you see the monstrous scorpion stand, which he at the bright altar fiercely slays. here on her lower parts see hydra[217] raise herself; whose bulk is very far extended. amid the winding of her body's placed the shining goblet;[218] and the glossy crow[219] plunges his beak into her parts below. antecanis beneath the twins is seen, call'd procyon by the greeks.[220] can any one in his senses imagine that this disposition of the stars, and this heaven so beautifully adorned, could ever have been formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms? or what other nature, being destitute of intellect and reason, could possibly have produced these effects, which not only required reason to bring them about, but the very character of which could not be understood and appreciated without the most strenuous exertions of well-directed reason? xlv. but our admiration is not limited to the objects here described. what is most wonderful is that the world is so durable, and so perfectly made for lasting that it is not to be impaired by time; for all its parts tend equally to the centre, and are bound together by a sort of chain, which surrounds the elements. this chain is nature, which being diffused through the universe, and performing all things with judgment and reason, attracts the extremities to the centre. if, then, the world is round, and if on that account all its parts, being of equal dimensions and relative proportions, mutually support and are supported by one another, it must follow that as all the parts incline to the centre (for that is the lowest place of a globe) there is nothing whatever which can put a stop to that propensity in the case of such great weights. for the same reason, though the sea is higher than the earth, yet because it has the like tendency, it is collected everywhere, equally concentres, and never overflows, and is never wasted. the air, which is contiguous, ascends by its lightness, but diffuses itself through the whole; therefore it is by nature joined and united to the sea, and at the same time borne by the same power towards the heaven, by the thinness and heat of which it is so tempered as to be made proper to supply life and wholesome air for the support of animated beings. this is encompassed by the highest region of the heavens, which is called the sky, which is joined to the extremity of the air, but retains its own heat pure and unmixed. xlvi. the stars have their revolutions in the sky, and are continued by the tendency of all parts towards the centre. their duration is perpetuated by their form and figure, for they are round; which form, as i think has been before observed, is the least liable to injury; and as they are composed of fire, they are fed by the vapors which are exhaled by the sun from the earth, the sea, and other waters; but when these vapors have nourished and refreshed the stars, and the whole sky, they are sent back to be exhaled again; so that very little is lost or consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the sky. hence we stoics conclude--which panætius[221] is said to have doubted of--that the whole world at last would be consumed by a general conflagration, when, all moisture being exhausted, neither the earth could have any nourishment, nor the air return again, since water, of which it is formed, would then be all consumed; so that only fire would subsist; and from this fire, which is an animating power and a deity, a new world would arise and be re-established in the same beauty. i should be sorry to appear to you to dwell too long upon this subject of the stars, and more especially upon that of the planets, whose motions, though different, make a very just agreement. saturn, the highest, chills; mars, placed in the middle, burns; while jupiter, interposing, moderates their excess, both of light and heat. the two planets beneath mars[222] obey the sun. the sun himself fills the whole universe with his own genial light; and the moon, illuminated by him, influences conception, birth, and maturity. and who is there who is not moved by this union of things, and by this concurrence of nature agreeing together, as it were, for the safety of the world? and yet i feel sure that none of these reflections have ever been made by these men. xlvii. let us proceed from celestial to terrestrial things. what is there in them which does not prove the principle of an intelligent nature? first, as to vegetables; they have roots to sustain their stems, and to draw from the earth a nourishing moisture to support the vital principle which those roots contain. they are clothed with a rind or bark, to secure them more thoroughly from heat and cold. the vines we see take hold on props with their tendrils, as if with hands, and raise themselves as if they were animated; it is even said that they shun cabbages and coleworts, as noxious and pestilential to them, and, if planted by them, will not touch any part. but what a vast variety is there of animals! and how wonderfully is every kind adapted to preserve itself! some are covered with hides, some clothed with fleeces, and some guarded with bristles; some are sheltered with feathers, some with scales; some are armed with horns, and some are furnished with wings to escape from danger. nature hath also liberally and plentifully provided for all animals their proper food. i could expatiate on the judicious and curious formation and disposition of their bodies for the reception and digestion of it, for all their interior parts are so framed and disposed that there is nothing superfluous, nothing that is not necessary for the preservation of life. besides, nature has also given these beasts appetite and sense; in order that by the one they may be excited to procure sufficient sustenance, and by the other they may distinguish what is noxious from what is salutary. some animals seek their food walking, some creeping, some flying, and some swimming; some take it with their mouth and teeth; some seize it with their claws, and some with their beaks; some suck, some graze, some bolt it whole, and some chew it. some are so low that they can with ease take such food as is to be found on the ground; but the taller, as geese, swans, cranes, and camels, are assisted by a length of neck. to the elephant is given a hand,[223] without which, from his unwieldiness of body, he would scarce have any means of attaining food. xlviii. but to those beasts which live by preying on others, nature has given either strength or swiftness. on some animals she has even bestowed artifice and cunning; as on spiders, some of which weave a sort of net to entrap and destroy whatever falls into it, others sit on the watch unobserved to fall on their prey and devour it. the naker--by the greeks called _pinna_--has a kind of confederacy with the prawn for procuring food. it has two large shells open, into which when the little fishes swim, the naker, having notice given by the bite of the prawn, closes them immediately. thus, these little animals, though of different kinds, seek their food in common; in which it is matter of wonder whether they associate by any agreement, or are naturally joined together from their beginning. there is some cause to admire also the provision of nature in the case of those aquatic animals which are generated on land, such as crocodiles, river-tortoises, and a certain kind of serpents, which seek the water as soon as they are able to drag themselves along. we frequently put duck-eggs under hens, by which, as by their true mothers, the ducklings are at first hatched and nourished; but when they see the water, they forsake them and run to it, as to their natural abode: so strong is the impression of nature in animals for their own preservation. xlix. i have read that there is a bird called platalea (the shoveller), that lives by watching those fowls which dive into the sea for their prey, and when they return with it, he squeezes their heads with his beak till they drop it, and then seizes on it himself. it is said likewise that he is in the habit of filling his stomach with shell-fish, and when they are digested by the heat which exists in the stomach, they cast them up, and then pick out what is proper nourishment. the sea-frogs, they say, are wont to cover themselves with sand, and moving near the water, the fishes strike at them, as at a bait, and are themselves taken and devoured by the frogs. between the kite and the crow there is a kind of natural war, and wherever the one finds the eggs of the other, he breaks them. but who is there who can avoid being struck with wonder at that which has been noticed by aristotle, who has enriched us with so many valuable remarks? when the cranes[224] pass the sea in search of warmer climes, they fly in the form of a triangle. by the first angle they repel the resisting air; on each side, their wings serve as oars to facilitate their flight; and the basis of their triangle is assisted by the wind in their stern. those which are behind rest their necks and heads on those which precede; and as the leader has not the same relief, because he has none to lean upon, he at length flies behind that he may also rest, while one of those which have been eased succeeds him, and through the whole flight each regularly takes his turn. i could produce many instances of this kind; but these may suffice. let us now proceed to things more familiar to us. the care of beasts for their own preservation, their circumspection while feeding, and their manner of taking rest in their lairs, are generally known, but still they are greatly to be admired. l. dogs cure themselves by a vomit, the egyptian ibis by a purge; from whence physicians have lately--i mean but few ages since--greatly improved their art. it is reported that panthers, which in barbarous countries are taken with poisoned flesh, have a certain remedy[225] that preserves them from dying; and that in crete, the wild goats, when they are wounded with poisoned arrows, seek for an herb called dittany, which, when they have tasted, the arrows (they say) drop from their bodies. it is said also that deer, before they fawn, purge themselves with a little herb called hartswort.[226] beasts, when they receive any hurt, or fear it, have recourse to their natural arms: the bull to his horns, the boar to his tusks, and the lion to his teeth. some take to flight, others hide themselves; the cuttle-fish vomits[227] blood; the cramp-fish benumbs; and there are many animals that, by their intolerable stink, oblige their pursuers to retire. li. but that the beauty of the world might be eternal, great care has been taken by the providence of the gods to perpetuate the different kinds of animals, and vegetables, and trees, and all those things which sink deep into the earth, and are contained in it by their roots and trunks; in order to which every individual has within itself such fertile seed that many are generated from one; and in vegetables this seed is enclosed in the heart of their fruit, but in such abundance that men may plentifully feed on it, and the earth be always replanted. with regard to animals, do we not see how aptly they are formed for the propagation of their species? nature for this end created some males and some females. their parts are perfectly framed for generation, and they have a wonderful propensity to copulation. when the seed has fallen on the matrix, it draws almost all the nourishment to itself, by which the foetus is formed; but as soon as it is discharged from thence, if it is an animal that is nourished by milk, almost all the food of the mother turns into milk, and the animal, without any direction but by the pure instinct of nature, immediately hunts for the teat, and is there fed with plenty. what makes it evidently appear that there is nothing in this fortuitous, but the work of a wise and foreseeing nature, is, that those females which bring forth many young, as sows and bitches, have many teats, and those which bear a small number have but few. what tenderness do beasts show in preserving and raising up their young till they are able to defend themselves! they say, indeed, that fish, when they have spawned, leave their eggs; but the water easily supports them, and produces the young fry in abundance. lii. it is said, likewise, that tortoises and crocodiles, when they have laid their eggs on the land, only cover them with earth, and then leave them, so that their young are hatched and brought up without assistance; but fowls and other birds seek for quiet places to lay in, where they build their nests in the softest manner, for the surest preservation of their eggs; which, when they have hatched, they defend from the cold by the warmth of their wings, or screen them from the sultry heat of the sun. when their young begin to be able to use their wings, they attend and instruct them; and then their cares are at an end. human art and industry are indeed necessary towards the preservation and improvement of certain animals and vegetables; for there are several of both kinds which would perish without that assistance. there are likewise innumerable facilities (being different in different places) supplied to man to aid him in his civilization, and in procuring abundantly what he requires. the nile waters egypt, and after having overflowed and covered it the whole summer, it retires, and leaves the fields softened and manured for the reception of seed. the euphrates fertilizes mesopotamia, into which, as we may say, it carries yearly new fields.[228] the indus, which is the largest of all rivers,[229] not only improves and cultivates the ground, but sows it also; for it is said to carry with it a great quantity of grain. i could mention many other countries remarkable for something singular, and many fields, which are, in their own natures, exceedingly fertile. liii. but how bountiful is nature that has provided for us such an abundance of various and delicious food; and this varying with the different seasons, so that we may be constantly pleased with change, and satisfied with abundance! how seasonable and useful to man, to beasts, and even to vegetables, are the etesian winds[230] she has bestowed, which moderate intemperate heat, and render navigation more sure and speedy! many things must be omitted on a subject so copious--and still a great deal must be said--for it is impossible to relate the great utility of rivers, the flux and reflux of the sea, the mountains clothed with grass and trees, the salt-pits remote from the sea-coasts, the earth replete with salutary medicines, or, in short, the innumerable designs of nature necessary for sustenance and the enjoyment of life. we must not forget the vicissitudes of day and night, ordained for the health of animated beings, giving them a time to labor and a time to rest. thus, if we every way examine the universe, it is apparent, from the greatest reason, that the whole is admirably governed by a divine providence for the safety and preservation of all beings. if it should be asked for whose sake this mighty fabric was raised, shall we say for trees and other vegetables, which, though destitute of sense, are supported by nature? that would be absurd. is it for beasts? nothing can be less probable than that the gods should have taken such pains for beings void of speech and understanding. for whom, then, will any one presume to say that the world was made? undoubtedly for reasonable beings; these are the gods and men, who are certainly the most perfect of all beings, as nothing is equal to reason. it is therefore credible that the universe, and all things in it, were made for the gods and for men. but we may yet more easily comprehend that the gods have taken great care of the interests and welfare of men, if we examine thoroughly into the structure of the body, and the form and perfection of human nature. there are three things absolutely necessary for the support of life--to eat, to drink, and to breathe. for these operations the mouth is most aptly framed, which, by the assistance of the nostrils, draws in the more air. liv. the teeth are there placed to divide and grind the food.[231] the fore-teeth, being sharp and opposite to each other, cut it asunder, and the hind-teeth (called the grinders) chew it, in which office the tongue seems to assist. at the root of the tongue is the gullet, which receives whatever is swallowed: it touches the tonsils on each side, and terminates at the interior extremity of the palate. when, by the motions of the tongue, the food is forced into this passage, it descends, and those parts of the gullet which are below it are dilated, and those above are contracted. there is another passage, called by physicians the rough artery,[232] which reaches to the lungs, for the entrance and return of the air we breathe; and as its orifice is joined to the roots of the tongue a little above the part to which the gullet is annexed, it is furnished with a sort of coverlid,[233] lest, by the accidental falling of any food into it, the respiration should be stopped. as the stomach, which is beneath the gullet, receives the meat and drink, so the lungs and the heart draw in the air from without. the stomach is wonderfully composed, consisting almost wholly of nerves; it abounds with membranes and fibres, and detains what it receives, whether solid or liquid, till it is altered and digested. it sometimes contracts, sometimes dilates. it blends and mixes the food together, so that it is easily concocted and digested by its force of heat, and by the animal spirits is distributed into the other parts of the body. lv. as to the lungs, they are of a soft and spongy substance, which renders them the most commodious for respiration; they alternately dilate and contract to receive and return the air, that what is the chief animal sustenance may be always fresh. the juice,[234] by which we are nourished, being separated from the rest of the food, passes the stomach and intestines to the liver, through open and direct passages, which lead from the mesentery to the gates of the liver (for so they call those vessels at the entrance of it). there are other passages from thence, through which the food has its course when it has passed the liver. when the bile, and those humors which proceed from the kidneys, are separated from the food, the remaining part turns to blood, and flows to those vessels at the entrance of the liver to which all the passages adjoin. the chyle, being conveyed from this place through them into the vessel called the hollow vein, is mixed together, and, being already digested and distilled, passes into the heart; and from the heart it is communicated through a great number of veins to every part of the body. it is not difficult to describe how the gross remains are detruded by the motion of the intestines, which contract and dilate; but that must be declined, as too indelicate for discourse. let us rather explain that other wonder of nature, the air, which is drawn into the lungs, receives heat both by that already in and by the coagitation of the lungs; one part is turned back by respiration, and the other is received into a place called the ventricle of the heart.[235] there is another ventricle like it annexed to the heart, into which the blood flows from the liver through the hollow vein. thus by one ventricle the blood is diffused to the extremities through the veins, and by the other the breath is communicated through the arteries; and there are such numbers of both dispersed through the whole body that they manifest a divine art. why need i speak of the bones, those supports of the body, whose joints are so wonderfully contrived for stability, and to render the limbs complete with regard to motion and to every action of the body? or need i mention the nerves, by which the limbs are governed--their many interweavings, and their proceeding from the heart,[236] from whence, like the veins and arteries, they have their origin, and are distributed through the whole corporeal frame? lvi. to this skill of nature, and this care of providence, so diligent and so ingenious, many reflections may be added, which show what valuable things the deity has bestowed on man. he has made us of a stature tall and upright, in order that we might behold the heavens, and so arrive at the knowledge of the gods; for men are not simply to dwell here as inhabitants of the earth, but to be, as it were, spectators of the heavens and the stars, which is a privilege not granted to any other kind of animated beings. the senses, which are the interpreters and messengers of things, are placed in the head, as in a tower, and wonderfully situated for their proper uses; for the eyes, being in the highest part, have the office of sentinels, in discovering to us objects; and the ears are conveniently placed in a high part of the person, being appointed to receive sound, which naturally ascends. the nostrils have the like situation, because all scent likewise ascends; and they have, with great reason, a near vicinity to the mouth, because they assist us in judging of meat and drink. the taste, which is to distinguish the quality of what we take; is in that part of the mouth where nature has laid open a passage for what we eat and drink. but the touch is equally diffused through the whole body, that we may not receive any blows, or the too rigid attacks of cold and heat, without feeling them. and as in building the architect averts from the eyes and nose of the master those things which must necessarily be offensive, so has nature removed far from our senses what is of the same kind in the human body. lvii. what artificer but nature, whose direction is incomparable, could have exhibited so much ingenuity in the formation of the senses? in the first place, she has covered and invested the eyes with the finest membranes, which she hath made transparent, that we may see through them, and firm in their texture, to preserve the eyes. she has made them slippery and movable, that they might avoid what would offend them, and easily direct the sight wherever they will. the actual organ of sight, which is called the pupil, is so small that it can easily shun whatever might be hurtful to it. the eyelids, which are their coverings, are soft and smooth, that they may not injure the eyes; and are made to shut at the apprehension of any accident, or to open at pleasure; and these movements nature has ordained to be made in an instant: they are fortified with a sort of palisade of hairs, to keep off what may be noxious to them when open, and to be a fence to their repose when sleep closes them, and allows them to rest as if they were wrapped up in a case. besides, they are commodiously hidden and defended by eminences on every side; for on the upper part the eyebrows turn aside the perspiration which falls from the head and forehead; the cheeks beneath rise a little, so as to protect them on the lower side; and the nose is placed between them as a wall of separation. the hearing is always open, for that is a sense of which we are in need even while we are sleeping; and the moment that any sound is admitted by it we are awakened even from sleep. it has a winding passage, lest anything should slip into it, as it might if it were straight and simple. nature also hath taken the same precaution in making there a viscous humor, that if any little creatures should endeavor to creep in, they might stick in it as in bird-lime. the ears (by which we mean the outward part) are made prominent, to cover and preserve the hearing, lest the sound should be dissipated and escape before the sense is affected. their entrances are hard and horny, and their form winding, because bodies of this kind better return and increase the sound. this appears in the harp, lute, or horn;[237] and from all tortuous and enclosed places sounds are returned stronger. the nostrils, in like manner, are ever open, because we have a continual use for them; and their entrances also are rather narrow, lest anything noxious should enter them; and they have always a humidity necessary for the repelling dust and many other extraneous bodies. the taste, having the mouth for an enclosure, is admirably situated, both in regard to the use we make of it and to its security. lviii. besides, every human sense is much more exquisite than those of brutes; for our eyes, in those arts which come under their judgment, distinguish with great nicety; as in painting, sculpture, engraving, and in the gesture and motion of bodies. they understand the beauty, proportion, and, as i may so term it, the becomingness of colors and figures; they distinguish things of greater importance, even virtues and vices; they know whether a man is angry or calm, cheerful or sad, courageous or cowardly, bold or timorous. the judgment of the ears is not less admirably and scientifically contrived with regard to vocal and instrumental music. they distinguish the variety of sounds, the measure, the stops, the different sorts of voices, the treble and the base, the soft and the harsh, the sharp and the flat, of which human ears only are capable to judge. there is likewise great judgment in the smell, the taste, and the touch; to indulge and gratify which senses more arts have been invented than i could wish: it is apparent to what excess we have arrived in the composition of our perfumes, the preparation of our food, and the enjoyment of corporeal pleasures. lix. again, he who does not perceive the soul and mind of man, his reason, prudence, and discernment, to be the work of a divine providence, seems himself to be destitute of those faculties. while i am on this subject, cotta, i wish i had your eloquence: how would you illustrate so fine a subject! you would show the great extent of the understanding; how we collect our ideas, and join those which follow to those which precede; establish principles, draw consequences, define things separately, and comprehend them with accuracy; from whence you demonstrate how great is the power of intelligence and knowledge, which is such that even god himself has no qualities more admirable. how valuable (though you academics despise and even deny that we have it) is our knowledge of exterior objects, from the perception of the senses joined to the application of the mind; by which we see in what relation one thing stands to another, and by the aid of which we have invented those arts which are necessary for the support and pleasure of life. how charming is eloquence! how divine that mistress of the universe, as you call it! it teaches us what we were ignorant of, and makes us capable of teaching what we have learned. by this we exhort others; by this we persuade them; by this we comfort the afflicted; by this we deliver the affrighted from their fear; by this we moderate excessive joy; by this we assuage the passions of lust and anger. this it is which bound men by the chains of right and law, formed the bonds of civil society, and made us quit a wild and savage life. and it will appear incredible, unless you carefully observe the facts, how complete the work of nature is in giving us the use of speech; for, first of all, there is an artery from the lungs to the bottom of the mouth, through which the voice, having its original principle in the mind, is transmitted. then the tongue is placed in the mouth, bounded by the teeth. it softens and modulates the voice, which would otherwise be confusedly uttered; and, by pushing it to the teeth and other parts of the mouth, makes the sound distinct and articulate. we stoics, therefore, compare the tongue to the bow of an instrument, the teeth to the strings, and the nostrils to the sounding-board. lx. but how commodious are the hands which nature has given to man, and how beautifully do they minister to many arts! for, such is the flexibility of the joints, that our fingers are closed and opened without any difficulty. with their help, the hand is formed for painting, carving, and engraving; for playing on stringed instruments, and on the pipe. these are matters of pleasure. there are also works of necessity, such as tilling the ground, building houses, making cloth and habits, and working in brass and iron. it is the business of the mind to invent, the senses to perceive, and the hands to execute; so that if we have buildings, if we are clothed, if we live in safety, if we have cities, walls, habitations, and temples, it is to the hands we owe them. by our labor, that is, by our hands, variety and plenty of food are provided; for, without culture, many fruits, which serve either for present or future consumption, would not be produced; besides, we feed on flesh, fish, and fowl, catching some, and bringing up others. we subdue four-footed beasts for our carriage, whose speed and strength supply our slowness and inability. on some we put burdens, on others yokes. we convert the sagacity of the elephant and the quick scent of the dog to our own advantage. out of the caverns of the earth we dig iron, a thing entirely necessary for the cultivation of the ground. we discover the hidden veins of copper, silver, and gold, advantageous for our use and beautiful as ornaments. we cut down trees, and use every kind of wild and cultivated timber, not only to make fire to warm us and dress our meat, but also for building, that we may have houses to defend us from the heat and cold. with timber likewise we build ships, which bring us from all parts every commodity of life. we are the only animals who, from our knowledge of navigation, can manage what nature has made the most violent--the sea and the winds. thus we obtain from the ocean great numbers of profitable things. we are the absolute masters of what the earth produces. we enjoy the mountains and the plains. the rivers and the lakes are ours. we sow the seed, and plant the trees. we fertilize the earth by overflowing it. we stop, direct, and turn the rivers: in short, by our hands we endeavor, by our various operations in this world, to make, as it were, another nature. lxi. but what shall i say of human reason? has it not even entered the heavens? man alone of all animals has observed the courses of the stars, their risings and settings. by man the day, the month, the year, is determined. he foresees the eclipses of the sun and moon, and foretells them to futurity, marking their greatness, duration, and precise time. from the contemplation of these things the mind extracts the knowledge of the gods--a knowledge which produces piety, with which is connected justice, and all the other virtues; from which arises a life of felicity, inferior to that of the gods in no single particular, except in immortality, which is not absolutely necessary to happy living. in explaining these things, i think that i have sufficiently demonstrated the superiority of man to other animated beings; from whence we should infer that neither the form and position of his limbs nor that strength of mind and understanding could possibly be the effect of chance. lxii. i am now to prove, by way of conclusion, that every thing in this world of use to us was made designedly for us. first of all, the universe was made for the gods and men, and all things therein were prepared and provided for our service. for the world is the common habitation or city of the gods and men; for they are the only reasonable beings: they alone live by justice and law. as, therefore, it must be presumed the cities of athens and lacedæmon were built for the athenians and lacedæmonians, and as everything there is said to belong to those people, so everything in the universe may with propriety be said to belong to the gods and men, and to them alone. in the next place, though the revolutions of the sun, moon, and all the stars are necessary for the cohesion of the universe, yet may they be considered also as objects designed for the view and contemplation of man. there is no sight less apt to satiate the eye, none more beautiful, or more worthy to employ our reason and penetration. by measuring their courses we find the different seasons, their durations and vicissitudes, which, if they are known to men alone, we must believe were made only for their sake. does the earth bring forth fruit and grain in such excessive abundance and variety for men or for brutes? the plentiful and exhilarating fruit of the vine and the olive-tree are entirely useless to beasts. they know not the time for sowing, tilling, or for reaping in season and gathering in the fruits of the earth, or for laying up and preserving their stores. man alone has the care and advantage of these things. lxiii. thus, as the lute and the pipe were made for those, and those only, who are capable of playing on them, so it must be allowed that the produce of the earth was designed for those only who make use of them; and though some beasts may rob us of a small part, it does not follow that the earth produced it also for them. men do not store up corn for mice and ants, but for their wives, their children, and their families. beasts, therefore, as i said before, possess it by stealth, but their masters openly and freely. it is for us, therefore, that nature hath provided this abundance. can there be any doubt that this plenty and variety of fruit, which delight not only the taste, but the smell and sight, was by nature intended for men only? beasts are so far from being partakers of this design, that we see that even they themselves were made for man; for of what utility would sheep be, unless for their wool, which, when dressed and woven, serves us for clothing? for they are not capable of anything, not even of procuring their own food, without the care and assistance of man. the fidelity of the dog, his affectionate fawning on his master, his aversion to strangers, his sagacity in finding game, and his vivacity in pursuit of it, what do these qualities denote but that he was created for our use? why need i mention oxen? we perceive that their backs were not formed for carrying burdens, but their necks were naturally made for the yoke, and their strong broad shoulders to draw the plough. in the golden age, which poets speak of, they were so greatly beneficial to the husbandman in tilling the fallow ground that no violence was ever offered them, and it was even thought a crime to eat them: the iron age began the fatal trade of blood, and hammer'd the destructive blade; then men began to make the ox to bleed, and on the tamed and docile beast to feed[238]. lxiv. it would take a long time to relate the advantages which we receive from mules and asses, which undoubtedly were designed for our use. what is the swine good for but to eat? whose life, chrysippus says, was given it but as salt[239] to keep it from putrefying; and as it is proper food for man, nature hath made no animal more fruitful. what a multitude of birds and fishes are taken by the art and contrivance of man only, and which are so delicious to our taste that one would be tempted sometimes to believe that this providence which watches over us was an epicurean! though we think there are some birds--the alites and oscines[240], as our augurs call them--which were made merely to foretell events. the large savage beasts we take by hunting, partly for food, partly to exercise ourselves in imitation of martial discipline, and to use those we can tame and instruct, as elephants, or to extract remedies for our diseases and wounds, as we do from certain roots and herbs, the virtues of which are known by long use and experience. represent to yourself the whole earth and seas as if before your eyes. you will see the vast and fertile plains, the thick, shady mountains, the immense pasturage for cattle, and ships sailing over the deep with incredible celerity; nor are our discoveries only on the face of the earth, but in its secret recesses there are many useful things, which being made for man, by man alone are discovered. lxv. another, and in my opinion the strongest, proof that the providence of the gods takes care of us is divination, which both of you, perhaps, will attack; you, cotta, because carneades took pleasure in inveighing against the stoics; and you, velleius, because there is nothing epicurus ridicules so much as the prediction of events. yet the truth of divination appears in many places, on many occasions, often in private, but particularly in public concerns. we receive many intimations from the foresight and presages of augurs and auspices; from oracles, prophecies, dreams, and prodigies; and it often happens that by these means events have proved happy to men, and imminent dangers have been avoided. this knowledge, therefore--call it either a kind of transport, or an art, or a natural faculty--is certainly found only in men, and is a gift from the immortal gods. if these proofs, when taken separately, should make no impression upon your mind, yet, when collected together, they must certainly affect you. besides, the gods not only provide for mankind universally, but for particular men. you may bring this universality to gradually a smaller number, and again you may reduce that smaller number to individuals. lxvi. for if the reasons which i have given prove to all of us that the gods take care of all men, in every country, in every part of the world separate from our continent, they take care of those who dwell on the same land with us, from east to west; and if they regard those who inhabit this kind of great island, which we call the globe of the earth, they have the like regard for those who possess the parts of this island--europe, asia, and africa; and therefore they favor the parts of these parts, as rome, athens, sparta, and rhodes; and particular men of these cities, separate from the whole; as curius, fabricius, coruncanius, in the war with pyrrhus; in the first punic war, calatinus, duillius, metellus, lutatius; in the second, maximus, marcellus, africanus; after these, paullus, gracchus, cato; and in our fathers' times, scipio, lælius. rome also and greece have produced many illustrious men, who we cannot believe were so without the assistance of the deity; which is the reason that the poets, homer in particular, joined their chief heroes--ulysses, agamemnon, diomedes, achilles--to certain deities, as companions in their adventures and dangers. besides, the frequent appearances of the gods, as i have before mentioned, demonstrate their regard for cities and particular men. this is also apparent indeed from the foreknowledge of events, which we receive either sleeping or waking. we are likewise forewarned of many things by the entrails of victims, by presages, and many other means, which have been long observed with such exactness as to produce an art of divination. there never, therefore, was a great man without divine inspiration. if a storm should damage the corn or vineyard of a person, or any accident should deprive him of some conveniences of life, we should not judge from thence that the deity hates or neglects him. the gods take care of great things, and disregard the small. but to truly great men all things ever happen prosperously; as has been sufficiently asserted and proved by us stoics, as well as by socrates, the prince of philosophers, in his discourses on the infinite advantages arising from virtue. lxvii. this is almost the whole that hath occurred to my mind on the nature of the gods, and what i thought proper to advance. do you, cotta, if i may advise, defend the same cause. remember that in rome you keep the first rank; remember that you are pontifex; and as your school is at liberty to argue on which side you please[241], do you rather take mine, and reason on it with that eloquence which you acquired by your rhetorical exercises, and which the academy improved; for it is a pernicious and impious custom to argue against the gods, whether it be done seriously, or only in pretence and out of sport. * * * * * book iii. i. when balbus had ended this discourse, then cotta, with a smile, rejoined, you direct me too late which side to defend; for during the course of your argument i was revolving in my mind what objections to make to what you were saying, not so much for the sake of opposition, as of obliging you to explain what i did not perfectly comprehend; and as every one may use his own judgment, it is scarcely possible for me to think in every instance exactly what you wish. you have no idea, o cotta, said velleius, how impatient i am to hear what you have to say. for since our friend balbus was highly delighted with your discourse against epicurus, i ought in my turn to be solicitous to hear what you can say against the stoics; and i therefore will give you my best attention, for i believe you are, as usual, well prepared for the engagement. i wish, by hercules! i were, replies cotta; for it is more difficult to dispute with lucilius than it was with you. why so? says velleius. because, replies cotta, your epicurus, in my opinion, does not contend strongly for the gods: he only, for the sake of avoiding any unpopularity or punishment, is afraid to deny their existence; for when he asserts that the gods are wholly inactive and regardless of everything, and that they have limbs like ours, but make no use of them, he seems to jest with us, and to think it sufficient if he allows that there are beings of any kind happy and eternal. but with regard to balbus, i suppose you observed how many things were said by him, which, however false they may be, yet have a perfect coherence and connection; therefore, my design, as i said, in opposing him, is not so much to confute his principles as to induce him to explain what i do not clearly understand: for which reason, balbus, i will give you the choice, either to answer me every particular as i go on, or permit me to proceed without interruption. if you want any explanation, replies balbus, i would rather you would propose your doubts singly; but if your intention is rather to confute me than to seek instruction for yourself, it shall be as you please; i will either answer you immediately on every point, or stay till you have finished your discourse. ii. very well, says cotta; then let us proceed as our conversation shall direct. but before i enter on the subject, i have a word to say concerning myself; for i am greatly influenced by your authority, and your exhortation at the conclusion of your discourse, when you desired me to remember that i was cotta and pontifex; by which i presume you intimated that i should defend the sacred rites and religion and ceremonies which we received from our ancestors. most undoubtedly i always have, and always shall defend them, nor shall the arguments either of the learned or unlearned ever remove the opinions which i have imbibed from them concerning the worship of the immortal gods. in matters of religion i submit to the rules of the high-priests, t. coruncanius, p. scipio, and p. scævola; not to the sentiments of zeno, cleanthes, or chrysippus; and i pay a greater regard to what c. lælius, one of our augurs and wise men, has written concerning religion, in that noble oration of his, than to the most eminent of the stoics: and as the whole religion of the romans at first consisted in sacrifices and divination by birds, to which have since been added predictions, if the interpreters[242] of the sibylline oracle or the aruspices have foretold any event from portents and prodigies, i have ever thought that there was no point of all these holy things which deserved to be despised. i have been even persuaded that romulus, by instituting divination, and numa, by establishing sacrifices, laid the foundation of rome, which undoubtedly would never have risen to such a height of grandeur if the gods had not been made propitious by this worship. these, balbus, are my sentiments both as a priest and as cotta. but you must bring me to your opinion by the force of your reason: for i have a right to demand from you, as a philosopher, a reason for the religion which you would have me embrace. but i must believe the religion of our ancestors without any proof. iii. what proof, says balbus, do you require of me? you have proposed, says cotta, four articles. first of all, you undertook to prove that there "are gods;" secondly, "of what kind and character they are;" thirdly, that "the universe is governed by them;" lastly, that "they provide for the welfare of mankind in particular." thus, if i remember rightly, you divided your discourse. exactly so, replies balbus; but let us see what you require. let us examine, says cotta, every proposition. the first one--that there are gods--is never contested but by the most impious of men; nay, though it can never be rooted out of my mind, yet i believe it on the authority of our ancestors, and not on the proofs which you have brought. why do you expect a proof from me, says balbus, if you thoroughly believe it? because, says cotta, i come to this discussion as if i had never thought of the gods, or heard anything concerning them. take me as a disciple wholly ignorant and unbiassed, and prove to me all the points which i ask. begin, then, replies balbus. i would first know, says cotta, why you have been so long in proving the existence of the gods, which you said was a point so very evident to all, that there was no need of any proof? in that, answers balbus, i have followed your example, whom i have often observed, when pleading in the forum, to load the judge with all the arguments which the nature of your cause would permit. this also is the practice of philosophers, and i have a right to follow it. besides, you may as well ask me why i look upon you with two eyes, since i can see you with one. iv. you shall judge, then, yourself, says cotta, if this is a very just comparison; for, when i plead, i do not dwell upon any point agreed to be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the clearest matters; besides, though i might take this method in pleading, yet i should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which requires the nicest distinction. and with regard to your making use of one eye only when you look on me, there is no reason for it, since together they have the same view; and since nature, to which you attribute wisdom, has been pleased to give us two passages by which we receive light. but the truth is, that it was because you did not think that the existence of the gods was so evident as you could wish that you therefore brought so many proofs. it was sufficient for me to believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them against yours. the proofs on which you found the existence of the gods tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not so; i have not only retained in my memory the whole of these proofs, but even the order in which you proposed them. the first was, that when we lift up our eyes towards the heavens, we immediately conceive that there is some divinity that governs those celestial bodies; on which you quoted this passage- look up to the refulgent heaven above, which all men call, unanimously, jove; intimating that we should invoke that as jupiter, rather than our capitoline jove[243], or that it is evident to the whole world that those bodies are gods which velleius and many others do not place even in the rank of animated beings. another strong proof, in your opinion, was that the belief of the existence of the gods was universal, and that mankind was daily more and more convinced of it. what! should an affair of such importance be left to the decision of fools, who, by your sect especially, are called madmen? v. but the gods have appeared to us, as to posthumius at the lake regillus, and to vatienus in the salarian way: something you mentioned, too, i know not what, of a battle of the locrians at sagra. do you believe that the tyndaridæ, as you called them; that is, men sprung from men, and who were buried in lacedæmon, as we learn from homer, who lived in the next age--do you believe, i say, that they appeared to vatienus on the road mounted on white horses, without any servant to attend them, to tell the victory of the romans to a country fellow rather than to m. cato, who was at that time the chief person of the senate? do you take that print of a horse's hoof which is now to be seen on a stone at regillus to be made by castor's horse? should you not believe, what is probable, that the souls of eminent men, such as the tyndaridæ, are divine and immortal, rather than that those bodies which had been reduced to ashes should mount on horses, and fight in an army? if you say that was possible, you ought to show how it is so, and not amuse us with fabulous old women's stories. do you take these for fabulous stories? says balbus. is not the temple, built by posthumius in honor of castor and pollux, to be seen in the forum? is not the decree of the senate concerning vatienus still subsisting? as to the affair of sagra, it is a common proverb among the greeks; when they would affirm anything strongly, they say "it is as certain as what passed at sagra." ought not such authorities to move you? you oppose me, replies cotta, with stories, but i ask reasons of you[244]. * * * vi. we are now to speak of predictions. no one can avoid what is to come, and, indeed, it is commonly useless to know it; for it is a miserable case to be afflicted to no purpose, and not to have even the last, the common comfort, hope, which, according to your principles, none can have; for you say that fate governs all things, and call that fate which has been true from all eternity. what advantage, then, is the knowledge of futurity to us, or how does it assist us to guard against impending evils, since it will come inevitably? but whence comes that divination? to whom is owing that knowledge from the entrails of beasts? who first made observations from the voice of the crow? who invented the lots?[245] not that i give no credit to these things, or that i despise attius navius's staff, which you mentioned; but i ought to be informed how these things are understood by philosophers, especially as the diviners are often wrong in their conjectures. but physicians, you say, are likewise often mistaken. what comparison can there be between divination, of the origin of which we are ignorant, and physic, which proceeds on principles intelligible to every one? you believe that the decii,[246] in devoting themselves to death, appeased the gods. how great, then, was the iniquity of the gods that they could not be appeased but at the price of such noble blood! that was the stratagem of generals such as the greeks call [greek: stratêgêma], and it was a stratagem worthy such illustrious leaders, who consulted the public good even at the expense of their lives: they conceived rightly, what indeed happened, that if the general rode furiously upon the enemy, the whole army would follow his example. as to the voice of the fauns, i never heard it. if you assure me that you have, i shall believe you, though i really know not what a faun is. vii. i do not, then, o balbus, from anything that you have said, perceive as yet that it is proved that there are gods. i believe it, indeed, but not from any arguments of the stoics. cleanthes, you have said, attributes the idea that men have of the gods to four causes. in the first place (as i have already sufficiently mentioned), to a foreknowledge of future events; secondly, to tempests, and other shocks of nature; thirdly, to the utility and plenty of things we enjoy; fourthly, to the invariable order of the stars and the heavens. the arguments drawn from foreknowledge i have already answered. with regard to tempests in the air, the sea, and the earth, i own that many people are affrighted by them, and imagine that the immortal gods are the authors of them. but the question is, not whether there are people who believe that there are gods, but whether there are gods or not. as to the two other causes of cleanthes, one of which is derived from the great abundance of desirable things which we enjoy, the other from the invariable order of the seasons and the heavens, i shall treat on them when i answer your discourse concerning the providence of the gods--a point, balbus, upon which you have spoken at great length. i shall likewise defer till then examining the argument which you attribute to chrysippus, that "if there is in nature anything which surpasses the power of man to produce, there must consequently be some being better than man." i shall also postpone, till we come to that part of my argument, your comparison of the world to a fine house, your observations on the proportion and harmony of the universe, and those smart, short reasons of zeno which you quote; and i shall examine at the same time your reasons drawn from natural philosophy, concerning that fiery force and that vital heat which you regard as the principle of all things; and i will investigate, in its proper place, all that you advanced the other day on the existence of the gods, and on the sense and understanding which you attributed to the sun, the moon, and all the stars; and i shall ask you this question over and over again, by what proofs are you convinced yourself there are gods? viii. i thought, says balbus, that i had brought ample proofs to establish this point. but such is your manner of opposing, that, when you seem on the point of interrogating me, and when i am preparing to answer, you suddenly divert the discourse, and give me no opportunity to reply to you; and thus those most important points concerning divination and fate are neglected which we stoics have thoroughly examined, but which your school has only slightly touched upon. but they are not thought essential to the question in hand; therefore, if you think proper, do not confuse them together, that we in this discussion may come to a clear explanation of the subject of our present inquiry. very well, says cotta. since, then, you have divided the whole question into four parts, and i have said all that i had to say on the first, i will take the second into consideration; in which, when you attempted to show what the character of the gods was, you seemed to me rather to prove that there are none; for you said that it was the greatest difficulty to draw our minds from the prepossessions of the eyes; but that as nothing is more excellent than the deity, you did not doubt that the world was god, because there is nothing better in nature than the world, and so we may reasonably think it animated, or, rather, perceive it in our minds as clearly as if it were obvious to our eyes. now, in what sense do you say there is nothing better than the world? if you mean that there is nothing more beautiful, i agree with you; that there is nothing more adapted to our wants, i likewise agree with you: but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, i am by no means of your opinion. not that i find it difficult to conceive anything in my mind independent of my eyes; on the contrary, the more i separate my mind from my eyes, the less i am able to comprehend your opinion. ix. nothing is better than the world, you say. nor is there, indeed, anything on earth better than the city of rome; do you think, therefore, that our city has a mind; that it thinks and reasons; or that this most beautiful city, being void of sense, is not preferable to an ant, because an ant has sense, understanding, reason, and memory? you should consider, balbus, what ought to be allowed you, and not advance things because they please you. for that old, concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of zeno has been all which you have so much enlarged upon in handling this topic: "that which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world reasons." if you would prove also that the world can very well read a book, follow the example of zeno, and say, "that which can read is better than that which cannot; nothing is better than the world; the world therefore can read." after the same manner you may prove the world to be an orator, a mathematician, a musician--that it possesses all sciences, and, in short, is a philosopher. you have often said that god made all things, and that no cause can produce an effect unlike itself. from hence it will follow, not only that the world is animated, and is wise, but also plays upon the fiddle and the flute, because it produces men who play on those instruments. zeno, therefore, the chief of your sect, advances no argument sufficient to induce us to think that the world reasons, or, indeed, that it is animated at all, and consequently none to think it a deity; though it may be said that there is nothing superior to it, as there is nothing more beautiful, nothing more useful to us, nothing more adorned, and nothing more regular in its motions. but if the world, considered as one great whole, is not god, you should not surely deify, as you have done, that infinite multitude of stars which only form a part of it, and which so delight you with the regularity of their eternal courses; not but that there is something truly wonderful and incredible in their regularity; but this regularity of motion, balbus, may as well be ascribed to a natural as to a divine cause. x. what can be more regular than the flux and reflux of the euripus at chalcis, the sicilian sea, and the violence of the ocean in those parts[247] where the rapid tide does europe from the libyan coast divide? the same appears on the spanish and british coasts. must we conclude that some deity appoints and directs these ebbings and flowings to certain fixed times? consider, i pray, if everything which is regular in its motion is deemed divine, whether it will not follow that tertian and quartan agues must likewise be so, as their returns have the greatest regularity. these effects are to be explained by reason; but, because you are unable to assign any, you have recourse to a deity as your last refuge. the arguments of chrysippus appeared to you of great weight; a man undoubtedly of great quickness and subtlety (i call those quick who have a sprightly turn of thought, and those subtle whose minds are seasoned by use as their hands are by labor): "if," says he, "there is anything which is beyond the power of man to produce, the being who produces it is better than man. man is unable to make what is in the world; the being, therefore, that could do it is superior to man. what being is there but a god superior to man? therefore there is a god." these arguments are founded on the same erroneous principles as zeno's, for he does not define what is meant by being better or more excellent, or distinguish between an intelligent cause and a natural cause. chrysippus adds, "if there are no gods, there is nothing better than man; but we cannot, without the highest arrogance, have this idea of ourselves." let us grant that it is arrogance in man to think himself better than the world; but to comprehend that he has understanding and reason, and that in orion and canicula there is neither, is no arrogance, but an indication of good sense. "since we suppose," continues he, "when we see a beautiful house, that it was built for the master, and not for mice, we should likewise judge that the world is the mansion of the gods." yes, if i believed that the gods built the world; but not if, as i believe, and intend to prove, it is the work of nature. xi. socrates, in xenophon, asks, "whence had man his understanding, if there was none in the world?" and i ask, whence had we speech, harmony, singing; unless we think it is the sun conversing with the moon when she approaches near it, or that the world forms an harmonious concert, as pythagoras imagines? this, balbus, is the effect of nature; not of that nature which proceeds artificially, as zeno says, and the character of which i shall presently examine into, but a nature which, by its own proper motions and mutations, modifies everything. for i readily agree to what you said about the harmony and general agreement of nature, which you pronounced to be firmly bound and united together, as it were, by ties of blood; but i do not approve of what you added, that "it could not possibly be so, unless it were so united by one divine spirit." on the contrary, the whole subsists by the power of nature, independently of the gods, and there is a kind of sympathy (as the greeks call it) which joins together all the parts of the universe; and the greater that is in its own power, the less is it necessary to have recourse to a divine intelligence. xii. but how will you get rid of the objections which carneades made? "if," says he, "there is no body immortal, there is none eternal; but there is no body immortal, nor even indivisible, or that cannot be separated and disunited; and as every animal is in its nature passive, so there is not one which is not subject to the impressions of extraneous bodies; none, that is to say, which can avoid the necessity of enduring and suffering: and if every animal is mortal, there is none immortal; so, likewise, if every animal may be cut up and divided, there is none indivisible, none eternal, but all are liable to be affected by, and compelled to submit to, external power. every animal, therefore, is necessarily mortal, dissoluble, and divisible." for as there is no wax, no silver, no brass which cannot be converted into something else, whatever is composed of wax, or silver, or brass may cease to be what it is. by the same reason, if all the elements are mutable, every body is mutable. now, according to your doctrine, all the elements are mutable; all bodies, therefore, are mutable. but if there were any body immortal, then all bodies would not be mutable. every body, then, is mortal; for every body is either water, air, fire, or earth, or composed of the four elements together, or of some of them. now, there is not one of all these elements that does not perish; for earthly bodies are fragile: water is so soft that the least shock will separate its parts, and fire and air yield to the least impulse, and are subject to dissolution; besides, any of these elements perish when converted into another nature, as when water is formed from earth, the air from water, and the sky from air, and when they change in the same manner back again. therefore, if there is nothing but what is perishable in the composition of all animals, there is no animal eternal. xiii. but, not to insist on these arguments, there is no animal to be found that had not a beginning, and will not have an end; for every animal being sensitive, they are consequently all sensible of cold and heat, sweet and bitter; nor can they have pleasing sensations without being subject to the contrary. as, therefore, they receive pleasure, they likewise receive pain; and whatever being is subject to pain must necessarily be subject to death. it must be allowed, therefore, that every animal is mortal. besides, a being that is not sensible of pleasure or pain cannot have the essence of an animal; if, then, on the one hand, every animal must be sensible of pleasure and pain, and if, on the other, every being that has these sensations cannot be immortal, we may conclude that as there is no animal insensible, there is none immortal. besides, there is no animal without inclination and aversion--an inclination to that which is agreeable to nature, and an aversion to the contrary: there are in the case of every animal some things which they covet, and others they reject. what they reject are repugnant to their nature, and consequently would destroy them. every animal, therefore, is inevitably subject to be destroyed. there are innumerable arguments to prove that whatever is sensitive is perishable; for cold, heat, pleasure, pain, and all that affects the sense, when they become excessive, cause destruction. since, then, there is no animal that is not sensitive, there is none immortal. xiv. the substance of an animal is either simple or compound; simple, if it is composed only of earth, of fire, of air, or of water (and of such a sort of being we can form no idea); compound, if it is formed of different elements, which have each their proper situation, and have a natural tendency to it--this element tending towards the highest parts, that towards the lowest, and another towards the middle. this conjunction may for some time subsist, but not forever; for every element must return to its first situation. no animal, therefore, is eternal. but your school, balbus, allows fire only to be the sole active principle; an opinion which i believe you derive from heraclitus, whom some men understand in one sense, some in another: but since he seems unwilling to be understood, we will pass him by. you stoics, then, say that fire is the universal principle of all things; that all living bodies cease to live on the extinction of that heat; and that throughout all nature whatever is sensible of that heat lives and flourishes. now, i cannot conceive that bodies should perish for want of heat, rather than for want of moisture or air, especially as they even die through excess of heat; so that the life of animals does not depend more on fire than on the other elements. however, air and water have this quality in common with fire and heat. but let us see to what this tends. if i am not mistaken, you believe that in all nature there is nothing but fire, which is self-animated. why fire rather than air, of which the life of animals consists, and which is called from thence _anima_,[248] the soul? but how is it that you take it for granted that life is nothing but fire? it seems more probable that it is a compound of fire and air. but if fire is self-animated, unmixed with any other element, it must be sensitive, because it renders our bodies sensitive; and the same objection which i just now made will arise, that whatever is sensitive must necessarily be susceptible of pleasure and pain, and whatever is sensible of pain is likewise subject to the approach of death; therefore you cannot prove fire to be eternal. you stoics hold that all fire has need of nourishment, without which it cannot possibly subsist; that the sun, moon, and all the stars are fed either with fresh or salt waters; and the reason that cleanthes gives why the sun is retrograde, and does not go beyond the tropics in the summer or winter, is that he may not be too far from his sustenance. this i shall fully examine hereafter; but at present we may conclude that whatever may cease to be cannot of its own nature be eternal; that if fire wants sustenance, it will cease to be, and that, therefore, fire is not of its own nature eternal. xv. after all, what kind of a deity must that be who is not graced with one single virtue, if we should succeed in forming this idea of such a one? must we not attribute prudence to a deity? a virtue which consists in the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent. yet what need has a being for the discernment of good and ill who neither has nor can have any ill? of what use is reason to him? of what use is understanding? we men, indeed, find them useful to aid us in finding out things which are obscure by those which are clear to us; but nothing can be obscure to a deity. as to justice, which gives to every one his own, it is not the concern of the gods; since that virtue, according to your doctrine, received its birth from men and from civil society. temperance consists in abstinence from corporeal pleasures, and if such abstinence hath a place in heaven, so also must the pleasures abstained from. lastly, if fortitude is ascribed to the deity, how does it appear? in afflictions, in labor, in danger? none of these things can affect a god. how, then, can we conceive this to be a deity that makes no use of reason, and is not endowed with any virtue? however, when i consider what is advanced by the stoics, my contempt for the ignorant multitude vanishes. for these are their divinities. the syrians worshipped a fish. the egyptians consecrated beasts of almost every kind. the greeks deified many men; as alabandus[249] at alabandæ, tenes at tenedos; and all greece pay divine honors to leucothea (who was before called ino), to her son palæmon, to hercules, to æsculapius, and to the tyndaridæ; our own people to romulus, and to many others, who, as citizens newly admitted into the ancient body, they imagine have been received into heaven. these are the gods of the illiterate. xvi. what are the notions of you philosophers? in what respect are they superior to these ideas? i shall pass them over; for they are certainly very admirable. let the world, then, be a deity, for that, i conceive, is what you mean by the refulgent heaven above, which all men call, unanimously, jove. but why are we to add many more gods? what a multitude of them there is! at least, it seems so to me; for every constellation, according to you, is a deity: to some you give the name of beasts, as the goat, the scorpion, the bull, the lion; to others the names of inanimate things, as the ship, the altar, the crown. but supposing these were to be allowed, how can the rest be granted, or even so much as understood? when we call corn ceres, and wine bacchus, we make use of the common manner of speaking; but do you think any one so mad as to believe that his food is a deity? with regard to those who, you say, from having been men became gods, i should be very willing to learn of you, either how it was possible formerly, or, if it had ever been, why is it not so now? i do not conceive, as things are at present, how hercules, burn'd with fiery torches on mount oeta, as accius says, should rise, with the flames, to the eternal mansions of his father. besides, homer also says that ulysses[250] met him in the shades below, among the other dead. but yet i should be glad to know which hercules we should chiefly worship; for they who have searched into those histories, which are but little known, tell us of several. the most ancient is he who fought with apollo about the tripos of delphi, and is son of jupiter and lisyto; and of the most ancient jupiters too, for we find many jupiters also in the grecian chronicles. the second is the egyptian hercules, and is believed to be the son of nilus, and to be the author of the phrygian characters. the third, to whom they offered sacrifices, is one of the idæi dactyli.[251] the fourth is the son of jupiter and asteria, the sister of latona, chiefly honored by the tyrians, who pretend that carthago[252] is his daughter. the fifth, called belus, is worshipped in india. the sixth is the son of alcmena by jupiter; but by the third jupiter, for there are many jupiters, as you shall soon see. xvii. since this examination has led me so far, i will convince you that in matters of religion i have learned more from the pontifical rites, the customs of our ancestors, and the vessels of numa,[253] which lælius mentions in his little golden oration, than from all the learning of the stoics; for tell me, if i were a disciple of your school, what answer could i make to these questions? if there are gods, are nymphs also goddesses? if they are goddesses, are pans and satyrs in the same rank? but they are not; consequently, nymphs are not goddesses. yet they have temples publicly dedicated to them. what do you conclude from thence? others who have temples are not therefore gods. but let us go on. you call jupiter and neptune gods; their brother pluto, then, is one; and if so, those rivers also are deities which they say flow in the infernal regions--acheron, cocytus, pyriphlegethon; charon also, and cerberus, are gods; but that cannot be allowed; nor can pluto be placed among the deities. what, then, will you say of his brothers? thus reasons carneades; not with any design to destroy the existence of the gods (for what would less become a philosopher?), but to convince us that on that matter the stoics have said nothing plausible. if, then, jupiter and neptune are gods, adds he, can that divinity be denied to their father saturn, who is principally worshipped throughout the west? if saturn is a god, then must his father, coelus, be one too, and so must the parents of coelus, which are the sky and day, as also their brothers and sisters, which by ancient genealogists are thus named: love, deceit, fear, labor, envy, fate, old age, death, darkness, misery, lamentation, favor, fraud, obstinacy, the destinies, the hesperides, and dreams; all which are the offspring of erebus and night. these monstrous deities, therefore, must be received, or else those from whom they sprung must be disallowed. xviii. if you say that apollo, vulcan, mercury, and the rest of that sort are gods, can you doubt the divinity of hercules and æsculapius, bacchus, castor and pollux? these are worshipped as much as those, and even more in some places. therefore they must be numbered among the gods, though on the mother's side they are only of mortal race. aristæus, who is said to have been the son of apollo, and to have found out the art of making oil from the olive; theseus, the son of neptune; and the rest whose fathers were deities, shall they not be placed in the number of the gods? but what think you of those whose mothers were goddesses? they surely have a better title to divinity; for, in the civil law, as he is a freeman who is born of a freewoman, so, in the law of nature, he whose mother is a goddess must be a god. the isle astypalæa religiously honor achilles; and if he is a deity, orpheus and rhesus are so, who were born of one of the muses; unless, perhaps, there may be a privilege belonging to sea marriages which land marriages have not. orpheus and rhesus are nowhere worshipped; and if they are therefore not gods, because they are nowhere worshipped as such, how can the others be deities? you, balbus, seemed to agree with me that the honors which they received were not from their being regarded as immortals, but as men richly endued with virtue. but if you think latona a goddess, how can you avoid admitting hecate to be one also, who was the daughter of asteria, latona's sister? certainly she is one, if we may judge by the altars erected to her in greece. and if hecate is a goddess, how can you refuse that rank to the eumenides? for they also have a temple at athens, and, if i understand right, the romans have consecrated a grove to them. the furies, too, whom we look upon as the inspectors into and scourges of impiety, i suppose, must have their divinity too. as you hold that there is some divinity presides over every human affair, there is one who presides over the travail of matrons, whose name, _natio_, is derived _a nascentibus_, from nativities, and to whom we used to sacrifice in our processions in the fields of ardæa; but if she is a deity, we must likewise acknowledge all those you mentioned, honor, faith, intellect, concord; by the same rule also, hope, juno, moneta,[254] and every idle phantom, every child of our imagination, are deities. but as this consequence is quite inadmissible, do not you either defend the cause from which it flows. xix. what say you to this? if these are deities, which we worship and regard as such, why are not serapis and isis[255] placed in the same rank? and if they are admitted, what reason have we to reject the gods of the barbarians? thus we should deify oxen, horses, the ibis, hawks, asps, crocodiles, fishes, dogs, wolves, cats, and many other beasts. if we go back to the source of this superstition, we must equally condemn all the deities from which they proceed. shall ino, whom the greeks call leucothea, and we matuta, be reputed a goddess, because she was the daughter of cadmus, and shall that title be refused to circe and pasiphae,[256] who had the sun for their father, and perseis, daughter of the ocean, for their mother? it is true, circe has divine honors paid her by our colony of circæum; therefore you call her a goddess; but what will you say of medea, the granddaughter of the sun and the ocean, and daughter of æetes and idyia? what will you say of her brother absyrtus, whom pacuvius calls ægialeus, though the other name is more frequent in the writings of the ancients? if you did not deify one as well as the other, what will become of ino? for all these deities have the same origin. shall amphiaraus and tryphonius be called gods? our publicans, when some lands in boeotia were exempted from the tax, as belonging to the immortal gods, denied that any were immortal who had been men. but if you deify these, erechtheus surely is a god, whose temple and priest we have seen at athens. and can you, then, refuse to acknowledge also codrus, and many others who shed their blood for the preservation of their country? and if it is not allowable to consider all these men as gods, then, certainly, probabilities are not in favor of our acknowledging the _divinity_ of those previously mentioned beings from whom these have proceeded. it is easy to observe, likewise, that if in many countries people have paid divine honors to the memory of those who have signalized their courage, it was done in order to animate others to practise virtue, and to expose themselves the more willingly to dangers in their country's cause. from this motive the athenians have deified erechtheus and his daughters, and have erected also a temple, called leocorion, to the daughters of leus.[257] alabandus is more honored in the city which he founded than any of the more illustrious deities; from thence stratonicus had a pleasant turn--as he had many--when he was troubled with an impertinent fellow who insisted that alabandus was a god, but that hercules was not; "very well," says he, "then let the anger of alabandus fall upon me, and that of hercules upon you." xx. do you not consider, balbus, to what lengths your arguments for the divinity of the heaven and the stars will carry you? you deify the sun and the moon, which the greeks take to be apollo and diana. if the moon is a deity, the morning-star, the other planets, and all the fixed stars are also deities; and why shall not the rainbow be placed in that number? for it is so wonderfully beautiful that it is justly said to be the daughter of thaumas.[258] but if you deify the rainbow, what regard will you pay to the clouds? for the colors which appear in the bow are only formed of the clouds, one of which is said to have brought forth the centaurs; and if you deify the clouds, you cannot pay less regard to the seasons, which the roman people have really consecrated. tempests, showers, storms, and whirlwinds must then be deities. it is certain, at least, that our captains used to sacrifice a victim to the waves before they embarked on any voyage. as you deify the earth under the name of ceres,[259] because, as you said, she bears fruits (_a gerendo_), and the ocean under that of neptune, rivers and fountains have the same right. thus we see that maso, the conqueror of corsica, dedicated a temple to a fountain, and the names of the tiber, spino, almo, nodinus, and other neighboring rivers are in the prayers[260] of the augurs. therefore, either the number of such deities will be infinite, or we must admit none of them, and wholly disapprove of such an endless series of superstition. xxi. none of all these assertions, then, are to be admitted. i must proceed now, balbus, to answer those who say that, with regard to those deified mortals, so religiously and devoutly reverenced, the public opinion should have the force of reality. to begin, then: they who are called theologists say that there are three jupiters; the first and second of whom were born in arcadia; one of whom was the son of æther, and father of proserpine and bacchus; the other the son of coelus, and father of minerva, who is called the goddess and inventress of war; the third one born of saturn in the isle of crete,[261] where his sepulchre is shown. the sons of jupiter ([greek: dioskouroi]) also, among the greeks, have many names; first, the three who at athens have the title of anactes,[262] tritopatreus, eubuleus, and dionysus, sons of the most ancient king jupiter and proserpine; the next are castor and pollux, sons of the third jupiter and leda; and, lastly, three others, by some called alco,[263] melampus, and tmolus, sons of atreus, the son of pelops. as to the muses, there were at first four--thelxiope, aoede, arche, and melete--daughters of the second jupiter; afterward there were nine, daughters of the third jupiter and mnemosyne; there were also nine others, having the same appellations, born of pierus and antiopa, by the poets usually called pierides and pieriæ. though _sol_ (the sun) is so called, you say, because he is _solus_ (single); yet how many suns do theologists mention? there is one, the son of jupiter and grandson of æther; another, the son of hyperion; a third, who, the egyptians say, was of the city heliopolis, sprung from vulcan, the son of nilus; a fourth is said to have been born at rhodes of acantho, in the times of the heroes, and was the grandfather of jalysus, camirus, and lindus; a fifth, of whom, it is pretended, aretes and circe were born at colchis. xxii. there are likewise several vulcans. the first (who had of minerva that apollo whom the ancient historians call the tutelary god of athens) was the son of coelus; the second, whom the egyptians call opas,[264] and whom they looked upon as the protector of egypt, is the son of nilus; the third, who is said to have been the master of the forges at lemnos, was the son of the third jupiter and of juno; the fourth, who possessed the islands near sicily called vulcaniæ,[265] was the son of menalius. one mercury had coelus for his father and dies for his mother; another, who is said to dwell in a cavern, and is the same as trophonius, is the son of valens and phoronis. a third, of whom, and of penelope, pan was the offspring, is the son of the third jupiter and maia. a fourth, whom the egyptians think it a crime to name, is the son of nilus. a fifth, whom we call, in their language, thoth, as with them the first month of the year is called, is he whom the people of pheneum[266] worship, and who is said to have killed argus, to have fled for it into egypt, and to have given laws and learning to the egyptians. the first of the æsculapii, the god of arcadia, who is said to have invented the probe and to have been the first person who taught men to use bandages for wounds, is the son of apollo. the second, who was killed with thunder, and is said to be buried in cynosura,[267] is the brother of the second mercury. the third, who is said to have found out the art of purging the stomach, and of drawing teeth, is the son of arsippus and arsinoe; and in arcadia there is shown his tomb, and the wood which is consecrated to him, near the river lusium. xxiii. i have already spoken of the most ancient of the apollos, who is the son of vulcan, and tutelar god of athens. there is another, son of corybas, and native of crete, for which island he is said to have contended with jupiter himself. a third, who came from the regions of the hyperborei[268] to delphi, is the son of the third jupiter and of latona. a fourth was of arcadia, whom the arcadians called nomio,[269] because they regarded him as their legislator. there are likewise many dianas. the first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged cupid, is the daughter of jupiter and proserpine. the second, who is more known, is daughter of the third jupiter and of latona. the third, whom the greeks often call by her father's name, is the daughter of upis[270] and glauce. there are many also of the dionysi. the first was the son of jupiter and proserpine. the second, who is said to have killed nysa, was the son of nilus. the third, who reigned in asia, and for whom the sabazia[271] were instituted, was the son of caprius. the fourth, for whom they celebrate the orphic festivals, sprung from jupiter and luna. the fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the trieterides, was the son of nysus and thyone. the first venus, who has a temple at elis, was the daughter of coelus and dies. the second arose out of the froth of the sea, and became, by mercury, the mother of the second cupid. the third, the daughter of jupiter and diana, was married to vulcan, but is said to have had anteros by mars. the fourth was a syrian, born of tyro, who is called astarte, and is said to have been married to adonis. i have already mentioned one minerva, mother of apollo. another, who is worshipped at sais, a city in egypt, sprung from nilus. the third, whom i have also mentioned, was daughter of jupiter. the fourth, sprung from jupiter and coryphe, the daughter of the ocean; the arcadians call her coria, and make her the inventress of chariots. a fifth, whom they paint with wings at her heels, was daughter of pallas, and is said to have killed her father for endeavoring to violate her chastity. the first cupid is said to be the son of mercury and the first diana; the second, of mercury and the second venus; the third, who is the same as anteros, of mars and the third venus. all these opinions arise from old stories that were spread in greece; the belief in which, balbus, you well know, ought to be stopped, lest religion should suffer. but you stoics, so far from refuting them, even give them authority by the mysterious sense which you pretend to find in them. can you, then, think, after this plain refutation, that there is need to employ more subtle reasonings? but to return from this digression. xxiv. we see that the mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, health, concord, and things of such kind, are purely natural, and have nothing of divinity in them; for either they are inherent in us, as the mind, faith, hope, virtue, and concord are; or else they are to be desired, as honor, health, and victory. i know indeed that they are useful to us, and see that statues have been religiously erected for them; but as to their divinity, i shall begin to believe it when you have proved it for certain. of this kind i may particularly mention fortune, which is allowed to be ever inseparable from inconstancy and temerity, which are certainly qualities unworthy of a divine being. but what delight do you take in the explication of fables, and in the etymology of names?--that coelus was castrated by his son, and that saturn was bound in chains by his son! by your defence of these and such like fictions you would make the authors of them appear not only not to be madmen, but to have been even very wise. but the pains which you take with your etymologies deserve our pity. that saturn is so called because _se saturat annis_, he is full of years; mavors, mars, because _magna vortit_, he brings about mighty changes; minerva, because _minuit_, she diminishes, or because _minatur_, she threatens; venus, because _venit ad omnia_, she comes to all; ceres, _a gerendo_, from bearing. how dangerous is this method! for there are many names would puzzle you. from what would you derive vejupiter and vulcan? though, indeed, if you can derive neptune _a nando_, from swimming, in which you seem to me to flounder about yourself more than neptune, you may easily find the origin of all names, since it is founded only upon the conformity of some one letter. zeno first, and after him cleanthes and chrysippus, are put to the unnecessary trouble of explaining mere fables, and giving reasons for the several appellations of every deity; which is really owning that those whom we call gods are not the representations of deities, but natural things, and that to judge otherwise is an error. xxv. yet this error has so much prevailed that even pernicious things have not only the title of divinity ascribed to them, but have also sacrifices offered to them; for fever has a temple on the palatine hill, and orbona another near that of the lares, and we see on the esquiline hill an altar consecrated to ill-fortune. let all such errors be banished from philosophy, if we would advance, in our dispute concerning the immortal gods, nothing unworthy of immortal beings. i know myself what i ought to believe; which is far different from what you have said. you take neptune for an intelligence pervading the sea. you have the same opinion of ceres with regard to the earth. i cannot, i own, find out, or in the least conjecture, what that intelligence of the sea or the earth is. to learn, therefore, the existence of the gods, and of what description and character they are, i must apply elsewhere, not to the stoics. let us proceed to the two other parts of our dispute: first, "whether there is a divine providence which governs the world;" and lastly, "whether that providence particularly regards mankind;" for these are the remaining propositions of your discourse; and i think that, if you approve of it, we should examine these more accurately. with all my heart, says velleius, for i readily agree to what you have hitherto said, and expect still greater things from you. i am unwilling to interrupt you, says balbus to cotta, but we shall take another opportunity, and i shall effectually convince you. but[272] * * * xxvi. shall i adore, and bend the suppliant knee, who scorn their power and doubt their deity? does not niobe here seem to reason, and by that reasoning to bring all her misfortunes upon herself? but what a subtle expression is the following! on strength of will alone depends success; a maxim capable of leading us into all that is bad. though i'm confined, his malice yet is vain, his tortured heart shall answer pain for pain; his ruin soothe my soul with soft content, lighten my chains, and welcome banishment! this, now, is reason; that reason which you say the divine goodness has denied to the brute creation, kindly to bestow it on men alone. how great, how immense the favor! observe the same medea flying from her father and her country: the guilty wretch from her pursuer flies. by her own hands the young absyrtus slain, his mangled limbs she scatters o'er the plain, that the fond sire might sink beneath his woe, and she to parricide her safety owe. reflection, as well as wickedness, must have been necessary to the preparation of such a fact; and did he too, who prepared that fatal repast for his brother, do it without reflection? revenge as great as atreus' injury shall sink his soul and crown his misery. xxvii. did not thyestes himself, not content with having defiled his brother's bed (of which atreus with great justice thus complains, when faithless comforts, in the lewd embrace, with vile adultery stain a royal race, the blood thus mix'd in fouler currents flows, taints the rich soil, and breeds unnumber'd woes)-did he not, i say, by that adultery, aim at the possession of the crown? atreus thus continues: a lamb, fair gift of heaven, with golden fleece, promised in vain to fix my crown in peace; but base thyestes, eager for the prey, crept to my bed, and stole the gem away. do you not perceive that thyestes must have had a share of reason proportionable to the greatness of his crimes--such crimes as are not only represented to us on the stage, but such as we see committed, nay, often exceeded, in the common course of life? the private houses of individual citizens, the public courts, the senate, the camp, our allies, our provinces, all agree that reason is the author of all the ill, as well as of all the good, which is done; that it makes few act well, and that but seldom, but many act ill, and that frequently; and that, in short, the gods would have shown greater benevolence in denying us any reason at all than in sending us that which is accompanied with so much mischief; for as wine is seldom wholesome, but often hurtful in diseases, we think it more prudent to deny it to the patient than to run the risk of so uncertain a remedy; so i do not know whether it would not be better for mankind to be deprived of wit, thought, and penetration, or what we call reason, since it is a thing pernicious to many and very useful to few, than to have it bestowed upon them with so much liberality and in such abundance. but if the divine will has really consulted the good of man in this gift of reason, the good of those men only was consulted on whom a well-regulated one is bestowed: how few those are, if any, is very apparent. we cannot admit, therefore, that the gods consulted the good of a few only; the conclusion must be that they consulted the good of none. xxviii. you answer that the ill use which a great part of mankind make of reason no more takes away the goodness of the gods, who bestow it as a present of the greatest benefit to them, than the ill use which children make of their patrimony diminishes the obligation which they have to their parents for it. we grant you this; but where is the similitude? it was far from deianira's design to injure hercules when she made him a present of the shirt dipped in the blood of the centaurs. nor was it a regard to the welfare of jason of pheræ that influenced the man who with his sword opened his imposthume, which the physicians had in vain attempted to cure. for it has often happened that people have served a man whom they intended to injure, and have injured one whom they designed to serve; so that the effect of the gift is by no means always a proof of the intention of the giver; neither does the benefit which may accrue from it prove that it came from the hands of a benefactor. for, in short, what debauchery, what avarice, what crime among men is there which does not owe its birth to thought and reflection, that is, to reason? for all opinion is reason: right reason, if men's thoughts are conformable to truth; wrong reason, if they are not. the gods only give us the mere faculty of reason, if we have any; the use or abuse of it depends entirely upon ourselves; so that the comparison is not just between the present of reason given us by the gods, and a patrimony left to a son by his father; for, after all, if the injury of mankind had been the end proposed by the gods, what could they have given them more pernicious than reason? for what seed could there be of injustice, intemperance, and cowardice, if reason were not laid as the foundation of these vices? xxix. i mentioned just now medea and atreus, persons celebrated in heroic poems, who had used this reason only for the contrivance and practice of the most flagitious crimes; but even the trifling characters which appear in comedies supply us with the like instances of this reasoning faculty; for example, does not he, in the eunuch, reason with some subtlety?- what, then, must i resolve upon? she turn'd me out-of-doors; she sends for me back again; shall i go? no, not if she were to beg it of me. another, in the twins, making no scruple of opposing a received maxim, after the manner of the academics, asserts that when a man is in love and in want, it is pleasant to have a father covetous, crabbed, and passionate, who has no love or affection for his children. this unaccountable opinion he strengthens thus: you may defraud him of his profits, or forge letters in his name, or fright him by your servant into compliance; and what you take from such an old hunks, how much more pleasantly do you spend it! on the contrary, he says that an easy, generous father is an inconvenience to a son in love; for, says he, i can't tell how to abuse so good, so prudent a parent, who always foreruns my desires, and meets me purse in hand, to support me in my pleasures: this easy goodness and generosity quite defeat all my frauds, tricks, and stratagems.[273] what are these frauds, tricks, and stratagems but the effects of reason? o excellent gift of the gods! without this phormio could not have said, find me out the old man: i have something hatching for him in my head. xxx. but let us pass from the stage to the bar. the prætor[274] takes his seat. to judge whom? the man who set fire to our archives. how secretly was that villany conducted! q. sosius, an illustrious roman knight, of the picene field,[275] confessed the fact. who else is to be tried? he who forged the public registers--alenus, an artful fellow, who counterfeited the handwriting of the six officers.[276] let us call to mind other trials: that on the subject of the gold of tolosa, or the conspiracy of jugurtha. let us trace back the informations laid against tubulus for bribery in his judicial office; and, since that, the proceedings of the tribune peduceus concerning the incest of the vestals. let us reflect upon the trials which daily happen for assassinations, poisonings, embezzlement of public money, frauds in wills, against which we have a new law; then that action against the advisers or assisters of any theft; the many laws concerning frauds in guardianship, breaches of trust in partnerships and commissions in trade, and other violations of faith in buying, selling, borrowing, or lending; the public decree on a private affair by the lætorian law;[277] and, lastly, that scourge of all dishonesty, the law against fraud, proposed by our friend aquillius; that sort of fraud, he says, by which one thing is pretended and another done. can we, then, think that this plentiful fountain of evil sprung from the immortal gods? if they have given reason to man, they have likewise given him subtlety, for subtlety is only a deceitful manner of applying reason to do mischief. to them likewise we must owe deceit, and every other crime, which, without the help of reason, would neither have been thought of nor committed. as the old woman wished that to the fir which on mount pelion grew the axe had ne'er been laid,[278] so we should wish that the gods had never bestowed this ability on man, the abuse of which is so general that the small number of those who make a good use of it are often oppressed by those who make a bad use of it; so that it seems to be given rather to help vice than to promote virtue among us. xxxi. this, you insist on it, is the fault of man, and not of the gods. but should we not laugh at a physician or pilot, though they are weak mortals, if they were to lay the blame of their ill success on the violence of the disease or the fury of the tempest? had there not been danger, we should say, who would have applied to you? this reasoning has still greater force against the deity. the fault, you say, is in man, if he commits crimes. but why was not man endued with a reason incapable of producing any crimes? how could the gods err? when we leave our effects to our children, it is in hopes that they may be well bestowed; in which we may be deceived, but how can the deity be deceived? as phoebus when he trusted his chariot to his son phaëthon, or as neptune when he indulged his son theseus in granting him three wishes, the consequence of which was the destruction of hippolitus? these are poetical fictions; but truth, and not fables, ought to proceed from philosophers. yet if those poetical deities had foreseen that their indulgence would have proved fatal to their sons, they must have been thought blamable for it. aristo of chios used often to say that the philosophers do hurt to such of their disciples as take their good doctrine in a wrong sense; thus the lectures of aristippus might produce debauchees, and those of zeno pedants. if this be true, it were better that philosophers should be silent than that their disciples should be corrupted by a misapprehension of their master's meaning; so if reason, which was bestowed on mankind by the gods with a good design, tends only to make men more subtle and fraudulent, it had been better for them never to have received it. there could be no excuse for a physician who prescribes wine to a patient, knowing that he will drink it and immediately expire. your providence is no less blamable in giving reason to man, who, it foresaw, would make a bad use of it. will you say that it did not foresee it? nothing could please me more than such an acknowledgment. but you dare not. i know what a sublime idea you entertain of her. xxxii. but to conclude. if folly, by the unanimous consent of philosophers, is allowed to be the greatest of all evils, and if no one ever attained to true wisdom, we, whom they say the immortal gods take care of, are consequently in a state of the utmost misery. for that nobody is well, or that nobody can be well, is in effect the same thing; and, in my opinion, that no man is truly wise, or that no man can be truly wise, is likewise the same thing. but i will insist no further on so self-evident a point. telamon in one verse decides the question. if, says he, there is a divine providence, good men would be happy, bad men miserable. but it is not so. if the gods had regarded mankind, they should have made them all virtuous; but if they did not regard the welfare of all mankind, at least they ought to have provided for the happiness of the virtuous. why, therefore, was the carthaginian in spain suffered to destroy those best and bravest men, the two scipios? why did maximus[279] lose his son, the consul? why did hannibal kill marcellus? why did cannæ deprive us of paulus? why was the body of regulus delivered up to the cruelty of the carthaginians? why was not africanus protected from violence in his own house? to these, and many more ancient instances, let us add some of later date. why is rutilius, my uncle, a man of the greatest virtue and learning, now in banishment? why was my own friend and companion drusus assassinated in his own house? why was scævola, the high-priest, that pattern of moderation and prudence, massacred before the statue of vesta? why, before that, were so many illustrious citizens put to death by cinna? why had marius, the most perfidious of men, the power to cause the death of catulus, a man of the greatest dignity? but there would be no end of enumerating examples of good men made miserable and wicked men prosperous. why did that marius live to an old age, and die so happily at his own house in his seventh consulship? why was that inhuman wretch cinna permitted to enjoy so long a reign? xxxiii. he, indeed, met with deserved punishment at last. but would it not have been better that these inhumanities had been prevented than that the author of them should be punished afterward? varius, a most impious wretch, was tortured and put to death. if this was his punishment for the murdering drusus by the sword, and metellus by poison, would it not have been better to have preserved their lives than to have their deaths avenged on varius? dionysius was thirty-eight years a tyrant over the most opulent and flourishing city; and, before him, how many years did pisistratus tyrannize in the very flower of greece! phalaris and apollodorus met with the fate they deserved, but not till after they had tortured and put to death multitudes. many robbers have been executed; but the number of those who have suffered for their crimes is short of those whom they have robbed and murdered. anaxarchus,[280] a scholar of democritus, was cut to pieces by command of the tyrant of cyprus; and zeno of elea[281] ended his life in tortures. what shall i say of socrates,[282] whose death, as often as i read of it in plato, draws fresh tears from my eyes? if, therefore, the gods really see everything that happens to men, you must acknowledge they make no distinction between the good and the bad. xxxiv. diogenes the cynic used to say of harpalus, one of the most fortunate villains of his time, that the constant prosperity of such a man was a kind of witness against the gods. dionysius, of whom we have before spoken, after he had pillaged the temple of proserpine at locris, set sail for syracuse, and, having a fair wind during his voyage, said, with a smile, "see, my friends, what favorable winds the immortal gods bestow upon church-robbers." encouraged by this prosperous event, he proceeded in his impiety. when he landed at peloponnesus, he went into the temple of jupiter olympius, and disrobed his statue of a golden mantle of great weight, an ornament which the tyrant gelo[283] had given out of the spoils of the carthaginians, and at the same time, in a jesting manner, he said "that a golden mantle was too heavy in summer and too cold in winter;" and then, throwing a woollen cloak over the statue, added, "this will serve for all seasons." at another time, he ordered the golden beard of æsculapius of epidaurus to be taken away, saying that "it was absurd for the son to have a beard, when his father had none." he likewise robbed the temples of the silver tables, which, according to the ancient custom of greece, bore this inscription, "to the good gods," saying "he was willing to make use of their goodness;" and, without the least scruple, took away the little golden emblems of victory, the cups and coronets, which were in the stretched-out hands of the statues, saying "he did not take, but receive them; for it would be folly not to accept good things from the gods, to whom we are constantly praying for favors, when they stretch out their hands towards us." and, last of all, all the things which he had thus pillaged from the temples were, by his order, brought to the market-place and sold by the common crier; and, after he had received the money for them, he commanded every purchaser to restore what he had bought, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they came. thus to his impiety towards the gods he added injustice to man. xxxv. yet neither did olympian jove strike him with his thunder, nor did æsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering death. he died in his bed, had funeral honors[284] paid to him, and left his power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful inheritance to his son. it is not without concern that i maintain a doctrine which seems to authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. without conscience man is contemptible. for as no family or state can be supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot believe that a divine providence regulates the world if there is no distinction between the honest and the wicked. but the gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if blasts or hail destroy their product, jupiter does not regard it, nor do kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. this argument might have some weight if, in bringing rutilius as an instance, i had only complained of the loss of his farm at formiæ; but i spoke of a personal misfortune, his banishment.[285] xxxvi. all men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn, olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and property of life, are derived from the gods; and, indeed, with reason, since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory, which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the gods, and not a personal merit. when we are honored with new dignities, or blessed with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond our expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we return thanks for it to the gods, and assume no praise to ourselves. but who ever thanked the gods that he was a good man? we thank them, indeed, for riches, health, and honor. for these we invoke the all-good and all-powerful jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice. no one ever offered a tenth of his estate to hercules to be made wise. it is reported, indeed, of pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the muses upon having made some new discovery in geometry;[286] but, for my part, i cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to apollo at delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. but to return. it is universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the gods, but wisdom must arise from ourselves; and though temples have been consecrated to the mind, to virtue, and to faith, yet that does not contradict their being inherent in us. in regard to hope, safety, assistance, and victory, we must rely upon the gods for them; from whence it follows, as diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked destroys the idea of a divine providence. xxxvii. but good men have sometimes success. they have so; but we cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the gods. diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at samothrace, one of his friends showed him several pictures[287] of people who had endured very dangerous storms; "see," says he, "you who deny a providence, how many have been saved by their prayers to the gods." "ay," says diagoras, "i see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were shipwrecked?" at another time, he himself was in a storm, when the sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to others under the like distress, asked them "if they believed diagoras was also aboard those ships?" in short, with regard to good or bad fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. the gods, like kings, regard not everything. what similitude is there between them? if kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the gods. xxxviii. your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children's children, and all his posterity. o wonderful equity of the gods! what city would endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for a crime committed by the father or the grandfather? shall tantalus' unhappy offspring know no end, no close, of this long scene of woe? when will the dire reward of guilt be o'er, and myrtilus demand revenge no more?[288] whether the poets have corrupted the stoics, or the stoics given authority to the poets, i cannot easily determine. both alike are to be condemned. if those persons whose names have been branded in the satires of hipponax or archilochus[289] were driven to despair, it did not proceed from the gods, but had its origin in their own minds. when we see ægistus and paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are we to attribute it to a deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for itself? i believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted to the care of hippocrates than to the power of æsculapius; that sparta received her laws from lycurgus[290] rather than from apollo; that those eyes of the maritime coast, corinth and carthage, were plucked out, the one by critolaus, the other by hasdrubal, without the assistance of any divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a deity cannot possibly be angry on any provocation. xxxix. but could not the deity have assisted and preserved those eminent cities? undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine, his power is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but the will is necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will of the gods, with the like ease, can create, move, and change all things. this you hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on natural and settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which all things are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and changes, and there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an instant; and that divine providence has the command and disposal of this universal matter, and consequently can, in any part of the universe, do whatever she pleases: from whence i conclude that this providence either knows not the extent of her power, or neglects human affairs, or cannot judge what is best for us. providence, you say, does not extend her care to particular men; there is no wonder in that, since she does not extend it to cities, or even to nations, or people. if, therefore, she neglects whole nations, is it not very probable that she neglects all mankind? but how can you assert that the gods do not enter into all the little circumstances of life, and yet hold that they distribute dreams among men? since you believe in dreams, it is your part to solve this difficulty. besides, you say we ought to call upon the gods. those who call upon the gods are individuals. divine providence, therefore, regards individuals, which consequently proves that they are more at leisure than you imagine. let us suppose the divine providence to be greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions of the heavens, supports the earth, and rules the seas; why does it suffer so many gods to be unemployed? why is not the superintendence of human affairs given to some of those idle deities which you say are innumerable? this is the purport of what i had to say concerning "the nature of the gods;" not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation of it is attended. xl. balbus, observing that cotta had finished his discourse--you have been very severe, says he, against a divine providence, a doctrine established by the stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too late, i shall defer my answer to another day. our argument is of the greatest importance; it concerns our altars,[291] our hearths, our temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold sacred; you, who by religion defend rome better than she is defended by her ramparts. this is a cause which, while i have life, i think i cannot abandon without impiety. there is nothing, replied cotta, which i desire more than to be confuted. i have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great superiority in argument. no doubt of it, says velleius; we have much to fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from jupiter, which, though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance than the discourse of the stoics concerning the nature of the gods. the conversation ended here, and we parted. velleius judged that the arguments of cotta were truest; but those of balbus seemed to me to have the greater probability.[292] on the commonwealth. * * * * * preface by the editor. this work was one of cicero's earlier treatises, though one of those which was most admired by his contemporaries, and one of which he himself was most proud. it was composed 54 b.c. it was originally in two books: then it was altered and enlarged into nine, and finally reduced to six. with the exception of the dream of scipio, in the last book, the whole treatise was lost till the year 1822, when the librarian of the vatican discovered a portion of them among the palimpsests in that library. what he discovered is translated here; but it is in a most imperfect and mutilated state. the form selected was that of a dialogue, in imitation of those of plato; and the several conferences were supposed to have taken place during the latin holidays, 129 b.c., in the consulship of caius sempronius, tuditanus, and marcus aquilius. the speakers are scipio africanus the younger, in whose garden the scene is laid; caius lælius; lucius furius philus; marcus manilius; spurius mummius, the brother of the taker of corinth, a stoic; quintus ælius tubero, a nephew of africanus; publius rutilius rufus; quintus mucius scævola, the tutor of cicero; and caius fannius, who was absent, however, on the second day of the conference. in the first book, the first thirty-three pages are wanting, and there are chasms amounting to thirty-eight pages more. in this book scipio asserts the superiority of an active over a speculative career; and after analyzing and comparing the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms of government, gives a preference to the first; although his idea of a perfect constitution would be one compounded of three kinds in due proportion. there are a few chasms in the earlier part of the second book, and the latter part of it is wholly lost. in it scipio was led on to give an account of the rise and progress of the roman constitution, from which he passed on to the examination of the great moral obligations which are the foundations of all political union. of the remaining books we have only a few disjointed fragments, with the exception, as has been before mentioned, of the dream of scipio in the sixth. * * * * * introduction to the first book, by the original translator. cicero introduces his subject by showing that men were not born for the mere abstract study of philosophy, but that the study of philosophic truth should always be made as practical as possible, and applicable to the great interests of philanthropy and patriotism. cicero endeavors to show the benefit of mingling the contemplative or philosophic with the political and active life, according to that maxim of plato--"happy is the nation whose philosophers are kings, and whose kings are philosophers." this kind of introduction was the more necessary because many of the ancient philosophers, too warmly attached to transcendental metaphysics and sequestered speculations, had affirmed that true philosophers ought not to interest themselves in the management of public affairs. thus, as m. villemain observes, it was a maxim of the epicureans, "sapiens ne accedat ad rempublicam" (let no wise man meddle in politics). the pythagoreans had enforced the same principle with more gravity. aristotle examines the question on both sides, and concludes in favor of active life. among aristotle's disciples, a writer, singularly elegant and pure, had maintained the pre-eminence of the contemplative life over the political or active one, in a work which cicero cites with admiration, and to which he seems to have applied for relief whenever he felt harassed and discouraged in public business. but here this great man was interested by the subject he discusses, and by the whole course of his experience and conduct, to refute the dogmas of that pusillanimous sophistry and selfish indulgence by bringing forward the most glorious examples and achievements of patriotism. in this strain he had doubtless commenced his exordium, and in this strain we find him continuing it at the point in which the palimpsest becomes legible. he then proceeds to introduce his illustrious interlocutors, and leads them at first to discourse on the astronomical laws that regulate the revolutions of our planet. from this, by a very graceful and beautiful transition, he passes on to the consideration of the best forms of political constitutions that had prevailed in different nations, and those modes of government which had produced the greatest benefits in the commonwealths of antiquity. this first book is, in fact, a splendid epitome of the political science of the age of cicero, and probably the most eloquent plea in favor of mixed monarchy to be found in all literature. * * * * * book i. i. [without the virtue of patriotism], neither caius duilius, nor aulus atilius,[293] nor lucius metellus, could have delivered rome by their courage from the terror of carthage; nor could the two scipios, when the fire of the second punic war was kindled, have quenched it in their blood; nor, when it revived in greater force, could either quintus maximus[294] have enervated it, or marcus marcellus have crushed it; nor, when it was repulsed from the gates of our own city, would scipio have confined it within the walls of our enemies. but cato, at first a new and unknown man, whom all we who aspire to the same honors consider as a pattern to lead us on to industry and virtue, was undoubtedly at liberty to enjoy his repose at tusculum, a most salubrious and convenient retreat. but he, mad as some people think him, though no necessity compelled him, preferred being tossed about amidst the tempestuous waves of politics, even till extreme old age, to living with all imaginable luxury in that tranquillity and relaxation. i omit innumerable men who have separately devoted themselves to the protection of our commonwealth; and those whose lives are within the memory of the present generation i will not mention, lest any one should complain that i had invidiously forgotten himself or some one of his family. this only i insist on--that so great is the necessity of this virtue which nature has implanted in man, and so great is the desire to defend the common safety of our country, that its energy has continually overcome all the blandishments of pleasure and repose. ii. nor is it sufficient to possess this virtue as if it were some kind of art, unless we put it in practice. an art, indeed, though not exercised, may still be retained in knowledge; but virtue consists wholly in its proper use and action. now, the noblest use of virtue is the government of the commonwealth, and the carrying-out in real action, not in words only, of all those identical theories which those philosophers discuss at every corner. for nothing is spoken by philosophers, so far as they speak correctly and honorably, which has not been discovered and confirmed by those persons who have been the founders of the laws of states. for whence comes piety, or from whom has religion been derived? whence comes law, either that of nations, or that which is called the civil law? whence comes justice, faith, equity? whence modesty, continence, the horror of baseness, the desire of praise and renown? whence fortitude in labors and perils? doubtless, from those who have instilled some of these moral principles into men by education, and confirmed others by custom, and sanctioned others by laws. moreover, it is reported of xenocrates, one of the sublimest philosophers, that when some one asked him what his disciples learned, he replied, "to do that of their own accord which they might be compelled to do by law." that citizen, therefore, who obliges all men to those virtuous actions, by the authority of laws and penalties, to which the philosophers can scarcely persuade a few by the force of their eloquence, is certainly to be preferred to the sagest of the doctors who spend their lives in such discussions. for which of their exquisite orations is so admirable as to be entitled to be preferred to a well-constituted government, public justice, and good customs? certainly, just as i think that magnificent and imperious cities (as ennius says) are superior to castles and villages, so i imagine that those who regulate such cities by their counsel and authority are far preferable, with respect to real wisdom, to men who are unacquainted with any kind of political knowledge. and since we are strongly prompted to augment the prosperity of the human race, and since we do endeavor by our counsels and exertions to render the life of man safer and wealthier, and since we are incited to this blessing by the spur of nature herself, let us hold on that course which has always been pursued by all the best men, and not listen for a moment to the signals of those who sound a retreat so loudly that they sometimes call back even those who have made considerable progress. iii. these reasons, so certain and so evident, are opposed by those who, on the other side, argue that the labors which must necessarily be sustained in maintaining the commonwealth form but a slight impediment to the vigilant and industrious, and are only a contemptible obstacle in such important affairs, and even in common studies, offices, and employments. they add the peril of life, that base fear of death, which has ever been opposed by brave men, to whom it appears far more miserable to die by the decay of nature and old age than to be allowed an opportunity of gallantly sacrificing that life for their country which must otherwise be yielded up to nature. on this point, however, our antagonists esteem themselves copious and eloquent when they collect all the calamities of heroic men, and the injuries inflicted on them by their ungrateful countrymen. for on this subject they bring forward those notable examples among the greeks; and tell us that miltiades, the vanquisher and conqueror of the persians, before even those wounds were healed which he had received in that most glorious victory, wasted away in the chains of his fellow-citizens that life which had been preserved from the weapons of the enemy. they cite themistocles, expelled and proscribed by the country which he had rescued, and forced to flee, not to the grecian ports which he had preserved, but to the bosom of the barbarous power which he had defeated. there is, indeed, no deficiency of examples to illustrate the levity and cruelty of the athenians to their noblest citizens--examples which, originating and multiplying among them, are said at different times to have abounded in our own most august empire. for we are told: of the exile of camillus, the disgrace of ahala, the unpopularity of nasica, the expulsion of lænas,[295] the condemnation of opimius, the flight of metellus, the cruel destruction of caius marius, the massacre of our chieftains, and the many atrocious crimes which followed. my own history is by no means free from such calamities; and i imagine that when they recollect that by my counsel and perils they were preserved in life and liberty, they are led by that consideration to bewail my misfortunes more deeply and affectionately. but i cannot tell why those who sail over the seas for the sake of knowledge and experience [should wonder at seeing still greater hazards braved in the service of the commonwealth]. iv. [since], on my quitting the consulship, i swore in the assembly of the roman people, who re-echoed my words, that i had saved the commonwealth, i console myself with this remembrance for all my cares, troubles, and injuries. although my misfortune had more of honor than misfortune, and more of glory than disaster; and i derive greater pleasure from the regrets of good men than sorrow from the exultation of the worthless. but even if it had happened otherwise, how could i have complained, as nothing befell me which was either unforeseen, or more painful than i expected, as a return for my illustrious actions? for i was one who, though it was in my power to reap more profit from leisure than most men, on account of the diversified sweetness of my studies, in which i had lived from boyhood--or, if any public calamity had happened, to have borne no more than an equal share with the rest of my countrymen in the misfortune--i nevertheless did not hesitate to oppose myself to the most formidable tempests and torrents of sedition, for the sake of saving my countrymen, and at my own proper danger to secure the common safety of all the rest. for our country did not beget and educate us with the expectation of receiving no support, as i may call it, from us; nor for the purpose of consulting nothing but our convenience, to supply us with a secure refuge for idleness and a tranquil spot for rest; but rather with a view of turning to her own advantage the nobler portion of our genius, heart, and counsel; giving us back for our private service only what she can spare from the public interests. v. those apologies, therefore, in which men take refuge as an excuse for their devoting themselves with more plausibility to mere inactivity do certainly not deserve to be listened to; when, for instance, they tell us that those who meddle with public affairs are generally good-for-nothing men, with whom it is discreditable to be compared, and miserable and dangerous to contend, especially when the multitude is in an excited state. on which account it is not the part of a wise man to take the reins, since he cannot restrain the insane and unregulated movements of the common people. nor is it becoming to a man of liberal birth, say they, thus to contend with such vile and unrefined antagonists, or to subject one's self to the lashings of contumely, or to put one's self in the way of injuries which ought not to be borne by a wise man. as if to a virtuous, brave, and magnanimous man there could be a juster reason for seeking the government than this--to avoid being subjected to worthless men, and to prevent the commonwealth from being torn to pieces by them; when, even if they were then desirous to save her, they would not have the power. vi. but this restriction who can approve, which would interdict the wise man from taking any share in the government beyond such as the occasion and necessity may compel him to? as if any greater necessity could possibly happen to any man than happened to me. in which, how could i have acted if i had not been consul at the time? and how could i have been a consul unless i had maintained that course of life from my childhood which raised me from the order of knights, in which i was born, to the very highest station? you cannot produce _extempore_, and just when you please, the power of assisting a commonwealth, although it may be severely pressed by dangers, unless you have attained the position which enables you legally to do so. and what most surprises me in the discourses of learned men, is to hear those persons who confess themselves incapable of steering the vessel of the state in smooth seas (which, indeed, they never learned, and never cared to know) profess themselves ready to assume the helm amidst the fiercest tempests. for those men are accustomed to say openly, and indeed to boast greatly, that they have never learned, and have never taken the least pains to explain, the principles of either establishing or maintaining a commonwealth; and they look on this practical science as one which belongs not to men of learning and wisdom, but to those who have made it their especial study. how, then, can it be reasonable for such men to promise their assistance to the state, when they shall be compelled to it by necessity, while they are ignorant how to govern the republic when no necessity presses upon it, which is a much more easy task? indeed, though it were true that the wise man loves not to thrust himself of his own accord into the administration of public affairs, but that if circumstances oblige him to it, then he does not refuse the office, yet i think that this science of civil legislation should in no wise be neglected by the philosopher, because all resources ought to be ready to his hand, which he knows not how soon he may be called on to use. vii. i have spoken thus at large for this reason, because in this work i have proposed to myself and undertaken a discussion on the government of a state; and in order to render it useful, i was bound, in the first place, to do away with this pusillanimous hesitation to mingle in public affairs. if there be any, therefore, who are too much influenced by the authority of the philosophers, let them consider the subject for a moment, and be guided by the opinions of those men whose authority and credit are greatest among learned men; whom i look upon, though some of them have not personally governed any state, as men who have nevertheless discharged a kind of office in the republic, inasmuch as they have made many investigations into, and left many writings concerning, state affairs. as to those whom the greeks entitle the seven wise men, i find that they almost all lived in the middle of public business. nor, indeed, is there anything in which human virtue can more closely resemble the divine powers than in establishing new states, or in preserving those already established. viii. and concerning these affairs, since it has been our good fortune to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our country, and also to have acquired some facility of explaining the powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject with the weight of personal experience and the habit of instruction and illustration. whereas before us many have been skilful in theory, though no exploits of theirs are recorded; and many others have been men of consideration in action, but unfamiliar with the arts of exposition. nor, indeed, is it at all our intention to establish a new and self-invented system of government; but our purpose is rather to recall to memory a discussion of the most illustrious men of their age in our commonwealth, which you and i, in our youth, when at smyrna, heard mentioned by publius rutilius rufus, who reported to us a conference of many days in which, in my opinion, there was nothing omitted that could throw light on political affairs. ix. for when, in the year of the consulship of tuditanus and aquilius, scipio africanus, the son of paulus æmilius, formed the project of spending the latin holidays at his country-seat, where his most intimate friends had promised him frequent visits during this season of relaxation, on the first morning of the festival, his nephew, quintus tubero, made his appearance; and when scipio had greeted him heartily and embraced him--how is it, my dear tubero, said he, that i see you so early? for these holidays must afford you a capital opportunity of pursuing your favorite studies. ah! replied tubero, i can study my books at any time, for they are always disengaged; but it is a great privilege, my scipio, to find you at leisure, especially in this restless period of public affairs. you certainly have found me so, said scipio, but, to speak truth, i am rather relaxing from business than from study. nay, said tubero, you must try to relax from your studies too, for here are several of us, as we have appointed, all ready, if it suits your convenience, to aid you in getting through this leisure time of yours. i am very willing to consent, answered scipio, and we may be able to compare notes respecting the several topics that interest us. x. be it so, said tubero; and since you invite me to discussion, and present the opportunity, let us first examine, before any one else arrives, what can be the nature of the parhelion, or double sun, which was mentioned in the senate. those that affirm they witnessed this prodigy are neither few nor unworthy of credit, so that there is more reason for investigation than incredulity.[296] ah! said scipio, i wish we had our friend panætius with us, who is fond of investigating all things of this kind, but especially all celestial phenomena. as for my opinion, tubero, for i always tell you just what i think, i hardly agree in these subjects with that friend of mine, since, respecting things of which we can scarcely form a conjecture as to their character, he is as positive as if he had seen them with his own eyes and felt them with his own hands. and i cannot but the more admire the wisdom of socrates, who discarded all anxiety respecting things of this kind, and affirmed that these inquiries concerning the secrets of nature were either above the efforts of human reason, or were absolutely of no consequence at all to human life. but, then, my africanus, replied tubero, of what credit is the tradition which states that socrates rejected all these physical investigations, and confined his whole attention to men and manners? for, with respect to him what better authority can we cite than plato? in many passages of whose works socrates speaks in such a manner that even when he is discussing morals, and virtues, and even public affairs and politics, he endeavors to interweave, after the fashion of pythagoras, the doctrines of arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic proportions with them. that is true, replied scipio; but you are aware, i believe, that plato, after the death of socrates, was induced to visit egypt by his love of science, and that after that he proceeded to italy and sicily, from his desire of understanding the pythagorean dogmas; that he conversed much with archytas of tarentum and timæus of locris; that he collected the works of philolaus; and that, finding in these places the renown of pythagoras flourishing, he addicted himself exceedingly to the disciples of pythagoras, and their studies; therefore, as he loved socrates with his whole heart, and wished to attribute all great discoveries to him, he interwove the socratic elegance and subtlety of eloquence with somewhat of the obscurity of pythagoras, and with that notorious gravity of his diversified arts. xi. when scipio had spoken thus, he suddenly saw lucius furius approaching, and saluting him, and embracing him most affectionately, he gave him a seat on his own couch. and as soon as publius rutilius, the worthy reporter of the conference to us, had arrived, when we had saluted him, he placed him by the side of tubero. then said furius, what is it that you are about? has our entrance at all interrupted any conversation of yours? by no means, said scipio, for you yourself too are in the habit of investigating carefully the subject which tubero was a little before proposing to examine; and our friend rutilius, even under the walls of numantia, was in the habit at times of conversing with me on questions of the same kind. what, then, was the subject of your discussion? said philus. we were talking, said scipio, of the double suns that recently appeared, and i wish, philus, to hear what you think of them. xii. just as he was speaking, a boy announced that lælius was coming to call on him, and that he had already left his house. then scipio, putting on his sandals and robes, immediately went forth from his chamber, and when he had walked a little time in the portico, he met lælius, and welcomed him and those that accompanied him, namely, spurius mummius, to whom he was greatly attached, and c. fannius and quintus scævola, sons-in-law of lælius, two very intelligent young men, and now of the quæstorian age.[297] when he had saluted them all, he returned through the portico, placing lælius in the middle; for there was in their friendship a sort of law of reciprocal courtesy, so that in the camp lælius paid scipio almost divine honors, on account of his eminent renown in war and in private life; in his turn scipio reverenced lælius, even as a father, because he was older than himself. then after they had exchanged a few words, as they walked up and down, scipio, to whom their visit was extremely welcome and agreeable, wished to assemble them in a sunny corner of the gardens, because it was still winter; and when they had agreed to this, there came in another friend, a learned man, much beloved and esteemed by all of them, m. manilius, who, after having been most warmly welcomed by scipio and the rest, seated himself next to lælius. xiii. then philus, commencing the conversation, said: it does not appear to me that the presence of our new guests need alter the subject of our discussion, but only that it should induce us to treat it more philosophically, and in a manner more worthy of our increased audience. what do you allude to? said lælius; or what was the discussion we broke in upon? scipio was asking me, replied philus, what i thought of the parhelion, or mock sun, whose recent apparition was so strongly attested. _lælius._ do you say then, my philus, that we have sufficiently examined those questions which concern our own houses and the commonwealth, that we begin to investigate the celestial mysteries? and philus replied: do you think, then, that it does not concern our houses to know what happens in that vast home which is not included in walls of human fabrication, but which embraces the entire universe--a home which the gods share with us, as the common country of all intelligent beings? especially when, if we are ignorant of these things, there are also many great practical truths which result from them, and which bear directly on the welfare of our race, of which we must be also ignorant. and here i can speak for myself, as well as for you, lælius, and all men who are ambitious of wisdom, that the knowledge and consideration of the facts of nature are by themselves very delightful. _lælius._ i have no objection to the discussion, especially as it is holiday-time with us. but cannot we have the pleasure of hearing you resume it, or are we come too late? _philus_. we have not yet commenced the discussion, and since the question remains entire and unbroken, i shall have the greatest pleasure, my lælius, in handing over the argument to you. _lælius._ no, i had much rather hear you, unless, indeed, manilius thinks himself able to compromise the suit between the two suns, that they may possess heaven as joint sovereigns without intruding on each other's empire. then manilius said: are you going, lælius, to ridicule a science in which, in the first place, i myself excel; and, secondly, without which no one can distinguish what is his own, and what is another's? but to return to the point. let us now at present listen to philus, who seems to me to have started a greater question than any of those that have engaged the attention of either publius mucius or myself. xiv. then philus said: i am not about to bring you anything new, or anything which has been thought over or discovered by me myself. but i recollect that caius sulpicius gallus, who was a man of profound learning, as you are aware, when this same thing was reported to have taken place in his time, while he was staying in the house of marcus marcellus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, asked to see a celestial globe which marcellus's grandfather had saved after the capture of syracuse from that magnificent and opulent city, without bringing to his own home any other memorial out of so great a booty; which i had often heard mentioned on account of the great fame of archimedes; but its appearance, however, did not seem to me particularly striking. for that other is more elegant in form, and more generally known, which was made by the same archimedes, and deposited by the same marcellus in the temple of virtue at rome. but as soon as gallus had begun to explain, in a most scientific manner, the principle of this machine, i felt that the sicilian geometrician must have possessed a genius superior to anything we usually conceive to belong to our nature. for gallus assured us that that other solid and compact globe was a very ancient invention, and that the first model had been originally made by thales of miletus. that afterward eudoxus of cnidus, a disciple of plato, had traced on its surface the stars that appear in the sky, and that many years subsequently, borrowing from eudoxus this beautiful design and representation, aratus had illustrated it in his verses, not by any science of astronomy, but by the ornament of poetic description. he added that the figure of the globe, which displayed the motions of the sun and moon, and the five planets, or wandering stars, could not be represented by the primitive solid globe; and that in this the invention of archimedes was admirable, because he had calculated how a single revolution should maintain unequal and diversified progressions in dissimilar motions. in fact, when gallus moved this globe, we observed that the moon succeeded the sun by as many turns of the wheel in the machine as days in the heavens. from whence it resulted that the progress of the sun was marked as in the heavens, and that the moon touched the point where she is obscured by the earth's shadow at the instant the sun appears opposite.[298] * * * xv. * * *[299] i had myself a great affection for this gallus, and i know that he was very much beloved and esteemed by my father paulus. i recollect that when i was very young, when my father, as consul, commanded in macedonia, and we were in the camp, our army was seized with a pious terror, because suddenly, in a clear night, the bright and full moon became eclipsed. and gallus, who was then our lieutenant, the year before that in which he was elected consul, hesitated not, next morning, to state in the camp that it was no prodigy, and that the phenomenon which had then appeared would always appear at certain periods, when the sun was so placed that he could not affect the moon with his light. but do you mean, said tubero, that he dared to speak thus to men almost entirely uneducated and ignorant? _scipio._ he did, and with great * * * for his opinion was no result of insolent ostentation, nor was his language unbecoming the dignity of so wise a man: indeed, he performed a very noble action in thus freeing his countrymen from the terrors of an idle superstition. xvi. and they relate that in a similar way, in the great war in which the athenians and lacedæmonians contended with such violent resentment, the famous pericles, the first man of his country in credit, eloquence, and political genius, observing the athenians overwhelmed with an excessive alarm during an eclipse of the sun which caused a sudden darkness, told them, what he had learned in the school of anaxagoras, that these phenomena necessarily happened at precise and regular periods when the body of the moon was interposed between the sun and the earth, and that if they happened not before every new moon, still they could not possibly happen except at the exact time of the new moon. and when he had proved this truth by his reasonings, he freed the people from their alarms; for at that period the doctrine was new and unfamiliar that the sun was accustomed to be eclipsed by the interposition of the moon, which fact they say that thales of miletus was the first to discover. afterward my friend ennius appears to have been acquainted with the same theory, who, writing about 350[300] years after the foundation of rome, says, "in the nones of june the sun was covered by the moon and night." the calculations in the astronomical art have attained such perfection that from that day, thus described to us by ennius and recorded in the pontifical registers, the anterior eclipses of the sun have been computed as far back as the nones of july in the reign of romulus, when that eclipse took place, in the obscurity of which it was affirmed that virtue bore romulus to heaven, in spite of the perishable nature which carried him off by the common fate of humanity. xvii. then said tubero: do not you think, scipio, that this astronomical science, which every day proves so useful, just now appeared in a different light to you,[301] * * * which the rest may see. moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? or who can think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to estimate the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the insignificance of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and especially in the portion which men inhabit? and when we consider that almost imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the majority of nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can be widely circulated? and then our estates and edifices, our cattle, and the enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed or denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination, often falling into the possession of the very worst men? how happy, then, ought we to esteem that man who alone has it in his power, not by the law of the romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right of nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any one but him who understands its true nature and use; who reckons our dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of emolument or glory--the man, in short, who can apply to himself the sentence which cato tells us my ancestor africanus loved to repeat, "that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less solitary than when alone." for who can believe that dionysius, when after every possible effort he ravished from his fellow-citizens their liberty, had performed a nobler work than archimedes, when, without appearing to be doing anything, he manufactured the globe which we have just been describing? who does not see that those men are in reality more solitary who, in the midst of a crowd, find no one with whom they can converse congenially than those who, without witnesses, hold communion with themselves, and enter into the secret counsels of the sagest philosophers, while they delight themselves in their writings and discoveries? and who would think any one richer than the man who is in want of nothing which nature requires; or more powerful than he who has attained all that she has need of; or happier than he who is free from all mental perturbation; or more secure in future than he who carries all his property in himself, which is thus secured from shipwreck? and what power, what magistracy, what royalty, can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking down on all terrestrial objects as low and transitory things, incessantly directs its attention to eternal and immutable verities, and which is persuaded that though others are called men, none are really so but those who are refined by the appropriate acts of humanity? in this sense an expression of plato or some other philosopher appears to me exceedingly elegant, who, when a tempest had driven his ship on an unknown country and a desolate shore, during the alarms with which their ignorance of the region inspired his companions, observed, they say, geometrical figures traced in the sand, on which he immediately told them to be of good cheer, for he had observed the indications of man. a conjecture he deduced, not from the cultivation of the soil which he beheld, but from the symbols of science. for this reason, tubero, learning and learned men, and these your favorite studies, have always particularly pleased me. xviii. then lælius replied: i cannot venture, scipio, to answer your arguments, or to [maintain the discussion either against] you, philus, or manilius.[302] * * * we had a friend in tubero's father's family, who in these respects may serve him as a model. sextus so wise, and ever on his guard. wise and cautious indeed he was, as ennius justly describes him--not because he searched for what he could never find, but because he knew how to answer those who prayed for deliverance from cares and difficulties. it is he who, reasoning against the astronomical studies of gallus, used frequently to repeat these words of achilles in the iphigenia[303]: they note the astrologic signs of heaven, whene'er the goats or scorpions of great jove, or other monstrous names of brutal forms, rise in the zodiac; but not one regards the sensible facts of earth, on which we tread, while gazing on the starry prodigies. he used, however, to say (and i have often listened to him with pleasure) that for his part he thought that zethus, in the piece of pacuvius, was too inimical to learning. he much preferred the neoptolemus of ennius, who professes himself desirous of philosophizing only in moderation; for that he did not think it right to be wholly devoted to it. but though the studies of the greeks have so many charms for you, there are others, perhaps, nobler and more extensive, which we may be better able to apply to the service of real life, and even to political affairs. as to these abstract sciences, their utility, if they possess any, lies principally in exciting and stimulating the abilities of youth, so that they more easily acquire more important accomplishments. xix. then tubero said: i do not mean to disagree with you, lælius; but, pray, what do you call more important studies? _lælius._ i will tell you frankly, though perhaps you will think lightly of my opinion, since you appeared so eager in interrogating scipio respecting the celestial phenomena; but i happen to think that those things which are every day before our eyes are more particularly deserving of our attention. why should the child of paulus æmilius, the nephew of æmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so glorious a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, and not ask how there can be two senates in one commonwealth, and, as it were, two distinct peoples? for, as you see, the death of tiberius gracchus, and the whole system of his tribuneship, has divided one people into two parties. but the slanderers and the enemies of scipio, encouraged by p. crassus and appius claudius, maintained, after the death of these two chiefs, a division of nearly half the senate, under the influence of metellus and mucius. nor would they permit the man[304] who alone could have been of service to help us out of our difficulties during the movement of the latins and their allies towards rebellion, violating all our treaties in the presence of factious triumvirs, and creating every day some fresh intrigue, to the disturbance of the worthier and wealthier citizens. this is the reason, young men, if you will listen to me, why you should regard this new sun with less alarm; for, whether it does exist, or whether it does not exist, it is, as you see, quite harmless to us. as to the manner of its existence, we can know little or nothing; and even if we obtained the most perfect understanding of it, this knowledge would make us but little wiser or happier. but that there should exist a united people and a united senate is a thing which actually may be brought about, and it will be a great evil if it is not; and that it does not exist at present we are aware; and we see that if it can be effected, our lives will be both better and happier. xx. then mucius said: what, then, do you consider, my lælius, should be our best arguments in endeavoring to bring about the object of your wishes? _lælius._ those sciences and arts which teach us how we may be most useful to the state; for i consider that the most glorious office of wisdom, and the noblest proof and business of virtue. in order, therefore, that we may consecrate these holidays as much as possible to conversations which may be profitable to the commonwealth, let us beg scipio to explain to us what in his estimation appears to be the best form of government. then let us pass on to other points, the knowledge of which may lead us, as i hope, to sound political views, and unfold the causes of the dangers which now threaten us. xxi. when philus, manilius, and mummius had all expressed their great approbation of this idea[305] * * * i have ventured [to open our discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on state politics the chief man in the state should be the principal speaker, but also because i recollect that you, scipio, were formerly very much in the habit of conversing with panætius and polybius, two greeks, exceedingly learned in political questions, and that you are master of many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us. and as you, therefore, are familiar with this subject, if you will explain to us your views respecting the general principles of a state (i speak for my friends as well as myself), we shall feel exceedingly obliged to you. xxii. then scipio said: i must acknowledge that there is no subject of meditation to which my mind naturally turns with more ardor and intensity than this very one which lælius has proposed to us. and, indeed, as i see that in every profession, every artist who would distinguish himself, thinks of, and aims at, and labors for no other object but that of attaining perfection in his art, should not i, whose main business, according to the example of my father and my ancestors, is the advancement and right administration of government, be confessing myself more indolent than any common mechanic if i were to bestow on this noblest of sciences less attention and labor than they devote to their insignificant trades? however, i am neither entirely satisfied with the decisions which the greatest and wisest men of greece have left us; nor, on the other hand, do i venture to prefer my own opinions to theirs. therefore, i must request you not to consider me either entirely ignorant of the grecian literature, nor yet disposed, especially in political questions, to yield it the pre-eminence over our own; but rather to regard me as a true-born roman, not illiberally instructed by the care of my father, and inflamed with the desire of knowledge, even from my boyhood, but still even more familiar with domestic precepts and practices than the literature of books. xxiii. on this philus said: i have no doubt, my scipio, that no one is superior to you in natural genius, and that you are very far superior to every one in the practical experience of national government and of important business. we are also acquainted with the course which your studies have at all times taken; and if, as you say, you have given so much attention to this science and art of politics, we cannot be too much obliged to lælius for introducing the subject: for i trust that what we shall hear from you will be far more useful and available than all the writings put together which the greeks have written for us. then scipio replied: you are raising a very high expectation of my discourse, such as is a most oppressive burden to a man who is required to discuss grave subjects. and philus said: although that may be a difficulty, my scipio, still you will be sure to conquer it, as you always do; nor is there any danger of eloquence failing you, when you begin to speak on the affairs of a commonwealth. xxiv. then scipio proceeded: i will do what you wish, as far as i can; and i shall enter into the discussion under favor of that rule which, i think, should be adopted by all persons in disputations of this kind, if they wish to avoid being misunderstood; namely, that when men have agreed respecting the proper name of the matter under discussion, it should be stated what that name exactly means, and what it legitimately includes. and when that point is settled, then it is fit to enter on the discussion; for it will never be possible to arrive at an understanding of what the character of the subject of the discussion is, unless one first understands exactly what it is. since, then, our investigations relate to a commonwealth, we must first examine what this name properly signifies. and when lælius had intimated his approbation of this course, scipio continued: i shall not adopt, said he, in so clear and simple a manner that system of discussion which goes back to first principles; as learned men often do in this sort of discussion, so as to go back to the first meeting of male and female, and then to the first birth and formation of the first family, and define over and over again what there is in words, and in how many manners each thing is stated. for, as i am speaking to men of prudence, who have acted with the greatest glory in the commonwealth, both in peace and war, i will take care not to allow the subject of the discussion itself to be clearer than my explanation of it. nor have i undertaken this task with the design of examining all its minuter points, like a school-master; nor will i promise you in the following discourse not to omit any single particular. then lælius said: for my part, i am impatient for exactly that kind of disquisition which you promise us. xxv. well, then, said africanus, a commonwealth is a constitution of the entire people. but the people is not every association of men, however congregated, but the association of the entire number, bound together by the compact of justice, and the communication of utility. the first cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man as a certain spirit of congregation which naturally belongs to him. for the human race is not a race of isolated individuals, wandering and solitary; but it is so constituted that even in the affluence of all things [and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously seeks society]. xxvi. [it is necessary to presuppose] these original seeds, as it were, since we cannot discover any primary establishment of the other virtues, or even of a commonwealth itself. these unions, then, formed by the principle which i have mentioned, established their headquarters originally in certain central positions, for the convenience of the whole population; and having fortified them by natural and artificial means, they called this collection of houses a city or town, distinguished by temples and public squares. every people, therefore, which consists of such an association of the entire multitude as i have described, every city which consists of an assemblage of the people, and every commonwealth which embraces every member of these associations, must be regulated by a certain authority, in order to be permanent. this intelligent authority should always refer itself to that grand first principle which established the commonwealth. it must be deposited in the hands of one supreme person, or intrusted to the administration of certain delegated rulers, or undertaken by the whole multitude. when the direction of all depends on one person, we call this individual a king, and this form of political constitution a kingdom. when it is in the power of privileged delegates, the state is said to be ruled by an aristocracy; and when the people are all in all, they call it a democracy, or popular constitution. and if the tie of social affection, which originally united men in political associations for the sake of public interest, maintains its force, each of these forms of government is, i will not say perfect, nor, in my opinion, essentially good, but tolerable, and such that one may accidentally be better than another: either a just and wise king, or a selection of the most eminent citizens, or even the populace itself (though this is the least commendable form), may, if there be no interference of crime and cupidity, form a constitution sufficiently secure. xxvii. but in a monarchy the other members of the state are often too much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and no power. and when all things are carried by a democracy, although it be just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling, inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. therefore, even if cyrus, the king of the persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, i should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as i have said before, the same as the commonwealth) could not be very effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of one individual. and though at present the people of marseilles, our clients, are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates of the highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the people a certain appearance of servitude; and when the athenians, at a certain period, having demolished their areopagus, conducted all public affairs by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their state, as it no longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer able to retain its original fair appearance. xxviii. i have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not looking on them in their disorganized and confused conditions, but in their proper and regular administration. these three particular forms, however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and defects i have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for there is not one of these three forms of government which has not a precipitous and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. for, after thinking of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable king, cyrus--to name him in preference to any one else--then, to produce a change in our minds, we behold the barbarous phalaris, that model of tyranny, to which the monarchical authority is easily abused by a facile and natural inclination. and, in like manner, along-side of the wise aristocracy of marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical faction of the thirty tyrants which once existed at athens. and, not to seek for other instances, among the same athenians, we can show you that when unlimited power was cast into the hands of the people, it inflamed the fury of the multitude, and aggravated that universal license which ruined their state.[306] * * * xxix. the worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and democrats are apt to degenerate. for thus, from these diverse elements, there occasionally arises (as i have said before) a new kind of government. and wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical returns in natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes, which it is the part of the wise politician to investigate with the closest attention. but to calculate their approach, and to join to this foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains in a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius. there is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion, is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government which is composed of the three particular forms which i have already noticed. xxx. _lælius._ i am not ignorant, scipio, that such is your opinion, for i have often heard you say so. but i do not the less desire, if it is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best of these three forms of commonwealths. for it may be of some use in considering[307] * * * xxxi. * * * and each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of him who governs it. therefore, in no other constitution than that in which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode, than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. and if it be not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all. and how can there be this character of equality, i do not say under a monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not really in their free power, though others ask them for them? for they are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of public authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted to those only of ancient families and large fortunes. but in a free people, as among the rhodians and athenians, there is no citizen who[308] * * * xxxii. * * * no sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance, when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of riches. but if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they say that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy; inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws, judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune and life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is the only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a commonwealth, that is to say, a constitution of the people. it is on this principle that, according to them, a people often vindicates its liberty from the domination of kings and nobles; while, on the other hand, kings are not sought for among free peoples, nor are the power and wealth of aristocracies. they deny, moreover, that it is fair to reject this general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of the unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined, and directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community, nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that the good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests that prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions; therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is still more rare, since, as ennius expresses it, in kingdoms there's no faith, and little love. wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? for if the fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality--if genius cannot be equally the property of all--rights, at least, should be equal among those who are citizens of the same republic. for what is a republic but an association of rights?[309] * * * xxxiii. but as to the other political constitutions, these democratical advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the name which they claim. for why, say they, should we apply the name of king, the title of jupiter the beneficent, and not rather the title of tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over a degraded multitude? for a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they must. but how could sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch, good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood royal? as to aristocrats, who will endure, say they, that men should distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of the people, but by their own votes? for how is such a one judged to be best either in learning, sciences, or arts?[310] * * * xxxiv. * * * if it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. but if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust itself--and, if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose the noblest--then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy that the safety of the state consists, especially as nature has not only appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort in high virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the desire of obedience towards these, their natural lords. but they say this aristocratical state is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men, who, through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the best. and so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the state, these chiefs obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of nobility. for riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit and insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more deformed than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest. but when virtue governs the commonwealth, what can be more glorious? when he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or passion; when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites and educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which he does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to his fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for all, there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a chief ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require elected magistrates. it was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of the few. thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted their security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not allow the people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their rulers. for as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of, it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues; and there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and dignities, so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and iniquitous. for as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most infamous, some of whom must exist in every state, then the equity which they eulogize becomes most inequitable--an evil which never can happen in those states which are governed by aristocracies. these reasonings, my lælius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought forward by those that so highly extol this form of political constitution. xxxv. then lælius said: but you have not told us, scipio, which of these three forms of government you yourself most approve. _scipio._ you are right to shape your question, which of the three i most approve, for there is not one of them which i approve at all by itself, since, as i told you, i prefer that government which is mixed and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately. but if i must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply and exclusively, i must confess i prefer the royal one, and praise that as the first and best. in this, which i here choose to call the primitive form of government, i find the title of father attached to that of king, to express that he watches over the citizens as over his children, and endeavors rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce them to slavery. so that it is more advantageous for those who are insignificant in property and capacity to be supported by the care of one excellent and eminently powerful man. the nobles here present themselves, who profess that they can do all this in much better style; for they say that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at least as much faith and equity. and, last of all, come the people, who cry with a loud voice that they will render obedience neither to the one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived of it. thus, the kings attract us by affection, the nobles by talent, the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the best. _lælius._ i think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point undetermined. xxxvi. _scipio._ we must then, i suppose, imitate aratus, who, when he prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty bound to begin with jupiter. _lælius._ wherefore jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which resembles that poem? _scipio._ why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men. how so? said lælius. do you, then, asked scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one universal monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as homer expresses it) all olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the gods are governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report. what men do you mean? said lælius. those, replied scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have arrived at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a single mind[311]. * * * xxxvii. but if you please, my lælius, i will bring forward evidences which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous. those, said lælius, are what i want. _scipio._ you are aware that it is now not four centuries since this city of ours has been without kings. _lælius._ you are correct; it is less than four centuries. _scipio._ well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or city? is it a long time? _lælius._ it hardly amounts to the age of maturity. _scipio._ you say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since there was a king in rome. _lælius._ and he was a proud king. _scipio._ but who was his predecessor? _lælius._ he was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the same praise on all his predecessors as far back as romulus, who reigned about six centuries ago. _scipio._ even he, then, is not very ancient. _lælius._ no; he reigned when greece was already becoming old. _scipio._ agreed. was romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous people? _lælius._ why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the greeks, who say that all people are either greeks or barbarians, i am afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then i believe the greeks were just as barbarous as the romans. then scipio said: but with respect to the present question, we do not so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. for if intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government of kings, you will confess that i am producing authorities that are neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant. xxxviii. then lælius said: i see, scipio, that you are very sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair judge, authorities are worth less than arguments. scipio replied: then, lælius, you shall yourself make use of an argument derived from your own senses. _lælius._ what senses do you mean? _scipio._ the feelings which you experience when at any time you happen to feel angry with any one. _lælius._ that happens rather oftener than i could wish. _scipio._ well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to triumph over your judgment? no, by hercules! said lælius; i imitate the famous archytas of tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward, "ah! you unlucky scoundrel, i would flog you to death, if it were not that i am in a rage with you." capital, said scipio. archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by reflection. and so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and this, in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when conscience reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or temerity. _lælius._ you have spoken the truth. _scipio._ well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your approbation? _lælius._ more than anything upon earth. _scipio._ then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal propensities should assume an ascendency over us? _lælius._ for my part, i can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious. _scipio._ you desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them all? _lælius._ certainly, that is my wish. _scipio._ how, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject of the commonwealth? in which, if the state is thrown into many hands, it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if power be not united, it soon comes to nothing. xxxix. then lælius asked: but what difference is there, i should like to know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in many? and scipio said: since i see, my lælius, that the authorities i have adduced have no great influence on you, i must continue to employ you yourself as my witness in proof of what i am saying. in what way, said lælius, are you going to make me again support your argument? _scipio._ why, thus: i recollect, when we were lately at formiæ, that you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one master only. _lælius._ to be sure, those of my steward. _scipio._ what do you at home? do you commit your affairs to the hands of many persons? _lælius._ no, i trust them to myself alone. _scipio._ well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master but yourself? _lælius._ not one. _scipio._ then i think you must grant me that, as respects the state, the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is superior to any other. _lælius._ you have conducted me to this conclusion, and i entertain very nearly that opinion. xl. and scipio said: you would still further agree with me, my lælius, if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, i should come at once to more illustrious examples. _lælius._ what examples do you mean? _scipio._ do not you observe that it was the cruelty and pride of one single tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the romans? _lælius._ yes, i acknowledge that. _scipio._ you are also aware of this fact, on which i think i shall debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion of king tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of liberty. then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the estates of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made annual, public authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took place in all cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders ensued, and, lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers in the hands of the populace. _lælius._ i must confess this is all too true. all these things now, said scipio, happened during periods of peace and tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. but as we observe the voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director, as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings; for public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular license. and in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen the entire command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief, without a colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the absolute character of his power. for though he is evidently called dictator because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe him, my lælius, in our sacred books entitled magister populi (the master of the people). this is certainly the case, said lælius. our ancestors, therefore, said scipio, acted wisely.[312] * * * xli. when the people is deprived of a just king, as ennius says, after the death of one of the best of monarchs, they hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth of their discourse, they cry, o romulus! o prince divine, sprung from the might of mars to be thy country's guardian! o our sire! be our protector still, o heaven-begot! not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced them their country's guardians, their fathers, and their gods. nor, indeed, without cause, for they added, thou, prince, hast brought us to the gates of light. and truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to them from the justice of their king. the same good-will would doubtless have remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been preserved on the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man the whole of that kind of constitution fell into ruin. i see it indeed, said lælius, and i long to know the history of these political revolutions both in our own commonwealth and in every other. xlii. and scipio said: when i shall have explained my opinion respecting the form of government which i prefer, i shall be able to speak to you more accurately respecting the revolutions of states, though i think that such will not take place so easily in the mixed form of government which i recommend. with respect, however, to absolute monarchy, it presents an inherent and invincible tendency to revolution. no sooner does a king begin to be unjust than this entire form of government is demolished, and he at once becomes a tyrant, which is the worst of all governments, and one very closely related to monarchy. if this state falls into the hands of the nobles, which is the usual course of events, it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of the three kinds of constitutions which i have described; for it is, as it were, a royal--that is to say, a paternal--council of the chief men of the state consulting for the public benefit. or if the people by itself has expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as long as it has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit, and applies itself to maintaining the constitution which it has established. but if ever the people has raised its forces against a just king and robbed him of his throne, or, as has frequently happened, has tasted the blood of its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole commonwealth to its own license, you can imagine no flood or conflagration so terrible, or any whose violence is harder to appease than this unbridled insolence of the populace. xliii. then we see realized that which plato so vividly describes, if i can but express it in our language. it is by no means easy to do it justice in translation: however, i will try. when, says plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers, drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down under the title of despots and tyrants. i dare say you recollect the passage. yes, said lælius, it is familiar to me. _scipio._ plato thus proceeds: then those who feel in duty bound to obey the chiefs of the state are persecuted by the insensate populace, who call them voluntary slaves. but those who, though invested with magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds in all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private families, and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness it. then the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. all modesty is banished; they become far too liberal for that. no difference is made between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads and cajoles his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. the young men assume the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the follies of children, lest they should be hated and oppressed by them. the very slaves even are under but little restraint; wives boast the same rights as their husbands; dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated in this outrageous excess of freedom, and run about so violently that they frighten the passengers from the road. at length the termination of all this infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens become so fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the slightest exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus the laws begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely without any master at all. then lælius said: you have very accurately rendered the opinions which he expressed. xliv. _scipio._ now, to return to the argument of my discourse. it appears that this extreme license, which is the only liberty in the eyes of the vulgar, is, according to plato, such that from it as a sort of root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. for as the excessive power of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so this excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of the people. thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal constitution the most favorable conditions are sometimes suddenly converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is especially observable in political governments; and this excessive liberty soon brings the people collectively and individually to an excessive servitude. for, as i said, this extreme liberty easily introduces the reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries. in fact, from the midst of this unbridled and capricious populace, they elect some one as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and expelled nobles: some new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often insolently persecuting those who have deserved well of the state, and ready to gratify the populace at his neighbor's expense as well as his own. then, since the private condition is naturally exposed to fears and alarms, the people invest him with many powers, and these are continued in his hands. such men, like pisistratus of athens, will soon find an excuse for surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they will conclude by becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them to dignity. if such despots perish by the vengeance of the better citizens, as is generally the case, the constitution is re-established; but if they fall by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction succeeds them, which is only another species of tyranny. and the same revolution arises from the fair system of aristocracy when any corruption has betrayed the nobles from the path of rectitude. thus the power is like the ball which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from kings to tyrants, from tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to democracy, and from these back again to tyrants and to factions; and thus the same kind of government is seldom long maintained. xlv. since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, in my opinion, very far preferable to the three other kinds of political constitutions. but it is itself inferior to that which is composed of an equal mixture of the three best forms of government, united and modified by one another. i wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal and pre-eminent chief. another portion of power should be deposited in the hands of the aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to the judgment and wish of the multitude. this constitution, in the first place, possesses that great equality without which men cannot long maintain their freedom; secondly, it offers a great stability, while the particular separate and isolated forms easily fall into their contraries; so that a king is succeeded by a despot, an aristocracy by a faction, a democracy by a mob and confusion; and all these forms are frequently sacrificed to new revolutions. in this united and mixed constitution, however, similar disasters cannot happen without the greatest vices in public men. for there can be little to occasion revolution in a state in which every person is firmly established in his appropriate rank, and there are but few modes of corruption into which we can fall. xlvi. but i fear, lælius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that if i were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. i shall therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which i have long studied. and in these matters i believe, i feel, and i affirm that of all governments there is none which, either in its entire constitution or the distribution of its parts, or in the discipline of its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers received from our earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down to us. and since you wish to hear from me a development of this constitution, with which you are all acquainted, i shall endeavor to explain its true character and excellence. thus keeping my eye fixed on the model of our roman commonwealth, i shall endeavor to accommodate to it all that i have to say on the best form of government. and by treating the subject in this way, i think i shall be able to accomplish most satisfactorily the task which lælius has imposed on me. xlvii. _lælius._ it is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a constitution which, if we possess (though at this moment we do not, still), when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing in it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as you, who, by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided for its safety forever? fragments. xlviii. as our country is the source of the greatest benefits, and is a parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still warmer gratitude than belongs to our human relations. * * * nor would carthage have continued to flourish during six centuries without wisdom and good institutions. * * * in truth, says cicero, although the reasonings of those men may contain most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare them with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will seem not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men as of amusement for their leisure. * * * * * introduction to the second book, by the original translator. in this second book of his commonwealth, cicero gives us a spirited and eloquent review of the history and successive developments of the roman constitution. he bestows the warmest praises on its early kings, points out the great advantages which had resulted from its primitive monarchical system, and explains how that system had been gradually broken up. in order to prove the importance of reviving it, he gives a glowing picture of the evils and disasters that had befallen the roman state in consequence of that overcharge of democratic folly and violence which had gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes, with a kind of prophetic sagacity, the fruit of his political experience, the subsequent revolutions of the roman state, which such a state of things would necessarily bring about. book ii. i. [when, therefore, he observed all his friends kindled with the de]sire of hearing him, scipio thus opened the discussion. i will commence, said scipio, with a sentiment of old cato, whom, as you know, i singularly loved and exceedingly admired, and to whom, in compliance with the judgment of both my parents, and also by my own desire, i was entirely devoted during my youth; of whose discourse, indeed, i could never have enough, so much experience did he possess as a statesman respecting the republic which he had so long governed, both in peace and war, with so much success. there was also an admirable propriety in his style of conversation, in which wit was tempered with gravity; a wonderful aptitude for acquiring, and at the same time communicating, information; and his life was in perfect correspondence and unison with his language. he used to say that the government of rome was superior to that of other states for this reason, because in nearly all of them there had been single individuals, each of whom had regulated their commonwealth according to their own laws and their own ordinances. so minos had done in crete, and lycurgus in sparta; and in athens, which experienced so many revolutions, first theseus, then draco, then solon, then clisthenes, afterward many others; and, lastly, when it was almost lifeless and quite prostrate, that great and wise man, demetrius phalereus, supported it. but our roman constitution, on the contrary, did not spring from the genius of one individual, but from that of many; and it was established, not in the lifetime of one man, but in the course of several ages and centuries. for, added he, there never yet existed any genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing at any time to escape its attention; and all the geniuses in the world united in a single mind could never, within the limits of a single life, exert a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize all, without the aid of experience and practice. thus, according to cato's usual habit, i now ascend in my discourse to the "origin of the people," for i like to adopt the expression of cato. i shall also more easily execute my proposed task if i thus exhibit to you our political constitution in its infancy, progress, and maturity, now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of socrates in the books of plato, i were to delineate a mere imaginary republic. ii. when all had signified their approbation, scipio resumed: what commencement of a political constitution can we conceive more brilliant, or more universally known, than the foundation of rome by the hand of romulus? and he was the son of mars: for we may grant this much to the common report existing among men, especially as it is not merely ancient, but one also which has been wisely maintained by our ancestors, in order that those who have done great service to communities may enjoy the reputation of having received from the gods, not only their genius, but their very birth. it is related, then, that soon after the birth of romulus and his brother remus, amulius, king of alba, fearing that they might one day undermine his authority, ordered that they should be exposed on the banks of the tiber; and that in this situation the infant romulus was suckled by a wild beast; that he was afterward educated by the shepherds, and brought up in the rough way of living and labors of the countrymen; and that he acquired, when he grew up, such superiority over the rest by the vigor of his body and the courage of his soul, that all the people who at that time inhabited the plains in the midst of which rome now stands, tranquilly and willingly submitted to his government. and when he had made himself the chief of those bands, to come from fables to facts, he took alba longa, a powerful and strong city at that time, and slew its king, amulius. iii. having acquired this glory, he conceived the design (as they tell us) of founding a new city and establishing a new state. as respected the site of his new city, a point which requires the greatest foresight in him who would lay the foundation of a durable commonwealth, he chose the most convenient possible position. for he did not advance too near the sea, which he might easily have done with the forces under his command, either by entering the territory of the rutuli and aborigines, or by founding his citadel at the mouth of the tiber, where many years after ancus martius established a colony. but romulus, with admirable genius and foresight, observed and perceived that sites very near the sea are not the most favorable positions for cities which would attain a durable prosperity and dominion. and this, first, because maritime cities are always exposed, not only to many attacks, but to perils they cannot provide against. for the continued land gives notice, by many indications, not only of any regular approaches, but also of any sudden surprises of an enemy, and announces them beforehand by the mere sound. there is no adversary who, on an inland territory, can arrive so swiftly as to prevent our knowing not only his existence, but his character too, and where he comes from. but a maritime and naval enemy can fall upon a town on the sea-coast before any one suspects that he is about to come; and when he does come, nothing exterior indicates who he is, or whence he comes, or what he wishes; nor can it even be determined and distinguished on all occasions whether he is a friend or a foe. iv. but maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed to corrupt influences, and revolutions of manners. their civilization is more or less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that nothing can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. those who inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but are urged afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. and even when they do not desert their country in person, still their minds are always expatiating and voyaging round the world. nor, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined corinth and carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and their attention to military pursuits. the proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their position nourishes many expensive and deceitful gratifications of the passions. and what i have spoken of corinth may be applied, for aught i know, without incorrectness to the whole of greece. for the peloponnesus itself is almost wholly on the sea-coast; nor, besides the phliasians, are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond the peloponnesus, the ænianes, the dorians, and the dolopes are the only inland people. why should i speak of the grecian islands, which, girded by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the institutions and manners of their cities? and these things, i have before noticed, do not respect ancient greece only; for which of all those colonies which have been led from greece into asia, thracia, italy, sicily, and africa, with the single exception of magnesia, is there that is not washed by the sea? thus it seems as if a sort of grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. for among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people, if we except the carthaginians and etruscans; one for the sake of commerce, the other of pillage. and this is one evident reason of the calamities and revolutions of greece, because she became infected with the vices which belong to maritime cities, which i just now briefly enumerated. but yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that there is a great facility for new inhabitants flocking to them. and, again, that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the produce of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers them a market for their goods. v. by what divine wisdom, then, could romulus embrace all the benefits that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the dangers to which they are exposed, except, as he did, by building his city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant commodities by the same channel? and in the same river a communication is found by which it not only receives from the sea all the productions necessary to the conveniences and elegances of life, but those also which are brought from the inland districts. so that romulus seems to me to have divined and anticipated that this city would one day become the centre and abode of a powerful and opulent empire; for there is no other part of italy in which a city could be situated so as to be able to maintain so wide a dominion with so much ease. vi. as to the natural fortifications of rome, who is so negligent and unobservant as not to have them depicted and deeply stamped on his memory? such is the plan and direction of the walls, which, by the prudence of romulus and his royal successors, are bounded on all sides by steep and rugged hills; and the only aperture between the esquiline and quirinal mountains is enclosed by a formidable rampart, and surrounded by an immense fosse. and as for our fortified citadel, it is so secured by a precipitous barrier and enclosure of rocks, that, even in that horrible attack and invasion of the gauls, it remained impregnable and inviolable. moreover, the site which he selected had also an abundance of fountains, and was healthy, though it was in the midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills which at once create a current of fresh air, and fling an agreeable shade over the valleys. vii. these things he effected with wonderful rapidity, and thus established the city, which, from his own name romulus, he determined to call rome. and in order to strengthen his new city, he conceived a design, singular enough, and even a little rude, yet worthy of a great man, and of a genius which discerned far away in futurity the means of strengthening his power and his people. the young sabine females of honorable birth who had come to rome, attracted by the public games and spectacles which romulus then, for the first time, established as annual games in the circus, were suddenly carried off at the feast of consus[313] by his orders, and were given in marriage to the men of the noblest families in rome. and when, on this account, the sabines had declared war against rome, the issue of the battle being doubtful and undecided, romulus made an alliance with tatius, king of the sabines, at the intercession of the matrons themselves who had been carried off. by this compact he admitted the sabines into the city, gave them a participation in the religious ceremonies, and divided his power with their king. viii. but after the death of tatius, the entire government was again vested in the hands of romulus, although, besides making tatius his own partner, he had also elected some of the chiefs of the sabines into the royal council, who on account of their affectionate regard for the people were called _patres_, or fathers. he also divided the people into three tribes, called after the name of tatius, and his own name, and that of locumo, who had fallen as his ally in the sabine war; and also into thirty curiæ, designated by the names of those sabine virgins, who, after being carried off at the festivals, generously offered themselves as the mediators of peace and coalition. but though these orders were established in the life of tatius, yet, after his death, romulus reigned with still greater power by the counsel and authority of the senate. ix. in this respect he approved and adopted the principle which lycurgus but little before had applied to the government of lacedæmon; namely, that the monarchical authority and the royal power operate best in the government of states when to this supreme authority is joined the influence of the noblest of the citizens. therefore, thus supported, and, as it were, propped up by this council or senate, romulus conducted many wars with the neighboring nations in a most successful manner; and while he refused to take any portion of the booty to his own palace, he did not cease to enrich the citizens. he also cherished the greatest respect for that institution of hierarchical and ecclesiastical ordinances which we still retain to the great benefit of the commonwealth; for in the very commencement of his government he founded the city with religious rites, and in the institution of all public establishments he was equally careful in attending to these sacred ceremonials, and associated with himself on these occasions priests that were selected from each of the tribes. he also enacted that the nobles should act as patrons and protectors to the inferior citizens, their natural clients and dependants, in their respective districts, a measure the utility of which i shall afterward notice.--the judicial punishments were mostly fines of sheep and oxen; for the property of the people at that time consisted in their fields and cattle, and this circumstance has given rise to the expressions which still designate real and personal wealth. thus the people were kept in order rather by mulctations than by bodily inflictions. x. after romulus had thus reigned thirty-seven years, and established these two great supports of government, the hierarchy and the senate, having disappeared in a sudden eclipse of the sun, he was thought worthy of being added to the number of the gods--an honor which no mortal man ever was able to attain to but by a glorious pre-eminence of virtue. and this circumstance was the more to be admired in the case of romulus because most of the great men that have been deified were so exalted to celestial dignities by the people, in periods very little enlightened, when fiction was easy and ignorance went hand-in-hand with credulity. but with respect to romulus we know that he lived less than six centuries ago, at a time when science and literature were already advanced, and had got rid of many of the ancient errors that had prevailed among less civilized peoples. for if, as we consider proved by the grecian annals, rome was founded in the seventh olympiad, the life of romulus was contemporary with that period in which greece already abounded in poets and musicians--an age when fables, except those concerning ancient matters, received little credit. for, one hundred and eight years after the promulgation of the laws of lycurgus, the first olympiad was established, which indeed, through a mistake of names, some authors have supposed constituted, by lycurgus likewise. and homer himself, according to the best computation, lived about thirty years before the time of lycurgus. we must conclude, therefore, that homer flourished very many years before the date of romulus. so that, as men had now become learned, and as the times themselves were not destitute of knowledge, there was not much room left for the success of mere fictions. antiquity indeed has received fables that have at times been sufficiently improbable: but this epoch, which was already so cultivated, disdaining every fiction that was impossible, rejected[314] * * * we may therefore, perhaps, attach some credit to this story of romulus's immortality, since human life was at that time experienced, cultivated, and instructed. and doubtless there was in him such energy of genius and virtue that it is not altogether impossible to believe the report of proculus julius, the husbandman, of that glorification having befallen romulus which for many ages we have denied to less illustrious men. at all events, proculus is reported to have stated in the council, at the instigation of the senators, who wished to free themselves from all suspicion of having been accessaries to the death of romulus, that he had seen him on that hill which is now called the quirinal, and that he had commanded him to inform the people that they should build him a temple on that same hill, and offer him sacrifices under the name of quirinus. xi. you see, therefore, that the genius of this great man did not merely establish the constitution of a new people, and then leave them, as it were, crying in their cradle; but he still continued to superintend their education till they had arrived at an adult and wellnigh a mature age. then lælius said: we now see, my scipio, what you meant when you said that you would adopt a new method of discussing the science of government, different from any found in the writings of the greeks. for that prime master of philosophy, whom none ever surpassed in eloquence, i mean plato, chose an open plain on which to build an imaginary city after his own taste--a city admirably conceived, as none can deny, but remote enough from the real life and manners of men. others, without proposing to themselves any model or type of government whatever, have argued on the constitutions and forms of states. you, on the contrary, appear to be about to unite these two methods; for, as far as you have gone, you seem to prefer attributing to others your discoveries, rather than start new theories under your own name and authority, as socrates has done in the writings of plato. thus, in speaking of the site of rome, you refer to a systematic policy, to the acts of romulus, which were many of them the result of necessity or chance; and you do not allow your discourse to run riot over many states, but you fix and concentrate it on our own commonwealth. proceed, then, in the course you have adopted; for i see that you intend to examine our other kings, in your pursuit of a perfect republic, as it were. xii. therefore, said scipio, when that senate of romulus which was composed of the nobles, whom the king himself respected so highly that he designated them _patres_, or fathers, and their children patricians, attempted after the death of romulus to conduct the government without a king, the people would not suffer it, but, amidst their regret for romulus, desisted not from demanding a fresh monarch. the nobles then prudently resolved to establish an interregnum--a new political form, unknown to other nations. it was not without its use, however, since, during the interval which elapsed before the definitive nomination of the new king, the state was not left without a ruler, nor subjected too long to the same governor, nor exposed to the fear lest some one, in consequence of the prolonged enjoyment of power, should become more unwilling to lay it aside, or more powerful if he wished to secure it permanently for himself. at which time this new nation discovered a political provision which had escaped the spartan lycurgus, who conceived that the monarch ought not to be elective--if indeed it is true that this depended on lycurgus--but that it was better for the lacedæmonians to acknowledge as their sovereign the next heir of the race of hercules, whoever he might be: but our romans, rude as they were, saw the importance of appointing a king, not for his family, but for his virtue and experience. xiii. and fame having recognized these eminent qualities in numa pompilius, the roman people, without partiality for their own citizens, committed itself, by the counsel of the senators, to a king of foreign origin, and summoned this sabine from the city of cures to rome, that he might reign over them. numa, although the people had proclaimed him king in their comitia curiata, did nevertheless himself pass a lex curiata respecting his own authority; and observing that the institutions of romulus had too much excited the military propensities of the people, he judged it expedient to recall them from this habit of warfare by other employments. xiv. and, in the first place, he divided severally among the citizens the lands which romulus had conquered, and taught them that even without the aid of pillage and devastation they could, by the cultivation of their own territories, procure themselves all kinds of commodities. and he inspired them with the love of peace and tranquillity, in which faith and justice are likeliest to flourish, and extended the most powerful protection to the people in the cultivation of their fields and the enjoyment of their produce. pompilius likewise having created hierarchical institutions of the highest class, added two augurs to the old number. he intrusted the superintendence of the sacred rites to five pontiffs, selected from the body of the nobles; and by those laws which we still preserve on our monuments he mitigated, by religious ceremonials, the minds that had been too long inflamed by military enthusiasm and enterprise. he also established the flamines and the salian priests and the vestal virgins, and regulated all departments of our ecclesiastical policy with the most pious care. in the ordinance of sacrifices, he wished that the ceremonial should be very arduous and the expenditure very light. he thus appointed many observances, whose knowledge is extremely important, and whose expense far from burdensome. thus in religious worship he added devotion and removed costliness. he was also the first to introduce markets, games, and the other usual methods of assembling and uniting men. by these establishments, he inclined to benevolence and amiability spirits whom the passion for war had rendered savage and ferocious. having thus reigned in the greatest peace and concord thirty-nine years--for in dates we mainly follow our polybius, than whom no one ever gave more attention to the investigation of the history of the times--he departed this life, having corroborated the two grand principles of political stability, religion and clemency. xv. when scipio had concluded these remarks, is it not, said manilius, a true tradition which is current, that our king numa was a disciple of pythagoras himself, or that at least he was a pythagorean in his doctrines? for i have often heard this from my elders, and we know that it is the popular opinion; but it does not seem to be clearly proved by the testimony of our public annals. then scipio replied: the supposition is false, my manilius; it is not merely a fiction, but a ridiculous and bungling one too; and we should not tolerate those statements, even in fiction, relating to facts which not only did not happen, but which never could have happened. for it was not till the fourth year of the reign of tarquinius superbus that pythagoras is ascertained to have come to sybaris, crotona, and this part of italy. and the sixty-second olympiad is the common date of the elevation of tarquin to the throne, and of the arrival of pythagoras. from which it appears, when we calculate the duration of the reigns of the kings, that about one hundred and forty years must have elapsed after the death of numa before pythagoras first arrived in italy. and this fact, in the minds of men who have carefully studied the annals of time, has never been at all doubted. o ye immortal gods! said manilius, how deep and how inveterate is this error in the minds of men! however, it costs me no effort to concede that our roman sciences were not imported from beyond the seas, but that they sprung from our own indigenous and domestic virtues. xvi. you will become still more convinced of this fact, said africanus, when tracing the progress of our commonwealth as it became gradually developed to its best and maturest condition. and you will find yet further occasion to admire the wisdom of our ancestors on this very account, since you will perceive, that even those things which they borrowed from foreigners received a much higher improvement among us than they possessed in the countries from whence they were imported among us; and you will learn that the roman people was aggrandized, not by chance or hazard, but rather by counsel and discipline, to which fortune indeed was by no means unfavorable. xvii. after the death of king pompilius, the people, after a short period of interregnum, chose tullus hostilius for their king, in the comitia curiata; and tullus, after numa's example, consulted the people in their curias to procure a sanction for his government. his excellence chiefly appeared in his military glory and great achievements in war. he likewise, out of his military spoils, constructed and decorated the house of comitia and the senate-house. he also settled the ceremonies of the proclamation of hostilities, and consecrated their righteous institution by the religious sanction of the fetial priests, so that every war which was not duly announced and declared might be adjudged illegal, unjust, and impious. and observe how wisely our kings at that time perceived that certain rights ought to be allowed to the people, of which we shall have a good deal to say hereafter. tullus did not even assume the ensigns of royalty without the approbation of the people; and when he appointed twelve lictors, with their axes to go before him[315] * * * xviii. * * * [_manilius_.] this commonwealth of rome, which you are so eloquently describing, did not creep towards perfection; it rather flew at once to the maturity of its grandeur. [_scipio._] after tullus, ancus martius, a descendant of numa by his daughter, was appointed king by the people. he also procured the passing of a law[316] through the comitia curiata respecting his government. this king having conquered the latins, admitted them to the rights of citizens of rome. he added to the city the aventine and cælian hills; he distributed the lands he had taken in war; he bestowed on the public all the maritime forests he had acquired; and he built the city ostia, at the mouth of the tiber, and colonized it. when he had thus reigned twenty-three years, he died. then said lælius: doubtless this king deserves our praises, but the roman history is obscure. we possess, indeed, the name of this monarch's mother, but we know nothing of his father. it is so, said scipio; but in those ages little more than the names of the kings were recorded. xix. for the first time at this period, rome appears to have become more learned by the study of foreign literature; for it was no longer a little rivulet, flowing from greece towards the walls of our city, but an overflowing river of grecian sciences and arts. this is generally attributed to demaratus, a corinthian, the first man of his country in reputation, honor, and wealth; who, not being able to bear the despotism of cypselus, tyrant of corinth, fled with large treasures, and arrived at tarquinii, the most flourishing city in etruria. there, understanding that the domination of cypselus was thoroughly established, he, like a free and bold-hearted man, renounced his country, and was admitted into the number of the citizens of tarquinii, and fixed his residence in that city. and having married a woman of the city, he instructed his two sons, according to the method of greek education, in all kinds of sciences and arts.[317] * * * xx. * * * [one of these sons] was easily admitted to the rights of citizenship at rome; and on account of his accomplished manners and learning, he became a favorite of our king ancus to such a degree that he was a partner in all his counsels, and was looked upon almost as his associate in the government. he, besides, possessed wonderful affability, and was very kind in assistance, support, protection, and even gifts of money, to the citizens. when, therefore, ancus died, the people by their unanimous suffrages chose for their king this lucius tarquinius (for he had thus transformed the greek name of his family, that he might seem in all respects to imitate the customs of his adopted countrymen). and when he, too, had procured the passing of a law respecting his authority, he commenced his reign by doubling the original number of the senators. the ancient senators he called patricians of the major families (_patres majorum gentium_), and he asked their votes first; and those new senators whom he himself had added, he entitled patricians of minor families. after this, he established the order of knights, on the plan which we maintain to this day. he would not, however, change the denomination of the tatian, rhamnensian, and lucerian orders, though he wished to do so, because attus nævius, an augur of the highest reputation, would not sanction it. and, indeed, i am aware that the corinthians were remarkably attentive to provide for the maintenance and good condition of their cavalry by taxes levied on the inheritance of widows and orphans. to the first equestrian orders lucius also added new ones, composing a body of three hundred knights. and this number he doubled, after having conquered the æquicoli, a large and ferocious people, and dangerous enemies of the roman state. having likewise repulsed from our walls an invasion of the sabines, he routed them by the aid of his cavalry, and subdued them. he also was the first person who instituted the grand games which are now called the roman games. he fulfilled his vow to build a temple to the all-good and all-powerful jupiter in the capitol--a vow which he made during a battle in the sabine war--and died after a reign of thirty-eight years. xxi. then lælius said: all that you have been relating corroborates the saying of cato, that the constitution of the roman commonwealth is not the work of one man, or one age; for we can clearly see what a great progress in excellent and useful institutions was continued under each successive king. but we are now arrived at the reign of a monarch who appears to me to have been of all our kings he who had the greatest foresight in matters of political government. so it appears to me, said scipio; for after tarquinius priscus comes servius sulpicius, who was the first who is reported to have reigned without an order from the people. he is supposed to have been the son of a female slave at tarquinii, by one of the soldiers or clients of king priscus; and as he was educated among the servants of this prince, and waiting on him at table, the king soon observed the fire of his genius, which shone forth even from his childhood, so skilful was he in all his words and actions. therefore, tarquin, whose own children were then very young, so loved servius that he was very commonly believed to be his own son, and he instructed him with the greatest care in all the sciences with which he was acquainted, according to the most exact discipline of the greeks. but when tarquin had perished by the plots of the sons of ancus, and servius (as i have said) had begun to reign, not by the order, but yet with the good-will and consent, of the citizens--because, as it was falsely reported that priscus was recovering from his wounds, servius, arrayed in the royal robes, delivered judgment, freed the debtors at his own expense, and, exhibiting the greatest affability, announced that he delivered judgment at the command of priscus--he did not commit himself to the senate; but, after priscus was buried, he consulted the people respecting his authority, and, being authorized by them to assume the dominion, he procured a law to be passed through the comitia curiata, confirming his government. he then, in the first place, avenged the injuries of the etruscans by arms. after which[318] * * * xxii. * * * he enrolled eighteen centuries of knights of the first order. afterward, having created a great number of knights from the common mass of the people, he divided the rest of the people into five classes, distinguishing between the seniors and the juniors. these he so constituted as to place the suffrages, not in the hands of the multitude, but in the power of the men of property. and he took care to make it a rule of ours, as it ought to be in every government, that the greatest number should not have the greatest weight. you are well acquainted with this institution, otherwise i would explain it to you; but you are familiar with the whole system, and know how the centuries of knights, with six suffrages, and the first class, comprising eighty centuries, besides one other century which was allotted to the artificers, on account of their utility to the state, produce eighty-nine centuries. if to these there are added twelve centuries--for that is the number of the centuries of the knights which remain[319]--the entire force of the state is summed up; and the arrangement is such that the remaining and far more numerous multitude, which is distributed through the ninety-six last centuries, is not deprived of a right of suffrage, which would be an arrogant measure; nor, on the other hand, permitted to exert too great a preponderance in the government, which would be dangerous. in this arrangement, servius was very cautious in his choice of terms and denominations. he called the rich _assidui_, because they afforded pecuniary succor[320] to the state. as to those whoso fortune did not exceed 1500 pence, or those who had nothing but their labor, he called them _proletarii_ classes, as if the state should expect from them a hardy progeny[321] and population. even a single one of the ninety-six last centuries contained numerically more citizens than the entire first class. thus, no one was excluded from his right of voting, yet the preponderance of votes was secured to those who had the deepest stake in the welfare of the state. moreover, with reference to the accensi, velati, trumpeters, hornblowers, proletarii[322] * * * xxiii. * * * that that republic is arranged in the best manner which, being composed in due proportions of those three elements, the monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratic, does not by punishment irritate a fierce and savage mind. * * * [a similar institution prevailed at carthage], which was sixty-five years more ancient than rome, since it was founded thirty-nine years before the first olympiad; and that most ancient law-giver lycurgus made nearly the same arrangements. thus the system of regular subordination, and this mixture of the three principal forms of government, appear to me common alike to us and them. but there is a peculiar advantage in our commonwealth, than which nothing can be more excellent, which i shall endeavor to describe as accurately as possible, because it is of such a character that nothing analogous can be discovered in ancient states; for these political elements which i have noticed were so united in the constitutions of rome, of sparta, and of carthage, that they were not counterbalanced by any modifying power. for in a state in which one man is invested with a perpetual domination, especially of the monarchical character, although there be a senate in it, as there was in rome under the kings, and in sparta, by the laws of lycurgus, or even where the people exercise a sort of jurisdiction, as they used in the days of our monarchy, the title of king must still be pre-eminent; nor can such a state avoid being, and being called, a kingdom. and this kind of government is especially subject to frequent revolutions, because the fault of a single individual is sufficient to precipitate it into the most pernicious disasters. in itself, however, royalty is not only not a reprehensible form of government, but i do not know whether it is not far preferable to all other simple constitutions, if i approved of any simple constitution whatever. but this preference applies to royalty so long only as it maintains its appropriate character; and this character provides that one individual's perpetual power, and justice, and universal wisdom should regulate the safety, equality, and tranquillity of the whole people. but many privileges must be wanting to communities that live under a king; and, in the first place, liberty, which does not consist in slavery to a just master, but in slavery to no master at all[323] * * * xxiv. * * * [let us now pass on to the reign of the seventh and last king of rome, tarquinius superbus.] and even this unjust and cruel master had good fortune for his companion for some time in all his enterprises. for he subdued all latium; he captured suessa pometia, a powerful and wealthy city, and, becoming possessed of an immense spoil of gold and silver, he accomplished his father's vow by the building of the capitol. he established colonies, and, faithful to the institutions of those from whom he sprung, he sent magnificent presents, as tokens of gratitude for his victories, to apollo at delphi. xxv. here begins the revolution of our political system of government, and i must beg your attention to its natural course and progression. for the grand point of political science, the object of our discourses, is to know the march and the deviations of governments, that when we are acquainted with the particular courses and inclinations of constitutions, we may be able to restrain them from their fatal tendencies, or to oppose adequate obstacles to their decline and fall. for this tarquinius superbus, of whom i am speaking, being first of all stained with the blood of his admirable predecessor on the throne, could not be a man of sound conscience and mind; and as he feared himself the severest punishment for his enormous crime, he sought his protection in making himself feared. then, in the glory of his victories and his treasures, he exulted in insolent pride, and could neither regulate his own manners nor the passions of the members of his family. when, therefore, his eldest son had offered violence to lucretia, daughter of tricipitinus and wife of collatinus, and this chaste and noble lady had stabbed herself to death on account of the injury she could not survive--then a man eminent for his genius and virtue, lucius brutus, dashed from his fellow-citizens this unjust yoke of odious servitude; and though he was but a private man, he sustained the government of the entire commonwealth, and was the first that taught the people in this state that no one was a private man when the preservation of our liberties was concerned. beneath his authority and command our city rose against tyranny, and, stirred by the recent grief of the father and relatives of lucretia, and with the recollections of tarquin's haughtiness, and the numberless crimes of himself and his sons, they pronounced sentence of banishment against him and his children, and the whole race of the tarquins. xxvi. do you not observe, then, how the king sometimes degenerates into the despot, and how, by the fault of one individual, a form of government originally good is abused to the worst of purposes? here is a specimen of that despot over the people whom the greeks denominate a tyrant. for, according to them, a king is he who, like a father, consults the interests of his people, and who preserves those whom he is set over in the very best condition of life. this indeed is, as i have said, an excellent form of government, yet still liable, and, as it were, inclined, to a pernicious abuse. for as soon as a king assumes an unjust and despotic power, he instantly becomes a tyrant, than which nothing baser or fouler, than which no imaginable animal can be more detestable to gods or men; for though in form a man, he surpasses the most savage monsters in ferocious cruelty. for who can justly call him a human being, who admits not between himself and his fellow-countrymen, between himself and the whole human race, any communication of justice, any association of kindness? but we shall find some fitter occasion of speaking of the evils of tyranny when the subject itself prompts us to declare against them who, even in a state already liberated, have affected these despotic insolencies. xxvii. such is the first origin and rise of a tyrant. for this was the name by which the greeks choose to designate an unjust king; and by the title king our romans universally understand every man who exercises over the people a perpetual and undivided domination. thus spurius cassius, and marcus manlius, and spurius mælius, are said to have wished to seize upon the kingly power, and lately [tiberius gracchus incurred the same accusation].[324] * * * xxviii. * * * [lycurgus, in sparta, formed, under the name of elders,] a small council consisting of twenty-eight members only; to these he allotted the supreme legislative authority, while the king held the supreme executive authority. our romans, emulating his example, and translating his terms, entitled those whom he had called elders, senators, which, as we have said, was done by romulus in reference to the elect patricians. in this constitution, however, the power, the influence, and name of the king is still pre-eminent. you may distribute, indeed, some show of power to the people, as lycurgus and romulus did, but you inflame them, with the thirst of liberty by allowing them even the slightest taste of its sweetness; and still their hearts will be overcast with alarm lest their king, as often happens, should become unjust. the prosperity of the people, therefore, can be little better than fragile, when placed at the disposal of any one individual, and subjected to his will and caprices. xxix. thus the first example, prototype, and original of tyranny has been discovered by us in the history of our own roman state, religiously founded by romulus, without applying to the theoretical commonwealth which, according to plato's recital, socrates was accustomed to describe in his peripatetic dialogues. we have observed tarquin, not by the usurpation of any new power, but by the unjust abuse of the power which he already possessed, overturn the whole system of our monarchical constitution. let us oppose to this example of the tyrant another, a virtuous king--wise, experienced, and well informed respecting the true interest and dignity of the citizens--a guardian, as it were, and superintendent of the commonwealth; for that is a proper name for every ruler and governor of a state. and take you care to recognize such a man when you meet him, for he is the man who, by counsel and exertion, can best protect the nation. and as the name of this man has not yet been often mentioned in our discourse, and as the character of such a man must be often alluded to in our future conversations, [i shall take an early opportunity of describing it.][325] * * * xxx. * * * [plato has chosen to suppose a territory and establishments of citizens, whose fortunes] were precisely equal. and he has given us a description of a city, rather to be desired than expected; and he has made out not such a one as can really exist, but one in which the principles of political affairs may be discerned. but for me, if i can in any way accomplish it, while i adopt the same general principles as plato, i am seeking to reduce them to experience and practice, not in the shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual commonwealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power; in order to be able to point out, with the most graphic precision, the causes of every political good and social evil. for after rome had flourished more than two hundred and forty years under her kings and interreges, and after tarquin was sent into banishment, the roman people conceived as much detestation of the name of king as they had once experienced regret at the death, or rather disappearance, of romulus. therefore, as in the first instance they could hardly bear the idea of losing a king, so in the latter, after the expulsion of tarquin, they could not endure to hear the name of a king.[326] * * * xxxi. * * * therefore, when that admirable constitution of romulus had lasted steadily about two hundred and forty years. * * * the whole of that law was abolished. in this humor, our ancestors banished collatinus, in spite of his innocence, because of the suspicion that attached to his family, and all the rest of the tarquins, on account of the unpopularity of their name. in the same humor, valerius publicola was the first to lower the fasces before the people, when he spoke in the assembly of the people. he also had the materials of his house conveyed to the foot of mount velia, having observed that the commencement of his edifice on the summit of this hill, where king tullius had once dwelt, excited the suspicions of the people. it was the same man, who in this respect pre-eminently deserved the name of publicola, who carried in favor of the people the first law received in the comitia centuriata, that no magistrate should sentence to death or scourging a roman citizen who appealed from his authority to the people. and the pontifical books attest that the right of appeal had existed, even against the decision of the kings. our augural books affirm the same thing. and the twelve tables prove, by a multitude of laws, that there was a right of appeal from every judgment and penalty. besides, the historical fact that the decemviri who compiled the laws were created with the privilege of judging without appeal, sufficiently proves that the other magistrates had not the same power. and a consular law, passed by lucius valerius politus and marcus horatius barbatus, men justly popular for promoting union and concord, enacted that no magistrate should thenceforth be appointed with authority to judge without appeal; and the portian laws, the work of three citizens of the name of portius, as you are aware, added nothing new to this edict but a penal sanction. therefore publicola, having promulgated this law in favor of appeal to the people, immediately ordered the axes to be removed from the fasces, which the lictors carried before the consuls, and the next day appointed spurius lucretius for his colleague. and as the new consul was the oldest of the two, publicola ordered his lictors to pass over to him; and he was the first to establish the rule, that each of the consuls should be preceded by the lictors in alternate months, that there should be no greater appearance of imperial insignia among the free people than they had witnessed in the days of their kings. thus, in my opinion, he proved himself no ordinary man, as, by so granting the people a moderate degree of liberty, he more easily maintained the authority of the nobles. nor is it without reason that i have related to you these ancient and almost obsolete events; but i wished to adduce my instances of men and circumstances from illustrious persons and times, as it is to such events that the rest of my discourse will be directed. xxxii. at that period, then, the senate preserved the commonwealth in such a condition that though the people were really free, yet few acts were passed by the people, but almost all, on the contrary, by the authority, customs, and traditions of the senate. and over all the consuls exercised a power--in time, indeed, only annual, but in nature and prerogative completely royal. the consuls maintained, with the greatest energy, that rule which so much conduces to the power of our nobles and great men, that the acts of the commons of the people shall not be binding, unless the authority of the patricians has approved them. about the same period, and scarcely ten years after the first consuls, we find the appointment of the dictator in the person of titus lartius. and this new kind of power--namely, the dictatorship--appears exceedingly similar to the monarchical royalty. all his power, however, was vested in the supreme authority of the senate, to which the people deferred; and in these times great exploits were performed in war by brave men invested with the supreme command, whether dictators or consuls. xxxiii. but as the nature of things necessarily brought it to pass that the people, once freed from its kings, should arrogate to itself more and more authority, we observe that after a short interval of only sixteen years, in the consulship of postumus cominius and spurius cassius, they attained their object; an event explicable, perhaps, on no distinct principle, but, nevertheless, in a manner independent of any distinct principle. for recollect what i said in commencing our discourse, that if there exists not in the state a just distribution and subordination of rights, offices, and prerogatives, so as to give sufficient domination to the chiefs, sufficient authority to the counsel of the senators, and sufficient liberty to the people, this form of the government cannot be durable. for when the excessive debts of the citizens had thrown the state into disorder, the people first retired to mount sacer, and next occupied mount aventine. and even the rigid discipline of lycurgus could not maintain those restraints in the case of the greeks. for in sparta itself, under the reign of theopompus, the five magistrates whom they term ephori, and in crete ten whom they entitle cosmi, were established in opposition to the royal power, just as tribunes were added among us to counterbalance the consular authority. xxxiv. there might have been a method, indeed, by which our ancestors could have been relieved from the pressure of debt, a method with which solon the athenian, who lived at no very distant period before, was acquainted, and which our senate did not neglect when, in the indignation which the odious avarice of one individual excited, all the bonds of the citizens were cancelled, and the right of arrest for a while suspended. in the same way, when the plebeians were oppressed by the weight of the expenses occasioned by public misfortunes, a cure and remedy were sought for the sake of public security. the senate, however, having forgotten their former decision, gave an advantage to the democracy; for, by the creation of two tribunes to appease the sedition of the people, the power and authority of the senate were diminished; which, however, still remained dignified and august, inasmuch as it was still composed of the wisest and bravest men, who protected their country both with their arms and with their counsels; whose authority was exceedingly strong and flourishing, because in honor they were as much before their fellow-citizens as they were inferior in luxuriousness, and, as a general rule, not superior to them in wealth. and their public virtues were the more agreeable to the people, because even in private matters they were ready to serve every citizen, by their exertions, their counsels, and their liberality. xxxv. such was the situation of the commonwealth when the quæstor impeached spurius cassius of being so much emboldened by the excessive favor of the people as to endeavor to make himself master of monarchical power. and, as you have heard, his own father, having said that he had found that his son was really guilty of this crime, condemned him to death at the instance of the people. about fifty-four years after the first consulate, spurius tarpeius and aulus aternius very much gratified the people by proposing, in the comitia centuriata, the substitution of fines instead of corporal punishments. twenty years afterward, lucius papirius and publius pinarius, the censors, having by a strict levy of fines confiscated to the state the entire flocks and herds of many private individuals, a light tax on the cattle was substituted for the law of fines in the consulship of caius julius and publius papirius. xxxvi. but, some years previous to this, at a period when the senate possessed the supreme influence, and the people were submissive and obedient, a new system was adopted. at that time both the consuls and tribunes of the people abdicated their magistracies, and the decemviri were appointed, who were invested with great authority, from which there was no appeal whatever, so as to exercise the chief domination, and to compile the laws. after having composed, with much wisdom and equity, the ten tables of laws, they nominated as their successors in the ensuing year other decemviri, whose good faith and justice do not deserve equal praise. one member of this college, however, merits our highest commendation. i allude to caius julius, who declared respecting the nobleman lucius sestius, in whose chamber a dead body had been exhumed under his own eyes, that though as decemvir he held the highest power without appeal, he still required bail, because he was unwilling to neglect that admirable law which permitted no court but the comitia centuriata to pronounce final sentence on the life of a roman citizen. xxxvii. a third year followed under the authority of the same decemvirs, and still they were not disposed to appoint their successors. in a situation of the commonwealth like this, which, as i have often repeated, could not be durable, because it had not an equal operation with respect to all the ranks of the citizens, the whole public power was lodged in the hands of the chiefs and decemvirs of the highest nobility, without the counterbalancing authority of the tribunes of the people, without the sanction of any other magistracies, and without appeal to the people in the case of a sentence of death or scourging. thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government, or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though matrimonial alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners, they forbade, by the most abominable and inhuman edict, that any marriages should take place between the nobles and the commons--an order which was afterward abrogated by the decree of canuleius. besides, they introduced into all their political measures corruption, cruelty, and avarice. and indeed the story is well known, and celebrated in many literary compositions, that a certain decimus virginius was obliged, on account of the libidinous violence of one of these decemvirs, to stab his virgin daughter in the midst of the forum. then, when he in his desperation had fled to the roman army which was encamped on mount algidum, the soldiers abandoned the war in which they were engaged, and took possession of the sacred mount, as they had done before on a similar occasion, and next invested mount aventine in their arms.[327] our ancestors knew how to prove most thoroughly, and to retain most wisely. * * * xxxviii. and when scipio had spoken in this manner, and all his friends were awaiting in silence the rest of his discourse, then said tubero: since these men who are older than i, my scipio, make no fresh demands on you, i shall take the liberty to tell you what i particularly wish you would explain in your subsequent remarks. do so, said scipio, and i shall be glad to hear. then tubero said: you appear to me to have spoken a panegyric on our commonwealth of rome exclusively, though lælius requested your views not only of the government of our own state, but of the policy of states in general. i have not, therefore, yet sufficiently learned from your discourse, with respect to that mixed form of government you most approve, by what discipline, moral and legal, we may be best able to establish and maintain it. xxxix. africanus replied: i think that we shall soon find an occasion better adapted to the discussion you have proposed, respecting the constitution and conservatism of states. as to the best form of government, i think on this point i have sufficiently answered the question of lælius. for in answering him, i, in the first place, specifically noticed the three simple forms of government--monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; and the three vicious constitutions contrary to them, into which they often degenerate; and i said that none of these forms, taken separately, was absolutely good; but i described as preferable to either of them that mixed government which is composed of a proper amalgamation of these simple ingredients. if i have since depicted our own roman constitution as an example, it was not in order to define the very best form of government, for that may be understood without an example; but i wished, in the exhibition of a mighty commonwealth actually in existence, to render distinct and visible what reason and discourse would vainly attempt to display without the assistance of experimental illustration. yet, if you still require me to describe the best form of government, independent of all particular examples, we must consult that exactly proportioned and graduated image of government which nature herself presents to her investigators. since you * * * this model of a city and people[328] * * * xl. * * * which i also am searching for, and which i am anxious to arrive at. _lælius._ you mean the model that would be approved by the truly accomplished politician? _scipio._ the same. _lælius._ you have plenty of fair patterns even now before you, if you would but begin with yourself. then scipio said: i wish i could find even one such, even in the entire senate. for he is really a wise politician who, as we have often seen in africa, while seated on a huge and unsightly elephant, can guide and rule the monster, and turn him whichever way he likes by a slight admonition, without any actual exertion. _lælius._ i recollect, and when i was your lieutenant i often saw, one of these drivers. _scipio._ thus an indian or carthaginian regulates one of these huge animals, and renders him docile and familiar with human manners. but the genius which resides in the mind of man, by whatever name it may be called, is required to rein and tame a monster far more multiform and intractable, whenever it can accomplish it, which indeed is seldom. it is necessary to hold in with a strong hand that ferocious[329] * * * xli. * * * [beast, denominated the mob, which thirsts after blood] to such a degree that it can scarcely be sated with the most hideous massacres of men. * * * but to a man who is greedy, and grasping, and lustful, and fond of wallowing in voluptuousness. the fourth kind of anxiety is that which is prone to mourning and melancholy, and which is constantly worrying itself. [_the next paragraph, "esse autem angores," etc., is wholly unintelligible without the context._] as an unskilful charioteer is dragged from his chariot, covered with dirt, bruised, and lacerated. the excitements of men's minds are like a chariot, with horses harnessed to it; in the proper management of which, the chief duty of the driver consists in knowing his road: and if he keeps the road, then, however rapidly he proceeds, he will encounter no obstacles; but if he quits the proper track, then, although he may be going gently and slowly, he will either be perplexed on rugged ground, or fall over some steep place, or at least he will be carried where he has no need to go.[330] xlii. * * * can be said. then lælius said: i now see the sort of politician you require, on whom you would impose the office and task of government, which is what i wished to understand. he must be an almost unique specimen, said africanus, for the task which i set him comprises all others. he must never cease from cultivating and studying himself, that he may excite others to imitate him, and become, through the splendor of his talents and enterprises, a living mirror to his countrymen. for as in flutes and harps, and in all vocal performances, a certain unison and harmony must be preserved amidst the distinctive tones, which cannot be broken or violated without offending experienced ears; and as this concord and delicious harmony is produced by the exact gradation and modulation of dissimilar notes; even so, by means of the just apportionment of the highest, middle, and lower classes, the state is maintained in concord and peace by the harmonic subordination of its discordant elements: and thus, that which is by musicians called harmony in song answers and corresponds to what we call concord in the state--concord, the strongest and loveliest bond of security in every commonwealth, being always accompanied by justice and equity. xliii. and after this, when scipio had discussed with considerable breadth of principle and felicity of illustration the great advantage that justice is to a state, and the great injury which would arise if it were wanting, pilus, one of those who were present at the discussion, took up the matter and demanded that this question should be argued more carefully, and that something more should be said about justice, on account of a sentiment that was now obtaining among people in general, that political affairs could not be wholly carried on without some disregard of justice. xliv. * * * to be full of justice. then scipio replied: i certainly think so. and i declare to you that i consider that all i have spoken respecting the government of the state is worth nothing, and that it will be useless to proceed further, unless i can prove that it is a false assertion that political business cannot be conducted without injustice and corruption; and, on the other hand, establish as a most indisputable fact that without the strictest justice no government whatever can last long. but, with your permission, we have had discussion enough for the day. the rest--and much remains for our consideration--we will defer till to-morrow. when they had all agreed to this, the debate of the day was closed. * * * * * introduction to the third book, by the original translator. cicero here enters on the grand question of political justice, and endeavors to evince throughout the absolute verity of that inestimable proverb, "honesty is the best policy," in all public as well as in all private affairs. st. augustine, in his city of god, has given the following analysis of this magnificent disquisition: "in the third book of cicero's commonwealth" (says he) "the question of political justice is most earnestly discussed. philus is appointed to support, as well as he can, the sophistical arguments of those who think that political government cannot be carried on without the aid of injustice and chicanery. he denies holding any such opinion himself; yet, in order to exhibit the truth more vividly through the force of contrast, he pleads with the utmost ingenuity the cause of injustice against justice; and endeavors to show, by plausible examples and specious dialectics, that injustice is as useful to a statesman as justice would be injurious. then lælius, at the general request, takes up the plea for justice, and maintains with all his eloquence that nothing could be so ruinous to states as injustice and dishonesty, and that without a supreme justice, no political government could expect a long duration. this point being sufficiently proved, scipio returns to the principal discussion. he reproduces and enforces the short definition that he had given of a commonwealth--that it consisted in the welfare of the entire people, by which word 'people' he does not mean the mob, but the community, bound together by the sense of common rights and mutual benefits. he notices how important such just definitions are in all debates whatever, and draws this conclusion from the preceding arguments--that the commonwealth is the common welfare whenever it is swayed with justice and wisdom, whether it be subordinated to a king, an aristocracy, or a democracy. but if the king be unjust, and so becomes a tyrant; and the aristocracy unjust, which makes them a faction; or the democrats unjust, and so degenerate into revolutionists and destructives--then not only the commonwealth is corrupted, but in fact annihilated. for it can be no longer the common welfare when a tyrant or a faction abuse it; and the people itself is no longer the people when it becomes unjust, since it is no longer a community associated by a sense of right and utility, according to the definition."--_aug. civ. dei._ 3-21. this book is of the utmost importance to statesmen, as it serves to neutralize the sophistries of machiavelli, which are still repeated in many cabinets. book iii. i. * * *[331] cicero, in the third book of his treatise on a commonwealth, says that nature has treated man less like a mother than a step-dame, for she has cast him into mortal life with a body naked, fragile, and infirm, and with a mind agitated by troubles, depressed by fears, broken by labors, and exposed to passions. in this mind, however, there lies hidden, and, as it were, buried, a certain divine spark of genius and intellect. though man is born a frail and powerless being, nevertheless he is safe from all animals destitute of voice; and at the same time those other animals of greater strength, although they bravely endure the violence of weather, cannot be safe from man. and the result is, that reason does more for man than nature does for brutes; since, in the latter, neither the greatness of their strength nor the firmness of their bodies can save them from being oppressed by us, and made subject to our power. * * * plato returned thanks to nature that he had been born a man. ii. * * * aiding our slowness by carriages, and when it had taught men to utter the elementary and confused sounds of unpolished expression, articulated and distinguished them into their proper classes, and, as their appropriate signs, attached certain words to certain things, and thus associated, by the most delightful bond of speech, the once divided races of men. and by a similar intelligence, the inflections of the voice, which appeared infinite, are, by the discovery of a few alphabetic characters, all designated and expressed; by which we maintain converse with our absent friends, by which also indications of our wishes and monuments of past events are preserved. then came the use of numbers--a thing necessary to human life, and at the same time immutable and eternal; a science which first urged us to raise our views to heaven, and not gaze without an object on the motions of the stars, and the distribution of days and nights. iii. * * *[332] [then appeared the sages of philosophy], whose minds took a higher flight, and who were able to conceive and to execute designs worthy of the gifts of the gods. wherefore let those men who have left us sublime essays on the principles of living be regarded as great men--which indeed they are--as learned men, as masters of truth and virtue; provided that these principles of civil government, this system of governing people, whether it be a thing discovered by men who have lived amidst a variety of political events, or one discussed amidst their opportunities of literary tranquillity, is remembered to be, as indeed it is, a thing by no means to be despised, being one which causes in first-rate minds, as we not unfrequently see, an incredible and almost divine virtue. and when to these high faculties of soul, received from nature and expanded by social institutions, a politician adds learning and extensive information concerning things in general, like those illustrious personages who conduct the dialogue in the present treatise, none will refuse to confess the superiority of such persons to all others; for, in fact, what can be more admirable than the study and practice of the grand affairs of state, united to a literary taste and a familiarity with the liberal arts? or what can we imagine more perfect than a scipio, a lælius, or a philus, who, not to omit anything which belonged to the most perfect excellence of the greatest men, joined to the examples of our ancestors and the traditions of our countrymen the foreign philosophy of socrates? wherefore he who had both the desire and the power to acquaint himself thoroughly both with the customs and the learning of his ancestors appears to me to have attained to the very highest glory and honor. but if we cannot combine both, and are compelled to select one of these two paths to wisdom--though to some people the tranquil life spent in the research of literature and arts may appear to be the most happy and delectable--yet, doubtless, the science of politics is more laudable and illustrious, for in this political field of exertion our greatest men have reaped their honors, like the invincible curius, whom neither gold nor iron could subdue. iv. * * *[333] that wisdom existed still. there existed this general difference between these two classes, that among the one the development of the principles of nature is the subject of their study and eloquence, and among the other national laws and institutions form the principal topics of investigation. in honor of our country, we may assert that she has produced within herself a great number, i will not say of sages (since philosophy is so jealous of this name), but of men worthy of the highest celebrity, because by them the precepts and discoveries of the sages have been carried out into actual practice. and, moreover, though there have existed, and still do exist, many great and glorious empires, yet since the noblest masterpiece of genius in the world is the establishment of a state and commonwealth which shall be a lasting one, even if we reckon but a single legislator for each empire, the number of these excellent men will appear very numerous. to be convinced of this, we have only to turn our eyes on any nation of italy, latium, the sabines, the volscians, the samnites, or the etrurians, and then direct our attention to that mighty nation of the greeks, and then to the assyrians, persians, and carthaginians, and[334] * * * v. * * * [scipio and his friends having again assembled, scipio spoke as follows: in our last conversation, i promised to prove that honesty is the best policy in all states and commonwealths whatsoever. but if i am to plead in favor of strict honesty and justice in all public affairs, no less than in private, i must request philus, or some one else, to take up the advocacy of the other side; the truth will then become more manifest, from the collision of opposite arguments, as we see every day exemplified at the bar.] and philus replied: in good truth, you have allotted me a very creditable cause when you wish me to undertake the defence of vice. perhaps, said lælius, you are afraid, lest, in reproducing the ordinary objections made to justice in politics, you should seem to express your own sentiments; though you are universally respected as an almost unique example of the ancient probity and good faith; nor is it unknown how familiar you are with the lawyer-like habit of disputing on both sides of a question, because you think that this is the best way of getting at the truth. and philus said: very well; i obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes open, i will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who seek for gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are searching for justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound to shrink from no annoyance. and i wish, as i am about to make use of the antagonist arguments of a foreigner, i might also employ a foreign language. the pleas, therefore, now to be urged by lucius furius philus are those [once employed by] the greek carneades, a man who was accustomed to express whatever [served his turn].[335] * * *[336]let it be understood, therefore, that i by no means express my own sentiments, but those of carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher, who was wont to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere wantonness of wit. vi. he was a philosopher of the academic school; and if any one is ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and acuteness in arguing, he may learn it from the mention made of him by cicero or by lucilius, when neptune, discoursing on a very difficult subject, declares that it cannot be explained, not even if hell were to restore carneades himself for the purpose. this philosopher, having been sent by the athenians to rome as an ambassador, discussed the subject of justice very amply in the hearing of galba and cato the censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. and the next day he overturned all his arguments by others of a contrary tendency, and disparaged justice, which the day before he had extolled; speaking not indeed with the gravity of a philosopher whose wisdom ought to be steady, and whose opinions unchangeable, but in a kind of rhetorical exercise of arguing on each side--a practice which he was accustomed to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who were asserting anything. the arguments by which he disparaged justice are mentioned by lucius furius in cicero; i suppose, since he was discussing the commonwealth, in order to introduce a defence and panegyric of that quality without which he did not think a commonwealth could be administered. but carneades, in order to refute aristotle and plato, the advocates of justice, collected in his first argument everything that was in the habit of being advanced on behalf of justice, in order afterward to be able to overturn it, as he did. vii. many philosophers indeed, and especially plato and aristotle, have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating that virtue, and extolling it with the highest praise, as giving to every one what belongs to him, as preserving equity in all things, and urging that while the other virtues are, as it were, silent and shut up, justice is the only one which is not absorbed in considerations of self-interest, and which is not secret, but finds its whole field for exercise out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and serving as many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought to exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain authority, and not in every one! but there is no one, not even a man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute of opportunities of displaying justice. but because these philosophers knew not what its essence was, or whence it proceeded, or what its employment was, they attributed that first of all virtues, which is the common good of all men, to a few only, and asserted that it aimed at no advantage of its own, but was anxious only for that of others. so it was well that carneades, a man of the greatest genius and acuteness, refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice which had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its defenders had brought forward no trustworthy or strong arguments in its behalf. justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous in its whole essence. which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates itself to the advantage of others. viii. * * * both to discover and maintain. while the other, aristotle, has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice. for i did not expect anything grand or magnificent from chrysippus, who, after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the signification of words than the reality of things. but it was surely worthy of those heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a virtue so eminently beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the social interests above the selfish, and teaches us to love others rather than ourselves. it was worthy of their genius, we say, to elevate this virtue to a divine throne, not far from that of wisdom. and certainly they neither wanted the will to accomplish this (for what else could be the cause of their writing on the subject, or what could have been their design?) nor the genius, in which they excelled all men. but the weakness of their cause was too great for either their intention or their eloquence to make it popular. in fact, this justice on which we reason is a civil right, but no natural one; for if it were natural and universal, then justice and injustice would be recognized similarly by all men, just as the heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness. ix. now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of which the poet pacuvius makes mention, could take his flight over all nations and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would see that the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. in the first place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of egypt, which preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and events, a bull adored as a deity, under the name of apis, and a multitude of other monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the same nation into the number of the gods. in the next place, he would see in greece, as among ourselves, magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive of xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the athenian temples was the belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined within narrow walls the gods, whose proper home was the entire universe. but afterward philip, in his hostile projects against the persians, and alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this plea for war, that they were desirous to avenge the temples of greece, which the greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this monument of the impiety of the persians might always remain before the eyes of their posterity. how many--such as the inhabitants of taurica along the euxine sea; as the king of egypt, busiris; as the gauls and the carthaginians--have thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the gods to sacrifice men! and, besides, the customs of life are so various that the cretans and ætolians regard robbery as honorable. and the lacedæmonians say that their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a lance. the athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public proclamation, that all the lands which produced olives and corn were their own. the gauls consider it a base employment to raise corn by agricultural labor, and go with arms in their hands, and mow down the harvests of neighboring peoples. but we ourselves, the most equitable of all nations, who, in order to raise the value of our vines and olives, do not permit the races beyond the alps to cultivate either vineyards or oliveyards, are said in this matter to act with prudence, but not with justice. you see, then, that wisdom and policy are not always the same as equity. and lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most admirable jurisprudence and most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the rich to be cultivated by the common people, who were reduced to slavery. x. if i were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions, manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations, but as they vary likewise in single cities--in this one of ours, for example--i could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. for instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present company--i mean manilius--if you were to consult him relative to the legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his youth, before the voconian enactment came into force--an edict which was passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently full of injustice with regard to women. for why should a woman be disabled from inheriting property? why can a vestal virgin become an heir, while her mother cannot? and why, admitting that it is necessary to set some limit to the wealth of women, should crassus's daughter, if she be his only child, inherit thousands without offending the law, while my daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.[337] * * * xi. * * * [if this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact different laws at different times. if a just man and a virtuous man is bound to obey the laws, i ask, what laws do you mean? do you intend all the laws indifferently? but neither does virtue permit this inconstancy in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural conscience. the laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice, but on our fear of punishment. there is, therefore, no natural justice; and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature. are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man to render every one his due rights? are we, then, to attribute the first of these characteristics to animals? for not only men of moderate abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as pythagoras and empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right to the same justice. they declare that inexpiable penalties impend over those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. it is, therefore, a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such crime[338] * * * xii. for when he[339] inquired of a pirate by what right he dared to infest the sea with his little brigantine: "by the same right," he replied, "which is your warrant for conquering the world." * * * wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power, riches, and estates. for by what means could this same alexander, that illustrious general, who extended his empire over all asia, without violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned without bound or limit? but justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching what does not belong to us. what is the result, then? if you obey the dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at. however, as we are discussing public matters, those examples are more illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. and since the question between justice and policy applies equally to private and public affairs, i think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. i will not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own roman people, whom africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from the cradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world. justice is[340] * * * xiii. how far utility is at variance with justice we may learn from the roman people itself, which, declaring war by means of the fecials, and committing injustice with all legal formality, always coveting and laying violent hands on the property of others, acquired the possession of the whole world. what is the advantage of one's own country but the disadvantage of another state or nation, by extending one's dominions by territories evidently wrested from others, increasing one's power, improving one's revenues, etc.? therefore, whoever has obtained these advantages for his country--that is to say, whoever has overthrown cities, subdued nations, and by these means filled the treasury with money, taken lands, and enriched his fellow-citizens--such a man is extolled to the skies; is believed to be endowed with consummate and perfect virtue; and this mistake is fallen into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by philosophers, who even give rules for injustice. xiv. * * * for all those who have the right of life and death over the people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title of king, which belongs to the all-good jupiter. but when certain men, by favor of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the entire government, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate themselves an aristocracy. if the people gets the upper hand, and rules everything after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is in fact license. and when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and every class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one trusts in his own strength, a kind of compact is formed between the great and the little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government which scipio has been commending. thus justice, according to these facts, is not the daughter of nature or conscience, but of human imbecility. for when it becomes necessary to choose between these three predicaments, either to do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong with retribution, or to do no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with impunity; next, neither to do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing is more wretched than to struggle incessantly between the wrong we inflict and that we receive. therefore, he who attains to that first end[341] * * * xv. this was the sum of the argument of carneades: that men had established laws among themselves from considerations of advantage, varying them according to their different customs, and altering them often so as to adapt them to the times; but that there was no such thing as natural law; that all men and all other animals are led to their own advantage by the guidance of nature; that there is no such thing as justice, or, if there be, that it is extreme folly, since a man would injure himself while consulting the interests of others. and he added these arguments, that all nations who were flourishing and dominant, and even the romans themselves, who were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be just--that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to others--would have to return to their cottages, and to lie down in want and misery. except, perhaps, of the arcadians and athenians, who, i presume, dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive, pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field-mice. xvi. in reply to these statements, the following arguments are often adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we inquire, who is a good man?--understanding by that term a frank and single-minded man--we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers, and slanderers. for those men assert that the wise man does not seek virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of the good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on the other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain suspicion, and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and punishment. do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or that there is any advantage which can be procured by injustice, precious enough to counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and the haunting consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and hangs over his devoted head.[342] * * * xvii. [our philosophers, therefore, put a case. suppose, say they, two men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor and remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but his vice and audacity. and suppose that their city has so mistaken their characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous, impious, and audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked man, on the contrary, as a pattern of probity and fidelity. on account of this error of their fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented, his hands are cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned, bound, burned, exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears to all men to be most deservedly the most miserable of men. on the other hand, the flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all, and honors, offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him, and he shall be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest of mortals, and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of prosperity. yet, for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these two men he would rather be? xviii. what happens among individuals happens also among nations. there is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion to just subordination. i need not go far for examples. during my own consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted respecting the treaty of numantia. no one was ignorant that quintus pompey had signed a treaty, and that mancinus had done the same. the latter, being a virtuous man, supported the proposition which i laid before the people, after the decree of the senate. the former, on the other side, opposed it vehemently. if modesty, probity, or faith had been regarded, mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason, counsel, and prudence, pompey surpassed him. whether[343] * * * xix. if a man should have a faithless slave, or an unwholesome house, with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these objections from the buyer? if he stated those facts, he would be honest, no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would be thought a fool, because he would either get very little for his property, or else fail to sell it at all. by concealing these defects, on the other hand, he will be called a shrewd man--as one who has taken care of his own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding, because he will be deceiving his neighbors. again, let us suppose that one man meets another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be copper or lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital bargain, or correct the mistake, and purchase at a fair rate? he would evidently be a fool in the world's opinion if he preferred the latter. xx. it is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor robbery. what, then, would your just man do, if, in a case of shipwreck, he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank? would he not thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape by his exertions, especially as no human witness could be present in the mid-sea? if he acted like a wise man of the world, he would certainly do so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life. if, on the other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable injury on his neighbor, he will be an eminently honorable and just man, but not the less a fool, because he saved another's life at the expense of his own. again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were pressing in the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade mounted on a horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being killed himself, or shall he fling him from the horse in order to preserve his own life from the pursuers? if he does so, he is a wise man, but at the same time a wicked one; if he does not, he is admirably just, but at the same time stupid. xxi. _scipio._ i might reply at great length to these sophistical objections of philus, if it were not, my lælius, that all our friends are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the present debate, especially as you promised yesterday that you would plead at large on my side of the argument. if you cannot spare time for this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you. _lælius._ this carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young men. i think all the while that i am hearing him that he must be a very impure person; if he be not, as i would fain believe, his discourse is not less pernicious. xxii.[344] true law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. this law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. it needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. it is not one thing at rome, and another at athens; one thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. it is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. god himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer. and he who does not obey it flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. and by so doing he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils which are usually accounted punishments. xxiii. i am aware that in the third book of cicero's treatise on the commonwealth (unless i am mistaken) it is argued that no war is ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth unless it be one either for the sake of keeping faith, or for safety; and what he means by a war for safety, and what safety he wishes us to understand, he points out in another passage, where he says, "but private men often escape from these penalties, which even the most stupid persons feel--want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes--by embracing the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death itself is a penalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from punishment. for a state ought to be established so as to be eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state, as there is for a man, in whose case death is not only inevitable, but often even desirable; but when a state is put an end to, it is destroyed, extinguished. it is in some degree, to compare small things with great, as if this whole world were to perish and fall to pieces." in his treatise on the commonwealth, cicero says those wars are unjust which are undertaken without reason. again, after a few sentences, he adds, no war is considered just unless it be formally announced and declared, and unless it be to obtain restitution of what has been taken away. but our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the master of all the whole world. xxiv. also, in that same treatise on the commonwealth, he argues most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of justice against injustice. and since, when a little time before the part of injustice was upheld against justice, and the doctrine was urged that a republic could not prosper and flourish except by injustice, this was put forward as the strongest argument, that it was unjust for men to serve other men as their masters; but that unless a dominant state, such as a great republic, acted on this injustice, it could not govern its provinces; answer was made on behalf of justice, that it was just that it should be so, because slavery is advantageous to such men, and their interests are consulted by a right course of conduct--that is, by the license of doing injury being taken from the wicked--and they will fare better when subjugated, because when not subjugated they fared worse: and to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance, taken, as it were, from nature, was added, and it was said, why, then, does god govern man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason govern lust, and the other vicious parts of the mind? xxv. hear what tully says more plainly still in the third book of his treatise on the commonwealth, when discussing the reasons for government. do we not, says he, see that nature herself has given the power of dominion to everything that is best, to the extreme advantage of what is subjected to it? why, then, does god govern man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason govern lust and passion and the other vicious parts of the same mind? listen thus far; for presently he adds, but still there are dissimilarities to be recognized in governing and in obeying. for as the mind is said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, still it governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. the authority of kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of the mind--that is to say, wisdom--controls the vicious and weak parts of itself, such as lust, passion, and the other perturbations. for there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to some one else who might be their own masters; but when those are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury done. xxvi. if, says carneades, you were to know that an asp was lying hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you, you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit down. still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who could prove that you had known? but we are bringing forward too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found. and on these topics a great deal is said by lælius in our treatise on the republic. if, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful. * * * xxvii. i am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the affection borne to our children is implanted by nature; indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man and man which has its origin in nature. and if there be not, then there is an end of all society in life. may it turn out well, says carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more sensibly than my friend lucius or patro: for, as they refer everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever done for the sake of another? and when they say that a man ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. but these arguments are argued, i think, in those books by praising which you have given me spirits. in which i agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not that of a wise man. xxviii. and again, in cicero, that same advocate of justice, lælius, says, virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she any other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and exacts without bitterness. and in another place the same lælius says: when a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you offer him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? he considers these but mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. and if the ingratitude of the people, and the envy of his competitors, or the violence of powerful enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly recompense, he still enjoys a thousand consolations in the approbation of conscience, and sustains himself by contemplating the beauty of moral rectitude. xxix. * * * this virtue, in order to be true, must be universal. tiberius gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the latin peoples. but if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend itself further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to violence, so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only restrained by fear, then, although we, during our days, may escape the peril, yet am i solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and the immortality of the commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might become perpetual and invincible if our people would maintain their ancient institutions and manners. xxx. when lælius had ceased to speak, all those that were present expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. but scipio, more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy, exclaimed: you have pleaded, my lælius, many causes with an eloquence superior to that of servius galba, our colleague, whom you used during his life to prefer to all others, even to the attic orators [and never did i hear you speak with more energy than to-day, while pleading the cause of justice][345] * * * * * * that two things were wanting to enable him to speak in public and in the forum, confidence and voice. xxxi. * * * this justice, continued scipio, is the very foundation of lawful government in political constitutions. can we call the state of agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty of a single tyrant--where there is no universal bond of right, nor social consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people, properly so named? it is the same in syracuse--that illustrious city which timæus calls the greatest of the grecian towns. it was indeed a most beautiful city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed through all its districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its temples, and its walls, gave syracuse the appearance of a most flourishing state. but while dionysius its tyrant reigned there, nothing of all its wealth belonged to the people, and the people were nothing better than the slaves of one master. thus, wherever i behold a tyrant, i know that the social constitution must be not merely vicious and corrupt, as i stated yesterday, but in strict truth no social constitution at all. xxxii. _lælius._ you have spoken admirably, my scipio, and i see the point of your observations. _scipio._ you grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community? _lælius._ that is evident. _scipio._ you judge most correctly. for what was the state of athens when, during the great peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust domination of the thirty tyrants? the antique glory of that city, the imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of phidias, and the magnificent harbor of piræus--did they constitute it a commonwealth? _lælius._ certainly not, because these did not constitute the real welfare of the community. _scipio._ and at rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost all its securities and all its blessings? _lælius._ yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted, and the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate rights. xxxiii. _scipio._ i now come to the third, or democratical, form of government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and are carried into execution just as they please. here the populace inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. can you deny, my lælius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the state? _lælius._ there is no political constitution to which i more absolutely deny the name of a _commonwealth_ than that in which all things lie in the power of the multitude. if a commonwealth, which implies the welfare of the entire community, could not exist in agrigentum, syracuse, or athens when tyrants reigned over them--if it could not exist in rome when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs--neither do i see how this sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy and the sway of the mob; because, in the first place, my scipio, i build on your own admirable definition, that there can be no community, properly so called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights. and, by this definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just as tyrannical as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no monster can be more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and appearance of the people. nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws place the property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that we should do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of the sane into the hands of the mad multitude][346] * * * xxxiv. * * * [it is far more rational] to assert that a wise and virtuous aristocratical government deserves the title of a commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom. and much more so in my opinion, said mummius. for the unity of power often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy, consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most fortunate circumstance possible for any state. however this be, i much prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is. xxxv. scipio replied: i am well acquainted, my mummius, with your decided antipathy to the democratical system. and, although, we may speak of it with rather more indulgence than you are accustomed to accord it, i must certainly agree with you, that of all the three particular forms of government, none is less commendable than democracy. i do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy is preferable to royalty. if you suppose that wisdom governs the state, is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch as in many nobles? but we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion like the present. when we pronounce the word "aristocracy," which, in greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived more excellent? for what can be thought better than the best? but when, on the other hand, the title "king" is mentioned, we begin to imagine a tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. but we are not speaking of an unjust king when we are examining the true nature of royal authority. to this name of king, therefore, do but attach the idea of a romulus, a numa, a tullus, and perhaps you will be less severe to the monarchical form of constitution. _mummius_. have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of democratical government? _scipio._ why, i think some democratical forms less objectionable than others; and, by way of illustration, i will ask you what you thought of the government in the isle of rhodes, where we were lately together; did it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution? _mummius_. it did, and not much liable to abuse. _scipio._ you say truly. but, if you recollect, it was a very extraordinary experiment. all the inhabitants were alternately senators and citizens. some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and some months they spent in their civil employments. in both they exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same men judged all causes, capital and not capital. and they had as much influence, and were of as much importance as * * * fragments. xxxvi. there is therefore some unquiet feeling in individuals, which either exults in pleasure or is crushed by annoyance. [_the next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such, unintelligible_.] the phoenicians were the first who by their commerce, and by the merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and magnificence and insatiable degrees of everything into greece. sardanapalus, the luxurious king of assyria, of whom tully, in the third book of his treatise on the republic, says, "the notorious sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than even by his name." what is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless some one wishes to make the whole of athos a monument? for what is athos or the vast olympus? * * * xxxvii. i will endeavor in the proper place to show it, according to the definitions of cicero himself, in which, putting forth scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained what a commonwealth and what a republic is; adducing also many assertions of his own, and of those whom he has represented as taking part in that discussion, to the effect that the state of rome was not such a commonwealth, because there has never been genuine justice in it. however, according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was a commonwealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by the more ancient than by the later romans. it is now fitting that i should explain, as briefly and as clearly as i can, what, in the second book of this work, i promised to prove, according to the definitions which cicero, in his books on the commonwealth, puts into the mouth of scipio, arguing that the roman state was never a commonwealth; for he briefly defines a commonwealth as a state of the people; the people as an assembly of the multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a community of interests. what he calls a common feeling of right he explains by discussion, showing in this way that a commonwealth cannot proceed without justice. where, therefore, there is no genuine justice, there can be no right, for that which is done according to right is done justly; and what is done unjustly cannot be done according to right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be called or thought rights; since they themselves call that right (_jus_) which flows from the source of justice: and they say that that assertion which is often made by some persons of erroneous sentiments, namely, that that is right which is advantageous to the most powerful, is false. wherefore, where there is no true justice there can be no company of men united by a common feeling of right; therefore there can be no people (_populus_), according to that definition of scipio or cicero: and if there be no people, there can be no state of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be, which is not worthy of the name of a people. and thus, if a commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that is not a people which is not united by a common feeling of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then the undoubted inference is, that where there is no justice there is no commonwealth. moreover, justice is that virtue which gives every one his own. no war can be undertaken by a just and wise state unless for faith or self-defence. this self-defence of the state is enough to insure its perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. those afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under--poverty, exile, prison, and torment--private individuals seek to escape from by an instantaneous death. but for states, the greatest calamity of all is that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. a state should be so constituted as to live forever. for a commonwealth there is no natural dissolution as there is for a man, to whom death not only becomes necessary, but often desirable. and when a state once decays and falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that, if we may compare great things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe. all wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust. and no war can be reputed just unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it be not preceded by a rational demand for restitution. our roman commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of the world. * * * * * introduction to the fourth book, by the original translator. in this fourth book cicero treats of morals and education, and the use and abuse of stage entertainments. we retain nothing of this important book save a few scattered fragments, the beauty of which fills us with the greater regret for the passages we have lost. book iv. fragments. i. * * * since mention has been made of the body and of the mind, i will endeavor to explain the theory of each as well as the weakness of my understanding is able to comprehend it--a duty which i think it the more becoming in me to undertake, because marcus tullius, a man of singular genius, after having attempted to perform it in the fourth book of his treatise on the commonwealth, compressed a subject of wide extent within narrow limits, only touching lightly on all the principal points. and that there might be no excuse alleged for his not having followed out this topic, he himself has assured us that he was not wanting either in inclination or in anxiety to do so; for, in the first book of his treatise on laws, when he was touching briefly on the same subject, he speaks thus: "this topic scipio, in my opinion, has sufficiently discussed in those books which you have read." and the mind itself, which sees the future, remembers the past. well did marcus tullius say, in truth, if there is no one who would not prefer death to being changed into the form of some beast, although he were still to retain the mind of a man, how much more wretched is it to have the mind of a beast in the form of a man! to me this fate appears as much worse than the other as the mind is superior to the body. tullius says somewhere that he does not think the good of a ram and of publius africanus identical. and also by its being interposed, it causes shade and night, which is adapted both to the numbering of days and to rest from labor. and as in the autumn he has opened the earth to receive seeds, in winter relaxed it that it may digest them, and by the ripening powers of summer softened some and burned up others. when the shepherds use * * * for cattle. cicero, in the fourth book of his commonwealth, uses the word "armentum," and "armentarius," derived from it. ii. the great law of just and regular subordination is the basis of political prosperity. there is much advantage in the harmonious succession of ranks and orders and classes, in which the suffrages of the knights and the senators have their due weight. too many have foolishly desired to destroy this institution, in the vain hope of receiving some new largess, by a public decree, out of a distribution of the property of the nobility. iii. consider, now, how wisely the other provisions have been adopted, in order to secure to the citizens the benefits of an honest and happy life; for that is, indeed, the grand object of all political association, and that which every government should endeavor to procure for the people, partly by its institutions, and partly by its laws. consider, in the first place, the national education of the people--a matter on which the greeks have expended much labor in vain, and which is the only point on which polybius, who settled among us, accuses the negligence of our institutions. for our countrymen have thought that education ought not to be fixed, nor regulated by laws, nor be given publicly and uniformly to all classes of society. for[347] * * * according to tully, who says that men going to serve in the army have guardians assigned to them, by whom they are governed the first year. iv. [in our ancient laws, young men were prohibited from appearing] naked in the public baths, so far back were the principles of modesty traced by our ancestors. among the greeks, on the contrary, what an absurd system of training youth is exhibited in their gymnasia! what a frivolous preparation for the labors and hazards of war! what indecent spectacles, what impure and licentious amours are permitted! i do not speak only of the eleans and thebans, among whom, in all love affairs, passion is allowed to run into shameless excesses; but the spartans, while they permit every kind of license to their young men, save that of violation, fence off, by a very slight wall, the very exception on which they insist, besides other crimes which i will not mention. then lælius said: i see, my scipio, that on the subject of the greek institutions, which you censure, you prefer attacking the customs of the most renowned peoples to contending with your favorite plato, whose name you have avoided citing, especially as * * * v. so that cicero, in his treatise on the commonwealth, says that it was a reproach to young men if they had no lovers. not only as at sparta, where boys learn to steal and plunder. and our master plato, even more than lycurgus, who would have everything to be common, so that no one should be able to call anything his own property. i would send him to the same place whither he sends homer, crowned with chaplets and anointed with perfumes, banishing him from the city which he is describing. vi. the judgment of the censor inflicts scarcely anything more than a blush on the man whom he condemns. therefore as all that adjudication turns solely on the name (_nomen_), the punishment is called ignominy. nor should a prefect be set over women, an officer who is created among the greeks; but there should be a censor to teach husbands to manage their wives. so the discipline of modesty has great power. all women abstain from wine. and also if any woman was of bad character, her relations used not to kiss her. so petulance is derived from asking (_petendo_); wantonness (_procacitas_) from _procando_, that is, from demanding. vii. for i do not approve of the same nation being the ruler and the farmer of lands. but both in private families and in the affairs of the commonwealth i look upon economy as a revenue. faith (_fides_) appears to me to derive its name from that being done (_fit_) which is said. in a citizen of rank and noble birth, caressing manners, display, and ambition are marks of levity. examine for a while the books on the republic, and learn that good men know no bound or limit in consulting the interests of their country. see in that treatise with what praises frugality, and continency, and fidelity to the marriage tie, and chaste, honorable, and virtuous manners are extolled. viii. i marvel at the elegant choice, not only of the facts, but of the language. if they dispute (_jurgant_). it is a contest between well-wishers, not a quarrel between enemies, that is called a dispute (_jurgium_), therefore the law considers that neighbors dispute (_jurgare_) rather than quarrel (_litigare_) with one another. the bounds of man's care and of man's life are the same; so by the pontifical law the sanctity of burial * * * they put them to death, though innocent, because they had left those men unburied whom they could not rescue from the sea because of the violence of the storm. nor in this discussion have i advocated the cause of the populace, but of the good. for one cannot easily resist a powerful people if one gives them either no rights at all or very little. in which case i wish i could augur first with truth and fidelity * * * ix. cicero saying this in vain, when speaking of poets, "and when the shouts and approval of the people, as of some great and wise teacher, has reached them, what darkness do they bring on! what alarms do they cause! what desires do they excite!" cicero says that if his life were extended to twice its length, he should not have time to read the lyric poets. x. as scipio says in cicero, "as they thought the whole histrionic art, and everything connected with the theatre, discreditable, they thought fit that all men of that description should not only be deprived of the honors belonging to the rest of the citizens, but should also be deprived of their franchise by the sentence of the censors." and what the ancient romans thought on this subject cicero informs us, in those books which he wrote on the commonwealth, where scipio argues and says * * * comedies could never (if it had not been authorized by the common customs of life) have made theatres approve of their scandalous exhibitions. and the more ancient greeks provided a certain correction for the vicious taste of the people, by making a law that it should be expressly defined by a censorship what subjects comedy should treat, and how she should treat them. whom has it not attacked? or, rather, whom has it not wounded? and whom has it spared? in this, no doubt, it sometimes took the right side, and lashed the popular demagogues and seditious agitators, such as cleon, cleophon, and hyperbolus. we may tolerate that; though indeed the censure of the magistrate would, in these cases, have been more efficacious than the satire of the poet. but when pericles, who governed the athenian commonwealth for so many years with the highest authority, both in peace and war, was outraged by verses, and these were acted on the stage, it was hardly more decent than if, among us, plautus and nævius had attacked publius and cnæus, or cæcilius had ventured to revile marcus cato. our laws of the twelve tables, on the contrary--so careful to attach capital punishment to a very few crimes only--have included in this class of capital offences the offence of composing or publicly reciting verses of libel, slander, and defamation, in order to cast dishonor and infamy on a fellow-citizen. and they have decided wisely; for our life and character should, if suspected, be submitted to the sentence of judicial tribunals and the legal investigations of our magistrates, and not to the whims and fancies of poets. nor should we be exposed to any charge of disgrace which we cannot meet by legal process, and openly refute at the bar. in our laws, i admire the justice of their expressions, as well as their decisions. thus the word _pleading_ signifies rather an amicable suit between friends than a quarrel between enemies. it is not easy to resist a powerful people, if you allow them no rights, or next to none. the old romans would not allow any living man to be either praised or blamed on the stage. xi. cicero says that comedy is an imitation of life; a mirror of customs, an image of truth. since, as is mentioned in that book on the commonwealth, not only did æschines the athenian, a man of the greatest eloquence, who, when a young man, had been an actor of tragedies, concern himself in public affairs, but the athenians often sent aristodemus, who was also a tragic actor, to philip as an ambassador, to treat of the most important affairs of peace and war. * * * * * introduction to the fifth book, by the original translator. in this fifth book cicero explains and enforces the duties of magistrates, and the importance of practical experience to all who undertake their important functions. only a few fragments have survived the wreck of ages and descended to us. book v. fragments. i. ennius has told us- of men and customs mighty rome consists; which verse, both for its precision and its verity, appears to me as if it had issued from an oracle; for neither the men, unless the state had adopted a certain system of manners--nor the manners, unless they had been illustrated by the men--could ever have established or maintained for so many ages so vast a republic, or one of such righteous and extensive sway. thus, long before our own times, the force of hereditary manners of itself moulded most eminent men; and admirable citizens, in return, gave new weight to the ancient customs and institutions of our ancestors. but our age, on the contrary, having received the commonwealth as a finished picture of another century, but one already beginning to fade through the lapse of years, has not only neglected to renew the colors of the original painting, but has not even cared to preserve its general form and prominent lineaments. for what now remains of those antique manners, of which the poet said that our commonwealth consisted? they have now become so obsolete and forgotten that they are not only not cultivated, but they are not even known. and as to the men, what shall i say? for the manners themselves have only perished through a scarcity of men; of which great misfortune we are not only called to give an account, but even, as men accused of capital offences, to a certain degree to plead our own cause in connection with it. for it is owing to our vices, rather than to any accident, that we have retained the name of republic when we have long since lost the reality. ii. * * * there is no employment so essentially royal as the exposition of equity, which comprises the true interpretation of all laws. this justice subjects used generally to expect from their kings. for this reason, lands, fields, woods, and pastures were reserved as the property of kings, and cultivated for them, without any labor on their part, in order that no anxiety on account of their personal interests might distract their attention from the welfare of the state. nor was any private man allowed to be the judge or arbitrator in any suit; but all disputes were terminated by the royal sentence. and of all our roman monarchs, numa appears to me to have best preserved this ancient custom of the kings of greece. for the others, though they also discharged this duty, were for the main part employed in conducting military enterprises, and in attending to those rights which belonged to war. but the long peace of numa's reign was the mother of law and religion in this city. and he was himself the author of those admirable laws which, as you are aware, are still extant. and this character is precisely what belongs to the man of whom we are speaking. * * * iii. [_scipio._ ought not a farmer] to be acquainted with the nature of plants and seeds? _manilius._ certainly, provided he attends to his practical business also. _scipio._ do you think that knowledge only fit for a steward? _manilius._ certainly not, inasmuch as the cultivation of land often fails for want of agricultural labor. _scipio._ therefore, as the steward knows the nature of a field, and the scribe knows penmanship, and as both of them seek, in their respective sciences, not mere amusement only, but practical utility, so this statesman of ours should have studied the science of jurisprudence and legislation; he should have investigated their original sources; but he should not embarrass himself in debating and arguing, reading and scribbling. he should rather employ himself in the actual administration of government, and become a sort of steward of it, being perfectly conversant with the principles of universal law and equity, without which no man can be just: not unfamiliar with the civil laws of states; but he will use them for practical purposes, even as a pilot uses astronomy, and a physician natural philosophy. for both these men bring their theoretical science to bear on the practice of their arts; and our statesman [should do the same with the science of politics, and make it subservient to the actual interests of philanthropy and patriotism]. * * * iv. * * * in states in which good men desire glory and approbation, and shun disgrace and ignominy. nor are such men so much alarmed by the threats and penalties of the law as by that sentiment of shame with which nature has endowed man, which is nothing else than a certain fear of deserved censure. the wise director of a government strengthens this natural instinct by the force of public opinion, and perfects it by education and manners. and thus the citizens are preserved from vice and corruption rather by honor and shame than by fear of punishment. but this argument will be better illustrated when we treat of the love of glory and praise, which we shall discuss on another occasion. v. as respects the private life and the manners of the citizens, they are intimately connected with the laws that constitute just marriages and legitimate offspring, under the protection of the guardian deities around the domestic hearths. by these laws, all men should be maintained in their rights of public and private property. it is only under a good government like this that men can live happily--for nothing can be more delightful than a well-constituted state. on which account it appears to me a very strange thing what this * * * vi. i therefore consume all my time in considering what is the power of that man, whom, as you think, we have described carefully enough in our books. do you, then, admit our idea of that governor of a commonwealth to whom we wish to refer everything? for thus, i imagine, does scipio speak in the fifth book: "for as a fair voyage is the object of the master of a ship, the health of his patient the aim of a physician, and victory that of a general, so the happiness of his fellow-citizens is the proper study of the ruler of a commonwealth; that they may be stable in power, rich in resources, widely known in reputation, and honorable through their virtue. for a ruler ought to be one who can perfect this, which is the best and most important employment among mankind." and works in your literature rightly praise that ruler of a country who consults the welfare of his people more than their inclinations. vii. tully, in those books which he wrote upon the commonwealth, could not conceal his opinions, when he speaks of appointing a chief of the state, who, he says, must be maintained by glory; and afterward he relates that his ancestors did many admirable and noble actions from a desire of glory. tully, in his treatise on the commonwealth, wrote that the chief of a state must be maintained by glory, and that a commonwealth would last as long as honor was paid by every one to the chief. [_the next paragraph is unintelligible._] which virtue is called fortitude, which consists of magnanimity, and a great contempt of death and pain. viii. as marcellus was fierce, and eager to fight, maximus prudent and cautious. who discovered his violence and unbridled ferocity. which has often happened not only to individuals, but also to most powerful nations. in the whole world. because he inflicted the annoyances of his old age on your families. ix. cicero, in his treatise on the commonwealth, says, "as menelaus of lacedæmon had a certain agreeable sweetness of eloquence." and in another place he says, "let him cultivate brevity in speaking." by the evidence of which arts, as tully says, it is a shame for the conscience of the judge to be misled. for he says, "and as nothing in a commonwealth ought to be so uncorrupt as a suffrage and a sentence, i do not see why the man who perverts them by money is worthy of punishment, while he who does so by eloquence is even praised. indeed, i myself think that he who corrupts the judge by his speech does more harm than he who does so by money, because no one can corrupt a sensible man by money, though he may by speaking." and when scipio had said this, mummius praised him greatly, for he was extravagantly imbued with a hatred of orators. * * * * * introduction to the sixth book. in this last book of his commonwealth, cicero labors to show that truly pious philanthropical and patriotic statesmen will not only be rewarded on earth by the approval of conscience and the applause of all good citizens, but that they may expect hereafter immortal glory in new forms of being. to illustrate this, he introduces the "dream of scipio," in which he explains the resplendent doctrines of plato respecting the immortality of the soul with inimitable dignity and elegance. this somnium scipionis, for which we are indebted to the citation of macrobius, is the most beautiful thing of the kind ever written. it has been intensely admired by all european scholars, and will be still more so. there are two translations of it in our language; one attached to oliver's edition of cicero's thoughts, the other by mr. danby, published in 1829. of these we have freely availed ourselves, and as freely we express our acknowledgments. book vi. scipio's dream. i. therefore you rely upon all the prudence of this rule, which has derived its very name (_prudentia_) from foreseeing (_a providendo_). wherefore the citizen must so prepare himself as to be always armed against those things which trouble the constitution of a state. and that dissension of the citizens, when one party separates from and attacks another, is called sedition. and in truth in civil dissensions, as the good are of more importance than the many, i think that we should regard the weight of the citizens, and not their number. for the lusts, being severe mistresses of the thoughts, command and compel many an unbridled action. and as they cannot be satisfied or appeased by any means, they urge those whom they have inflamed with their allurements to every kind of atrocity. ii. which indeed was so much the greater in him because though the cause of the colleagues was identical, not only was their unpopularity not equal, but the influence of gracchus was employed in mitigating the hatred borne to claudius. who encountered the number of the chiefs and nobles with these words, and left behind him that mournful and dignified expression of his gravity and influence. that, as he writes, a thousand men might every day descend into the forum with cloaks dyed in purple. [_the next paragraph is unintelligible._] for our ancestors wished marriages to be firmly established. there is a speech extant of lælius with which we are all acquainted, expressing how pleasing to the immortal gods are the * * * and * * * of the priests. iii. cicero, writing about the commonwealth, in imitation of plato, has related the story of the return of er the pamphylian to life; who, as he says, had come to life again after he had been placed on the funeral pile, and related many secrets about the shades below; not speaking, like plato, in a fabulous imitation of truth, but using a certain reasonable invention of an ingenious dream, cleverly intimating that these things which were uttered about the immortality of the soul, and about heaven, are not the inventions of dreaming philosophers, nor the incredible fables which the epicureans ridicule, but the conjectures of wise men. he insinuates that that scipio who by the subjugation of carthage obtained africanus as a surname for his family, gave notice to scipio the son of paulus of the treachery which threatened him from his relations, and the course of fate, because by the necessity of numbers he was confined in the period of a perfect life, and he says that he in the fifty-sixth year of his age * * * iv. some of our religion who love plato, on account of his admirable kind of eloquence, and of some correct opinions which he held, say that he had some opinions similar to my own touching the resurrection of the dead, which subject tully touches on in his treatise on the commonwealth, and says that he was rather jesting than intending to say that was true. for he asserts that a man returned to life, and related some stories which harmonized with the discussions of the platonists. v. in this point the imitation has especially preserved the likeness of the work, because, as plato, in the conclusion of his volume, represents a certain person who had returned to life, which he appeared to have quitted, as indicating what is the condition of souls when stripped of the body, with the addition of a certain not unnecessary description of the spheres and stars, an appearance of circumstances indicating things of the same kind is related by the scipio of cicero, as having been brought before him in sleep. vi. tully is found to have preserved this arrangement with no less judgment than genius. after, in every condition of the commonwealth, whether of leisure or business, he has given the palm to justice, he has placed the sacred abodes of the immortal souls, and the secrets of the heavenly regions, on the very summit of his completed work, indicating whither they must come, or rather return, who have managed the republic with prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation. but that platonic relater of secrets was a man of the name of er, a pamphylian by nation, a soldier by profession, who, after he appeared to have died from wounds received in battle, and twelve days afterward was about to receive the honors of the funeral pile with the others who were slain at the same time, suddenly either recovering his life, or else never having lost it, as if he were giving a public testimony, related to all men all that he had done or seen in the days that he had thus passed between life and death. although cicero, as if himself conscious of the truth, grieves that this story has been ridiculed by the ignorant, still, avoiding giving an example of foolish reproach, he preferred speaking of the relater as of one awakened from a swoon rather than restored to life. vii. and before we look at the words of the dream we must explain what kind of persons they are by whom cicero says that even the account of plato was ridiculed, who are not apprehensive that the same thing may happen to them. nor by this expression does he wish the ignorant mob to be understood, but a kind of men who are ignorant of the truth, though pretending to be philosophers with a display of learning, who, it was notorious, had read such things, and were eager to find faults. we will say, therefore, who they are whom he reports as having levelled light reproaches against so great a philosopher, and who of them has even left an accusation of him committed to writing, etc. the whole faction of the epicureans, always wandering at an equal distance from truth, and thinking everything ridiculous which they do not understand, has ridiculed the sacred volume, and the most venerable mysteries of nature. but colotes, who is somewhat celebrated and remarkable for his loquacity among the pupils of epicurus, has even recorded in a book the bitter reproaches which he aims at him. but since the other arguments which he foolishly urges have no connection with the dream of which we are now talking, we will pass them over at present, and attend only to the calumny which will stick both to cicero and plato, unless it is silenced. he says that a fable ought not to have been invented by a philosopher, since no kind of falsehood is suitable to professors of truth. for why, says he, if you wish to give us a notion of heavenly things and to teach us the nature of souls, did you not do so by a simple and plain explanation? why was a character invented, and circumstances, and strange events, and a scene of cunningly adduced falsehood arranged, to pollute the very door of the investigation of truth by a lie? since these things, though they are said of the platonic er, do also attack the rest of our dreaming africanus. viii. this occasion incited scipio to relate his dream, which he declares that he had buried in silence for a long time. for when lælius was complaining that there were no statues of nasica erected in any public place, as a reward for his having slain the tyrant, scipio replied in these words: "but although the consciousness itself of great deeds is to wise men the most ample reward of virtue, yet that divine nature ought to have, not statues fixed in lead, nor triumphs with withering laurels, but some more stable and lasting kinds of rewards." "what are they?" said lælius. "then," said scipio, "suffer me, since we have now been keeping holiday for three days, * * * etc." by which preface he came to the relation of his dream; pointing out that those were the more stable and lasting kinds of rewards which he himself had seen in heaven reserved for good governors of commonwealths. ix. when i had arrived in africa, where i was, as you are aware, military tribune of the fourth legion under the consul manilius, there was nothing of which i was more earnestly desirous than to see king masinissa, who, for very just reasons, had been always the especial friend of our family. when i was introduced to him, the old man embraced me, shed tears, and then, looking up to heaven, exclaimed--i thank thee, o supreme sun, and ye also, ye other celestial beings, that before i depart from this life i behold in my kingdom, and in this my palace, publius cornelius scipio, by whose mere name i seem to be reanimated; so completely and indelibly is the recollection of that best and most invincible of men, africanus, imprinted in my mind. after this, i inquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom. he, on the other hand, questioned me about the condition of our commonwealth, and in this mutual interchange of conversation we passed the whole of that day. x. in the evening we were entertained in a manner worthy the magnificence of a king, and carried on our discourse for a considerable part of the night. and during all this time the old man spoke of nothing but africanus, all whose actions, and even remarkable sayings, he remembered distinctly. at last, when we retired to bed, i fell into a more profound sleep than usual, both because i was fatigued with my journey, and because i had sat up the greatest part of the night. here i had the following dream, occasioned, as i verily believe, by our preceding conversation; for it frequently happens that the thoughts and discourses which have employed us in the daytime produce in our sleep an effect somewhat similar to that which ennius writes happened to him about homer, of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently to think and speak. africanus, i thought, appeared to me in that shape, with which i was better acquainted from his picture than from any personal knowledge of him. when i perceived it was he, i confess i trembled with consternation; but he addressed me, saying, take courage, my scipio; be not afraid, and carefully remember what i shall say to you. xi. do you see that city carthage, which, though brought under the roman yoke by me, is now renewing former wars, and cannot live in peace? (and he pointed to carthage from a lofty spot, full of stars, and brilliant, and glittering)--to attack which city you are this day arrived in a station not much superior to that of a private soldier. before two years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and complete its overthrow; and you shall obtain, by your own merit, the surname of africanus, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as derived from me. and when you have destroyed carthage, and received the honor of a triumph, and been made censor, and, in quality of ambassador, visited egypt, syria, asia, and greece, you shall be elected a second time consul in your absence, and, by utterly destroying numantia, put an end to a most dangerous war. but when you have entered the capitol in your triumphal car, you shall find the roman commonwealth all in a ferment, through the intrigues of my grandson tiberius gracchus. xii. it is on this occasion, my dear africanus, that you show your country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence. but i see that the destiny, however, of that time is, as it were, uncertain; for when your age shall have accomplished seven times eight revolutions of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked put by the natural product of these two numbers, each of which is esteemed a perfect one, but for different reasons, then shall the whole city have recourse to you alone, and place its hopes in your auspicious name. on you the senate, all good citizens, the allies, the people of latium, shall cast their eyes; on you the preservation of the state shall entirely depend. in a word, _if you escape the impious machinations of your relatives_, you will, in quality of dictator, establish order and tranquillity in the commonwealth. when on this lælius made an exclamation, and the rest of the company groaned loudly, scipio, with a gentle smile, said, i entreat you, do not wake me out of my dream, but have patience, and hear the rest. xiii. now, in order to encourage you, my dear africanus, continued the shade of my ancestor, to defend the state with the greater cheerfulness, be assured that, for all those who have in any way conduced to the preservation, defence, and enlargement of their native country, there is a certain place in heaven where they shall enjoy an eternity of happiness. for nothing on earth is more agreeable to god, the supreme governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies of men united together by laws, which are called states. it is from heaven their rulers and preservers came, and thither they return. xiv. though at these words i was extremely troubled, not so much at the fear of death as at the perfidy of my own relations, yet i recollected myself enough to inquire whether he himself, my father paulus, and others whom we look upon as dead, were really living. yes, truly, replied he, they all enjoy life who have escaped from the chains of the body as from a prison. but as to what you call life on earth, that is no more than one form of death. but see; here comes your father paulus towards you! and as soon as i observed him, my eyes burst out into a flood of tears; but he took me in his arms, embraced me, and bade me not weep. xv. when my first transports subsided, and i regained the liberty of speech, i addressed my father thus: thou best and most venerable of parents, since this, as i am informed by africanus, is the only substantial life, why do i linger on earth, and not rather haste to come hither where you are? that, replied he, is impossible: unless that god, whose temple is all that vast expanse you behold, shall free you from the fetters of the body, you can have no admission into this place. mankind have received their being on this very condition, that they should labor for the preservation of that globe which is situated, as you see, in the midst of this temple, and is called earth. men are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal fires which you call stars and constellations; and which, being round, spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their cycles and revolutions with amazing rapidity. it is your duty, therefore, my publius, and that of all who have any veneration for the gods, to preserve this wonderful union of soul and body; nor without the express command of him who gave you a soul should the least thought be entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post assigned you by god himself. but rather follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me, your father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety; which is due in a great degree to parents and relations, but most of all to our country. such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the company of those, who, after having lived on earth and escaped from the body, inhabit the place which you now behold. xvi. this was the shining circle, or zone, whose remarkable brightness distinguishes it among the constellations, and which, after the greeks, you call the milky way. from thence, as i took a view of the universe, everything appeared beautiful and admirable; for there those stars are to be seen that are never visible from our globe, and everything appears of such magnitude as we could not have imagined. the least of all the stars was that removed farthest from heaven, and situated next to the earth; i mean our moon, which shines with a borrowed light. now, the globes of the stars far surpass the magnitude of our earth, which at that distance appeared so exceedingly small that i could not but be sensibly affected on seeing our whole empire no larger than if we touched the earth, as it were, at a single point. xvii. and as i continued to observe the earth with great attention, how long, i pray you, said africanus, will your mind be fixed on that object? why don't you rather take a view of the magnificent temples among which you have arrived? the universe is composed of nine circles, or rather spheres, one of which is the heavenly one, and is exterior to all the rest, which it embraces; being itself the supreme god, and bounding and containing the whole. in it are fixed those stars which revolve with never-varying courses. below this are seven other spheres, which revolve in a contrary direction to that of the heavens. one of these is occupied by the globe which on earth they call saturn. next to that is the star of jupiter, so benign and salutary to mankind. the third in order is that fiery and terrible planet called mars. below this, again, almost in the middle region, is the sun--the leader, governor, and prince of the other luminaries; the soul of the world, which it regulates and illumines; being of such vast size that it pervades and gives light to all places. then follow venus and mercury, which attend, as it were, on the sun. lastly, the moon, which shines only in the reflected beams of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of all. below this, if we except that gift of the gods, the soul, which has been given by the liberality of the gods to the human race, everything is mortal, and tends to dissolution; but above the moon all is eternal. for the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the centre, is immovable, and, being the lowest, all others gravitate towards it. xviii. when i had recovered myself from the astonishment occasioned by such a wonderful prospect, i thus addressed africanus: pray what is this sound that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner? to which he replied: it is that which is called the _music of the spheres_, being produced by their motion and impulse; and being formed by unequal intervals, but such as are divided according to the justest proportion, it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds, various concerts of harmony. for it is impossible that motions so great should be performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature that the extremes on one side should produce sharp, and on the other flat sounds. for which reason the sphere of the fixed stars, being the highest, and being carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a shrill and acute sound; whereas that of the moon, being the lowest, moves with a very flat one. as to the earth, which makes the ninth sphere, it remains immovably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the universe. but those eight revolving circles, in which both mercury and venus are moved with the same celerity, give out sounds that are divided by seven distinct intervals, which is generally the regulating number of all things. this celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians both on stringed instruments and with the voice, whereby they have opened to themselves a way to return to the celestial regions, as have likewise many others who have employed their sublime genius while on earth in cultivating the divine sciences. by the amazing noise of this sound the ears of mankind have been in some degree deafened; and indeed hearing is the dullest of all the human senses. thus, the people who dwell near the cataracts of the nile, which are called catadupa[348], are, by the excessive roar which that river makes in precipitating itself from those lofty mountains, entirely deprived of the sense of hearing. and so inconceivably great is this sound which is produced by the rapid motion of the whole universe, that the human ear is no more capable of receiving it than the eye is able to look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose beams easily dazzle the strongest sight. while i was busied in admiring the scene of wonders, i could not help casting my eyes every now and then on the earth. xix. on which africanus said, i perceive that you are still employed in contemplating the seat and residence of mankind. but if it appears to you so small, as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix your attention forever on these heavenly objects. is it possible that you should attain any human applause or glory that is worth the contending for? the earth, you see, is peopled but in a very few places, and those, too, of small extent; and they appear like so many little spots of green scattered through vast, uncultivated deserts. and those who inhabit the earth are not only so remote from each other as to be cut off from all mutual correspondence, but their situation being in oblique or contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps in those diametrically opposite to yours, all expectation of universal fame must fall to the ground. xx. you may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt and surrounded with certain zones, whereof those two that are most remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are congealed with frost; but that one in the middle, which is far the largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. the other two are habitable, one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your antipodes, with whom you have no connection; the other, towards the north, is that which you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may see, falls to your share. for the whole extent of what you see is, as it were, but a little island, narrow at both ends and wide in the middle, which is surrounded by the sea which on earth you call the great atlantic ocean, and which, notwithstanding this magnificent name, you see is very insignificant. and even in these cultivated and well-known countries, has yours, or any of our names, ever passed the heights of the caucasus or the currents of the ganges? in what other parts to the north or the south, or where the sun rises and sets, will your names ever be heard? and if we leave these out of the question, how small a space is there left for your glory to spread itself abroad; and how long will it remain in the memory of those whose minds are now full of it? xxi. besides all this, if the progeny of any future generation should wish to transmit to their posterity the praises of any one of us which they have heard from their forefathers, yet the deluges and combustions of the earth, which must necessarily happen at their destined periods, will prevent our obtaining, not only an eternal, but even a durable glory. and, after all, what does it signify whether those who shall hereafter be born talk of you, when those who have lived before you, whose number was perhaps not less, and whose merit certainly greater, were not so much as acquainted with your name? xxii. especially since not one of those who shall hear of us is able to retain in his memory the transactions of a single year. the bulk of mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is only one star. but when all the stars shall have returned to the place whence they set out, and after long periods shall again exhibit the same aspect of the whole heavens, that is what ought properly to be called the revolution of a year, though i scarcely dare attempt to enumerate the vast multitude of ages contained in it. for as the sun in old time was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when the soul of romulus penetrated into these eternal mansions, so, when all the constellations and stars shall revert to their primary position, and the sun shall at the same point and time be again eclipsed, then you may consider that the grand year is completed. be assured, however, that the twentieth part of it is not yet elapsed. xxiii. wherefore, if you have no hopes of returning to this place where great and good men enjoy all that their souls can wish for, of what value, pray, is all that human glory, which can hardly endure for a small portion of one year? if, then, you wish to elevate your views to the contemplation of this eternal seat of splendor, you will not be satisfied with the praises of your fellow-mortals, nor with any human rewards that your exploits can obtain; but virtue herself must point out to you the true and only object worthy of your pursuit. leave to others to speak of you as they may, for speak they will. their discourses will be confined to the narrow limits of the countries you see, nor will their duration be very extensive; for they will perish like those who utter them, and will be no more remembered by their posterity. xxiv. when he had ceased to speak in this manner, i said, o africanus, if indeed the door of heaven is open to those who have deserved well of their country, although, indeed, from my childhood i have always followed yours and my father's steps, and have not neglected to imitate your glory, still, i will from henceforth strive to follow them more closely. follow them, then, said he, and consider your body only, not yourself, as mortal. for it is not your outward form which constitutes your being, but your mind; not that substance which is palpable to the senses, but your spiritual nature. _know, then, that you are a god_--for a god it must be, which flourishes, and feels, and recollects, and foresees, and governs, regulates and moves the body over which it is set, as the supreme ruler does the world which is subject to him. for as that eternal being moves whatever is mortal in this world, so the immortal mind of man moves the frail body with which it is connected. xxv. for whatever is always moving must be eternal; but that which derives its motion from a power which is foreign to itself, when that motion ceases must itself lose its animation. that alone, then, which moves itself can never cease to be moved, because it can never desert itself. moreover, it must be the source, and origin, and principle of motion in all the rest. there can be nothing prior to a principle, for all things must originate from it; and it cannot itself derive its existence from any other source, for if it did it would no longer be a principle. and if it had no beginning, it can have no end; for a beginning that is put an end to will neither be renewed by any other cause, nor will it produce anything else of itself. all things, therefore, must originate from one source. thus it follows that motion must have its source in something which is moved by itself, and which can neither have a beginning nor an end. otherwise all the heavens and all nature must perish, for it is impossible that they can of themselves acquire any power of producing motion in themselves. xxvi. as, therefore, it is plain that what is moved by itself must be eternal, who will deny that this is the general condition and nature of minds? for as everything is inanimate which is moved by an impulse exterior to itself, so what is animated is moved by an interior impulse of its own; for this is the peculiar nature and power of mind. and if that alone has the power of self-motion, it can neither have had a beginning, nor can it have an end. do you, therefore, exercise this mind of yours in the best pursuits. and the best pursuits are those which consist in promoting the good of your country. such employments will speed the flight of your mind to this its proper abode; and its flight will be still more rapid, if, even while it is enclosed in the body, it will look abroad, and disengage itself as much as possible from its bodily dwelling, by the contemplation of things which are external to itself. this it should do to the utmost of its power. for the minds of those who have given themselves up to the pleasures of the body, paying, as it were, a servile obedience to their lustful impulses, have violated the laws of god and man; and therefore, when they are separated from their bodies, flutter continually round the earth on which they lived, and are not allowed to return to this celestial region till they have been purified by the revolution of many ages. thus saying, he vanished, and i awoke from my dream. a fragment. and although it is most desirable that fortune should remain forever in the most brilliant possible condition, nevertheless, the equability of life excites less interest than those changeable conditions wherein prosperity suddenly revives out of the most desperate and ruinous circumstances. the end. footnotes: [1] archilochus was a native of paros, and flourished about 714-676 b.c. his poems were chiefly iambics of bitter satire. horace speaks of him as the inventor of iambics, and calls himself his pupil. parios ego primus iambos ostendi latio, numeros animosque secutus archilochi, non res et agentia verba lycamben. epist. i. xix. 25. and in another place he says, archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo--a.p. 74. [2] this was livius andronicus: he is supposed to have been a native of tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the romans, during their wars in southern italy; owing to which he became the slave of m. livius salinator. he wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which cicero (brutus 18) speaks very contemptuously, as "livianæ fabulæ non satis dignæ quæ iterum legantur"--not worth reading a second time. he also wrote a latin odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about 221 b.c. [3] c. fabius, surnamed pictor, painted the temple of salus, which the dictator c. junius brutus bubulus dedicated 302 b.c. the temple was destroyed by fire in the reign of claudius. the painting is highly praised by dionysius, xvi. 6. [4] for an account of the ancient greek philosophers, see the sketch at the end of the disputations. [5] isocrates was born at athens 436 b.c. he was a pupil of gorgias, prodicus, and socrates. he opened a school of rhetoric, at athens, with great success. he died by his own hand at the age of ninety-eight. [6] so horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds of improbable fictions: pictoribus atque poetis quidlibet audendi semper fuit æqua potestas.--a. p. 9. which roscommon translates: painters and poets have been still allow'd their pencil and their fancies unconfined. [7] epicharmus was a native of cos, but lived at megara, in sicily, and when megara was destroyed, removed to syracuse, and lived at the court of hiero, where he became the first writer of comedies, so that horace ascribes the invention of comedy to him, and so does theocritus. he lived to a great age. [8] pherecydes was a native of scyros, one of the cyclades; and is said to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of the phoenicians. he is said also to have been a pupil of pittacus, the rival of thales, and the master of pythagoras. his doctrine was that there were three principles ([greek: zeus], or æther; [greek: chthôn], or chaos; and [greek: chronos], or time) and four elements (fire, earth, air, and water), from which everything that exists was formed.--_vide_ smith's dict. gr. and rom. biog. [9] archytas was a native of tarentum, and is said to have saved the life of plato by his influence with the tyrant dionysius. he was especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that horace calls him maris et terra numeroque carentis arenæ mensorem. od. i. 28.1. plato is supposed to have learned some of his views from him, and aristotle to have borrowed from him every idea of the categories. [10] this was not timæus the historian, but a native of locri, who is said also in the de finibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of plato. there is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however, probably spurious, and only an abridgment of plato's dialogue timæus. [11] dicæarchus was a native of messana, in sicily, though he lived chiefly in greece. he was one of the later disciples of aristotle. he was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, and died about 285 b.c. [12] aristoxenus was a native of tarentum, and also a pupil of aristotle. we know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul to be a _harmony_ of the body; a doctrine which had been already discussed by plato in the phædo, and combated by aristotle. he was a great musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come down to us are fragments of some musical treatises.--smith's dict. gr. and rom. biog.; to which source i must acknowledge my obligation for nearly the whole of these biographical notes. [13] the simonides here meant is the celebrated poet of ceos, the perfecter of elegiac poetry among the greeks. he flourished about the time of the persian war. besides his poetry, he is said to have been the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. he died at the court of hiero, 467 b.c. [14] theodectes was a native of phaselis, in pamphylia, a distinguished rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of philip of macedon. he was a pupil of isocrates, and lived at athens, and died there at the age of forty-one. [15] cineas was a thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came to rome as ambassador from pyrrhus after the battle of heraclea, 280 b.c., and his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after his arrival he was able to address all the senators and knights by name. he probably died before pyrrhus returned to italy, 276 b.c. [16] charmadas, called also charmides, was a fellow-pupil with philo, the larissæan of clitomachus, the carthaginian. he is said by some authors to have founded a fourth academy. [17] metrodorus was a minister of mithridates the great; and employed by him as supreme judge in pontus, and afterward as an ambassador. cicero speaks of him in other places (de orat. ii. 88) as a man of wonderful memory. [18] quintus hortensius was eight years older than cicero; and, till cicero's fame surpassed his, he was accounted the most eloquent of all the romans. he was verres's counsel in the prosecution conducted against him by cicero. seneca relates that his memory was so great that he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue backward. he died 50 b.c. [19] this treatise is one which has not come down to us, but which had been lately composed by cicero in order to comfort himself for the loss of his daughter. [20] the epigram is, [greek: eipas hêlie chaire, kleombrotos hômbrakiôtês hêlat' aph' hypsêlou teicheos eis aidên, axion ouden idôn thanatou kakon, alla platônos hen to peri psychês gramm' analexamenos.] which may be translated, perhaps, farewell, o sun, cleombrotus exclaim'd, then plunged from off a height beneath the sea; stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed, but moved by plato's high philosophy. [21] this is alluded to by juvenal: provida pompeio dederat campania febres optandas: sed multæ urbes et publica vota vicerunt. igitur fortuna ipsius et urbis, servatum victo caput abstulit.--sat. x. 283. [22] pompey's second wife was julia, the daughter of julius cæsar, she died the year before the death of crassus, in parthia. virgil speaks of cæsar and pompey as relations, using the same expression (socer) as cicero: aggeribus socer alpinis atque arce monoeci descendens, gener adversis instructus eois.--æn. vi. 830. [23] this idea is beautifully expanded by byron: yet if, as holiest men have deem'd, there be a land of souls beyond that sable shore to shame the doctrine of the sadducee and sophist, madly vain or dubious lore, how sweet it were in concert to adore with those who made our mortal labors light, to hear each voice we fear'd to hear no more. behold each mighty shade reveal'd to sight, the bactrian, samian sage, and all who taught the right! _childe harold_, ii. [24] the epitaph in the original is: [greek: ô xein' angeilon lakedaimoniois hoti têde keimetha, tois keinôn peithomenoi nomimois.] [25] this was expressed in the greek verses, [greek: archês men mê phynai epichthonioisin ariston, phynta d' hopôs ôkista pylas aidyo perêsai] which by some authors are attributed to homer. [26] this is the first fragment of the cresphontes.--ed. var. vii., p. 594. [greek: edei gar hêmas syllogon poioumenous ton phynta thrênein, eis hos' erchetai kaka. ton d' au thanonta kai ponôn pepaumenon chairontas euphêmointas ekpemein domôn] [27] the greek verses are quoted by plutarch: [greek: êpou nêpie, êlithioi phrenes andrôn euthynoos keitai moiridiô thanatô ouk ên gar zôein kalon autô oute goneusi.] [28] this refers to the story that when eumolpus, the son of neptune, whose assistance the eleusinians had called in against the athenians, had been slain by the athenians, an oracle demanded the sacrifice of one of the daughters of erechtheus, the king of athens. and when one was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied her to death. [29] menoeceus was son of creon, and in the war of the argives against thebes, teresias declared that the thebans should conquer if menoeceus would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he killed himself outside the gates of thebes. [30] the greek is, [greek: mêde moi aklaustos thanatos moloi, alla philoisi poiêsaimi thanôn algea kai stonachas.] [31] soph. trach. 1047. [32] the lines quoted by cicero here appear to have come from the latin play of prometheus by accius; the ideas are borrowed, rather than translated, from the prometheus of æschylus. [33] from _exerceo_. [34] each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in front of the camp. [35] insania--from _in_, a particle of negative force in composition, and _sanus_, healthy, sound. [36] the man who first received this surname was l. calpurnius piso, who was consul, 133 b.c., in the servile war. [37] the greek is, [greek: alla moi oidanetai kradiê cholô hoppot' ekeinou mnêsomai hos m' asyphêlon en argeioisin erexen.]--il. ix. 642. i have given pope's translation in the text. [38] this is from the theseus: [greek: egô de touto para sophou tinos mathôn eis phrontidas noun symphoras t' eballomên phygas t' emautô prostitheis patras emês. thanatous t' aôrous, kai kakôn allas hodous hôs, ei ti paschoim' ôn edoxazon pote mê moi neorton prospeson mallon dakoi.] [39] ter. phorm. ii. i. 11. [40] this refers to the speech of agamemnon in euripides, in the iphigenia in aulis, [greek: zêlô se, geron, zêlô d' andrôn hos akindynon bion exeperas', agnôs, akleês.]--v. 15. [41] this is a fragment from the hypsipyle: [greek: ephy men oudeis hostis ou ponei brotôn thaptei te tekna chater' au ktatai nea, autos te thnêskei. kai tad' achthontai brotoi eis gên pherontes gên anankaiôs d' echei bion therizein hôste karpimon stachyn.] [42] [greek: pollas ek kephalês prothelymnous helketo chaitas.]--il. x. 15. [43] [greek: êtoi ho kappedion to alêion oios alato hon thymon katedôn, paton anthrôpôn aleeinôn.]--il. vi. 201. [44] this is a translation from euripides: [greek: hôsth' himeros m' hypêlthe gê te k' ouranô lexai molousê deuro mêdeias tychas.]--med. 57. [45] [greek: liên gar polloi kai epêtrimoi êmata panta piptousin, pote ken tis anapneuseie ponoio; alla chrê ton men katathaptemen, hos ke thanêsi, nêlea thymon echontas, ep' êmati dakrysantas.]- hom. il. xix. 226. [46] this is one of the fragments of euripides which we are unable to assign to any play in particular; it occurs var. ed. tr. inc. 167. [greek: ei men tod' êmar prôton ên kakoumenô kai mê makran dê dia ponôn enaustoloun eikos sphadazein ên an, hôs neozyga pôlon, chalinon artiôs dedegmenon nyn d' amblys eimi, kai katêrtykôs kakôn.] [47] this is only a fragment, preserved by stobæus: [greek: tous d' an megistous kai sophôtatous phreni toiousd' idois an, oios esti nyn hode, kalôs kakôs prassonti symparainesai hotan de daimôn andros eutychous to prin mastig' episê tou biou palintropon, ta polla phrouda kai kakôs eirêmena.] [48] [greek: ôk. oukoun promêtheu touto gignôskeis hoti orgês nosousês eisin iatroi logoi. pr. ean tis en kairô ge malthassê kear kai mê sphrigônta thymon ischnainê bia.]- æsch. prom. v. 378. [49] cicero alludes here to il. vii. 211, which is thus translated by pope: his massy javelin quivering in his hand, he stood the bulwark of the grecian band; through every argive heart new transport ran, all troy stood trembling at the mighty man: e'en hector paused, and with new doubt oppress'd, felt his great heart suspended in his breast; 'twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear, himself had challenged, and the foe drew near. but melmoth (note on the familiar letters of cicero, book ii. let. 23) rightly accuses cicero of having misunderstood homer, who "by no means represents hector as being thus totally dismayed at the approach of his adversary; and, indeed, it would have been inconsistent with the general character of that hero to have described him under such circumstances of terror." [greek: ton de kai argeioi meg' egêtheon eisoroôntes, trôas de tromos ainos hypêlythe gyia hekaston, hektori d' autô thymos eni stêthessi patassen.] but there is a great difference, as dr. clarke remarks, between [greek: thymos eni stêthessi patassen] and [greek: kardeê exô stêtheôn ethrôsken], or [greek: tromos ainos hypêlythe gyia].--_the trojans_, says homer, _trembled_ at the sight of ajax, and even hector himself felt some emotion in his breast. [50] cicero means scipio nasica, who, in the riots consequent on the reelection of tiberius gracchus to the tribunate, 133 b.c., having called in vain on the consul, mucius scævola, to save the republic, attacked gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult. [51] _morosus_ is evidently derived from _mores_--"_morosus_, _mos_, stubbornness, self-will, etc."--riddle and arnold, lat. dict. [52] in the original they run thus: [greek: ouk estin ouden deinon hôd' eipein epos, oude pathos, oude xymphora theêlatos hês ouk an aroit' achthos anthrôpon physis.] [53] this passage is from the eunuch of terence, act i., sc. 1, 14. [54] these verses are from the atreus of accius. [55] this was marcus atilius regulus, the story of whose treatment by the carthaginians in the first punic war is well known to everybody. [56] this was quintus servilius cæpio, who, 105 b.c., was destroyed, with his army, by the cimbri, it was believed as a judgment for the covetousness which he had displayed in the plunder of tolosa. [57] this was marcus aquilius, who, in the year 88 b.c., was sent against mithridates as one of the consular legates; and, being defeated, was delivered up to the king by the inhabitants of mitylene. mithridates put him to death by pouring molten gold down his throat. [58] this was the elder brother of the triumvir marcus crassus, 87 b.c. he was put to death by fimbria, who was in command of some of the troops of marius. [59] lucius cæsar and caius cæsar were relations (it is uncertain in what degree) of the great cæsar, and were killed by fimbria on the same occasion as octavius. [60] m. antonius was the grandfather of the triumvir; he was murdered the same year, 87 b.c., by annius, when marius and cinna took rome. [61] this story is alluded to by horace: districtus ensis cui super impiâ cervice pendet non siculæ dapes dulcem elaborabunt saporem, non avium citharæve cantus somnum reducent.--iii. 1. 17. [62] hieronymus was a rhodian, and a pupil of aristotle, flourishing about 300 b.c. he is frequently mentioned by cicero. [63] we know very little of dinomachus. some mss. have clitomachus. [64] callipho was in all probability a pupil of epicurus, but we have no certain information about him. [65] diodorus was a syrian, and succeeded critolaus as the head of the peripatetic school at athens. [66] aristo was a native of ceos, and a pupil of lycon, who succeeded straton as the head of the peripatetic school, 270 b.c. he afterward himself succeeded lycon. [67] pyrrho was a native of elis, and the originator of the sceptical theories of some of the ancient philosophers. he was a contemporary of alexander. [68] herillus was a disciple of zeno of cittium, and therefore a stoic. he did not, however, follow all the opinions of his master: he held that knowledge was the chief good. some of the treatises of cleanthes were written expressly to confute him. [69] anacharsis was (herod., iv., 76) son of gnurus and brother of saulius, king of thrace. he came to athens while solon was occupied in framing laws for his people; and by the simplicity of his way of living, and his acute observations on the manners of the greeks, he excited such general admiration that he was reckoned by some writers among the seven wise men of greece. [70] this was appius claudius cæcus, who was censor 310 b.c., and who, according to livy, was afflicted with blindness by the gods for persuading the potitii to instruct the public servants in the way of sacrificing to hercules. he it was who made the via appia. [71] the fact of homer's blindness rests on a passage in the hymn to apollo, quoted by thucydides as a genuine work of homer, and which is thus spoken of by one of the most accomplished scholars that this country or this age has ever produced: "they are indeed beautiful verses; and if none worse had ever been attributed to homer, the prince of poets would have had little reason to complain. "he has been describing the delian festival in honor of apollo and diana, and concludes this part of the poem with an address to the women of that island, to whom it is to be supposed that he had become familiarly known by his frequent recitations: [greek: chairete d' hymeis pasai, emeio de kai metopisthe mnêsasth', hoppote ken tis epichthoniôn anthrôpôn enthad' aneirêtai xeinos talapeirios elthôn ô kourai, tis d' hymmin anêr hêdistos aoidôn enthade pôleitai kai teô terpesthe malista; hymeis d' eu mala pasai hypokrinasthe aph' hêmôn, typhlos anêr, oikei de chiô eni paipaloessê, tou pasai metopisthen aristeuousin aoidai.] virgins, farewell--and oh! remember me hereafter, when some stranger from the sea, a hapless wanderer, may your isle explore, and ask you, 'maids, of all the bards you boast, who sings the sweetest, and delights you most?' oh! answer all, 'a blind old man, and poor, sweetest he sings, and dwells on chios' rocky shore.' _coleridge's introduction to the study of the greek classic poets._ [72] some read _scientiam_ and some _inscientiam;_ the latter of which is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators. [73] for a short account of these ancient greek philosophers, see the sketch prefixed to the academics (_classical library_). [74] cicero wrote his philosophical works in the last three years of his life. when he wrote this piece, he was in the sixty-third year of his age, in the year of rome 709. [75] the academic. [76] diodorus and posidonius were stoics; philo and antiochus were academics; but the latter afterward inclined to the doctrine of the stoics. [77] julius cæsar. [78] cicero was one of the college of augurs. [79] the latinæ feriæ was originally a festival of the latins, altered by tarquinius superbus into a roman one. it was held in the alban mount, in honor of jupiter latiaris. this holiday lasted six days: it was not held at any fixed time; but the consul was never allowed to take the field till he had held them.--_vide_ smith, dict. gr. and rom. ant., p. 414. [80] _exhedra_, the word used by cicero, means a study, or place where disputes were held. [81] m. piso was a peripatetic. the four great sects were the stoics, the peripatetics, the academics, and the epicureans. [82] it was a prevailing tenet of the academics that there is no certain knowledge. [83] the five forms of plato are these: [greek: ousia, tauton, heteron, stasis, kinêsis.] [84] the four natures here to be understood are the four elements--fire, water, air, and earth; which are mentioned as the four principles of empedocles by diogenes laertius. [85] these five moving stars are saturn, jupiter, mars, mercury, and venus. their revolutions are considered in the next book. [86] or, generation of the gods. [87] the [greek: prolêpsis] of epicurus, before mentioned, is what he here means. [88] [greek: steremnia] is the word which epicurus used to distinguish between those objects which are perceptible to sense, and those which are imperceptible; as the essence of the divine being, and the various operations of the divine power. [89] zeno here mentioned is not the same that cotta spoke of before. this was the founder of the stoics. the other was an epicurean philosopher whom he had heard at athens. [90] that is, there would be the same uncertainty in heaven as is among the academics. [91] those nations which were neither greek nor roman. [92] _sigilla numerantes_ is the common reading; but p. manucius proposes _venerantes_, which i choose as the better of the two, and in which sense i have translated it. [93] fundamental doctrines. [94] that is, the zodiac. [95] the moon, as well as the sun, is indeed in the zodiac, but she does not measure the same course in a month. she moves in another line of the zodiac nearer the earth. [96] according to the doctrines of epicurus, none of these bodies themselves are clearly seen, but _simulacra ex corporibus effluentia_. [97] epicurus taught his disciples in a garden. [98] by the word _deus_, as often used by our author, we are to understand all the gods in that theology then treated of, and not a single personal deity. [99] the best commentators on this passage agree that cicero does not mean that aristotle affirmed that there was no such person as orpheus, but that there was no such poet, and that the verse called orphic was said to be the invention of another. the passage of aristotle to which cicero here alludes has, as dr. davis observes, been long lost. [100] a just proportion between the different sorts of beings. [101] some give _quos non pudeat earum epicuri vocum;_ but the best copies have not _non;_ nor would it be consistent with cotta to say _quos non pudeat_, for he throughout represents velleius as a perfect epicurean in every article. [102] his country was abdera, the natives of which were remarkable for their stupidity. [103] this passage will not admit of a translation answerable to the sense of the original. cicero says the word _amicitia_ (friendship) is derived from _amor_ (love or affection). [104] this manner of speaking of jupiter frequently occurs in homer, ----[greek: patêr andrôn te theôn te,] and has been used by virgil and other poets since ennius. [105] perses, or perseus, the last king of macedonia, was taken by cnæus octavius, the prætor, and brought as prisoner to paullus æmilius, 167 b.c. [106] an exemption from serving in the wars, and from paying public taxes. [107] mopsus. there were two soothsayers of this name: the first was one of the lapithæ, son of ampycus and chloris, called also the son of apollo and hienantis; the other a son of apollo and manto, who is said to have founded mallus, in asia minor, where his oracle existed as late as the time of strabo. [108] tiresias was the great theban prophet at the time of the war of the seven against thebes. [109] amphiaraus was king of argos (he had been one of the argonauts also). he was killed after the war of the seven against thebes, which he was compelled to join in by the treachery of his wife eriphyle, by the earth opening and swallowing him up as he was fleeing from periclymenus. [110] calchas was the prophet of the grecian army at the siege of troy. [111] helenus was a son of priam and hecuba. he is represented as a prophet in the philoctetes of sophocles. and in the æneid he is also represented as king of part of epirus, and as predicting to æneas the dangers and fortunes which awaited him. [112] this short passage would be very obscure to the reader without an explanation from another of cicero's treatises. the expression here, _ad investigandum suem regiones vineæ terminavit_, which is a metaphor too bold, if it was not a sort of augural language, seems to me to have been the effect of carelessness in our great author; for navius did not divide the regions, as he calls them, of the vine to find his sow, but to find a grape. [113] the peremnia were a sort of auspices performed just before the passing a river. [114] the acumina were a military auspices, and were partly performed on the point of a spear, from which they were called acumina. [115] those were called _testamenta in procinctu_, which were made by soldiers just before an engagement, in the presence of men called as witnesses. [116] this especially refers to the decii, one of whom devoted himself for his country in the war with the latins, 340 b.c., and his son imitated the action in the war with the samnites, 295 b.c. cicero (tusc. i. 37) says that his son did the same thing in the war with pyrrhus at the battle of asculum, though in other places (de off. iii. 4) he speaks of only two decii as having signalized themselves in this manner. [117] the rogator, who collected the votes, and pronounced who was the person chosen. there were two sorts of rogators; one was the officer here mentioned, and the other was the rogator, or speaker of the whole assembly. [118] which was sardinia, as appears from one of cicero's epistles to his brother quintus. [119] their sacred books of ceremonies. [120] the war between octavius and cinna, the consuls. [121] this, in the original, is a fragment of an old latin verse, _----terram fumare calentem._ [122] the latin word is _principatus_, which exactly corresponds with the greek word here used by cicero; by which is to be understood the superior, the most prevailing excellence in every kind and species of things through the universe. [123] the passage of aristotle to which cicero here refers is lost. [124] he means the epicureans. [125] here the stoic speaks too plain to be misunderstood. his world, his _mundus_, is the universe, and that universe is his great deity, _in quo sit totius naturæ principatus_, in which the superior excellence of universal nature consists. [126] athens, the seat of learning and politeness, of which balbus will not allow epicurus to be worthy. [127] this is pythagoras's doctrine, as appears in diogenes laertius. [128] he here alludes to mathematical and geometrical instruments. [129] balbus here speaks of the fixed stars, and of the motions of the orbs of the planets. he here alludes, says m. bonhier, to the different and diurnal motions of these stars; one sort from east to west, the other from one tropic to the other: and this is the construction which our learned and great geometrician and astronomer, dr. halley, made of this passage. [130] this mensuration of the year into three hundred and sixty-five days and near six hours (by the odd hours and minutes of which, in every fifth year, the _dies intercalaris_, or leap-year, is made) could not but be known, dr. halley states, by hipparchus, as appears from the remains of that great astronomer of the ancients. we are inclined to think that julius cæsar had divided the year, according to what we call the julian year, before cicero wrote this book; for we see, in the beginning of it, how pathetically he speaks of cæsar's usurpation. [131] the words of censorinus, on this occasion, are to the same effect. the opinions of philosophers concerning this great year are very different; but the institution of it is ascribed to democritus. [132] the zodiac. [133] though mars is said to hold his orbit in the zodiac with the rest, and to finish his revolution through the same orbit (that is, the zodiac) with the other two, yet balbus means in a different line of the zodiac. [134] according to late observations, it never goes but a sign and a half from the sun. [135] these, dr. davis says, are "aërial fires;" concerning which he refers to the second book of pliny. [136] in the eunuch of terence. [137] bacchus. [138] the son of ceres. [139] the books of ceremonies. [140] this libera is taken for proserpine, who, with her brother liber, was consecrated by the romans; all which are parts of nature in prosopopoeias. cicero, therefore, makes balbus distinguish between the person liber, or bacchus, and the liber which is a part of nature in prosopopoeia. [141] these allegorical fables are largely related by hesiod in his theogony. horace says exactly the same thing: hâc arte pollux et vagus hercules enisus arces attigit igneas: quos inter augustus recumbens purpureo bibit ore nectar. hâc te merentem, bacche pater, tuæ vexere tigres indocili jugum collo ferentes: hâc quirinus martis equis acheronta fugit.--hor. iii. 3. 9. [142] cicero means by _conversis casibus_, varying the cases from the common rule of declension; that is, by departing from the true grammatical rules of speech; for if we would keep to it, we should decline the word _jupiter_, _jupiteris_ in the second case, etc. [143] _pater divûmque hominumque._ [144] the common reading is, _planiusque alio loco idem;_ which, as dr. davis observes, is absurd; therefore, in his note, he prefers _planius quam alia loco idem_, from two copies, in which sense i have translated it. [145] from the verb _gero_, to bear. [146] that is, "mother earth." [147] janus is said to be the first who erected temples in italy, and instituted religious rites, and from whom the first month in the roman calendar is derived. [148] _stellæ vagantes._ [149] _noctu quasi diem efficeret._ ben jonson says the same thing: thou that mak'st a day of night, goddess excellently bright.--_ode to the moon._ [150] olympias was the mother of alexander. [151] venus is here said to be one of the names of diana, because _ad res omnes veniret;_ but she is not supposed to be the same as the mother of cupid. [152] here is a mistake, as fulvius ursinus observes; for the discourse seems to be continued in one day, as appears from the beginning of this book. this may be an inadvertency of cicero. [153] the senate of athens was so called from the words [greek: areios pagos], the village, some say the hill, of mars. [154] epicurus. [155] the stoics. [156] by _nulla cohærendi natura_--if it is the right, as it is the common reading--cicero must mean the same as by _nulla crescendi natura_, or _coalescendi_, either of which lambinus proposes; for, as the same learned critic well observes, is there not a cohesion of parts in a clod, or in a piece of stone? our learned walker proposes _sola cohærendi natura_, which mends the sense very much; and i wish he had the authority of any copy for it. [157] nasica scipio, the censor, is said to have been the first who made a water-clock in rome. [158] the epicureans. [159] an old latin poet, commended by quintilian for the gravity of his sense and his loftiness of style. [160] the shepherd is here supposed to take the stem or beak of the ship for the mouth, from which the roaring voices of the sailors came. _rostrum_ is here a lucky word to put in the mouth of one who never saw a ship before, as it is used for the beak of a bird, the snout of a beast or fish, and for the stem of a ship. [161] the epicureans. [162] greek, [greek: aêr]; latin, _aer_. [163] the treatise of aristotle, from whence this is taken, is lost. [164] to the universe the stoics certainly annexed the idea of a limited space, otherwise they could not have talked of a middle; for there can be no middle but of a limited space: infinite space can have no middle, there being infinite extension from every part. [165] these two contrary reversions are from the tropics of cancer and capricorn. they are the extreme bounds of the sun's course. the reader must observe that the astronomical parts of this book are introduced by the stoic as proofs of design and reason in the universe; and, notwithstanding the errors in his planetary system, his intent is well answered, because all he means is that the regular motions of the heavenly bodies, and their dependencies, are demonstrations of a divine mind. the inference proposed to be drawn from his astronomical observations is as just as if his system was in every part unexceptionably right: the same may be said of his anatomical observations. [166] in the zodiac. [167] ibid. [168] these verses of cicero are a translation from a greek poem of aratus, called the phænomena. [169] the fixed stars. [170] the arctic and antarctic poles. [171] the two arctoi are northern constellations. cynosura is what we call the lesser bear; helice, the greater bear; in latin, _ursa minor_ and _ursa major_. [172] these stars in the greater bear are vulgarly called the "seven stars," or the "northern wain;" by the latins, "septentriones." [173] the lesser bear. [174] the greater bear. [175] exactly agreeable to this and the following description of the dragon is the same northern constellation described in the map by flamsteed in his atlas coelestis; and all the figures here described by aratus nearly agree with the maps of the same constellations in the atlas coelestis, though they are not all placed precisely alike. [176] the tail of the greater bear. [177] that is, in macedon, where aratus lived. [178] the true interpretation of this passage is as follows: here in macedon, says aratus, the head of the dragon does not entirely immerge itself in the ocean, but only touches the superficies of it. by _ortus_ and _obitus_ i doubt not but cicero meant, agreeable to aratus, those parts which arise to view, and those which are removed from sight. [179] these are two northern constellations. engonasis, in some catalogues called hercules, because he is figured kneeling [greek: en gonasin] (on his knees). [greek: engonasin kaleous'], as aratus says, they call engonasis. [180] the crown is placed under the feet of hercules in the atlas coelestis; but ophiuchus ([greek: ophiouchos]), the snake-holder, is placed in the map by flamsteed as described here by aratus; and their heads almost meet. [181] the scorpion. ophiuchus, though a northern constellation, is not far from that part of the zodiac where the scorpion is, which is one of the six southern signs. [182] the wain of seven stars. [183] the wain-driver. this northern constellation is, in our present maps, figured with a club in his right hand behind the greater bear. [184] in some modern maps arcturus, a star of the first magnitude, is placed in the belt that is round the waist of boötes. cicero says _subter præcordia_, which is about the waist; and aratus says [greek: hypo zônê], under the belt. [185] _sub caput arcti_, under the head of the greater bear. [186] the crab is, by the ancients and moderns, placed in the zodiac, as here, between the twins and the lion; and they are all three northern signs. [187] the twins are placed in the zodiac with the side of one to the northern hemisphere, and the side of the other to the southern hemisphere. auriga, the charioteer, is placed in the northern hemisphere near the zodiac, by the twins; and at the head of the charioteer is helice, the greater bear, placed; and the goat is a bright star of the first magnitude placed on the left shoulder of this northern constellation, and called _capra_, the goat. _hoedi_, the kids, are two more stars of the same constellation. [188] a constellation; one of the northern signs in the zodiac, in which the hyades are placed. [189] one of the feet of cepheus, a northern constellation, is under the tail of the lesser bear. [190] grotius, and after him dr. davis, and other learned men, read _cassiepea_, after the greek [greek: kassiepeia], and reject the common reading, _cassiopea_. [191] these northern constellations here mentioned have been always placed together as one family with cepheus and perseus, as they are in our modern maps. [192] this alludes to the fable of perseus and andromeda. [193] pegasus, who is one of perseus and andromeda's family. [194] that is, with wings. [195] _aries_, the ram, is the first northern sign in the zodiac; _pisces_, the fishes, the last southern sign; therefore they must be near one another, as they are in a circle or belt. in flamsteed's atlas coelestis one of the fishes is near the head of the ram, and the other near the urn of aquarius. [196] these are called virgiliæ by cicero; by aratus, the pleiades, [greek: plêiades]; and they are placed at the neck of the bull; and one of perseus's feet touches the bull in the atlas coelestis. [197] this northern constellation is called fides by cicero; but it must be the same with lyra; because lyra is placed in our maps as fides is here. [198] this is called ales avis by cicero; and i doubt not but the northern constellation cygnus is here to be understood, for the description and place of the swan in the atlas coelestis are the same which ales avis has here. [199] pegasus. [200] the water-bearer, one of the six southern signs in the zodiac: he is described in our maps pouring water out of an urn, and leaning with one hand on the tail of capricorn, another southern sign. [201] when the sun is in capricorn, the days are at the shortest; and when in cancer, at the longest. [202] one of the six southern signs. [203] sagittarius, another southern sign. [204] a northern constellation. [205] a northern constellation. [206] a southern constellation. [207] this is canis major, a southern constellation. orion and the dog are named together by hesiod, who flourished many hundred years before cicero or aratus. [208] a southern constellation, placed as here in the atlas coelestis. [209] a southern constellation, so called from the ship argo, in which jason and the rest of the argonauts sailed on their expedition to colchos. [210] the ram is the first of the northern signs in the zodiac; and the last southern sign is the fishes; which two signs, meeting in the zodiac, cover the constellation called argo. [211] the river eridanus, a southern constellation. [212] a southern constellation. [213] this is called the scorpion in the original of aratus. [214] a southern constellation. [215] a southern constellation. [216] the serpent is not mentioned in cicero's translation; but it is in the original of aratus. [217] a southern constellation. [218] the goblet, or cup, a southern constellation. [219] a southern constellation. [220] antecanis, a southern constellation, is the little dog, and called _antecanis_ in latin, and [greek: prokyôn] in greek, because he rises before the other dog. [221] pansætius, a stoic philosopher. [222] mercury and venus. [223] the proboscis of the elephant is frequently called a hand, because it is as useful to him as one. "they breathe, drink, and smell, with what may not be improperly called a hand," says pliny, bk. viii. c. 10.--davis. [224] the passage of aristotle's works to which cicero here alludes is entirely lost; but plutarch gives a similar account. [225] balbus does not tell us the remedy which the panther makes use of; but pliny is not quite so delicate: he says, _excrementis hominis sibi medetur_. [226] aristotle says they purge themselves with this herb after they fawn. pliny says both before and after. [227] the cuttle-fish has a bag at its neck, the black blood of which the romans used for ink. it was called _atramentum_. [228] the euphrates is said to carry into mesopotamia a large quantity of citrons, with which it covers the fields. [229] q. curtius, and some other authors, say the ganges is the largest river in india; but ammianus marcellinus concurs with cicero in calling the river indus the largest of all rivers. [230] these etesian winds return periodically once a year, and blow at certain seasons, and for a certain time. [231] some read _mollitur_, and some _molitur;_ the latter of which p. manucius justly prefers, from the verb _molo_, _molis;_ from whence, says he, _molares dentes_, the grinders. [232] the weasand, or windpipe. [233] the epiglottis, which is a cartilaginous flap in the shape of a tongue, and therefore called so. [234] cicero is here giving the opinion of the ancients concerning the passage of the chyle till it is converted to blood. [235] what cicero here calls the ventricles of the heart are likewise called auricles, of which there is the right and left. [236] the stoics and peripatetics said that the nerves, veins, and arteries come directly from the heart. according to the anatomy of the moderns, they come from the brain. [237] the author means all musical instruments, whether string or wind instruments, which are hollow and tortuous. [238] the latin version of cicero is a translation from the greek of aratus. [239] chrysippus's meaning is, that the swine is so inactive and slothful a beast that life seems to be of no use to it but to keep it from putrefaction, as salt keeps dead flesh. [240] _ales_, in the general signification, is any large bird; and _oscinis_ is any singing bird. but they here mean those birds which are used in augury: _alites_ are the birds whose flight was observed by the augurs, and _oscines_ the birds from whose voices they augured. [241] as the academics doubted everything, it was indifferent to them which side of a question they took. [242] the keepers and interpreters of the sibylline oracles were the quindecimviri. [243] the popular name of jupiter in rome, being looked upon as defender of the capitol (in which he was placed), and stayer of the state. [244] some passages of the original are here wanting. cotta continues speaking against the doctrine of the stoics. [245] the word _sortes_ is often used for the answers of the oracles, or, rather, for the rolls in which the answers were written. [246] three of this eminent family sacrificed themselves for their country; the father in the latin war, the son in the tuscan war, and the grandson in the war with pyrrhus. [247] the straits of gibraltar. [248] the common reading is, _ex quo anima dicitur;_ but dr. davis and m. bouhier prefer _animal_, though they keep _anima_ in the text, because our author says elsewhere, _animum ex anima dictum_, tusc. i. 1. cicero is not here to be accused of contradictions, for we are to consider that he speaks in the characters of other persons; but there appears to be nothing in these two passages irreconcilable, and probably _anima_ is the right word here. [249] he is said to have led a colony from greece into caria, in asia, and to have built a town, and called it after his own name, for which his countrymen paid him divine honors after his death. [250] our great author is under a mistake here. homer does not say he met hercules himself, but his [greek: eidôlon], his "visionary likeness;" and adds that he himself [greek: met' athanatoisi theoisi terpetai en thaliês, kai echei kallisphyrou hêbên, paida dios megaloio kai hêrês chrysopedilou.] which pope translates- a shadowy form, for high in heaven's abodes himself resides, a god among the gods; there, in the bright assemblies of the skies, he nectar quaffs, and hebe crowns his joys. [251] they are said to have been the first workers in iron. they were called idæi, because they inhabited about mount ida in crete, and dactyli, from [greek: daktyloi] (the fingers), their number being five. [252] from whom, some say, the city of that name was called. [253] capedunculæ seem to have been bowls or cups, with handles on each side, set apart for the use of the altar.--davis. [254] see cicero de divinatione, and ovid. fast. [255] in the consulship of piso and gabinius sacrifices to serapis and isis were prohibited in rome; but the roman people afterward placed them again in the number of their gods. see tertullian's apol. and his first book ad nationes, and arnobius, lib. 2.--davis. [256] in some copies circe, pasiphae, and æa are mentioned together; but æa is rejected by the most judicious editors. [257] they were three, and are said to have averted a plague by offering themselves a sacrifice. [258] so called from the greek word [greek: thaumazô], to wonder. [259] she was first called geres, from _gero_, to bear. [260] the word is _precatione_, which means the books or forms of prayers used by the augurs. [261] cotta's intent here, as well as in other places, is to show how unphilosophical their civil theology was, and with what confusions it was embarrassed; which design of the academic the reader should carefully keep in view, or he will lose the chain of argument. [262] anactes, [greek: anaktes], was a general name for all kings, as we find in the oldest greek writers, and particularly in homer. [263] the common reading is aleo; but we follow lambinus and davis, who had the authority of the best manuscript copies. [264] some prefer phthas to opas (see dr. davis's edition); but opas is the generally received reading. [265] the lipari isles. [266] a town in arcadia. [267] in arcadia. [268] a northern people. [269] so called from the greek word [greek: nomos], _lex_, a law. [270] he is called [greek: ôpis] in some old greek fragments, and [greek: oupis] by callimachus in his hymn on diana. [271] [greek: sabazios], sabazius, is one of the names used for bacchus. [272] here is a wide chasm in the original. what is lost probably may have contained great part of cotta's arguments against the providence of the stoics. [273] here is one expression in the quotation from cæcilius that is not commonly met with, which is _præstigias præstrinxit;_ lambinus gives _præstinxit_, for the sake, i suppose, of playing on words, because it might then be translated, "he has deluded my delusions, or stratagems;" but _præstrinxit_ is certainly the right reading. [274] the ancient romans had a judicial as well as a military prætor; and he sat, with inferior judges attending him, like one of our chief-justices. _sessum it prætor_, which i doubt not is the right reading, lambinus restored from an old copy. the common reading was _sessum ite precor_. [275] picenum was a region of italy. [276] the _sex primi_ were general receivers of all taxes and tributes; and they were obliged to make good, out of their own fortunes, whatever deficiencies were in the public treasury. [277] the lætorian law was a security for those under age against extortioners, etc. by this law all debts contracted under twenty-five years of age were void. [278] this is from ennius- utinam ne in nemore pelio securibus cæsa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes. translated from the beginning of the medea of euripides- [greek: mêd' en napaisi pêlion pesein pote tmêtheisa peukê.] [279] q. fabius maximus, surnamed cunctator. [280] diogenes laertius says he was pounded to death in a stone mortar by command of nicocreon, tyrant of cyprus. [281] elea, a city of lucania, in italy. the manner in which zeno was put to death is, according to diogenes laertius, uncertain. [282] this great and good man was accused of destroying the divinity of the gods of his country. he was condemned, and died by drinking a glass of poison. [283] tyrant of sicily. [284] the common reading is, _in tympanidis rogum inlatus est_. this passage has been the occasion of as many different opinions concerning both the reading and the sense as any passage in the whole treatise. _tympanum_ is used for a timbrel or drum, _tympanidia_ a diminutive of it. lambinus says _tympana_ "were sticks with which the tyrant used to beat the condemned." p. victorius substitutes _tyrannidis_ for _tympanidis_. [285] the original is _de amissa salute;_ which means the sentence of banishment among the romans, in which was contained the loss of goods and estate, and the privileges of a roman; and in this sense l'abbé d'olivet translates it. [286] the forty-seventh proposition of the first book of euclid is unanimously ascribed to him by the ancients. dr. wotton, in his reflections upon ancient and modern learning, says, "it is indeed a very noble proposition, the foundation of trigonometry, of universal and various use in those curious speculations about incommensurable numbers." [287] these votive tables, or pictures, were hung up in the temples. [288] this passage is a fragment from a tragedy of attius. [289] hipponax was a poet at ephesus, and so deformed that bupalus drew a picture of him to provoke laughter; for which hipponax is said to have written such keen iambics on the painter that he hanged himself. lycambes had promised archilochus the poet to marry his daughter to him, but afterward retracted his promise, and refused her; upon which archilochus is said to have published a satire in iambic verse that provoked him to hang himself. [290] cicero refers here to an oracle approving of his laws, and promising sparta prosperity as long as they were obeyed, which lycurgus procured from delphi. [291] _pro aris et focis_ is a proverbial expression. the romans, when they would say their all was at stake, could not express it stronger than by saying they contended _pro aris et focis_, for religion and their firesides, or, as we express it, for religion and property. [292] cicero, who was an academic, gives his opinion according to the manner of the academics, who looked upon probability, and a resemblance of truth, as the utmost they could arrive at. [293] _i.e._, regulus. [294] _i.e._, fabius. [295] it is unnecessary to give an account of the other names here mentioned; but that of lænas is probably less known. he was publius popillius lænas, consul 132 b.c., the year after the death of tiberius gracchus, and it became his duty to prosecute the accomplices of gracchus, for which he was afterward attacked by caius gracchus with such animosity that he withdrew into voluntary exile. cicero pays a tribute to the energy of opimius in the first oration against catiline, c. iii. [296] this phenomenon of the parhelion, or mock sun, which so puzzled cicero's interlocutors, has been very satisfactorily explained by modern science. the parhelia are formed by the reflection of the sunbeams on a cloud properly situated. they usually accompany the coronæ, or luminous circles, and are placed in the same circumference, and at the same height. their colors resemble that of the rainbow; the red and yellow are towards the side of the sun, and the blue and violet on the other. there are, however, coronæ sometimes seen without parhelia, and _vice versâ_. parhelia are double, triple, etc., and in 1629, a parhelion of five suns was seen at rome, and another of six suns at arles, 1666. [297] there is a little uncertainty as to what this age was, but it was probably about twenty-five. [298] cicero here gives a very exact and correct account of the planetarium of archimedes, which is so often noticed by the ancient astronomers. it no doubt corresponded in a great measure to our modern planetarium, or orrery, invented by the earl of that name. this elaborate machine, whose manufacture requires the most exact and critical science, is of the greatest service to those who study the revolutions of the stars, for astronomic, astrologic, or meteorologic purposes. [299] the end of the fourteenth chapter and the first words of the fifteenth are lost; but it is plain that in the fifteenth it is scipio who is speaking. [300] there is evidently some error in the text here, for ennius was born 515 a.u.c., was a personal friend of the elder africanus, and died about 575 a.u.c., so that it is plain that we ought to read in the text 550, not 350. [301] two pages are lost here. afterward it is again scipio who is speaking. [302] two pages are lost here. [303] both ennius and nævius wrote tragedies called "iphigenia." mai thinks the text here corrupt, and expresses some doubt whether there is a quotation here at all. [304] he means scipio himself. [305] there is again a hiatus. what follows is spoken by lælius. [306] again two pages are lost. [307] again two pages are lost. it is evident that scipio is speaking again in cap. xxxi. [308] again two pages are lost. [309] again two pages are lost. [310] here four pages are lost. [311] here four pages are lost. [312] two pages are missing here. [313] a name of neptune. [314] about seven lines are lost here, and there is a great deal of corruption and imperfection in the next few sentences. [315] two pages are lost here. [316] the _lex curiata de imperio_, so often mentioned here, was the same as the _auctoritas patrum_, and was necessary in order to confer upon the dictator, consuls, and other magistrates the _imperium_, or military command: without this they had only a _potestas_, or civil authority, and could not meddle with military affairs. [317] two pages are missing here. [318] here two pages are missing. [319] i have translated this very corrupt passage according to niebuhr's emendation. [320] assiduus, ab ære dando. [321] proletarii, a prole. [322] here four pages are missing. [323] two pages are missing here. [324] two pages are missing here. [325] here twelve pages are missing. [326] sixteen pages are missing here. [327] here eight pages are missing. [328] a great many pages are missing here. [329] several pages are lost here; the passage in brackets is found in nonius under the word "exulto." [330] this and other chapters printed in smaller type are generally presumed to be of doubtful authenticity. [331] the beginning of this book is lost. the two first paragraphs come, the one from st. augustine, the other from lactantius. [332] eight or nine pages are lost here. [333] here six pages are lost. [334] here twelve pages are missing. [335] we have been obliged to insert two or three of these sentences between brackets, which are not found in the original, for the sake of showing the drift of the arguments of philus. he himself was fully convinced that justice and morality were of eternal and immutable obligation, and that the best interests of all beings lie in their perpetual development and application. this eternity of justice is beautifully illustrated by montesquieu. "long," says he, "before positive laws were instituted, the moral relations of justice were absolute and universal. to say that there were no justice or injustice but that which depends on the injunctions or prohibitions of positive laws, is to say that the radii which spring from a centre are not equal till we have formed a circle to illustrate the proposition. we must, therefore, acknowledge that the relations of equity were antecedent to the positive laws which corroborated them." but though philus was fully convinced of this, in order to give his friends scipio and lælius an opportunity of proving it, he frankly brings forward every argument for injustice that sophistry had ever cast in the teeth of reason.--_by the original translator_. [336] here four pages are missing. the following sentence is preserved in nonius. [337] two pages are missing here. [338] several pages are missing here. [339] he means alexander the great. [340] six or eight pages are lost here. [341] a great many pages are missing here. [342] six or eight pages are missing here. [343] several pages are lost here. [344] this and the following chapters are not the actual words of cicero, but quotations by lactantius and augustine of what they affirm that he said. [345] twelve pages are missing here. [346] eight pages are missing here. [347] six or eight pages are missing here. [348] catadupa, from [greek: kata] and [greek: doipos], noise. leviathan by thomas hobbes 1651 leviathan or the matter, forme, & power of a common-wealth ecclesiastical and civill thomas hobbes of malmesbury printed for andrew crooke, at the green dragon in st. paul's churchyard, 1651. transcriber's notes on the e-text: this e-text was prepared from the pelican classics edition of leviathan, which in turn was prepared from the first edition. i have tried to follow as closely as possible the original, and to give the flavour of the text that hobbes himself proof-read, but the following differences were unavoidable. hobbes used capitals and italics very extensively, for emphasis, for proper names, for quotations, and sometimes, it seems, just because. the original has very extensive margin notes, which are used to show where he introduces the definitions of words and concepts, to give in short the subject that a paragraph or section is dealing with, and to give references to his quotations, largely but not exclusively biblical. to some degree, these margin notes seem to have been intended to serve in place of an index, the original having none. they are all in italics. he also used italics for words in other languages than english, and there are a number of greek words, in the greek alphabet, in the text. to deal with these within the limits of plain vanilla ascii, i have done the following in this e-text. i have restricted my use of full capitalization to those places where hobbes used it, except in the chapter headings, which i have fully capitalized, where hobbes used a mixture of full capitalization and italics. where it is clear that the italics are to indicate the text is quoting, i have introduced quotation marks. within quotation marks i have retained the capitalization that hobbes used. where italics seem to be used for emphasis, or for proper names, or just because, i have capitalized the initial letter of the words. this has the disadvantage that they are not then distinguished from those that hobbes capitalized in plain text, but the extent of his italics would make the text very ugly if i was to use an underscore or slash. where the margin notes are either to introduce the paragraph subject, or to show where he introduces word definitions, i have included them as headers to the paragraph, again with all words having initial capitals, and on a shortened line. for margin references to quotes, i have included them in the text, in brackets immediately next to the quotation. where hobbes included references in the main text, i have left them as he put them, except to change his square brackets to round. for the greek alphabet, i have simply substituted the nearest ordinary letters that i can, and i have used initial capitals for foreign language words. neither thomas hobbes nor his typesetters seem to have had many inhibitions about spelling and punctuation. i have tried to reproduce both exactly, with the exception of the introduction of quotation marks. in preparing the text, i have found that it has much more meaning if i read it with sub-vocalization, or aloud, rather than trying to read silently. hobbes' use of emphasis and his eccentric punctuation and construction seem then to work. to my most honor'd friend mr. francis godolphin of godolphin honor'd sir. your most worthy brother mr sidney godolphin, when he lived, was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. for there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service of god, or to the service of his country, to civill society, or private friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your selfe, i humbly dedicate unto you this my discourse of common-wealth. i know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. for in a way beset with those that contend on one side for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. but yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the civill power, should not be by the civill power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too great. besides, i speak not of the men, but (in the abstract) of the seat of power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the roman capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there) offending none, i think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as favour them. that which perhaps may most offend, are certain texts of holy scripture, alledged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others. but i have done it with due submission, and also (in order to my subject) necessarily; for they are the outworks of the enemy, from whence they impugne the civill power. if notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may be pleased to excuse your selfe, and say that i am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true i say, that i honoured your brother, and honour you, and have presum'd on that, to assume the title (without your knowledge) of being, as i am, sir, your most humble, and most obedient servant, thomas hobbes. paris aprill 15/25 1651. contents of the chapters the first part of man introduction 1. of sense 2. of imagination 3. of the consequences or train of imaginations 4. of speech 5. of reason and science 6. of the interiour beginnings of voluntary motions, commonly called the passions; and the speeches by which they are expressed 7. of the ends or resolutions of discourse 8. of the vertues, commonly called intellectuall, and their contrary defects 9. of the severall subjects of knowledge 10. of power, worth, dignity, honour, and worthinesse 11. of the difference of manners 12. of religion 13. of the naturall condition of mankind as concerning their felicity and misery 14. of the first and second naturall lawes, and of contract 15. of other lawes of nature 16. of persons, authors, and things personated the second part of common-wealth 17. of the causes, generation, and definition of a common-wealth 18. of the rights of soveraignes by institution 19. of severall kinds of common-wealth by institution; and of succesion to the soveraign power 20. of dominion paternall, and despoticall 21. of the liberty of subjects 22. of systemes subject, politicall, and private 23. of the publique ministers of soveraign power 24. of the nutrition, and procreation of a common-wealth 25. of counsell 26. of civill lawes 27. of crimes, excuses, and extenuations 28. of punishments, and rewards 29. of those things that weaken, or tend to the dissolution of a common-wealth 30. of the office of the soveraign representative 31. of the kingdom of god by nature the third part of a christian common-wealth 32. of the principles of christian politiques 33. of the number, antiquity, scope, authority, and interpreters of the books of holy scripture. 34. of the signification, of spirit, angell, and inspiration in the books of holy scripture 35. of the signification in scripture of the kingdome of god, of holy, sacred, and sacrament 36. of the word of god, and of prophets 37. of miracles, and their use 38. of the signification in scripture of eternall life, hel, salvation, the world to come, and redemption 39. of the signification in scripture of the word church 40. of the rights of the kingdome of god, in abraham, moses, the high priests, and the kings of judah 41. of the office of our blessed saviour 42. of power ecclesiasticall 43. of what is necessary for mans reception into the kingdome of heaven the fourth part of the kingdome of darknesse 44. of spirituall darknesse from misinterpretation of scripture 45. of daemonology, and other reliques of the religion of the gentiles 46. of darknesse from vaine philosophy, and fabulous traditions 47. of the benefit proceeding from such darknesse; and to whom it accreweth 48. a review and conclusion the introduction nature (the art whereby god hath made and governes the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. for seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? for what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joynts, but so many wheeles, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? art goes yet further, imitating that rationall and most excellent worke of nature, man. for by art is created that great leviathan called a common-wealth, or state, (in latine civitas) which is but an artificiall man; though of greater stature and strength than the naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the soveraignty is an artificiall soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates, and other officers of judicature and execution, artificiall joynts; reward and punishment (by which fastned to the seat of the soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body naturall; the wealth and riches of all the particular members, are the strength; salus populi (the peoples safety) its businesse; counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and lawes, an artificiall reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sicknesse; and civill war, death. lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by god in the creation. to describe the nature of this artificiall man, i will consider first the matter thereof, and the artificer; both which is man. secondly, how, and by what covenants it is made; what are the rights and just power or authority of a soveraigne; and what it is that preserveth and dissolveth it. thirdly, what is a christian common-wealth. lastly, what is the kingdome of darkness. concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that wisedome is acquired, not by reading of books, but of men. consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. but there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, nosce teipsum, read thy self: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and passions of one man, to the thoughts, and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himselfe, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. i say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, feare, hope, &c; not the similitude or the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, &c: for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. and though by mens actions wee do discover their designee sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himselfe a good or evill man. but let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. he that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himselfe, not this, or that particular man; but man-kind; which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language, or science; yet, when i shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himselfe. for this kind of doctrine, admitteth no other demonstration. part 1 of man chapter i. of sense concerning the thoughts of man, i will consider them first singly, and afterwards in trayne, or dependance upon one another. singly, they are every one a representation or apparence, of some quality, or other accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an object. which object worketh on the eyes, eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of apparences. the originall of them all, is that which we call sense; (for there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.) the rest are derived from that originall. to know the naturall cause of sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and i have els-where written of the same at large. nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, i will briefly deliver the same in this place. the cause of sense, is the externall body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediatly, as in the tast and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain, and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. and this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light, or colour figured; to the eare, in a sound; to the nostrill, in an odour; to the tongue and palat, in a savour; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardnesse, softnesse, and such other qualities, as we discern by feeling. all which qualities called sensible, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. neither in us that are pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) but their apparence to us is fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. and as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action, for if those colours, and sounds, were in the bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in ecchoes by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one place; the apparence, in another. and though at some certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. so that sense in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as i have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our eyes, eares, and other organs thereunto ordained. but the philosophy-schooles, through all the universities of christendome, grounded upon certain texts of aristotle, teach another doctrine; and say, for the cause of vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a visible species(in english) a visible shew, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the eye, is seeing. and for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an audible species, that is, an audible aspect, or audible being seen; which entring at the eare, maketh hearing. nay for the cause of understanding also, they say the thing understood sendeth forth intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which comming into the understanding, makes us understand. i say not this, as disapproving the use of universities: but because i am to speak hereafter of their office in a common-wealth, i must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one. chapter ii. of imagination that when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. but that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily assented to. for men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. from hence it is, that the schooles say, heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their conservation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate absurdly. when a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: and as wee see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, &c. for after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. and this is it, that latines call imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. but the greeks call it fancy; which signifies apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking. memory the decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the starres; which starrs do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. but because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. and any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day. from whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. for the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: so that the distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. for as at a distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak; and wee lose( for example) of cities wee have seen, many particular streets; and of actions, many particular circumstances. this decaying sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (i mean fancy it selfe,) wee call imagination, as i said before; but when we would express the decay, and signifie that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. so that imagination and memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names. much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. againe, imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; the former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is simple imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. the other is compounded; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a centaure. so when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himselfe a hercules, or an alexander, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. there be also other imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense; as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon geometricall figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the images of lines, and angles before his eyes: which kind of fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse. dreams the imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call dreams. and these also (as all other imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by parcells in the sense. and because in sense, the brain, and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of externall objects, there can happen in sleep, no imagination; and therefore no dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brayn, and other organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the organs of sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. and hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. for my part, when i consider, that in dreames, i do not often, nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions that i do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, dreaming, as at other times; and because waking i often observe the absurdity of dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts; i am well satisfied, that being awake, i know i dreame not; though when i dreame, i think my selfe awake. and seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body; divers distempers must needs cause different dreams. and hence it is, that lying cold breedeth dreams of feare, and raiseth the thought and image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocall:) and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. in the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn. in summe, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations; the motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we dream, at another. apparitions or visions the most difficult discerning of a mans dream, from his waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. for he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. we read of marcus brutes, (one that had his life given him by julius caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at phillipi, the night before he gave battell to augustus caesar, he saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. for sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish: and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or any thing but a vision. and this is no very rare accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead mens ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt. from this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyres, fawnes, nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of fayries, ghosts, and goblins; and of the power of witches. for as for witches, i think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can; their trade being neerer to a new religion, than to a craft or science. and for fayries, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has i think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcisme, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men. neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but god can make unnaturall apparitions. but that he does it so often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of the course of nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of christian faith. but evill men under pretext that god can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. if this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it, prognostiques from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill obedience. and this ought to be the work of the schooles; but they rather nourish such doctrine. for (not knowing what imagination, or the senses are), what they receive, they teach: some saying, that imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause: others that they rise most commonly from the will; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by god; and evill thoughts by the divell: or that good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man, by god; and evill ones by the divell. some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common-sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood. understanding the imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally call understanding; and is common to man and beast. for a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his master; and so will many other beasts. that understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other formes of speech: and of this kinde of understanding i shall speak hereafter. chapter iii. of the consequence or trayne of imaginations by consequence, or trayne of thoughts, i understand that succession of one thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from discourse in words) mentall discourse. when a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. but as wee have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses. the reason whereof is this. all fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after sense: in so much as the former comming again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. but because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, that in the imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another. trayne of thoughts unguided this trayne of thoughts, or mentall discourse, is of two sorts. the first is unguided, without designee, and inconstant; wherein there is no passionate thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a dream. such are commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. and yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. for in a discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a roman penny? yet the cohaerence to me was manifest enough. for the thought of the warre, introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the delivering up of christ; and that again the thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick. trayne of thoughts regulated the second is more constant; as being regulated by some desire, and designee. for the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. from desire, ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. and because the end, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out, respice finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it. remembrance the trayn of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to man and beast. the other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. of which i have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. in summe, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by designee, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention, which the latines call sagacitas, and solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause, sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. this we call remembrance, or calling to mind: the latines call it reminiscentia, as it were a re-conning of our former actions. sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the alphabet, to start a rime. prudence sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. as he that foresees what wil become of a criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallowes. which kind of thoughts, is called foresight, and prudence, or providence; and sometimes wisdome; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. but this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him. the present onely has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory onely, but things to come have no being at all; the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past, to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience; but not with certainty enough. and though it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but presumption. for the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. from him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. the best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most signes to guesse by. signes a signe, is the event antecedent, of the consequent; and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been observed, before: and the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the signe. and therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has most signes, whereby to guesse at the future time, and consequently is the most prudent: and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary. neverthelesse it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. there be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten. conjecture of the time past as prudence is a praesumtion of the future, contracted from the experience of time past; so there is a praesumtion of things past taken from other things (not future but) past also. for he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing state hath first come into civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of any other state, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. but his conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the future; both being grounded onely upon experience. there is no other act of mans mind, that i can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. those other faculties, of which i shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of words, and speech. for besides sense, and thoughts, and the trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures. whatsoever we imagine, is finite. therefore there is no idea, or conception of anything we call infinite. no man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. and therefore the name of god is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. also because whatsoever (as i said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. no man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have, or can be incident to sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving schoolemen. chapter iv. of speech originall of speech the invention of printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters, is no great matter. but who was the first that found the use of letters, is not known. he that first brought them into greece, men say was cadmus, the sonne of agenor, king of phaenicia. a profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the tongue, palat, lips, and other organs of speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them. but the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of speech, consisting of names or apellations, and their connexion; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither common-wealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lyons, bears, and wolves. the first author of speech was god himselfe, that instructed adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; for the scripture goeth no further in this matter. but this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an orator or philosopher has need of. for i do not find any thing in the scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of words and speech, as generall, speciall, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of all, of entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other significant words of the school. but all this language gotten, and augmented by adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of babel, when by the hand of god, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. and being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious. the use of speech the generall use of speech, is to transferre our mentall discourse, into verbal; or the trayne of our thoughts, into a trayne of words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the registring of the consequences of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. so that the first use of names, is to serve for markes, or notes of remembrance. another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for, and for this use they are called signes. speciall uses of speech are these; first, to register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of arts. secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to counsell, and teach one another. thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently. abuses of speech to these uses, there are also foure correspondent abuses. first, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend. the manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of names, and the connexion of them. names proper & common universall of names, some are proper, and singular to one onely thing; as peter, john, this man, this tree: and some are common to many things; as man, horse, tree; every of which though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an universall; there being nothing in the world universall but names; for the things named, are every one of them individual and singular. one universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing onely; universals recall any one of those many. and of names universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. as for example, the name body is of larger signification than the word man, and conprehendeth it; and the names man and rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. but here wee must take notice, that by a name is not alwayes understood, as in grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. for all these words, hee that in his actions observeth the lawes of his country, make but one name, equivalent to this one word, just. by this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. for example, a man that hath no use of speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. but if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. but he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a triangle; will boldly conclude universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes, every triangle hath its three angles equall to two right angles. and thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as a universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places. but the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in numbering. a naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as one, two, and three, may observe every stroak of the clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. and it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. and he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: much lesse will he be able to add, and substract, and performe all other operations of arithmetique. so that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much lesse of magnitudes, of swiftnesse, of force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind. when two names are joyned together into a consequence, or affirmation; as thus, a man is a living creature; or thus, if he be a man, he is a living creature, if the later name living creature, signifie all that the former name man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is true; otherwise false. for true and false are attributes of speech, not of things. and where speech in not, there is neither truth nor falshood. errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth. seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. and therefore in geometry, (which is the onely science that it hath pleased god hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning. by this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himselfe. for the errours of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours. from whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. so that in the right definition of names, lyes the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no definitions' lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. for between true science, and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. for words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an aristotle, a cicero, or a thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man. subject to names subject to names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one from another, and leave a remainder. the latines called accounts of mony rationes, and accounting, ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account call items, they called nomina; that is, names: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word ratio, to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. the greeks have but one word logos, for both speech and reason; not that they thought there was no speech without reason; but no reasoning without speech: and the act of reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. and because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. this diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads. first, a thing may enter into account for matter, or body; as living, sensible, rationall, hot, cold, moved, quiet; with all which names the word matter, or body is understood; all such, being names of matter. secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for living put into account life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the like. and all such names, are the names of the accidents and properties, by which one matter, and body is distinguished from another. these are called names abstract; because severed (not from matter, but) from the account of matter. thirdly, we bring into account, the properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is seen by us, we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the sight, the colour, the idea of it in the fancy: and when any thing is heard, wee reckon it not; but the hearing, or sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the eare: and such are names of fancies. fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to names themselves, and to speeches: for, generall, universall, speciall, oequivocall, are names of names. and affirmation, interrogation, commandement, narration, syllogisme, sermon, oration, and many other such, are names of speeches. use of names positive and this is all the variety of names positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or words and speech. negative names with their uses there be also other names, called negative; which are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want foure, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used. words insignificant all other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. one, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by schoole-men, and pusled philosophers. another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeall body, or (which is all one) an incorporeall substance, and a great number more. for whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. for example if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. so likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words in-powred vertue, in-blown vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a round quadrangle. and therefore you shall hardly meet with a senselesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some latin or greek names. a frenchman seldome hears our saviour called by the name of parole, but by the name of verbe often; yet verbe and parole differ no more, but that one is latin, the other french. understanding when a man upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; then he is said to understand it; understanding being nothing els, but conception caused by speech. and therefore if speech be peculiar to man (as for ought i know it is,) then is understanding peculiar to him also. and therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind. what kinds of speeches signifie the appetites, aversions, and passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, i shall speak when i have spoken of the passions. inconstant names the names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of inconstant signification. for seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. for though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. and therefore in reasoning, a man bust take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of vertues, and vices; for one man calleth wisdome, what another calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; one gravity, what another stupidity, &c. and therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. no more can metaphors, and tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not. chapter v. of reason, and science. reason what it is when a man reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. and though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides adding and substracting, men name other operations, as multiplying and dividing; yet they are the same; for multiplication, is but addition together of things equall; and division, but substracting of one thing, as often as we can. these operations are not incident to numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. for as arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in numbers; so the geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficiall,) angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftnesse, force, power, and the like; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words; adding together two names, to make an affirmation; and two affirmations, to make a syllogisme; and many syllogismes to make a demonstration; and from the summe, or conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one proposition, to finde the other. writers of politiques, adde together pactions, to find mens duties; and lawyers, lawes and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. in summe, in what matter soever there is place for addition and substraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do. reason defined out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word reason, when wee reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind. for reason, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and substracting) of the consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; i say marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men. right reason where and as in arithmetique, unpractised men must, and professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false conclusions; not but that reason it selfe is always right reason, as well as arithmetique is a certain and infallible art: but no one mans reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. and therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right reason, the reason of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right reason constituted by nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: and when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. for they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right reason, by the claym they lay to it. the use of reason the use and end of reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. for there can be no certainty of the last conclusion, without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. as when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth. of error and absurdity when a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called error; to which even the most prudent men are subject. but when we reason in words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called error, it is indeed an absurdity, or senseless speech. for error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. but when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. and words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call absurd, insignificant, and non-sense. and therefore if a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle; or accidents of bread in cheese; or immaterial substances; or of a free subject; a free will; or any free, but free from being hindred by opposition, i should not say he were in an errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, absurd. i have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a man did excell all other animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. and now i adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to generall rules, called theoremes, or aphorismes; that is, he can reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another. but this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. and of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe philosophy. for it is most true that cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. and the reason is manifest. for there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in geometry; whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. causes of absurditie the first cause of absurd conclusions i ascribe to the want of method; in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, one, two, and three. and whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which i have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. and therefore the second cause of absurd assertions, i ascribe to the giving of names of bodies, to accidents; or of accidents, to bodies; as they do, that say, faith is infused, or inspired; when nothing can be powred, or breathed into any thing, but body; and that, extension is body; that phantasmes are spirits, &c. the third i ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies; as they do that say, the colour is in the body; the sound is in the ayre, &c. the fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies, to names, or speeches; as they do that say, that there be things universall; that a living creature is genus, or a generall thing, &c. the fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents, to names and speeches; as they do that say, the nature of a thing is in its definition; a mans command is his will; and the like. the sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. for though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, the proverb sayes this or that (whereas wayes cannot go, nor proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted. the seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the schooles, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-now, and the like canting of schoole-men. to him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. for all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. for who is so stupid, as both to mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him? science by this it appears that reason is not as sense, and memory, borne with us; nor gotten by experience onely; as prudence is; but attayned by industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call science. and whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something els when we will, or the like, another time; because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects. children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have attained the use of speech: but are called reasonable creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. and the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. for as for science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. geometry they have thought conjuring: but for other sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden. but yet they that have no science, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. for ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary. to conclude, the light of humane minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; encrease of science, the way; and the benefit of man-kind, the end. and on the contrary, metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt. prudence & sapience, with their difference as, much experience, is prudence; so, is much science, sapience. for though wee usually have one name of wisedome for them both; yet the latines did always distinguish between prudentia and sapientia, ascribing the former to experience, the later to science. but to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: the ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as prudence to sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. but they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him. signes of science the signes of science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. certain, when he that pretendeth the science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. but in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. and even of those men themselves, that in councells of the common-wealth, love to shew their reading of politiques and history, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse. chapter vi. of the interiour beginnings of voluntary motions commonly called the passions. and the speeches by which they are expressed. motion vitall and animal there be in animals, two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the bloud, the pulse, the breathing, the concoctions, nutrition, excretion, &c; to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other in animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. that sense, is motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we see, heare, &c.; and that fancy is but the reliques of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already sayd in the first and second chapters. and because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internall beginning of all voluntary motion. and although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. for let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. these small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavour. endeavour; appetite; desire; hunger; thirst; aversion this endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire; the later, being the generall name; and the other, oftentimes restrayned to signifie the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. and when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called aversion. these words appetite, and aversion we have from the latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. so also do the greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme. for nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. for the schooles find in meere appetite to go, or move, no actuall motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphoricall motion; which is but an absurd speech; for though words may be called metaphoricall; bodies, and motions cannot. that which men desire, they are also sayd to love; and to hate those things, for which they have aversion. so that desire, and love, are the same thing; save that by desire, we alwayes signifie the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. so also by aversion, we signifie the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object. of appetites, and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feele in their bodies;) and some other appetites, not many. the rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. for of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire, than to tast and try. but aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not. contempt those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to contemne: contempt being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from want of experience of them. and because the constitution of a mans body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object. good evill but whatsoever is the object of any mans appetite or desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate, and aversion, evill; and of his contempt, vile, and inconsiderable. for these words of good, evill, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no common-wealth;) or, (in a common-wealth,) from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof. pulchrum turpe; delightfull profitable; unpleasant unprofitable the latine tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evill; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes promiseth good; and the later, that, which promiseth evill. but in our tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. but for pulchrum, we say in some things, fayre; in other beautifull, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable; and for turpe, foule, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the mine, or countenance, that promiseth good and evill. so that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightfull; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evill: for evill, in promise, is that they call turpe; evill in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evill in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtfull. delight displeasure as, in sense, that which is really within us, is (as i have sayd before) onely motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the eare, sound; to the nostrill, odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, eares, and other organs to the heart; the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to, or from the object moving. but the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call delight, or trouble of mind. pleasure offence this motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it delight, and pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of vitall motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, (a juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall. pleasure therefore, (or delight,) is the apparence, or sense of good; and molestation or displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. and consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more or lesse; and all hatred, and aversion, with more or lesse displeasure and offence. pleasures of sense; pleasures of the mind; joy paine griefe of pleasures, or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called pleasures of sense, (the word sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be lawes.) of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hearing, smell, tast, or touch; others arise from the expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of things; whether those things in the sense please or displease: and these are pleasures of the mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called joy. in the like manner, displeasures, are some in the sense, and called payne; others, in the expectation of consequences, and are called griefe. these simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. as first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. secondly, from the object loved or hated. thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. fourthly, from the alteration or succession it selfe. hope-for appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called hope. despaire-the same, without such opinion, despaire. feare-aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, feare. courage-the same, with hope of avoyding that hurt by resistance, courage. anger-sudden courage, anger. confidence-constant hope, confidence of our selves. diffidence-constant despayre, diffidence of our selves. indignation-anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by injury, indignation. benevolence-desire of good to another, benevolence, good will, charity. if to man generally, good nature. covetousnesse-desire of riches, covetousnesse: a name used alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those riches are sought. ambition-desire of office, or precedence, ambition: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned. pusillanimity-desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; and fear of things that are but of little hindrance, pusillanimity. magnanimity-contempt of little helps, and hindrances, magnanimity. valour-magnanimity, in danger of death, or wounds, valour, fortitude. liberality-magnanimity in the use of riches, liberality miserablenesse-pusillanimity, in the same wretchednesse, miserablenesse; or parsimony; as it is liked or disliked. kindnesse-love of persons for society, kindnesse. naturall lust-love of persons for pleasing the sense onely, natural lust. luxury-love of the same, acquired from rumination, that is imagination of pleasure past, luxury. the passion of love; jealousie-love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, the passion of love. the same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, jealousie. revengefulnesse-desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, revengefulnesse. curiosity-desire, to know why, and how, curiosity; such as is in no living creature but man; so that man is distinguished, not onely by his reason; but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall pleasure. religion superstition; true religion-feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition. and when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, true religion. panique terrour-feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, panique terror; called so from the fables that make pan the author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. and therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people. admiration-joy, from apprehension of novelty, admiration; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause. glory vaine-glory-joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called glorying: which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is called vaine-glory: which name is properly given; because a well-grounded confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called vaine. dejection-griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind. the vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons; and is corrected often times by age, and employment. sudden glory laughter-sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. and it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. and therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a signe of pusillanimity. for of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able. sudden dejection weeping-on the contrary, sudden dejection is the passion that causeth weeping; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are women, and children. therefore, some weep for the loss of friends; others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation. but in all cases, both laughter and weeping, are sudden motions; custome taking them both away. for no man laughs at old jests; or weeps for an old calamity. shame blushing-griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is shame, or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable. impudence-the contempt of good reputation is called impudence. pitty-griefe, for the calamity of another is pitty; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a fellow-feeling: and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least pitty; and for the same calamity, those have least pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. cruelty-contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call cruelty; proceeding from security of their own fortune. for, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes, without other end of his own, i do not conceive it possible. emulation envy-griefe, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called emulation: but joyned with endeavour to supplant or hinder a competitor, envie. deliberation-when in the mind of man, appetites and aversions, hopes and feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able to do it; sometimes despaire, or feare to attempt it; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and feares, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call deliberation. therefore of things past, there is no deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such deliberation vaine. but of things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. and it is called deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite, or aversion. this alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and feares is no less in other living creatures than in man; and therefore beasts also deliberate. every deliberation is then sayd to end when that whereof they deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our appetite, or aversion. the will in deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the will; the act, (not the faculty,) of willing. and beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will. the definition of the will, given commonly by the schooles, that it is a rationall appetite, is not good. for if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. for a voluntary act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other. but if in stead of a rationall appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that i have given here. will, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating. and though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite. for if the intervenient appetites make any action voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient aversions should make the same action involuntary; and so one and the same action should be both voluntary & involuntary. by this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions. formes of speech, in passion the formes of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts. and first generally all passions may be expressed indicatively; as, i love, i feare, i joy, i deliberate, i will, i command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the passion they proceed from. deliberation is expressed subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, if this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in generall words, but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. the language of desire, and aversion, is imperative; as, do this, forbear that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is command; otherwise prayer; or els counsell. the language of vaine-glory, of indignation, pitty and revengefulness, optative: but of the desire to know, there is a peculiar expression called interrogative; as, what is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? other language of the passions i find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signifie as speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed. these forms of speech, i say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such passions or not. the best signes of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have. good and evill apparent and because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. but for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or seeming good. and contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent or seeming evill: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others. felicity continual successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call felicity; i mean the felicity of this life. for there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without feare, no more than without sense. what kind of felicity god hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of school-men, beatifical vision, is unintelligible. praise magnification the form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the goodnesse of anything is praise. that whereby they signifie the power and greatness of anything is magnifying. and that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the greeks called makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. and thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions. chapter vii. of the ends or resolutions of discourse of all discourse, governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an end, either by attaining, or by giving over. and in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time. judgement, or sentence final; doubt if the discourse be meerly mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. so that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans discourse, you leave him in a praesumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. all which is opinion. and that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil, the same is alternate opinion in the enquiry of the truth of past, and future. and as the last appetite in deliberation is called the will, so the last opinion in search of the truth of past, and future, is called the judgement, or resolute and final sentence of him that discourseth. and as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good or bad is called deliberation; so the whole chain of opinions alternate, in the question of true, or false is called doubt. no discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. for, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. and for the knowledge of consequence, which i have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditionall. no man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing. science opinion conscience and therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogismes, the end or last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called science. but if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or if the definitions be not rightly joyned together into syllogismes, then the end or conclusion is again opinion, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood. when two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. and because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very evill act, for any man to speak against his conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. and last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so. beliefe faith when a mans discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person; and the resolution is called beleefe, and faith: faith, in the man; beleefe, both of the man, and of the truth of what he sayes. so then in beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. to have faith in, or trust to, or beleeve a man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to beleeve what is said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. but wee are to observe that this phrase, i beleeve in; as also the latine, credo in; and the greek, pisteno eis, are never used but in the writings of divines. in stead of them, in other writings are put, i beleeve him; i have faith in him; i rely on him: and in latin, credo illi; fido illi: and in greek, pisteno anto: and that this singularity of the ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the christian faith. but by beleeving in, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person; but confession and acknowledgement of the doctrine. for not onely christians, but all manner of men do so believe in god, as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed. from whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall reason, but from the authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith; and the honour done in believing, is done to him onely. and consequently, when wee believe that the scriptures are the word of god, having no immediate revelation from god himselfe, our beleefe, faith, and trust is in the church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. and they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of god, take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false prophet. and so it is also with all other history. for if i should not believe all that is written by historians, of the glorious acts of alexander, or caesar; i do not think the ghost of alexander, or caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the historian. if livy say the gods made once a cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not god therein, but livy. so that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be sent from god or not, is faith in men onely. chapter viii. of the vertues commonly called intellectual; and their contrary defects intellectuall vertue defined vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. for if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. and by vertues intellectuall, are always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a good witte; though the same word witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest. wit, naturall, or acquired these vertues are of two sorts; naturall, and acquired. by naturall, i mean not, that which a man hath from his birth: for that is nothing else but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst vertues. but i mean, that witte, which is gotten by use onely, and experience; without method, culture, or instruction. this naturall witte, consisteth principally in two things; celerity of imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and steddy direction to some approved end. on the contrary a slow imagination, maketh that defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called dulnesse, stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved. good wit, or fancy; good judgement; discretion and this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination. and whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose; those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a good wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a good fancy. but they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called distinguishing, and discerning, and judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a good judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this vertue is called discretion. the former, that is, fancy, without the help of judgement, is not commended as a vertue: but the later which is judgement, and discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of fancy. besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. this done; he that hath this vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention. but without steddinesse, and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: which kind of folly, i know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse. in a good poem, whether it be epique, or dramatique; as also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgement and fancy are required: but the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the extravagancy; but ought not to displease by indiscretion. in a good history, the judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse consisteth, in the method, in the truth, and in the choyse of the actions that are most profitable to be known. fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile. in orations of prayse, and in invectives, the fancy is praedominant; because the designe is not truth, but to honour or dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. the judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable. in hortatives, and pleadings, as truth, or disguise serveth best to the designe in hand; so is the judgement, or the fancy most required. in demonstration, in councell, and all rigourous search of truth, judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy. but for metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. for seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into councell, or reasoning, were manifest folly. and in any discourse whatsoever, if the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the discretion is manifest, though the fancy be never so ordinary. the secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the judgement shall approve of the time, place, and persons. an anatomist, or a physitian may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company. and 'tis the want of discretion that makes the difference. again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary fancy: but in a sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no gingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of discretion. so that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is wanting, but discretion. judgement therefore without fancy is wit, but fancy without judgement not. prudence when the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not easie, or usuall, this wit of his is called prudence; and dependeth on much experience, and memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. in which there is not so much difference of men, as there is in their fancies and judgements; because the experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having his private designes. to govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of prudence; but different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of art. a plain husband-man is more prudent in affaires of his own house, then a privy counseller in the affaires of another man. craft to prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by feare, or want; you have that crooked wisdome, which is called craft; which is a signe of pusillanimity. for magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. and that which the latines call versutia, (translated into english, shifting,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted craft, called versutia, from versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest. acquired wit as for acquired wit, (i mean acquired by method and instruction,) there is none but reason; which is grounded on the right use of speech; and produceth the sciences. but of reason and science, i have already spoken in the fifth and sixth chapters. the causes of this difference of witts, are in the passions: and the difference of passions, proceedeth partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education. for if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their sight, hearing, or other senses, than in their fancies, and discretions. it proceeds therefore from the passions; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference of customes, and education. the passions that most of all cause the differences of wit, are principally, the more or lesse desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honour. all which may be reduced to the first, that is desire of power. for riches, knowledge and honour are but severall sorts of power. giddinesse madnesse and therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy, or much judgement. for the thoughts, are to the desires, as scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired: all stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. for as to have no desire, is to be dead: so to have weak passions, is dulnesse; and to have passions indifferently for every thing, giddinesse, and distraction; and to have stronger, and more vehement passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call madnesse. whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the passions themselves. sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion, proceedeth from the evill constitution of the organs of the body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the passion. but in both cases the madnesse is of one and the same nature. the passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh madnesse, is either great vaine-glory; which is commonly called pride, and selfe-conceipt; or great dejection of mind. rage pride, subjecteth a man to anger, the excesse whereof, is the madnesse called rage, and fury. and thus it comes to passe that excessive desire of revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage: that excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also rage: excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes distraction, and giddinesse: the same, joyned with envy, rage: vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, rage. melancholy dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a madnesse commonly called melancholy, apparent also in divers manners; as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. in summe, all passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall name of madnesse. but of the severall kinds of madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. and if the excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when they tend to evill, are degrees of the same. (for example,) though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such passion; yet when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. for what argument of madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. for they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. and if this be madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. for as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the roaring of the sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular passions, are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. and if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. if some man in bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were god the father; i think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madnesse. this opinion of inspiration, called commonly, private spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an errour generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of god almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his spirit. again, that madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing passion, may be gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of the evill disposition of the organs. for the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of mad-men: some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering passions: for the effect of the wine, does but remove dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions. for, (i believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that passions unguided, are for the most part meere madnesse. the opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. some, deriving them from the passions; some, from daemons, or spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. the former sort therefore, called such men, mad-men: but the later, called them sometimes daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes energumeni, (that is agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in italy they are called not onely pazzi, mad-men; but also spiritati, men possest. there was once a great conflux of people in abdera, a city of the greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of andromeda, upon an extream hot day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from the tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce iambiques, with the names of perseus and andromeda; which together with the fever, was cured, by the comming on of winter: and this madnesse was thought to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy. likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in another graecian city, which seized onely the young maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves. this was by most then thought an act of the divel. but one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the magistrates, to strip such as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. this the story sayes cured that madnesse. but on the other side, the same graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the eumenides, or furyes; and sometimes of ceres, phoebus, and other gods: so much did men attribute to phantasmes, as to think them aereal living bodies; and generally to call them spirits. and as the romans in this, held the same opinion with the greeks: so also did the jewes; for they calle mad-men prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) daemoniacks; and some of them called both prophets, and daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both daemoniack, and mad-man. but for the gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because diseases, and health; vices, and vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as daemons. so that a man was to understand by daemon, as well (sometimes) an ague, as a divell. but for the jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange. for neither moses, nor abraham pretended to prophecy by possession of a spirit; but from the voyce of god; or by a vision or dream: nor is there any thing in his law, morall, or ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such enthusiasme; or any possession. when god is sayd, (numb. 11. 25.) to take from the spirit that was in moses, and give it to the 70. elders, the spirit of god (taking it for the substance of god) is not divided. the scriptures by the spirit of god in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to godlinesse. and where it is said (exod. 28. 3.) "whom i have filled with the spirit of wisdome to make garments for aaron," is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind of work. in the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and eminent. neither did the other prophets of the old testament pretend enthusiasme; or, that god spake in them; but to them by voyce, vision, or dream; and the burthen of the lord was not possession, but command. how then could the jewes fall into this opinion of possession? i can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. for they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be, but that either god, or the divell is in him? and hence it came to passe, when our saviour (mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the scribes said he had belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. and that (john 10. 20.) some said, "he hath a divell, and is mad;" whereas others holding him for a prophet, sayd, "these are not the words of one that hath a divell." so in the old testament he that came to anoynt jehu, (2 kings 9.11.) was a prophet; but some of the company asked jehu, "what came that mad-man for?" so that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinary manner, was thought by the jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct atheisme;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men daemoniacks, rather than mad-men. but why then does our saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad. to which i can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth. the scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of god; and to prepare their mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall reason. whether the earths, or suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the exorbitant actions of men, proceed from passion, or from the divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to god almighty; which is the thing for which the scripture was written. as for that our saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as christ did, (and inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a divel or not.) for is not christ also said (math. 8.26.) to have rebuked the winds? is not he said also (luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a fever? yet this does not argue that a fever is a divel. and whereas many of these divels are said to confesse christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men confessed him. and whereas our saviour (math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; it is manifestly a parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was. so that i see nothing at all in the scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that daemoniacks were any other thing but mad-men. insignificant speech there is yet another fault in the discourses of some men; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of madnesse; namely, that abuse of words, whereof i have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the name of absurdity. and that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. and this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. the common sort of men seldome speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other egregious persons counted idiots. but to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a schoole-man into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point; as the trinity; the deity; the nature of christ; transubstantiation; free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable latine, such as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the latine tongue was vulgar. what is the meaning of these words. "the first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to worke?" they are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of suarez first booke, of the concourse, motion, and help of god. when men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not mad, or intend to make others so? and particularly, in the question of transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the white-nesse, round-nesse, magni-tude, quali-ty, corruptibili-ty, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the wafer, into the body of our blessed saviour, do they not make those nesses, tudes and ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? for by spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another. so that this kind of absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of madnesse; and all the time that guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but lucide intervals. and thus much of the vertues and defects intellectuall. chapter ix. of the severall subjects of knowledge there are of knowledge two kinds; whereof one is knowledge of fact: the other knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another. the former is nothing else, but sense and memory, and is absolute knowledge; as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done: and this is the knowledge required in a witnesse. the later is called science; and is conditionall; as when we know, that, if the figure showne be a circle, then any straight line through the centre shall divide it into two equall parts. and this is the knowledge required in a philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to reasoning. the register of knowledge of fact is called history. whereof there be two sorts: one called naturall history; which is the history of such facts, or effects of nature, as have no dependance on mans will; such as are the histories of metals, plants, animals, regions, and the like. the other, is civill history; which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in common-wealths. the registers of science, are such books as contain the demonstrations of consequences of one affirmation, to another; and are commonly called books of philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the matter; and may be divided in such manner as i have divided them in the following table. i. science, that is, knowledge of consequences; which is called also philosophy a. consequences from accidents of bodies naturall; which is called naturall philosophy 1. consequences from the accidents common to all bodies naturall; which are quantity, and motion. a. consequences from quantity, and motion indeterminate; which, being the principles or first foundation of philosophy, is called philosophia prima philosophia prima b. consequences from motion, and quantity determined 1) consequences from quantity, and motion determined a) by figure, by number 1] mathematiques, geometry arithmetique 2) consequences from the motion, and quantity of bodies in speciall a) consequences from the motion, and quantity of the great parts of the world, as the earth and stars, 1] cosmography astronomy geography b) consequences from the motion of speciall kinds, and figures of body, 1] mechaniques, doctrine of weight science of engineers architecture navigation 2. physiques, or consequences from qualities a. consequences from the qualities of bodies transient, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish meteorology b. consequences from the qualities of bodies permanent 1) consequences from the qualities of the starres a) consequences from the light of the starres. out of this, and the motion of the sunne, is made the science of sciography b) consequences from the influence of the starres, astrology 2) consequences of the qualities from liquid bodies that fill the space between the starres; such as are the ayre, or substance aetherial. 3) consequences from qualities of bodies terrestrial a) consequences from parts of the earth that are without sense, 1] consequences from qualities of minerals, as stones, metals, &c . 2] consequences from the qualities of vegetables b) consequences from qualities of animals 1] consequences from qualities of animals in generall a] consequences from vision, optiques b] consequences from sounds, musique c] consequences from the rest of the senses 2] consequences from qualities of men in speciall a] consequences from passions of men, ethiques b] consequences from speech, i) in magnifying, vilifying, etc. poetry ii) in persuading, rhetorique iii) in reasoning, logique iv) in contracting, the science of just and unjust b. consequences from the accidents of politique bodies; which is called politiques, and civill philosophy 1. of consequences from the institution of common-wealths, to the rights, and duties of the body politique, or soveraign. 2. of consequences from the same, to the duty and right of the subjects. chapter x. of power, worth, dignity, honour and worthiness power the power of a man, (to take it universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent good. and is either originall, or instrumentall. naturall power, is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind: as extraordinary strength, forme, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. instrumentall are those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of god, which men call good luck. for the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast. the greatest of humane powers, is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, naturall, or civill, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction, or of divers factions leagued. therefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power: for they are strengths united. also riches joyned with liberality, is power; because it procureth friends, and servants: without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey. reputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adhaerance of those that need protection. so is reputation of love of a mans country, (called popularity,) for the same reason. also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many. good successe is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him. affability of men already in power, is encrease of power; because it gaineth love. reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others. nobility is power, not in all places, but onely in those common-wealths, where it has priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their power. eloquence is power; because it is seeming prudence. forme is power; because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers. the sciences, are small power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. for science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it. arts of publique use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war; because they conferre to defence, and victory, are power; and though the true mother of them, be science, namely the mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the light, by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed (the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother,) as his issue. worth the value, or worth of a man, is as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. an able conductor of souldiers, is of great price in time of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. a learned and uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war. and as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. for let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others. the manifestation of the value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called honouring, and dishonouring. to value a man at a high rate, is to honour him; at a low rate, is to dishonour him. but high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe. dignity the publique worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the common-wealth, is that which men commonly call dignity. and this value of him by the common-wealth, is understood, by offices of command, judicature, publike employment; or by names and titles, introduced for distinction of such value. to honour and dishonour to pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to honour; because a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde is, the more is the honour. to obey, is to honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. and consequently to disobey, is to dishonour. to give great gifts to a man, is to honour him; because 'tis buying of protection, and acknowledging of power. to give little gifts, is to dishonour; because it is but almes, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps. to be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. to neglect, is to dishonour. to give way, or place to another, in any commodity, is to honour; being a confession of greater power. to arrogate, is to dishonour. to shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to honour; for both to love, and to feare, is to value. to contemne, or lesse to love or feare then he expects, is to dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing. to praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to honour; because nothing but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. to revile, mock, or pitty, is to dishonour. to speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to honour him; as signes of fear to offend. to speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonour. to believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. to distrust, or not believe, is to dishonour. to hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. to sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to dishonour. to do those things to another, which he takes for signes of honour, or which the law or custome makes so, is to honour; because in approving the honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. to refuse to do them, is to dishonour. to agree with in opinion, is to honour; as being a signe of approving his judgement, and wisdome. to dissent, is dishonour; and an upbraiding of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly. to imitate, is to honour; for it is vehemently to approve. to imitate ones enemy, is to dishonour. to honour those another honours, is to honour him; as a signe of approbation of his judgement. to honour his enemies, is to dishonour him. to employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to honour; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. to deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to dishonour. all these wayes of honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as without common-wealths. but in common-wealths, where he, or they that have the supreme authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of honour, there be other honours. a soveraigne doth honour a subject, with whatsoever title, or office, or employment, or action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his will to honour him. the king of persia, honoured mordecay, when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the kings garment, upon one of the kings horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince before him, proclayming, "thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour." and yet another king of persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service, to weare one of the kings robes, gave him leave so to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it as the kings foole; and then it was dishonour. so that of civill honour; such as are magistracy, offices, titles; and in some places coats, and scutchions painted: and men honour such as have them, as having so many signes of favour in the common-wealth; which favour is power. honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of power. and therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many, is honourable; as arguments of power. to be honoured of few or none, dishonourable. good fortune (if lasting,) honourable; as a signe of the favour of god. ill fortune, and losses, dishonourable. riches, are honourable; for they are power. poverty, dishonourable. magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of power. pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are dishonourable. timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. and irresolution, dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: for when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is pusillanimity. all actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much experience, science, discretion, or wit, are honourable; for all these are powers. actions, or words that proceed from errour, ignorance, or folly, dishonourable. gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else, is honourable; because employment is a signe of power. but if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonourable. for the gravity of the former, is like the steddinesse of a ship laden with merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a ship ballasted with sand, and other trash. to be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good, is honourable; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. on the contrary, obscurity, is dishonourable. to be descended from conspicuous parents, is honourable; because they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their ancestors. on the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage, is dishonourable. actions proceeding from equity, joyned with losse, are honourable; as signes of magnanimity: for magnanimity is a signe of power. on the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity, is dishonourable. nor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for honour consisteth onely in the opinion of power. therefore the ancient heathen did not thinke they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the gods, when they introduced them in their poems, committing rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: in so much as nothing is so much celebrated in jupiter, as his adulteries; nor in mercury, as his frauds, and thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne of homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the cattell of appollo, from his herdsmen. also amongst men, till there were constituted great common-wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a pyrate, or a high-way theefe; but rather a lawfull trade, not onely amongst the greeks, but also amongst all other nations; as is manifest by the histories of antient time. and at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are, and alwayes will be honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for them that make the challenge. for duels also are many times effects of courage; and the ground of courage is alwayes strength or skill, which are power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of dishonour, in one, or both the combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the lists to avoyd disgrace. scutchions, and coats of armes haereditary, where they have any eminent priviledges, are honourable; otherwise not: for their power consisteth either in such priviledges, or in riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. this kind of honour, commonly called gentry, has been derived from the antient germans. for there never was any such thing known, where the german customes were unknown. nor is it now any where in use, where the germans have not inhabited. the antient greek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with such devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted buckler was a signe of poverty, and of a common souldier: but they transmitted not the inheritance of them. the romans transmitted the marks of their families: but they were the images, not the devises of their ancestors. amongst the people of asia, afrique, and america, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. the germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived into england, france, spain, and italy, when in great numbers they either ayded the romans, or made their own conquests in these westerne parts of the world. for germany, being antiently, as all other countries, in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little lords, or masters of families, that continually had wars one with another; those masters, or lords, principally to the end they might, when they were covered with arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their armor, or their scutchion, or coat, with the picture of some beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets. and his ornament both of the armes, and crest, descended by inheritance to their children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the old master, that is to say in dutch, the here-alt thought fit. but when many such families, joyned together, made a greater monarchy, this duty of the herealt, to distinguish scutchions, was made a private office a part. and the issue of these lords, is the great and antient gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisadoes, and other notes of war; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military. afterwards, not onely kings, but popular common-wealths, gave divers manners of scutchions, to such as went forth to the war, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. all which, by an observing reader, may be found in such ancient histories, greek and latine, as make mention of the german nation, and manners, in their times. titles of honour titles of honour, such as are duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the soveraigne power of the common-wealth: which titles, were in old time titles of office, and command, derived some from the romans, some from the germans, and french. dukes, in latine duces, being generalls in war: counts, comites, such as bare the generall company out of friendship; and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: marquises, marchiones, were counts that governed the marches, or bounds of the empire. which titles of duke, count, and marquis, came into the empire, about the time of constantine the great, from the customes of the german militia. but baron, seems to have been a title of the gaules, and signifies a great man; such as were the kings, or princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from vir, to ber, and bar, that signified the same in the language of the gaules, that vir in latine; and thence to bero, and baro: so that such men were called berones, and after barones; and (in spanish) varones. but he that would know more particularly the originall of titles of honour, may find it, as i have done this, in mr. seldens most excellent treatise of that subject. in processe of time these offices of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable government, were turned into meer titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the common-wealth: and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other titles also, were devised to the same end. worthinesse fitnesse worthinesse, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named fitnesse, or aptitude. for he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and worthiest of riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. for merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: of which i shall say more hereafter, when i shall speak of contracts. chapter xi. of the difference of manners what is here meant by manners by manners, i mean not here, decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the small morals; but those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in peace, and unity. to which end we are to consider, that the felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. for there is no such finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor summum bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the books of the old morall philosophers. nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than he, whose senses and imaginations are at a stand. felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. the cause whereof is, that the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. and therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired. a restlesse desire of power, in all men so that in the first place, i put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of power after power, that ceaseth onely in death. and the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. and from hence it is, that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it a home by lawes, or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind. love of contention from competition competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, enclineth to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other. particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of antiquity. for men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other. civil obedience from love of ease desire of ease, and sensuall delight, disposeth men to obey a common power: because by such desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own industry, and labour. from feare of death or wounds fear of death, and wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. on the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle. and from love of arts desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, enclineth men to obey a common power: for such desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection from some other power than their own. love of vertue, from love of praise desire of praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we contemn also the praises. desire of fame after death does the same. and though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell: yet is not such fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination. hate, from difficulty of requiting great benefits to have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfiet love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never see him more. for benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome; which is to ones equall, hateful. but to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it. and from conscience of deserving to be hated to have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. for he must expect revenge, or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull. promptnesse to hurt, from fear feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty. and from distrust of their own wit men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. for these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first. and in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of wit. vain undertaking from vain-glory vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered. vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient. ambition, from opinion of sufficiency men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government, are disposed to ambition. because without publique employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. and therefore eloquent speakers are enclined to ambition; for eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others irresolution, from too great valuing of small matters pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. for after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of motives, the one way and the other, are not great: therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity. frugality,(though in poor men a vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: for it weakeneth their endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by reward. confidence in others from ignorance of the marks of wisdome and kindnesse eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming wisdome, the later seeming kindnesse. adde to them military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. the two former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others. and from the ignorance of naturall causes want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. for all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them. and from want of understanding ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: for neither error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected. from the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: as they that approve a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that mislike it, haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler. from the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the senators of rome in killing catiline, and the many actions of a number of senators in killing caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one. adhaerence to custome, from ignorance of the nature of right and wrong ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposeth a man to make custome and example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that unjust which it hath been the custome to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an example, or (as the lawyers which onely use the false measure of justice barbarously call it) a precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their parents, and masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: which is the cause, that the doctrine of right and wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword: whereas the doctrine of lines, and figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. for i doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equall to two angles of a square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able. adhaerence to private men, from ignorance of the causes of peace ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate, and instrumentall: for these are all the causes they perceive. and hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the publique, discharge their anger upon the publicans, that is to say, farmers, collectors, and other officers of the publique revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the supreme authority, for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon. credulity from ignorance of nature ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the impossibility. and credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that ignorance it selfe without malice, is able to make a man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them. curiosity to know, from care of future time anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage. naturall religion, from the same curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call god. so that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one god eternall; though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. for as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men call fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call god; and yet not have an idea, or image of him in his mind. and they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their gods. by which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. and this feare of things invisible, is the naturall seed of that, which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that worship, or feare that power otherwise than they do, superstition. and this seed of religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers. chapter xii. of religion religion, in man onely seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of religion, but in man onely; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of religion, is also onely in man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other living creatures. first, from his desire of knowing causes and first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune. from the consideration of the beginning of things secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later. from his observation of the sequell of things thirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see; man observeth how one event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe. the naturall cause of religion, the anxiety of the time to come the two first, make anxiety. for being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; so that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of prometheus. for as prometheus, (which interpreted, is, the prudent man,) was bound to the hill caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: so that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep. which makes them fear the power of invisible things this perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. and therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some power, or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old poets said, that the gods were at first created by humane feare: which spoken of the gods, (that is to say, of the many gods of the gentiles) is very true. but the acknowledging of one god eternall, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in time to come. for he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers confessed) one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of god: and all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods, as there be men that feigne them. and suppose them incorporeall and for the matter, or substance of the invisible agents, so fancyed; they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but that it was the same with that of the soule of man; and that the soule of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be reall, and externall substances; and therefore call them ghosts; as the latines called them imagines, and umbrae; and thought them spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those invisible agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. but the opinion that such spirits were incorporeall, or immateriall, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit, and incorporeall; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: and therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternall god, choose rather to confesse he is incomprehensible, and above their understanding; than to define his nature by spirit incorporeall, and then confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with intention to make the divine nature understood; but piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of bodies visible. but know not the way how they effect anything then, for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event, any dependance or connexion at all: and therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: as the athenians did for their war at lepanto, demand another phormio; the pompeian faction for their warre in afrique, another scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. in like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of god be amongst them; as charming, and conjuring (the leiturgy of witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing. but honour them as they honour men thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of body, considerate addresses, sober behaviour, premeditated words, swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves. and attribute to them all extraordinary events lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things, after one or two encounters, for prognostiques of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion. foure things, naturall seeds of religion and in these foure things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casuall for prognostiques, consisteth the naturall seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgements, and passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another. made different by culture for these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. one sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. the other, have done it, by gods commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to obedience, lawes, peace, charity, and civill society. so that the religion of the former sort, is a part of humane politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects. and the religion of the later sort is divine politiques; and containeth precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the kingdome of god. of the former sort, were all the founders of common-wealths, and the law-givers of the gentiles: of the later sort, were abraham, moses, and our blessed saviour; by whom have been derived unto us the lawes of the kingdome of god. the absurd opinion of gentilisme and for that part of religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the gentiles, in one place or another, a god, or divell; or by their poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other. the unformed matter of the world, was a god, by the name of chaos. the heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds, were so many gods. men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dogge, a snake, an onion, a leeke, deified. besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called daemons; the plains, with pan, and panises, or satyres; the woods, with fawnes, and nymphs; the sea, with tritons, and other nymphs; every river, and fountayn, with a ghost of his name, and with nymphs; every house, with it lares, or familiars; every man, with his genius; hell, with ghosts, and spirituall officers, as charon, cerberus, and the furies; and in the night time, all places with larvae, lemures, ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of fayries, and bugbears. they have also ascribed divinity, and built temples to meer accidents, and qualities; such as are time, night, day, peace, concord, love, contention, vertue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that good, or evill, for, or against which they prayed. they invoked also their own wit, by the name of muses; their own ignorance, by the name of fortune; their own lust, by the name of cupid; their own rage, by the name furies; their own privy members by the name of priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to incubi, and succubae: insomuch as there was nothing, which a poet could introduce as a person in his poem, which they did not make either a god, or a divel. the same authors of the religion of the gentiles, observing the second ground for religion, which is mens ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall gods; ascribing the cause of foecundity, to venus; the cause of arts, to apollo; of subtilty and craft, to mercury; of tempests and stormes, to aeolus; and of other effects, to other gods: insomuch as there was amongst the heathen almost as great variety of gods, as of businesse. and to the worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards their gods, namely oblations, prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same legislators of the gentiles have added their images, both in picture, and sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them: and endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their idols; as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely the shapes, some of men, some of beasts, some of monsters; but also the faculties, and passions of men and beasts; as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill gods, and but inmates of heaven, as bacchus, hercules, and others;) besides, anger, revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of power, or a cause of pleasure; and all such vices, as amongst men are taken to be against law, rather than against honour. lastly, to the prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but conjectures upon the experience of time past; and supernaturall, divine revelation; the same authors of the religion of the gentiles, partly upon pretended experience, partly upon pretended revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of divination; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the priests at delphi, delos, ammon, and other famous oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous cavernes: sometimes in the leaves of the sibills; of whose prophecyes (like those perhaps of nostradamus; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the roman republique: sometimes in the insignificant speeches of mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine spirit; which possession they called enthusiasme; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted theomancy, or prophecy; sometimes in the aspect of the starres at their nativity; which was called horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology: sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called thumomancy, or presage: sometimes in the prediction of witches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: sometimes in the casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called augury: sometimes in the entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was aruspicina: sometimes in dreams: sometimes in croaking of ravens, or chattering of birds: sometimes in the lineaments of the face; which was called metoposcopy; or by palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words, called omina: sometimes in monsters, or unusuall accidents; as ecclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the like, which they called portenta and ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshew some great calamity to come; sometimes, in meer lottery, as crosse and pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of verses in homer, and virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. so easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance. the designes of the authors of the religion of the heathen and therefore the first founders, and legislators of common-wealths amongst the gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; first, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god, or other spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls, that their lawes might the more easily be received: so numa pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted amongst the romans, from the nymph egeria: and the first king and founder of the kingdome of peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the sunne: and mahomet, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conferences with the holy ghost, in forme of a dove. secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by the lawes. thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of the gods might be appeased; and that ill success in war, great contagions of sicknesse, earthquakes, and each mans private misery, came from the anger of the gods; and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. and though amongst the antient romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary. and by these, and such other institutions, they obtayned in order to their end, (which was the peace of the commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their governors. and being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of festivalls, and publike gomes, made in honour of the gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the state. and therefore the romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no scruple of tollerating any religion whatsoever in the city of rome it selfe; unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their civill government; nor do we read, that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the jewes; who (being the peculiar kingdome of god) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall king or state whatsoever. and thus you see how the religion of the gentiles was a part of their policy. the true religion, and the lawes of gods kingdome the same but where god himselfe, by supernaturall revelation, planted religion; there he also made to himselfe a peculiar kingdome; and gave lawes, not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby in the kingdome of god, the policy, and lawes civill, are a part of religion; and therefore the distinction of temporall, and spirituall domination, hath there no place. it is true, that god is king of all the earth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. for there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command of the whole army, should have withall a peculiar regiment, or company of his own. god is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen people, he is king by covenant. but to speake more largly of the kingdome of god, both by nature, and covenant, i have in the following discourse assigned an other place. the causes of change in religion from the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation. for seeing all formed religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom god himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; it followeth necessarily, when they that have the goverment of religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of divine revelation; that the religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the civill sword) contradicted and rejected. injoyning beleefe of impossibilities that which taketh away the reputation of wisedome, in him that formeth a religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beliefe of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects the author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against naturall reason. doing contrary to the religion they establish that which taketh away the reputation of sincerity, is the doing, or saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way of religion: as injustice, cruelty, prophanesse, avarice, and luxury. for who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such invisible power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall, for lesser faults? that which taketh away the reputation of love, is the being detected of private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. for that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others want of the testimony of miracles lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling, can be no other, than the operation of miracles; or true prophecy, (which also is a miracle;) or extraordinary felicity. and therefore, to those points of religion, which have been received from them that did such miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their calling by some miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what the custome, and lawes of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. for as in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes, and arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, (which are miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts. all which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in the examples following. first, we have the example of the children of israel; who when moses, that had approved his calling to them by miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of egypt, was absent but 40 dayes, revolted from the worship of the true god, recommended to them by him; and setting up (exod.32 1,2) a golden calfe for their god, relapsed into the idolatry of the egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered. and again, after moses, aaron, joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of god in israel, (judges 2 11) were dead; another generation arose, and served baal. so that miracles fayling, faith also failed. again, when the sons of samuel, (1 sam.8.3) being constituted by their father judges in bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of israel refused any more to have god to be their king, in other manner than he was king of other people; and therefore cryed out to samuel, to choose them a king after the manner of the nations. so that justice fayling, faith also fayled: insomuch, as they deposed their god, from reigning over them. and whereas in the planting of christian religion, the oracles ceased in all parts of the roman empire, and the number of christians encreased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the apostles, and evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the priests of the gentiles of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between princes. also the religion of the church of rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in england, and many other parts of christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of vertue in the pastors, maketh faith faile in the people: and partly from bringing of the philosophy, and doctrine of aristotle into religion, by the schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the clergy into a reputation both of ignorance, and of fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own princes, as in france, and holland; or with their will, as in england. lastly, amongst the points by the church of rome declared necessary for salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the pope, and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other christian princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign authority, as easily as it has been excluded in england. for who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a king hath not his authority from christ, unlesse a bishop crown him? that a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry? that whether a prince be born in lawfull marriage, or not, must be judged by authority from rome? that subjects may be freed from their alleageance, if by the court of rome, the king be judged an heretique? that a king (as chilperique of france) may be deposed by a pope (as pope zachary,) for no cause; and his kingdome given to one of his subjects? that the clergy, and regulars, in what country soever, shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of their king, in cases criminall? or who does not see, to whose profit redound the fees of private masses, and vales of purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most lively faith, if (as i sayd) the civill magistrate, and custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdome, or probity of their teachers? so that i may attribute all the changes of religion in the world, to one and the some cause; and that is, unpleasing priests; and those not onely amongst catholiques, but even in that church that hath presumed most of reformation. chapter xiii. of the naturall condition of mankind, as concerning their felicity, and misery nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. for as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe. and as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) i find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. for prudence, is but experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. that which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. for such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: for they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. but this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. for there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share. from equality proceeds diffidence from this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. and therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. and from hence it comes to passe, that where an invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. and the invader again is in the like danger of another. from diffidence warre and from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. and by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him. againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. for every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: and upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example. so that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. the first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. the first use violence, to make themselves masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflexion in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. out of civil states, there is alwayes warre of every one against every one hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. for warre, consisteth not in battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of warre; as it is in the nature of weather. for as the nature of foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. all other time is peace. the incommodites of such a war whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of warre, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. in such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. it may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee lawes, and publike officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as i do by my words? but neither of us accuse mans nature in it. the desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. no more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it. it may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and i believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. for the savage people in many places of america, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as i said before. howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to feare; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill warre. but though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of soveraigne authority, because of their independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdomes; and continuall spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war. but because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men. in such a warre, nothing is unjust to this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. force, and fraud, are in warre the two cardinall vertues. justice, and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. if they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. they are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. it is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. and thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason. the passions that incline men to peace the passions that encline men to peace, are feare of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. and reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. these articles, are they, which otherwise are called the lawes of nature: whereof i shall speak more particularly, in the two following chapters. chapter xiv. of the first and second naturall lawes, and of contracts right of nature what the right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgement, and reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. liberty what by liberty, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall impediments: which impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him. a law of nature what a law of nature, (lex naturalis,) is a precept, or generall rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. for though they that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because right, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; whereas law, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. naturally every man has right to everything and because the condition of man, (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one anothers body. and therefore, as long as this naturall right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. the fundamental law of nature and consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of reason, "that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of warre." the first branch, of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamentall law of nature; which is, "to seek peace, and follow it." the second, the summe of the right of nature; which is, "by all means we can, to defend our selves." the second law of nature from this fundamentall law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe." for as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of warre. but if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: for that were to expose himselfe to prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to peace. this is that law of the gospell; "whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them." and that law of all men, "quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri ne feceris." what it is to lay down a right to lay downe a mans right to any thing, is to devest himselfe of the liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own right to the same. for he that renounceth, or passeth away his right, giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own originall right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. so that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right originall. renouncing (or) transferring right what; obligation duty justice right is layd aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by transferring it to another. by simply renouncing; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. by transferring; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. and when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it his duty, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is injustice, and injury, as being sine jure; the right being before renounced, or transferred. so that injury, or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of scholers is called absurdity. for as it is there called an absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the beginning: so in the world, it is called injustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. the way by which a man either simply renounceth, or transferreth his right, is a declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so renounce, or transferre; or hath so renounced, or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. and these signes are either words onely, or actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often) both words and actions. and the same are the bonds, by which men are bound, and obliged: bonds, that have their strength, not from their own nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture. not all rights are alienable whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. for it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himselfe. and therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. as first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any good to himselfe. the same may be sayd of wounds, and chayns, and imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. and lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring or right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. and therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the end, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted. contract what the mutuall transferring of right, is that which men call contract. there is difference, between transferring of right to the thing; and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the thing it selfe. for the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right; as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after. covenant what again, one of the contractors, may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the contract on his part, is called pact, or covenant: or both parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) violation of faith. free-gift when the transferring of right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; this is not contract, but gift, freegift, grace: which words signifie one and the same thing. signes of contract expresse signes of contract, are either expresse, or by inference. expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie; and such words are either of the time present, or past; as, i give, i grant, i have given, i have granted, i will that this be yours: or of the future; as, i will give, i will grant; which words of the future, are called promise. signes of contract by inference signes by inference, are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes the consequence of silence; sometimes the consequence of actions; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a signe by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor. free gift passeth by words of the present or past words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient signe of a free-gift and therefore not obligatory. for if they be of the time to come, as, to morrow i will give, they are a signe i have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till i transferre it by some other act. but if the words be of the time present, or past, as, "i have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow," then is my to morrows right given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. and there is a great difference in the signification of these words, volos hoc tuum esse cras, and cros dabo; that is between "i will that this be thine to morrow," and, "i will give it to thee to morrow:" for the word i will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present; but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come: and therefore the former words, being of the present, transferre a future right; the later, that be of the future, transferre nothing. but if there be other signes of the will to transferre a right, besides words; then, though the gift be free, yet may the right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man propound a prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, the gift is free; and though the words be of the future, yet the right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them runne. signes of contract are words both of the past, present, and future in contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time present, or past; but also where they are of the future; because all contract is mutuall translation, or change of right; and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the right should passe: for unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. and for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent to a covenant; and therefore obligatory. merit what he that performeth first in the case of a contract, is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as due. also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a free gift; yet so to win, or so to catch, is to merit, and to have it as due. for the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the event of the contention. but there is between these two sorts of merit, this difference, that in contract, i merit by vertue of my own power, and the contractors need; but in this case of free gift, i am enabled to merit onely by the benignity of the giver; in contract, i merit at the contractors hand that hee should depart with his right; in this case of gift, i merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers. and this i think to be the meaning of that distinction of the schooles, between meritum congrui, and meritum condigni. for god almighty, having promised paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through this world according to the precepts, and limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall merit paradise ex congruo. but because no man can demand a right to it, by his own righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the free grace of god onely; they say, no man can merit paradise ex condigno. this i say, i think is the meaning of that distinction; but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of art, longer than it serves their turn; i will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this i say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claime the prize as due. covenants of mutuall trust, when invalid if a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer nature, (which is a condition of warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is voyd; but if there be a common power set over them bothe, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not voyd. for he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the feare of some coerceive power; which in the condition of meer nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. and therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living. but in a civill estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do. the cause of feare, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be alwayes something arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other signe of the will not to performe; else it cannot make the covenant voyd. for that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing. right to the end, containeth right to the means he that transferreth any right, transferreth the means of enjoying it, as farre as lyeth in his power. as he that selleth land, is understood to transferre the herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it. and they that give to a man the right of government in soveraignty, are understood to give him the right of levying mony to maintain souldiers; and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice. no covenant with beasts to make covenant with bruit beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right; nor can translate any right to another; and without mutuall acceptation, there is no covenant. nor with god without speciall revelation to make covenant with god, is impossible, but by mediation of such as god speaketh to, either by revelation supernaturall, or by his lieutenants that govern under him, and in his name; for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted, or not. and therefore they that vow any thing contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. and if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them. no covenant, but of possible and future the matter, or subject of a covenant, is alwayes something that falleth under deliberation; (for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes understood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth, to performe. and therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no covenant. but if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to more no man can be obliged. covenants how made voyd men are freed of their covenants two wayes; by performing; or by being forgiven. for performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that right, in which the obligation consisted. covenants extorted by feare are valide covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer nature, are obligatory. for example, if i covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my life, to an enemy; i am bound by it. for it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it; and consequently, where no other law (as in the condition, of meer nature) forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid. therefore prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of their ransome, are obliged to pay it; and if a weaker prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war. and even in common-wealths, if i be forced to redeem my selfe from a theefe by promising him mony, i am bound to pay it, till the civill law discharge me. for whatsoever i may lawfully do without obligation, the same i may lawfully covenant to do through feare: and what i lawfully covenant, i cannot lawfully break. the former covenant to one, makes voyd the later to another a former covenant, makes voyd a later. for a man that hath passed away his right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null. a mans covenant not to defend himselfe, is voyd a covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd. for (as i have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his right to save himselfe from death, wounds, and imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof is the onely end of laying down any right,) and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. for though a man may covenant thus, "unlesse i do so, or so, kill me;" he cannot covenant thus "unless i do so, or so, i will not resist you, when you come to kill me." for man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. and this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law, by which they are condemned. no man obliged to accuse himselfe a covenant to accuse ones selfe, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalide. for in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation: and in the civill state, the accusation is followed with punishment; which being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. the same is also true, of the accusation of those, by whose condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a father, wife, or benefactor. for the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by nature; and therefore not to be received: and where a mans testimony is not to be credited, his not bound to give it. also accusations upon torture, are not to be reputed as testimonies. for torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth; and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured; not to the informing of the torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own life. the end of an oath; the forme of as oath the force of words, being (as i have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants; there are in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. and those are either a feare of the consequence of breaking their word; or a glory, or pride in appearing not to need to breake it. this later is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensuall pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind. the passion to be reckoned upon, is fear; whereof there be two very generall objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend. of these two, though the former be the greater power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater feare. the feare of the former is in every man, his own religion: which hath place in the nature of man before civill society. the later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer nature, the inequality of power is not discerned, but by the event of battell. so that before the time of civill society, or in the interruption thereof by warre, there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of that invisible power, which they every one worship as god; and feare as a revenger of their perfidy. all therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civill power, is to put one another to swear by the god he feareth: which swearing or oath, is a forme of speech, added to a promise; by which he that promiseth, signifieth, that unlesse he performe, he renounceth the mercy of his god, or calleth to him for vengeance on himselfe. such was the heathen forme, "let jupiter kill me else, as i kill this beast." so is our forme, "i shall do thus, and thus, so help me god." and this, with the rites and ceremonies, which every one useth in his own religion, that the feare of breaking faith might be the greater. no oath, but by god by this it appears, that an oath taken according to any other forme, or rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no oath: and there is no swearing by any thing which the swearer thinks not god. for though men have sometimes used to swear by their kings, for feare, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them divine honour. and that swearing unnecessarily by god, is but prophaning of his name: and swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not swearing, but an impious custome, gotten by too much vehemence of talking. an oath addes nothing to the obligation it appears also, that the oath addes nothing to the obligation. for a covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of god, without the oath, as much as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an oath. chapter xv. of other lawes of nature the third law of nature, justice from that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, that men performe their covenants made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of warre. justice and injustice what and in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and originall of justice. for where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. but when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of injustice, is no other than the not performance of covenant. and whatsoever is not unjust, is just. justice and propriety begin with the constitution of common-wealth but because covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former chapter,) are invalid; though the originall of justice be the making of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of warre, cannot be done. therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compell men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutuall contract men acquire, in recompence of the universall right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a common-wealth. and this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the schooles: for they say, that "justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own." and therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injustice; and where there is no coerceive power erected, that is, where there is no common-wealth, there is no propriety; all men having right to all things: therefore where there is no common-wealth, there nothing is unjust. so that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civill power, sufficient to compell men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins. justice not contrary to reason the foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. he does not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice: but he questioneth, whether injustice, taking away the feare of god, (for the same foole hath said in his heart there is no god,) may not sometimes stand with that reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. the kingdome of god is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against reason, it is not against justice; or else justice is not to be approved for good. from such reasoning as this, succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the name of vertue; and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a kingdome. and the heathen that believed, that saturn was deposed by his son jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same jupiter to be the avenger of injustice: somewhat like to a piece of law in cokes commentaries on litleton; where he sayes, if the right heire of the crown be attainted of treason; yet the crown shall descend to him, and eo instante the atteynder be voyd; from which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the heire apparent of a kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be against reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. this specious reasoning is nevertheless false. for the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of performance on either side; as when there is no civill power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no covenants: but either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. and i say it is not against reason. for the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; first, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. secondly, that in a condition of warre, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single power. he therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and therefore if he be left, or cast out of society, he perisheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves. as for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant. and for the other instance of attaining soveraignty by rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. justice therefore, that is to say, keeping of covenant, is a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a law of nature. there be some that proceed further; and will not have the law of nature, to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the breach of covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the soveraigne power constituted over them by their own consent.) but because there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason, or nature. covenants not discharged by the vice of the person to whom made others, that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of faith, do neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as heretiques, and such as use not to performe their covenant to others: and this also is against reason. for if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it. justice of men, and justice of actions what the names of just, and unjust, when they are attributed to men, signifie one thing; and when they are attributed to actions, another. when they are attributed to men, they signifie conformity, or inconformity of manners, to reason. but when they are attributed to actions, they signifie the conformity, or inconformity to reason, not of manners, or manner of life, but of particular actions. a just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his actions may be all just: and an unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. and such men are more often in our language stiled by the names of righteous, and unrighteous; then just, and unjust; though the meaning be the same. therefore a righteous man, does not lose that title, by one, or a few unjust actions, that proceed from sudden passion, or mistake of things, or persons: nor does an unrighteous man, lose his character, for such actions, as he does, of forbeares to do, for feare: because his will is not framed by the justice, but by the apparant benefit of what he is to do. that which gives to humane actions the relish of justice, is a certain noblenesse or gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. this justice of the manners, is that which is meant, where justice is called a vertue; and injustice a vice. but the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but guiltlesse; and the injustice of the same, (which is also called injury,) gives them but the name of guilty. justice of manners, and justice of actions again, the injustice of manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do injurie; and is injustice before it proceed to act; and without supposing any individuall person injured. but the injustice of an action, (that is to say injury,) supposeth an individuall person injured; namely him, to whom the covenant was made: and therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another. as when the master commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation; and therefore could not injure him. and so also in common-wealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the detaining of debt, is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence, are injuries to the person of the common-wealth. nothing done to a man, by his own consent can be injury whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. for if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please, by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done him. and if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a release of that covenant; and so again there is no injury done him. justice commutative, and distributive justice of actions, is by writers divided into commutative, and distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmeticall; the later in proportion geometricall. commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; and distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. as if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. the value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. and merit (besides that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative, not distributive,) is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace onely. and therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. to speak properly, commutative justice, is the justice of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant, in buying, and selling; hiring, and letting to hire; lending, and borrowing; exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract. and distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is just. wherein, (being trusted by them that make him arbitrator,) if he performe his trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and his is indeed just distribution, and may be called (though improperly) distributive justice; but more properly equity; which also is a law of nature, as shall be shewn in due place. the fourth law of nature, gratitude as justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free-gift: and is the fourth law of nature; which may be conceived in this forme, "that a man which receiveth benefit from another of meer grace, endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will." for no man giveth, but with intention of good to himselfe; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war; which is contrary to the first and fundamentall law of nature, which commandeth men to seek peace. the breach of this law, is called ingratitude; and hath the same relation to grace, that injustice hath to obligation by covenant. the fifth, mutuall accommodation, or compleasance a fifth law of nature, is compleasance; that is to say, "that every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest." for the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to society; a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an aedifice. for as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of nature, will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of society, as combersome thereunto. for seeing every man, not onely by right, but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; he that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall law of nature, which commandeth to seek peace. the observers of this law, may be called sociable, (the latines call them commodi;) the contrary, stubborn, insociable, froward, intractable. the sixth, facility to pardon a sixth law of nature is this, "that upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it." for pardon, is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but feare; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is signe of an aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature. the seventh, that in revenges, men respect onely the future good a seventh is, " that in revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow." whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. for this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. besides, revenge without respect to the example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the end is alwayes somewhat to come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of warre; which is against the law of nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of cruelty. the eighth, against contumely and because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a law of nature set down this precept, "that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred, or contempt of another." the breach of which law, is commonly called contumely. the ninth, against pride the question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. the inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the lawes civill. i know that aristotle in the first booke of his politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his philosophy;) others to serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he;) as if master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit; which is not only against reason; but also against experience. for there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory. if nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. and therefore for the ninth law of nature, i put this, "that every man acknowledge other for his equall by nature." the breach of this precept is pride. the tenth against arrogance on this law, dependeth another, "that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest." as it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine rights of nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. if in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of nature. the observers of this law, are those we call modest, and the breakers arrogant men. the greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share. the eleventh equity also "if a man be trusted to judge between man and man," it is a precept of the law of nature, "that he deale equally between them." for without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by warre. he therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the use of judges, and arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamentall lawe of nature) is the cause of warre. the observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called equity, and (as i have sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, acception of persons, prosopolepsia. the twelfth, equall use of things common and from this followeth another law, "that such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right." for otherwise the distribution is unequall, and contrary to equitie. the thirteenth, of lot but some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common. then, the law of nature, which prescribeth equity, requireth, "that the entire right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the first possession, be determined by lot." for equall distribution, is of the law of nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined. the fourteenth, of primogeniture, and first seising of lots there be two sorts, arbitrary, and naturall. arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the competitors; naturall, is either primogeniture, (which the greek calls kleronomia, which signifies, given by lot;) or first seisure. and therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the first possessor; and is some cases to the first-borne, as acquired by lot. the fifteenth, of mediators it is also a law of nature, "that all men that mediate peace, be allowed safe conduct." for the law that commandeth peace, as the end, commandeth intercession, as the means; and to intercession the means is safe conduct. the sixteenth, of submission to arbitrement and because, though men be never so willing to observe these lawes, there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; first, whether it were done, or not done; secondly (if done) whether against the law, or not against the law; the former whereof, is called a question of fact; the later a question of right; therefore unlesse the parties to the question, covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from peace as ever. this other, to whose sentence they submit, is called an arbitrator. and therefore it is of the law of nature, "that they that are at controversie, submit their right to the judgement of an arbitrator." the seventeenth, no man is his own judge and seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the cause of war, remains, against the law of nature. the eighteenth, no man to be judge, that has in him cause of partiality for the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. and thus also the controversie, and the condition of war remaineth, contrary to the law of nature. the nineteenth, of witnesse and in a controversie of fact, the judge being to give no more credit to one, than to the other, (if there be no other arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: for else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the law of nature. these are the lawes of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of civill society. there be other things tending to the destruction of particular men; as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the law of nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place. a rule, by which the laws of nature may easily be examined and though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the lawes of nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, "do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;" which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the lawes of nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these lawes of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable. the lawes of nature oblige in conscience alwayes, but in effect then onely when there is security the lawes of nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes. for he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all lawes of nature, which tend to natures preservation. and again, he that shall observe the same lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not peace, but war; & consequently the destruction of his nature by violence. and whatsoever lawes bind in foro interno, may be broken, not onely by a fact contrary to the law but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. for though his action in this case, be according to the law; which where the obligation is in foro interno, is a breach. the laws of nature are eternal; the lawes of nature are immutable and eternall, for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. for it can never be that warre shall preserve life, and peace destroy it. and yet easie the same lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, i mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. for in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just. the science of these lawes, is the true morall philosophy and the science of them, is the true and onely moral philosophy. for morall philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good, and evill, in the conversation, and society of mankind. good, and evill, are names that signifie our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men, differ not onely in their judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. and therefore so long as man is in the condition of meer nature, (which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good, and evill: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace, which (as i have shewed before) are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, & the rest of the laws of nature, are good; that is to say, morall vertues; and their contrarie vices, evill. now the science of vertue and vice, is morall philosophie; and therfore the true doctrine of the lawes of nature, is the true morall philosophie. but the writers of morall philosophie, though they acknowledge the same vertues and vices; yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude; or not the cause, but the quantity of a gift, made liberality. these dictates of reason, men use to call by the name of lawes; but improperly: for they are but conclusions, or theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. but yet if we consider the same theoremes, as delivered in the word of god, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called lawes. chapter xvi. of persons, authors, and things personated a person what a person, is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction." person naturall, and artificiall when they are considered as his owne, then is he called a naturall person: and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a feigned or artificiall person. the word person, whence the word person is latine: instead whereof the greeks have prosopon, which signifies the face, as persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage; and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a mask or visard: and from the stage, hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunalls, as theaters. so that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate, is to act, or represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his person, or act in his name; (in which sence cicero useth it where he saies, "unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, & judicis, i beare three persons; my own, my adversaries, and the judges;") and is called in diverse occasions, diversly; as a representer, or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like. actor, author; authority of persons artificiall, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. and then the person is the actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the author: in which case the actor acteth by authority. for that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an owner, and in latine dominus, in greeke kurios; speaking of actions, is called author. and as the right of possession, is called dominion; so the right of doing any action, is called authority. so that by authority, is alwayes understood a right of doing any act: and done by authority, done by commission, or licence from him whose right it is. covenants by authority, bind the author from hence it followeth, that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. and therfore all that hath been said formerly, (chap. 14) of the nature of covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their commission, but no farther. and therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. for no man is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave. but not the actor when the actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature: for though the action be against the law of nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do it, is against the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of covenant. the authority is to be shewne and he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid, without his counter-assurance. but if he that so covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actors word; then is the covenant valid; because the actor in this case maketh himselfe the author. and therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor onely; there being no author but himselfe. things personated, inanimate there are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by fiction. inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. but things inanimate, cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors: yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are owners, or governours of those things. and therefore, such things cannot be personated, before there be some state of civill government. irrational likewise children, fooles, and mad-men that have no use of reason, may be personated by guardians, or curators; but can be no authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. yet during the folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give authority to the guardian. but this again has no place but in a state civill, because before such estate, there is no dominion of persons. false gods an idol, or meer figment of the brain, my be personated; as were the gods of the heathen; which by such officers as the state appointed, were personated, and held possessions, and other goods, and rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. but idols cannot be authors: for a idol is nothing. the authority proceeded from the state: and therefore before introduction of civill government, the gods of the heathen could not be personated. the true god the true god may be personated. as he was; first, by moses; who governed the israelites, (that were not his, but gods people,) not in his own name, with hoc dicit moses; but in gods name, with hoc dicit dominus. secondly, by the son of man, his own son our blessed saviour jesus christ, that came to reduce the jewes, and induce all nations into the kingdome of his father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his father. and thirdly, by the holy ghost, or comforter, speaking, and working in the apostles: which holy ghost, was a comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both. a multitude of men, how one person a multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. for it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. and it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person: and unity, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude. every one is author and because the multitude naturally is not one, but many; they cannot be understood for one; but many authors, of every thing their representative faith, or doth in their name; every man giving their common representer, authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they give him authority without stint: otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to act. an actor may be many men made one by plurality of voyces and if the representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. for if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the affirmative, and the greater in the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the representative hath. representatives, when the number is even, unprofitable and a representative of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of action. yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. for when a cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. the like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time; for when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing execution, is a decree of dilation. negative voyce or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;) whereof every one has by a negative voice, authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no representative; because by the diversity of opinions, and interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of a multitude, especially in time of warre. of authors there be two sorts. the first simply so called; which i have before defined to be him, that owneth the action of another simply. the second is he, that owneth an action, or covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. and these authors conditionall, are generally called suretyes, in latine fidejussores, and sponsores; and particularly for debt, praedes; and for appearance before a judge, or magistrate, vades. part ii. of common-wealth chapter xvii. of the causes, generation, and definition of a common-wealth the end of common-wealth, particular security the finall cause, end, or designe of men, (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of these lawes of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters. which is not to be had from the law of nature: for the lawes of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,) if themselves, without the terrour of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. and covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. therefore notwithstanding the lawes of nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. and in all places, where men have lived by small families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a trade, and so farre from being reputed against the law of nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other lawes therein, but the lawes of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. and as small familyes did then; so now do cities and kingdomes which are but greater families (for their own security) enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are rememdbred for it in after ages with honour. nor from the conjunction of a few men or familyes nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. the multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to move him to attempt. nor from a great multitude, unlesse directed by one judgement and be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. for being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. for if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other lawes of nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to be any civill government, or common-wealth at all; because there would be peace without subjection. and that continually nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one battell, or one warre. for though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a warre amongst themselves. why certain creatures without reason, or speech, do neverthelesse live in society, without any coercive power it is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by aristotle numbred amongst politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why man-kind cannot do the same. to which i answer, first, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally warre; but amongst these not so. secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not from the private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. but man, whose joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent. thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civill warre. fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is good, in the likenesse of evill; and evill, in the likenesse of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of good and evill; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure. fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene injury, and dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellowes: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdome, and controule the actions of them that governe the common-wealth. lastly, the agreement of these creatures is naturall; that of men, is by covenant only, which is artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit. the generation of a common-wealth the only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to beare their person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concerne the common peace and safetie; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements, to his judgment. this is more than consent, or concord; it is a reall unitie of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, "i authorise and give up my right of governing my selfe, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner." this done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a common-wealth, in latine civitas. this is the generation of that great leviathan, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that mortall god, to which wee owe under the immortall god, our peace and defence. for by this authoritie, given him by every particular man in the common-wealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. the definition of a common-wealth and in him consisteth the essence of the common-wealth; which (to define it,) is "one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutuall covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence." soveraigne, and subject, what and he that carryeth this person, as called soveraigne, and said to have soveraigne power; and every one besides, his subject. the attaining to this soveraigne power, is by two wayes. one, by naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. the other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. this later, may be called a politicall common-wealth, or common-wealth by institution; and the former, a common-wealth by acquisition. and first, i shall speak of a common-wealth by institution. chapter xviii. of the rights of soveraignes by institution the act of instituting a common-wealth, what a common-wealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, (that is to say, to be their representative;) every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorise all the actions and judgements, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men. the consequences to such institution, are i. the subjects cannot change the forme of government from this institution of a common-wealth are derived all the rights, and facultyes of him, or them, on whom the soveraigne power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled. first, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. and consequently they that have already instituted a common-wealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. and therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transferre their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or other assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is their soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the soveraignty to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. besides, if he that attempteth to depose his soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the institution, author of all his soveraign shall do: and because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. and whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their soveraign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with god; this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with god, but by mediation of some body that representeth gods person; which none doth but gods lieutenant, who hath the soveraignty under god. but this pretence of covenant with god, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition. 2. soveraigne power cannot be forfeited secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make soveraigne, by covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the soveraigne; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. that he which is made soveraigne maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a severall covenant with every man. with the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person: and if he make so many severall covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in particular. besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the covenant made by the soveraigne at his institution; and others, or one other of his subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to the sword again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the institution. it is therefore in vain to grant soveraignty by way of precedent covenant. the opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the publique sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that man, or assembly of men that hath the soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. but when an assembly of men is made soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such covenant to have past in the institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the people of rome, made a covenant with the romans, to hold the soveraignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the romans might lawfully depose the roman people. that men see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy, which they despair to enjoy. 3. no man can without injustice protest against the institution of the soveraigne declared by the major part. thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. for if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therfore unjustly. and whether he be of the congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever. 4. the soveraigns actions cannot be justly accused by the subject fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and judgements of the soveraigne instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. for he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a common-wealth, every particular man is author of all the soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. it is true that they that have soveraigne power, may commit iniquity; but not injustice, or injury in the proper signification. 5. what soever the soveraigne doth, is unpunishable by the subject fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. for seeing every subject is author of the actions of his soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe. 6. the soveraigne is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defence of his subjects and because the end of this institution, is the peace and defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means; it belongeth of right, to whatsoever man, or assembly that hath the soveraignty, to be judge both of the meanes of peace and defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home and hostility from abroad; and, when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same. and therefore, and judge of what doctrines are fit to be taught them sixtly, it is annexed to the soveraignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all bookes before they be published. for the actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the wel governing of opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens actions, in order to their peace, and concord. and though in matter of doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace. for doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. it is true, that in a common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of governours, and teachers, false doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary truths may be generally offensive; yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new truth, that can be, does never breake the peace, but onely somtimes awake the warre. for those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up armes, to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in warre; and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. it belongeth therefore to him that hath the soveraign power, to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace, thereby to prevent discord and civill warre. 7. the right of making rules, whereby the subject may every man know what is so his owne, as no other subject can without injustice take it from him seventhly, is annexed to the soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow subjects: and this is it men call propriety. for before constitution of soveraign power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth warre: and therefore this proprietie, being necessary to peace, and depending on soveraign power, is the act of the power, in order to the publique peace. these rules of propriety (or meum and tuum) and of good, evill, lawfull and unlawfull in the actions of subjects, are the civill lawes, that is to say, the lawes of each commonwealth in particular; though the name of civill law be now restrained to the antient civill lawes of the city of rome; which being the head of a great part of the world, her lawes at that time were in these parts the civill law. 8. to him also belongeth the right of all judicature and decision of controversies: eightly, is annexed to the soveraigntie, the right of judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies, which may arise concerning law, either civill, or naturall, or concerning fact. for without the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one subject, against the injuries of another; the lawes concerning meum and tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of warre; and contrary to the end for which every common-wealth is instituted. 9. and of making war, and peace, as he shall think best: ninthly, is annexed to the soveraignty, the right of making warre, and peace with other nations, and common-wealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. for the power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their armies; and the strength of an army, in the union of their strength under one command; which command the soveraign instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the militia, without other institution, maketh him that hath it soveraign. and therefore whosoever is made generall of an army, he that hath the soveraign power is alwayes generallissimo. 10. and of choosing all counsellours, and ministers, both of peace, and warre: tenthly, is annexed to the soveraignty, the choosing of all councellours, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace, and war. for seeing the soveraign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and defence; he is understood to have power to use such means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge. 11. and of rewarding, and punishing, and that (where no former law hath determined the measure of it) arbitrary: eleventhly, to the soveraign is committed the power of rewarding with riches, or honour; and of punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every subject according to the lawe he hath formerly made; or if there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same. 12. and of honour and order lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation, quarrells, factions, and at last warre, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a common enemy; it is necessary that there be lawes of honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those lawes in execution. but it hath already been shown, that not onely the whole militia, or forces of the common-wealth; but also the judicature of all controversies, is annexed to the soveraignty. to the soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of honour; and to appoint what order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another. these rights are indivisible these are the rights, which make the essence of soveraignty; and which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what man, or assembly of men, the soveraign power is placed, and resideth. for these are incommunicable, and inseparable. the power to coyn mony; to dispose of the estate and persons of infant heires; to have praeemption in markets; and all other statute praerogatives, may be transferred by the soveraign; and yet the power to protect his subject be retained. but if he transferre the militia, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of execution of the lawes; or if he grant away the power of raising mony; the militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of spirits. and so if we consider any one of the said rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of peace and justice, the end for which all common-wealths are instituted. and this division is it, whereof it is said, "a kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:" for unlesse this division precede, division into opposite armies can never happen. if there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of england, that these powers were divided between the king, and the lords, and the house of commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this civill warre; first between those that disagreed in politiques; and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion; which have so instructed men in this point of soveraign right, that there be few now (in england,) that do not see, that these rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto been. and can by no grant passe away without direct renouncing of the soveraign power and because they are essentiall and inseparable rights, it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the soveraign power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and the name of soveraign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them, the grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto. the power and honour of subjects vanisheth in the presence of the power soveraign this great authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of soveraign kings, though they be singulis majores, of greater power than every one of their subjects, yet they be universis minores, of lesse power than them all together. for if by all together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then all together, and every one, signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. but if by all together, they understand them as one person (which person the soveraign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the soveraignty is in an assembly of the people; but in a monarch they see it not; and yet the power of soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed. and as the power, so also the honour of the soveraign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the subjects. for in the soveraignty is the fountain of honour. the dignities of lord, earle, duke, and prince are his creatures. as in the presence of the master, the servants are equall, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the soveraign. and though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the starres in presence of the sun. soveraigne power not hurtfull as the want of it, and the hurt proceeds for the greatest part from not submitting readily, to a lesse but a man may here object, that the condition of subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. and commonly they that live under a monarch, think it the fault of monarchy; and they that live under the government of democracy, or other soveraign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of common-wealth; whereas the power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any forme of government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civill warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to lawes, and a coercive power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of soveraign governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governours to draw from them what they can in time of peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies. for all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their passions and self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely morall and civill science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded. chapter xix. of the severall kinds of common-wealth by institution, and of succession to the soveraigne power the different formes of common-wealths but three the difference of common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the soveraign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. and because the soveraignty is either in one man, or in an assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of common-wealth. for the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. when the representative is one man, then is the common-wealth a monarchy: when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a democracy, or popular common-wealth: when an assembly of a part onely, then it is called an aristocracy. other kind of common-wealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all must have the soveraign power (which i have shewn to be indivisible) entire. tyranny and oligarchy, but different names of monarchy, and aristocracy there be other names of government, in the histories, and books of policy; as tyranny, and oligarchy: but they are not the names of other formes of government, but of the same formes misliked. for they that are discontented under monarchy, call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy, called it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a democracy, call it anarchy, (which signifies want of government;) and yet i think no man believes, that want of government, is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the governours. subordinate representatives dangerous it is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give authority to one man, to represent them every one; as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch, as absolutely, as to any other representative. therefore, where there is already erected a soveraign power, there can be no other representative of the same people, but onely to certain particular ends, by the soveraign limited. for that were to erect two soveraigns; and every man to have his person represented by two actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that power, which (if men will live in peace) is indivisible, and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of warre, contrary to the end for which all soveraignty is instituted. and therefore as it is absurd, to think that a soveraign assembly, inviting the people of their dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to make known their advise, or desires, should therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a monarchy. and i know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a monarchy, he that had the soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called soveraign, had the title of majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their king; was notwithstanding never considered as their representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the truth committed to them. comparison of monarchy, with soveraign assemblyes the difference between these three kindes of common-wealth, consisteth not in the difference of power; but in the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people; for which end they were instituted. and to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe; first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall person. and though he be carefull in his politique person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the passions of men, are commonly more potent than their reason. from whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. now in monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. the riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his subjects. for no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civill warre. secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. but when a soveraigne assembly has need of counsell, none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. for the understanding is by the flame of the passions, never enlightned, but dazled: nor is there any place, or time, wherein an assemblie can receive counsell with secrecie, because of their owne multitude. thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch, are subject to no other inconstancy, than that of humane nature; but in assemblies, besides that of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. for the absence of a few, that would have the resolution once taken, continue firme, (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday. fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or interest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a civill warre. fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which i confesse is a great and inevitable inconvenience. but the same may as well happen, where the soveraigne power is in an assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill counsell, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch by flatterers; and becoming one an others flatterers, serve one anothers covetousnesse and ambition by turnes. and whereas the favorites of an assembly, are many; and the kindred much more numerous, than of any monarch. besides, there is no favourite of a monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: but orators, that is to say, favourites of soveraigne assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. for to accuse, requires lesse eloquence (such is mans nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles justice. sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchie, that the soveraigntie may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discerne between good and evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power, must be in the hand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as curators, and protectors of his person, and authority. but to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the soveraign power, into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men; is to say that all government is more inconvenient, than confusion, and civill warre. and therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become competitors. to make it appear, that this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of government we call monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent monarch, hath appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressely by testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the custome in that case received: and then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition, and injustice of the subjects; which in all kinds of government, where the people are not well instructed in their duty, and the rights of soveraignty, is the same. or else the precedent monarch, hath not at all taken order for such tuition; and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule, that the tuition shall be in him, that hath by nature most interest in the preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. for seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or dammage, is not tuition, but trechery. so that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the government under a child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of monarchy, but to the ambition of subjects, and ignorance of their duty. on the other side, there is no great common-wealth, the soveraignty whereof is in a great assembly, which is not, as to consultations of peace, and warre, and making of lawes, in the same condition, as if the government were in a child. for as a child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed: so an assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. and as a child has need of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person, and authority: so also (in great common-wealths,) the soveraign assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of custodes libertatis; that is of dictators, or protectors of their authoritie; which are as much as temporary monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than infant kings, by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors. though the kinds of soveraigntie be, as i have now shewn, but three; that is to say, monarchie, where one man has it; or democracie, where the generall assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracie, where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: yet he that shall consider the particular common-wealthes that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other formes, arising from these mingled together. as for example, elective kingdomes; where kings have the soveraigne power put into their hands for a time; of kingdomes, wherein the king hath a power limited: which governments, are nevertheless by most writers called monarchie. likewise if a popular, or aristocraticall common-wealth, subdue an enemies countrie, and govern the same, by a president, procurator, or other magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a democraticall, or aristocraticall government. but it is not so. for elective kings, are not soveraignes, but ministers of the soveraigne; nor limited kings soveraignes, but ministers of them that have the soveraigne power: nor are those provinces which are in subjection to a democracie, or aristocracie of another common-wealth, democratically, or aristocratically governed, but monarchically. and first, concerning an elective king, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of christendome at this day; or to certaine yeares or moneths, as the dictators power amongst the romans; if he have right to appoint his successor, he is no more elective but hereditary. but if he have no power to elect his successor, then there is some other man, or assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of warre. if it be known who have the power to give the soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the soveraigntie was in them before: for none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. but if there be none that can give the soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the law of nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of civill warre. and consequently he was, when elected, a soveraign absolute. secondly, that king whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not soveraign. the soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that assembly which had the right to limit him; and by consequence the government not monarchy, but either democracy, or aristocracy; as of old time in sparta; where the kings had a priviledge to lead their armies; but the soveraignty was in the ephori. thirdly, whereas heretofore the roman people, governed the land of judea (for example) by a president; yet was not judea therefore a democracy; because they were not governed by any assembly, into which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an aristocracy; because they were not governed by any assembly, into which, any man could enter by their election: but they were governed by one person, which though as to the people of rome was an assembly of the people, or democracy; yet as to the people of judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a monarch. for though where the people are governed by an assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a democracy, or aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a monarchy; not of one man, over another man; but of one people, over another people. of the right of succession of all these formes of government, the matter being mortall, so that not onely monarchs, but also whole assemblies dy, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an artificiall man, so there be order also taken, for an artificiall eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an assembly, should return into the condition of warre in every age; and they that are governed by one man, as soon as their governour dyeth. this artificiall eternity, is that which men call the right of succession. there is no perfect forme of government, where the disposing of the succession is not in the present soveraign. for if it be in any other particular man, or private assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the right is in himselfe. and if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the common-wealth dissolved; and the right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security. in a democracy, the whole assembly cannot faile, unlesse the multitude that are to be governed faile. and therefore questions of the right of succession, have in that forme of government no place at all. in an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dyeth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the assembly, as the soveraign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all counsellours, and officers. for that which the representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth, as author. and though the soveraign assembly, may give power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their court; yet it is still by their authority, that the election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled. the present monarch hath right to dispose of the succession the greatest difficultie about the right of succession, is in monarchy: and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. for in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. as to the question, who shall appoint the successor, of a monarch that hath the soveraign authority; that is to say, (for elective kings and princes have not the soveraign power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude. for the death of him that hath the soveraign power in propriety, leaves the multitude without any soveraign at all; that is, without any representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: and therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne sword; which is a returne to confusion, and to the condition of a war of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution. therfore it is manifest, that by the institution of monarchy, the disposing of the successor, is alwaies left to the judgment and will of the present possessor. and for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power; it is determined by his expresse words, and testament; or by other tacite signes sufficient. succession passeth by expresse words; by expresse words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his life time, viva voce, or by writing; as the first emperours of rome declared who should be their heires. for the word heire does not of it selfe imply the children, or nearest kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his estate. if therefore a monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his heire, either by word or writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his predecessor, invested in the right of being monarch. or, by not controlling a custome; but where testament, and expresse words are wanting, other naturall signes of the will are to be followed: whereof the one is custome. and therefore where the custome is, that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession; for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time. and likewise where the custome is, that the next of the male kindred succeedeth, there also the right of succession is in the next of the kindred male, for the same reason. and so it is if the custome were to advance the female. for whatsoever custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall signe he would have that custome stand. or, by presumption of naturall affection but where neither custome, nor testament hath preceded, there it is to be understood, first, that a monarchs will is, that the government remain monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe. secondly, that a child of his own, male, or female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a male than a female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. thirdly, where his own issue faileth, rather a brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and 'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred. to dispose of the succession, though to a king of another nation, not unlawfull but if it be lawfull for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words of contract, or testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the governours, ignorant of the true rules of politiques. and therefore the romans when they had subdued many nations, to make their government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole nations, and sometimes to principall men of every nation they conquered, not onely the privileges, but also the name of romans; and took many of them into the senate, and offices of charge, even in the roman city. and this was it our most wise king, king james, aymed at, in endeavouring the union of his two realms of england and scotland. which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the civill warres, which make both those kingdomes at this present, miserable. it is not therefore any injury to the people, for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will; though by the fault of many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull. chapter xx. of dominion paternall and despoticall a common-wealth by acquisition, is that, where the soveraign power is acquired by force; and it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power. wherein different from a common-wealth by institution and this kind of dominion, or soveraignty, differeth from soveraignty by institution, onely in this, that men who choose their soveraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: but in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. in both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of common-wealth, could be obliged to obedience. it is true, that in a common-wealth once instituted, or acquired, promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the lawes; but the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. also, when he may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the invalidity of the covenant, that absolveth him, but the sentence of the soveraign. otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: but when the soveraign, who is the actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the author of such absolution. the rights of soveraignty the same in both but the rights, and consequences of soveraignty, are the same in both. his power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another: he cannot forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of injury: he cannot be punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary for peace; and judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator; and supreme judge of controversies; and of the times, and occasions of warre, and peace: to him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellours, commanders, and all other officers, and ministers; and to determine of rewards, and punishments, honour, and order. the reasons whereof, are the same which are alledged in the precedent chapter, for the same rights, and consequences of soveraignty by institution. dominion paternall how attained not by generation, but by contract dominion is acquired two wayes; by generation, and by conquest. the right of dominion by generation, is that, which the parent hath over his children; and is called paternall. and is not so derived from the generation, as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from the childs consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. for as to the generation, god hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally parents: the dominion therefore over the child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two masters. and whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man onely, as being of the more excellent sex; they misreckon in it. for there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war. in common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the civill law: and for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the father; because for the most part common-wealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families. but the question lyeth now in the state of meer nature; where there are supposed no lawes of matrimony; no lawes for the education of children; but the law of nature, and the naturall inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to their children. in this condition of meer nature, either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child by contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. if they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. we find in history that the amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male should be sent back, but the female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the females was in the mother. or education; if there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. for in the condition of meer nature, where there are no matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is the father, unlesse it be declared by the mother: and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. again, seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the dominion over it is hers. but if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the dominion is in him that nourisheth it. for it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him. or precedent subjection of one of the parents to the other if the mother be the fathers subject, the child, is in the fathers power: and if the father be the mothers subject, (as when a soveraign queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the child is subject to the mother; because the father also is her subject. if a man and a woman, monarches of two severall kingdomes, have a child, and contract concerning who shall have the dominion of him, the right of the dominion passeth by the contract. if they contract not, the dominion followeth the dominion of the place of his residence. for the soveraign of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein. he that hath the dominion over the child, hath dominion also over their childrens children. for he that hath dominion over the person of a man, hath dominion over all that is his; without which, dominion were but a title, without the effect. the right of succession followeth the rules of the rights of possession the right of succession to paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same manner, as doth the right of succession to monarchy; of which i have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter. despoticall dominion, how attained dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call despoticall, from despotes, which signifieth a lord, or master; and is the dominion of the master over his servant. and this dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. and after such covenant made, the vanquished is a servant, and not before: for by the word servant (whether it be derived from servire, to serve, or from servare, to save, which i leave to grammarians to dispute) is not meant a captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him. not by the victory, but by the consent of the vanquished it is not therefore the victory, that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit. and that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) quarter, (which the greeks called zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the victor, by submission, and to compound for their life, with ransome, or service: and therefore he that hath quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion. and then onely is his life in security, and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. for slaves that work in prisons, or fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters. the master of the servant, is master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. for he holdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the master shall do. and in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury. in summe the rights and consequences of both paternall and despoticall dominion, are the very same with those of a soveraign by institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. so that for a man that is monarch of divers nations, whereof he hath, in one the soveraignty by institution of the people assembled, and in another by conquest, that is by the submission of each particular, to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one nation more than of the other, from the title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of ignorance of the rights of soveraignty. for the soveraign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no soveraignty at all; and so every man may lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war. difference between a family and a kingdom by this it appears, that a great family if it be not part of some common-wealth, is of it self, as to the rights of soveraignty, a little monarchy; whether that family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the father of master is the soveraign. but yet a family is not properly a common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. for where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. and thus much shall suffice; concerning what i find by speculation, and deduction, of soveraign rights, from the nature, need, and designes of men, in erecting of commonwealths, and putting themselves under monarchs, or assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their protection. the right of monarchy from scripture let us now consider what the scripture teacheth in the same point. to moses, the children of israel say thus. (exod. 20. 19) "speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not god speak to us, lest we dye." this is absolute obedience to moses. concerning the right of kings, god himself by the mouth of samuel, saith, (1 sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) "this shall be the right of the king you will have to reigne over you. he shall take your sons, and set them to drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cookes, and bakers. he shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. he shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. he shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his businesse. he shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his servants." this is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, "you shall be his servants." againe, when the people heard what power their king was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, (verse. 19 &c.) "we will be as all other nations, and our king shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our wars." here is confirmed the right that soveraigns have, both to the militia, and to all judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power, as one man can possibly transferre to another. again, the prayer of king salomon to god, was this. (1 kings 3. 9) "give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between good and evill." it belongeth therefore to the soveraigne to bee judge, and to praescribe the rules of discerning good and evill; which rules are lawes; and therefore in him is the legislative power. saul sought the life of david; yet when it was in his power to slay saul, and his servants would have done it, david forbad them, saying (1 sam. 24. 9) "god forbid i should do such an act against my lord, the anoynted of god." for obedience of servants st. paul saith, (coll. 3. 20) "servants obey your masters in all things," and, (verse. 22) "children obey your parents in all things." there is simple obedience in those that are subject to paternall, or despoticall dominion. again, (math. 23. 2,3) "the scribes and pharisees sit in moses chayre and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do." there again is simple obedience. and st. paul, (tit. 3. 2) "warn them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in authority, & obey them." this obedience is also simple. lastly, our saviour himselfe acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by kings imposed, where he sayes, "give to caesar that which is caesars;" and payed such taxes himselfe. and that the kings word, is sufficient to take any thing from any subject, when there is need; and that the king is judge of that need: for he himselfe, as king of the jewes, commanded his disciples to take the asse, and asses colt to carry him into jerusalem, saying, (mat. 21. 2,3) "go into the village over against you, and you shall find a shee asse tyed, and her colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me. and if any man ask you, what you mean by it, say the lord hath need of them: and they will let them go." they will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the lord. to these places may be added also that of genesis, (gen. 3. 5) "you shall be as gods, knowing good and evill." and verse 11. "who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which i commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?" for the cognisance of judicature of good and evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a triall of adams obedience; the divell to enflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should be as gods, knowing good and evill. whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them gods office, which is judicature of good and evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. and whereas it is sayd, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitely censure god himselfe. and thereupon god saith, "hast thou eaten, &c." as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my commandements? whereby it is cleerly, (though allegorically,) signified, that the commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their subjects to be censured, nor disputed. soveraign power ought in all common-wealths to be absolute so it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and scripture, that the soveraign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocraticall common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. and though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. the condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no common-wealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds from the subjects disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from which the common-wealth had its being. and whosoever thinking soveraign power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater. the greatest objection is, that of the practise; when men ask, where, and when, such power has by subjects been acknowledged. but one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a kingdome long free from sedition and civill warre. in those nations, whose common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the subjects never did dispute of the soveraign power. but howsoever, an argument for the practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. for though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. the skill of making, and maintaining common-wealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetique and geometry; not (as tennis-play) on practise onely: which rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out. chapter xxi. of the liberty of subjects liberty what liberty, or freedome, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition; (by opposition, i mean externall impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rationall. for whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. and so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would. but when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the liberty; but the power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse. what it is to be free and according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, a free-man, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to." but when the words free, and liberty, are applyed to any thing but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment: and therefore, when 'tis said (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. and when we say a guift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the guift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law, or covenant to give it. so when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. lastly, from the use of the word freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe. feare and liberty consistent feare and liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: it is therefore the action, of one that was free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for feare of imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. and generally all actions which men doe in common-wealths, for feare of the law, or actions, which the doers had liberty to omit. liberty and necessity consistent liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel: so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed from their will) proceed from liberty; and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of god the first of all causes) proceed from necessity. so that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. and therefore god, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which god will, & no more, nor lesse. for though men may do many things, which god does not command, nor is therefore author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite gods will is not the cause. and did not his will assure the necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of god. and this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall liberty, which only is properly called liberty. artificiall bonds, or covenants but as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificiall man, which we call a common-wealth; so also have they made artificiall chains, called civill lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the soveraigne power; and at the other end to their own ears. these bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them. liberty of subjects consisteth in liberty from covenants in relation to these bonds only it is, that i am to speak now, of the liberty of subjects. for seeing there is no common-wealth in the world, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. for if wee take liberty in the proper sense, for corporall liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy. againe, if we take liberty, for an exemption from lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. and yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the lawes are of no power to protect them, without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. the liberty of a subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the soveraign hath praetermitted; such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like. liberty of the subject consistent with unlimited power of the soveraign neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such liberty, the soveraign power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. for it has been already shewn, that nothing the soveraign representative can doe to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of every act the soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the subject of god, and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature. and therefore it may, and doth often happen in common-wealths, that a subject may be put to death, by the command of the soveraign power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: in which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had liberty to doe the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without injury put to death. and the same holdeth also in a soveraign prince, that putteth to death an innocent subject. for though the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equitie, (as was the killing of uriah, by david;) yet it was not an injurie to uriah; but to god. not to uriah, because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by uriah himself; and yet to god, because david was gods subject; and prohibited all iniquitie by the law of nature. which distinction, david himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, "to thee only have i sinned." in the same manner, the people of athens, when they banished the most potent of their common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every citizen bringing his oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him, sometimes banished an aristides, for his reputation of justice; and sometimes a scurrilous jester, as hyperbolus, to make a jest of it. and yet a man cannot say, the soveraign people of athens wanted right to banish them; or an athenian the libertie to jest, or to be just. the liberty which writers praise, is the liberty of soveraigns; not of private men the libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in the histories, and philosophy of the antient greeks, and romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politiques, is not the libertie of particular men; but the libertie of the common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were no civil laws, nor common-wealth at all. and the effects of it also be the same. for as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods, or lands; no security; but a full and absolute libertie in every particular man: so in states, and common-wealths not dependent on one another, every common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that man, or assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. but withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about. the athenians, and romanes, were free; that is, free common-wealths: not that any particular men had the libertie to resist their own representative; but that their representative had the libertie to resist, or invade other people. there is written on the turrets of the city of luca in great characters at this day, the word libertas; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more libertie, or immunitie from the service of the commonwealth there, than in constantinople. whether a common-wealth be monarchicall, or popular, the freedome is still the same. but it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of libertie; and for want of judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their private inheritance, and birth right, which is the right of the publique only. and when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of government. in these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution, and rights of common-wealths, from aristotle, cicero, and other men, greeks and romanes, that living under popular states, derived those rights, not from the principles of nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the practice of their own common-wealths, which were popular; as the grammarians describe the rules of language, out of the practise of the time; or the rules of poetry, out of the poems of homer and virgil. and because the athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their government,) that they were freemen, and all that lived under monarchy were slaves; therefore aristotle puts it down in his politiques,(lib.6.cap.2) "in democracy, liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is free in any other government." and as aristotle; so cicero, and other writers have grounded their civill doctrine, on the opinions of the romans, who were taught to hate monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their soveraign, shared amongst them the soveraignty of rome; and afterwards by their successors. and by reading of these greek, and latine authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as i think i may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these western parts have bought the learning of the greek and latine tongues. liberty of the subject how to be measured to come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what rights we passe away, when we make a common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the actions (without exception) of the man, or assembly we make our soveraign. for in the act of our submission, consisteth both our obligation, and our liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free. and because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, "i authorise all his actions," or from the intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his power, (which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth;) the obligation, and liberty of the subject, is to be derived, either from those words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the end of the institution of soveraignty; namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy. subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade them first therefore, seeing soveraignty by institution, is by covenant of every one to every one; and soveraignty by acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest, that every subject has liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred. i have shewn before in the 14. chapter, that covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. therefore, are not bound to hurt themselves; if the soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey. if a man be interrogated by the soveraign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as i have shewn in the same chapter) can be obliged by covenant to accuse himselfe. again, the consent of a subject to soveraign power, is contained in these words, "i authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;" in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall liberty: for by allowing him to kill me, i am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me. "'tis one thing to say 'kill me, or my fellow, if you please;' another thing to say, 'i will kill my selfe, or my fellow.'" it followeth therefore, that no man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission; but on the intention; which is to be understood by the end thereof. when therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the end for which the soveraignty was ordained; then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise there is. nor to warfare, unless they voluntarily undertake it upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a souldier to fight against the enemy, though his soveraign have right enough to punish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the common-wealth. and there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. when armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. for the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not injustice, but cowardise. but he that inrowleth himselfe a souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his captaines leave. and when the defence of the common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain. to resist the sword of the common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath liberty; because such liberty, takes away from the soveraign, the means of protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government. but in case a great many men together, have already resisted the soveraign power unjustly, or committed some capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? certainly they have: for they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the innocent. there was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. and if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. but the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull. the greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of the law as for other lyberties, they depend on the silence of the law. in cases where the soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. and therefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the soveraignty shall think most convenient. as for example, there was a time, when in england a man might enter in to his own land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force. but in after-times, that liberty of forcible entry, was taken away by a statute made (by the king) in parliament. and is some places of the world, men have the liberty of many wives: in other places, such liberty is not allowed. if a subject have a controversie with his soveraigne, of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent law; he hath the same liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a subject; and before such judges, as are appointed by the soveraign. for seeing the soveraign demandeth by force of a former law, and not by vertue of his power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that law. the sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the soveraign; and consequently the subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause; and sentence, according to that law. but if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of law: for all that is done by him in vertue of his power, is done by the authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the soveraign, brings it against himselfe. if a monarch, or soveraign assembly, grant a liberty to all, or any of his subjects; which grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the soveraignty to another. for in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and the soveraign power; and therefore the soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the power of warre, and peace, of judicature, of appointing officers, and councellours, of levying mony, and the rest named in the 18th chapter. in what cases subjects absolved of their obedience to their soveraign the obligation of subjects to the soveraign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. for the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. the soveraignty is the soule of the common-wealth; which once departed from the body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. the end of obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it. and though soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by intestine discord. in case of captivity if a subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be within the guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall libertie given him, on condition to be subject to the victor, he hath libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe. the case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country. but if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever. in case the soveraign cast off the government from himself and heyrs if a monarch shall relinquish the soveraignty, both for himself, and his heires; his subjects returne to the absolute libertie of nature; because, though nature may declare who are his sons, and who are the nerest of his kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his heyr. if therefore he will have no heyre, there is no soveraignty, nor subjection. the case is the same, if he dye without known kindred, and without declaration of his heyre. for then there can no heire be known, and consequently no subjection be due. in case of banishment if the soveraign banish his subject; during the banishment, he is not subject. but he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still subject; but it is, by contract between soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of subjection. for whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is subject to all the lawes thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of the soveraigns, or by speciall licence. in case the soveraign render himself subject to another if a monarch subdued by war, render himself subject to the victor; his subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the victor. but if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own body; he is not understood to have given away the right of soveraigntie; and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. for, his right remaining, the question is only of the administration; that is to say, of the magistrates and officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed. chapter xxii. of systemes subject, politicall, and private the divers sorts of systemes of people having spoken of the generation, forme, and power of a common-wealth, i am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. and first of systemes, which resemble the similar parts, or muscles of a body naturall. by systemes; i understand any numbers of men joyned in one interest, or one businesse. of which, some are regular, and some irregular. regular are those, where one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number. all other are irregular. of regular, some are absolute, and independent, subject to none but their own representative: such are only common-wealths; of which i have spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. others are dependent; that is to say, subordinate to some soveraign power, to which every one, as also their representative is subject. of systemes subordinate, some are politicall, and some private. politicall (otherwise called bodies politique, and persons in law,) are those, which are made by authority from the soveraign power of the common-wealth. private, are those, which are constituted by subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. for no authority derived from forraign power, within the dominion of another, is publique there, but private. and of private systemes, some are lawfull; some unlawfull: lawfull, are those which are allowed by the common-wealth: all other are unlawfull. irregular systemes, are those which having no representative, consist only in concourse of people; which if not forbidden by the common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of people to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are lawfull. but when the intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are unlawfull. in all bodies politique the power of the representative is limited in bodies politique, the power of the representative is alwaies limited: and that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the power soveraign. for power unlimited, is absolute soveraignty. and the soveraign, in every commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects; and therefore no other, can be representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave; and to give leave to a body politique of subjects, to have an absolute representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth, and to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defence, which the soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. for consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone. the bounds of that power, which is given to the representative of a bodie politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. one is their writt, or letters from the soveraign: the other is the law of the common-wealth. by letters patents for though in the institution or acquisition of a common-wealth, which is independent, there needs no writing, because the power of the representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten law of nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembred without letters, nor taken notice of, unlesse such letters be patent, that they may be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the seales, or other permanent signes of the authority soveraign. and the lawes and because such limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible to be described in writing; the ordinary lawes, common to all subjects, must determine, that the representative may lawfully do, in all cases, where the letters themselves are silent. and therefore when the representative is one man, his unwarranted acts his own onely in a body politique, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the person of the body, which is not warranted in his letters, nor by the lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the body, nor of any other member thereof besides himselfe: because further than his letters, or the lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his own. but what he does according to these, is the act of every one: for of the act of the soveraign every one is author, because he is their representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of the soveraign, is the act of the soveraign, and therefore every member of the body is author of it. when it is an assembly, it is the act of them that assented onely but if the representative be an assembly, whatsoever that assembly shall decree, not warranted by their letters, or the lawes, is the act of the assembly, or body politique, and the act of every one by whose vote the decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he voted it by procuration. it is the act of the assembly, because voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their letters (which is to such artificiall, and fictitious bodies, capitall,) or (if the assembly have a common stock, wherein none of the innocent members have propriety,) by pecuniary mulct. for from corporall penalties nature hath exempted all bodies politique. but they that gave not their vote, are therefore innocent, because the assembly cannot represent any man in things unwarranted by their letters, and consequently are not involved in their votes. when the representative is one man, if he borrow mony, or owe it, by contract; he is lyable onely, the members not if the person of the body politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same body, (for no letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the representatives. for if he should have authority from his letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as proceeding from errour, commonly incident to humane nature, and an unsufficient signe of the will of the granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the representer soveraign, and falleth not under the present question, which is onely of bodies subordinate. no member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the representative himselfe: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the letters, and to the qualification of the body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely for debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any), or (if there be none) out of his own estate. if he come into debt by contract, or mulct, the case is the same. when it is an assembly, they onely are liable that have assented but when the representative is an assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe for the payment: for he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one, he be discharged. if the debt be to one of the assembly, the body onely is obliged but if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly onely is obliged to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) for having liberty of vote, if he vote the mony, shall be borrowed, he votes it shall be payd; if he vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former vote, and is obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony. protestation against the decrees of bodies politique sometimes lawful; but against soveraign power never it is manifest by this, that in bodies politique subordinate, and subject to a soveraign power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the representative assembly, and cause their dissent to be registred, or to take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: but in a soveraign assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their soveraignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the soveraign power, is as to the subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of god) justified by the command; for of such command every subject is the author. bodies politique for government of a province, colony, or town the variety of bodies politique, is almost infinite; for they are not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. and as to their affaires, some are ordained for government; as first, the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major part; and then this assembly is a body politique, and their power limited by commission. this word province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for, and under him; and therefore when in one common-wealth there be divers countries, that have their lawes distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place, the administration of the government being committed to divers persons, those countries where the soveraign is not resident, but governs by commission, are called provinces. but of the government of a province, by an assembly residing in the province it selfe, there be few examples. the romans who had the soveraignty of many provinces; yet governed them alwaies by presidents, and praetors; and not by assemblies, as they governed the city of rome, and territories adjacent. in like manner, when there were colonies sent from england, to plant virginia, and sommer-ilands; though the government of them here, were committed to assemblies in london, yet did those assemblies never commit the government under them to any assembly there; but did to each plantation send one governour; for though every man, where he can be present by nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by nature also enclined, to commit the government of their common interest rather to a monarchicall, then a popular form of government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose rather to trust one servant, than a assembly either of their friends or servants. but howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the government of a province, or colony committed to an assembly: and when it is, that which in this place i have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull act is decreed, is the act onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged. also that an assembly residing out of the bounds of that colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the colony it selfe, as having no jurisdiction, nor authoritie elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the law of the place alloweth them. and though the assembly have right, to impose a mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the lawes they make; yet out of the colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same. and that which is said here, of the rights of an assembly, for the government of a province, or a colony, is appliable also to an assembly for the government of a town, or university, or a college, or a church, or for any other government over the persons of men. and generally, in all bodies politique, if any particular member conceive himself injured by the body it self, the cognisance of his cause belongeth to the soveraign, and those the soveraign hath ordained for judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to the body it self. for the whole body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a soveraign assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the soveraign be not judge, though in his own cause, there can be no judge at all. bodies politique for ordering of trade in a bodie politique, for the well ordering of forraigne traffique, the most commodious representative is an assembly of all the members; that is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be present at all the deliberations, and resolutions of the body, if they will themselves. for proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one corporation. it is true, there be few merchants, that with the merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn together in one society; where every man may either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. but this is no body politique, there being no common representative to oblige them to any other law, than that which is common to all other subjects. the end of their incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. so that to grant to a company of merchants to be a corporation, or body politique, is to grant them a double monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. for when there is a company incorporate for any particular forraign country, they only export the commodities vendible in that country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. for at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainfull to the merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: and abroad there is but one buyer of forraign merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers. of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. for at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. on the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: for where but one selleth, the merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: such corporations therefore are no other then monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could. the end then of these bodies of merchants, being not a common benefit to the whole body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. and therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly, where every member of the body may be present at the consultations, if he will. if a body politique of merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their representative assembly, every member is lyable by himself for the whole. for a stranger can take no notice of their private lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: but if the debt be to one of the company, the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any. if the common-wealth impose a tax upon the body, it is understood to be layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the company. for there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their particular adventures. if a mulct be layd upon the body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the body; which if a crime, (because the body was ordeyned by the authority of the common-wealth,) is not his. if one of the members be indebted to the body, he may be sued by the body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the body; but only by authority of the common-wealth: for if they can doe it by their own authority, they can by their own authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be judge in their own cause. a bodie politique for counsel to be give to the soveraign these bodies made for the government of men, or of traffique, be either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. but there be bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their businesse. for example, if a soveraign monarch, or a soveraign assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to send to him their deputies, to enforme him of the condition, and necessities of the subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good lawes, or for any other cause, as with one person representing the whole country, such deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a body politique, representing every subject of that dominion; but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that man, or assembly, that by the soveraign authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the body is dissolved. for if they were the absolute representative of the people, then were it the soveraign assembly; and so there would be two soveraign assemblies, or two soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their peace. and therefore where there is once a soveraignty, there can be no absolute representation of the people, but by it. and for the limits of how farre such a body shall represent the whole people, they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent for. for the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent, than is in the writing directed to them from their soveraign expressed. a regular private body, lawfull, as a family private bodies regular, and lawfull, are those that are constituted without letters, or other written authority, saving the lawes common to all other subjects. and because they be united in one person representative, they are held for regular; such as are all families, in which the father, or master ordereth the whole family. for he obligeth his children, and servants, as farre as the law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the law hath forbidden to be done. in all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their fathers, and masters, as to their immediate soveraigns. for the father, and master being before the institution of common-wealth, absolute soveraigns in their own families, they lose afterward no more of their authority, than the law of the common-wealth taketh from them. private bodies regular, but unlawfull private bodies regular, but unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person representative, without any publique authority at all; such as are the corporations of beggars, theeves and gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the corporations of men, that by authority from any forraign person, unite themselves in anothers dominion, for easier propagation of doctrines, and for making a party, against the power of the common-wealth. systemes irregular, such as are private leagues irregular systemes, in their nature, but leagues, or sometimes meer concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become lawfull, or unlawfull, according to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans design therein: and his designe is to be understood by the occasion. the leagues of subjects, (because leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence,) are in a common-wealth (which is no more than a league of all the subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of factions, or conspiracies. for a league being a connexion of men by covenants, if there be no power given to any one man or assembly, (as in the condition of meer nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore leagues between common-wealths, over whom there is no humane power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. but leagues of the subjects of one and the same common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the soveraign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or unknown to the common-wealth) unlawfull. for all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the publique, and unjustly concealed. secret cabals if the soveraign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the guidance of the rest; this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawfull, as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest. but if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no injustice; because in this case he is no part of the assembly. and though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse law against it,) yet it is not injustice. for sometimes, (as mens manners are,) justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged. feuds of private families in all common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires, it is faction, and unlawfull. for having the protection of the common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. and whereas in nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no common-wealth. factions for government and as factions for kindred, so also factions for government of religion, as of papists, protestants, &c. or of state, as patricians, and plebeians of old time in rome, and of aristocraticalls and democraticalls of old time in greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out of the hand of the soveraign. concourse of people, is an irregular systeme, the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. if the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at church, or at a publique shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. it may be lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a petition to be delivered to a judge, or magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. but in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawfull, but such a number, as the present officers are not able to suppresse, and bring to justice. when an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the assembly is an unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. such was the case of st. paul at ephesus; where demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of pauls companions before the magistrate, saying with one voyce, "great is diana of the ephesians;" which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their religion, and trade. the occasion here, considering the lawes of that people, was just; yet was their assembly judged unlawfull, and the magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words,(acts 19. 40) "if demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man, of any thing, there be pleas, and deputies, let them accuse one another. and if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called. for we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this concourse of people." where he calleth an assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a sedition, and such as they could not answer for. and this is all i shall say concerning systemes, and assemblyes of people, which may be compared (as i said,) to the similar parts of mans body; such as be lawfull, to the muscles; such as are unlawfull, to wens, biles, and apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours. chapter xxiii. of the publique ministers of soveraign power in the last chapter i have spoken of the similar parts of a common-wealth; in this i shall speak of the parts organicall, which are publique ministers. publique minister who a publique minister, is he, that by the soveraign, (whether a monarch, or an assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with authority to represent in that employment, the person of the common-wealth. and whereas every man, or assembly that hath soveraignty, representeth two persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two capacities, one naturall, and another politique, (as a monarch, hath the person not onely of the common-wealth, but also of a man; and a soveraign assembly hath the person not onely of the common-wealth, but also of the assembly); they that be servants to them in their naturall capacity, are not publique ministers; but those onely that serve them in the administration of the publique businesse. and therefore neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers that waite on the assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an aristocracy, or democracy; nor stewards, chamberlains, cofferers, or any other officers of the houshold of a monarch, are publique ministers in a monarchy. ministers for the generall administration of publique ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general administration, either of the whole dominion, or of a part thereof. of the whole, as to a protector, or regent, may bee committed by the predecessor of an infant king, during his minority, the whole administration of his kingdome. in which case, every subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the kings name, and not inconsistent with his soveraigne power. of a part, or province; as when either a monarch, or a soveraign assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a governour, lieutenant, praefect, or vice-roy: and in this case also, every one of that province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the soveraign, and that not incompatible with the soveraigns right. for such protectors, vice-roys, and governours, have no other right, but what depends on the soveraigns will; and no commission that can be given them, can be interpreted for a declaration of the will to transferre the soveraignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose. and this kind of publique ministers resembleth the nerves, and tendons that move the severall limbs of a body naturall. for speciall administration, as for oeconomy others have speciall administration; that is to say, charges of some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: as at home, first, for the oeconomy of a common-wealth, they that have authority concerning the treasure, as tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever publique revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts thereof, are publique ministers: ministers, because they serve the person representative, and can doe nothing against his command, nor without his authority: publique, because they serve him in his politicall capacity. secondly, they that have authority concerning the militia; to have the custody of armes, forts, ports; to levy, pay, or conduct souldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or sea, are publique ministers. but a souldier without command, though he fight for the common-wealth, does not therefore represent the person of it; because there is none to represent it to. for every one that hath command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth. for instruction of the people they also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the soveraign power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godlinesse, and in peace among themselves, and resist the publique enemy, are publique ministers: ministers, in that they doe it not by their own authority, but by anothers; and publique, because they doe it (or should doe it) by no authority, but that of the soveraign. the monarch, or the soveraign assembly only hath immediate authority from god, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the soveraign, receiveth his power dei gratia simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but god: all other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of god, and their soveraigns; as in a monarchy dei gratia & regis; or dei providentia & voluntate regis. for judicature they also to whom jurisdiction is given, are publique ministers. for in their seats of justice they represent the person of the soveraign; and their sentence, is his sentence; for (as hath been before declared) all judicature is essentially annexed to the soveraignty; and therefore all other judges are but ministers of him, or them that have the soveraign power. and as controversies are of two sorts, namely of fact, and of law; so are judgements, some of fact, some of law: and consequently in the same controversie, there may be two judges, one of fact, another of law. and in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between the party judged, and the judge; which because they be both subjects to the soveraign, ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be judge in his own cause. but the soveraign is already agreed on for judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare the cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for judge such as they shall both agree on. and this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes; as first, if the defendant be allowed to except against such of his judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the complaynant he hath already chosen his own judge,) those which he excepteth not against, are judges he himself agrees on. secondly, if he appeale to any other judge, he can appeale no further; for his appeale is his choice. thirdly, if he appeale to the soveraign himself, and he by himself, or by delegates which the parties shall agree on, give sentence; that sentence is finall: for the defendant is judged by his own judges, that is to say, by himself. these properties of just and rationall judicature considered, i cannot forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice, established both for common, and also for publique pleas in england. by common pleas, i meane those, where both the complaynant and defendant are subjects: and by publique, (which are also called pleas of the crown) those, where the complaynant is the soveraign. for whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one was lords, the other commons; the lords had this priviledge, to have for judges in all capitall crimes, none but lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged as a priviledge of favour, their judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. and in all controversies, every subject (as also in civill controversies the lords) had for judges, men of the country where the matter in controversie lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last twelve men without exception being agreed on, they were judged by those twelve. so that having his own judges, there could be nothing alledged by the party, why the sentence should not be finall, these publique persons, with authority from the soveraign power, either to instruct, or judge the people, are such members of the common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body naturall. for execution publique ministers are also all those, that have authority from the soveraign, to procure the execution of judgements given; to publish the soveraigns commands; to suppresse tumults; to apprehend, and imprison malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace. for every act they doe by such authority, is the act of the common-wealth; and their service, answerable to that of the hands, in a bodie naturall. publique ministers abroad, are those that represent the person of their own soveraign, to forraign states. such are ambassadors, messengers, agents, and heralds, sent by publique authoritie, and on publique businesse. but such as are sent by authoritie only of some private partie of a troubled state, though they be received, are neither publique, nor private ministers of the common-wealth; because none of their actions have the common-wealth for author. likewise, an ambassador sent from a prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though authority be publique; yet because the businesse is private, and belonging to him in his naturall capacity; is a private person. also if a man be sent into another country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the authority, and the businesse be publique; yet because there is none to take notice of any person in him, but his own; he is but a private minister; but yet a minister of the common-wealth; and may be compared to an eye in the body naturall. and those that are appointed to receive the petitions or other informations of the people, and are as it were the publique eare, are publique ministers, and represent their soveraign in that office. counsellers without other employment then to advise are not publique ministers neither a counsellor, nor a councell of state, if we consider it with no authority of judicature or command, but only of giving advice to the soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a publique person. for the advice is addressed to the soveraign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. but a body of counsellors, are never without some other authority, either of judicature, or of immediate administration: as in a monarchy, they represent the monarch, in delivering his commands to the publique ministers: in a democracy, the councell, or senate propounds the result of their deliberations to the people, as a councell; but when they appoint judges, or heare causes, or give audience to ambassadors, it is in the quality of a minister of the people: and in an aristocracy the councell of state is the soveraign assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves. chapter xxiv. of the nutrition, and procreation of a common-wealth the nourishment of a common-wealth consisteth in the commodities of sea and land the nutrition of a common-wealth consisteth, in the plenty, and distribution of materials conducing to life: in concoction, or preparation; and (when concocted) in the conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the publique use. as for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by nature, to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common mother) land, and sea, god usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to man-kind. for the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetals, and minerals, god hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of the earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. insomuch as plenty dependeth (next to gods favour) meerly on the labour and industry of men. this matter, commonly called commodities, is partly native, and partly forraign: native, that which is to be had within the territory of the common-wealth; forraign, that which is imported from without. and because there is no territory under the dominion of one common-wealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance, and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just warre, or by labour: for a mans labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: and there have been common-wealths that having no more territory, than hath served them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the manifactures, whereof the materials were brought in from other places. and the right of distribution of them the distribution of the materials of this nourishment, is the constitution of mine, and thine, and his, that is to say, in one word propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of common-wealth to the soveraign power. for where there is no common-wealth, there is, (as hath been already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour; and therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety nor community; but uncertainty. which is so evident, that even cicero, (a passionate defender of liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all propriety to the law civil, "let the civill law," saith he, "be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from his ancestor, or leave to his children." and again; "take away the civill law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another mans." seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of common-wealth; which can do nothing but by the person that represents it, it is the act onely of the soveraign; and consisteth in the lawes, which none can make that have not the soveraign power. and this they well knew of old, who called that nomos, (that is to say, distribution,) which we call law; and defined justice, by distributing to every man his own. all private estates of land proceed originally from the arbitrary distribution of the soveraign in this distribution, the first law, is for division of the land it selfe: wherein the soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he, and not according as any subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to equity, and the common good. the children of israel, were a common-wealth in the wildernesse; but wanted the commodities of the earth, till they were masters of the land of promise; which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of eleazar the priest, and joshua their generall: who when there were twelve tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of joseph; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the land; and ordained for the tribe of levi no land; but assigned them the tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore arbitrary. and though a people comming into possession of a land by warre, do not alwaies exterminate the antient inhabitants, (as did the jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them their estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the victors distribution; as the people of england held all theirs of william the conquerour. propriety of a subject excludes not the dominion of the soveraign, but onely of another subject from whence we may collect, that the propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their soveraign, be it an assembly, or a monarch. for seeing the soveraign, that is to say, the common-wealth (whose person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common peace and security, this distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: and consequently, whatsoever distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd. it is true, that a soveraign monarch, or the greater part of a soveraign assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the law of nature; but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of injustice, or any way to speak evill of their soveraign; because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the soveraign power, made them their own. but in what cases the commands of soveraigns are contrary to equity, and the law of nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place. the publique is not to be dieted in the distribution of land, the common-wealth it selfe, may be conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine the whole expence to the common peace, and defence necessarily required: which were very true, if there could be any representative conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities. but the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of publique land, or of any certaine revenue for the common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the dissolution of government, and to the condition of meere nature, and war, assoon as ever the soveraign power falleth into the hands of a monarch, or of an assembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in engaging the publique stock, into a long, or costly war. common-wealths can endure no diet: for seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by externall accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the publique riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. and whereas in england, there were by the conquerour, divers lands reserved to his own use, (besides forrests, and chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of woods,) and divers services reserved on the land he gave his subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in his publique, but in his naturall capacity: for he, and his successors did for all that, lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects land, when they judged it necessary. or if those publique lands, and services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing taxes) insufficient, and (as it appeares by the late revenue of the crown) subject to alienation, and diminution. it is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their representative. the places and matter of traffique depend, as their distribution, on the soveraign as the distribution of lands at home; so also to assigne in what places, and for what commodities, the subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to the soveraign. for if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. and therefore it belongeth to the common-wealth, (that is, to the soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign traffique. the laws of transferring property belong also to the soveraign further, seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a common-wealth, that every man have a propriety in a portion of land, or in some few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall contract. and therefore it belongeth to the common-wealth, (that is to say, to the soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid. and for the matter, and distribution of the nourishment, to the severall members of the common-wealth, thus much (considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient. mony the bloud of a common-wealth by concoction, i understand the reducing of all commodities, which are not presently consumed, but reserved for nourishment in time to come, to some thing of equal value, and withall so portably, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such nourishment as the place affordeth. and this is nothing else but gold, and silver, and mony. for gold and silver, being (as it happens) almost in all countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious measure for the value of all things else between nations; and mony (of what matter soever coyned by the soveraign of a common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the subjects of that common-wealth. by the means of which measures, all commodities, moveable, and immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from man to man, within the common-wealth; and goes round about, nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; in so much as this concoction, is as it were the sanguification of the common-wealth: for naturall bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every member of the body of man. and because silver and gold, have their value from the matter it self; they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few common-wealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places. but base mony, may easily be enhanced, or abased. secondly, they have the priviledge to make common-wealths, move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, into forraign countries; and supply, not only private subjects that travell, but also whole armies with provision. but that coyne, which is not considerable for the matter, but for the stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it. the conduits and way of mony to the publique use the conduits, and wayes by which it is conveyed to the publique use, are of two sorts; one, that conveyeth it to the publique coffers; the other, that issueth the same out againe for publique payments. of the first sort, are collectors, receivers, and treasurers; of the second are the treasurers againe, and the officers appointed for payment of severall publique or private ministers. and in this also, the artificiall man maintains his resemblance with the naturall; whose veins receiving the bloud from the severall parts of the body, carry it to the heart; where being made vitall, the heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the members of the same. the children of a common-wealth colonies the procreation, or children of a common-wealth, are those we call plantations, or colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the common-wealth, under a conductor, or governour, to inhabit a forraign country, either formerly voyd of inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre. and when a colony is setled, they are either a common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the common-wealth from which they went was called their metropolis, or mother, and requires no more of them, then fathers require of the children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestique government, which is honour, and friendship; or else they remain united to their metropolis, as were the colonies of the people of rome; and then they are no common-wealths themselves, but provinces, and parts of the common-wealth that sent them. so that the right of colonies (saving honour, and league with their metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their licence, or letters, by which their soveraign authorised them to plant. chapter xxv. of counsell counsell what how fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of counsels, and commands, arising from the imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. for the words "doe this," are the words not onely of him that commandeth; but also of him that giveth counsell; and of him that exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion. but finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the precepts of counsellours, for the precepts of them that command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve. to avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes of commanding, counselling, and exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, i define them thus. differences between command and counsell command is, where a man saith, "doe this," or "doe this not," without expecting other reason than the will of him that sayes it. from this it followeth manifestly, that he that commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own benefit: for the reason of his command is his own will onely, and the proper object of every mans will, is some good to himselfe. counsell, is where a man saith, "doe" or "doe not this," and deduceth his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. and from this it is evident, that he that giveth counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he giveth it. therefore between counsell and command, one great difference is, that command is directed to a mans own benefit; and counsell to the benefit of another man. and from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the counsell turned into the nature of a command. a third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe; but to demand right to counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some other good to himselfe; which (as i said before) is of every mans will the proper object. this also is incident to the nature of counsell; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: for to ask counsell of another, is to permit him to give such counsell as he shall think best; and consequently, he that giveth counsell to his soveraign, (whether a monarch, or an assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate. for if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of, before the debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further counsell; for the sense of the assembly, is the resolution of the debate, and end of all deliberation. and generally he that demandeth counsell, is author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the soveraign cannot, no man else can. but if one subject giveth counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the lawes, whether that counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by the common-wealth; because ignorance of the law, is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the lawes to which he is subject. exhortation and dehortation what exhortation, and dehortation, is counsell, accompanied with signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, counsell vehemently pressed. for he that exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he counselleth, to action: as he that dehorteth, deterreth him from it. and therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tooles of oratory, to perswade their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of following their advise. from whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation, is directed to the good of him that giveth the counsell, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellour; who (by the definition of counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his whom he adviseth. and that he directeth his counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is counselled, or not at all. secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lyeth onely, where a man is to speak to a multitude; because when the speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a multitude; which are too many to enter into dispute, and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once. thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required to give counsell, are corrupt counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. for though the counsell they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good counsellour, than he that giveth a just sentence for a reward, is a just judge. but where a man may lawfully command, as a father in his family, or a leader in an army, his exhortations and dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: but then they are no more counsells, but commands; which when they are for execution of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsell, rather then in harsher language of command. examples of the difference between command and counsell, we may take from the formes of speech that expresse them in holy scripture. "have no other gods but me; make to thy selfe no graven image; take not gods name in vain; sanctifie the sabbath; honour thy parents; kill not; steale not," &c. are commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of god our king, whom we are obliged to obey. but these words, "sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow me," are counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have "treasure in heaven." these words, "go into the village over against you, and you shall find an asse tyed, and her colt; loose her, and bring her to me," are a command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their master: but these words, "repent, and be baptized in the name of jesus," are counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of god almighty, who shall still be king in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins. differences of fit and unfit counsellours as the difference of counsell from command, hath been now deduced from the nature of counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the same. for experience, being but memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and counsell but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the vertues, and defects of counsell, are the same with the vertues, and defects intellectuall: and to the person of a common-wealth, his counsellours serve him in the place of memory, and mentall discourse. but with this resemblance of the common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give counsell to the representative person of a common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. and therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good counsellour, that his ends, and interest, be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of him he counselleth. secondly, because the office of a counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. and therefore rash, and unevident inferences; (such as are fetched onely from examples, or authority of books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphoricall speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we counsell towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the office of a counsellour. thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great common-wealth are necessary to be known, no man is presumed to be a good counsellour, but in such businesse, as he hath not onely been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered. for seeing the businesse of a common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home, and defend them against forraign invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of man-kind, of the rights of government, and of the nature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without study; and of the strength, commodities, places, both of their own country, and their neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes of all nations that may any way annoy them. and this is not attained to, without much experience. of which things, not onely the whole summe, but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. the wit required for counsel, as i have said before is judgement. and the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or businesse, and of others to another. when for the doing of any thing, there be infallible rules, (as in engines, and edifices, the rules of geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his counsell, that has learnt, or found out the rule. and when there is no such rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best judgement, and is the best counsellour. fourthly, to be able to give counsell to a common-wealth, in a businesse that hath reference to another common-wealth, it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences, and letters that come from thence, and with all the records of treaties, and other transactions of state between them; which none can doe, but such as the representative shall think fit. by which we may see, that they who are not called to counsell, can have no good counsell in such cases to obtrude. fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equall, a man is better counselled by hearing them apart, then in an assembly; and that for many causes. first, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an assembly may of them deliver their advise with i, or no, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. secondly, in an assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the publique; and these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and eloquence drawes others into the same advice. for the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with orations) to the setting of the common-wealth on fire, under pretence of counselling it. thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. besides, there cannot be an assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of authors; which is an impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of counselling apart, is easily avoided. fourthly, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in publique businesse,) the counsells of many, and especially in assemblies, are dangerous; and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence. to conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of counsell from a great assembly of counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? a man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able seconds at tennis play, placed in their proper stations. he does next best, that useth his own judgement only; as he that has no second at all. but he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a framed counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. and though it be true, that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many counsellours; but then only, when the finall resolution is in one man. otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one; and therefore no great popular common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent man amongst them; or by the secret counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open consultations of the assembly. and as for very little common-wealths, be they popular, or monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours. chapter xxvi. of civill lawes civill law what by civill lawes, i understand the lawes, that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are members, not of this, or that common-wealth in particular, but of a common-wealth. for the knowledge of particular lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of the lawes of their severall countries; but the knowledge of civill law in generall, to any man. the antient law of rome was called their civil law, from the word civitas, which signifies a common-wealth; and those countries, which having been under the roman empire, and governed by that law, retaine still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civill law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own civill lawes. but that is not it i intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is law here, and there; but what is law; as plato, aristotle, cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the law. and first it manifest, that law in generall, is not counsell, but command; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. and as for civill law, it addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is persona civitatis, the person of the common-wealth. which considered, i define civill law in this manner. "civill law, is to every subject, those rules, which the common-wealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule." in which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. for every man seeth, that some lawes are addressed to all the subjects in generall; some to particular provinces; some to particular vocations; and some to particular men; and are therefore lawes, to every of those to whom the command is directed; and to none else. as also, that lawes are the rules of just, and unjust; nothing being reputed unjust, that is not contrary to some law. likewise, that none can make lawes but the common-wealth; because our subjection is to the common-wealth only: and that commands, are to be signified by sufficient signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. and therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. now i deduce from it this that followeth. the soveraign is legislator 1. the legislator in all common-wealths, is only the soveraign, be he one man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of men, as in a democracy, or aristocracy. for the legislator, is he that maketh the law. and the common-wealth only, praescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call law: therefore the common-wealth is the legislator. but the common-wealth is no person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the representative, (that is, the soveraign;) and therefore the soveraign is the sole legislator. for the same reason, none can abrogate a law made, but the soveraign; because a law is not abrogated, but by another law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution. and not subject to civill law 2. the soveraign of a common-wealth, be it an assembly, or one man, is not subject to the civill lawes. for having power to make, and repeale lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. for he is free, that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound. use, a law not by vertue of time, but of the soveraigns consent 3. when long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that maketh the authority, but the will of the soveraign signified by his silence, (for silence is sometimes an argument of consent;) and it is no longer law, then the soveraign shall be silent therein. and therefore if the soveraign shall have a question of right grounded, not upon his present will, but upon the lawes formerly made; the length of time shal bring no prejudice to his right; but the question shal be judged by equity. for many unjust actions, and unjust sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any man can remember. and our lawyers account no customes law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill customes are to be abolished; but the judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the law, which is the soveraign assembly, or monarch. the law of nature, and the civill law contain each other 4. the law of nature, and the civill law, contain each other, and are of equall extent. for the lawes of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other morall vertues on these depending, in the condition of meer nature (as i have said before in the end of the 15th chapter,) are not properly lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. when a common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually lawes, and not before; as being then the commands of the common-wealth; and therefore also civill lawes: for it is the soveraign power that obliges men to obey them. for in the differences of private men, to declare, what is equity, what is justice, and what is morall vertue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of soveraign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which ordinances are therefore part of the civill law. the law of nature therefore is a part of the civill law in all common-wealths of the world. reciprocally also, the civill law is a part of the dictates of nature. for justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature. but every subject in a common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the civill law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) and therefore obedience to the civill law is part also of the law of nature. civill, and naturall law are not different kinds, but different parts of law; whereof one part being written, is called civill, the other unwritten, naturall. but the right of nature, that is, the naturall liberty of man, may by the civill law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making lawes, is no other, but such restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any peace. and law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common enemy. provinciall lawes are not made by custome, but by the soveraign power 5. if the soveraign of one common-wealth, subdue a people that have lived under other written lawes, and afterwards govern them by the same lawes, by which they were governed before; yet those lawes are the civill lawes of the victor, and not of the vanquished common-wealth, for the legislator is he, not by whose authority the lawes were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be lawes. and therefore where there be divers provinces, within the dominion of a common-wealth, and in those provinces diversity of lawes, which commonly are called the customes of each severall province, we are not to understand that such customes have their force, onely from length of time; but that they were antiently lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the constitutions, and statutes of their soveraigns; and are now lawes, not by vertue of the praescription of time, but by the constitutions of their present soveraigns. but if an unwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no other but a law of nature, equally obliging all man-kind. some foolish opinions of lawyers concerning the making of lawes 6. seeing then all lawes, written, and unwritten, have their authority, and force, from the will of the common-wealth; that is to say, from the will of the representative; which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other common-wealths the soveraign assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in severall common-wealths, directly, or by consequence making the legislative power depend on private men, or subordinate judges. as for example, "that the common law, hath no controuler but the parlament;" which is true onely where a parlament has the soveraign power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. for if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to controule them, and consequently to controule their controulings. and if there be no such right, then the controuler of lawes is not parlamentum, but rex in parlamento. and where a parlament is soveraign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe, that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a legislative power. item, that the two arms of a common-wealth, are force, and justice; the first whereof is in the king; the other deposited in the hands of the parlament. as if a common-wealth could consist, where the force were in any hand, which justice had not the authority to command and govern. 7. that law can never be against reason, our lawyers are agreed; and that not the letter,(that is, every construction of it,) but that which is according to the intention of the legislator, is the law. and it is true: but the doubt is, of whose reason it is, that shall be received for law. it is not meant of any private reason; for then there would be as much contradiction in the lawes, as there is in the schooles; nor yet (as sr. ed, coke makes it (sir edward coke, upon littleton lib.2. ch.6 fol 97.b),) an artificiall perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, (as his was.) for it is possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine; and of those that study, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that juris prudentia, or wisedome of subordinate judges; but the reason of this our artificiall man the common-wealth, and his command, that maketh law: and the common-wealth being in their representative but one person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the lawes; and when there doth, the same reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. in all courts of justice, the soveraign (which is the person of the common-wealth,) is he that judgeth: the subordinate judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his soveraign to make such law, that his sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his soveraigns sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one. law made, if not also made known, is no law 8. from this, that the law is a command, and a command consisteth in declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the command of the common-wealth, is law onely to those, that have means to take notice of it. over naturall fooles, children, or mad-men there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a common-wealth. and as those from whom nature, or accident hath taken away the notice of all lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular law, is excused, if he observe it not; and to speak properly, that law is no law to him. it is therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signes be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the law; that is to say, what is the will of the soveraign, as well in monarchies, as in other formes of government. unwritten lawes are all of them lawes of nature and first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a law of nature. for whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no law can be, but the law of nature. the lawes of nature therefore need not any publishing, nor proclamation; as being contained in this one sentence, approved by all the world, "do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe." secondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a law of nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other subjects. for whatsoever law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a law not only civill, but naturall. for example, if the soveraign employ a publique minister, without written instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take for instructions the dictates of reason; as if he make a judge, the judge is to take notice, that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his soveraign, which being alwaies understood to be equity, he is bound to it by the law of nature: or if an ambassador, he is (in al things not conteined in his written instructions) to take for instruction that which reason dictates to be most conducing to his soveraigns interest; and so of all other ministers of the soveraignty, publique and private. all which instructions of naturall reason may be comprehended under one name of fidelity; which is a branch of naturall justice. the law of nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other lawes, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the soveraign authority. for the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the common-wealth, is to be supposed alwaies consonant to equity and reason. and in antient time, before letters were in common use, the lawes were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily reteine them in memory. and for the same reason solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten commandements (prov. 7. 3) upon his ten fingers. and for the law which moses gave to the people of israel at the renewing of the covenant, (deut. 11. 19) he biddeth them to teach it their children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and dores of their houses; and (deut. 31. 12) to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to heare it read. nothing is law where the legislator cannot be known nor is it enough the law be written, and published; but also that there be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the soveraign. for private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designes, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for lawes what they please, without, or against the legislative authority. there is therefore requisite, not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient signes of the author, and authority. the author, or legislator is supposed in every common-wealth to be evident, because he is the soveraign, who having been constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. and though the ignorance, and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory of the first constitution of their common-wealth is worn out, they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the soveraignty is placed. and it is a dictate of naturall reason, and consequently an evident law of nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. therefore of who is soveraign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evill men suggest,) can make any doubt. the difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the authority derived from him; the removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the publique registers, publique counsels, publique ministers, and publique seales; by which all lawes are sufficiently verified. difference between verifying and authorising verifyed, i say, not authorised: for the verification, is but the testimony and record; not the authority of the law; which consisteth in the command of the soveraign only. the law verifyed by the subordinate judge if therefore a man have a question of injury, depending on the law of nature; that is to say, on common equity; the sentence of the judge, that by commission hath authority to take cognisance of such causes, is a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individuall case. for though the advice of one that professeth the study of the law, be usefull for the avoyding of contention; yet it is but advice; tis the judge must tell men what is law, upon the hearing of the controversy. by the publique registers but when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written law; every man by recourse to the registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the crime, whither it be an injury, or not: nay he ought to doe so: for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may informe himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull. in like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written law, which he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complaine before he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right. by letters patent, and publique seale if the question be of obedience to a publique officer; to have seen his commission, with the publique seale, and heard it read; or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient verification of his authority. for every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour, to informe himself of all written lawes, that may concerne his own future actions. the interpretation of the law dependeth on the soveraign power the legislator known; and the lawes, either by writing, or by the light of nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very materiall circumstance to make them obligatory. for it is not the letter, but the intendment, or meaning; that is to say, the authentique interpretation of the law (which is the sense of the legislator,) in which the nature of the law consisteth; and therefore the interpretation of all lawes dependeth on the authority soveraign; and the interpreters can be none but those, which the soveraign, (to whom only the subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. for else, by the craft of an interpreter, the law my be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the soveraign; by which means the interpreter becomes the legislator. all lawes need interpretation all laws, written, and unwritten, have need of interpretation. the unwritten law of nature, though it be easy to such, as without partiality, and passion, make use of their naturall reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become of all laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. the written laws, if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or two; if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding of the finall causes, for which the law was made; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the legislator. to him therefore there can not be any knot in the law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as alexander did with his sword in the gordian knot,) by the legislative power; which no other interpreter can doe. the authenticall interpretation of law is not that of writers the interpretation of the lawes of nature, in a common-wealth, dependeth not on the books of morall philosophy. the authority of writers, without the authority of the common-wealth, maketh not their opinions law, be they never so true. that which i have written in this treatise, concerning the morall vertues, and of their necessity, for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident truth, is not therefore presently law; but because in all common-wealths in the world, it is part of the civill law: for though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by the soveraigne power that it is law: otherwise, it were a great errour, to call the lawes of nature unwritten law; whereof wee see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves. the interpreter of the law is the judge giving sentence viva voce in every particular case the interpretation of the law of nature, is the sentence of the judge constituted by the soveraign authority, to heare and determine such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the law to the present case. for in the act of judicature, the judge doth no more but consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and equity; and the sentence he giveth, is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature; which interpretation is authentique; not because it is his private sentence; but because he giveth it by authority of the soveraign, whereby it becomes the soveraigns sentence; which is law for that time, to the parties pleading. the sentence of a judge, does not bind him, or another judge to give like sentence in like cases ever after but because there is no judge subordinate, nor soveraign, but may erre in a judgement of equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to doe it. no mans error becomes his own law; nor obliges him to persist in it. neither (for the same reason) becomes it a law to other judges, though sworn to follow it. for though a wrong sentence given by authority of the soveraign, if he know and allow it, in such lawes as are mutable, be a constitution of a new law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in lawes immutable, such as are the lawes of nature, they are no lawes to the same, or other judges, in the like cases for ever after. princes succeed one another; and one judge passeth, another commeth; nay, heaven and earth shall passe; but not one title of the law of nature shall passe; for it is the eternall law of god. therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a law contrary to naturall equity: nor any examples of former judges, can warrant an unreasonable sentence, or discharge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity (in the case he is to judge,) from the principles of his own naturall reason. for example sake, 'tis against the law of nature, to punish the innocent; and innocent is he that acquitteth himselfe judicially, and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge. put the case now, that a man is accused of a capitall crime, and seeing the powers and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges, runneth away for feare of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legall triall, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is neverthelesse condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the innocent. i say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of precedent judges, that had done the same. for he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no injustice can be a pattern of judgement to succeeding judges. a written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: but that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime judicially, is contrary to the nature of a presumption, which hath no place after judgement given. yet this is set down by a great lawyer for the common law of england. "if a man," saith he, "that is innocent, be accused of felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the felony, he shall notwithstanding his innocency, forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. for as to the forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proofe against the presumption in law, grounded upon his flight." here you see, an innocent man, judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his innocency, (when no written law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall, upon a presumption in law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. if the law ground upon his flight a presumption of the fact, (which was capitall,) the sentence ought to have been capitall: if the presumption were not of the fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? this therefore is no law of england; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law, but upon the presumption of the judges. it is also against law, to say that no proofe shall be admitted against a presumption of law. for all judges, soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to heare proofe, refuse to do justice: for though the sentence be just, yet the judges that condemn without hearing the proofes offered, are unjust judges; and their presumption is but prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the seat of justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow. there be other things of this nature, wherein mens judgements have been perverted, by trusting to precedents: but this is enough to shew, that though the sentence of the judge, be a law to the party pleading, yet it is no law to any judge, that shall succeed him in that office. in like manner, when question is of the meaning of written lawes, he is not the interpreter of them, that writeth a commentary upon them. for commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the text; and therefore need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such interpretation. and therefore unlesse there be an interpreter authorised by the soveraign, from which the subordinate judges are not to recede, the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, in the some manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten law; and their sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for lawes in that particular case; but not to bind other judges, in like cases to give like judgements. for a judge may erre in the interpretation even of written lawes; but no errour of a subordinate judge, can change the law, which is the generall sentence of the soveraigne. the difference between the letter and sentence of the law in written lawes, men use to make a difference between the letter, and the sentence of the law: and when by the letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished. for the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the law. but if by the letter, be meant the literall sense, then the letter, and the sentence or intention of the law, is all one. for the literall sense is that, which the legislator is alwayes supposed to be equity: for it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the soveraigne. he ought therefore, if the word of the law doe not fully authorise a reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of nature; or if the case be difficult, to respit judgement till he have received more ample authority. for example, a written law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: it happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no speciall law ordained. it is evident, that this case is contained in the same law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the intention of the legislator. again, the word of the law, commandeth to judge according to the evidence: a man is accused falsly of a fact, which the judge saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. in this case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to the condemnation of the innocent, nor shall the judge give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses; because the letter of the law is to the contrary: but procure of the soveraign that another be made judge, and himselfe witnesse. so that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written law, may lead him to the intention of the law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no incommodity can warrant a sentence against the law. for every judge of right, and wrong, is not judge of what is commodious, or incommodious to the common-wealth. the abilities required in a judge the abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, that is to say, in a good judge, are not the same with those of an advocate; namely the study of the lawes. for a judge, as he ought to take notice of the fact, from none but the witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the law, from nothing but the statutes, and constitutions of the soveraign, alledged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the soveraign power to declare them; and need not take care before-hand, what hee shall judge; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say concerning the fact, by witnesses; and what hee shall say in point of law, from those that shall in their pleadings shew it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. the lords of parlament in england were judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the lawes, and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority of giving sentence. in like manner, in the ordinary trialls of right, twelve men of the common people, are the judges, and give sentence, not onely of the fact, but of the right; and pronounce simply for the complaynant, or for the defendant; that is to say, are judges not onely of the fact, but also of the right: and in a question of crime, not onely determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be murder, homicide, felony, assault, and the like, which are determinations of law: but because they are not supposed to know the law of themselves, there is one that hath authority to enforme them of it, in the particular case they are to judge of. but yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unlesse it be made appear, they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward. the things that make a good judge, or good interpreter of the lawes, are, first a right understanding of that principall law of nature called equity; which depending not on the reading of other mens writings, but on the goodnesse of a mans own naturall reason, and meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. secondly, contempt of unnecessary riches, and preferments. thirdly, to be able in judgement to devest himselfe of all feare, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. fourthly, and lastly, patience to heare; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath heard. divisions of law the difference and division of the lawes, has been made in divers manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. for it is a thing that dependeth not on nature, but on the scope of the writer; and is subservient to every mans proper method. in the institutions of justinian, we find seven sorts of civill lawes. 1. the edicts, constitutions, and epistles of the prince, that is, of the emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. like these, are the proclamations of the kings of england. 2. the decrees of the whole people of rome (comprehending the senate,) when they were put to the question by the senate. these were lawes, at first, by the vertue of the soveraign power residing in the people; and such of them as by the emperours were not abrogated, remained lawes by the authority imperiall. for all lawes that bind, are understood to be lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them. somewhat like to these lawes, are the acts of parliament in england. 3. the decrees of the common people (excluding the senate,) when they were put to the question by the tribune of the people. for such of them as were not abrogated by the emperours, remained lawes by the authority imperiall. like to these, were the orders of the house of commons in england. 4. senatus consulta, the orders of the senate; because when the people of rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it was thought fit by the emperour, that men should consult the senate in stead of the people: and these have some resemblance with the acts of counsell. 5. the edicts of praetors, and (in some cases) of the aediles: such as are the chiefe justices in the courts of england. 6. responsa prudentum; which were the sentences, and opinions of those lawyers, to whom the emperour gave authority to interpret the law, and to give answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice; which answers, the judges in giving judgement were obliged by the constitutions of the emperour to observe; and should be like the reports of cases judged, if other judges be by the law of england bound to observe them. for the judges of the common law of england, are not properly judges, but juris consulti; of whom the judges, who are either the lords, or twelve men of the country, are in point of law to ask advice. 7. also, unwritten customes, (which in their own nature are an imitation of law,) by the tacite consent of the emperour, in case they be not contrary to the law of nature, are very lawes. another division of lawes, is into naturall and positive. naturall are those which have been lawes from all eternity; and are called not onely naturall, but also morall lawes; consisting in the morall vertues, as justice, equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace, and charity; of which i have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters. positive, are those which have not been for eternity; but have been made lawes by the will of those that have had the soveraign power over others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the will of their legislator. another division of law again, of positive lawes some are humane, some divine; and of humane positive lawes, some are distributive, some penal. distributive are those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak to all the subjects. penal are those, which declare, what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law; and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution. for though every one ought to be informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; neverthelesse the command is not addressed to the delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,) but to publique ministers appointed to see the penalty executed. and these penal lawes are for the most part written together with the lawes distributive; and are sometimes called judgements. for all lawes are generall judgements, or sentences of the legislator; as also every particular judgement, is a law to him, whose case is judged. divine positive law how made known to be law divine positive lawes (for naturall lawes being eternall, and universall, are all divine,) are those, which being the commandements of god, (not from all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but onely to a certain people, or to certain persons,) are declared for such, by those whom god hath authorised to declare them. but this authority of man to declare what be these positive lawes of god, how can it be known? god may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver lawes to other men. but because it is of the essence of law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from god, how can a man without supernaturall revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them? for the first question, how a man can be assured of the revelation of another, without a revelation particularly to himselfe, it is evidently impossible: for though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the miracles they see him doe, or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the extraordinary wisedome, or extraordinary felicity of his actions, all which are marks of gods extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidence of speciall revelation. miracles are marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another. sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most often the work of god by naturall, and ordinary causes. and therefore no man can infallibly know by naturall reason, that another has had a supernaturall revelation of gods will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the signs thereof shall appear greater, or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief. but for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. for if the law declared, be not against the law of nature (which is undoubtedly gods law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound i say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of god, ordinary, or extraordinary. faith of supernaturall law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibite to god, but a gift which god freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of his lawes; but a rejection of them all, except the lawes naturall. but this that i say, will be made yet cleerer, by the examples, and testimonies concerning this point in holy scripture. the covenant god made with abraham (in a supernaturall manner) was thus, (gen. 17. 10) "this is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee." abrahams seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what abraham should declare to them for gods law; which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their parents; who (if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of abraham) have soveraign power over their children, and servants. againe, where god saith to abraham, "in thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed: for i know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the lord, and to observe righteousnesse and judgement," it is manifest, the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their soveraign. at mount sinai moses only went up to god; the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound to obey all that moses declared to them for gods law. upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, "speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not god speak to us, lest we dye?" by which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of god, is to obey for such, the command of the common-wealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for gods commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is gods commandement; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the commandements of the common-wealth. i conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the morall law, (that is to say, to the law of nature,) all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law, which is declared to be so, by the lawes of the common-wealth. which also is evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not against the law of nature, may be made law in the name of them that have the soveraign power; and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it, when tis propounded in the name of god. besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other commandements of god, than are declared for such by the common-wealth. christian states punish those that revolt from christian religion, and all other states, those that set up any religion by them forbidden. for in whatsoever is not regulated by the common-wealth, tis equity (which is the law of nature, and therefore an eternall law of god) that every man equally enjoy his liberty. another division of lawes there is also another distinction of laws, into fundamentall, and not fundamentall: but i could never see in any author, what a fundamentall law signifieth. neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that manner. a fundamentall law what for a fundamentall law in every common-wealth is that, which being taken away, the common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose foundation is destroyed. and therefore a fundamentall law is that, by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the soveraign, whether a monarch, or a soveraign assembly, without which the common-wealth cannot stand, such as is the power of war and peace, of judicature, of election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the publique good. not fundamentall is that the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the common-wealth; such as are the lawes concerning controversies between subject and subject. thus much of the division of lawes. difference between law and right i find the words lex civilis, and jus civile, that is to say, law and right civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so. for right is liberty, namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us: but civill law is an obligation; and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature gave us. nature gave a right to every man to secure himselfe by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention; but the civill law takes away that liberty, in all cases where the protection of the lawe may be safely stayd for. insomuch as lex and jus, are as different as obligation and liberty. and between a law and a charter likewise lawes and charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing. yet charters are donations of the soveraign; and not lawes, but exemptions from law. the phrase of a law is jubeo, injungo, i command, and enjoyn: the phrase of a charter is dedi, concessi, i have given, i have granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a law. a law may be made to bind all the subjects of a common-wealth: a liberty, or charter is only to one man, or some one part of the people. for to say all the people of a common-wealth, have liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath been no law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated. chapter xxvii. of crimes, excuses, and extenuations sinne what a sinne, is not onely a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. for such contempt, is a breach of all his lawes at once. and therefore may consist, not onely in the commission of a fact, or in the speaking of words by the lawes forbidden, or in the omission of what the law commandeth, but also in the intention, or purpose to transgresse. for the purpose to breake the law, is some degree of contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. to be delighted in the imagination onely, of being possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force, or fraud, is no breach of the law, that sayth, "thou shalt not covet:" nor is the pleasure a man my have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage, and displeasure, a sinne; but the resolving to put some act in execution, that tendeth thereto. for to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it were reall, is a passion so adhaerent to the nature both of a man, and every other living creature, as to make it a sinne, were to make sinne of being a man. the consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the first motions of the mind, (though checked with the fear of god) be sinnes. but i confesse it is safer to erre on that hand, than on the other. a crime what a crime, is a sinne, consisting in the committing (by deed, or word) of that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath commanded. so that every crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a crime. to intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare in word, or fact: for god that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be crime; which distinction the greeks observed in the word amartema, and egklema, or aitia; wherof the former, (which is translated sinne,) signifieth any swarving from the law whatsoever; but the two later, (which are translated crime,) signifie that sinne onely, whereof one man may accuse another. but of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for humane accusation. in like manner the latines by peccatum, which is sinne, signifie all manner of deviation from the law; but by crimen, (which word they derive from cerno, which signifies to perceive,) they mean onely such sinnes, as my be made appear before a judge; and therfore are not meer intentions. where no civill law is, there is no crime from this relation of sinne to the law, and of crime to the civill law, may be inferred, first, that where law ceaseth, sinne ceaseth. but because the law of nature is eternall, violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and all facts contrary to any morall vertue, can never cease to be sinne. secondly, that the civill law ceasing, crimes cease: for there being no other law remaining, but that of nature, there is no place for accusation; every man being his own judge, and accused onely by his own conscience, and cleared by the uprightnesse of his own intention. when therefore his intention is right, his fact is no sinne: if otherwise, his fact is sinne; but not crime. thirdly, that when the soveraign power ceaseth, crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such power, there is no protection to be had from the law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the institution of soveraign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all soveraignty was ordained. but this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the power that protected them: for that was a crime from the beginning. ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man the source of every crime, is some defect of the understanding; or some errour in reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions. defect in the understanding, is ignorance; in reasoning, erroneous opinion. again, ignorance is of three sort; of the law, and of the soveraign, and of the penalty. ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himselfe. therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to that law, it is a crime. if a man come from the indies hither, and perswade men here to receive a new religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the lawes of this country, though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that comming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the religion there. but ignorance of the civill law, shall excuse a man in a strange country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no civill law is binding. ignorance of the civill law excuseth sometimes in the like manner, if the civill law of a mans own country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the action against the law of nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other cases ignorance of the civill law, excuseth not. ignorance of the soveraign excuseth not ignorance of the soveraign power, in the place of a mans ordinary residence, excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the power, by which he hath been protected there. ignorance of the penalty excuseth not ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man: for in breaking the law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the lawes, in every common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to arbitrary punishment. for it is reason, that he which does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his will whose law is thereby violated. punishments declared before the fact, excuse from greater punishments after it but when a penalty, is either annexed to the crime in the law it selfe, or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty. for the punishment foreknown, if not great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves; and therefore when they are punished more than the law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the same crime; it the law that tempted, and deceiveth them. nothing can be made a crime by a law made after the fact no law, made after a fact done, can make it a crime: because if the fact be against the law of nature, the law was before the fact; and a positive law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be obligatory. but when the law that forbiddeth a fact, is made before the fact be done; yet he that doth the fact, is lyable to the penalty ordained after, in case no lesser penalty were made known before, neither by writing, nor by example, for the reason immediatly before alledged. false principles of right and wrong causes of crime from defect in reasoning, (that is to say, from errour,) men are prone to violate the lawes, three wayes. first, by presumption of false principles; as when men from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the cob-web lawes of their country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their enterprises, have been esteemed the onely criminals; have thereupon taken for principles, and grounds of their reasoning, "that justice is but a vain word: that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry, and hazard, is his own: that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust: that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like again;" and many more of that kind: which being granted, no act in it selfe can be a crime, but must be made so (not by the law, but) by the successe of them that commit it; and the same fact be vertuous, or vicious, as fortune pleaseth; so that what marius makes a crime, sylla shall make meritorious, and caesar (the same lawes standing) turn again into a crime, to the perpetuall disturbance of the peace of the common-wealth. false teachers mis-interpreting the law of nature secondly, by false teachers, that either mis-interpret the law of nature, making it thereby repugnant to the law civill; or by teaching for lawes, such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a subject. and false inferences from true principles, by teachers thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but onely common experience, and a good naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of right and wrong, which is no lesse difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study. and of those defects in reasoning, there is none that can excuse (though some of them may extenuate) a crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private businesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge; because they pretend to the reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their excuse. by their passions; of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one, is vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud, or some other naturall quality, not depending on the will of those that have the soveraign authority. from whence proceedeth a presumption that the punishments ordained by the lawes, and extended generally to all subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the vulgar. presumption of riches therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique justice, or obtaining pardon by mony, or other rewards. and friends and that such as have multitude of potent kindred; and popular men, that have gained reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate the lawes, from a hope of oppressing the power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution. wisedome and that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own wisedome, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the lawes with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime, but what their own designes require should be so. it happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such crimes, as consist in craft, and in deceiving of their neighbours; because they think their designes are too subtile to be perceived. these i say are effects of a false presumption of their own wisdome. for of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of common-wealth, (which can never happen without a civill warre,) very few are left alive long enough, to see their new designes established: so that the benefit of their crimes, redoundeth to posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not as wise, as they thought they were. and those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes. and generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,) are subject to anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: and there are few crimes that may not be produced by anger. hatred, lust, ambition, covetousnesse, causes of crime as for the passions, of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousnesse, what crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. for in those things men hate, they find a continuall, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him; the former is difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the law. ambition, and covetousnesse are passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. and for lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie, or uncertain punishments. fear sometimes cause of crime, as when the danger is neither present, nor corporeall of all passions, that which enclineth men least to break the lawes, is fear. nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing, (when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the lawes,) that makes men keep them. and yet in many cases a crime may be committed through feare. for not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear onely of corporeall hurt, which we call bodily fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. a man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; if he wound him to death, this is no crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes, where the law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. but to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatnings, i may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing i have time, and means to demand protection, from the soveraign power,) is a crime. again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries (for which they that made the lawes, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of reason, to take notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge. this is a crime; for the hurt is not corporeall, but phantasticall, and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. also a man may stand in fear of spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange dreams and visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the lawes; and that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be excused by this fear; but is a crime. for (as i have shewn before in the second chapter) dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our senses had formerly received waking; and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be reall visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own, or anothers dream, or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power of invisible spirits, than is permitted by the common-wealth, leaveth the law of nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the law of nature, if any one have it) there could no law be made to hold, and so all common-wealth would be dissolved. crimes not equall from these different sources of crimes, it appeares already, that all crimes are not (as the stoicks of old time maintained) of the same allay. there is place, not only for excuse, by which that which seemed a crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for extenuation, by which the crime, that seemed great, is made lesse. for though all crimes doe equally deserve the name of injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse, which the stoicks rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the stoicks not observing, held it as great a crime, to kill a hen, against the law, as to kill ones father. totall excuses that which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of a crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the law. for the fact committed once against the law, if he that committed it be obliged to the law, can be no other than a crime. the want of means to know the law, totally excuseth: for the law whereof a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. but the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the lawes of nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only children, and madmen are excused from offences against the law naturall. where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the obligation of the law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and consequently such obedience is no crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can. if a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. and supposing such a law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, "if i doe it not, i die presently; if i doe it, i die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained;" nature therefore compells him to the fact. when a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtaine for mony nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another mans sword, he is totally excused, for the reason next before alledged. excuses against the author again, facts done against the law, by the authority of another, are by that authority excused against the author; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the law, bothe the author, and actor are criminalls. from hence it followeth that when that man, or assembly, that hath the soveraign power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former law, the doing of it is totally excused: for he ought not to condemn it himselfe, because he is the author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other. besides, when the soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the law. if that man, or assembly, that hath the soveraign power, disclaime any right essentiall to the soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the subject, any liberty inconsistent with the soveraign power, that is to say, with the very being of a common-wealth, if the subject shall refuse to obey the command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is neverthelesse a sinne, and contrary to the duty of the subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the soveraignty, because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evill consequence thereof. but if he not onely disobey, but also resist a publique minister in the execution of it, then it is a crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the peace,) upon complaint. the degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and measured, first, by the malignity of the source, or cause: secondly, by the contagion of the example: thirdly, by the mischiefe of the effect; and fourthly, by the concurrence of times, places, and persons. presumption of power, aggravateth the same fact done against the law, if it proceed from presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the law, is a greater crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: for presumption of impunity by force, is a root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all lawes; whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient for the future. a crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: for he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the law. evill teachers, extenuate hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a teacher, or an interpreter of the law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles, and reasoning: for what is taught by one that teacheth by publique authority, the common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of law, till the same authority controuleth it; and in all crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the soveraign power, nor are against an evident law, excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his private judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof, to stand, or fall. examples of impunity, extenuate the same fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, as a greater crime, than if there have been may precedent examples of impunity. for those examples, are so many hopes of impunity given by the soveraign himselfe: and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole. praemeditation, aggravateth a crime arising from a sudden passion, is not so great, as when the same ariseth from long meditation: for in the former case there is a place for extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on the law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane society; all which in committing the crime, hee hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite. but there is no suddennesse of passion sufficient for a totall excuse: for all the time between the first knowing of the law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the law, to rectifie the irregularity of his passions. where the law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater crime, than where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their callings, and be informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the soveraign power. tacite approbation of the soveraign, extenuates those facts which the law expresly condemneth, but the law-maker by other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse crimes, than the same facts, condemned both by the law, and lawmaker. for seeing the will of the law-maker is a law, there appear in this case two contradictory lawes; which would totally excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command. but because there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression of his law, but also to the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole crime to the delinquent. for example, the law condemneth duells; the punishment is made capitall: on the contrary part, he that refuseth duell, is subject to contempt and scorne, without remedy; and sometimes by the soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in warre: if thereupon he accept duell, considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the soveraign power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher; which i say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid. the examples of princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the lawes themselves. and though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please god to give men an extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that precept. comparison of crimes from their effects again, if we compare crimes by the mischiefe of their effects, first, the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. and therefore, when a fact hurteth, not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former, is a fertile crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is barren. to maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised preacher, than in a private person: so also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. likewise in a professor of the law, to maintain any point, on do any act, that tendeth to the weakning of the soveraign power, as a greater crime, than in another man: also in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law, is a greater crime, than the same fact in another: for such men not onely commit crime, but teach it for law to all other men. and generally all crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by becoming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them. laesae majestas also facts of hostility against the present state of the common-wealth, are greater crimes, than the same acts done to private men; for the dammage extends it selfe to all: such are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the common-wealth to an enemy; also all attempts upon the representative of the common-wealth, be it a monarch, or an assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish the authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession: which crimes the latines understand by crimina laesae majestatis, and consist in designe, or act, contrary to a fundamentall law. bribery and false testimony likewise those crimes, which render judgements of no effect, are greater crimes, than injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive mony to give false judgement, or testimony, is a greater crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all judgements are rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges. depeculation also robbery, and depeculation of the publique treasure, or revenues, is a greater crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a private man; because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once. counterfeiting authority also the counterfeit usurpation of publique ministery, the counterfeiting of publique seales, or publique coine, than counterfeiting of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the dammage of many. crimes against private men compared of facts against the law, done to private men, the greater crime, is that, where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. and therefore to kill against the law, is a greater crime, that any other injury, life preserved. and to kill with torment, greater, than simply to kill. and mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his goods. and the spoyling a man of his goods, by terrour of death, or wounds, than by clandestine surreption. and by clandestine surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained. and the violation of chastity by force, greater, than by flattery. and of a woman married, than of a woman not married. for all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and some lesse sensible of the same offence. but the law regardeth not the particular, but the generall inclination of mankind. and therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the lawes of the greeks, romans, and other both antient, and moderne common-wealths; supposing the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own vertue,) but in the pusillanimity of him that is offended by it. also a crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. for to kill ones parent, is a greater crime, than to kill another: for the parent ought to have the honour of a soveraign, (though he have surrendred his power to the civill law,) because he had it originally by nature. and to robbe a poore man, is a greater crime, than to robbe a rich man; because 'tis to the poore a more sensible dammage. and a crime committed in the time, or place appointed for devotion, is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the law. many other cases of aggravation, and extenuation might be added: but by these i have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of any other crime proposed. publique crimes what lastly, because in almost all crimes there is an injury done, not onely to some private man, but also to the common-wealth; the same crime, when the accusation is in the name of the common-wealth, is called publique crime; and when in the name of a private man, a private crime; and the pleas according thereunto called publique, judicia publica, pleas of the crown; or private pleas. as in an accusation of murder, if the accuser be a private man, the plea is a private plea; if the accuser be the soveraign, the plea is a publique plea. chapter xxviii. of punishments, and rewards the definition of punishment "a punishment, is an evill inflicted by publique authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience." right to punish whence derived before i inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the right, or authority of punishing in any case, came in. for by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. in the making of a common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himselfe. also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the soveraignty, in the punishing of another; but of himselfe not. but to covenant to assist the soveraign, in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give him a right to punish. it is manifest therefore that the right which the common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the subjects. but i have also shewed formerly, that before the institution of common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. and this is the foundation of that right of punishing, which is exercised in every common-wealth. for the subjects did not give the soveraign that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by naturall law) as entire, as in the condition of meer nature, and of warre of every one against his neighbour. private injuries, and revenges no punishments from the definition of punishment, i inferre, first, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled punishment; because they proceed not from publique authority. nor denyall of preferment secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique favour, is not a punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before. nor pain inflicted without publique hearing thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique authority, without precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is punished, ought first to be judged by publique authority, to be a transgression of the law. nor pain inflicted by usurped power fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and judges without authority from the soveraign, is not punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique authority. nor pain inflicted without respect to the future good fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the lawes, is not punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name. naturall evill consequences, no punishments sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by nature, divers hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of god, who is the author of nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the name of punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the authority of man. hurt inflicted, if lesse than the benefit of transgressing, is not punishment seventhly, if the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the price, or redemption, than the punishment of a crime: because it is of the nature of punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the law; which end (if it be lesse that the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect. where the punishment is annexed to the law, a greater hurt is not punishment, but hostility eighthly, if a punishment be determined and prescribed in the law it selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater punishment inflicted, the excesse is not punishment, but an act of hostility. for seeing the aym of punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the terrour of a great punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. but where there is no punishment at all determined by the law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of punishment. for he that goes about the violation of a law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary punishment. hurt inflicted for a fact done before the law, no punishment ninthly, harme inflicted for a fact done before there was a law that forbad it, is not punishment, but an act of hostility: for before the law, there is no transgression of the law: but punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the law; therefore harme inflicted before the law made, is not punishment, but an act of hostility. the representative of the common-wealth unpunishable tenthly, hurt inflicted on the representative of the common-wealth, is not punishment, but an act of hostility: because it is of the nature of punishment, to be inflicted by publique authority, which is the authority only of the representative it self. hurt to revolted subjects is done by right of war, not by way of punishment lastly, harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of punishment: because seeing they were either never subject to the law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of hostility. but in declared hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull. from whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the representative of the common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the representative will: for in denying subjection, he denyes such punishment as by the law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the representative. for the punishments set down in the law, are to subjects, not to enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the soveraign power. the first, and most generall distribution of punishments, is into divine, and humane. of the former i shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient place hereafter. humane, are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandement of man; and are either corporall, or pecuniary, or ignominy, or imprisonment, or exile, or mixt of these. punishments corporall corporall punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully enjoyed. capitall and of these, some be capitall, some lesse than capitall. capitall, is the infliction of death; and that either simply, or with torment. lesse than capitall, are stripes, wounds, chains, and any other corporall paine, not in its own nature mortall. for if upon the infliction of a punishment death follow not in the intention of the inflicter, the punishment is not be bee esteemed capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened. pecuniary punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a summe of mony, but also of lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for mony. and in case the law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a punishment, but the price of priviledge, and exemption from the law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the mony: except where the law is naturall, or part of religion; for in that case it is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of it. as where a law exacteth a pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of god in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to sweare, but the punishment of the transgression of a law undispensable. in like manner if the law impose a summe of mony to be payd, to him that has been injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender. ignominy ignominy, is the infliction of such evill, as is made dishonorable; or the deprivation of such good, as is made honourable by the common-wealth. for there be some things honorable by nature; as the effects of courage, magnanimity, strength, wisdome, and other abilities of body and mind: others made honorable by the common-wealth; as badges, titles, offices, or any other singular marke of the soveraigns favour. the former, (though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a law; and therefore the losse of them is not punishment. but the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made them honorable, and are properly punishments: such are degrading men condemned, of their badges, titles, and offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come. imprisonment imprisonment, is when a man is by publique authority deprived of liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned. the former is not punishment; because no man is supposed to be punisht, before he be judicially heard, and declared guilty. and therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the law of nature. but the later is punishment, because evill, and inflicted by publique authority, for somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression of the law. under this word imprisonment, i comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a house, which is called by the generall name of a prison; or an iland, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to quarries, and in these times to gallies; or be it a chaine, or any other such impediment. exile exile, (banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart out of the dominion of the common-wealth, or out of a certaine part thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to avoid punishment by flight. and cicero sayes, there was never any such punishment ordained in the city of rome; but cals it a refuge of men in danger. for if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his goods, and the revenue of his lands, the meer change of ayr is no punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the common-wealth, for which all punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of mens wils to the observation of the law;) but many times to the dammage of the common-wealth. for a banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a member of the same. but if he be withall deprived of his lands, or goods, then the punishment lyeth not in the exile, but is to be reckoned amongst punishments pecuniary. the punishment of innocent subjects is contrary to the law of nature all punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the law of nature; for punishment is only of transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. it is therefore a violation, first, of that law of nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: for there can arrive no good to the common-wealth, by punishing the innocent. secondly, of that, which forbiddeth ingratitude: for seeing all soveraign power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the punishment of the innocent, is a rendring of evill for good. and thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is to say, an equall distribution of justice; which in punishing the innocent is not observed. but the harme done to innocents in war, not so but the infliction of what evill soever, on an innocent man, that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the common-wealth, and without violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. for all men that are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. but against enemies, whom the common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall right of nature to make warre; wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent and innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his own people. and upon this ground it is, that also in subjects, who deliberatly deny the authority of the common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies. for rebellion, is but warre renewed. reward, is either salary, or grace reward, is either of gift, or by contract. when by contract, it is called salary, and wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. when of gift, it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. and therefore when the soveraign of a common-wealth appointeth a salary to any publique office, he that receiveth it, is bound in justice to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall. for though men have no lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to serve the publique, without reward, or salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the common-wealth, unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a debt. benefits bestowed for fear, are not rewards the benefits which a soveraign bestoweth on a subject, for fear of some power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the common-wealth, are not properly rewards; for they are not salaryes; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the common-wealth disservice: nor are they graces; because they be extorted by feare, which ought not to be incident to the soveraign power: but are rather sacrifices, which the soveraign (considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of the common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion. salaries certain and casuall and whereas some salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the execution of the office for which the salary is ordained; the later is in some cases hurtfull to the common-wealth; as in the case of judicature. for where the benefit of the judges, and ministers of a court of justice, ariseth for the multitude of causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow two inconveniences: one, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about jurisdiction; each court drawing to it selfe, as many causes as it can. but in offices of execution there are not those inconveniences; because their employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. and thus much shall suffice for the nature of punishment, and reward; which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a common-wealth. hitherto i have set forth the nature of man, (whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to government;) together with the great power of his governour, whom i compared to leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of job; where god having set forth the great power of leviathan, called him king of the proud. "there is nothing," saith he, "on earth, to be compared with him. he is made so as not be afraid. hee seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the children of pride." but because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose lawes he ought to obey; i shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases, and the causes of his mortality; and of what lawes of nature he is bound to obey. chapter xxix. of those things that weaken, or tend to the dissolution of a common-wealth dissolution of common-wealths proceedeth from imperfect institution though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. for by the nature of their institution, they are designed to live, as long as man-kind, or as the lawes of nature, or as justice it selfe, which gives them life. therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the matter; but as they are the makers, and orderers of them. for men, as they become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit laws, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able architect, be compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity. amongst the infirmities therefore of a common-wealth, i will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a defectuous procreation. want of absolute power of which, this is one, "that a man to obtain a kingdome, is sometimes content with lesse power, than to the peace, and defence of the common-wealth is necessarily required." from whence it commeth to passe, that when the exercise of the power layd by, is for the publique safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; in the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs. and when kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign common-wealths; who in order to the good of their own subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of their neighbours. so was thomas beckett archbishop of canterbury, supported against henry the second, by the pope; the subjection of ecclesiastiques to the common-wealth, having been dispensed with by william the conqueror at his reception, when he took an oath, not to infringe the liberty of the church. and so were the barons, whose power was by william rufus (to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the soveraign power, maintained in their rebellion against king john, by the french. nor does this happen in monarchy onely. for whereas the stile of the antient roman common-wealth, was, the senate, and people of rome; neither senate, nor people pretended to the whole power; which first caused the seditions, of tiberius gracchus, caius gracchus, lucius saturnius, and others; and afterwards the warres between the senate and the people, under marius and sylla; and again under pompey and caesar, to the extinction of their democraty, and the setting up of monarchy. the people of athens bound themselves but from one onely action; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the island of salamis; and yet thereby, if solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the people that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of their citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all common-wealths forced to, that have their power never so little limited. private judgement of good and evill in the second place, i observe the diseases of a common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, "that every private man is judge of good and evill actions." this is true in the condition of meer nature, where there are no civill lawes; and also under civill government, in such cases as are not determined by the law. but otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evill actions, is the civill law; and the judge the legislator, who is alwayes representative of the common-wealth. from this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit. whereby the common-wealth is distracted and weakened. erroneous conscience another doctrine repugnant to civill society, is, that "whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sinne;" and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evill. for a mans conscience, and his judgement is the same thing; and as the judgement, so also the conscience may be erroneous. therefore, though he that is subject to no civill law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a common-wealth; because the law is the publique conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the soveraign power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes. pretence of inspiration it hath been also commonly taught, "that faith and sanctity, are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernaturall inspiration, or infusion," which granted, i see not why any man should render a reason of his faith; or why every christian should not be also a prophet; or why any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own inspiration, for the rule of his action. and thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evill; or to make judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution of all civill government. faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by god almighty; and yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them that concurre to every effect, unobservable. faith, and sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall wayes, by which god worketh them in his elect, as such time as he thinketh fit. and these three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned divines; who joyning the words of holy scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that sanctity and naturall reason, cannot stand together. subjecting the soveraign power to civill lawes a fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a common-wealth, is this, "that he that hath the soveraign power, is subject to the civill lawes." it is true, that soveraigns are all subjects to the lawes of nature; because such lawes be divine, and cannot by any man, or common-wealth be abrogated. but to those lawes which the soveraign himselfe, that is, which the common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. for to be subject to lawes, is to be subject to the common-wealth, that is to the soveraign representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but freedome from the lawes. which errour, because it setteth the lawes above the soveraign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him; which is to make a new soveraign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion, and dissolution of the common-wealth. attributing of absolute propriety to the subjects a fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the dissolution of a common-wealth, is, "that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods; such, as excludeth the right of the soveraign." every man has indeed a propriety that excludes the right of every other subject: and he has it onely from the soveraign power; without the protection whereof, every other man should have equall right to the same. but if the right of the soveraign also be excluded, he cannot performe the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a common-wealth. and if the propriety of subjects, exclude not the right of the soveraign representative to their goods; much lesse to their offices of judicature, or execution, in which they represent the soveraign himselfe. dividing of the soveraign power there is a sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a common-wealth; and 'tis this, "that the soveraign power may be divided." for what is it to divide the power of a common-wealth, but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other. and for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power. imitation of neighbour nations and as false doctrine, so also often-times the example of different government in a neighbouring nation, disposeth men to alteration of the forme already setled. so the people of the jewes were stirred up to reject god, and to call upon the prophet samuel, for a king after the manner of the nations; so also the lesser cities of greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the aristocraticall, and democraticall factions; one part of almost every common-wealth, desiring to imitate the lacedaemonians; the other, the athenians. and i doubt not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in england, out of an imitation of the low countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme of their government. for the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty: when therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer. imitation of the greeks, and romans and as to rebellion in particular against monarchy; one of the most frequent causes of it, is the reading of the books of policy, and histories of the antient greeks, and romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the conductors of their armies, receive withall a pleasing idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the vertue of their popular form of government: not considering the frequent seditions, and civill warres, produced by the imperfection of their policy. from the reading, i say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their kings, because the greek and latine writers, in their books, and discourses of policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him tyrant. for they say not regicide, that is, killing of a king, but tyrannicide, that is, killing of a tyrant is lawfull. from the same books, they that live under a monarch conceive an opinion, that the subjects in a popular common-wealth enjoy liberty; but that in a monarchy they are all slaves. i say, they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a popular government; for they find no such matter. in summe, i cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet masters, as are fit to take away their venime; which venime i will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad dogge, which is a disease the physicians call hydrophobia, or fear of water. for as he that is so bitten, has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a dogge: so when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre. as here have been doctors, that hold there be three soules in a man; so there be also that think there may be more soules, (that is, more soveraigns,) than one, in a common-wealth; and set up a supremacy against the soveraignty; canons against lawes; and a ghostly authority against the civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity) that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another kingdome, as it were a kingdome of fayries, in the dark. now seeing it is manifest, that the civill power, and the power of the common-wealth is the same thing; and that supremacy, and the power of making canons, and granting faculties, implyeth a common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is soveraign, another supreme; where one can make lawes, and another make canons; there must needs be two common-wealths, of one & the same subjects; which is a kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. for notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of temporall, and ghostly, they are still two kingdomes, and every subject is subject to two masters. for seeing the ghostly power challengeth the right to declare what is sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is law, (sinne being nothing but the transgression of the law;) and again, the civill power challenging to declare what is law, every subject must obey two masters, who bothe will have their commands be observed as law; which is impossible. or, if it be but one kingdome, either the civill, which is the power of the common-wealth, must be subordinate to the ghostly; or the ghostly must be subordinate to the temporall and then there is no supremacy but the temporall. when therefore these two powers oppose one another, the common-wealth cannot but be in great danger of civill warre, and dissolution. for the civill authority being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: and the spirituall, though it stand in the darknesse of schoole distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of darknesse, and ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to trouble, and sometimes to destroy a common-wealth. and this is a disease which not unfitly may be compared to the epilepsie, or falling-sicknesse (which the jewes took to be one kind of possession by spirits) in the body naturall. for as in this disease, there is an unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the soule in the brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the body politique, when the spirituall power, moveth the members of a common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the nerves of it,) otherwise than by the civill power (which is the soule of the common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates the people, and either overwhelm the common-wealth with oppression, or cast it into the fire of a civill warre. mixt government sometimes also in the meerly civill government, there be more than one soule: as when the power of levying mony, (which is the nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall assembly; the power of conduct and command, (which is the motive faculty,) on one man; and the power of making lawes, (which is the rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; this endangereth the common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good lawes; but most often for want of such nourishment, as is necessary to life, and motion. for although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the common-wealth into three factions, and call it mixt monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent common-wealth, but three independent factions; nor one representative person, but three. in the kingdome of god, there may be three persons independent, without breach of unity in god that reigneth; but where men reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. and therefore if the king bear the person of the people, and the generall assembly bear also the person of the people, and another assembly bear the person of a part of the people, they are not one person, nor one soveraign, but three persons, and three soveraigns. to what disease in the naturall body of man, i may exactly compare this irregularity of a common-wealth, i know not. but i have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast, and stomach, of his own: if he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact. want of mony hitherto i have named such diseases of a common-wealth, as are of the greatest, and most present danger. there be other, not so great; which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. as first, the difficulty of raising mony, for the necessary uses of the common-wealth; especially in the approach of warre. this difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the soveraigns right to the use of the same. from whence it commeth to passe, that the soveraign power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the publique treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by strategems of law, to obtain little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the common-wealth must perish. insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the heart, to force a passage for the bloud; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole of a time, till (if nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if nature be too weak) the patient dyeth. monopolies and abuses of publicans again, there is sometimes in a common-wealth, a disease, which resembleth the pleurisie; and that is, when the treasure of the common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by monopolies, or by farmes of the publique revenues; in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisie, getting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth there an inflammation, accompanied with a fever, and painfull stitches. popular men also, the popularity of a potent subject, (unlesse the common-wealth have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous disease; because the people (which should receive their motion from the authority of the soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the lawes, to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. and this is commonly of more danger in a popular government, than in a monarchy; as it may easily be made believe, they are the people. by this means it was, that julius caesar, who was set up by the people against the senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his army, made himselfe master, both of senate and people. and this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft. excessive greatnesse of a town, multitude of corporations another infirmity of a common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a town, when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit, the number, and expence of a great army: as also the great number of corporations; which are as it were many lesser common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man. liberty of disputing against soveraign power to which may be added, the liberty of disputing against absolute power, by pretenders to politicall prudence; which though bred for the most part in the lees of the people; yet animated by false doctrines, are perpetually medling with the fundamentall lawes, to the molestation of the common-wealth; like the little wormes, which physicians call ascarides. we may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or bulimia, of enlarging dominion; with the incurable wounds thereby many times received from the enemy; and the wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; as also the lethargy of ease, and consumption of riot and vain expence. dissolution of the common-wealth lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies got a final victory; so as (the forces of the common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of subjects in their loyalty; then is the common-wealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. for the soveraign, is the publique soule, giving life and motion to the common-wealth; which expiring, the members are governed by it no more, than the carcasse of a man, by his departed (though immortal) soule. for though the right of a soveraign monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the obligation of the members may. for he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,) to protect his protection as long as he is able. but when the power of an assembly is once suppressed, the right of the same perisheth utterly; because the assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the soveraignty to re-enter. chapter xxx. of the office of the soveraign representative the procuration of the good of the people the office of the soveraign, (be it a monarch, or an assembly,) consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the soveraign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to god, the author of that law, and to none but him. but by safety here, is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawfull industry, without danger, or hurt to the common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe. by instruction & lawes and this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to individualls, further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a generall providence, contained in publique instruction, both of doctrine, and example; and in the making, and executing of good lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their own cases. against the duty of a soveraign to relinquish any essentiall right of soveraignty or not to see the people taught the grounds of them and because, if the essentiall rights of soveraignty (specified before in the eighteenth chapter) be taken away, the common-wealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen in this life;) it is the office of the soveraign, to maintain those rights entire; and consequently against his duty, first, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them. for he that deserteth the means, deserteth the ends; and he deserteth the means, that being the soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the civill lawes; and renounceth the power of supreme judicature; or of making warre, or peace by his own authority; or of judging of the necessities of the common-wealth; or of levying mony, and souldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making officers, and ministers both of warre, and peace; or of appointing teachers, and examining what doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the defence, peace, and good of the people. secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the common-wealth shall require their use and exercise. and the grounds of these rights, have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any civill law, or terrour of legal punishment. for a civill law, that shall forbid rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall rights of soveraignty,) is not (as a civill law) any obligation, but by vertue onely of the law of nature, that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the right of any law the soveraign maketh. and for the punishment, they take it but for an act of hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of hostility, to avoyd. objection of those that say there are no principles of reason for absolute soveraignty as i have heard some say, that justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a common-wealth,) is his own, which i have already shewed to be false: so there be also that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those essentiall rights, which make soveraignty absolute. for if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any common-wealth, where those rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. wherein they argue as ill, as if the savage people of america, should deny there were any grounds, or principles of reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. time, and industry, produce every day new knowledge. and as the art of well building, is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. but supposing that these of mine are not such principles of reason; yet i am sure they are principles from authority of scripture; as i shall make it appear, when i shall come to speak of the kingdome of god, (administred by moses,) over the jewes, his peculiar people by covenant. objection from the incapacity of the vulgar but they say again, that though the principles be right, yet common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. i should be glad, that the rich, and potent subjects of a kingdome, or those that are accounted the most learned, were no lesse incapable than they. but all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn. potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a power to bridle their affections; and learned men, any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their authority: whereas the common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with dependance on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by publique authority shall be imprinted in them. shall whole nations be brought to acquiesce in the great mysteries of christian religion, which are above reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which is against reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the law, to make that received, which is so consonant to reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? i conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the essentiall rights (which are the naturall, and fundamentall lawes) of soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a soveraign has his power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the common-wealth; and consequently, it is his duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his duty, but his benefit also, and security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall person, from rebellion. subjects are to be taught, not to affect change of government and (to descend to particulars) the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of government they see in their neighbour nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. for the prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocraticall, or democraticall assembly, commeth not from aristocracy, nor from democracy, but from the obedience, and concord of the subjects; nor do the people flourish in a monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. take away in any kind of state, the obedience, (and consequently the concord of the people,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. and they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsell of medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. this desire of change, is like the breach of the first of gods commandements: for there god says, non habebis deos alienos; thou shalt not have the gods of other nations; and in another place concerning kings, that they are gods. nor adhere (against the soveraign) to popular men secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the common-wealth; nor of any assembly, (except the soveraign assembly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them from the soveraign authority. for that soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought, that is not jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime marriage with them in facie ecclesiae by preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten commandements. nor to dispute the soveraign power thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great fault it is, to speak evill of the soveraign representative, (whether one man, or an assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his power, or any way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people, and their obedience (in which the safety of the common-wealth consisteth) slackened. which doctrine the third commandement by resemblance pointeth to. and to have dayes set apart to learn their duty fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the soveraign power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; it is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and praises given to god, the soveraign of soveraigns) hear those their duties told them, and the positive lawes, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh them lawes. to this end had the jewes every seventh day, a sabbath, in which the law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their king was god; that having created the world in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that god was their king, which redeemed them from their servile, and painfull labour in egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoyced in god, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation. so that the first table of the commandements, is spent all, in setting down the summe of gods absolute power; not onely as god, but as king by pact, (in peculiar) of the jewes; and may therefore give light, to those that have the soveraign power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects. and to honour their parents and because the first instruction of children, dependeth on the care of their parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes of honour. to which end they are to be taught, that originally the father of every man was also his soveraign lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the fathers of families, when by instituting a common-wealth, they resigned that absolute power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. for to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the institution of soveraign power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men. and this accordeth with the fifth commandement. and to avoyd doing of injury: again, every soveraign ought to cause justice to be taught, which (consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbour, by violence, or fraud, of any thing which by the soveraign authority is theirs. of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living. therefore the people are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcibly rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods. for which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false judgement, by corruption either of judges or witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandements. and to do all this sincerely from the heart lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act. and this is the intention of the tenth commandement, and the summe of the second table; which is reduced all to this one commandement of mutuall charity, "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe:" as the summe of the first table is reduced to "the love of god;" whom they had then newly received as their king. the use of universities as for the means, and conduits, by which the people may receive this instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may opinions, contrary to the peace of man-kind, upon weak and false principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. i mean those, which i have in the precedent chapter specified: as that men shall judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the law it selfe, but by their own private judgements; that subjects sinne in obeying the commands of the common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be lawfull: that their propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the dominion, which the common-wealth hath over the same: that it is lawfull for subjects to kill such, as they call tyrants: that the soveraign power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the people by this means. they whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of man-kind,) being diverted from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of naturall justice, but also of all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive the notions of their duty, chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of their neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of law, and conscience, than themselves. and the divines, and such others as make shew of learning, derive their knowledge from the universities, and from the schooles of law, or from the books, which by men eminent in those schooles, and universities have been published. it is therefore manifest, that the instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of youth in the universities. but are not (may some men say) the universities of england learned enough already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach the universities? hard questions. yet to the first, i doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of henry the eighth, the power of the pope, was alwayes upheld against the power of the common-wealth, principally by the universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many preachers, against the soveraign power of the king, and by so many lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. for in such a contradiction of opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and 'tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the civill authority. but to the later question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either i, or no: for any man that sees what i am doing, may easily perceive what i think. the safety of the people, requireth further, from him, or them that have the soveraign power, that justice be equally administred to all degrees of people; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them: for in this consisteth equity; to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his people. all breaches of the law, are offences against the common-wealth: but there be some, that are also against private persons. those that concern the common-wealth onely, may without breach of equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe, according to his own discretion. but an offence against a private man, cannot in equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction. the inequality of subjects, proceedeth from the acts of soveraign power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the soveraign; that is to say, in a court of justice, then the inequality between kings, and their subjects, in the presence of the king of kings. the honour of great persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. and the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. the consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. impunity maketh insolence; insolence hatred; and hatred, an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse, though with the ruine of the common-wealth. equall taxes to equall justice, appertaineth also the equall imposition of taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the common-wealth for his defence. it is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his labour. they must either do as the jewes did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the temple, build with one hand, and hold the sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. for the impositions that are layd on the people by the soveraign power, are nothing else but the wages, due to them that hold the publique sword, to defend private men in the exercise of severall trades, and callings. seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons, but for many more. which considered, the equality of imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. for what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the common-wealth, then the other? but when the impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth: nor is the common-wealth defrauded, by the luxurious waste of private men. publique charity and whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the necessities of nature require,) by the lawes of the common-wealth. for as it is uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the soveraign of a common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity. prevention of idlenesse but for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such lawes, as may encourage all manner of arts; as navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manifacture that requires labour. the multitude of poor, and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. and when all the world is overchargd with inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is warre; which provideth for every man, by victory, or death. good lawes what to the care of the soveraign, belongeth the making of good lawes. but what is a good law? by a good law, i mean not a just law: for no law can be unjust. the law is made by the soveraign power, and all that is done by such power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. it is in the lawes of a common-wealth, as in the lawes of gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. a good law is that, which is needfull, for the good of the people, and withall perspicuous. such as are necessary for the use of lawes, (which are but rules authorised) is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion, as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way. and therefore a law that is not needfull, having not the true end of a law, is not good. a law may be conceived to be good, when it is for the benefit of the soveraign; though it be not necessary for the people; but it is not so. for the good of the soveraign and people, cannot be separated. it is a weak soveraign, that has weak subjects; and a weak people, whose soveraign wanteth power to rule them at his will. unnecessary lawes are not good lawes; but trapps for mony: which where the right of soveraign power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend the people. such as are perspicuous the perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the law it selfe, as in a declaration of the causes, and motives, for which it was made. that is it, that shewes us the meaning of the legislator, and the meaning of the legislator known, the law is more easily understood by few, than many words. for all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the law, is multiplication of ambiguity: besides it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the law. and this is a cause of many unnecessary processes. for when i consider how short were the lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; me thinks i see a contention between the penners, and pleaders of the law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got the victory. it belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator, (such as is in all common-wealths the supreme representative, be it one man, or an assembly,) to make the reason perspicuous, why the law was made; and the body of the law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be. punishments it belongeth also to the office of the soveraign, to make a right application of punishments, and rewards. and seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest punishments are to be inflicted for those crimes, that are of most danger to the publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the government established; those that spring from contempt of justice; those that provoke indignation in the multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem authorised, as when they are committed by sonnes, servants, or favorites of men in authority: for indignation carrieth men, not onely against the actors, and authors of injustice; but against all power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of tarquin; when for the insolent act of one of his sonnes, he was driven out of rome, and the monarchy it selfe dissolved. but crimes of infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the fact be a great crime, or not, there is place many times for lenity, without prejudice to the common-wealth; and lenity when there is such place for it, is required by the law of nature. the punishment of the leaders, and teachers in a commotion; not the poore seduced people, when they are punished, can profit the common-wealth by their example. to be severe to the people, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed. rewards in like manner it belongeth to the office, and duty of the soveraign, to apply his rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the common-wealth: wherein consisteth their use, and end; and is then done, when they that have well served the common-wealth, are with as little expence of the common treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. to buy with mony, or preferment, from a popular ambitious subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of gratitude, but of fear: nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the dammage of the publique. it is a contention with ambition, like that of hercules with the monster hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three. for in like manner, when the stubbornnesse of one popular man, is overcome with reward, there arise many more (by the example) that do the same mischiefe, in hope of like benefit: and as all sorts of manifacture, so also malice encreaseth by being vendible. and though sometimes a civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the publique ruine more assured. it is therefore against the duty of the soveraign, to whom the publique safety is committed, to reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the peace of their country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater. counsellours another businesse of the soveraign, is to choose good counsellours; i mean such, whose advice he is to take in the government of the common-wealth. for this word counsell, consilium, corrupted from considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of facts past, and of law for the present. i take it here in the first sense onely: and in this sense, there is no choyce of counsell, neither in a democracy, nor aristocracy; because the persons counselling are members of the person counselled. the choyce of counsellours therefore is to monarchy; in which, the soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his office as he ought to do. the most able counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace, and defence of the common-wealth. it is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. but to know, who has most knowledge of the publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse. for to know, who knowes the rules almost of any art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. but the best signes of knowledge of any art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. good counsell comes not by lot, nor by inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of state, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the politiques, (as there does in the study of geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. for the politiques is the harder study of the two. whereas in these parts of europe, it hath been taken for a right of certain persons, to have place in the highest councell of state by inheritance; it is derived from the conquests of the antient germans; wherein many absolute lords joyning together to conquer other nations, would not enter in to the confederacy, without such priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their posterity, and the posterity of their subjects; which priviledges being inconsistent with the soveraign power, by the favour of the soveraign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth naturally to their abilities. and how able soever be the counsellours in any affaire, the benefit of their counsell is greater, when they give every one his advice, and reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly, by way of orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction, through envy, emulation, or other passions arising from the difference of opinion. the best counsell, in those things that concern not other nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the subjects may enjoy, by lawes that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and complaints of the people of each province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall rights of soveraignty, to be diligently taken notice of. for without those essentiall rights, (as i have often before said,) the common-wealth cannot at all subsist. commanders a commander of an army in chiefe, if he be not popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his army; and consequently cannot performe that office with good successe. he must therefore be industrious, valiant, affable, liberall and fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his souldiers. this is popularity, and breeds in the souldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the generall, in punishing (when need is) the mutinous, or negligent souldiers. but this love of souldiers, (if caution be not given of the commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to soveraign power; especially when it is in the hands of an assembly not popular. it belongeth therefore to the safety of the people, both that they be good conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the soveraign commits his armies. but when the soveraign himselfe is popular, that is, reverenced and beloved of his people, there is no danger at all from the popularity of a subject. for souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their captain; though they love him, against their soveraign, when they love not onely his person, but also his cause. and therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawfull soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their titles, to save the people from the shame of receiving them. to have a known right to soveraign power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own family: nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their armies. for the greatest and most active part of mankind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present. concerning the offices of one soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that law, which is commonly called the law of nations, i need not say any thing in this place; because the law of nations, and the law of nature, is the same thing. and every soveraign hath the same right, in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own body. and the same law, that dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to common-wealths, that is, to the consciences of soveraign princes, and soveraign assemblies; there being no court of naturall justice, but in the conscience onely; where not man, but god raigneth; whose lawes, (such of them as oblige all mankind,) in respect of god, as he is the author of nature, are naturall; and in respect of the same god, as he is king of kings, are lawes. but of the kingdome of god, as king of kings, and as king also of a peculiar people, i shall speak in the rest of this discourse. chapter xxxi. of the kingdome of god by nature the scope of the following chapters that the condition of meer nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are soveraigns, nor subjects, is anarchy, and the condition of warre: that the praecepts, by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the lawes of nature: that a common-wealth, without soveraign power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand: that subjects owe to soveraigns, simple obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the lawes of god, i have sufficiently proved, in that which i have already written. there wants onely, for the entire knowledge of civill duty, to know what are those lawes of god. for without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the civill power, whether it be contrary to the law of god, or not: and so, either by too much civill obedience, offends the divine majesty, or through feare of offending god, transgresses the commandements of the common-wealth. to avoyd both these rocks, it is necessary to know what are the lawes divine. and seeing the knowledge of all law, dependeth on the knowledge of the soveraign power; i shall say something in that which followeth, of the kingdome of god. who are subjects in the kingdome of god "god is king, let the earth rejoice," saith the psalmist. (psal. 96. 1). and again, "god is king though the nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the cherubins, though the earth be moved." (psal. 98. 1). whether men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to the divine power. by denying the existence, or providence of god, men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke. but to call this power of god, which extendeth it selfe not onely to man, but also to beasts, and plants, and bodies inanimate, by the name of kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of the word. for he onely is properly said to raigne, that governs his subjects, by his word, and by promise of rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with punishment that obey it not. subjects therefore in the kingdome of god, are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures irrationall; because they understand no precepts as his: nor atheists; nor they that believe not that god has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings. they therefore that believe there is a god that governeth the world, and hath given praecepts, and propounded rewards, and punishments to mankind, are gods subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as enemies. a threefold word of god, reason, revelation, prophecy to rule by words, requires that such words be manifestly made known; for else they are no lawes: for to the nature of lawes belongeth a sufficient, and clear promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of ignorance; which in the lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that is, proclamation, or promulgation by the voyce of man. but god declareth his lawes three wayes; by the dictates of naturall reason, by revelation, and by the voyce of some man, to whom by the operation of miracles, he procureth credit with the rest. from hence there ariseth a triple word of god, rational, sensible, and prophetique: to which correspondeth a triple hearing; right reason, sense supernaturall, and faith. as for sense supernaturall, which consisteth in revelation, or inspiration, there have not been any universall lawes so given, because god speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things. a twofold kingdome of god, naturall and prophetique from the difference between the other two kinds of gods word, rationall, and prophetique, there may be attributed to god, a two-fold kingdome, naturall, and prophetique: naturall, wherein he governeth as many of mankind as acknowledge his providence, by the naturall dictates of right reason; and prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar nation (the jewes) for his subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not onely by naturall reason, but by positive lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy prophets. of the naturall kingdome of god i intend to speak in this chapter. the right of gods soveraignty is derived from his omnipotence the right of nature, whereby god reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his lawes, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of gratitude for his benefits; but from his irresistible power. i have formerly shewn, how the soveraign right ariseth from pact: to shew how the same right may arise from nature, requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away. seeing all men by nature had right to all things, they had right every one to reigne over all the rest. but because this right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that right, to set up men (with soveraign authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of power irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that power have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion. to those therefore whose power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power, that the kingdome over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to god almighty; not as creator, and gracious; but as omnipotent. and though punishment be due for sinne onely, because by that word is understood affliction for sinne; yet the right of afflicting, is not alwayes derived from mens sinne, but from gods power. sinne not the cause of all affliction this question, "why evill men often prosper, and good men suffer adversity," has been much disputed by the antient, and is the same with this of ours, "by what right god dispenseth the prosperities and adversities of this life;" and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the vulgar, but of philosophers, and which is more, of the saints, concerning the divine providence. "how good," saith david, "is the god of israel to those that are upright in heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for i was grieved at the wicked, when i saw the ungodly in such prosperity." and job, how earnestly does he expostulate with god, for the many afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his righteousnesse? this question in the case of job, is decided by god himselfe, not by arguments derived from job's sinne, but his own power. for whereas the friends of job drew their arguments from his affliction to his sinne, and he defended himselfe by the conscience of his innocence, god himselfe taketh up the matter, and having justified the affliction by arguments drawn from his power, such as this "where was thou when i layd the foundations of the earth," and the like, both approved job's innocence, and reproved the erroneous doctrine of his friends. conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our saviour, concerning the man that was born blind, in these words, "neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of god might be made manifest in him." and though it be said "that death entred into the world by sinne," (by which is meant that if adam had never sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soule from his body,) it follows not thence, that god could not justly have afflicted him, though he had not sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne. divine lawes having spoken of the right of gods soveraignty, as grounded onely on nature; we are to consider next, what are the divine lawes, or dictates of naturall reason; which lawes concern either the naturall duties of one man to another, or the honour naturally due to our divine soveraign. the first are the same lawes of nature, of which i have spoken already in the 14. and 15. chapters of this treatise; namely, equity, justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the morall vertues. it remaineth therefore that we consider, what praecepts are dictated to men, by their naturall reason onely, without other word of god, touching the honour and worship of the divine majesty. honour and worship what honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the power, and goodnesse of another: and therefore to honour god, is to think as highly of his power and goodnesse, as is possible. and of that opinion, the externall signes appearing in the words, and actions of men, are called worship; which is one part of that which the latines understand by the word cultus: for cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own wills. in the first sense the labour bestowed on the earth, is called culture; and the education of children a culture of their mindes. in the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by force, but by compleasance, it signifieth as much as courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. and this is properly worship: in which sense publicola, is understood for a worshipper of the people, and cultus dei, for the worship of god. severall signes of honour from internall honour, consisting in the opinion of power and goodnesse, arise three passions; love, which hath reference to goodnesse; and hope, and fear, that relate to power: and three parts of externall worship; praise, magnifying, and blessing: the subject of praise, being goodnesse; the subject of magnifying, and blessing, being power, and the effect thereof felicity. praise, and magnifying are significant both by words, and actions: by words, when we say a man is good, or great: by actions, when we thank him for his bounty, and obey his power. the opinion of the happinesse of another, can onely be expressed by words. worship naturall and arbitrary there be some signes of honour, (both in attributes and actions,) that be naturally so; as amongst attributes, good, just, liberall, and the like; and amongst actions, prayers, thanks, and obedience. others are so by institution, or custome of men; and in some times and places are honourable; in others dishonourable; in others indifferent: such as are the gestures in salutation, prayer, and thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. the former is naturall; the later arbitrary worship. worship commanded and free and of arbitrary worship, there bee two differences: for sometimes it is a commanded, sometimes voluntary worship: commanded, when it is such as hee requireth, who is worshipped: free, when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit. when it is commanded, not the words, or gestures, but the obedience is the worship. but when free, the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are not worship; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator. worship publique and private again, there is a publique, and a private worship. publique, is the worship that a common-wealth performeth, as one person. private, is that which a private person exhibiteth. publique, in respect of the whole common-wealth, is free; but in respect of particular men it is not so. private, is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some restraint, either from the lawes, or from the opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of liberty. the end of worship the end of worship amongst men, is power. for where a man seeth another worshipped he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his power greater. but god has no ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity, by those rules of honour, that reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good already received from them. attributes of divine honour that we may know what worship of god is taught us by the light of nature, i will begin with his attributes. where, first, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him existence: for no man can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any beeing. secondly, that those philosophers, who sayd the world, or the soule of the world was god, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his existence: for by god, is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world is god, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no god. thirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternall, (seeing that which is eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a god. fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) ease to god, take from him the care of mankind; take from him his honour: for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of honour. fifthly, in those things that signifie greatnesse, and power; to say he is finite, is not to honour him: for it is not a signe of the will to honour god, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and finite, is lesse than we can; because to finite, it is easie to adde more. therefore to attribute figure to him, is not honour; for all figure is finite: nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is finite: not to attribute to him parts, or totality; which are the attributes onely of things finite: nor to say he is this, or that place: for whatsoever is in place, is bounded, and finite: nor that he is moved, or resteth: for both these attributes ascribe to him place: nor that there be more gods than one; because it implies them all finite: for there cannot be more than one infinite: nor to ascribe to him (unlesse metaphorically, meaning not the passion, but the effect) passions that partake of griefe; as repentance, anger, mercy: or of want; as appetite, hope, desire; or of any passive faculty: for passion, is power limited by somewhat else. and therefore when we ascribe to god a will, it is not to be understood, as that of man, for a rationall appetite; but as the power, by which he effecteth every thing. likewise when we attribute to him sight, and other acts of sense; as also knowledge, and understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse the organicall parts of mans body: for there is no such thing in god; and being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to him. hee that will attribute to god, nothing but what is warranted by naturall reason, must either use such negative attributes, as infinite, eternall, incomprehensible; or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy,) but how much wee admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a signe of humility, and of a will to honour him as much as we can: for there is but one name to signifie our conception of his nature, and that is, i am: and but one name of his relation to us, and that is god; in which is contained father, king, and lord. actions that are signes of divine honour concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most generall precept of reason, that they be signes of the intention to honour god; such as are, first, prayers: for not the carvers, when they made images, were thought to make them gods; but the people that prayed to them. secondly, thanksgiving; which differeth from prayer in divine worship, no otherwise, than that prayers precede, and thanks succeed the benefit; the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge god, for author of all benefits, as well past, as future. thirdly, gifts; that is to say, sacrifices, and oblations, (if they be of the best,) are signes of honour: for they are thanksgivings. fourthly, not to swear by any but god, is naturally a signe of honour: for it is a confession that god onely knoweth the heart; and that no mans wit, or strength can protect a man against gods vengence on the perjured. fifthly, it is a part of rationall worship, to speak considerately of god; for it argues a fear of him, and fear, is a confession of his power. hence followeth, that the name of god is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in vain: and it is to no purpose; unlesse it be by way of oath, and by order of the common-wealth, to make judgements certain; or between common-wealths, to avoyd warre. and that disputing of gods nature is contrary to his honour: for it is supposed, that in this naturall kingdome of god, there is no other way to know any thing, but by naturall reason; that is, from the principles of naturall science; which are so farre from teaching us any thing of gods nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living. and therefore, when men out of the principles of naturall reason, dispute of the attributes of god, they but dishonour him: for in the attributes which we give to god, we are not to consider the signification of philosophicall truth; but the signification of pious intention, to do him the greatest honour we are able. from the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the nature of god, that tend not to his honour, but to the honour of our own wits, and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate, and vain abuses of his sacred name. sixthly, in prayers, thanksgivings, offerings and sacrifices, it is a dictate of naturall reason, that they be every one in his kind the best, and most significant of honour. as for example, that prayers, and thanksgiving, be made in words and phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor plebeian; but beautifull and well composed; for else we do not god as much honour as we can. and therefore the heathens did absurdly, to worship images for gods: but their doing it in verse, and with musick, both of voyce, and instruments, was reasonable. also that the beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their actions in worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him. seventhly, reason directeth not onely to worship god in secret; but also, and especially, in publique, and in the sight of men: for without that, (that which in honour is most acceptable) the procuring others to honour him, is lost. lastly, obedience to his lawes (that is, in this case to the lawes of nature,) is the greatest worship of all. for as obedience is more acceptable to god than sacrifice; so also to set light by his commandements, is the greatest of all contumelies. and these are the lawes of that divine worship, which naturall reason dictateth to private men. publique worship consisteth in uniformity but seeing a common-wealth is but one person, it ought also to exhibite to god but one worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men, publiquely. and this is publique worship; the property whereof, is to be uniforme: for those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a publique worship. and therefore, where many sorts of worship be allowed, proceeding from the different religions of private men, it cannot be said there is any publique worship, nor that the common-wealth is of any religion at all. all attributes depend on the lawes civill and because words (and consequently the attributes of god) have their signification by agreement, and constitution of men; those attributes are to be held significative of honour, that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but reason, may be done by the will of the common-wealth, by lawes civill. and because a common-wealth hath no will, nor makes no lawes, but those that are made by the will of him, or them that have the soveraign power; it followeth, that those attributes which the soveraign ordaineth, in the worship of god, for signes of honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their publique worship. not all actions but because not all actions are signes by constitution; but some are naturally signes of honour, others of contumely, these later (which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence) cannot be made by humane power a part of divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent, modest, humble behaviour) ever be separated from it. but whereas there be an infinite number of actions, and gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them as the common-wealth shall ordain to be publiquely and universally in use, as signes of honour, and part of gods worship, are to be taken and used for such by the subjects. and that which is said in the scripture, "it is better to obey god than men," hath place in the kingdome of god by pact, and not by nature. naturall punishments having thus briefly spoken of the naturall kingdome of god, and his naturall lawes, i will adde onely to this chapter a short declaration of his naturall punishments. there is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chayn of consequences, as no humane providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. and in this chayn, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the naturall punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more harme that good. and hereby it comes to passe, that intemperance, is naturally punished with diseases; rashnesse, with mischances; injustice, with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruine; cowardise, with oppression; negligent government of princes, with rebellion; and rebellion, with slaughter. for seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of lawes; naturall punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the lawes of nature; and therfore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects. the conclusion of the second part and thus farre concerning the constitution, nature, and right of soveraigns; and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the principles of naturall reason. and now, considering how different this doctrine is, from the practise of the greatest part of the world, especially of these western parts, that have received their morall learning from rome, and athens; and how much depth of morall philosophy is required, in them that have the administration of the soveraign power; i am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, and the common-wealth of plato; for he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of state, and change of governments by civill warre, ever to be taken away, till soveraigns be philosophers. but when i consider again, that the science of naturall justice, is the onely science necessary for soveraigns, and their principall ministers; and that they need not be charged with the sciences mathematicall, (as by plato they are,) further, than by good lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither plato, nor any other philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the theoremes of morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; i recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and i think clear,) without the help of any interested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire soveraignty, in protecting the publique teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice. part iii. of a christian common-wealth chapter xxxii. of the principles of christian politiques the word of god delivered by prophets is the main principle of christian politiques i have derived the rights of soveraigne power, and the duty of subjects hitherto, from the principles of nature onely; such as experience has found true, or consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that is to say, from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions (of such words as are essentiall to all politicall reasoning) universally agreed on. but in that i am next to handle, which is the nature and rights of a christian common-wealth, whereof there dependeth much upon supernaturall revelations of the will of god; the ground of my discourse must be, not only the naturall word of god, but also the propheticall. neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor (that which is the undoubted word of god) our naturall reason. for they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicate faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion, for though there be many things in gods word above reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination. therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words; and not to labour in sifting out a philosophicall truth by logick, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of naturall science. for it is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect. what it is to captivate the understanding but by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty, to the opinion of any other man; but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due. for sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. we then captivate our understanding and reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull authority) we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is trust, and faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken. how god speaketh to men when god speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately. how god speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. for if a man pretend to me, that god hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and i make doubt of it, i cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it. it is true, that if he be my soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare i beleeve him not; but not to think any otherwise then my reason perswades me. but if one that hath not such authority over me, shall pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe, or obedience. for to say that god hath spoken to him in the holy scripture, is not to say god hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the prophets, or of the apostles, or of the church, in such manner as he speaks to all other christian men. to say he hath spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that god spake to him; which is not of force to win beleef from any man, that knows dreams are for the most part naturall, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary revelation. to say he hath seen a vision, or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. to say he speaks by supernaturall inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can alledge no naturall and sufficient reason. so that though god almighty can speak to a man, by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration; yet he obliges no man to beleeve he hath so done to him that pretends it; who (being a man), may erre, and (which is more) may lie. by what marks prophets are known how then can he, to whom god hath never revealed his wil immediately (saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not to obey his word, delivered by him, that sayes he is a prophet? (1 kings 22) of 400 prophets, of whom the k. of israel asked counsel, concerning the warre he made against ramoth gilead, only micaiah was a true one.(1 kings 13) the prophet that was sent to prophecy against the altar set up by jeroboam, though a true prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence appears to be a prophet sent from god, was yet deceived by another old prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of god, to eat and drink with him. if one prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of god, by other way than that of reason? to which i answer out of the holy scripture, that there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true prophet is to be known. one is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other religion than that which is already established. asunder (i say) neither of these is sufficient. (deut. 13 v. 1,2,3,4,5 ) "if a prophet rise amongst you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle come to passe; if he say, let us follow strange gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. but that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to revolt from the lord your god." in which words two things are to be observed, first, that god wil not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the prophets calling; but (as it is in the third verse) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself. for the works of the egyptian sorcerers, though not so great as those of moses, yet were great miracles. secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the king, or him that governeth by the kings authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make triall of their allegiance. for these words, "revolt from the lord your god," are in this place equivalent to "revolt from your king." for they had made god their king by pact at the foot of mount sinai; who ruled them by moses only; for he only spake with god, and from time to time declared gods commandements to the people. in like manner, after our saviour christ had made his disciples acknowledge him for the messiah, (that is to say, for gods anointed, whom the nation of the jews daily expected for their king, but refused when he came,) he omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. "there shall arise," (saith he) "false christs, and false prophets, and shall doe great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very elect." (mat. 24. 24) by which it appears, that false prophets may have the power of miracles; yet are wee not to take their doctrin for gods word. st. paul says further to the galatians, that "if himself, or an angell from heaven preach another gospel to them, than he had preached, let him be accursed." (gal. 1. 8) that gospel was, that christ was king; so that all preaching against the power of the king received, in consequence to these words, is by st. paul accursed. for his speech is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already received jesus for the christ, that is to say, for king of the jews. the marks of a prophet in the old law, miracles, and doctrine conformable to the law and as miracles, without preaching that doctrine which god hath established; so preaching the true doctrine, without the doing of miracles, is an unsufficient argument of immediate revelation. for if a man that teacheth not false doctrine, should pretend to bee a prophet without shewing any miracle, he is never the more to bee regarded for his pretence, as is evident by deut. 18. v. 21, 22. "if thou say in thy heart, how shall we know that the word (of the prophet) is not that which the lord hath spoken. when the prophet shall have spoken in the name of the lord, that which shall not come to passe, that's the word which the lord hath not spoken, but the prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart, fear him not." but a man may here again ask, when the prophet hath foretold a thing, how shal we know whether it will come to passe or not? for he may foretel it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time, longer then the time of mans life; or indefinitely, that it will come to passe one time or other: in which case this mark of a prophet is unusefull; and therefore the miracles that oblige us to beleeve a prophet, ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not long deferr'd event. so that it is manifest, that the teaching of the religion which god hath established, and the showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the scripture would have a true prophet, that is to say immediate revelation to be acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith. miracles ceasing, prophets cease, the scripture supplies their place seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations, or inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the holy scriptures, which since the time of our saviour, supply the want of all other prophecy; and from which, by wise and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to god and man, without enthusiasme, or supernaturall inspiration, may easily be deduced. and this scripture is it, out of which i am to take the principles of my discourse, concerning the rights of those that are the supream govenors on earth, of christian common-wealths; and of the duty of christian subjects towards their soveraigns. and to that end, i shall speak in the next chapter, or the books, writers, scope and authority of the bible. chapter xxxiii. of the number, antiquity, scope, authority, and interpreters of the books of holy scriptures of the books of holy scripture by the books of holy scripture, are understood those, which ought to be the canon, that is to say, the rules of christian life. and because all rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are laws; the question of the scripture, is the question of what is law throughout all christendome, both naturall, and civill. for though it be not determined in scripture, what laws every christian king shall constitute in his own dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute. seeing therefore i have already proved, that soveraigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators; those books only are canonicall, that is, law, in every nation, which are established for such by the soveraign authority. it is true, that god is the soveraign of all soveraigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly potentate command to the contrary. but the question is not of obedience to god, but of when, and what god hath said; which to subjects that have no supernaturall revelation, cannot be known, but by that naturall reason, which guided them, for the obtaining of peace and justice, to obey the authority of their severall common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull soveraigns. according to this obligation, i can acknowledge no other books of the old testament, to be holy scripture, but those which have been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the authority of the church of england. what books these are, is sufficiently known, without a catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by st. jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the wisdome of solomon, ecclesiasticus, judith, tobias, the first and second of maccabees, (though he had seen the first in hebrew) and the third and fourth of esdras, for apocrypha. of the canonicall, josephus a learned jew, that wrote in the time of the emperor domitian, reckoneth twenty two, making the number agree with the hebrew alphabet. st. jerome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner. for josephus numbers five books of moses, thirteen of prophets, that writ the history of their own times (which how it agrees with the prophets writings contained in the bible wee shall see hereafter), and four of hymnes and morall precepts. but st. jerome reckons five books of moses, eight of prophets, and nine of other holy writ, which he calls of hagiographa. the septuagint, who were 70. learned men of the jews, sent for by ptolemy king of egypt, to translate the jewish law, out of the hebrew into the greek, have left us no other for holy scripture in the greek tongue, but the same that are received in the church of england. as for the books of the new testament, they are equally acknowledged for canon by all christian churches, and by all sects of christians, that admit any books at all for canonicall. their antiquity who were the originall writers of the severall books of holy scripture, has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other history, (which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any arguments of naturall reason; for reason serves only to convince the truth (not of fact, but) of consequence. the light therefore that must guide us in this question, must be that which is held out unto us from the bookes themselves: and this light, though it show us not the writer of every book, yet it is not unusefull to give us knowledge of the time, wherein they were written. the pentateuch not written by moses and first, for the pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were written by moses, because they are called the five books of moses; no more than these titles, the book of joshua, the book of judges, the book of ruth, and the books of the kings, are arguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by joshua, by the judges, by ruth, and by the kings. for in titles of books, the subject is marked, as often as the writer. the history of livy, denotes the writer; but the history of scanderbeg, is denominated from the subject. we read in the last chapter of deuteronomie, ver. 6. concerning the sepulcher of moses, "that no man knoweth of his sepulcher to this day," that is, to the day wherein those words were written. it is therefore manifest, that those words were written after his interrement. for it were a strange interpretation, to say moses spake of his own sepulcher (though by prophecy), that it was not found to that day, wherein he was yet living. but it may perhaps be alledged, that the last chapter only, not the whole pentateuch, was written by some other man, but the rest not: let us therefore consider that which we find in the book of genesis, chap. 12. ver. 6 "and abraham passed through the land to the place of sichem, unto the plain of moreh, and the canaanite was then in the land;" which must needs bee the words of one that wrote when the canaanite was not in the land; and consequently, not of moses, who dyed before he came into it. likewise numbers 21. ver. 14. the writer citeth another more ancient book, entituled, the book of the warres of the lord, wherein were registred the acts of moses, at the red-sea, and at the brook of arnon. it is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five books of moses were written after his time, though how long after it be not so manifest. but though moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form we have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have written: as for example, the volume of the law, which is contained, as it seemeth in the 11 of deuteronomie, and the following chapters to the 27. which was also commanded to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of canaan. (deut. 31. 9) and this did moses himself write, and deliver to the priests and elders of israel, to be read every seventh year to all israel, at their assembling in the feast of tabernacles. and this is that law which god commanded, that their kings (when they should have established that form of government) should take a copy of from the priests and levites to lay in the side of the arke; (deut. 31. 26) and the same which having been lost, was long time after found again by hilkiah, and sent to king josias, who causing it to be read to the people, renewed the covenant between god and them. (2 king. 22. 8 & 23. 1,2,3) the book of joshua written after his time that the book of joshua was also written long after the time of joshua, may be gathered out of many places of the book it self. joshua had set up twelve stones in the middest of jordan, for a monument of their passage; (josh 4. 9) of which the writer saith thus, "they are there unto this day;" (josh 5. 9) for "unto this day", is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man. in like manner, upon the saying of the lord, that he had rolled off from the people the reproach of egypt, the writer saith, "the place is called gilgal unto this day;" which to have said in the time of joshua had been improper. so also the name of the valley of achor, from the trouble that achan raised in the camp, (josh. 7. 26) the writer saith, "remaineth unto this day;" which must needs bee therefore long after the time of joshua. arguments of this kind there be many other; as josh. 8. 29. 13. 13. 14. 14. 15. 63. the booke of judges and ruth written long after the captivity the same is manifest by like arguments of the book of judges, chap. 1. 21,26 6.24 10.4 15.19 17.6 and ruth 1. 1. but especially judg. 18. 30. where it is said, that jonathan "and his sonnes were priests to the tribe of dan, untill the day of the captivity of the land." the like of the bookes of samuel that the books of samuel were also written after his own time, there are the like arguments, 1 sam. 5.5. 7.13,15. 27.6. & 30.25. where, after david had adjudged equall part of the spoiles, to them that guarded the ammunition, with them that fought, the writer saith, "he made it a statute and an ordinance to israel to this day." (2. sam. 6.4.) again, when david (displeased, that the lord had slain uzzah, for putting out his hand to sustain the ark,) called the place perez-uzzah, the writer saith, it is called so "to this day": the time therefore of the writing of that book, must be long after the time of the fact; that is, long after the time of david. the books of the kings, and the chronicles as for the two books of the kings, and the two books of the chronicles, besides the places which mention such monuments, as the writer saith, remained till his own days; such as are 1 kings 9.13. 9.21. 10. 12. 12.19. 2 kings 2.22. 8.22. 10.27. 14.7. 16.6. 17.23. 17.34. 17.41. 1 chron. 4.41. 5.26. it is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in babylon, that the history of them is continued till that time. for the facts registred are alwaies more ancient than such books as make mention of, and quote the register; as these books doe in divers places, referring the reader to the chronicles of the kings of juda, to the chronicles of the kings of israel, to the books of the prophet samuel, or the prophet nathan, of the prophet ahijah; to the vision of jehdo, to the books of the prophet serveiah, and of the prophet addo. ezra and nehemiah the books of esdras and nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the walls and houses of jerusalem, the renovation of the covenant, and ordination of their policy are therein contained. esther the history of queen esther is of the time of the captivity; and therefore the writer must have been of the same time, or after it. job the book of job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written: and though it appear sufficiently (exekiel 14.14, and james 5.11.) that he was no fained person; yet the book it self seemeth not to be a history, but a treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed, "why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted;" and it is the most probably, because from the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of job beginneth, the hebrew is (as st. jerome testifies) in prose; and from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in hexameter verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose. so that the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added, but as a preface in the beginning, and an epilogue in the end. but verse is no usuall stile of such, as either are themselves in great pain, as job; or of such as come to comfort them, as his friends; but in philosophy, especially morall philosophy, in ancient time frequent. the psalter the psalmes were written the most part by david, for the use of the quire. to these are added some songs of moses, and other holy men; and some of them after the return from the captivity; as the 137. and the 126. whereby it is manifest that the psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return of the jews from babylon. the proverbs the proverbs, being a collection of wise and godly sayings, partly of solomon, partly of agur the son of jakeh; and partly of the mother of king lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by solomon, rather then by agur, or the mother of lemues; and that, though the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this one book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them all. ecclesiastes and the canticles the books of ecclesiastes and the canticles have nothing that was not solomons, except it be the titles, or inscriptions. for "the words of the preacher, the son of david, king in jerusalem;" and, "the song of songs, which is solomon's," seem to have been made for distinctions sake, then, when the books of scripture were gathered into one body of the law; to the end, that not the doctrine only, but the authors also might be extant. the prophets of the prophets, the most ancient, are sophoniah, jonas, amos, hosea, isaiah and michaiah, who lived in the time of amaziah, and azariah, otherwise ozias, kings of judah. but the book of jonas is not properly a register of his prophecy, (for that is contained in these few words, "fourty dayes and ninivy shall be destroyed,") but a history or narration of his frowardenesse and disputing gods commandements; so that there is small probability he should be the author, seeing he is the subject of it. but the book of amos is his prophecy. jeremiah, abdias, nahum, and habakkuk prophecyed in the time of josiah. ezekiel, daniel, aggeus, and zacharias, in the captivity. when joel and malachi prophecyed, is not evident by their writings. but considering the inscriptions, or titles of their books, it is manifest enough, that the whole scripture of the old testament, was set forth in the form we have it, after the return of the jews from their captivity in babylon, and before the time of ptolemaeus philadelphus, that caused it to bee translated into greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of judea for that purpose. and if the books of apocrypha (which are recommended to us by the church, though not for canonicall, yet for profitable books for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the scripture was set forth in the form wee have it in, by esdras; as may appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, chapt. 14. verse 21, 22, &c. where speaking to god, he saith thus, "thy law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou has done, or the works that are to begin. but if i have found grace before thee, send down the holy spirit into me, and i shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the later days, may live." and verse 45. "and it came to passe when the forty dayes were fulfilled, that the highest spake, saying, 'the first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them onely to such as be wise among the people.'" and thus much concerning the time of the writing of the bookes of the old testament. the new testament the writers of the new testament lived all in lesse then an age after christs ascension, and had all of them seen our saviour, or been his disciples, except st. paul, and st. luke; and consequently whatsoever was written by them, is as ancient as the time of the apostles. but the time wherein the books of the new testament were received, and acknowledged by the church to be of their writing, is not altogether so ancient. for, as the bookes of the old testament are derived to us, from no higher time then that of esdras, who by the direction of gods spirit retrived them, when they were lost: those of the new testament, of which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private mans hand, cannot bee derived from a higher time, that that wherein the governours of the church collected, approved, and recommended them to us, as the writings of those apostles and disciples; under whose names they go. the first enumeration of all the bookes, both of the old, and new testament, is in the canons of the apostles, supposed to be collected by clement the first (after st. peter) bishop of rome. but because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the councell of laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the bible to the then christian churches, for the writings of the prophets and apostles: and this councell was held in the 364. yeer after christ. at which time, though ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the church, as no more to esteem emperours, though christian, for the shepherds of the people, but for sheep; and emperours not christian, for wolves; and endeavoured to passe their doctrine, not for counsell, and information, as preachers; but for laws, as absolute governours; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to christian doctrine, to be pious; yet i am perswaded they did not therefore falsifie the scriptures, though the copies of the books of the new testament, were in the hands only of the ecclesiasticks; because if they had had an intention so to doe, they would surely have made them more favorable to their power over christian princes, and civill soveraignty, than they are. i see not therefore any reason to doubt, but that the old, and new testament, as we have them now, are the true registers of those things, which were done and said by the prophets, and apostles. and so perhaps are some of those books which are called apocrypha, if left out of the canon, not for inconformity of doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the hebrew. for after the conquest of asia by alexander the great, there were few learned jews, that were not perfect in the greek tongue. for the seventy interpreters that converted the bible into greek, were all of them hebrews; and we have extant the works of philo and josephus both jews, written by them eloquently in greek. but it is not the writer, but the authority of the church, that maketh a book canonicall. their scope and although these books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest the writers were all indued with one and the same spirit, in that they conspire to one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the rights of the kingdome of god, the father, son, and holy ghost. for the book of genesis, deriveth the genealogy of gods people, from the creation of the world, to the going into egypt: the other four books of moses, contain the election of god for their king, and the laws which hee prescribed for their government: the books of joshua, judges, ruth, and samuel, to the time of saul, describe the acts of gods people, till the time they cast off gods yoke, and called for a king, after the manner of their neighbour nations; the rest of the history of the old testament, derives the succession of the line of david, to the captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of the kingdome of god, even our blessed saviour god the son, whose coming was foretold in the bookes of the prophets, after whom the evangelists writt his life, and actions, and his claim to the kingdome, whilst he lived one earth: and lastly, the acts, and epistles of the apostles, declare the coming of god, the holy ghost, and the authority he left with them, and their successors, for the direction of the jews, and for the invitation of the gentiles. in summe, the histories and the prophecies of the old testament, and the gospels, and epistles of the new testament, have had one and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of god; 1. in moses, and the priests; 2. in the man christ; and 3. in the apostles and the successors to apostolicall power. for these three at several times did represent the person of god: moses, and his successors the high priests, and kings of judah, in the old testament: christ himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the apostles, and their successors, from the day of pentecost (when the holy ghost descended on them) to this day. the question of the authority of the scriptures stated. it is a question much disputed between the divers sects of christian religion, from whence the scriptures derive their authority; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, how wee know them to be the word of god, or, why we beleeve them to be so: and the difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein the question it self is couched. for it is beleeved on all hands, that the first and originall author of them is god; and consequently the question disputed, is not that. again, it is manifest, that none can know they are gods word, (though all true christians beleeve it,) but those to whom god himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our knowledge of it. lastly, when the question is propounded of our beleefe; because some are moved to beleeve for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one generall answer for them all. the question truly stated is, by what authority they are made law. their authority and interpretation as far as they differ not from the laws of nature, there is no doubt, but they are the law of god, and carry their authority with them, legible to all men that have the use of naturall reason: but this is no other authority, then that of all other morall doctrine consonant to reason; the dictates whereof are laws, not made, but eternall. if they be made law by god himselfe, they are of the nature of written law, which are laws to them only to whom god hath so sufficiently published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he know not they were his. he therefore, to whom god hath not supernaturally revealed, that they are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not obliged to obey them, by any authority, but his, whose commands have already the force of laws; that is to say, by any other authority, then that of the common-wealth, residing in the soveraign, who only has the legislative power. again, if it be not the legislative authority of the common-wealth, that giveth them the force of laws, it must bee some other authority derived from god, either private, or publique: if private, it obliges onely him, to whom in particular god hath been pleased to reveale it. for if every man should be obliged, to take for gods law, what particular men, on pretence of private inspiration, or revelation, should obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out of pride, and ignorance, take their own dreams, and extravagant fancies, and madnesse, for testimonies of gods spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences,) it were impossible that any divine law should be acknowledged. if publique, it is the authority of the common-wealth, or of the church. but the church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a common-wealth of christians; called a common-wealth, because it consisteth of men united in one person, their soveraign; and a church, because it consisteth in christian men, united in one christian soveraign. but if the church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all; it can neither command, nor doe any action at all; nor is capable of having any power, or right to any thing; nor has any will, reason, nor voice; for all these qualities are personall. now if the whole number of christians be not contained in one common-wealth, they are not one person; nor is there an universall church that hath any authority over them; and therefore the scriptures are not made laws, by the universall church: or if it bee one common-wealth, then all christian monarchs, and states are private persons, and subject to bee judged, deposed, and punished by an universall soveraigne of all christendome. so that the question of the authority of the scriptures is reduced to this, "whether christian kings, and the soveraigne assemblies in christian common-wealths, be absolute in their own territories, immediately under god; or subject to one vicar of christ, constituted over the universall church; to bee judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death, as hee shall think expedient, or necessary for the common good." which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular consideration of the kingdome of god; from whence also, wee are to judge of the authority of interpreting the scripture. for, whosoever hath a lawfull power over any writing, to make it law, hath the power also to approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same. chapter xxxiv. of the signification of spirit, angel, and inspiration in the books of holy scripture body and spirit how taken in the scripture seeing the foundation of all true ratiocination, is the constant signification of words; which in the doctrine following, dependeth not (as in naturall science) on the will of the writer, nor (as in common conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the scripture; it is necessary, before i proceed any further, to determine, out of the bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may render what i am to inferre upon them, obscure, or disputable. i will begin with the words body, and spirit, which in the language of the schools are termed, substances, corporeall, and incorporeall. the word body, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a reall part of that we call the universe. for the universe, being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also body; nor any thing properly a body, that is not also part of (that aggregate of all bodies) the universe. the same also, because bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is called substance, that is to say, subject, to various accidents, as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still; and to seem to our senses sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one colour, smel, tast, or sound, somtimes of another. and this diversity of seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies, on the organs of our sense) we attribute to alterations of the bodies that operate, & call them accidents of those bodies. and according to this acceptation of the word, substance and body, signifie the same thing; and therefore substance incorporeall are words, which when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an incorporeall body. but in the sense of common people, not all the universe is called body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling, to resist their force, or by the sense of their eyes, to hinder them from a farther prospect. therefore in the common language of men, aire, and aeriall substances, use not to be taken for bodies, but (as often as men are sensible of their effects) are called wind, or breath, or (because the some are called in the latine spiritus) spirits; as when they call that aeriall substance, which in the body of any living creature, gives it life and motion, vitall and animall spirits. but for those idols of the brain, which represent bodies to us, where they are not, as in a looking-glasse, in a dream, or to a distempered brain waking, they are (as the apostle saith generally of all idols) nothing; nothing at all, i say, there where they seem to bee; and in the brain it self, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the organs of our sense. and men, that are otherwise imployed, then to search into their causes, know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call them bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a power supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to call them spirits, because the sense of touch discerneth nothing in the place where they appear, to resist their fingers: so that the proper signification of spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, and invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasme of the imagination. but for metaphoricall significations, there be many: for sometimes it is taken for disposition or inclination of the mind; as when for the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say, a spirit contradiction; for a disposition to uncleannesse, an unclean spirit; for perversenesse, a froward spirit; for sullennesse, a dumb spirit, and for inclination to godlinesse, and gods service, the spirit of god: sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when great wisdome is called the spirit of wisdome; and mad men are said to be possessed with a spirit. other signification of spirit i find no where any; and where none of these can satisfie the sense of that word in scripture, the place falleth not under humane understanding; and our faith therein consisteth not in our opinion, but in our submission; as in all places where god is said to be a spirit; or where by the spirit of god, is meant god himselfe. for the nature of god is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what he is, but only that he is; and therefore the attributes we give him, are not to tell one another, what he is, nor to signifie our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honor him with such names as we conceive most honorable amongst our selves. spirit of god taken in the scripture sometimes for a wind, or breath gen. 1. 2. "the spirit of god moved upon the face of the waters." here if by the spirit of god be meant god himself, then is motion attributed to god, and consequently place, which are intelligible only of bodies, and not of substances incorporeall; and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is body. but the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, gen. 8. 1. where when the earth was covered with waters, as in the beginning, god intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth like words, "i will bring my spirit upon the earth, and the waters shall be diminished:" in which place by spirit is understood a wind, (that is an aire or spirit moved,) which might be called (as in the former place) the spirit of god, because it was gods work. secondly, for extraordinary gifts of the understanding gen. 41. 38. pharaoh calleth the wisdome of joseph, the spirit of god. for joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and to set him over the land of egypt, he saith thus, "can we find such a man as this is, in whom is the spirit of god?" and exod. 28.3. "thou shalt speak (saith god) to all that are wise hearted, whom i have filled with the spirit of wisdome, to make aaron garments, to consecrate him." where extraordinary understanding, though but in making garments, as being the gift of god, is called the spirit of god. the same is found again, exod. 31.3,4,5,6. and 35.31. and isaiah 11.2,3. where the prophet speaking of the messiah, saith, "the spirit of the lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdome and understanding, the spirit of counsell, and fortitude; and the spirit of the fear of the lord." where manifestly is meant, not so many ghosts, but so many eminent graces that god would give him. thirdly, for extraordinary affections in the book of judges, an extraordinary zeal, and courage in the defence of gods people, is called the spirit of god; as when it excited othoniel, gideon, jeptha, and samson to deliver them from servitude, judg. 3.10. 6.34. 11.29. 13.25. 14.6,19. and of saul, upon the newes of the insolence of the ammonites towards the men of jabeth gilead, it is said (1 sam.11.6.) that "the spirit of god came upon saul, and his anger (or, as it is in the latine, his fury) was kindled greatly." where it is not probable was meant a ghost, but an extraordinary zeal to punish the cruelty of the ammonites. in like manner by the spirit of god, that came upon saul, when hee was amongst the prophets that praised god in songs, and musick (1 sam.19.20.) is to be understood, not a ghost, but an unexpected and sudden zeal to join with them in their devotions. fourthly, for the gift of prediction by dreams and visions the false prophet zedekiah, saith to micaiah (1 kings 22.24.) "which way went the spirit of the lord from me to speak to thee?" which cannot be understood of a ghost; for micaiah declared before the kings of israel and judah, the event of the battle, as from a vision, and not as from a spirit, speaking in him. in the same manner it appeareth, in the books of the prophets, that though they spake by the spirit of god, that is to say, by a speciall grace of prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a ghost within them, but by some supernaturall dream or vision. fiftly, for life gen. 2.7. it is said, "god made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrills (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." there the breath of life inspired by god, signifies no more, but that god gave him life; and (job 27.3.) "as long as the spirit of god is in my nostrils;" is no more then to say, "as long as i live." so in ezek. 1.20. "the spirit of life was in the wheels," is equivalent to, "the wheels were alive." and (ezek. 2.30.) "the spirit entred into me, and set me on my feet," that is, "i recovered my vitall strength;" not that any ghost, or incorporeal substance entred into, and possessed his body. sixtly, for a subordination to authority in the 11 chap. of numbers. verse 17. "i will take (saith god) of the spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burthen of the people with thee;" that is, upon the seventy elders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the campe; of whom some complained, and joshua desired moses to forbid them; which moses would not doe. whereby it appears; that joshua knew not they had received authority so to do, and prophecyed according to the mind of moses, that is to say, by a spirit, or authority subordinate to his own. in the like sense we read (deut. 34.9.) that "joshua was full of the spirit of wisdome," because moses had laid his hands upon him: that is, because he was ordained by moses, to prosecute the work hee had himselfe begun, (namely, the bringing of gods people into the promised land), but prevented by death, could not finish. in the like sense it is said, (rom. 8.9.) "if any man have not the spirit of christ, he is none of his:" not meaning thereby the ghost of christ, but a submission to his doctrine. as also (1 john 4.2.) "hereby you shall know the spirit of god; every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come in the flesh, is of god;" by which is meant the spirit of unfained christianity, or submission to that main article of christian faith, that jesus is the christ; which cannot be interpreted of a ghost. likewise these words (luke 4.1.) "and jesus full of the holy ghost" (that is, as it is exprest, mat. 4.1. and mar. 1.12. "of the holy spirit",) may be understood, for zeal to doe the work for which hee was sent by god the father: but to interpret it of a ghost, is to say, that god himselfe (for so our saviour was,) was filled with god; which is very unproper, and unsignificant. how we came to translate spirits, by the word ghosts, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the imaginary inhabitants of mans brain, i examine not: but this i say, the word spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly a reall substance, or metaphorically, some extraordinary ability of affection of the mind, or of the body. seventhly, for aeriall bodies the disciples of christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (mat. 14.26. and marke 6.49.) supposed him to be a spirit, meaning thereby an aeriall body, and not a phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him; which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not common to many at once, as visible bodies are; but singular, because of the differences of fancies), but of bodies only. in like manner, where he was taken for a spirit, by the same apostles (luke 24.3,7.): so also (acts 12.15) when st. peter was delivered out of prison, it would not be beleeved; but when the maid said he was at the dore, they said it was his angel; by which must be meant a corporeall substance, or we must say, the disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both jews and gentiles, that some such apparitions were not imaginary, but reall; and such as needed not the fancy of man for their existence: these the jews called spirits, and angels, good or bad; as the greeks called the same by the name of daemons. and some such apparitions may be reall, and substantiall; that is to say, subtile bodies, which god can form by the same power, by which he formed all things, and make use of, as of ministers, and messengers (that is to say, angels) to declare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary and supernaturall manner. but when hee hath so formed them they are substances, endued with dimensions, and take up roome, and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to bodies; and therefore are not ghosts incorporeall, that is to say, ghosts that are in no place; that is to say, that are no where; that is to say, that seeming to be somewhat, are nothing. but if corporeall be taken in the most vulgar manner, for such substances as are perceptible by our externall senses; then is substance incorporeall, a thing not imaginary, but reall; namely, a thin substance invisible, but that hath the same dimensions that are in grosser bodies. angel what by the name of angel, is signified generally, a messenger; and most often, a messenger of god: and by a messenger of god, is signified, any thing that makes known his extraordinary presence; that is to say, the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a dream, or vision. concerning the creation of angels, there is nothing delivered in the scriptures. that they are spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of spirit, is signified both in scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst jews, and gentiles, sometimes thin bodies; as the aire, the wind, the spirits vitall, and animall, of living creatures; and sometimes the images that rise in the fancy in dreams, and visions; which are not reall substances, but accidents of the brain; yet when god raiseth them supernaturally, to signifie his will, they are not unproperly termed gods messengers, that is to say, his angels. and as the gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain, for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy; and out of them framed their opinions of daemons, good and evill; which because they seemed to subsist really, they called substances; and because they could not feel them with their hands, incorporeall: so also the jews upon the same ground, without any thing in the old testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the sect of the sadduces,) that those apparitions (which it pleased god sometimes to produce in the fancie of men, for his own service, and therefore called them his angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of god; whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the angels of god, and those they thought would hurt them, they called evill angels, or evill spirits; such as was the spirit of python, and the spirits of mad-men, of lunatiques, and epileptiques: for they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, daemoniaques. but if we consider the places of the old testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be understood by the word angel, but some image raised (supernaturally) in the fancy, to signifie the presence of god in the execution of some supernaturall work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not exprest, it may be understood in the same manner. for we read gen. 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely an angel, but god; where that which (verse 7.) is called the angel of the lord, in the tenth verse, saith to agar, "i will multiply thy seed exceedingly;" that is, speaketh in the person of god. neither was this apparition a fancy figured, but a voice. by which it is manifest, that angel signifieth there, nothing but god himself, that caused agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice supernaturall, testifying gods speciall presence there. why therefore may not the angels that appeared to lot, and are called gen. 19.13. men; and to whom, though they were but two, lot speaketh (ver. 18.) as but one, and that one, as god, (for the words are, "lot said unto them, oh not so my lord") be understood of images of men, supernaturally formed in the fancy; as well as before by angel was understood a fancyed voice? when the angel called to abraham out of heaven, to stay his hand (gen. 22.11.) from slaying isaac, there was no apparition, but a voice; which neverthelesse was called properly enough a messenger, or angel of god, because it declared gods will supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent ghosts. the angels which jacob saw on the ladder of heaven (gen. 28.12.) were a vision of his sleep; therefore onely fancy, and a dream; yet being supernaturall, and signs of gods speciall presence, those apparitions are not improperly called angels. the same is to be understood (gen.31.11.) where jacob saith thus, "the angel of the lord appeared to mee in my sleep." for an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that which all men call a dreame, whether such dreame be naturall, or supernaturall: and that which there jacob calleth an angel, was god himselfe; for the same angel saith (verse 13.) "i am the god of bethel." also (exod.14.9.) the angel that went before the army of israel to the red sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19.) the lord himself; and he appeared not in the form of a beautifull man, but in form (by day) of a pillar of cloud and (by night) in form of a pillar of fire; and yet this pillar was all the apparition, and angel promised to moses (exod. 14.9.) for the armies guide: for this cloudy pillar, is said, to have descended, and stood at the dore of the tabernacle, and to have talked with moses. there you see motion, and speech, which are commonly attributed to angels, attributed to a cloud, because the cloud served as a sign of gods presence; and was no lesse an angel, then if it had had the form of a man, or child of never so great beauty; or wings, as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common people. for it is not the shape; but their use, that makes them angels. but their use is to be significations of gods presence in supernaturall operations; as when moses (exod. 33.14.) had desired god to goe along with the campe, (as he had done alwaies before the making of the golden calfe,) god did not answer, "i will goe," nor "i will send an angel in my stead;" but thus, "my presence shall goe with thee." to mention all the places of the old testament where the name of angel is found, would be too long. therefore to comprehend them all at once, i say, there is no text in that part of the old testament, which the church of england holdeth for canonicall, from which we can conclude, there is, or hath been created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of spirit or angel,) that hath not quantity; and that may not be, by the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as one part may bee in one place, and the next part in the next place to it; and, in summe, which is not (taking body for that, which is some what, or some where) corporeall; but in every place, the sense will bear the interpretation of angel, for messenger; as john baptist is called an angel, and christ the angel of the covenant; and as (according to the same analogy) the dove, and the fiery tongues, in that they were signes of gods speciall presence, might also be called angels. though we find in daniel two names of angels, gabriel, and michael; yet is cleer out of the text it selfe, (dan. 12.1) that by michael is meant christ, not as an angel, but as a prince: and that gabriel (as the like apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernaturall phantasme, by which it seemed to daniel, in his dream, that two saints being in talke, one of them said to the other, "gabriel, let us make this man understand his vision:" for god needeth not, to distinguish his celestiall servants by names, which are usefull onely to the short memories of mortalls. nor in the new testament is there any place, out of which it can be proved, that angels (except when they are put for such men, as god hath made the messengers, and ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent, and withall incorporeall. that they are permanent, may bee gathered from the words of our saviour himselfe, (mat. 25.41.) where he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, "go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels:" which place is manifest for the permanence of evill angels, (unlesse wee might think the name of devill and his angels may be understood of the churches adversaries and their ministers;) but then it is repugnant to their immateriality; because everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible substances, such as are all things incorporeall. angels therefore are not thence proved to be incorporeall. in like manner where st. paul sayes (1 cor. 6.3.) "knew ye not that wee shall judge the angels?" and (2 pet. 2.4.) "for if god spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down into hell." and (jude 1,6.) "and the angels that kept not their first estate, but left their owne habitation, hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto the judgement of the last day;" though it prove the permanence of angelicall nature, it confirmeth also their materiality. and (mat. 22.30.) in the resurrection men doe neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as the angels of god in heaven:" but in the resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeall; so therefore also are the angels. there be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion. to men that understand the signification of these words, substance, and incorporeall; as incorporeall is taken not for subtile body, but for not body, they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an angel, or spirit is (in that sense) an incorporeall substance, is to say in effect, there is no angel nor spirit at all. considering therefore the signification of the word angel in the old testament, and the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of nature; i was enclined to this opinion, that angels were nothing but supernaturall apparitions of the fancy, raised by the speciall and extraordinary operation of god, thereby to make his presence and commandements known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. but the many places of the new testament, and our saviours own words, and in such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the scripture, have extorted from my feeble reason, an acknowledgement, and beleef, that there be also angels substantiall, and permanent. but to beleeve they be in no place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they (though indirectly) say, that will have them incorporeall, cannot by scripture bee evinced. inspiration what on the signification of the word spirit, dependeth that of the word inspiration; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind, in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if spirits be not corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible; for phantasmes are not, but only seem to be somewhat. that word therefore is used in the scripture metaphorically onely: as (gen. 2.7.) where it is said, that god inspired into man the breath of life, no more is meant, then that god gave unto him vitall motion. for we are not to think that god made first a living breath, and then blew it into adam after he was made, whether that breath were reall, or seeming; but only as it is (acts 17.25.) "that he gave him life and breath;" that is, made him a living creature. and where it is said (2 tim. 3.16.) "all scripture is given by inspiration from god," speaking there of the scripture of the old testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie, that god enclined the spirit or mind of those writers, to write that which should be usefull, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. but where st. peter (2 pet. 1.21.) saith, that "prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but the holy men of god spake as they were moved by the holy spirit," by the holy spirit, is meant the voice of god in a dream, or vision supernaturall, which is not inspiration; nor when our saviour breathing on his disciples, said, "receive the holy spirit," was that breath the spirit, but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them. and though it be said of many, and of our saviour himself, that he was full of the holy spirit; yet that fulnesse is not to be understood for infusion of the substance of god, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the gifts of god. so likewise where god sayes (joel 2.28.) "i will powre out my spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophecy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions," wee are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his spirit were like water, subject to effusion, or infusion; but as if god had promised to give them propheticall dreams, and visions. for the proper use of the word infused, in speaking of the graces of god, is an abuse of it; for those graces are vertues, not bodies to be carryed hither and thither, and to be powred into men, as into barrels. in the same manner, to take inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that good spirits entred into men to make them prophecy, or evill spirits into those that became phrenetique, lunatique, or epileptique, is not to take the word in the sense of the scripture; for the spirit there is taken for the power of god, working by causes to us unknown. as also (acts 2.2.) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein the apostles were assembled on the day of pentecost, is not to be understood for the holy spirit, which is the deity it self; but for an externall sign of gods speciall working on their hearts, to effect in them the internall graces, and holy vertues hee thought requisite for the performance of their apostleship. chapter xxxv. of the signification in scripture of kingdome of god, of holy, sacred, and sacrament kingdom of god taken by divines metaphorically but in the scriptures properly the kingdome of god in the writings of divines, and specially in sermons, and treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternall felicity, after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call the kingdome of glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity) sanctification, which they terme the kingdome of grace, but never for the monarchy, that is to say, the soveraign power of god over any subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of kingdome. to the contrary, i find the kingdome of god, to signifie in most places of scripture, a kingdome properly so named, constituted by the votes of the people of israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose god for their king by covenant made with him, upon gods promising them the possession of the land of canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for dominion over sinne; (and only in the new testament;) because such a dominion as that, every subject shall have in the kingdome of god, and without prejudice to the soveraign. from the very creation, god not only reigned over all men naturally by his might; but also had peculiar subjects, whom he commanded by a voice, as one man speaketh to another. in which manner he reigned over adam, and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of good and evill; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to be as god, judging between good and evill, not by his creators commandement, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternall life, wherein god had at first created him: and afterwards god punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universall deluge; and in these eight did consist the then kingdome of god. the originall of the kingdome of god after this, it pleased god to speak to abraham, and (gen. 17.7,8.) to make a covenant with him in these words, "i will establish my covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a god to thee, and to thy seed after thee; and i will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of canaan for an everlasting possession." and for a memoriall, and a token of this covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11.) the sacrament of circumcision. this is it which is called the old covenant, or testament; and containeth a contract between god and abraham; by which abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be subject to gods positive law; for to the law morall he was obliged before, as by an oath of allegiance. and though the name of king be not yet given to god, nor of kingdome to abraham and his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an institution by pact, of gods peculiar soveraignty over the seed of abraham; which in the renewing of the same covenant by moses, at mount sinai, is expressely called a peculiar kingdome of god over the jews: and it is of abraham (not of moses) st. paul saith (rom. 4.11.) that he is the "father of the faithfull," that is, of those that are loyall, and doe not violate their allegiance sworn to god, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the new covenant by baptisme. that the kingdome of god is properly his civill soveraignty over a peculiar people by pact this covenant, at the foot of mount sinai, was renewed by moses (exod. 19.5.) where the lord commandeth moses to speak to the people in this manner, "if you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then yee shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and yee shall be unto me a sacerdotall kingdome, and an holy nation." for a "peculiar people" the vulgar latine hath, peculium de cunctis populis: the english translation made in the beginning of the reign of king james, hath, a "peculiar treasure unto me above all nations;" and the geneva french, "the most precious jewel of all nations." but the truest translation is the first, because it is confirmed by st. paul himself (tit. 2.14.) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed saviour "gave himself for us, that he might purifie us to himself, a peculiar (that is, an extraordinary) people:" for the word is in the greek periousios, which is opposed commonly to the word epiousios: and as this signifieth ordinary, quotidian, or (as in the lords prayer) of daily use; so the other signifieth that which is overplus, and stored up, and enjoyed in a speciall manner; which the latines call peculium; and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason god rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, "for all the earth is mine," as if he should say, "all the nations of the world are mine;" but it is not so that you are mine, but in a speciall manner: for they are all mine, by reason of my power; but you shall be mine, by your own consent, and covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations. the same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same text, "yee shall be to me a sacerdotall kingdome, and an holy nation." the vulgar latine hath it, regnum sacerdotale, to which agreeth the translation of that place (1 pet. 2.9.) sacerdotium regale, a regal priesthood; as also the institution it self, by which no man might enter into the sanctum sanctorum, that is to say, no man might enquire gods will immediately of god himselfe, but onely the high priest. the english translation before mentioned, following that of geneva, has, "a kingdome of priests;" which is either meant of the succession of one high priest after another, or else it accordeth not with st. peter, nor with the exercise of the high priesthood; for there was never any but the high priest onely, that was to informe the people of gods will; nor any convocation of priests ever allowed to enter into the sanctum sanctorum. again, the title of a holy nation confirmes the same: for holy signifies, that which is gods by speciall, not by generall right. all the earth (as is said in the text) is gods; but all the earth is not called holy, but that onely which is set apart for his especiall service, as was the nation of the jews. it is therefore manifest enough by this one place, that by the kingdome of god, is properly meant a common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto) for their civill government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards god their king, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards other nations both in peace and warre; which properly was a kingdome, wherein god was king, and the high priest was to be (after the death of moses) his sole viceroy, or lieutenant. but there be many other places that clearly prove the same. as first (1 sam. 8.7.) when the elders of israel (grieved with the corruption of the sons of samuel) demanded a king, samuel displeased therewith, prayed unto the lord; and the lord answering said unto him, "hearken unto the voice of the people, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that i should not reign over them." out of which it is evident, that god himself was then their king; and samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which god from time to time appointed him. again, (1 sam. 12.12.) where samuel saith to the people, "when yee saw that nahash king of the children of ammon came against you, ye said unto me, nay, but a king shall reign over us, when the lord your god was your king:" it is manifest that god was their king, and governed the civill state of their common-wealth. and after the israelites had rejected god, the prophets did foretell his restitution; as (isaiah 24.23.) "then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed when the lord of hosts shall reign in mount zion, and in jerusalem;" where he speaketh expressely of his reign in zion, and jerusalem; that is, on earth. and (micah 4.7.) "and the lord shall reign over them in mount zion:" this mount zion is in jerusalem upon the earth. and (ezek. 20.33.) "as i live, saith the lord god, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arme, and with fury powred out, i wil rule over you; and (verse 37.) i will cause you to passe under the rod, and i will bring you into the bond of the covenant;" that is, i will reign over you, and make you to stand to that covenant which you made with me by moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of samuel, and in your election of another king. and in the new testament, the angel gabriel saith of our saviour (luke 1.32,33) "he shall be great, and be called the son of the most high, and the lord shall give him the throne of his father david; and he shall reign over the house of jacob for ever; and of his kingdome there shall be no end." this is also a kingdome upon earth; for the claim whereof, as an enemy to caesar, he was put to death; the title of his crosse, was, jesus of nazareth, king of the jews; hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of thornes; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said of the disciples (acts 17.7.) "that they did all of them contrary to the decrees of caesar, saying there was another king, one jesus. the kingdome therefore of god, is a reall, not a metaphoricall kingdome; and so taken, not onely in the old testament, but the new; when we say, "for thine is the kingdome, the power, and glory," it is to be understood of gods kingdome, by force of our covenant, not by the right of gods power; for such a kingdome god alwaies hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, "thy kingdome come," unlesse it be meant of the restauration of that kingdome of god by christ, which by revolt of the israelites had been interrupted in the election of saul. nor had it been proper to say, "the kingdome of heaven is at hand," or to pray, "thy kingdome come," if it had still continued. there be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives too much light to christian kings to see their right of ecclesiastical government. this they have observed, that in stead of a sacerdotall kingdome, translate, a kingdome of priests: for they may as well translate a royall priesthood, (as it is in st. peter) into a priesthood of kings. and whereas, for a peculiar people, they put a pretious jewel, or treasure, a man might as well call the speciall regiment, or company of a generall, the generalls pretious jewel, or his treasure. in short, the kingdome of god is a civill kingdome; which consisted, first in the obligation of the people of israel to those laws, which moses should bring unto them from mount sinai; and which afterwards the high priest of the time being, should deliver to them from before the cherubins in the sanctum sanctorum; and which kingdome having been cast off, in the election of saul, the prophets foretold, should be restored by christ; and the restauration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in the lords prayer, "thy kingdome come;" and the right whereof we acknowledge, when we adde, "for thine is the kingdome, the power, and glory, for ever and ever, amen;" and the proclaiming whereof, was the preaching of the apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the teachers of the gospel; to embrace which gospel, (that is to say, to promise obedience to gods government) is, to bee in the kingdome of grace, because god hath gratis given to such the power to bee the subjects (that is, children) of god hereafter, when christ shall come in majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his owne people, which is called the kingdome of glory. if the kingdome of god (called also the kingdome of heaven, from the gloriousnesse, and admirable height of that throne) were not a kingdome which god by his lieutenant, or vicars, who deliver his commandements to the people, did exercise on earth; there would not have been so much contention, and warre, about who it is, by whom god speaketh to us; neither would many priests have troubled themselves with spirituall jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it them. out of this literall interpretation of the kingdome of god, ariseth also the true interpretation of the word holy. for it is a word, which in gods kingdome answereth to that, which men in their kingdomes use to call publique, or the kings. the king of any countrey is the publique person, or representative of all his own subjects. and god the king of israel was the holy one of israel. the nation which is subject to one earthly soveraign, is the nation of that soveraign, that is, of the publique person. so the jews, who were gods nation, were called (exod. 19.6.) "a holy nation." for by holy, is alwaies understood, either god himselfe, or that which is gods in propriety; as by publique is alwaies meant, either the person of the common-wealth it self, or something that is so the common-wealths, as no private person can claim any propriety therein. therefore the sabbath (gods day) is a holy day; the temple, (gods house) a holy house; sacrifices, tithes, and offerings (gods tribute) holy duties; priests, prophets, and anointed kings, under christ (gods ministers) holy men; the coelestiall ministring spirits (gods messengers) holy angels; and the like: and wheresoever the word holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety, gotten by consent. in saying "hallowed be thy name," we do but pray to god for grace to keep the first commandement, of "having no other gods but him." mankind is gods nation in propriety: but the jews only were a holy nation. why, but because they became his propriety by covenant. sacred what and the word profane, is usually taken in the scripture for the same with common; and consequently their contraries, holy, and proper, in the kingdome of god must be the same also. but figuratively, those men also are called holy, that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designes, and wholly devoted, and given themselves to god. in the proper sense, that which is made holy by gods appropriating or separating it to his own use, is said to be sanctified by god, as the seventh day in the fourth commandement; and as the elect in the new testament were said to bee sanctified, when they were endued with the spirit of godlinesse. and that which is made holy by the dedication of men, and given to god, so as to be used onely in his publique service, is called also sacred, and said to be consecrated, as temples, and other houses of publique prayer, and their utensils, priests, and ministers, victimes, offerings, and the externall matter of sacraments. degrees of sanctity of holinesse there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the service of god, there may bee some set apart again, for a neerer and more especial service. the whole nation of the israelites were a people holy to god; yet the tribe of levi was amongst the israelites a holy tribe; and amongst the levites, the priests were yet more holy; and amongst the priests, the high priest was the most holy. so the land of judea was the holy land; but the holy city wherein god was to be worshipped, was more holy; and again, the temples more holy than the city; and the sanctum sanctorum more holy than the rest of the temple. sacrament a sacrament, is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and a consecration of it to gods service, for a sign, either of our admission into the kingdome of god, to be of the number of his peculiar people, or for a commemoration of the same. in the old testament, the sign of admission was circumcision; in the new testament, baptisme. the commemoration of it in the old testament, was the eating (at a certain time, which was anniversary) of the paschall lamb; by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their bondage in egypt; and in the new testament, the celebrating of the lords supper; by which, we are put in mind, of our deliverance from the bondage of sin, by our blessed saviours death upon the crosse. the sacraments of admission, are but once to be used, because there needs but one admission; but because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance, and of our allegeance, the sacraments of commemoration have need to be reiterated. and these are the principall sacraments, and as it were the solemne oathes we make of our alleageance. there be also other consecrations, that may be called sacraments, as the word implyeth onely consecration to gods service; but as it implies an oath, or promise of alleageance to god, there were no other in the old testament, but circumcision, and the passover; nor are there any other in the new testament, but baptisme, and the lords supper. chapter xxxvi. of the word of god, and of prophets word what when there is mention of the word of god, or of man, it doth not signifie a part of speech, such as grammarians call a nown, or a verb, or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it significative; but a perfect speech or discourse, whereby the speaker affirmeth, denieth, commandeth, promiseth, threateneth, wisheth, or interrogateth. in which sense it is not vocabulum, that signifies a word; but sermo, (in greek logos) that is some speech, discourse, or saying. the words spoken by god and concerning god, both are called gods word in scripture again, if we say the word of god, or of man, it may bee understood sometimes of the speaker, (as the words that god hath spoken, or that a man hath spoken): in which sense, when we say, the gospel of st. matthew, we understand st. matthew to be the writer of it: and sometimes of the subject: in which sense, when we read in the bible, "the words of the days of the kings of israel, or judah," 'tis meant, that the acts that were done in those days, were the subject of those words; and in the greek, which (in the scripture) retaineth many hebraismes, by the word of god is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by god, but concerning god, and his government; that is to say, the doctrine of religion: insomuch, as it is all one, to say logos theou, and theologia; which is, that doctrine which wee usually call divinity, as is manifest by the places following (acts 13.46.) "then paul and barnabas waxed bold, and said, it was necessary that the word of god should first have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge your selves unworthy of everlasting life, loe, we turn to the gentiles." that which is here called the word of god, was the doctrine of christian religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes before. and (acts 5.20.) where it is said to the apostles by an angel, "go stand and speak in the temple, all the words of this life;" by the words of this life, is meant, the doctrine of the gospel; as is evident by what they did in the temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same chap. "daily in the temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach christ jesus:" in which place it is manifest, that jesus christ was the subject of this word of life; or (which is all one) the subject of the words of this life eternall, that our saviour offered them. so (acts 15.7.) the word of god, is called the word of the gospel, because it containeth the doctrine of the kingdome of christ; and the same word (rom. 10.8,9.) is called the word of faith; that is, as is there expressed, the doctrine of christ come, and raised from the dead. also (mat. 13. 19.) "when any one heareth the word of the kingdome;" that is, the doctrine of the kingdome taught by christ. again, the same word, is said (acts 12. 24.) "to grow and to be multiplied;" which to understand of the evangelicall doctrine is easie, but of the voice, or speech of god, hard and strange. in the same sense the doctrine of devils, signifieth not the words of any devill, but the doctrine of heathen men concerning daemons, and those phantasms which they worshipped as gods. (1 tim. 4.1.) considering these two significations of the word of god, as it is taken in scripture, it is manifest in this later sense (where it is taken for the doctrine of the christian religion,) that the whole scripture is the word of god: but in the former sense not so. for example, though these words, "i am the lord thy god, &c." to the end of the ten commandements, were spoken by god to moses; yet the preface, "god spake these words and said," is to be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy history. the word of god, as it is taken for that which he hath spoken, is understood sometimes properly, sometimes metaphorically. properly, as the words, he hath spoken to his prophets; metaphorically, for his wisdome, power, and eternall decree, in making the world; in which sense, those fiats, "let there be light," "let there be a firmament," "let us make man," &c. (gen. 1.) are the word of god. and in the same sense it is said (john 1.3.) "all things were made by it, and without it was nothing made that was made; and (heb. 1.3.) "he upholdeth all things by the word of his power;" that is, by the power of his word; that is, by his power; and (heb. 11.3.) "the worlds were framed by the word of god;" and many other places to the same sense: as also amongst the latines, the name of fate, which signifieth properly the word spoken, is taken in the same sense. secondly, for the effect of his word secondly, for the effect of his word; that is to say, for the thing it self, which by his word is affirmed, commanded, threatned, or promised; as (psalm 105.19.) where joseph is said to have been kept in prison, "till his word was come;" that is, till that was come to passe which he had (gen. 40.13.) foretold to pharaohs butler, concerning his being restored to his office: for there by his word was come, is meant, the thing it self was come to passe. so also (1 king. 18.36.) elijah saith to god, "i have done all these thy words," in stead of "i have done all these things at thy word," or commandement: and (jer. 17.15.) "where is the word of the lord," is put for, "where is the evill he threatened:" and (ezek. 12.28.) "there shall none of my words be prolonged any more:" by "words" are understood those things, which god promised to his people. and in the new testament (mat. 24.35.) "heaven and earth shal pass away, but my words shall not pass away;" that is, there is nothing that i have promised or foretold, that shall not come to passe. and in this sense it is, that st. john the evangelist, and, i think, st. john onely calleth our saviour himself as in the flesh "the word of god (as joh. 1.14.) the word was made flesh;" that is to say, the word, or promise that christ should come into the world, "who in the beginning was with god;" that is to say, it was in the purpose of god the father, to send god the son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of eternall life, but it was not till then put in execution, and actually incarnate; so that our saviour is there called "the word," not because he was the promise, but the thing promised. they that taking occasion from this place, doe commonly call him the verbe of god, do but render the text more obscure. they might as well term him the nown of god: for as by nown, so also by verbe, men understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeall, or spirituall; and therefore it cannot be said to bee either god, or man; whereas our saviour is both. and this word which st. john in his gospel saith was with god, is (in his 1 epistle, verse 1.) called "the word of life;" and (verse 2.) "the eternall life, which was with the father:" so that he can be in no other sense called the word, then in that, wherein he is called eternall life; that is, "he that hath procured us eternall life," by his comming in the flesh. so also (apocalypse 19.13.) the apostle speaking of christ, clothed in a garment dipt in bloud, saith; his name is "the word of god;" which is to be understood, as if he had said his name had been, "he that was come according to the purpose of god from the beginning, and according to his word and promises delivered by the prophets." so that there is nothing here of the incarnation of a word, but of the incarnation of god the son, therefore called the word, because his incarnation was the performance of the promise; in like manner as the holy ghost is called the promise. (acts 1.4. luke 24.49.) thirdly, for the words of reason and equity there are also places of the scripture, where, by the word of god, is signified such words as are consonant to reason, and equity, though spoken sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. for pharaoh necho was an idolator; yet his words to the good king josiah, in which he advised him by messengers, not to oppose him in his march against carchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of god; and that josiah not hearkning to them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read 2 chron. 35. vers. 21,22,23. it is true, that as the same history is related in the first book of esdras, not pharaoh, but jeremiah spake these words to josiah, from the mouth of the lord. but wee are to give credit to the canonicall scripture, whatsoever be written in the apocrypha. the word of god, is then also to be taken for the dictates of reason, and equity, when the same is said in the scriptures to bee written in mans heart; as psalm 36.31. jerem. 31.33. deut.30.11, 14. and many other like places. divers acceptions of the word prophet the name of prophet, signifieth in scripture sometimes prolocutor; that is, he that speaketh from god to man, or from man to god: and sometimes praedictor, or a foreteller of things to come; and sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. it is most frequently used in the sense of speaking from god to the people. so moses, samuel, elijah, isaiah, jeremiah, and others were prophets. and in this sense the high priest was a prophet, for he only went into the sanctum sanctorum, to enquire of god; and was to declare his answer to the people. and therefore when caiphas said, it was expedient that one man should die for the people, st. john saith (chap. 11.51.) that "he spake not this of himselfe, but being high priest that year, he prophesied that one man should dye for the nation." also they that in christian congregations taught the people, (1 cor. 14.3.) are said to prophecy. in the like sense it is, that god saith to moses (exod. 4.16.) concerning aaron, "he shall be thy spokes-man to the people; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him in stead of god;" that which here is spokesman, is (chap.7.1.) interpreted prophet; "see (saith god) i have made thee a god to pharaoh, and aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet." in the sense of speaking from man to god, abraham is called a prophet (genes. 20.7.) where god in a dream speaketh to abimelech in this manner, "now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a prophet, and shall pray for thee;" whereby may be also gathered, that the name of prophet may be given, not unproperly to them that in christian churches, have a calling to say publique prayers for the congregation. in the same sense, the prophets that came down from the high place (or hill of god) with a psaltery, and a tabret, and a pipe, and a harp (1 sam. 10.5,6.) and (vers. 10.) saul amongst them, are said to prophecy, in that they praised god, in that manner publiquely. in the like sense, is miriam (exod. 15.20.) called a prophetesse. so is it also to be taken (1 cor. 11.4,5.) where st. paul saith, "every man that prayeth or prophecyeth with his head covered, &c. and every woman that prayeth or prophecyeth with her head uncovered: for prophecy in that place, signifieth no more, but praising god in psalmes, and holy songs; which women might doe in the church, though it were not lawfull for them to speak to the congregation. and in this signification it is, that the poets of the heathen, that composed hymnes and other sorts of poems in the honor of their gods, were called vates (prophets) as is well enough known by all that are versed in the books of the gentiles, and as is evident (tit. 1.12.) where st. paul saith of the cretians, that a prophet of their owne said, they were liars; not that st. paul held their poets for prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word prophet was commonly used to signifie them that celebrated the honour of god in verse praediction of future contingents, not alwaies prophecy when by prophecy is meant praediction, or foretelling of future contingents; not only they were prophets, who were gods spokesmen, and foretold those things to others, which god had foretold to them; but also all those imposters, that pretend by the helpe of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to foretell the like events in time to come: of which (as i have declared already in the 12. chapter of this discourse) there be many kinds, who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater reputation of prophecy, by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings. prophecy is not an art, nor (when it is taken for praediction) a constant vocation; but an extraordinary, and temporary employment from god, most often of good men, but sometimes also of the wicked. the woman of endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a phantasme of samuel, and foretold saul his death, was not therefore a prophetesse; for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise such a phantasme; nor does it appear that god commanded the raising of it; but onely guided that imposture to be a means of sauls terror and discouragement; and by consequent, of the discomfiture, by which he fell. and for incoherent speech, it was amongst the gentiles taken for one sort of prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intoxicated with a spirit, or vapour from the cave of the pythian oracle at delphi, were for the time really mad, and spake like mad-men; of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies are said to be made of materia prima. in the scripture i find it also so taken (1 sam. 18. 10.) in these words, "and the evill spirit came upon saul, and he prophecyed in the midst of the house." the manner how god hath spoken to the prophets and although there be so many significations in scripture of the word prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to whom god speaketh immediately, that which the prophet is to say from him, to some other man, or to the people. and hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner god speaketh to such a prophet. can it (may some say) be properly said, that god hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? the prophet david argueth thus, "shall he that made the eye, not see? or he that made the ear, not hear?" but this may be spoken, not (as usually) to signifie gods nature, but to signifie our intention to honor him. for to see, and hear, are honorable attributes, and may be given to god, to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive) his almighty power. but if it were to be taken in the strict, and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all parts of mans body, that he had also the same use of them which we have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. therefore we are to interpret gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which god makes them understand his will: and the wayes whereby he doth this, are many; and to be sought onely in the holy scripture: where though many times it be said, that god spake to this, and that person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many places, that deliver also the signes by which they were to acknowledge his presence, and commandement; and by these may be understood, how he spake to many of the rest. to the extraordinary prophets of the old testament he spake by dreams, or visions in what manner god spake to adam, and eve, and cain, and noah, is not expressed; nor how he spake to abraham, till such time as he came out of his own countrey to sichem in the land of canaan; and then (gen. 12.7.) god is said to have appeared to him. so there is one way, whereby god made his presence manifest; that is, by an apparition, or vision. and again, (gen. 15.1.) the word of the lord came to abraham in a vision; that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of gods presence, appeared as gods messenger, to speak to him. again, the lord appeared to abraham (gen. 18. 1.) by an apparition of three angels; and to abimelech (gen. 20. 3.) in a dream: to lot (gen. 19. 1.) by an apparition of two angels: and to hagar (gen. 21. 17.) by the apparition of one angel: and to abraham again (gen. 22. 11.) by the apparition of a voice from heaven: and (gen. 26. 24.) to isaac in the night; (that is, in his sleep, or by dream): and to jacob (gen. 18. 12.) in a dream; that is to say (as are the words of the text) "jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder, &c." and (gen. 32. 1.) in a vision of angels: and to moses (exod. 3.2.) in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush: and after the time of moses, (where the manner how god spake immediately to man in the old testament, is expressed) hee spake alwaies by a vision, or by a dream; as to gideon, samuel, eliah, elisha, isaiah, ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets; and often in the new testament, as to joseph, to st. peter, to st. paul, and to st. john the evangelist in the apocalypse. onely to moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in mount sinai, and in the tabernacle; and to the high priest in the tabernacle, and in the sanctum sanctorum of the temple. but moses, and after him the high priests were prophets of a more eminent place, and degree in gods favour; and god himself in express words declareth, that to other prophets hee spake in dreams and visions, but to his servant moses, in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. the words are these (numb. 12. 6,7,8.) "if there be a prophet among you, i the lord will make my self known to him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a dream. my servant moses is not so, who is faithfull in all my house; with him i will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the lord shall he behold." and (exod. 33. 11.) "the lord spake to moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend." and yet this speaking of god to moses, was by mediation of an angel, or angels, as appears expressely, acts 7. ver. 35. and 53. and gal. 3. 19. and was therefore a vision, though a more cleer vision than was given to other prophets. and conformable hereunto, where god saith (deut. 13. 1.) "if there arise amongst you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams," the later word is but the interpretation of the former. and (joel 2. 28.) "your sons and your daughters shall prophecy; your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions:" where again, the word prophecy is expounded by dream, and vision. and in the same manner it was, that god spake to solomon, promising him wisdome, riches, and honor; for the text saith, (1 kings 3. 15.) "and solomon awoak, and behold it was a dream:" so that generally the prophets extraordinary in the old testament took notice of the word of god no otherwise, than from their dreams, or visions, that is to say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an extasie; which imaginations in every true prophet were supernaturall; but in false prophets were either naturall, or feigned. the same prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the spirit; as (zach. 7. 12.) where the prophet speaking of the jewes, saith, "they made their hearths hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the lord of hosts hath sent in his spirit by the former prophets." by which it is manifest, that speaking by the spirit, or inspiration, was not a particular manner of gods speaking, different from vision, when they that were said to speak by the spirit, were extraordinary prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a particular commission, or (which is all one) a new dream, or vision. to prophets of perpetuall calling, and supreme, god spake in the old testament from the mercy seat, in a manner not expressed in the scripture. of prophets, that were so by a perpetuall calling in the old testament, some were supreme, and some subordinate: supreme were first moses; and after him the high priest, every one for his time, as long as the priesthood was royall; and after the people of the jews, had rejected god, that he should no more reign over them, those kings which submitted themselves to gods government, were also his chief prophets; and the high priests office became ministeriall. and when god was to be consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the lord, as the king commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the king thought fit. for king saul (1 sam. 13. 9.) commanded the burnt offering to be brought, and (1 sam. 14. 18.) he commands the priest to bring the ark neer him; and (ver. 19.) again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage upon his enemies. and in the same chapter saul asketh counsell of god. in like manner king david, after his being anointed, though before he had possession of the kingdome, is said to "enquire of the lord" (1 sam. 23. 2.) whether he should fight against the philistines at keilah; and (verse 10.) david commandeth the priest to bring him the ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in keilah, or not. and king solomon (1 kings 2. 27.) took the priesthood from abiathar, and gave it (verse 35.) to zadoc. therefore moses, and the high priests, and the pious kings, who enquired of god on all extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have, were all soveraign prophets. but in what manner god spake unto them, is not manifest. to say that when moses went up to god in mount sinai, it was a dream, or vision, such as other prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which god made between moses, and other prophets, numb. 12. 6,7,8. to say god spake or appeared as he is in his own nature, is to deny his infinitenesse, invisibility, incomprehensibility. to say he spake by inspiration, or infusion of the holy spirit, as the holy spirit signifieth the deity, is to make moses equall with christ, in whom onely the godhead (as st. paul speaketh col. 2.9.) dwelleth bodily. and lastly, to say he spake by the holy spirit, as it signifieth the graces, or gifts of the holy spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernaturall. for god disposeth men to piety, justice, mercy, truth, faith, and all manner of vertue, both morall, and intellectuall, by doctrine, example, and by severall occasions, naturall, and ordinary. and as these ways cannot be applyed to god, in his speaking to moses, at mount sinai; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his speaking to the high priests, from the mercy-seat. therefore in what manner god spake to those soveraign prophets of the old testament, whose office it was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. in the time of the new testament, there was no soveraign prophet, but our saviour; who was both god that spake, and the prophet to whom he spake. to prophets of perpetuall calling, but subordinate, god spake by the spirit. to subordinate prophets of perpetuall calling, i find not any place that proveth god spake to them supernaturally; but onely in such manner, as naturally he inclineth men to piety, to beleef, to righteousnesse, and to other vertues all other christian men. which way, though it consist in constitution, instruction, education, and the occasions and invitements men have to christian vertues; yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the spirit of god, or holy spirit (which we in our language call the holy ghost): for there is no good inclination, that is not of the operation of god. but these operations are not alwaies supernaturall. when therefore a prophet is said to speak in the spirit, or by the spirit of god, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks according to gods will, declared by the supreme prophet. for the most common acceptation of the word spirit, is in the signification of a mans intention, mind, or disposition. in the time of moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that prophecyed in the campe of the israelites. in what manner god spake to them, is declared in the 11 of numbers, verse 25. "the lord came down in a cloud, and spake unto moses, and took of the spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy elders. and it came to passe, when the spirit rested upon them, they prophecyed, and did not cease," by which it is manifest, first, that their prophecying to the people, was subservient, and subordinate to the prophecying of moses; for that god took of the spirit of moses, to put upon them; so that they prophecyed as moses would have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to prophecy at all. for there was (verse 27.) a complaint made against them to moses; and joshua would have moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but said to joshua, bee not jealous in my behalf. secondly, that the spirit of god in that place, signifieth nothing but the mind and disposition to obey, and assist moses in the administration of the government. for if it were meant they had the substantial spirit of god; that is, the divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no lesse manner than christ himself, in whom onely the spirit of god dwelt bodily. it is meant therefore of the gift and grace of god, that guided them to co-operate with moses; from whom their spirit was derived. and it appeareth (verse 16.) that, they were such as moses himself should appoint for elders and officers of the people: for the words are, "gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be elders and officers of the people:" where, "thou knowest," is the same with "thou appointest," or "hast appointed to be such." for we are told before (exod. 18.) that moses following the counsell of jethro his father-in-law, did appoint judges, and officers over the people, such as feared god; and of these, were those seventy, whom god by putting upon them moses spirit, inclined to aid moses in the administration of the kingdome: and in this sense the spirit of god is said (1 sam. 16. 13, 14.) presently upon the anointing of david, to have come upon david, and left saul; god giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people, and taking them away from him, he rejected. so that by the spirit is meant inclination to gods service; and not any supernaturall revelation. god sometimes also spake by lots god spake also many times by the event of lots; which were ordered by such as he had put in authority over his people. so wee read that god manifested by the lots which saul caused to be drawn (1 sam. 14. 43.) the fault that jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the oath taken by the people. and (josh. 18. 10.) god divided the land of canaan amongst the israelite, by the "lots that joshua did cast before the lord in shiloh." in the same manner it seemeth to be, that god discovered (joshua 7.16., &c.) the crime of achan. and these are the wayes whereby god declared his will in the old testament. all which ways he used also in the new testament. to the virgin mary, by a vision of an angel: to joseph in a dream: again to paul in the way to damascus in a vision of our saviour: and to peter in the vision of a sheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh, of clean and unclean, beasts; and in prison, by vision of an angel: and to all the apostles, and writers of the new testament, by the graces of his spirit; and to the apostles again (at the choosing of matthias in the place of judas iscariot) by lot. every man ought to examine the probability of a pretended prophets calling seeing then all prophecy supposeth vision, or dream, (which two, when they be naturall, are the same,) or some especiall gift of god, so rarely observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well such gifts, as the most extraordinary dreams, and visions, may proceed from god, not onely by his supernaturall, and immediate, but also by his naturall operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of reason and judgement to discern between naturall, and supernaturall gifts, and between naturall, and supernaturall visions, or dreams. and consequently men had need to be very circumspect, and wary, in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us to obey god in that way, which he in gods name telleth us to be the way to happinesse. for he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture; and consequently, ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience; unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in the institution of a common-wealth; as when the prophet is the civill soveraign, or by the civil soveraign authorized. and if this examination of prophets, and spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose, to set out the marks, by which every man might be able, to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom they ought not to follow. seeing therefore such marks are set out (deut. 13. 1,&c.) to know a prophet by; and (1 john 4.1.&c) to know a spirit by: and seeing there is so much prophecying in the old testament; and so much preaching in the new testament against prophets; and so much greater a number ordinarily of false prophets, then of true; every one is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own perill. and first, that there were many more false than true prophets, appears by this, that when ahab (1 kings 12.) consulted four hundred prophets, they were all false imposters, but onely one michaiah. and a little before the time of the captivity, the prophets were generally lyars. "the prophets" (saith the lord by jerem. cha. 14. verse 14.) "prophecy lies in my name. i sent them not, neither have i commanded them, nor spake unto them, they prophecy to you a false vision, a thing of naught; and the deceit of their heart." in so much as god commanded the people by the mouth of the prophet jeremiah (chap. 23. 16.) not to obey them. "thus saith the lord of hosts, hearken not unto the words of the prophets, that prophecy to you. they make you vain, they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the lord." all prophecy but of the soveraign prophet is to be examined by every subject seeing then there was in the time of the old testament, such quarrells amongst the visionary prophets, one contesting with another, and asking when departed the spirit from me, to go to thee? as between michaiah, and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the lye to one another, (as in jerem. 14.14.) and such controversies in the new testament at this day, amongst the spirituall prophets: every man then was, and now is bound to make use of his naturall reason, to apply to all prophecy those rules which god hath given us, to discern the true from the false. of which rules, in the old testament, one was, conformable doctrine to that which moses the soveraign prophet had taught them; and the other the miraculous power of foretelling what god would bring to passe, as i have already shown out of deut. 13. 1. &c. and in the new testament there was but one onely mark; and that was the preaching of this doctrine, that jesus is the christ, that is, the king of the jews, promised in the old testament. whosoever denyed that article, he was a false prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that taught it was a true prophet. for st. john (1 epist, 4. 2, &c) speaking expressely of the means to examine spirits, whether they be of god, or not; after he hath told them that there would arise false prophets, saith thus, "hereby know ye the spirit of god. every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come in the flesh, is of god;" that is, is approved and allowed as a prophet of god: not that he is a godly man, or one of the elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth jesus to be the christ; but for that he is a prophet avowed. for god sometimes speaketh by prophets, whose persons he hath not accepted; as he did by baalam; and as he foretold saul of his death, by the witch of endor. again in the next verse, "every spirit that confesseth not that jesus christ is come in the flesh, is not of christ. and this is the spirit of antichrist." so that the rule is perfect on both sides; that he is a true prophet, which preacheth the messiah already come, in the person of jesus; and he a false one that denyeth him come, and looketh for him in some future imposter, that shall take upon him that honour falsely, whom the apostle there properly calleth antichrist. every man therefore ought to consider who is the soveraign prophet; that is to say, who it is, that is gods viceregent on earth; and hath next under god, the authority of governing christian men; and to observe for a rule, that doctrine, which in the name of god, hee commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines, which pretended prophets with miracles, or without, shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that rule, to doe as they did, that came to moses, and complained that there were some that prophecyed in the campe, whose authority so to doe they doubted of; and leave to the soveraign, as they did to moses to uphold, or to forbid them, as hee should see cause; and if hee disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom god hath given a part of the spirit of their soveraigne. for when christian men, take not their christian soveraign, for gods prophet; they must either take their owne dreams, for the prophecy they mean to bee governed by, and the tumour of their own hearts for the spirit of god; or they must suffer themselves to bee lead by some strange prince; or by some of their fellow subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander of the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their calling, then sometimes an extraordinary successe, and impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both divine, and humane, reduce all order, government, and society, to the first chaos of violence, and civill warre. chapter xxxvii. of miracles, and their use a miracle is a work that causeth admiration by miracles are signified the admirable works of god: & therefore they are also called wonders. and because they are for the most part, done, for a signification of his commandement, in such occasions, as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private naturall reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly in holy scripture, called signes, in the same sense, as they are called by the latines, ostenta, and portenta, from shewing, and fore-signifying that, which the almighty is about to bring to passe. and must therefore be rare, whereof there is no naturall cause known to understand therefore what is a miracle, we must first understand what works they are, which men wonder at, and call admirable. and there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: the one is, if it be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been produced: the other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by naturall means, but onely by the immediate hand of god. but when wee see some possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a miracle. therefore, if a horse, or cow should speak, it were a miracle; because both the thing is strange, & the naturall cause difficult to imagin: so also were it, to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production of some new shape of a living creature. but when a man, or other animal, engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the other; yet because 'tis usuall, it is no miracle. in like manner, if a man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a miracle; because strange: but if a peece of wood be so changed; because we see it often, it is no miracle: and yet we know no more, by what operation of god, the one is brought to passe, than the other. the first rainbow that was seen in the world, was a miracle, because the first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from god, placed in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more an universall destruction of the world by water. but at this day, because they are frequent, they are not miracles, neither to them that know their naturall causes, nor to them who know them not. again, there be many rare works produced by the art of man: yet when we know they are done; because thereby wee know also the means how they are done, we count them not for miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of god, but by mediation of humane industry. that which seemeth a miracle to one man, may seem otherwise to another furthermore, seeing admiration and wonder, is consequent to the knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a miracle to one, and not to another. and thence it is, that ignorant, and superstitious men make great wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of god,) admire not at all: as when ecclipses of the sun and moon have been taken for supernaturall works, by the common people; when neverthelesse, there were others, could from their naturall causes, have foretold the very hour they should arrive: or, as when a man, by confederacy, and secret intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man, thereby tells him, what he has done in former time; it seems to him a miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such miracles as those, cannot easily be done. the end of miracles again, it belongeth to the nature of a miracle, that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to gods messengers, ministers, and prophets, that thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by god, and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. and therefore, though the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universall deluge, were admirable works; yet because they were not done to procure credit to any prophet, or other minister of god, they use not to be called miracles. for how admirable soever any work be, the admiration consisteth not in that it could be done, because men naturally beleeve the almighty can doe all things, but because he does it at the prayer, or word of a man. but the works of god in egypt, by the hand of moses, were properly miracles; because they were done with intention to make the people of israel beleeve, that moses came unto them, not out of any design of his owne interest, but as sent from god. therefore after god had commanded him to deliver the israelites from the egyptian bondage, when he said (exod 4.1. &c.) "they will not beleeve me, but will say, the lord hath not appeared unto me," god gave him power, to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent, and again to return it into a rod; and by putting his hand into his bosome, to make it leprous; and again by pulling it out to make it whole, to make the children of israel beleeve (as it is verse 5.) that the god of their fathers had appeared unto him; and if that were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into bloud. and when hee had done these miracles before the people, it is said (verse 41.) that "they beleeved him." neverthelesse, for fear of pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him. therefore the other works which were done to plague pharaoh and the egyptians, tended all to make the israelites beleeve in moses, and were properly miracles. in like manner if we consider all the miracles done by the hand of moses, and all the rest of the prophets, till the captivity; and those of our saviour, and his apostles afterward; we shall find, their end was alwaies to beget, or confirm beleefe, that they came not of their own motion, but were sent by god. wee may further observe in scripture, that the end of miracles, was to beget beleef, not universally in all men, elect, and reprobate; but in the elect only; that is to say, is such as god had determined should become his subjects. for those miraculous plagues of egypt, had not for end, the conversion of pharaoh; for god had told moses before, that he would harden the heart of pharaoh, that he should not let the people goe: and when he let them goe at last, not the miracles perswaded him, but the plagues forced him to it. so also of our saviour, it is written, (mat. 13. 58.) that he wrought not many miracles in his own countrey, because of their unbeleef; and (in marke 6.5.) in stead of, "he wrought not many," it is, "he could work none." it was not because he wanted power; which to say, were blasphemy against god; nor that the end of miracles was not to convert incredulous men to christ; for the end of all the miracles of moses, of prophets, of our saviour, and of his apostles was to adde men to the church; but it was, because the end of their miracles, was to adde to the church (not all men, but) such as should be saved; that is to say, such as god had elected. seeing therefore our saviour sent from his father, hee could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom his father had rejected. they that expounding this place of st. marke, say, that his word, "hee could not," is put for, "he would not," do it without example in the greek tongue, (where would not, is put sometimes for could not, in things inanimate, that have no will; but could not, for would not, never,) and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak christians; as if christ could doe no miracles, but amongst the credulous. the definition of a miracle from that which i have here set down, of the nature, and use of a miracle, we may define it thus, "a miracle, is a work of god, (besides his operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation,) done for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation." and from this definition, we may inferre; first, that in all miracles, the work done, is not the effect of any vertue in the prophet; because it is the effect of the immediate hand of god; that is to say god hath done it, without using the prophet therein, as a subordinate cause. secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit, can do a miracle. for it must either be by vertue of some naturall science, or by incantation, that is, vertue of words. for if the inchanters do it by their own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from god; which all men deny: and if they doe it by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of god, but naturall, and consequently no miracle. there be some texts of scripture, that seem to attribute the power of working wonders (equall to some of those immediate miracles, wrought by god himself,) to certain arts of magick, and incantation. as for example, when we read that after the rod of moses being cast on the ground became a serpent, (exod. 7. 11.) "the magicians of egypt did the like by their enchantments;" and that after moses had turned the waters of the egyptian streams, rivers, ponds, and pooles of water into blood, (exod. 7. 22.) "the magicians of egypt did so likewise, with their enchantments;" and that after moses had by the power of god brought frogs upon the land, (exod. 8. 7.) "the magicians also did so with their enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of egypt;" will not a man be apt to attribute miracles to enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of words; and think the same very well proved out of this, and other such places? and yet there is no place of scripture, that telleth us what on enchantment is. if therefore enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of strange effects by spells, and words; but imposture, and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far from supernaturall, as the impostors need not the study so much as of naturall causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind, to doe them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of magick, witchcraft, and enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first sight they seem to bear. that men are apt to be deceived by false miracles for it is evident enough, that words have no effect, but on those that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the intentions, or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce, hope, fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. therefore when a rod seemeth a serpent, or the water bloud, or any other miracle seemeth done by enchantment; if it be not to the edification of gods people, not the rod, nor the water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon by the words, but the spectator. so that all the miracle consisteth in this, that the enchanter has deceived a man; which is no miracle, but a very easie matter to doe. for such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes, and of the nature, and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused. what opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a science of the course of the stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people, this hour, or day the sun should be darkned? a juggler by the handling of his goblets, and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the devil. a man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in antient time were called ventriloqui,) and so make the weaknesse of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men beleeve it is a voice from heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. and for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that, obtain the reputation of being conjurers. but it is too long a businesse, to reckon up the severall sorts of those men, which the greeks called thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of things wonderfull; and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity. but if we looke upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to bee beleeved. for two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charme, will deceive many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witnesse; will deceive many more. cautions against the imposture of miracles in this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended miracles, there can be no better, nor i think any other caution, than that which god hath prescribed, first by moses, (as i have said before in the precedent chapter,) in the beginning of the 13. and end of the 18. of deuteronomy; that wee take not any for prophets, that teach any other religion, then that which gods lieutenant, (which at that time was moses,) hath established; nor any, (though he teach the same religion,) whose praediction we doe not see come to passe. moses therefore in his time, and aaron, and his successors in their times, and the soveraign governour of gods people, next under god himself, that is to say, the head of the church in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he hath established, before wee give credit to a pretended miracle, or prophet. and when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not onely so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his naturall power, but that it requires the immediate hand of god. and in this also we must have recourse to gods lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull cases, wee have submitted our private judgments. for example; if a man pretend, that after certain words spoken over a peece of bread, that presently god hath made it not bread, but a god, or a man, or both, and neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done; nor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of god, by his vicar, or lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. if he say not, then followeth that which moses saith, (deut. 18. 22.) "he hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him." if he say 'tis done, then he is not to contradict it. so also if wee see not, but onely hear tell of a miracle, we are to consult the lawful church; that is to say, the lawful head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. and this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under christian soveraigns. for in these times, i do not know one man, that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason, would think supernaturall: and the question is no more, whether what wee see done, be a miracle; whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a reall work, and not the act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lye. in which question we are not every one, to make our own private reason, or conscience, but the publique reason, that is, the reason of gods supreme lieutenant, judge; and indeed we have made him judge already, if wee have given him a soveraign power, to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence. a private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be miracles, or lies. but when it comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the publique; that is to say, to gods lieutenant. but who is this lieutenant of god, and head of the church, shall be considered in its proper place thereafter. chapter xxxviii. of the signification in scripture of eternall life, hell, salvation, the world to come, and redemption the maintenance of civill society, depending on justice; and justice on the power of life and death, and other lesse rewards and punishments, residing in them that have the soveraignty of the common-wealth; it is impossible a common-wealth should stand, where any other than the soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than life; and of inflicting greater punishments than death. now seeing eternall life is a greater reward, than the life present; and eternall torment a greater punishment than the death of nature; it is a thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire (by obeying authority) to avoid the calamities of confusion, and civill war, what is meant in holy scripture, by life eternall, and torment eternall; and for what offences, against whom committed, men are to be eternally tormented; and for what actions, they are to obtain eternall life. place of adams eternity if he had not sinned, the terrestrial paradise and first we find, that adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandement of god, he had enjoyed it in the paradise of eden everlastingly. for there was the tree of life; whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of knowledge of good an evill; which was not allowed him. and therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, god thrust him out of paradise, "lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live for ever." (gen. 3. 22.) by which it seemeth to me, (with submission neverthelesse both in this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the scriptures, to the interpretation of the bible authorized by the common-wealth, whose subject i am,) that adam if he had not sinned, had had an eternall life on earth: and that mortality entred upon himself, and his posterity, by his first sin. not that actuall death then entred; for adam then could never have had children; whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he dyed. but where it is said, "in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," it must needs bee meant of his mortality, and certitude of death. seeing then eternall life was lost by adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancell that forfeiture was to recover thereby, that life again. now jesus christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers, that eternall life, which was lost by the sin of adam. and in this sense it is, that the comparison of st. paul holdeth (rom. 5.18, 19.) "as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousnesse of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life." which is again (1 cor. 15.21,22) more perspicuously delivered in these words, "for since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. for as in adam all die, even so in christ shall all be made alive." texts concerning the place of life eternall for beleevers concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that eternall life, which christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged seem to make it on earth. for if as in adam, all die, that is, have forfeited paradise, and eternall life on earth; even so in christ all shall be made alive; then all men shall be made to live on earth; for else the comparison were not proper. hereunto seemeth to agree that of the psalmist, (psal. 133.3.) "upon zion god commanded the blessing, even life for evermore;" for zion, is in jerusalem, upon earth: as also that of s. joh. (rev. 2.7.) "to him that overcommeth i will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of god." this was the tree of adams eternall life; but his life was to have been on earth. the same seemeth to be confirmed again by st. joh. (rev. 21.2.) where he saith, "i john saw the holy city, new jerusalem, coming down from god out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband:" and again v. 10. to the same effect: as if he should say, the new jerusalem, the paradise of god, at the coming again of christ, should come down to gods people from heaven, and not they goe up to it from earth. and this differs nothing from that, which the two men in white clothing (that is, the two angels) said to the apostles, that were looking upon christ ascending (acts 1.11.) "this same jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into heaven." which soundeth as if they had said, he should come down to govern them under his father, eternally here; and not take them up to govern them in heaven; and is conformable to the restauration of the kingdom of god, instituted under moses; which was a political government of the jews on earth. again, that saying of our saviour (mat. 22.30.) "that in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of god in heaven," is a description of an eternall life, resembling that which we lost in adam in the point of marriage. for seeing adam, and eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on earth eternally, in their individuall persons; it is manifest, they should not continually have procreated their kind. for if immortals should have generated, as mankind doth now; the earth in a small time, would not have been able to afford them a place to stand on. the jews that asked our saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many brothers, should be, in the resurrection, knew not what were the consequences of immortality; that there shal be no generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is marriage, or generation among the angels. the comparison between that eternall life which adam lost, and our saviour by his victory over death hath recovered; holdeth also in this, that as adam lost eternall life by his sin, and yet lived after it for a time; so the faithful christian hath recovered eternal life by christs passion, though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time; namely, till the resurrection. for as death is reckoned from the condemnation of adam, not from the execution; so life is reckoned from the absolution, not from the resurrection of them that are elected in christ. ascension into heaven that the place wherein men are to live eternally, after the resurrection, is the heavens, meaning by heaven, those parts of the world, which are the most remote from earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in another higher heaven, called caelum empyreum, (whereof there is no mention in scripture, nor ground in reason) is not easily to be drawn from any text that i can find. by the kingdome of heaven, is meant the kingdome of the king that dwelleth in heaven; and his kingdome was the people of israel, whom he ruled by the prophets his lieutenants, first moses, and after him eleazar, and the soveraign priests, till in the days of samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortall man for their king, after the manner of other nations. and when our saviour christ, by the preaching of his ministers, shall have perswaded the jews to return, and called the gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new kingdome of heaven, because our king shall then be god, whose throne is heaven; without any necessity evident in the scripture, that man shall ascend to his happinesse any higher than gods footstool the earth. on the contrary, we find written (joh. 3.13.) that "no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the son of man, that is in heaven." where i observe by the way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the words of our saviour, but of st. john himself; for christ was then not in heaven, but upon the earth. the like is said of david (acts 2.34.) where st. peter, to prove the ascension of christ, using the words of the psalmist, (psal. 16.10.) "thou wilt not leave my soule in hell, nor suffer thine holy one to see corruption," saith, they were spoken (not of david, but) of christ; and to prove it, addeth this reason, "for david is not ascended into heaven." but to this a man may easily answer, and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the generall day of judgment, yet their souls were in heaven as soon as they were departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our saviour (luke 20.37,38.) who proving the resurrection out of the word of moses, saith thus, "that the dead are raised, even moses shewed, at the bush, when he calleth the lord, the god of abraham, and the god of isaac, and the god of jacob. for he is not a god of the dead, but of the living; for they all live to him." but if these words be to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they prove not at all that which our saviour intended to prove, which was the resurrection of the body, that is to say, the immortality of the man. therefore our saviour meaneth, that those patriarchs were immortall; not by a property consequent to the essence, and nature of mankind, but by the will of god, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow eternall life upon the faithfull. and though at that time the patriarchs and many other faithfull men were dead, yet as it is in the text, they lived to god; that is, they were written in the book of life with them that were absolved of their sinnes, and ordained to life eternall at the resurrection. that the soul of man is in its own nature eternall, and a living creature independent on the body; or that any meer man is immortall, otherwise than by the resurrection in the last day, (except enos and elias,) is a doctrine not apparent in scripture. the whole 14. chapter of job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himselfe, is a complaint of this mortality of nature; and yet no contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection. "there is hope of a tree," (saith hee verse 7.) "if it be cast down, though the root thereof wax old, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet when it scenteth the water it will bud, and bring forth boughes like a plant. but man dyeth, and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he?" and (verse 12.) "man lyeth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more." but when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? st. peter tells us, that it is at the generall resurrection. for in his 2. epistle, 3. chapter, and 7. verse, he saith, that "the heavens and the earth that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men," and (verse 12.) "looking for, and hasting to the comming of god, wherein the heavens shall be on fire, and shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat. neverthelesse, we according to the promise look for new heavens, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousnesse." therefore where job saith, man riseth not till the heavens be no more; it is all one, as if he had said, the immortall life (and soule and life in the scripture, do usually signifie the same thing) beginneth not in man, till the resurrection, and day of judgment; and hath for cause, not his specificall nature, and generation; but the promise. for st. peter saies not, "wee look for new heavens, and a new earth, (from nature) but from promise." lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of scripture, in the 35. chapter of this book, that the kingdom of god is a civil common-wealth, where god himself is soveraign, by vertue first of the old, and since of the new covenant, wherein he reigneth by his vicar, or lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after the comming again of our saviour in his majesty, and glory, to reign actually, and eternally; the kingdom of god is to be on earth. but because this doctrine (though proved out of places of scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; i doe but propound it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of religion; but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the authority, (not yet amongst my countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech, and writing, (whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must by all men, that mean to be protected by their laws, be obeyed. for the points of doctrine concerning the kingdome (of) god, have so great influence on the kingdome of man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under god have the soveraign power. the place after judgment, of those who were never in the kingdome of god, or having been in, are cast out as the kingdome of god, and eternall life, so also gods enemies, and their torments after judgment, appear by the scripture, to have their place on earth. the name of the place, where all men remain till the resurrection, that were either buryed, or swallowed up of the earth, is usually called in scripture, by words that signifie under ground; which the latines read generally infernus, and inferni, and the greeks hades; that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the grave, as any other deeper place. but for the place of the damned after the resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the old, nor new testament, by any note of situation; but onely by the company: as that it shall bee, where such wicked men were, as god in former times in extraordinary, and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the earth: as for example, that they are in inferno, in tartarus, or in the bottomelesse pit; because corah, dathan, and abirom, were swallowed up alive into the earth. not that the writers of the scripture would have us beleeve, there could be in the globe of the earth, which is not only finite, but also (compared to the height of the stars) of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a bottome; that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the greeks in their daemonologie (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning daemons,) and after them, the romans called tartarus; of which virgill sayes, bis patet in praeceps, tantem tenditque sub umbras, quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus olympum: for that is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear: but that wee should beleeve them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on whom god inflicted that exemplary punnishment. the congregation of giants again, because those mighty men of the earth, that lived in the time of noah, before the floud, (which the greeks called heroes, and the scripture giants, and both say, were begotten, by copulation of the children of god, with the children of men,) were for their wicked life destroyed by the generall deluge; the place of the damned, is therefore also sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased giants; as proverbs 21.16. "the man that wandreth out of the way of understanding, shall remain in the congregation of the giants," and job 26.5. "behold the giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them." here the place of the damned, is under the water. and isaiah 14.9. "hell is troubled how to meet thee," (that is, the king of babylon) "and will displace the giants for thee:" and here again the place of the damned, (if the sense be literall,) is to be under water. lake of fire thirdly, because the cities of sodom, and gomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of god, were consumed for their wickednesse with fire and brimstone, and together with them the countrey about made a stinking bituminous lake; the place of the damned is sometimes expressed by fire, and a fiery lake: as in the apocalypse ch.21.8. "but the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolators, and all lyars, shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire, and brimstone; which is the second death." so that it is manifest, that hell fire, which is here expressed by metaphor, from the reall fire of sodome, signifieth not any certain kind, or place of torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for destruction, as it is in the 20. chapter, at the 14. verse; where it is said, that "death and hell were cast into the lake of fire;" that is to say, were abolished, and destroyed; as if after the day of judgment, there shall be no more dying, nor no more going into hell; that is, no more going to hades (from which word perhaps our word hell is derived,) which is the same with no more dying. utter darknesse fourthly, from the plague of darknesse inflicted on the egyptians, of which it is written (exod. 10.23.) "they saw not one another, neither rose any man from his place for three days; but all the children of israel had light in their dwellings;" the place of the wicked after judgment, is called utter darknesse, or (as it is in the originall) darknesse without. and so it is expressed (mat. 22.13.) where the king commandeth his servants, "to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his wedding garment, and to cast him out," eis to skotos to exoteron, externall darknesse, or darknesse without: which though translated utter darknesse, does not signifie how great, but where that darknesse is to be; namely, without the habitation of gods elect. gehenna, and tophet lastly, whereas there was a place neer jerusalem, called the valley of the children of hinnon; in a part whereof, called tophet, the jews had committed most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the idol moloch; and wherein also god had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments; and wherein josias had burnt the priests of moloch upon their own altars, as appeareth at large in the 2 of kings chap. 23. the place served afterwards, to receive the filth, and garbage which was carried thither, out of the city; and there used to be fires made, from time to time, to purifie the aire, and take away the stench of carrion. from this abominable place, the jews used ever after to call the place of the damned, by the name of gehenna, or valley of hinnon. and this gehenna, is that word, which is usually now translated hell; and from the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of everlasting, and unquenchable fire. of the literall sense of the scripture concerning hell seeing now there is none, that so interprets the scripture, as that after the day of judgment, the wicked are all eternally to be punished in the valley of hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after under ground, or under water; or that after the resurrection, they shall no more see one another; nor stir from one place to another; it followeth, me thinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning hell fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to bee enquired after, (for of all metaphors there is some reall ground, that may be expressed in proper words) both of the place of hell, and the nature of hellish torment, and tormenters. satan, devill, not proper names, but appellatives and first for the tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties, exactly and properly delivered by the names of, the enemy, or satan; the accuser, or diabolus; the destroyer, or abbadon. which significant names, satan, devill, abbadon, set not forth to us any individuall person, as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality; and are therefore appellatives; which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are, in the latine, and modern bibles; because thereby they seem to be the proper names of daemons; and men are the more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of devills; which at that time was the religion of the gentiles, and contrary to that of moses, and of christ. and because by the enemy, the accuser, and destroyer, is meant, the enemy of them that shall be in the kingdome of god; therefore if the kingdome of god after the resurrection, bee upon the earth, (as in the former chapter i have shewn by scripture it seems to be,) the enemy, and his kingdome must be on earth also. for so also was it, in the time before the jews had deposed god. for gods kingdome was in palestine; and the nations round about, were the kingdomes of the enemy; and consequently by satan, is meant any earthly enemy of the church. torments of hell the torments of hell, are expressed sometimes, by "weeping, and gnashing of teeth," as mat. 8.12. sometimes, by "the worm of conscience;" as isa.66.24. and mark 9.44, 46, 48; sometimes, by fire, as in the place now quoted, "where the worm dyeth not, and the fire is not quenched," and many places beside: sometimes by "shame, and contempt," as dan. 12.2. "and many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake; some to everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt." all which places design metaphorically a grief, and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternall felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity, and disobedience have lost. and because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their own actuall miseries; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily paines, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not onely live under evill and cruell governours, but have also for enemy, the eternall king of the saints, god almighty. and amongst these bodily paines, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death. for though the scripture bee clear for an universall resurrection; yet wee do not read, that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternall life. for whereas st. paul (1 cor. 15.42, 43.) to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith, that "the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weaknesse, it is raised in power;" glory and power cannot be applyed to the bodies of the wicked: nor can the name of second death, bee applyed to those that can never die but once: and although in metaphoricall speech, a calamitous life everlasting, may bee called an everlasting death yet it cannot well be understood of a second death. the fire prepared for the wicked, is an everlasting fire: that is to say, the estate wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense the fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred, that hee who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure, and resist them so, as to be eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die. and though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire, and torments (into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever;) yet i find none that affirm there shall bee an eternall life therein of any individuall person; but on the contrary, an everlasting death, which is the second death: (apoc. 20. 13,14.) "for after death, and the grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be judged according to his works; death and the grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire. this is the second death." whereby it is evident, that there is to bee a second death of every one that shall bee condemned at the day of judgement, after which hee shall die no more. the joyes of life eternall, and salvation the same thing, salvation from sin, and from misery, all one the joyes of life eternall, are in scripture comprehended all under the name of salvation, or being saved. to be saved, is to be secured, either respectively, against speciall evills, or absolutely against all evill, comprehending want, sicknesse, and death it self. and because man was created in a condition immortall, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happinesse by the sin of adam; it followeth, that to be saved from sin, is to be saved from all the evill, and calamities that sinne hath brought upon us. and therefore in the holy scripture, remission of sinne, and salvation from death and misery, is the same thing, as it appears by the words of our saviour, who having cured a man sick of the palsey, by saying, (mat. 9.2.) "son be of good cheer, thy sins be forgiven thee;" and knowing that the scribes took for blasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive sins, asked them (v.5.) "whether it were easier to say, thy sinnes be forgiven thee, or, arise and walk;" signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, "thy sins are forgiven," and "arise and walk;" and that he used that form of speech, onely to shew he had power to forgive sins. and it is besides evident in reason, that since death and misery, were the punishments of sin, the discharge of sinne, must also be a discharge of death and misery; that is to say, salvation absolute, such as the faithfull are to enjoy after the day of judgment, by the power, and favour of jesus christ, who for that cause is called our saviour. concerning particular salvations, such as are understood, 1 sam. 14.39. "as the lord liveth that saveth israel," that is, from their temporary enemies, and 2 sam. 22.4. "thou art my saviour, thou savest me from violence;" and 2 kings 13.5. "god gave the israelites a saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the assyrians," and the like, i need say nothing; there being neither difficulty, nor interest, to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind. the place of eternall salvation but concerning the generall salvation, because it must be in the kingdome of heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the place. on one side, by kingdome (which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth that this salvation should be on earth. for by salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious reign of our king, by conquest; not a safety by escape: and therefore there where we look for salvation, we must look also for triumph; and before triumph, for victory; and before victory, for battell; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in heaven. but how good soever this reason may be, i will not trust to it, without very evident places of scripture. the state of salvation is described at large, isaiah, 33. ver. 20,21,22,23,24. "look upon zion, the city of our solemnities, thine eyes shall see jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken. but there the glorious lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers, and streams; wherein shall goe no gally with oares; neither shall gallant ship passe thereby. for the lord is our judge, the lord is our lawgiver, the lord is our king, he will save us. thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame take the prey. and the inhabitant shall not say, i am sicke; the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity." in which words wee have the place from whence salvation is to proceed, "jerusalem, a quiet habitation;" the eternity of it, "a tabernacle that shall not be taken down," &c. the saviour of it, "the lord, their judge, their lawgiver, their king, he will save us;" the salvation, "the lord shall be to them as a broad mote of swift waters," &c. the condition of their enemies, "their tacklings are loose, their masts weake, the lame shal take the spoil of them." the condition of the saved, "the inhabitants shall not say, i am sick:" and lastly, all this is comprehended in forgivenesse of sin, "the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity." by which it is evident, that salvation shall be on earth, then, when god shall reign, (at the coming again of christ) in jerusalem; and from jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the gentiles that shall be received into gods kingdome; as is also more expressely declared by the same prophet, chap. 66.20, 21. "and they," (that is, the gentiles who had any jew in bondage) "shall bring all your brethren, for an offering to the lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and in charets, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, jerusalem, saith the lord, as the children of israel bring an offering in a clean vessell into the house of the lord. and i will also take of them for priests and for levites, saith the lord:" whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of gods kingdome (which is the place, from whence the salvation of us that were gentiles, shall proceed) shall be jerusalem; and the same is also confirmed by our saviour, in his discourse with the woman of samaria, concerning the place of gods worship; to whom he saith, john 4.22. that the samaritans worshipped they know not what, but the jews worship what they knew, "for salvation is of the jews (ex judais, that is, begins at the jews): as if he should say, you worship god, but know not by whom he wil save you, as we doe, that know it shall be one of the tribe of judah, a jew, not a samaritan. and therefore also the woman not impertinently answered him again, "we know the messias shall come." so that which our saviour saith, "salvation is from the jews," is the same that paul sayes (rom. 1.16,17.) "the gospel is the power of god to salvation to every one that beleeveth; to the jew first, and also to the greek. for therein is the righteousnesse of god revealed from faith to faith;" from the faith of the jew, to the faith of the gentile. in the like sense the prophet joel describing the day of judgment, (chap. 2.30,31.) that god would "shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, bloud, and fire, and pillars of smoak. the sun should be turned to darknesse, and the moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day of the lord come," he addeth verse 32. "and it shall come to passe, that whosoever shall call upon the name of the lord, shall be saved. for in mount zion, and in jerusalem shall be salvation." and obadiah verse 17 saith the same, "upon mount zion shall be deliverance; and there shall be holinesse, and the house of jacob shall possesse their possessions," that is, the possessions of the heathen, which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by the mount of esau, the land of the philistines, the fields of ephraim, of samaria, gilead, and the cities of the south, and concludes with these words, "the kingdom shall be the lords." all these places are for salvation, and the kingdome of god (after the day of judgement) upon earth. on the other side, i have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven; that is to say, into any coelum empyreum, or other aetheriall region; saving that it is called the kingdome of heaven; which name it may have, because god, that was king of the jews, governed them by his commands, sent to moses by angels from heaven, to reduce them to their obedience; and shall send him thence again, to rule both them, and all other faithfull men, from the day of judgment, everlastingly: or from that, that the throne of this our great king is in heaven; whereas the earth is but his footstoole. but that the subjects of god should have any place as high as his throne, or higher than his footstoole, it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of a king, nor can i find any evident text for it in holy scripture. from this that hath been said of the kingdom of god, and of salvation, it is not hard to interpret, what is meant by the world to come. there are three worlds mentioned in scripture, the old world, the present world, and the world to come. of the first, st. peter speaks, (2 pet. 2.5.) "if god spared not the old world, but saved noah the eighth person, a preacher of righteousnesse, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly," &c. so the first world, was from adam to the generall flood. of the present world, our saviour speaks (john 18.36.) "my kingdome is not of this world." for he came onely to teach men the way of salvation, and to renew the kingdome of his father, by his doctrine. of the world to come, st. peter speaks, (2 pet. 3. 13.) "neverthelesse we according to his promise look for new heavens, and a new earth." this is that world, wherein christ coming down from heaven, in the clouds, with great power, and glory, shall send his angels, and shall gather together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the earth, and thence forth reign over them, (under his father) everlastingly. redemption salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent redemption; for he that is once guilty of sin, is obnoxious to the penalty of the same; and must pay (or some other for him) such ransome, as he that is offended, and has him in his power, shall require. and seeing the person offended, is almighty god, in whose power are all things; such ransome is to be paid before salvation can be acquired, as god hath been pleased to require. by this ransome, is not intended a satisfaction for sin, equivalent to the offence, which no sinner for himselfe, nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another; the dammage a man does to another, he may make amends for by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot be taken away by recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible. but sins may bee pardoned to the repentant, either gratis, or upon such penalty, as god is pleased to accept. that which god usually accepted in the old testament, was some sacrifice, or oblation. to forgive sin is not an act of injustice, though the punishment have been threatned. even amongst men, though the promise of good, bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises, of evill, bind them not; much lesse shall they bind god, who is infinitely more mercifull then men. our saviour christ therefore to redeem us, did not in that sense satisfie for the sins of men, as that his death, of its own vertue, could make it unjust in god to punish sinners with eternall death; but did make that sacrifice, and oblation of himself, at his first coming, which god was pleased to require, for the salvation at his second coming, of such as in the mean time should repent, and beleeve in him. and though this act of our redemption, be not alwaies in scripture called a sacrifice, and oblation, but sometimes a price, yet by price we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof, he could claim right to a pardon for us, from his offended father, but that price which god the father was pleased in mercy to demand. chapter xxxix. of the signification in scripture of the word church church the lords house the word church, (ecclesia) signifieth in the books of holy scripture divers things. sometimes (though not often) it is taken for gods house, that is to say, for a temple, wherein christians assemble to perform holy duties publiquely; as, 1 cor. 14. ver. 34. "let your women keep silence in the churches:" but this is metaphorically put, for the congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the edifice it self, to distinguish between the temples of christians, and idolaters. the temple of jerusalem was gods house, and the house of prayer; and so is any edifice dedicated by christians to the worship of christ, christs house: and therefore the greek fathers call it kuriake, the lords house; and thence, in our language it came to be called kyrke, and church. ecclesia properly what church (when not taken for a house) signifieth the same that ecclesia signified in the grecian common-wealths; that is to say, a congregation, or an assembly of citizens, called forth, to hear the magistrate speak unto them; and which in the common-wealth of rome was called concio, as he that spake was called ecclesiastes, and concionator. and when they were called forth by lawfull authority, (acts 19.39.) it was ecclesia legitima, a lawfull church, ennomos ecclesia. but when they were excited by tumultuous, and seditious clamor, then it was a confused church, ecclesia sugkechumene. it is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the congregation, though not actually assembled; that is to say, for the whole multitude of christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as (act. 8.3.) where it is said, that "saul made havock of the church:" and in this sense is christ said to be head of the church. and sometimes for a certain part of christians, as (col. 4.15.) "salute the church that is in his house." sometimes also for the elect onely; as (ephes. 5.27.) "a glorious church, without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and without blemish;" which is meant of the church triumphant, or, church to come. sometimes, for a congregation assembled, of professors of christianity, whether their profession be true, or counterfeit, as it is understood, mat. 18.17. where it is said, "tell it to the church, and if hee neglect to hear the church, let him be to thee as a gentile, or publican." in what sense the church is one person church defined and in this last sense only it is that the church can be taken for one person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to doe any other action whatsoever; for without authority from a lawfull congregation, whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the performance of it; and not the act of them all in grosse, as of one body; much lesse that act of them that were absent, or that being present, were not willing it should be done. according to this sense, i define a church to be, "a company of men professing christian religion, united in the person of one soveraign; at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble." and because in all common-wealths, that assembly, which is without warrant from the civil soveraign, is unlawful; that church also, which is assembled in any common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawfull assembly. a christian common-wealth, and a church all one it followeth also, that there is on earth, no such universall church as all christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on earth, to which all other common-wealths are subject: there are christians, in the dominions of severall princes and states; but every one of them is subject to that common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. and therefore a church, such as one as is capable to command, to judge, absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil common-wealth, consisting of christian men; and is called a civill state, for that the subjects of it are men; and a church, for that the subjects thereof are christians. temporall and spirituall government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their lawfull soveraign. it is true, that the bodies of the faithfull, after the resurrection shall be not onely spirituall, but eternall; but in this life they are grosse, and corruptible. there is therefore no other government in this life, neither of state, nor religion, but temporall; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawfull to any subject, which the governour both of the state, and of the religion, forbiddeth to be taught: and that governor must be one; or else there must needs follow faction, and civil war in the common-wealth, between the church and state; between spiritualists, and temporalists; between the sword of justice, and the shield of faith; and (which is more) in every christian mans own brest, between the christian, and the man. the doctors of the church, are called pastors; so also are civill soveraignes: but if pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may bee one chief pastor, men will be taught contrary doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be false. who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of nature, hath been already shewn; namely, that it is the civill soveraign; and to whom the scripture hath assigned that office, we shall see in the chapters following. chapter xl of the rights of the kingdome of god, in abraham, moses, high priests, and the kings of judah the soveraign rights of abraham the father of the faithfull, and first in the kingdome of god by covenant, was abraham. for with him was the covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of god; not onely such, as he could take notice of, (as morall laws,) by the light of nature; but also such, as god should in speciall manner deliver to him by dreams and visions. for as to the morall law, they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withall, by promise of the land of canaan. nor was there any contract, that could adde to, or strengthen the obligation, by which both they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey god almighty: and therefore the covenant which abraham made with god, was to take for the commandement of god, that which in the name of god was commanded him, in a dream, or vision, and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same. abraham had the sole power of ordering the religion of his own people in this contract of god with abraham, wee may observe three points of important consequence in the government of gods people. first, that at the making of this covenant, god spake onely to abraham; and therefore contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their wills (which make the essence of all covenants) were before the contract involved in the will of abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawfull power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. according whereunto (gen 18.18, 19.) god saith, "all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him, for i know him that he will command his children and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the lord." from whence may be concluded this first point, that they to whom god hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive commandements of god, from their soveraign; as the family and seed of abraham did from abraham their father, and lord, and civill soveraign. and consequently in every common-wealth, they who have no supernaturall revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their own soveraign, in the externall acts and profession of religion. as for the inward thought, and beleef of men, which humane governours can take no notice of, (for god onely knoweth the heart) they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of god; and consequently fall not under obligation. no pretence of private spirit against the religion of abraham from whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawfull for abraham, when any of his subjects should pretend private vision, or spirit, or other revelation from god, for the countenancing of any doctrine which abraham should forbid, or when they followed, or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is lawfull now for the soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his private spirit against the laws: for hee hath the same place in the common-wealth, that abraham had in his own family. abraham sole judge, and interpreter of what god spake there ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but abraham in his family, so none but the soveraign in a christian common-wealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the word of god. for god spake onely to abraham; and it was he onely, that was able to know what god said, and to interpret the same to his family: and therefore also, they that have the place of abraham in a common-wealth, are the onely interpreters of what god hath spoken. the authority of moses whereon grounded the same covenant was renewed with isaac; and afterwards with jacob; but afterwards no more, till the israelites were freed from the egyptians, and arrived at the foot of mount sinai: and then it was renewed by moses (as i have said before, chap. 35.) in such manner, as they became from that time forward the peculiar kingdome of god; whose lieutenant was moses, for his owne time; and the succession to that office was setled upon aaron, and his heirs after him, to bee to god a sacerdotall kingdome for ever. by this constitution, a kingdome is acquired to god. but seeing moses had no authority to govern the israelites, as a successor to the right of abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for gods lieutenant, longer than they beleeved that god spake unto him. and therefore his authority (notwithstanding the covenant they made with god) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his sanctity, and of the reality of his conferences with god, and the verity of his miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law of god, which he propounded to them in gods name. we are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him. for it could not be the commandement of god that could oblige them; because god spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of moses himself; and our saviour saith of himself, (john 5. 31.) "if i bear witnesse of my self, my witnesse is not true," much lesse if moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a claim of kingly power over gods people) ought his testimony to be received. his authority therefore, as the authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of the people, and their promise to obey him. and so it was: for "the people" (exod. 20.18.) "when they saw the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the noyse of the trumpet, and the mountaine smoaking, removed, and stood a far off. and they said unto moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not god speak with us lest we die." here was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the commandement of god. moses was (under god) soveraign of the jews, all his own time, though aaron had the priesthood and notwithstanding the covenant constituted a sacerdotall kingdome, that is to say, a kingdome hereditary to aaron; yet that is to be understood of the succession, after moses should bee dead. for whosoever ordereth, and establisheth the policy, as first founder of a common-wealth (be it monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy) must needs have soveraign power over the people all the while he is doing of it. and that moses had that power all his own time, is evidently affirmed in the scripture. first, in the text last before cited, because the people promised obedience, not to aaron but to him. secondly, (exod. 24.1, 2.) "and god said unto moses, come up unto the lord, thou, and aaron, nadab and abihu, and seventy of the elders of israel. and moses alone shall come neer the lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up with him." by which it is plain, that moses who was alone called up to god, (and not aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the people who were forbidden to come up) was alone he, that represented to the israelites the person of god; that is to say, was their sole soveraign under god. and though afterwards it be said (verse 9.) "then went up moses, and aaron, nadab, and abihu, and seventy of the elders of israel, and they saw the god of israel, and there was under his feet, as it were a paved work of a saphire stone," &c. yet this was not till after moses had been with god before, and had brought to the people the words which god had said to him. he onely went for the businesse of the people; the others, as the nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour to that speciall grace, which was not allowed to the people; which was, (as in the verse after appeareth) to see god and live. "god laid not his hand upon them, they saw god and did eat and drink" (that is, did live), but did not carry any commandement from him to the people. again, it is every where said, "the lord spake unto moses," as in all other occasions of government; so also in the ordering of the ceremonies of religion, contained in the 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 chapters of exodus, and throughout leviticus: to aaron seldome. the calfe that aaron made, moses threw into the fire. lastly, the question of the authority of aaron, by occasion of his and miriams mutiny against moses, was (numbers 12.) judged by god himself for moses. so also in the question between moses, and the people, when corah, dathan, and abiram, and two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly "gathered themselves together" (numbers 16. 3) "against moses, and against aaron, and said unto them, 'ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the lord is amongst them, why lift you up your selves above the congregation of the lord?'" god caused the earth to swallow corah, dathan, and abiram with their wives and children alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire. therefore neither aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes of the people, but moses alone had next under god the soveraignty over the israelites: and that not onely in causes of civill policy, but also of religion; for moses onely spake with god, and therefore onely could tell the people, what it was that god required at their hands. no man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where god talked with moses. "thou shalt set bounds" (saith the lord, exod 19. 12.) "to the people round about, and say, take heed to your selves that you goe not up into the mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the mount shall surely be put to death." and again (verse 21.) "get down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the lord to gaze." out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a christian common-wealth holdeth the place of moses, is the sole messenger of god, and interpreter of his commandements. and according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the scripture to proceed further then the bounds which are set by their severall soveraigns. for the scriptures since god now speaketh in them, are the mount sinai; the bounds whereof are the laws of them that represent gods person on earth. to look upon them and therein to behold the wondrous works of god, and learn to fear him is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into what god saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves judges whether he govern as god commandeth him, or not, is to transgresse the bounds god hath set us, and to gaze upon god irreverently. all spirits were subordinate to the spirit of moses there was no prophet in the time of moses, nor pretender to the spirit of god, but such as moses had approved, and authorized. for there were in his time but seventy men, that are said to prophecy by the spirit of god, and these were of all moses his election; concerning whom god saith to moses (numb. 11.16.) "gather to mee seventy of the elders of israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people." to these god imparted his spirit; but it was not a different spirit from that of moses; for it is said (verse 25.) "god came down in a cloud, and took of the spirit that was upon moses, and gave it to the seventy elders." but as i have shewn before (chap. 36.) by spirit, is understood the mind; so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that god endued them with a mind conformable, and subordinate to that of moses, that they might prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in gods name, in such manner, as to set forward (as ministers of moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as was agreeable to moses his doctrine. for they were but ministers; and when two of them prophecyed in the camp, it was thought a new and unlawfull thing; and as it is in the 27. and 28. verses of the same chapter, they were accused of it, and joshua advised moses to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by moses his spirit that they prophecyed. by which it is manifest, that no subject ought to pretend to prophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him, whom god hath set in the place of moses. after moses the soveraignty was in the high priest aaron being dead, and after him also moses, the kingdome, as being a sacerdotall kingdome, descended by vertue of the covenant, to aarons son, eleazar the high priest: and god declared him (next under himself) for soveraign, at the same time that he appointed joshua for the generall of their army. for thus god saith expressely (numb. 27.21.) concerning joshua; "he shall stand before eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsell for him, before the lord, at his word shall they goe out, and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the children of israel with him:" therefore the supreme power of making war and peace, was in the priest. the supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high priest: for the book of the law was in their keeping; and the priests and levites onely were the subordinate judges in causes civill, as appears in deut. 17.8, 9, 10. and for the manner of gods worship, there was never doubt made, but that the high priest till the time of saul, had the supreme authority. therefore the civill and ecclesiasticall power were both joined together in one and the same person, the high priest; and ought to bee so, in whosoever governeth by divine right; that is, by authority immediate from god. of the soveraign power between the time of joshua and of saul after the death of joshua, till the time of saul, the time between is noted frequently in the book of judges, "that there was in those dayes no king in israel;" and sometimes with this addition, that "every man did that which was right in his own eyes." by which is to bee understood, that where it is said, "there was no king," is meant, "there was no soveraign power" in israel. and so it was, if we consider the act, and exercise of such power. for after the death of joshua, & eleazar, "there arose another generation" (judges 2.10.) "that knew not the lord, nor the works which he had done for israel, but did evill in the sight of the lord, and served baalim." and the jews had that quality which st. paul noteth, "to look for a sign," not onely before they would submit themselves to the government of moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. whereas signs, and miracles had for end to procure faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they have once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of nature. but if we consider not the exercise, but the right of governing, the soveraign power was still in the high priest. therefore whatsoever obedience was yeelded to any of the judges, (who were men chosen by god extraordinarily, to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of the enemy,) it cannot bee drawn into argument against the right the high priest had to the soveraign power, in all matters, both of policy and religion. and neither the judges, nor samuel himselfe had an ordinary, but extraordinary calling to the government; and were obeyed by the israelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with god, appearing in their wisdome, courage, or felicity. hitherto therefore the right of regulating both the policy, and the religion, were inseparable. of the rights of the kings of israel to the judges, succeeded kings; and whereas before, all authority, both in religion, and policy, was in the high priest; so now it was all in the king. for the soveraignty over the people, which was before, not onely by vertue of the divine power, but also by a particular pact of the israelites in god, and next under him, in the high priest, as his viceregent on earth, was cast off by the people, with the consent of god himselfe. for when they said to samuel (1 sam. 8.5.) "make us a king to judge us, like all the nations," they signified that they would no more bee governed by the commands that should bee laid upon them by the priest, in the name of god; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all other nations were commanded; and consequently in deposing the high priest of royall authority, they deposed that peculiar government of god. and yet god consented to it, saying to samuel (verse 7.) "hearken unto the voice of the people, in all that they shall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected mee, that i should not reign over them." having therefore rejected god, in whose right the priests governed, there was no authority left to the priests, but such as the king was pleased to allow them; which was more, or lesse, according as the kings were good, or evill. and for the government of civill affaires, it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the king. for in the same chapter, verse 20. they say they will be like all the nations; that their king shall be their judge, and goe before them, and fight their battells; that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in peace and war. in which is contained also the ordering of religion; for there was no other word of god in that time, by which to regulate religion, but the law of moses, which was their civill law. besides, we read (1 kings 2.27.) that solomon "thrust out abiathar from being priest before the lord:" he had therefore authority over the high priest, as over any other subject; which is a great mark of supremacy in religion. and we read also (1 kings 8.) that hee dedicated the temple; that he blessed the people; and that he himselfe in person made that excellent prayer, used in the consecrations of all churches, and houses of prayer; which is another great mark of supremacy in religion. again, we read (2 kings 22.) that when there was question concerning the book of the law found in the temple, the same was not decided by the high priest, but josiah sent both him, and others to enquire concerning it, of hulda, the prophetesse; which is another mark of the supremacy in religion. lastly, wee read (1 chro. 26.30.) that david made hashabiah and his brethren, hebronites, officers of israel among them westward, "in all businesse of the lord, and in the service of the king." likewise (verse 32.) that hee made other hebronites, "rulers over the reubenites, the gadites, and the halfe tribe of manasseh" (these were the rest of israel that dwelt beyond jordan) "for every matter pertaining to god, and affairs of the king." is not this full power, both temporall and spirituall, as they call it, that would divide it? to conclude; from the first institution of gods kingdome, to the captivity, the supremacy of religion, was in the same hand with that of the civill soveraignty; and the priests office after the election of saul, was not magisteriall, but ministeriall. the practice of supremacy in religion, was not in the time of the kings, according to the right thereof notwithstanding the government both in policy and religion, were joined, first in the high priests, and afterwards in the kings, so far forth as concerned the right; yet it appeareth by the same holy history, that the people understood it not; but there being amongst them a great part, and probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles, or (which is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities, or great felicity in the enterprises of their governours, gave sufficient credit, either to the fame of moses, or to the colloquies between god and the priests; they took occasion as oft as their governours displeased them, by blaming sometimes the policy, sometimes the religion, to change the government, or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure: and from thence proceeded from time to time the civill troubles, divisions, and calamities of the nation. as for example, after the death of eleazar and joshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of god, but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the covenant of a sacerdotall kingdome, regarded no more the commandement of the priest, nor any law of moses, but did every man that which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed in civill affairs, such men, as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with god (as they ought to doe,) but with such men, or women, as they guessed to bee prophets by their praedictions of things to come; and thought they had an idol in their chappel, yet if they had a levite for their chaplain, they made account they worshipped the god of israel. and afterwards when they demanded a king, after the manner of the nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of god their king; but despairing of the justice of the sons of samuel, they would have a king to judg them in civill actions; but not that they would allow their king to change the religion which they thought was recommended to them by moses. so that they alwaies kept in store a pretext, either of justice, or religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevaile. samuel was displeased with the people, for that they desired a king, (for god was their king already, and samuel had but an authority under him); yet did samuel, when saul observed not his counsell, in destroying agag as god had commanded, anoint another king, namely david, to take the succession from his heirs. rehoboam was no idolater; but when the people thought him an oppressor; that civil pretence carried from him ten tribes to jeroboam an idolater. and generally through the whole history of the kings, as well of judah, as of israel, there were prophets that alwaies controlled the kings, for transgressing the religion; and sometimes also for errours of state; (2 chro. 19. 2.) as jehosaphat was reproved by the prophet jehu, for aiding the king of israel against the syrians; and hezekiah, by isaiah, for shewing his treasures to the ambassadors of babylon. by all which it appeareth, that though the power both of state and religion were in the kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled in the use of it, but such as were gracious for their own naturall abilities, or felicities. so that from the practise of those times, there can no argument be drawn, that the right of supremacy in religion was not in the kings, unlesse we place it in the prophets; and conclude, that because hezekiah praying to the lord before the cherubins, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the prophet isaiah, therefore isaiah was supreme head of the church; or because josiah consulted hulda the prophetesse, concerning the book of the law, that therefore neither he, nor the high priest, but hulda the prophetesse had the supreme authority in matter of religion; which i thinke is not the opinion of any doctor. after the captivity the jews had no setled common-wealth during the captivity, the jews had no common-wealth at all and after their return, though they renewed their covenant with god, yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to esdras, nor to any other; and presently after they became subjects to the greeks (from whose customes, and daemonology, and from the doctrine of the cabalists, their religion became much corrupted): in such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion, both in state and religion, concerning the supremacy in either. and therefore so far forth as concerneth the old testament, we may conclude, that whosoever had the soveraignty of the common-wealth amongst the jews, the same had also the supreme authority in matter of gods externall worship; and represented gods person; that is the person of god the father; though he were not called by the name of father, till such time as he sent into the world his son jesus christ, to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his everlasting kingdome, to be saved for evermore. of which we are to speak in the chapter following. chapter xli. of the office of our blessed saviour three parts of the office of christ we find in holy scripture three parts of the office of the messiah: the first of a redeemer, or saviour: the second of a pastor, counsellour, or teacher, that is, of a prophet sent from god, to convert such as god hath elected to salvation; the third of a king, and eternall king, but under his father, as moses and the high priests were in their severall times. and to these three parts are corespondent three times. for our redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the sacrifice, wherein he offered up himself for our sinnes upon the crosse: our conversion he wrought partly then in his own person; and partly worketh now by his ministers; and will continue to work till his coming again. and after his coming again, shall begin that his glorious reign over his elect, which is to last eternally. his office as a redeemer to the office of a redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the ransome of sin, (which ransome is death,) it appertaineth, that he was sacrificed, and thereby bare upon his own head, and carryed away from us our iniquities, in such sort as god had required. not that the death of one man, though without sinne, can satisfie for the offences of all men, in the rigour of justice, but in the mercy of god, that ordained such sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. in the old law (as we may read, leviticus the 16.) the lord required, that there should every year once, bee made an atonement for the sins of all israel, both priests, and others; for the doing whereof, aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself and the priests a young bullock; and for the rest of the people, he was to receive from them two young goates, of which he was to sacrifice one; but as for the other, which was the scape goat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune man, to cause the goat to be led into the wildernesse, and there to escape, and carry away with him the iniquities of the people. as the sacrifice of the one goat was a sufficient (because an acceptable) price for the ransome of all israel; so the death of the messiah, is a sufficient price, for the sins of all mankind, because there was no more required. our saviour christs sufferings seem to be here figured, as cleerly, as in the oblation of isaac, or in any other type of him in the old testament: he was both the sacrificed goat, and the scape goat; "hee was oppressed, and he was afflicted (isa. 53.7.); he opened not his mouth; he brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumbe before the shearer, so opened he not his mouth:" here he is the sacrificed goat. "he hath born our griefs, (ver.4.) and carried our sorrows;" and again, (ver. 6.) "the lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all:" and so he is the scape goat. "he was cut off from the land of the living (ver. 8.) for the transgression of my people:" there again he is the sacrificed goat. and again (ver. 11.) "he shall bear their sins:" hee is the scape goat. thus is the lamb of god equivalent to both those goates; sacrificed, in that he dyed; and escaping, in his resurrection; being raised opportunely by his father, and removed from the habitation of men in his ascension. christs kingdome not of this world for as much therefore, as he that redeemeth, hath no title to the thing redeemed, before the redemption, and ransome paid; and this ransome was the death of the redeemer; it is manifest, that our saviour (as man) was not king of those that he redeemed, before hee suffered death; that is, during that time hee conversed bodily on the earth. i say, he was not then king in present, by vertue of the pact, which the faithfull make with him in baptisme; neverthelesse, by the renewing of their pact with god in baptisme, they were obliged to obey him for king, (under his father) whensoever he should be pleased to take the kingdome upon him. according whereunto, our saviour himself expressely saith, (john 18.36.) "my kingdome is not of this world." now seeing the scripture maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day of judgment, (which is therefore also called, the last day;) and that which shall bee a new heaven, and a new earth; the kingdome of christ is not to begin till the general resurrection. and that is it which our saviour saith, (mat. 16.27.) "the son of man shall come in the glory of his father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works." to reward every man according to his works, is to execute the office of a king; and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his father, with his angells. when our saviour saith, (mat. 23.2.) "the scribes and pharisees sit in moses seat; all therefore whatsoever they bid you doe, that observe and doe;" hee declareth plainly, that hee ascribeth kingly power, for that time, not to himselfe, but to them. and so hee hath also, where he saith, (luke 12.14.) "who made mee a judge, or divider over you?" and (john 12.47.) "i came not to judge the world, but to save the world." and yet our saviour came into this world that hee might bee a king, and a judge in the world to come: for hee was the messiah, that is, the christ, that is, the anointed priest, and the soveraign prophet of god; that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in moses the prophet, in the high priests that succeeded moses, and in the kings that succeeded the priests. and st. john saies expressely (chap. 5. ver. 22.) "the father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the son." and this is not repugnant to that other place, "i came not to judge the world:" for this is spoken of the world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is said, that at the second coming of christ, (mat. 19. 28.) "yee that have followed me in the regeneration, when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, yee shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of israel." the end of christs comming was to renew the covenant of the kingdome of god, and to perswade the elect to imbrace it, which was the second part of his office if then christ while hee was on earth, had no kingdome in this world, to what end was his first coming? it was to restore unto god, by a new covenant, the kingdome, which being his by the old covenant, had been cut off by the rebellion of the israelites in the election of saul. which to doe, he was to preach unto them, that he was the messiah, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets; and to offer himselfe in sacrifice for the sinnes of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience such as should beleeve in him amongst the gentiles. so that there are two parts of our saviours office during his aboad upon the earth; one to proclaim himself the christ; and another by teaching, and by working of miracles, to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the immortality beleevers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in majesty, to take possession of his fathers kingdome. and therefore it is, that the time of his preaching, is often by himself called the regeneration; which is not properly a kingdome, and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the magistrates that then were, (for hee commanded to obey those that sate then in moses chaire, and to pay tribute to caesar;) but onely an earnest of the kingdome of god that was to come, to those to whom god had given the grace to be his disciples, and to beleeve in him; for which cause the godly are said to bee already in the kingdome of grace, as naturalized in that heavenly kingdome. the preaching of christ not contrary to the then law of the jews, nor of caesar hitherto therefore there is nothing done, or taught by christ, that tendeth to the diminution of the civill right of the jewes, or of caesar. for as touching the common-wealth which then was amongst the jews, both they that bare rule amongst them, that they that were governed, did all expect the messiah, and kingdome of god; which they could not have done if their laws had forbidden him (when he came) to manifest, and declare himself. seeing therefore he did nothing, but by preaching, and miracles go about to prove himselfe to be that messiah, hee did therein nothing against their laws. the kingdome hee claimed was to bee in another world; he taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sate in moses seat: he allowed them to give caesar his tribute, and refused to take upon himselfe to be a judg. how then could his words, or actions bee seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their then civill government? but god having determined his sacrifice, for the reduction of his elect to their former covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the same to effect, made use of their malice, and ingratitude. nor was it contrary to the laws of caesar. for though pilate himself (to gratifie the jews) delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced openly, that he found no fault in him: and put for title of his condemnation, not as the jews required, "that he pretended to be king;" but simply, "that hee was king of the jews;" and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it; saying, "what i have written, i have written." the third part of his office was to be king (under his father) of the elect as for the third part of his office, which was to be king, i have already shewn that his kingdome was not to begin till the resurrection. but then he shall be king, not onely as god, in which sense he is king already, and ever shall be, of all the earth, in vertue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own elect, by vertue of the pact they make with him in their baptisme. and therefore it is, that our saviour saith (mat. 19.28.) that his apostles should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of israel, "when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory;" whereby he signified that he should reign then in his humane nature; and (mat. 16.27.) "the son of man shall come in the glory of his father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works." the same we may read, marke 13..26. and 14.26. and more expressely for the time, luke 22.29, 30. "i appoint unto you a kingdome, as my father hath appointed to mee, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdome, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of israel." by which it is manifest that the kingdome of christ appointed to him by his father, is not to be before the son of man shall come in glory, and make his apostles judges of the twelve tribes of israel. but a man may here ask, seeing there is no marriage in the kingdome of heaven, whether men shall then eat, and drink; what eating therefore is meant in this place? this is expounded by our saviour (john 6.27.) where he saith, "labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the son of man shall give you." so that by eating at christs table, is meant the eating of the tree of life; that is to say, the enjoying of immortality, in the kingdome of the son of man. by which places, and many more, it is evident, that our saviours kingdome is to bee exercised by him in his humane nature. christs authority in the kingdome of god subordinate to his father again, he is to be king then, no otherwise than as subordinate, or viceregent of god the father, as moses was in the wildernesse; and as the high priests were before the reign of saul; and as the kings were after it. for it is one of the prophecies concerning christ, that he should be like (in office) to moses; "i will raise them up a prophet (saith the lord, deut. 18.18.) from amongst their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words into his mouth," and this similitude with moses, is also apparent in the actions of our saviour himself, whilest he was conversant on earth. for as moses chose twelve princes of the tribes, to govern under him; so did our saviour choose twelve apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of israel; and as moses authorized seventy elders, to receive the spirit of god, and to prophecy to the people, that is, (as i have said before,) to speak unto them in the name of god; so our saviour also ordained seventy disciples, to preach his kingdome, and salvation to all nations. and as when a complaint was made to moses, against those of the seventy that prophecyed in the camp of israel, he justified them in it, as being subservient therein to his government; so also our saviour, when st. john complained to him of a certain man that cast out devills in his name, justified him therein, saying, (luke 9.50.) "forbid him not, for hee that is not against us, is on our part." again, our saviour resembled moses in the institution of sacraments, both of admission into the kingdome of god, and of commemoration of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. as the children of israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdome of god, before the time of moses, the rite of circumcision, which rite having been omitted in the wildernesse, was again restored as soon as they came into the land of promise; so also the jews, before the coming of our saviour, had a rite of baptizing, that is, of washing with water all those that being gentiles, embraced the god of israel. this rite st. john the baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the christ, whom hee preached to bee already come into the world; and our saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken by all that beleeved in him. from what cause the rite of baptisme first proceeded, is not expressed formally in the scripture; but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of moses, concerning leprousie; wherein the leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the campe of israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the priest to be clean, hee was admitted into the campe after a solemne washing. and this may therefore bee a type of the washing in baptisme; wherein such men as are cleansed of the leprousie of sin by faith, are received into the church with the solemnity of baptisme. there is another conjecture drawn from the ceremonies of the gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens; and that is, when a man that was thought dead, chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would doe to converse with a ghost, unlesse hee were received again into the number of men, by washing, as children new born were washed from the uncleannesse of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth. this ceremony of the greeks, in the time that judaea was under the dominion of alexander, and the greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept into the religion of the jews. but seeing it is not likely our saviour would countenance a heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from the legall ceremony of washing after leprosie. and for the other sacraments, of eating the paschall lambe, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament of the lords supper; in which the breaking of the bread, and the pouring out of the wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of sin, by christs passion, as the eating of the paschall lambe, kept in memory the deliverance of the jewes out of the bondage of egypt. seeing therefore the authority of moses was but subordinate, and hee but a lieutenant to god; it followeth, that christ, whose authority, as man, was to bee like that of moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his father. the same is more expressely signified, by that that hee teacheth us to pray, "our father, let thy kingdome come;" and, "for thine is the kingdome, the power and the glory;" and by that it is said, that "hee shall come in the glory of his father;" and by that which st. paul saith, (1 cor. 15.24.) "then commeth the end, when hee shall have delivered up the kingdome to god, even the father;" and by many other most expresse places. one and the same god is the person represented by moses, and by christ our saviour therefore, both in teaching, and reigning, representeth (as moses did) the person of god; which god from that time forward, but not before, is called the father; and being still one and the same substance, is one person as represented by moses, and another person as represented by his sonne the christ. for person being a relative to a representer, it is consequent to plurality of representers, that there bee a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance. chapter xlii. of power ecclesiasticall for the understanding of power ecclesiasticall, what, and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our saviour, into two parts; one before the conversion of kings, and men endued with soveraign civill power; the other after their conversion. for it was long after the ascension, before any king, or civill soveraign embraced, and publiquely allowed the teaching of christian religion. of the holy spirit that fel on the apostles and for the time between, it is manifest, that the power ecclesiasticall, was in the apostles; and after them in such as were by them ordained to preach the gospell, and to convert men to christianity, and to direct them that were converted in the way of salvation; and after these the power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and this was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by which was signified the giving of the holy spirit, or spirit of god, to those whom they ordained ministers of god, to advance his kingdome. so that imposition of hands, was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach christ, and teach his doctrine; and the giving of the holy ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands, was an imitation of that which moses did. for moses used the same ceremony to his minister joshua, as wee read deuteronomy 34. ver. 9. "and joshua the son of nun was full of the spirit of wisdome; for moses had laid his hands upon him." our saviour therefore between his resurrection, and ascension, gave his spirit to the apostles; first, by "breathing on them, and saying," (john 20.22.) "receive yee the holy spirit;" and after his ascension (acts 2.2, 3.) by sending down upon them, a "mighty wind, and cloven tongues of fire;" and not by imposition of hands; as neither did god lay his hands on moses; and his apostles afterward, transmitted the same spirit by imposition of hands, as moses did to joshua. so that it is manifest hereby, in whom the power ecclesiasticall continually remained, in those first times, where there was not any christian common-wealth; namely, in them that received the same from the apostles, by successive laying on of hands. of the trinity here wee have the person of god born now the third time. for as moses, and the high priests, were gods representative in the old testament; and our saviour himselfe as man, during his abode on earth: so the holy ghost, that is to say, the apostles, and their successors, in the office of preaching, and teaching, that had received the holy spirit, have represented him ever since. but a person, (as i have shewn before, [chapt. 16.].) is he that is represented, as often as hee is represented; and therefore god, who has been represented (that is, personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three persons; though neither the word person, nor trinity be ascribed to him in the bible. st. john indeed (1 epist. 5.7.) saith, "there be three that bear witnesse in heaven, the father, the word, and the holy spirit; and these three are one:" but this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three persons in the proper signification of persons; which is, that which is represented by another. for so god the father, as represented by moses, is one person; and as represented by his sonne, another person, and as represented by the apostles, and by the doctors that taught by authority from them derived, is a third person; and yet every person here, is the person of one and the same god. but a man may here ask, what it was whereof these three bare witnesse. st. john therefore tells us (verse 11.) that they bear witnesse, that "god hath given us eternall life in his son." again, if it should be asked, wherein that testimony appeareth, the answer is easie; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he wrought, first by moses; secondly, by his son himself; and lastly by his apostles, that had received the holy spirit; all which in their times represented the person of god; and either prophecyed, or preached jesus christ. and as for the apostles, it was the character of the apostleship, in the twelve first and great apostles, to bear witnesse of his resurrection; as appeareth expressely (acts 1. ver. 21,22.) where st peter, when a new apostle was to be chosen in the place of judas iscariot, useth these words, "of these men which have companied with us all the time that the lord jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning at the baptisme of john, unto that same day that hee was taken up from us, must one bee ordained to be a witnesse with us of his resurrection:" which words interpret the bearing of witnesse, mentioned by st. john. there is in the same place mentioned another trinity of witnesses in earth. for (ver. 8.) he saith, "there are three that bear witnesse in earth, the spirit, and the water, and the bloud; and these three agree in one:" that is to say, the graces of gods spirit, and the two sacraments, baptisme, and the lords supper, which all agree in one testimony, to assure the consciences of beleevers, of eternall life; of which testimony he saith (verse 10.) "he that beleeveth on the son of man hath the witnesse in himselfe." in this trinity on earth the unity is not of the thing; for the spirit, the water, and the bloud, are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony: but in the trinity of heaven, the persons are the persons of one and the same god, though represented in three different times and occasions. to conclude, the doctrine of the trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the scripture, is in substance this; that god who is alwaies one and the same, was the person represented by moses; the person represented by his son incarnate; and the person represented by the apostles. as represented by the apostles, the holy spirit by which they spake, is god; as represented by his son (that was god and man), the son is that god; as represented by moses, and the high priests, the father, that is to say, the father of our lord jesus christ, is that god: from whence we may gather the reason why those names father, son, and holy spirit in the signification of the godhead, are never used in the old testament: for they are persons, that is, they have their names from representing; which could not be, till divers men had represented gods person in ruling, or in directing under him. thus wee see how the power ecclesiasticall was left by our saviour to the apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better exercise that power,) endued with the holy spirit, which is therefore called sometime in the new testament paracletus which signifieth an assister, or one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly translated a comforter. let us now consider the power it selfe, what it was, and over whom. the power ecclesiasticall is but the power to teach cardinall bellarmine in his third generall controversie, hath handled a great many questions concerning the ecclesiasticall power of the pope of rome; and begins with this, whether it ought to be monarchicall, aristocraticall, or democraticall. all which sorts of power, are soveraign, and coercive. if now it should appear, that there is no coercive power left them by our saviour; but onely a power to proclaim the kingdom of christ, and to perswade men to submit themselves thereunto; and by precepts and good counsell, to teach them that have submitted, what they are to do, that they may be received into the kingdom of god when it comes; and that the apostles, and other ministers of the gospel, are our schoolemasters, and not our commanders, and their precepts not laws, but wholesome counsells then were all that dispute in vain. an argument thereof, the power of christ himself i have shewn already (in the last chapter,) that the kingdome of christ is not of this world: therefore neither can his ministers (unlesse they be kings,) require obedience in his name. for if the supreme king, have not his regall power in this world; by what authority can obedience be required to his officers? as my father sent me, (so saith our saviour) i send you. but our saviour was sent to perswade the jews to return to, and to invite the gentiles, to receive the kingdome of his father, and not to reign in majesty, no not, as his fathers lieutenant, till the day of judgment. from the name of regeneration the time between the ascension, and the generall resurrection, is called, not a reigning, but a regeneration; that is, a preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of christ, at the day of judgment; as appeareth by the words of our saviour, mat. 19.28. "you that have followed me in the regeneration, when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve thrones;" and of st. paul (ephes. 6.15.) "having your feet shod with the preparation of the gospell of peace." from the comparison of it, with fishing, leaven, seed and is compared by our saviour, to fishing; that is, to winning men to obedience, not by coercion, and punishing; but by perswasion: and therefore he said not to his apostles, hee would make them so many nimrods, hunters of men; but fishers of men. it is compared also to leaven; to sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of mustard-seed; by all which compulsion is excluded; and consequently there can in that time be no actual reigning. the work of christs ministers, is evangelization; that is, a proclamation of christ, and a preparation for his second comming; as the evangelization of john baptist, was a preparation to his first coming. from the nature of faith: again, the office of christs ministers in this world, is to make men beleeve, and have faith in christ: but faith hath no relation to, nor dependence at all upon compulsion, or commandement; but onely upon certainty, or probability of arguments drawn from reason, or from something men beleeve already. therefore the ministers of christ in this world, have no power by that title, to punish any man for not beleeving, or for contradicting what they say; they have i say no power by that title of christs ministers, to punish such: but if they have soveraign civill power, by politick institution, then they may indeed lawfully punish any contradiction to their laws whatsoever: and st. paul, of himselfe and other then preachers of the gospell saith in expresse words, (2 cor. 1.24.) "wee have no dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy." from the authority christ hath left to civill princes another argument, that the ministers of christ in this present world have no right of commanding, may be drawn from the lawfull authority which christ hath left to all princes, as well christians, as infidels. st. paul saith (col. 3.20.) "children obey your parents in all things; for this is well pleasing to the lord." and ver. 22. "servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, as fearing the lord;" this is spoken to them whose masters were infidells; and yet they are bidden to obey them in all things. and again, concerning obedience to princes. (rom. 13. the first 6. verses) exhorting to "be subject to the higher powers," he saith, "that all power is ordained of god;" and "that we ought to be subject to them, not onely for" fear of incurring their "wrath, but also for conscience sake." and st. peter, (1 epist. chap. 2e ver. 13, 14, 15.) "submit your selves to every ordinance of man, for the lords sake, whether it bee to the king, as supreme, or unto governours, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evill doers, and for the praise of them that doe well; for so is the will of god." and again st. paul (tit. 3.1.) "put men in mind to be subject to principalities, and powers, and to obey magistrates." these princes, and powers, whereof st. peter, and st. paul here speak, were all infidels; much more therefore we are to obey those christians, whom god hath ordained to have soveraign power over us. how then can wee be obliged to doe any thing contrary to the command of the king, or other soveraign representant of the common-wealth, whereof we are members, and by whom we look to be protected? it is therefore manifest, that christ hath not left to his ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued with civill authority, any authority to command other men. what christians may do to avoid persecution but what (may some object) if a king, or a senate, or other soveraign person forbid us to beleeve in christ? to this i answer, that such forbidding is of no effect, because beleef, and unbeleef never follow mens commands. faith is a gift of god, which man can neither give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. and if it be further asked, what if wee bee commanded by our lawfull prince, to say with our tongue, wee beleeve not; must we obey such command? profession with the tongue is but an externall thing, and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience; and wherein a christian, holding firmely in his heart the faith of christ, hath the same liberty which the prophet elisha allowed to naaman the syrian. naaman was converted in his heart to the god of israel; for hee saith (2 kings 5.17.) "thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice unto other gods but unto the lord. in this thing the lord pardon thy servant, that when my master goeth into the house of rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and i bow my selfe in the house of rimmon; when i bow my selfe in the house of rimmon, the lord pardon thy servant in this thing." this the prophet approved, and bid him "goe in peace." here naaman beleeved in his heart; but by bowing before the idol rimmon, he denyed the true god in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips. but then what shall we answer to our saviours saying, "whosoever denyeth me before men, i will deny him before my father which is in heaven?" this we may say, that whatsoever a subject, as naaman was, is compelled to in obedience to his soveraign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his soveraigns; nor is it he that in this case denyeth christ before men, but his governour, and the law of his countrey. if any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true, and unfeigned christianity; i ask him, in case there should be a subject in any christian common-wealth, that should be inwardly in his heart of the mahometan religion, whether if his soveraign command him to bee present at the divine service of the christian church, and that on pain of death, he think that mamometan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawful prince. if he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth all private men, to disobey their princes, in maintenance of their religion, true, or false; if he say, he ought to bee obedient, then he alloweth to himself, that which hee denyeth to another, contrary to the words of our saviour, "whatsoever you would that men should doe unto you, that doe yee unto them;" and contrary to the law of nature, (which is the indubitable everlasting law of god) "do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should doe unto thee." of martyrs but what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the history of the church, that they have needlessely cast away their lives? for answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been for that cause put to death; whereof some have received a calling to preach, and professe the kingdome of christ openly; others have had no such calling, nor more has been required of them than their owne faith. the former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witnesse to this point, that jesus christ is risen from the dead, were true martyrs; for a martyr is, (to give the true definition of the word) a witnesse of the resurrection of jesus the messiah; which none can be but those that conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: for a witnesse must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not good. and that none but such, can properly be called martyrs of christ, is manifest out of the words of st. peter, act. 1.21, 22. "wherefore of these men which have companyed with us all the time that the lord jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the baptisme of john unto that same day hee was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a martyr (that is a witnesse) with us of his resurrection:" where we may observe, that he which is to bee a witnesse of the truth of the resurrection of christ, that is to say, of the truth of this fundamentall article of christian religion, that jesus was the christ, must be some disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before, and after his resurrection; and consequently must be one of his originall disciples: whereas they which were not so, can witnesse no more, but that their antecessors said it, and are therefore but witnesses of other mens testimony; and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of christs witnesses. he, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the history of our saviours life, and of the acts, or epistles of the apostles; or which he beleeveth upon the authority of a private man, wil oppose the laws and authority of the civill state, is very far from being a martyr of christ, or a martyr of his martyrs. 'tis one article onely, which to die for, meriteth so honorable a name; and that article is this, that jesus is the christ; that is to say, he that hath redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternall life in his glorious kingdome. to die for every tenet that serveth the ambition, or profit of the clergy, is not required; nor is it the death of the witnesse, but the testimony it self that makes the martyr: for the word signifieth nothing else, but the man that beareth witnesse, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not. also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article, but taketh it upon him of his private authority, though he be a witnesse, and consequently a martyr, either primary of christ, or secondary of his apostles, disciples, or their successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because being not called thereto, tis not required at his hands; nor ought hee to complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work. none therefore can be a martyr, neither of the first, nor second degree, that have not a warrant to preach christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but such as are sent to the conversion of infidels. for no man is a witnesse to him that already beleeveth, and therefore needs no witnesse; but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. christ sent his apostles, and his seventy disciples, with authority to preach; he sent not all that beleeved: and he sent them to unbeleevers; "i send you (saith he) as sheep amongst wolves;" not as sheep to other sheep. argument from the points of their commission lastly the points of their commission, as they are expressely set down in the gospel, contain none of them any authority over the congregation. to preach we have first (mat. 10.) that the twelve apostles were sent "to the lost sheep of the house of israel," and commanded to preach, "that the kingdome of god was at hand." now preaching in the originall, is that act, which a crier, herald, or other officer useth to doe publiquely in proclaiming of a king. but a crier hath not right to command any man. and (luke 10.2.) the seventy disciples are sent out, "as labourers, not as lords of the harvest;" and are bidden (verse 9.) to say, "the kingdome of god is come nigh unto you;" and by kingdome here is meant, not the kingdome of grace, but the kingdome of glory; for they are bidden to denounce it (ver. 11.) to those cities which shall not receive them, as a threatning, that it shall be more tolerable in that day for sodome, than for such a city. and (mat. 20.28.) our saviour telleth his disciples, that sought priority of place, their office was to minister, even as the son of man came, not to be ministred unto, but to minister. preachers therefore have not magisteriall, but ministeriall power: "bee not called masters, (saith our saviour, mat. 23.10) for one is your master, even christ." and teach another point of their commission, is, to teach all nations; as it is in mat. 28.19. or as in st. mark 16.15 "goe into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." teaching therefore, and preaching is the same thing. for they that proclaim the comming of a king, must withall make known by what right he commeth, if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him: as st. paul did to the jews of thessalonica, when "three sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the scriptures, opening, and alledging that christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this jesus is christ." but to teach out of the old testament that jesus was christ, (that is to say, king,) and risen from the dead, is not to say, that men are bound after they beleeve it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws, and commands of their soveraigns; but that they shall doe wisely, to expect the coming of christ hereafter, in patience, and faith, with obedience to their present magistrates. to baptize; another point of their commission, is to baptize, "in the name of the father, and of the son, and of the holy ghost." what is baptisme? dipping into water. but what is it to dip a man into the water in the name of any thing? the meaning of these words of baptisme is this. he that is baptized, is dipped or washed, as a sign of becomming a new man, and a loyall subject to that god, whose person was represented in old time by moses, and the high priests, when he reigned over the jews; and to jesus christ, his sonne, god, and man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his humane nature represent his fathers person in his eternall kingdome after the resurrection; and to acknowledge the doctrine of the apostles, who assisted by the spirit of the father, and of the son, were left for guides to bring us into that kingdome, to be the onely, and assured way thereunto. this, being our promise in baptisme; and the authority of earthly soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of judgment; (for that is expressely affirmed by s. paul 1 cor. 15. 22, 23, 24. where he saith, "as in adam all die, so in christ all shall be made alive. but every man in his owne order, christ the first fruits, afterward they that are christs, at his comming; then commeth the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdome of god, even the father, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power") it is manifest, that we do not in baptisme constitute over us another authority, by which our externall actions are to be governed in this life; but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles for our direction in the way to life eternall. and to forgive, and retain sinnes the power of remission, and retention of sinnes, called also the power of loosing, and binding, and sometimes the keyes of the kingdome of heaven, is a consequence of the authority to baptize, or refuse to baptize. for baptisme is the sacrament of allegeance, of them that are to be received into the kingdome of god; that is to say, into eternall life; that is to say, to remission of sin: for as eternall life was lost by the committing, so it is recovered by the remitting of mens sins. the end of baptisme is remission of sins: and therefore st. peter, when they that were converted by his sermon on the day of pentecost, asked what they were to doe, advised them to "repent, and be baptized in the name of jesus, for the remission of sins." and therefore seeing to baptize is to declare the reception of men into gods kingdome; and to refuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion; it followeth, that the power to declare them cast out, or retained in it, was given to the same apostles, and their substitutes, and successors. and therefore after our saviour had breathed upon them, saying, (john 20.22.) "receive the holy ghost," hee addeth in the next verse, "whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained." by which words, is not granted an authority to forgive, or retain sins, simply and absolutely, as god forgiveth or retaineth them, who knoweth the heart of man, and truth of his penitence and conversion; but conditionally, to the penitent: and this forgivenesse, or absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned repentance, is thereby without other act, or sentence of the absolvent, made void, and hath no effect at all to salvation, but on the contrary, to the aggravation of his sin. therefore the apostles, and their successors, are to follow but the outward marks of repentance; which appearing, they have no authority to deny absolution; and if they appeare not, they have no authority to absolve. the same also is to be observed in baptisme: for to a converted jew, or gentile, the apostles had not the power to deny baptisme; nor to grant it to the un-penitent. but seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another mans repentance, further than by externall marks, taken from his words, and actions, which are subject to hypocrisie; another question will arise, who it is that is constituted judge of those marks. and this question is decided by our saviour himself; (mat. 18. 15, 16, 17.) "if thy brother (saith he) shall trespasse against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee, and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. but if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one, or two more. and if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man, and a publican." by which it is manifest, that the judgment concerning the truth of repentance, belonged not to any one man, but to the church, that is, to the assembly of the faithfull, or to them that have authority to bee their representant. but besides the judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing of sentence: and this belonged alwaies to the apostle, or some pastor of the church, as prolocutor; and of this our saviour speaketh in the 18 verse, "whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." and comformable hereunto was the practise of st. paul (1 cor. 5.3, 4, & 5.) where he saith, "for i verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have determined already, as though i were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed; in the name of our lord jesus christ when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our lord jesus christ, to deliver such a one to satan;" that is to say, to cast him out of the church, as a man whose sins are not forgiven. paul here pronounceth the sentence; but the assembly was first to hear the cause, (for st. paul was absent;) and by consequence to condemn him. but in the same chapter (ver. 11, 12.) the judgment in such a case is more expressely attributed to the assembly: "but now i have written unto you, not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, &c. with such a one no not to eat. for what have i to do to judg them that are without? do not ye judg them that are within?" the sentence therefore by which a man was put out of the church, was pronounced by the apostle, or pastor; but the judgment concerning the merit of the cause, was in the church; that is to say, (as the times were before the conversion of kings, and men that had soveraign authority in the common-wealth,) the assembly of the christians dwelling in the same city; as in corinth, in the assembly of the christians of corinth. of excommunication this part of the power of the keyes, by which men were thrust out from the kingdome of god, is that which is called excommunication; and to excommunicate, is in the originall, aposunagogon poiein, to cast out of the synagogue; that is, out of the place of divine service; a word drawn from the custom of the jews, to cast out of their synagogues, such as they thought in manners, or doctrine, contagious, as lepers were by the law of moses separated from the congregation of israel, till such time as they should be by the priest pronounced clean. the use of excommunication without civill power. the use and effect of excommunication, whilest it was not yet strengthened with the civill power, was no more, than that they, who were not excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. it was not enough to repute them as heathen, that never had been christians; for with such they might eate, and drink; which with excommunicate persons they might not do; as appeareth by the words of st. paul, (1 cor. 5. ver. 9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to "company with fornicators;" but (because that could not bee without going out of the world,) he restraineth it to such fornicators, and otherwise vicious persons, as were of the brethren; "with such a one" (he saith) they ought not to keep company, "no, not to eat." and this is no more than our saviour saith (mat. 18.17.) "let him be to thee as a heathen, and as a publican." for publicans (which signifieth farmers, and receivers of the revenue of the common-wealth) were so hated, and detested by the jews that were to pay for it, as that publican and sinner were taken amongst them for the same thing: insomuch, as when our saviour accepted the invitation of zacchaeus a publican; though it were to convert him, yet it was objected to him as a crime. and therefore, when our saviour, to heathen, added publican, he did forbid them to eat with a man excommunicate. as for keeping them out of their synagogues, or places of assembly, they had no power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he were christian, or heathen. and because all places are by right, in the dominion of the common-wealth; as well hee that was excommunicated, as hee that never was baptized, might enter into them by commission from the civill magistrate; as paul before his conversion entred into their synagogues at damascus, (acts 9.2.) to apprehend christians, men and women, and to carry them bound to jerusalem, by commission from the high priest. of no effect upon an apostate by which it appears, that upon a christian, that should become an apostate, in a place where the civill power did persecute, or not assist the church, the effect of excommunication had nothing in it, neither of dammage in this world, nor of terrour: not of terrour, because of their unbeleef; nor of dammage, because they returned thereby into the favour of the world; and in the world to come, were to be in no worse estate, then they which never had beleeved. the dammage redounded rather to the church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer execution of their malice. but upon the faithfull only excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those, that beleeved that jesus christ was to come again in glory, to reign over, and to judge both the quick, and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into his kingdom, to those whose sins were retained; that is, to those that were excommunicated by the church. and thence it is that st. paul calleth excommunication, a delivery of the excommunicate person to satan. for without the kingdom of christ, all other kingdomes after judgment, are comprehended in the kingdome of satan. this is it that the faithfull stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicate, that is to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not forgiven. whereby wee may understand, that excommunication in the time that christian religion was not authorized by the civill power, was used onely for a correction of manners, not of errours in opinion: for it is a punishment, whereof none could be sensible but such as beleeved, and expected the coming again of our saviour to judge the world; and they who so beleeved, needed no other opinion, but onely uprightnesse of life, to be saved. for what fault lyeth excommunication there lyeth excommunication for injustice; as (mat. 18.) if thy brother offend thee, tell it him privately; then with witnesses; lastly, tell the church; and then if he obey not, "let him be to thee as an heathen man, and a publican." and there lyeth excommunication for a scandalous life, as (1 cor. 5. 11.) "if any man that is called a brother, be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such a one yee are not to eat." but to excommunicate a man that held this foundation, that jesus was the christ, for difference of opinion in other points, by which that foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth no authority in the scripture, nor example in the apostles. there is indeed in st. paul (titus 3.10.) a text that seemeth to be to the contrary. "a man that is an haeretique, after the first and second admonition, reject." for an haeretique, is he, that being a member of the church, teacheth neverthelesse some private opinion, which the church has forbidden: and such a one, s. paul adviseth titus, after the first, and second admonition, to reject. but to reject (in this place) is not to excommunicate the man; but to give over admonishing him, to let him alone, to set by disputing with him, as one that is to be convinced onely by himselfe. the same apostle saith (2 tim. 2.23.) "foolish and unlearned questions avoid;" the word avoid in this place, and reject in the former, is the same in the originall, paraitou: but foolish questions may bee set by without excommunication. and again, (tit. 3.93) "avoid foolish questions," where the originall, periistaso, (set them by) is equivalent to the former word reject. there is no other place that can so much as colourably be drawn, to countenance the casting out of the church faithfull men, such as beleeved the foundation, onely for a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good & pious conscience. but on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a lesson to pastors, (such as timothy and titus were) not to make new articles of faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to a needlesse burthen of conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the church. which lesson the apostles themselves observed well. s. peter and s. paul, though their controversie were great, (as we may read in gal. 2.11.) yet they did not cast one another out of the church. neverthelesse, during the apostles time, there were other pastors that observed it not; as diotrephes (3 john 9. &c.) who cast out of the church, such as s. john himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took in praeeminence; so early it was, that vainglory, and ambition had found entrance into the church of christ. of persons liable to excommunication that a man be liable to excommunication, there be many conditions requisite; as first, that he be a member of some commonalty, that is to say, of some lawfull assembly, that is to say, of some christian church, that hath power to judge of the cause for which hee is to bee excommunicated. for where there is no community, there can bee no excommunication; nor where there is no power to judge, can there bee any power to give sentence. from hence it followeth, that one church cannot be excommunicated by another: for either they have equall power to excommunicate each other, in which case excommunication is not discipline, nor an act of authority, but schisme, and dissolution of charity; or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they both have but one voice, and then they be but one church; and the part excommunicated, is no more a church, but a dissolute number of individuall persons. and because the sentence of excommunication, importeth an advice, not to keep company, nor so much as to eat with him that is excommunicate, if a soveraign prince, or assembly bee excommunicate, the sentence is of no effect. for all subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of their own soveraign (when he requireth it) by the law of nature; nor can they lawfully either expell him from any place of his own dominion, whether profane or holy; nor go out of his dominion, without his leave; much lesse (if he call them to that honour,) refuse to eat with him. and as to other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the state excommunicate: for the very institution, as it uniteth many men into one community; so it dissociateth one community from another: so that excommunication is not needfull for keeping kings and states asunder; nor has any further effect then is in the nature of policy it selfe; unlesse it be to instigate princes to warre upon one another. nor is the excommunication of a christian subject, that obeyeth the laws of his own soveraign, whether christian, or heathen, of any effect. for if he beleeve that "jesus is the christ, he hath the spirit of god" (1 joh. 4.1.) "and god dwelleth in him, and he in god," (1 joh. 4.15.) but hee that hath the spirit of god; hee that dwelleth in god; hee in whom god dwelleth, can receive no harm by the excommunication of men. therefore, he that beleeveth jesus to be the christ, is free from all the dangers threatned to persons excommunicate. he that beleeveth it not, is no christian. therefore a true and unfeigned christian is not liable to excommunication; nor he also that is a professed christian, till his hypocrisy appear in his manners, that is, till his behaviour bee contrary to the law of his soveraign, which is the rule of manners, and which christ and his apostles have commanded us to be subject to. for the church cannot judge of manners but by externall actions, which actions can never bee unlawfull, but when they are against the law of the common-wealth. if a mans father, or mother, or master bee excommunicate, yet are not the children forbidden to keep them company, nor to eat with them; for that were (for the most part) to oblige them not to eat at all, for want of means to get food; and to authorise them to disobey their parents, and masters, contrary to the precept of the apostles. in summe, the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the apostles and pastors of the church have their commission from our saviour; which is not to rule by command and coaction, but by teaching and direction of men in the way of salvation in the world to come. and as a master in any science, may abandon his scholar, when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but not accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a teacher of christian doctrine may abandon his disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they doe him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him: for to a teacher that shall so complain, may be applyed the answer of god to samuel in the like place, (1 sam. 8.) "they have not rejected thee, but mee." excommunication therefore when it wanteth the assistance of the civill power, as it doth, when a christian state, or prince is excommunicate by a forain authority, is without effect; and consequently ought to be without terrour. the name of fulmen excommunicationis (that is, the thunderbolt of excommunication) proceeded from an imagination of the bishop of rome, which first used it, that he was king of kings, as the heathen made jupiter king of the gods; and assigned him in their poems, and pictures, a thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue, and punish the giants, that should dare to deny his power: which imagination was grounded on two errours; one, that the kingdome of christ is of this world, contrary to our saviours owne words, "my kingdome is not of this world;" the other, that hee is christs vicar, not onely over his owne subjects, but over all the christians of the world; whereof there is no ground in scripture, and the contrary shall bee proved in its due place. of the interpreter of the scriptures before civill soveraigns became christians st. paul coming to thessalonica, where was a synagogue of the jews, (acts 17.2, 3.) "as his manner was, went in unto them, and three sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the scriptures, opening and alledging, that christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and that this jesus whom he preached was the christ." the scriptures here mentioned were the scriptures of the jews, that is, the old testament. the men, to whom he was to prove that jesus was the christ, and risen again from the dead, were also jews, and did beleeve already, that they were the word of god. hereupon (as it is verse 4.) some of them beleeved, and (as it is in the 5. ver.) some beleeved not. what was the reason, when they all beleeved the scripture, that they did not all beleeve alike; but that some approved, others disapproved the interpretation of st. paul that cited them; and every one interpreted them to himself? it was this; s. paul came to them without any legall commission, and in the manner of one that would not command, but perswade; which he must needs do, either by miracles, as moses did to the israelites in egypt, that they might see his authority in gods works; or by reasoning from the already received scripture, that they might see the truth of his doctrine in gods word. but whosoever perswadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom hee speaketh judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the force of his inferences upon them. if these jews of thessalonica were not, who else was the judge of what s. paul alledged out of scripture? if s. paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? it had been enough to have said, i find it so in scripture, that is to say, in your laws, of which i am interpreter, as sent by christ. the interpreter therefore of the scripture, to whose interpretation the jews of thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might beleeve, or not beleeve, according as the allegations seemed to himselfe to be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged. and generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any proofe, maketh judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech. and as to the case of the jews in particular, they were bound by expresse words (deut. 17.) to receive the determination of all hard questions, from the priests and judges of israel for the time being. but this is to bee understood of the jews that were yet unconverted. for the conversion of the gentiles, there was no use of alledging the scriptures, which they beleeved not. the apostles therefore laboured by reason to confute their idolatry; and that done, to perswade them to the faith of christ, by their testimony of his life, and resurrection. so that there could not yet bee any controversie concerning the authority to interpret scripture; seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity, to follow any mans interpretation of any scripture, except his soveraigns interpretation of the laws of his countrey. let us now consider the conversion it self, and see what there was therein, that could be cause of such an obligation. men were converted to no other thing then to the beleef of that which the apostles preached: and the apostles preached nothing, but that jesus was the christ, that is to say, the king that was to save them, and reign over them eternally in the world to come; and consequently that hee was not dead, but risen again from the dead, and gone up into heaven, and should come again one day to judg the world, (which also should rise again to be judged,) and reward every man according to his works. none of them preached that himselfe, or any other apostle was such an interpreter of the scripture, as all that became christians, ought to take their interpretation for law. for to interpret the laws, is part of the administration of a present kingdome; which the apostles had not. they prayed then, and all other pastors ever since, "let thy kingdome come;" and exhorted their converts to obey their then ethnique princes. the new testament was not yet published in one body. every of the evangelists was interpreter of his own gospel; and every apostle of his own epistle; and of the old testament, our saviour himselfe saith to the jews (john 5. 39.) "search the scriptures; for in them yee thinke to have eternall life, and they are they that testifie of me." if hee had not meant they should interpret them, hee would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the christ; he would either have interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the interpretation of the priests. when a difficulty arose, the apostles and elders of the church assembled themselves together, and determined what should bee preached, and taught, and how they should interpret the scriptures to the people; but took not from the people the liberty to read, and interpret them to themselves. the apostles sent divers letters to the churches, and other writings for their instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not allowed them to interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. and as it was in the apostles time, it must be till such time as there should be pastors, that could authorise an interpreter, whose interpretation should generally be stood to: but that could not be till kings were pastors, or pastors kings. of the power to make scripture law there be two senses, wherein a writing may be said to be canonicall; for canon, signifieth a rule; and a rule is a precept, by which a man is guided, and directed in any action whatsoever. such precepts, though given by a teacher to his disciple, or a counsellor to his friend, without power to compell him to observe them, are neverthelesse canons; because they are rules: but when they are given by one, whom he that receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those canons, not onely rules, but laws: the question therefore here, is of the power to make the scriptures (which are the rules of christian faith) laws. of the ten commandements that part of the scripture, which was first law, was the ten commandements, written in two tables of stone, and delivered by god himselfe to moses; and by moses made known to the people. before that time there was no written law of god, who as yet having not chosen any people to bee his peculiar kingdome, had given no law to men, but the law of nature, that is to say, the precepts of naturall reason, written in every mans own heart. of these two tables, the first containeth the law of soveraignty; 1. that they should not obey, nor honour the gods of other nations, in these words, "non habebis deos alienos coram me," that is, "thou shalt not have for gods, the gods that other nations worship; but onely me:" whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honor, as their king and governour, any other god, than him that spake unto them then by moses, and afterwards by the high priest. 2. that they "should not make any image to represent him;" that is to say, they were not to choose to themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any representative of their own fancying, but obey moses and aaron, whom he had appointed to that office. 3. that "they should not take the name of god in vain;" that is, they should not speak rashly of their king, nor dispute his right, nor the commissions of moses and aaron, his lieutenants. 4. that "they should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour," and employ that time in doing him publique honor. the second table containeth the duty of one man towards another, as "to honor parents; not to kill; not to commit adultery; not to steale; not to corrupt judgment by false witnesse;" and finally, "not so much as to designe in their heart the doing of any injury one to another." the question now is, who it was that gave to these written tables the obligatory force of lawes. there is no doubt but that they were made laws by god himselfe: but because a law obliges not, nor is law to any, but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the soveraign, how could the people of israel that were forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what god said to moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws which moses propounded to them? some of them were indeed the laws of nature, as all the second table; and therefore to be acknowledged for gods laws; not to the israelites alone, but to all people: but of those that were peculiar to the israelites, as those of the first table, the question remains; saving that they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of them, to obey moses, in these words (exod. 20.19.) "speak them thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not god speak to us, lest we die." it was therefore onely moses then, and after him the high priest, whom (by moses) god declared should administer this his peculiar kingdome, that had on earth, the power to make this short scripture of the decalogue to bee law in the common-wealth of israel. but moses, and aaron, and the succeeding high priests were the civill soveraigns. therefore hitherto, the canonizing, or making of the scripture law, belonged to the civill soveraigne. of the judicial, and leviticall law the judiciall law, that is to say, the laws that god prescribed to the magistrates of israel, for the rule of their administration of justice, and of the sentences, or judgments they should pronounce, in pleas between man and man; and the leviticall law, that is to say, the rule that god prescribed touching the rites and ceremonies of the priests and levites, were all delivered to them by moses onely; and therefore also became lawes, by vertue of the same promise of obedience to moses. whether these laws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the people by moses (after his forty dayes being with god in the mount) by word of mouth, is not expressed in the text; but they were all positive laws, and equivalent to holy scripture, and made canonicall by moses the civill soveraign. the second law after the israelites were come into the plains of moab over against jericho, and ready to enter into the land of promise, moses to the former laws added divers others; which therefore are called deuteronomy: that is, second laws. and are (as it is written, deut. 29.1.) "the words of a covenant which the lord commanded moses to make with the children of israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in horeb." for having explained those former laws, in the beginning of the book of deuteronomy, he addeth others, that begin at the 12. cha. and continue to the end of the 26. of the same book. this law (deut. 27.1.) they were commanded to write upon great stones playstered over, at their passing over jordan: this law also was written by moses himself in a book; and delivered into the hands of the "priests, and to the elders of israel," (deut. 31.9.) and commanded (ve. 26.) "to be put in the side of the arke;" for in the ark it selfe was nothing but the ten commandements. this was the law, which moses (deuteronomy 17.18.) commanded the kings of israel should keep a copie of: and this is the law, which having been long time lost, was found again in the temple in the time of josiah, and by his authority received for the law of god. but both moses at the writing, and josiah at the recovery thereof, had both of them the civill soveraignty. hitherto therefore the power of making scripture canonicall, was in the civill soveraign. besides this book of the law, there was no other book, from the time of moses, till after the captivity, received amongst the jews for the law of god. for the prophets (except a few) lived in the time of the captivity it selfe; and the rest lived but a little before it; and were so far from having their prophecies generally received for laws, as that their persons were persecuted, partly by false prophets, and partly by the kings which were seduced by them. and this book it self, which was confirmed by josiah for the law of god, and with it all the history of the works of god, was lost in the captivity, and sack of the city of jerusalem, as appears by that of 2 esdras 14.21. "thy law is burnt; therefor no man knoweth the things that are done of thee, of the works that shall begin." and before the captivity, between the time when the law was lost, (which is not mentioned in the scripture, but may probably be thought to be the time of rehoboam, when shishak king of egypt took the spoils of the temple,(1 kings 14.26.)) and the time of josiah, when it was found againe, they had no written word of god, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such, as each of them esteemed prophets. the old testament, when made canonicall from whence we may inferre, that the scriptures of the old testament, which we have at this day, were not canonicall, nor a law unto the jews, till the renovation of their covenant with god at their return from the captivity, and restauration of their common-wealth under esdras. but from that time forward they were accounted the law of the jews, and for such translated into greek by seventy elders of judaea, and put into the library of ptolemy at alexandria, and approved for the word of god. now seeing esdras was the high priest, and the high priest was their civill soveraigne, it is manifest, that the scriptures were never made laws, but by the soveraign civill power. the new testament began to be canonicall under christian soveraigns by the writings of the fathers that lived in the time before that christian religion was received, and authorised by constantine the emperour, we may find, that the books wee now have of the new testament, were held by the christians of that time (except a few, in respect of whose paucity the rest were called the catholique church, and others haeretiques) for the dictates of the holy ghost; and consequently for the canon, or rule of faith: such was the reverence and opinion they had of their teachers; as generally the reverence that the disciples bear to their first masters, in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not small. therefore there is no doubt, but when s. paul wrote to the churches he had converted; or any other apostle, or disciple of christ, to those which had then embraced christ, they received those their writings for the true christian doctrine. but in that time, when not the power and authority of the teacher, but the faith of the hearer caused them to receive it, it was not the apostles that made their own writings canonicall, but every convert made them so to himself. but the question here, is not what any christian made a law, or canon to himself, (which he might again reject, by the same right he received it;) but what was so made a canon to them, as without injustice they could not doe any thing contrary thereunto. that the new testament should in this sense be canonicall, that is to say, a law in any place where the law of the common-wealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a law. for a law, (as hath been already shewn) is the commandement of that man, or assembly, to whom we have given soveraign authority, to make such rules for the direction of our actions, as hee shall think fit; and to punish us, when we doe any thing contrary to the same. when therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other rules, which the soveraign ruler hath not prescribed, they are but counsell, and advice; which, whether good, or bad, hee that is counselled, may without injustice refuse to observe, and when contrary to the laws already established, without injustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. i say, he cannot in this case observe the same in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men; though he may without blame beleeve the his private teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice; and that it were publiquely received for law. for internall faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; whereas the words, and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our civil obedience, are injustice both before god and man. seeing then our saviour hath denyed his kingdome to be in this world, seeing he hath said, he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected us to other laws than those of the common-wealth; that is, the jews to the law of moses, (which he saith (mat. 5.) he came not to destroy, but to fulfill,) and other nations to the laws of their severall soveraigns, and all men to the laws of nature; the observing whereof, both he himselfe, and his apostles have in their teaching recommended to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the last day into his eternall kingdome, wherein shall be protection, and life everlasting. seeing then our saviour, and his apostles, left not new laws to oblige us in this world, but new doctrine to prepare us for the next; the books of the new testament, which containe that doctrine, untill obedience to them was commanded, by them that god hath given power to on earth to be legislators, were not obligatory canons, that is, laws, but onely good, and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take, and refuse at his owne perill, without injustice. again, our saviour christs commission to his apostles, and disciples, was to proclaim his kingdome (not present, but) to come; and to teach all nations; and to baptize them that should beleeve; and to enter into the houses of them that should receive them; and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them; but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compell them to obedience by the sword. in all which there is nothing of power, but of perswasion. he sent them out as sheep unto wolves, not as kings to their subjects. they had not in commission to make laws; but to obey, and teach obedience to laws made; and consequently they could not make their writings obligatory canons, without the help of the soveraign civill power. and therefore the scripture of the new testament is there only law, where the lawfull civill power hath made it so. and there also the king, or soveraign, maketh it a law to himself; by which he subjecteth himselfe, not to the doctor, or apostle, that converted him, but to god himself, and his son jesus christ, as immediately as did the apostles themselves. of the power of councells to make the scripture law that which may seem to give the new testament, in respect of those that have embraced christian doctrine, the force of laws, in the times, and places of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their synods. for we read (acts 15.28.) the stile of the councell of the apostles, the elders, and the whole church, in this manner, "it seemed good to the holy ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary things, &c." which is a stile that signifieth a power to lay a burthen on them that had received their doctrine. now "to lay a burthen on another," seemeth the same that "to oblige;" and therefore the acts of that councell were laws to the then christians. neverthelesse, they were no more laws than are these other precepts, "repent, be baptized; keep the commandements; beleeve the gospel; come unto me; sell all that thou hast; give it to the poor;" and "follow me;" which are not commands, but invitations, and callings of men to christianity, like that of esay 55.1. "ho, every man that thirsteth, come yee to the waters, come, and buy wine and milke without money." for first, the apostles power was no other than that of our saviour, to invite men to embrace the kingdome of god; which they themselves acknowledged for a kingdome (not present, but) to come; and they that have no kingdome, can make no laws. and secondly, if their acts of councell, were laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. but we read not any where, that they who received not the doctrine of christ, did therein sin; but that they died in their sins; that is, that their sins against the laws to which they owed obedience, were not pardoned. and those laws were the laws of nature, and the civill laws of the state, whereto every christian man had by pact submitted himself. and therefore by the burthen, which the apostles might lay on such as they had converted, are not to be understood laws, but conditions, proposed to those that sought salvation; which they might accept, or refuse at their own perill, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being condemned, and excluded out of the kingdome of god for their sins past. and therefore of infidels, s. john saith not, the wrath of god shall "come" upon them, but "the wrath of god remaineth upon them;" and not that they shall be condemned; but that "they are condemned already."(john 3.36, 3.18) nor can it be conceived, that the benefit of faith, "is remission of sins" unlesse we conceive withall, that the dammage of infidelity, is "the retention of the same sins." but to what end is it (may some man aske), that the apostles, and other pastors of the church, after their time, should meet together, to agree upon what doctrine should be taught, both for faith and manners, if no man were obliged to observe their decrees? to this may be answered, that the apostles, and elders of that councell, were obliged even by their entrance into it, to teach the doctrine therein concluded, and decreed to be taught, so far forth, as no precedent law, to which they were obliged to yeeld obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other christians should be obliged to observe, what they taught. for though they might deliberate what each of them should teach; yet they could not deliberate what others should do, unless their assembly had had a legislative power; which none could have but civill soveraigns. for though god be the soveraign of all the world, we are not bound to take for his law, whatsoever is propounded by every man in his name; nor any thing contrary to the civill law, which god hath expressely commanded us to obey. seeing then the acts of councell of the apostles, were then no laws, but councells; much lesse are laws the acts of any other doctors, or councells since, if assembled without the authority of the civill soveraign. and consequently, the books of the new testament, though most perfect rules of christian doctrine, could not be made laws by any other authority then that of kings, or soveraign assemblies. the first councell, that made the scriptures we now have, canon, is not extant: for that collection the first bishop of rome after s. peter, is subject to question: for though the canonicall books bee there reckoned up; yet these words, "sint vobis omnibus clericis & laicis libris venerandi, &c." containe a distinction of clergy, and laity, that was not in use so neer st. peters time. the first councell for setling the canonicall scripture, that is extant, is that of laodicea, can. 59. which forbids the reading of other books then those in the churches; which is a mandate that is not addressed to every christian, but to those onely that had authority to read any publiquely in the church; that is, to ecclesiastiques onely. of the right of constituting ecclesiasticall officers in the time of the apostles of ecclesiastical officers in the time of the apostles, some were magisteriall, some ministeriall. magisteriall were the offices of preaching of the gospel of the kingdom of god to infidels; of administring the sacraments, and divine service; and of teaching the rules of faith and manners to those that were converted. ministeriall was the office of deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the administration of the secular necessities of the church, at such time as they lived upon a common stock of mony, raised out of the voluntary contributions of the faithfull. amongst the officers magisteriall, the first, and principall were the apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen and constituted by our saviour himselfe; and their office was not onely to preach, teach, and baptize, but also to be martyrs, (witnesses of our saviours resurrection.) this testimony, was the specificall, and essentiall mark; whereby the apostleship was distinguished from other magistracy ecclesiasticall; as being necessary for an apostle, either to have seen our saviour after his resurrection, or to have conversed with him before, and seen his works, and other arguments of his divinity, whereby they might be taken for sufficient witnesses. and therefore at the election of a new apostle in the place of judas iscariot, s. peter saith (acts 1.21,22.) "of these men that have companyed with us, all the time that the lord jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptisme of john unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witnesse with us of his resurrection:" where, by this word must, is implyed a necessary property of an apostle, to have companyed with the first and prime apostles in the time that our saviour manifested himself in the flesh. matthias made apostle by the congregation. the first apostle, of those which were not constituted by christ in the time he was upon the earth, was matthias, chosen in this manner: there were assembled together in jerusalem about 120 christians (acts 1.15.) these appointed two, joseph the just, and matthias (ver. 23.) and caused lots to be drawn; "and (ver. 26.) the lot fell on matthias and he was numbred with the apostles." so that here we see the ordination of this apostle, was the act of the congregation, and not of st. peter, nor of the eleven, otherwise then as members of the assembly. paul and barnabas made apostles by the church of antioch after him there was never any other apostle ordained, but paul and barnabas, which was done (as we read acts 13.1,2,3.) in this manner. "there were in the church that was at antioch, certaine prophets, and teachers; as barnabas, and simeon that was called niger, and lucius of cyrene, and manaen; which had been brought up with herod the tetrarch, and saul. as they ministred unto the lord, and fasted, the holy ghost said, 'separate mee barnabas, and saul for the worke whereunto i have called them.' and when they had fasted, and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away." by which it is manifest, that though they were called by the holy ghost, their calling was declared unto them, and their mission authorized by the particular church of antioch. and that this their calling was to the apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (acts 14.14.) apostles: and that it was by vertue of this act of the church of antioch, that they were apostles, s. paul declareth plainly (rom. 1.1.) in that hee useth the word, which the holy ghost used at his calling: for he stileth himself, "an apostle separated unto the gospel of god;" alluding to the words of the holy ghost, "separate me barnabas and saul, &c." but seeing the work of an apostle, was to be a witnesse of the resurrection of christ, and man may here aske, how s. paul that conversed not with our saviour before his passion, could know he was risen. to which it is easily answered, that our saviour himself appeared to him in the way to damascus, from heaven, after his ascension; "and chose him for a vessell to bear his name before the gentiles, and kings, and children of israel;" and consequently (having seen the lord after his passion) was a competent witnesse of his resurrection: and as for barnabas, he was a disciple before the passion. it is therefore evident that paul, and barnabas were apostles; and yet chosen, and authorized (not by the first apostles alone, but) by the church of antioch; as matthias was chosen, and authorized by the church of jerusalem. what offices in the church are magisteriall bishop, a word formed in our language, out of the greek episcopus, signifieth an overseer, or superintendent of any businesse, and particularly a pastor or shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not only amongst the jews that were originally shepherds, but also amongst the heathen, to signifie the office of a king, or any other ruler, or guide of people, whether he ruled by laws, or doctrine. and so the apostles were the first christian bishops, instituted by christ himselfe: in which sense the apostleship of judas is called (acts 1.20.) his bishoprick. and afterwards, when there were constituted elders in the christian churches, with charge to guide christs flock by their doctrine, and advice; these elders were also called bishops. timothy was an elder (which word elder, in the new testament is a name of office, as well as of age;) yet he was also a bishop. and bishops were then content with the title of elders. nay s. john himselfe, the apostle beloved of our lord, beginneth his second epistle with these words, "the elder to the elect lady." by which it is evident, that bishop, pastor, elder, doctor, that is to say, teacher, were but so many divers names of the same office in the time of the apostles. for there was then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine, and perswading. the kingdome of god was yet to come, in a new world; so that there could be no authority to compell in any church, till the common-wealth had embraced the christian faith; and consequently no diversity of authority, though there were diversity of employments. besides these magisteriall employments in the church, namely apostles, bishops, elders, pastors, and doctors, whose calling was to proclaim christ to the jews, and infidels, and to direct, and teach those that beleeved we read in the new testament of no other. for by the names of evangelists and prophets, is not signified any office, but severall gifts, by which severall men were profitable to the church: as evangelists, by writing the life and acts of our saviour; such as were s. matthew and s. john apostles, and s. marke and s. luke disciples, and whosoever else wrote of that subject, (as s. thomas, and s. barnabas are said to have done, though the church have not received the books that have gone under their names:) and as prophets, by the gift of interpreting the old testament; and sometimes by declaring their speciall revelations to the church. for neither these gifts, nor the gifts of languages, nor the gift of casting out devils, or of curing other diseases, nor any thing else did make an officer in the church, save onely the due calling and election to the charge of teaching. ordination of teachers as the apostles, matthias, paul, and barnabas, were not made by our saviour himself, but were elected by the church, that is, by the assembly of christians; namely, matthias by the church of jerusalem, and paul, and barnabas by the church of antioch; so were also the presbyters, and pastors in other cities, elected by the churches of those cities. for proof whereof, let us consider, first, how s. paul proceeded in the ordination of presbyters, in the cities where he had converted men to the christian faith, immediately after he and barnabas had received their apostleship. we read (acts 14.23.) that "they ordained elders in every church;" which at first sight may be taken for an argument, that they themselves chose, and gave them their authority: but if we consider the originall text, it will be manifest, that they were authorized, and chosen by the assembly of the christians of each city. for the words there are, "cheirotonesantes autoispresbuterous kat ekklesian," that is, "when they had ordained them elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation." now it is well enough known, that in all those cities, the manner of choosing magistrates, and officers, was by plurality of suffrages; and (because the ordinary way of distinguishing the affirmative votes from the negatives, was by holding up of hands) to ordain an officer in any of the cities, was no more but to bring the people together, to elect them by plurality of votes, whether it were by plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a vessell marked for the affirmative, or negative; for divers cities had divers customes in that point. it was therefore the assembly that elected their own elders: the apostles were onely presidents of the assembly to call them together for such election, and to pronounce them elected, and to give them the benediction, which now is called consecration. and for this cause they that were presidents of the assemblies, as (in the absence of the apostles) the elders were, were called proestotes, and in latin antistities; which words signifie the principall person of the assembly, whose office was to number the votes, and to declare thereby who was chosen; and where the votes were equall, to decide the matter in question, by adding his own; which is the office of a president in councell. and (because all the churches had their presbyters ordained in the same manner,) where the word is constitute, (as titus 1.5.) "ina katasteses kata polin presbuterous," "for this cause left i thee in crete, that thou shouldest constitute elders in every city," we are to understand the same thing; namely, that hee should call the faithfull together, and ordain them presbyters by plurality of suffrages. it had been a strange thing, if in a town, where men perhaps had never seen any magistrate otherwise chosen then by an assembly, those of the town becomming christians, should so much as have thought on any other way of election of their teachers, and guides, that is to say, of their presbyters, (otherwise called bishops,) then this of plurality of suffrages, intimated by s. paul (acts 14.23.) in the word cheirotonesantes: nor was there ever any choosing of bishops, (before the emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them,) but by the assemblies of the christians in every severall town. the same is also confirmed by the continuall practise even to this day, in the election of the bishops of rome. for if the bishop of any place, had the right of choosing another, to the succession of the pastorall office, in any city, at such time as he went from thence, to plant the same in another place; much more had he had the right, to appoint his successour in that place, in which he last resided and dyed: and we find not, that ever any bishop of rome appointed his successor. for they were a long time chosen by the people, as we may see by the sedition raised about the election, between damascus, and ursinicus; which ammianus marcellinus saith was so great, that juventius the praefect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to goe out of the city; and that there were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the church it self. and though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole clergy of rome, and afterwards by the cardinalls; yet never any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor. if therefore they pretended no right to appoint their successors, i think i may reasonably conclude, they had no right to appoint the new power; which none could take from the church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawfull authority, not onely to teach, but to command the church; which none could doe, but the civill soveraign. ministers of the church what the word minister in the originall diakonos signifieth one that voluntarily doth the businesse of another man; and differeth from a servant onely in this, that servants are obliged by their condition, to what is commanded them; whereas ministers are obliged onely by their undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have undertaken: so that both they that teach the word of god, and they that administer the secular affairs of the church, are both ministers, but they are ministers of different persons. for the pastors of the church, called (acts 6.4.) "the ministers of the word," are ministers of christ, whose word it is: but the ministery of a deacon, which is called (verse 2. of the same chapter) "serving of tables," is a service done to the church, or congregation: so that neither any one man, nor the whole church, could ever of their pastor say, he was their minister; but of a deacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or distribute maintenance to the christians, when they lived in each city on a common stock, or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or other worldly businesse of the church, the whole congregation might properly call him their minister. for their employment, as deacons, was to serve the congregation; though upon occasion they omitted not to preach the gospel, and maintain the doctrine of christ, every one according to his gifts, as s. steven did; and both to preach, and baptize, as philip did: for that philip, which (act. 8. 5.) preached the gospel at samaria, and (verse 38.) baptized the eunuch, was philip the deacon, not philip the apostle. for it is manifest (verse 1.) that when philip preached in samaria, the apostles were at jerusalem, and (verse 14.) "when they heard that samaria had received the word of god, sent peter and john to them;" by imposition of whose hands, they that were baptized (verse 15.) received (which before by the baptisme of philip they had not received) the holy ghost. for it was necessary for the conferring of the holy ghost, that their baptisme should be administred, or confirmed by a minister of the word, not by a minister of the church. and therefore to confirm the baptisme of those that philip the deacon had baptized, the apostles sent out of their own number from jerusalem to samaria, peter, and john; who conferred on them that before were but baptized, those graces that were signs of the holy spirit, which at that time did accompany all true beleevers; which what they were may be understood by that which s. marke saith (chap. 16.17.) "these signs follow them that beleeve in my name; they shall cast out devills; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." this to doe, was it that philip could not give; but the apostles could, and (as appears by this place) effectually did to every man that truly beleeved, and was by a minister of christ himself baptized: which power either christs ministers in this age cannot conferre, or else there are very few true beleevers, or christ hath very few ministers. and how chosen what that the first deacons were chosen, not by the apostles, but by a congregation of the disciples; that is, of christian men of all sorts, is manifest out of acts 6. where we read that the twelve, after the number of disciples was multiplyed, called them together, and having told them, that it was not fit that the apostles should leave the word of god, and serve tables, said unto them (verse 3.) "brethren looke you out among you seven men of honest report, full of the holy ghost, and of wisdome, whom we may appoint over this businesse." here it is manifest, that though the apostles declared them elected; yet the congregation chose them; which also, (verse the fift) is more expressely said, where it is written, that "the saying pleased the multitude, and they chose seven, &c." of ecclesiasticall revenue, under the law of moses under the old testament, the tribe of levi were onely capable of the priesthood, and other inferiour offices of the church. the land was divided amongst the other tribes (levi excepted,) which by the subdivision of the tribe of joseph, into ephraim and manasses, were still twelve. to the tribe of levi were assigned certain cities for their habitation, with the suburbs for their cattell: but for their portion, they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their brethren. again, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the oblations, and sacrifices. for god had said to aaron (numb. 18. 20.) "thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part amongst them, i am thy part, and thine inheritance amongst the children of israel." for god being then king, and having constituted the tribe of levi to be his publique ministers, he allowed them for their maintenance, the publique revenue, that is to say, the part that god had reserved to himself; which were tythes, and offerings: and that it is which is meant, where god saith, i am thine inheritance. and therefore to the levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of clergy from kleros, which signifieth lot, or inheritance; not that they were heirs of the kingdome of god, more than other; but that gods inheritance, was their maintenance. now seeing in this time god himself was their king, and moses, aaron, and the succeeding high priests were his lieutenants; it is manifest, that the right of tythes, and offerings was constituted by the civill power. after their rejection of god in the demand of a king, they enjoyed still the same revenue; but the right thereof was derived from that, that the kings did never take it from them: for the publique revenue was at the disposing of him that was the publique person; and that (till the captivity) was the king. and again, after the return from the captivity, they paid their tythes as before to the priest. hitherto therefore church livings were determined by the civill soveraign. in our saviours time, and after of the maintenance of our saviour, and his apostles, we read onely they had a purse, (which was carried by judas iscariot;) and, that of the apostles, such as were fisher-men, did sometimes use their trade; and that when our saviour sent the twelve apostles to preach, he forbad them "to carry gold, and silver, and brasse in their purses, for that the workman is worthy of his hire:" (mat. 10. 9,10.) by which it is probable, their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment; for their employment was (ver. 8.) "freely to give, because they had freely received;" and their maintenance was the free gift of those that beleeved the good tyding they carryed about of the coming of the messiah their saviour. to which we may adde, that which was contributed out of gratitude, by such as our saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned "certain women (luke 8. 2,3.) which had been healed of evill spirits and infirmities; mary magdalen, out of whom went seven devills; and joanna the wife of chuza, herods steward; and susanna, and many others, which ministred unto him of their substance. after our saviours ascension, the christians of every city lived in common, (acts 4. 34.) upon the mony which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the apostles, of good will, not of duty; for "whilest the land remained (saith s. peter to ananias acts 5.4.) was it not thine? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power?" which sheweth he needed not to have saved his land, nor his money by lying, as not being bound to contribute any thing at all, unlesse he had pleased. and as in the time of the apostles, so also all the time downward, till after constantine the great, we shall find, that the maintenance of the bishops, and pastors of the christian church, was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that had embraced their doctrine. there was yet no mention of tythes: but such was in the time of constantine, and his sons, the affection of christians to their pastors, as ammianus marcellinus saith (describing the sedition of damasus and ursinicus about the bishopricke,) that it was worth their contention, in that the bishops of those times by the liberality of their flock, and especially of matrons, lived splendidly, were carryed in coaches, and sumptuous in their fare and apparell. the ministers of the gospel lived on the benevolence of their flocks but here may some ask, whether the pastor were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution, as upon almes, "for who (saith s. paul 1 cor. 9. 7.) goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock, and eatheth not of the milke of the flock?" and again, (1 cor. 9. 13.) "doe ye not know that they which minister about holy things, live of the things of the temple; and they which wait at the altar, partake with the altar;" that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the altar for their maintenance? and then he concludeth, "even so hath the lord appointed, that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel. from which place may be inferred indeed, that the pastors of the church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the pastors were to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own allowance, and be (as it were) their own carvers. their allowance must needs therefore be determined, either by the gratitude, and liberality of every particular man of their flock, or by the whole congregation. by the whole congregation it could not be, because their acts were then no laws: therefore the maintenance of pastors, before emperours and civill soveraigns had made laws to settle it, was nothing but benevolence. they that served at the altar lived on what was offered. in what court should they sue for it, who had no tribunalls? or if they had arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their judgments, when they had no power to arme their officers? it remaineth therefore, that there could be no certaine maintenance assigned to any pastors of the church, but by the whole congregation; and then onely, when their decrees should have the force (not onely of canons, but also) of laws; which laws could not be made, but by emperours, kings, or other civill soveraignes. the right of tythes in moses law, could not be applyed to the then ministers of the gospell; because moses and the high priests were the civill soveraigns of the people under god, whose kingdom amongst the jews was present; whereas the kingdome of god by christ is yet to come. hitherto hath been shewn what the pastors of the church are; what are the points of their commission (as that they were to preach, to teach, to baptize, to be presidents in their severall congregations;) what is ecclesiasticall censure, viz. excommunication, that is to say, in those places where christianity was forbidden by the civill laws, a putting of themselves out of the company of the excommunicate, and where christianity was by the civill law commanded, a putting the excommunicate out of the congregations of christians; who elected the pastors and ministers of the church, (that it was, the congregation); who consecrated and blessed them, (that it was the pastor); what was their due revenue, (that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and the voluntary contributions of devout and gratefull christians). we are to consider now, what office those persons have, who being civill soveraignes, have embraced also the christian faith. the civill soveraign being a christian hath the right of appointing pastors and first, we are to remember, that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace, and to be taught the subjects, is in all common-wealths inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved cha. 18.) to the soveraign power civill, whether it be in one man, or in one assembly of men. for it is evident to the meanest capacity, that mens actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good, or evill, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to the soveraign power, will bee more hurtfull to them, than their disobedience, will disobey the laws, and thereby overthrow the common-wealth, and introduce confusion, and civill war; for the avoiding whereof, all civill government was ordained. and therefore in all common-wealths of the heathen, the soveraigns have had the name of pastors of the people, because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people, but by their permission and authority. this right of the heathen kings, cannot bee thought taken from them by their conversion to the faith of christ; who never ordained, that kings for beleeving in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but himself, or (which is all one) be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of peace amongst their subjects, and for their defence against foraign enemies. and therefore christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors they please, to teach the church, that is, to teach the people committed to their charge. again, let the right of choosing them be (as before the conversion of kings) in the church, for so it was in the time of the apostles themselves (as hath been shewn already in this chapter); even so also the right will be in the civill soveraign, christian. for in that he is a christian, he allowes the teaching; and in that he is the soveraign (which is as much as to say, the church by representation,) the teachers hee elects, are elected by the church. and when an assembly of christians choose their pastor in a christian common-wealth, it is the soveraign that electeth him, because tis done by his authority; in the same manner, as when a town choose their maior, it is the act of him that hath the soveraign power: for every act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid. and therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of history, concerning the election of pastors, by the people, or by the clergy, they are no arguments against the right of any civill soveraign, because they that elected them did it by his authority. seeing then in every christian common-wealth, the civill soveraign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority, that all other pastors are made, and have power to teach, and performe all other pastorall offices; it followeth also, that it is from the civill soveraign, that all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and other functions pertaining to that office; and that they are but his ministers; in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, judges in courts of justice, and commanders of armies, are all but ministers of him that is the magistrate of the whole common-wealth, judge of all causes, and commander of the whole militia, which is alwayes the civill soveraign. and the reason hereof, is not because they that teach, but because they that are to learn, are his subjects. for let it be supposed, that a christian king commit the authority of ordaining pastors in his dominions to another king, (as divers christian kings allow that power to the pope;) he doth not thereby constitute a pastor over himself, nor a soveraign pastor over his people; for that were to deprive himself of the civill power; which depending on the opinion men have of their duty to him, and the fear they have of punishment in another world, would depend also on the skill, and loyalty of doctors, who are no lesse subject, not only to ambition, but also to ignorance, than any other sort of men. so that where a stranger hath authority to appoint teachers, it is given him by the soveraign in whose dominions he teacheth. christian doctors are our schoolmasters to christianity; but kings are fathers of families, and may receive schoolmasters for their subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the publique good; the care of which they stand so long charged withall, as they retain any other essentiall right of the soveraignty. the pastorall authority of soveraigns only is de jure divino, that of other pastors is jure civili if a man therefore should ask a pastor, in the execution of his office, as the chief priests and elders of the people (mat. 21.23.) asked our saviour, "by what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority:" he can make no other just answer, but that he doth it by the authority of the common-wealth, given him by the king, or assembly that representeth it. all pastors, except the supreme, execute their charges in the right, that is by the authority of the civill soveraign, that is, jure civili. but the king, and every other soveraign executeth his office of supreme pastor, by immediate authority from god, that is to say, in gods right, or jure divino. and therefore none but kings can put into their titles (a mark of their submission to god onely ) dei gratia rex, &c. bishops ought to say in the beginning of their mandates, "by the favour of the kings majesty, bishop of such a diocesse;" or as civill ministers, "in his majesties name." for in saying, divina providentia, which is the same with dei gratia, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the civill state; and sliely slip off the collar of their civill subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the common-wealth. christian kings have power to execute all manner of pastoral function but if every christian soveraign be the supreme pastor of his own subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the authority, not only to preach (which perhaps no man will deny;) but also to baptize, and to administer the sacrament of the lords supper; and to consecrate both temples, and pastors to gods service; which most men deny; partly because they use not to do it; and partly because the administration of sacraments, and consecration of persons, and places to holy uses, requireth the imposition of such mens hands, as by the like imposition successively from the time of the apostles have been ordained to the like ministery. for proof therefore that christian kings have power to baptize, and to consecrate, i am to render a reason, both why they use not to doe it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of imposition of hands, they are made capable of doing it, when they will. there is no doubt but any king, in case he were skilfull in the sciences, might by the same right of his office, read lectures of them himself, by which he authorizeth others to read them in the universities. neverthelesse, because the care of the summe of the businesse of the common-wealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him to apply himself in person to that particular. a king may also if he please, sit in judgment, to hear and determine all manner of causes, as well as give others authority to doe it in his name; but that the charge that lyeth upon him of command and government, constrain him to bee continually at the helm, and to commit the ministeriall offices to others under him. in the like manner our saviour (who surely had power to baptize) baptized none himselfe, but sent his apostles and disciples to baptize. (john 4.2.) so also s. paul, by the necessity of preaching in divers and far distant places, baptized few: amongst all the corinthians he baptized only crispus, cajus, and stephanus; (1 cor.1.14,16.) and the reason was, because his principall charge was to preach. (1 cor. 1.17.) whereby it is manifest, that the greater charge, (such as is the government of the church,) is a dispensation for the lesse. the reason therefore why christian kings use not to baptize, is evident, and the same, for which at this day there are few baptized by bishops, and by the pope fewer. and as concerning imposition of hands, whether it be needfull, for the authorizing of a king to baptize, and consecrate, we may consider thus. imposition of hands, was a most ancient publique ceremony amongst the jews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person, or other thing intended in a mans prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration, condemnation, or other speech. so jacob in blessing the children of joseph (gen. 48.14.) "laid his right hand on ephraim the younger, and his left hand on manasseh the first born;" and this he did wittingly (though they were so presented to him by joseph, as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms acrosse) to design to whom he intended the greater blessing. so also in the sacrificing of the burnt offering, aaron is commanded (exod. 29.10.) "to lay his hands on the head of the bullock;" and (ver. 15.) "to lay his hand on the head of the ramme." the same is also said again, levit. 1.4. & 8.14. likewise moses when he ordained joshua to be captain of the israelites, that is, consecrated him to gods service, (numb. 27.23.) "laid his hands upon him, and gave him his charge," designing and rendring certain, who it was they were to obey in war. and in the consecration of the levites (numb. 8.10.) god commanded that "the children of israel should put their hands upon the levites." and in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed the lord (levit. 24.14.) god commanded that "all that heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the congregation should stone him." and why should they only that heard him, lay their hands upon him, and not rather a priest, levite, or other minister of justice, but that none else were able to design, and demonstrate to the eyes of the congregation, who it was that had blasphemed, and ought to die? and to design a man, or any other thing, by the hand to the eye is lesse subject to mistake, than when it is done to the eare by a name. and so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole congregation at once, which cannot be done by laying on of hands, yet "aaron (levit. 9.22.) did lift up his hand towards the people when he blessed them." and we read also of the like ceremony of consecration of temples amongst the heathen, as that the priest laid his hands on some post of the temple, all the while he was uttering the words of consecration. so naturall it is to design any individuall thing, rather by the hand, to assure the eyes, than by words to inform the eare in matters of gods publique service. this ceremony was not therefore new in our saviours time. for jairus (mark 5.23.) whose daughter was sick, besought our saviour (not to heal her, but) "to lay his hands upon her, that shee might bee healed." and (matth. 19.13.) "they brought unto him little children, that hee should put his hands on them, and pray." according to this ancient rite, the apostles, and presbyters, and the presbytery it self, laid hands on them whom they ordained pastors, and withall prayed for them that they might receive the holy ghost; and that not only once, but sometimes oftner, when a new occasion was presented: but the end was still the same, namely a punctuall, and religious designation of the person, ordained either to the pastorall charge in general, or to a particular mission: so (act. 6.6.) "the apostles prayed, and laid their hands" on the seven deacons; which was done, not to give them the holy ghost, (for they were full of the holy ghost before thy were chosen, as appeareth immediately before, verse 3.) but to design them to that office. and after philip the deacon had converted certain persons in samaria, peter and john went down (act. 8.17.)" and laid their hands on them, and they received the holy ghost." and not only an apostle, but a presbyter had this power: for s. paul adviseth timothy (1 tim. 5.22.) "lay hands suddenly on no man;" that is, designe no man rashly to the office of a pastor. the whole presbytery laid their hands on timothy, as we read 1 tim. 4.14. but this is to be understood, as that some did it by the appointment of the presbytery, and most likely their proestos, or prolocutor, which it may be was st. paul himself. for in his 2 epist. to tim. ver. 6. he saith to him, "stirre up the gift of god which is in thee, by the laying on of my hands:" where note by the way, that by the holy ghost, is not meant the third person in the trinity, but the gifts necessary to the pastorall office. we read also, that st. paul had imposition of hands twice; once from ananias at damascus (acts 9.17,18.) at the time of his baptisme; and again (acts 13.3.) at antioch, when he was first sent out to preach. the use then of this ceremony considered in the ordination of pastors, was to design the person to whom they gave such power. but if there had been then any christian, that had had the power of teaching before; the baptizing of him, that is the making of him a christian, had given him no new power, but had onely caused him to preach true doctrine, that is, to use his power aright; and therefore the imposition of hands had been unnecessary; baptisme it selfe had been sufficient. but every soveraign, before christianity, had the power of teaching, and ordaining teachers; and therefore christianity gave them no new right, but only directed them in the way of teaching truth; and consequently they needed no imposition of hands (besides that which is done in baptisme) to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastorall function, as namely, to baptize, and consecrate. and in the old testament, though the priest only had right to consecrate, during the time that the soveraignty was in the high priest; yet it was not so when the soveraignty was in the king: for we read (1 kings 8.) that solomon blessed the people, consecrated the temple, and pronounced that publique prayer, which is the pattern now for consecration of all christian churches, and chappels: whereby it appears, he had not only the right of ecclesiasticall government; but also of exercising ecclesiasticall functions. the civill soveraigne if a christian, is head of the church in his own dominions from this consolidation of the right politique, and ecclesiastique in christian soveraigns, it is evident, they have all manner of power over their subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of mens externall actions, both in policy, and religion; and may make such laws, as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own subjects, both as they are the common-wealth, and as they are the church: for both state, and church are the same men. if they please therefore, they may (as many christian kings now doe) commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the pope; but then the pope is in that point subordinate to them, and exerciseth that charge in anothers dominion jure civili, in the right of the civill soveraign; not jure divino, in gods right; and may therefore be discharged of that office, when the soveraign for the good of his subjects shall think it necessary. they may also if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an assembly of pastors; and give them what power over the church, or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honor, as of bishops, archbishops, priests, or presbyters, they will; and make such laws for their maintenance, either by tithes, or otherwise, as they please, so they doe it out of a sincere conscience, of which god onely is the judge. it is the civill soveraign, that is to appoint judges, and interpreters of the canonicall scriptures; for it is he that maketh them laws. it is he also that giveth strength to excommunications; which but for such laws and punishments, as may humble obstinate libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the church, would bee contemned. in summe, he hath the supreme power in all causes, as well ecclesiasticall, as civill, as far as concerneth actions, and words, for these onely are known, and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no judg at all, but god, that knoweth the heart. and these rights are incident to all soveraigns, whether monarchs, or assemblies: for they that are the representants of a christian people, are representants of the church: for a church, and a common-wealth of christian people, are the same thing. cardinal bellarmines books de summo pontifice considered though this that i have here said, and in other places of this book, seem cleer enough for the asserting of the supreme ecclesiasticall power to christian soveraigns; yet because the pope of romes challenge to that power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and i think as strongly as is possible, by cardinall bellarmine, in his controversie de summo pontifice; i have thought it necessary, as briefly as i can, to examine the grounds, and strength of his discourse. the first book of five books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three questions: one, which is simply the best government, monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy; and concludeth for neither, but for a government mixt of all there: another, which of these is the best government of the church; and concludeth for the mixt, but which should most participate of monarchy: the third, whether in this mixt monarchy, st. peter had the place of monarch. concerning his first conclusion, i have already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that all governments which men are bound to obey, are simple, and absolute. in monarchy there is but one man supreme; and all other men that have any kind of power in the state, have it by his commission, during his pleasure; and execute it in his name: and in aristocracy, and democracy, but one supreme assembly, with the same power that in monarchy belongeth to the monarch, which is not a mixt, but an absolute soveraignty. and of the three sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already established; but the present ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the law of nature, and the divine positive law, to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof. besides, it maketh nothing to the power of any pastor, (unlesse he have the civill soveraignty,) what kind of government is the best; because their calling is not to govern men by commandement, but to teach them, and perswade them by arguments, and leave it to them to consider, whether they shall embrace, or reject the doctrine taught. for monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of soveraigns, not of pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of masters of families, not three sorts of schoolmasters for their children. and therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of government of the church, is nothing to the question of the popes power without his own dominions: for in all other common-wealths his power (if hee have any at all) is that of the schoolmaster onely, and not of the master of the family. for the third conclusion, which is, that st. peter was monarch of the church, he bringeth for his chiefe argument the place of s. matth. (chap. 16.18, 19.) "thou art peter, and upon this rock i will build my church, &c. and i will give thee the keyes of heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." which place well considered, proveth no more, but that the church of christ hath for foundation one onely article; namely, that which peter in the name of all the apostles professing, gave occasion to our saviour to speak the words here cited; which that wee may cleerly understand, we are to consider, that our saviour preached by himself, by john baptist, and by his apostles, nothing but this article of faith, "that he was the christ;" all other articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on that. john began first, (mat. 3.2.) preaching only this, "the kingdome of god is at hand." then our saviour himself (mat. 4.17.) preached the same: and to his twelve apostles, when he gave them their commission (mat. 10.7.) there is no mention of preaching any other article but that. this was the fundamentall article, that is the foundation of the churches faith. afterwards the apostles being returned to him, he asketh them all, (mat. 16.13) not peter onely, "who men said he was;" and they answered, that "some said he was john the baptist, some elias, and others jeremias, or one of the prophets:" then (ver. 15.) he asked them all again, (not peter onely) "whom say yee that i am?" therefore peter answered (for them all) "thou art christ, the son of the living god;" which i said is the foundation of the faith of the whole church; from which our saviour takes the occasion of saying, "upon this stone i will build my church;" by which it is manifest, that by the foundation-stone of the church, was meant the fundamentall article of the churches faith. but why then (will some object) doth our saviour interpose these words, "thou art peter"? if the originall of this text had been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared: we are therefore to consider, that the apostle simon, was surnamed stone, (which is the signification of the syriacke word cephas, and of the greek word petrus). our saviour therefore after the confession of that fundamentall article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in english) thus, thou art "stone," and upon this stone i will build my church: which is as much as to say, this article, that "i am the christ," is the foundation of all the faith i require in those that are to bee members of my church: neither is this allusion to a name, an unusuall thing in common speech: but it had been a strange, and obscure speech, if our saviour intending to build his church on the person of st. peter, had said, "thou art a stone, and upon this stone i will build my church," when it was so obvious without ambiguity to have said, "i will build my church on thee; and yet there had been still the same allusion to his name. and for the following words, "i will give thee the keyes of heaven, &c." it is no more than what our saviour gave also to all the rest of his disciples (matth. 18.18.) "whatsoever yee shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven. and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." but howsoever this be interpreted, there is no doubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors; such as are all christian civill soveraignes in their own dominions. in so much, as if st. peter, or our saviour himself had converted any of them to beleeve him, and to acknowledge his kingdome; yet because his kingdome is not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him; or else hee must have deprived him of the soveraignty, to which the right of teaching is inseparably annexed. and thus much in refutation of his first book, wherein hee would prove st. peter to have been the monarch universall of the church, that is to say, of all the christians in the world. the second book the second book hath two conclusions: one, that s. peter was bishop of rome, and there dyed: the other, that the popes of rome are his successors. both which have been disputed by others. but supposing them to be true; yet if by bishop of rome bee understood either the monarch of the church, or the supreme pastor of it; not silvester, but constantine (who was the first christian emperour) was that bishop; and as constantine, so all other christian emperors were of right supreme bishops of the roman empire; i say of the roman empire, not of all christendome: for other christian soveraigns had the same right in their severall territories, as to an office essentially adhaerent to their soveraignty. which shall serve for answer to his second book. the third book in the third book, he handleth the question whether the pope be antichrist. for my part, i see no argument that proves he is so, in that sense that scripture useth the name: nor will i take any argument from the quality of antichrist, to contradict the authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised in the dominions of any other prince, or state. it is evident that the prophets of the old testament foretold, and the jews expected a messiah, that is, a christ, that should re-establish amongst them the kingdom of god, which had been rejected by them in the time of samuel, when they required a king after the manner of other nations. this expectation of theirs, made them obnoxious to the imposture of all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the kingdome, and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by hypocriticall life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. our saviour therefore, and his apostles forewarned men of false prophets, and of false christs. false christs, are such as pretend to be the christ, but are not, and are called properly antichrists, in such sense, as when there happeneth a schisme in the church by the election of two popes, the one calleth the other antipapa, or the false pope. and therefore antichrist in the proper signification hath two essentiall marks; one, that he denyeth jesus to be christ; and another that he professeth himselfe to bee christ. the first mark is set down by s. john in his 1 epist. 4. ch. 3. ver. "every spirit that confesseth not that jesus christ is come in the flesh, is not of god; and this is the spirit of antichrist." the other mark is expressed in the words of our saviour, (mat. 24.5.) "many shall come in my name, saying, i am christ;" and again, "if any man shall say unto you, loe, here is christ, there is christ beleeve it not." and therefore antichrist must be a false christ, that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be christ. and out of these two marks, "to deny jesus to be the christ," and to "affirm himselfe to be the christ," it followeth, that he must also be an "adversary of the true christ," which is another usuall signification of the word antichrist. but of these many antichrists, there is one speciall one, o antichristos, the antichrist, or antichrist definitely, as one certaine person; not indefinitely an antichrist. now seeing the pope of rome, neither pretendeth himself, nor denyeth jesus to be the christ, i perceive not how he can be called antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that falsely pretendeth to be his lieutenant, or vicar generall, but to be hee. there is also some mark of the time of this speciall antichrist, as (mat. 24.15.) when that abominable destroyer, spoken of by daniel, (dan. 9. 27.) shall stand in the holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were to last long, (ver. 22.) "no flesh could be saved; but for the elects sake those days shall be shortened" (made fewer). but that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately (ver. 29.) by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a concussion of the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our saviour, in the cloudes. and therefore the antichrist is not yet come; whereas, many popes are both come and gone. it is true, the pope in taking upon him to give laws to all christian kings, and nations, usurpeth a kingdome in this world, which christ took not on him: but he doth it not as christ, but as for christ, wherein there is nothing of the antichrist. the fourth book in the fourth book, to prove the pope to be the supreme judg in all questions of faith and manners, (which is as much as to be the absolute monarch of all christians in the world,) be bringeth three propositions: the first, that his judgments are infallible: the second, that he can make very laws, and punish those that observe them not: the third, that our saviour conferred all jurisdiction ecclesiasticall on the pope of rome. texts for the infallibility of the popes judgement in points of faith for the infallibility of his judgments, he alledgeth the scriptures: and first, that of luke 22.31. "simon, simon, satan hath desired you that hee may sift you as wheat; but i have prayed for thee, that thy faith faile not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." this, according to bellarmines exposition, is, that christ gave here to simon peter two priviledges: one, that neither his faith should fail, neither he, nor any of his successors should ever define any point concerning faith, or manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former pope: which is a strange, and very much strained interpretation. but he that with attention readeth that chapter, shall find there is no place in the whole scripture, that maketh more against the popes authority, than this very place. the priests and scribes seeking to kill our saviour at the passeover, and judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing the passeover being come, our saviour celebrated the same with his apostles, which he said, till the kingdome of god was come hee would doe no more; and withall told them, that one of them was to betray him: hereupon they questioned, which of them it should be; and withall (seeing the next passeover their master would celebrate should be when he was king) entred into a contention, who should then be the greater man. our saviour therefore told them, that the kings of the nations had dominion over their subjects, and are called by a name (in hebrew) that signifies bountifull; but i cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to serve one another; i ordain you a kingdome, but it is such as my father hath ordained mee; a kingdome that i am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possesse till my second coming; then yee shall eat and drink at my table, and sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of israel: and then addressing himself to st. peter, he saith, simon, simon, satan seeks by suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but i have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail; thou therefore (note this,) being converted, and understanding my kingdome as of another world, confirm the same faith in thy brethren: to which s. peter answered (as one that no more expected any authority in this world) "lord i am ready to goe with thee, not onely to prison, but to death." whereby it is manifest, s. peter had not onely no jurisdiction given him in this world, but a charge to teach all the other apostles, that they also should have none. and for the infallibility of st. peters sentence definitive in matter of faith, there is no more to be attributed to it out of this text, than that peter should continue in the beleef of this point, namely, that christ should come again, and possesse the kingdome at the day of judgement; which was not given by the text to all his successors; for wee see they claim it in the world that now is. the second place is that of matth. 16. "thou art peter, and upon this rocke i will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." by which (as i have already shewn in this chapter) is proved no more, than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession of peter, which gave occasion to that speech; namely this, that jesus is christ the sonne of god. the third text is john 21. ver. 16,17. "feed my sheep;" which contains no more but a commission of teaching: and if we grant the rest of the apostles to be contained in that name of sheep; then it is the supreme power of teaching: but it was onely for the time that there were no christian soveraigns already possessed of that supremacy. but i have already proved, that christian soveraignes are in their owne dominions the supreme pastors, and instituted thereto, by vertue of their being baptized, though without other imposition of hands. for such imposition being a ceremony of designing the person, is needlesse, when hee is already designed to the power of teaching what doctrine he will, by his institution to an absolute power over his subjects. for as i have proved before, soveraigns are supreme teachers (in generall) by their office and therefore oblige themselves (by their baptisme) to teach the doctrine of christ: and when they suffer others to teach their people, they doe it at the perill of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the heads of families that god will require the account of the instruction of his children and servants. it is of abraham himself, not of a hireling, that god saith (gen. 18.19) "i know him that he will command his children, and his houshold after him, that they keep the way of the lord, and do justice and judgement. the fourth place is that of exod. 28.30. "thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgment, the urim and the thummin:" which hee saith is interpreted by the septuagint, delosin kai aletheian, that is, evidence and truth: and thence concludeth, god had given evidence, and truth, (which is almost infallibility,) to the high priest. but be it evidence and truth it selfe that was given; or be it but admonition to the priest to endeavour to inform himself cleerly, and give judgment uprightly; yet in that it was given to the high priest, it was given to the civill soveraign: for next under god was the high priest in the common-wealth of israel; and is an argument for evidence and truth, that is, for the ecclesiasticall supremacy of civill soveraigns over their own subjects, against the pretended power of the pope. these are all the texts hee bringeth for the infallibility of the judgement of the pope, in point of faith. texts for the same in point of manners for the infallibility of his judgment concerning manners, hee bringeth one text, which is that of john 16.13. "when the spirit of truth is come, hee will lead you into all truth" where (saith he) by all truth, is meant, at least, all truth necessary to salvation. but with this mitigation, he attributeth no more infallibility to the pope, than to any man that professeth christianity, and is not to be damned: for if any man erre in any point, wherein not to erre is necessary to salvation, it is impossible he should be saved; for that onely is necessary to salvation, without which to be saved is impossible. what points these are, i shall declare out of the scripture in the chapter following. in this place i say no more, but that though it were granted, the pope could not possibly teach any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him to any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince, unlesse we shall also say, a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly promised his work to another. besides the text, he argueth from reason, thus, if the pope could erre in necessaries, then christ hath not sufficiently provided for the churches salvation; because he hath commanded her to follow the popes directions. but this reason is invalid, unlesse he shew when, and where christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a pope: nay granting whatsoever was given to s. peter was given to the pope; yet seeing there is in the scripture no command to any man to obey st. peter, no man can bee just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are contrary to those of his lawfull soveraign. lastly, it hath not been declared by the church, nor by the pope himselfe, that he is the civill soveraign of all the christians in the world; and therefore all christians are not bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in point of manners. for the civill soveraignty, and supreme judicature in controversies of manners, are the same thing: and the makers of civill laws, are not onely declarers, but also makers of the justice, and injustice of actions; there being nothing in mens manners that makes them righteous, or unrighteous, but their conformity with the law of the soveraign. and therefore when the pope challengeth supremacy in controversies of manners, hee teacheth men to disobey the civill soveraign; which is an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of our saviour and his apostles, delivered to us in the scripture. to prove the pope has power to make laws, he alledgeth many places; as first, deut. 17.12. "the man that will doe presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest, (that standeth to minister there before the lord thy god, or unto the judge,) even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evill from israel." for answer whereunto, we are to remember that the high priest (next and immediately under god) was the civill soveraign; and all judges were to be constituted by him. the words alledged sound therefore thus. "the man that will presume to disobey the civill soveraign for the time being, or any of his officers in the execution of their places, that man shall die, &c." which is cleerly for the civill soveraignty, against the universall power of the pope. secondly, he alledgeth that of matth. 16. "whatsoever yee shall bind, &c." and interpreteth it for such binding as is attributed (matth. 23.4.) to the scribes and pharisees, "they bind heavy burthens, and grievous to be born, and lay them on mens shoulders;" by which is meant (he sayes) making of laws; and concludes thence, the pope can make laws. but this also maketh onely for the legislative power of civill soveraigns: for the scribes, and pharisees sat in moses chaire, but moses next under god was soveraign of the people of israel: and therefore our saviour commanded them to doe all that they should say, but not all that they should do. that is, to obey their laws, but not follow their example. the third place, is john 21.16. "feed my sheep;" which is not a power to make laws, but a command to teach. making laws belongs to the lord of the family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his chaplain, as also a schoolmaster to teach his children. the fourth place john 20.21. is against him. the words are, "as my father sent me, so send i you." but our saviour was sent to redeem (by his death) such as should beleeve; and by his own, and his apostles preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdome; which he himself saith, is not of this world, and hath taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter, though hee refused (acts 1.6,7.) to tell his apostles when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve apostles shall sit on twelve thrones (every one perhaps as high as that of st. peter) to judge the twelve tribes of israel. seeing then god the father sent not our saviour to make laws in this present world, wee may conclude from the text, that neither did our saviour send s. peter to make laws here, but to perswade men to expect his second comming with a stedfast faith; and in the mean time, if subjects, to obey their princes; and if princes, both to beleeve it themselves, and to do their best to make their subjects doe the same; which is the office of a bishop. therefore this place maketh most strongly for the joining of the ecclesiasticall supremacy to the civill soveraignty, contrary to that which cardinall bellarmine alledgeth it for. the fift place is acts 15.28. "it hath seemed good to the holy spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden, than these necessary things, that yee abstaine from meats offered to idols, and from bloud, and from things strangled, and from fornication." here hee notes the word laying of burdens for the legislative power. but who is there, that reading this text, can say, this stile of the apostles may not as properly be used in giving counsell, as in making laws? the stile of a law is, we command: but, we think good, is the ordinary stile of them, that but give advice; and they lay a burthen that give advice, though it bee conditionall, that is, if they to whom they give it, will attain their ends: and such is the burthen, of abstaining from things strangled, and from bloud; not absolute, but in case they will not erre. i have shewn before (chap. 25.) that law, is distinguished from counsell, in this, that the reason of a law, is taken from the designe, and benefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a counsell, from the designe, and benefit of him, to whom the counsell is given. but here, the apostles aime onely at the benefit of the converted gentiles, namely their salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed, or not. and therefore the acts of this councell, were not laws, but counsells. the sixt place is that of rom. 13. "let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of god;" which is meant, he saith not onely of secular, but also of ecclesiasticall princes. to which i answer, first, that there are no ecclesiasticall princes but those that are also civill soveraignes; and their principalities exceed not the compasse of their civill soveraignty; without those bounds though they may be received for doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for princes. for if the apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own princes, and also to the pope, he had taught us a doctrine, which christ himself hath told us is impossible, namely, "to serve two masters." and though the apostle say in another place, "i write these things being absent, lest being present i should use sharpnesse, according to the power which the lord hath given me;" it is not, that he challenged a power either to put to death, imprison, banish, whip, or fine any of them, which are punishments; but onely to excommunicate, which (without the civill power) is no more but a leaving of their company, and having no more to doe with them, than with a heathen man, or a publican; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the excommunicant, than to the excommunicate. the seventh place is 1 cor. 4.21. "shall i come unto you with a rod, or in love, and the spirit of lenity?" but here again, it is not the power of a magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a rod; but onely the power of excommunication, which is not in its owne nature a punishment, but onely a denouncing of punishment, that christ shall inflict, when he shall be in possession of his kingdome, at the day of judgment. nor then also shall it bee properly a punishment, as upon a subject that hath broken the law; but a revenge, as upon an enemy, or revolter, that denyeth the right of our saviour to the kingdome: and therefore this proveth not the legislative power of any bishop, that has not also the civill power. the eighth place is, timothy 3.2. "a bishop must be the husband but of one wife, vigilant, sober, &c." which he saith was a law. i thought that none could make a law in the church, but the monarch of the church, st. peter. but suppose this precept made by the authority of st. peter; yet i see no reason why to call it a law, rather than an advice, seeing timothy was not a subject, but a disciple of st. paul; nor the flock under the charge of timothy, his subjects in the kingdome, but his scholars in the schoole of christ: if all the precepts he giveth timothy, be laws, why is not this also a law, "drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy healths sake"? and why are not also the precepts of good physitians, so many laws? but that it is not the imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute subjection to a person, that maketh his precept laws. in like manner, the ninth place, 1 tim. 5. 19. "against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses," is a wise precept, but not a law. the tenth place is, luke 10.16. "he that heareth you, heareth mee; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me." and there is no doubt, but he that despiseth the counsell of those that are sent by christ, despiseth the counsell of christ himself. but who are those now that are sent by christ, but such as are ordained pastors by lawfull authority? and who are lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the soveraign pastor? and who is ordained by the soveraign pastor in a christian common-wealth, that is not ordained by the authority of the soveraign thereof? out of this place therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his soveraign being a christian, heareth christ; and hee that despiseth the doctrine which his king being a christian, authorizeth, despiseth the doctrine of christ (which is not that which bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the contrary). but all this is nothing to a law. nay more, a christian king, as a pastor, and teacher of his subjects, makes not thereby his doctrines laws. he cannot oblige men to beleeve; though as a civill soveraign he may make laws suitable to his doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are commanded, they are laws; and the externall actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the soveraign, and not of the subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his owne at all; because god hath commanded to obey them. the eleventh, is every place, where the apostle for counsell, putteth some word, by which men use to signifie command; or calleth the following of his counsell, by the name of obedience. and therefore they are alledged out of 1 cor. 11.2. "i commend you for keeping my precepts as i delivered them to you." the greek is, "i commend you for keeping those things i delivered to you, as i delivered them." which is far from signifying that they were laws, or any thing else, but good counsell. and that of 1 thess. 4.2. "you know what commandements we gave you:" where the greek word is paraggelias edokamen, equivalent to paredokamen, what wee delivered to you, as in the place next before alledged, which does not prove the traditions of the apostles, to be any more than counsells; though as is said in the 8th verse, "he that despiseth them, despiseth not man, but god": for our saviour himself came not to judge, that is, to be king in this world; but to sacrifice himself for sinners, and leave doctors in his church, to lead, not to drive men to christ, who never accepteth forced actions, (which is all the law produceth,) but the inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work of laws, but of counsell, and doctrine. and that of 2 thess. 3.14. "if any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may bee ashamed": where from the word obey, he would inferre, that this epistle was a law to the thessalonians. the epistles of the emperours were indeed laws. if therefore the epistle of s. paul were also a law, they were to obey two masters. but the word obey, as it is in the greek upakouei, signifieth hearkening to, or putting in practice, not onely that which is commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that which is delivered in a way of counsell for our good; and therefore st. paul does not bid kill him that disobeys, nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him, which legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that he may bee ashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the empire of an apostle, but his reputation amongst the faithfull, which the christians stood in awe of. the last place is that of heb. 13.17. "obey your leaders, and submit your selves to them, for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account:" and here also is intended by obedience, a following of their counsell: for the reason of our obedience, is not drawn from the will and command of our pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the salvation of our souls they watch for, and not for the exaltation of their own power, and authority. if it were meant here, that all they teach were laws, then not onely the pope, but every pastor in his parish should have legislative power. again, they that are bound to obey, their pastors, have no power to examine their commands. what then shall wee say to st. john who bids us (1 epist. chap. 4. ver. 1.) "not to beleeve every spirit, but to try the spirits whether they are of god, because many false prophets are gone out into the world"? it is therefore manifest, that wee may dispute the doctrine of our pastors; but no man can dispute a law. the commands of civill soveraigns are on all sides granted to be laws: if any else can make a law besides himselfe, all common-wealth, and consequently all peace, and justice must cease; which is contrary to all laws, both divine and humane. nothing therefore can be drawn from these, or any other places of scripture, to prove the decrees of the pope, where he has not also the civill soveraignty, to be laws. the question of superiority between the pope and other bishops the last point hee would prove, is this, "that our saviour christ has committed ecclesiasticall jurisdiction immediately to none but the pope." wherein he handleth not the question of supremacy between the pope and christian kings, but between the pope and other bishops. and first, he sayes it is agreed, that the jurisdiction of bishops, is at least in the generall de jure divino, that is, in the right of god; for which he alledges s. paul, ephes. 4.11. where hee sayes, that christ after his ascension into heaven, "gave gifts to men, some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers:" and thence inferres, they have indeed their jurisdiction in gods right; but will not grant they have it immediately from god, but derived through the pope. but if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction de jure divino, and yet not immediately; what lawfull jurisdiction, though but civill, is there in a christian common-wealth, that is not also de jure divino? for christian kings have their civill power from god immediately; and the magistrates under him exercise their severall charges in vertue of his commission; wherein that which they doe, is no lesse de jure divino mediato, than that which the bishops doe, in vertue of the popes ordination. all lawfull power is of god, immediately in the supreme governour, and mediately in those that have authority under him: so that either hee must grant every constable in the state, to hold his office in the right of god; or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so, besides the pope himselfe. but this whole dispute, whether christ left the jurisdiction to the pope onely, or to other bishops also, if considered out of these places where the pope has the civill soveraignty, is a contention de lana caprina: for none of them (where they are not soveraigns) has any jurisdiction at all. for jurisdiction is the power of hearing and determining causes between man and man; and can belong to none, but him that hath the power to prescribe the rules of right and wrong; that is, to make laws; and with the sword of justice to compell men to obey his decisions, pronounced either by himself, or by the judges he ordaineth thereunto; which none can lawfully do, but the civill soveraign. therefore when he alledgeth out of the 6 of luke, that our saviour called his disciples together, and chose twelve of them which he named apostles, he proveth that he elected them (all, except matthias, paul and barnabas,) and gave them power and command to preach, but not to judge of causes between man and man: for that is a power which he refused to take upon himselfe, saying, "who made me a judge, or a divider, amongst you?" and in another place, "my kingdome is not of this world." but hee that hath not the power to hear, and determine causes between man and man, cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all. and yet this hinders not, but that our saviour gave them power to preach and baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own lawfull soveraign forbidden: for to our own soveraigns christ himself, and his apostles have in sundry places expressely commanded us in all things to be obedient. the arguments by which he would prove, that bishops receive their jurisdiction from the pope (seeing the pope in the dominions of other princes hath no jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. yet because they prove, on the contrary, that all bishops receive jurisdiction when they have it from their civill soveraigns, i will not omit the recitall of them. the first, is from numbers 11. where moses not being able alone to undergoe the whole burthen of administring the affairs of the people of israel, god commanded him to choose seventy elders, and took part of the spirit of moses, to put it upon those seventy elders: by which it is understood, not that god weakened the spirit of moses, for that had not eased him at all; but that they had all of them their authority from him; wherein he doth truly, and ingenuously interpret that place. but seeing moses had the entire soveraignty in the common-wealth of the jews, it is manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they had their authority from the civill soveraign: and therefore that place proveth, that bishops in every christian common-wealth have their authority from the civill soveraign; and from the pope in his own territories only, and not in the territories of any other state. the second argument, is from the nature of monarchy; wherein all authority is in one man, and in others by derivation from him: but the government of the church, he says, is monarchicall. this also makes for christian monarchs. for they are really monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own church (for the church is the same thing with a christian people;) whereas the power of the pope, though hee were s. peter, is neither monarchy, nor hath any thing of archicall, nor craticall, but onely of didacticall; for god accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience. the third, is, from that the sea of s. peter is called by s. cyprian, the head, the source, the roote, the sun, from whence the authority of bishops is derived. but by the law of nature (which is a better principle of right and wrong, than the word of any doctor that is but a man) the civill soveraign in every common-wealth, is the head, the source, the root, and the sun, from which all jurisdiction is derived. and therefore, the jurisdiction of bishops, is derived from the civill soveraign. the fourth, is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions: for if god (saith he) had given it them immediately, he had given aswell equality of jurisdiction, as of order: but wee see, some are bishops but of own town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces; which differences were not determined by the command of god; their jurisdiction therefore is not of god, but of man; and one has a greater, another a lesse, as it pleaseth the prince of the church. which argument, if he had proved before, that the pope had had an universall jurisdiction over all christians, had been for his purpose. but seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is notoriously known, the large jurisdiction of the pope was given him by those that had it, that is, by the emperours of rome, (for the patriarch of constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being bishop of the capitall city of the empire, and seat of the emperour, claimed to be equal to him,) it followeth, that all other bishops have their jurisdiction from the soveraigns of the place wherein they exercise the same: and as for that cause they have not their authority de jure divino; so neither hath the pope his de jure divino, except onely where hee is also the civill soveraign. his fift argument is this, "if bishops have their jurisdiction immediately from god, the pope could not take it from them, for he can doe nothing contrary to gods ordination;" and this consequence is good, and well proved. "but, (saith he) the pope can do this, and has done it." this also is granted, so he doe it in his own dominions, or in the dominions of any other prince that hath given him that power; but not universally, in right of the popedome: for that power belongeth to every christian soveraign, within the bounds of his owne empire, and is inseparable from the soveraignty. before the people of israel had (by the commandment of god to samuel) set over themselves a king, after the manner of other nations, the high priest had the civill government; and none but he could make, nor depose an inferiour priest: but that power was afterwards in the king, as may be proved by this same argument of bellarmine; for if the priest (be he the high priest or any other) had his jurisdiction immediately from god, then the king could not take it from him; "for he could do nothing contrary to gods ordinance: but it is certain, that king solomon (1 kings 2.26.) deprived abiathar the high priest of his office, and placed zadok (verse 35.) in his room. kings therefore may in the like manner ordaine, and deprive bishops, as they shall thinke fit, for the well governing of their subjects. his sixth argument is this, if bishops have their jurisdiction de jure divino (that is, immediately from god,) they that maintaine it, should bring some word of god to prove it: but they can bring none. the argument is good; i have therefore nothing to say against it. but it is an argument no lesse good, to prove the pope himself to have no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince. lastly, hee bringeth for argument, the testimony of two popes, innocent, and leo; and i doubt not but hee might have alledged, with as good reason, the testimonies of all the popes almost since s. peter: for considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made pope, he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. neverthelesse, they should therein but doe, as innocent, and leo did, bear witnesse of themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good. of the popes temporall power in the fift book he hath four conclusions. the first is, "that the pope in not lord of all the world:" the second, "that the pope is not lord of all the christian world:" the third, "that the pope (without his owne territory) has not any temporall jurisdiction directly:" these three conclusions are easily granted. the fourth is, "that the pope has (in the dominions of other princes) the supreme temporall power indirectly:" which is denyed; unlesse he mean by indirectly, that he has gotten it by indirect means; then is that also granted. but i understand, that when he saith he hath it indirectly, he means, that such temporall jurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is but a consequence of his pastorall authority, the which he could not exercise, unlesse he have the other with it: and therefore to the pastorall power (which he calls spirituall) the supreme power civill is necessarily annexed; and that thereby hee hath a right to change kingdomes, giving them to one, and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces to the salvation of souls. before i come to consider the arguments by which hee would prove this doctrine, it will not bee amisse to lay open the consequences of it; that princes, and states, that have the civill soveraignty in their severall common-wealths, may bethink themselves, whether it bee convenient for them, and conducing to the good of their subjects, of whom they are to give an account at the day of judgment, to admit the same. when it is said, the pope hath not (in the territories of other states) the supreme civill power directly; we are to understand, he doth not challenge it, as other civill soveraigns doe, from the originall submission thereto of those that are to be governed. for it is evident, and has already been sufficiently in this treatise demonstrated, that the right of all soveraigns, is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to bee governed; whether they that choose him, doe it for their common defence against an enemy, as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a man, or an assembly of men to protect them; or whether they doe it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy. the pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the supreme civill power over other states directly, denyeth no more, but that his right cometh to him by that way; he ceaseth not for all that, to claime it another way; and that is, (without the consent of them that are to be governed) by a right given him by god, (which hee calleth indirectly,) in his assumption to the papacy. but by what way soever he pretend, the power is the same; and he may (if it bee granted to be his right) depose princes and states, as often as it is for the salvation of soules, that is, as often as he will; for he claimeth also the sole power to judge, whether it be to the salvation of mens souls, or not. and this is the doctrine, not onely that bellarmine here, and many other doctors teach in their sermons and books, but also that some councells have decreed, and the popes have decreed, and the popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put in practise. for the fourth councell of lateran held under pope innocent the third, (in the third chap. de haereticis,) hath this canon. "if a king at the popes admonition, doe not purge his kingdome of haeretiques, and being excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of their obedience." and the practise hereof hath been seen on divers occasions; as in the deposing of chilperique, king of france; in the translation of the roman empire to charlemaine; in the oppression of john king of england; in transferring the kingdome of navarre; and of late years, in the league against henry the third of france, and in many more occurrences. i think there be few princes that consider not this as injust, and inconvenient; but i wish they would all resolve to be kings, or subjects. men cannot serve two masters: they ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their obedience. for this distinction of temporall, and spirituall power is but words. power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another indirect power, as with a direct one. but to come now to his arguments. the first is this, "the civill power is subject to the spirituall: therefore he that hath the supreme power spirituall, hath right to command temporall princes, and dispose of their temporalls in order to the spirituall. as for the distinction of temporall, and spirituall, let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly, that the temporall, or civill power is subject to the spirituall. there be but two ways that those words can be made sense. for when wee say, one power is subject to another power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is subject to him that hath the other; or that the one power is to the other, as the means to the end. for wee cannot understand, that one power hath power over another power; and that one power can have right or command over another: for subjection, command, right, and power are accidents, not of powers, but of persons: one power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a sadler, to the art of a rider. if then it be granted, that the civill government be ordained as a means to bring us to a spirituall felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a king have the civill power, and the pope the spirituall, that therefore the king is bound to obey the pope, more then every sadler is bound to obey every rider. therefore as from subordination of an art, cannot be inferred the subjection of the professor; so from the subordination of a government, cannot be inferred the subjection of the governor. when therefore he saith, the civill power is subject to the spirituall, his meaning is, that the civill soveraign, is subject to the spirituall soveraign. and the argument stands thus, "the civil soveraign, is subject to the spirituall; therefore the spirituall prince may command temporall princes." where the conclusion is the same, with the antecedent he should have proved. but to prove it, he alledgeth first, this reason, "kings and popes, clergy and laity make but one common-wealth; that is to say, but one church: and in all bodies the members depend one upon another: but things spirituall depend not of things temporall: therefore, temporall depend on spirituall. and therefore are subject to them." in which argumentation there be two grosse errours: one is, that all christian kings, popes, clergy, and all other christian men, make but one common-wealth: for it is evident that france is one common-wealth, spain another, and venice a third, &c. and these consist of christians; and therefore also are severall bodies of christians; that is to say, severall churches: and their severall soveraigns represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural man; which no generall or universall church is, till it have a representant; which it hath not on earth: for if it had, there is no doubt but that all christendome were one common-wealth, whose soveraign were that representant, both in things spirituall and temporall: and the pope, to make himself this representant, wanteth three things that our saviour hath not given him, to command, and to judge, and to punish, otherwise than (by excommunication) to run from those that will not learn of him: for though the pope were christs onely vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government, till our saviours second coming: and then also it is not the pope, but st. peter himselfe, with the other apostles, that are to be judges of the world. the other errour in this his first argument is, that he sayes, the members of every common-wealth, as of a naturall body, depend one of another: it is true, they cohaere together; but they depend onely on the soveraign, which is the soul of the common-wealth; which failing, the common-wealth is dissolved into a civill war, no one man so much as cohaering to another, for want of a common dependance on a known soveraign; just as the members of the naturall body dissolve into earth, for want of a soul to hold them together. therefore there is nothing in this similitude, from whence to inferre a dependance of the laity on the clergy, or of the temporall officers on the spirituall; but of both on the civill soveraign; which ought indeed to direct his civill commands to the salvation of souls; but is not therefore subject to any but god himselfe. and thus you see the laboured fallacy of the first argument, to deceive such men as distinguish not between the subordination of actions in the way to the end; and the subjection of persons one to another in the administration of the means. for to every end, the means are determined by nature, or by god himselfe supernaturally: but the power to make men use the means, is in every nation resigned (by the law of nature, which forbiddeth men to violate their faith given) to the civill soveraign. his second argument is this, "every common-wealth, (because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in it self,) may command any other common-wealth, not subject to it, and force it to change the administration of the government, nay depose the prince, and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend it selfe against the injuries he goes about to doe them: much more may a spirituall common-wealth command a temporall one to change the administration of their government, and may depose princes, and institute others, when they cannot otherwise defend the spirituall good." that a common-wealth, to defend it selfe against injuries, may lawfully doe all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. and if it were also true, that there is now in this world a spirituall common-wealth, distinct from a civill common-wealth, then might the prince thereof, upon injury done him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to come, repaire, and secure himself by warre; which is in summe, deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of hostility. but by the same reason, it would be no lesse lawfull for a civill soveraign, upon the like injuries done, or feared, to make warre upon the spirituall soveraign; which i beleeve is more than cardinall bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition. but spirituall common-wealth there is none in this world: for it is the same thing with the kingdome of christ; which he himselfe saith, is not of this world; but shall be in the next world, at the resurrection, when they that have lived justly, and beleeved that he was the christ, shall (though they died naturall bodies) rise spirituall bodies; and then it is, that our saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries, and make a spirituall common-wealth. in the mean time, seeing there are no men on earth, whose bodies are spirituall; there can be no spirituall common-wealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unlesse wee call preachers, that have commission to teach, and prepare men for their reception into the kingdome of christ at the resurrection, a common-wealth; which i have proved to bee none. the third argument is this; "it is not lawfull for christians to tolerate an infidel, or haereticall king, in case he endeavour to draw them to his haeresie, or infidelity. but to judge whether a king draw his subjects to haeresie, or not, belongeth to the pope. therefore hath the pope right, to determine whether the prince be to be deposed, or not deposed." to this i answer, that both these assertions are false. for christians, (or men of what religion soever,) if they tolerate not their king, whatsoever law hee maketh, though it bee concerning religion, doe violate their faith, contrary to the divine law, both naturall and positive: nor is there any judge of haeresie amongst subjects, but their own civill soveraign; for "haeresie is nothing else, but a private opinion, obstinately maintained, contrary to the opinion which the publique person (that is to say, the representant of the common-wealth) hath commanded to bee taught." by which it is manifest, that an opinion publiquely appointed to bee taught, cannot be haeresie; nor the soveraign princes that authorize them, haeretiques. for haeretiques are none but private men, that stubbornly defend some doctrine, prohibited by their lawful soveraigns. but to prove that christians are not to tolerate infidell, or haereticall kings, he alledgeth a place in deut. 17. where god forbiddeth the jews, when they shall set a king over themselves, to choose a stranger; and from thence inferreth, that it is unlawfull for a christian, to choose a king, that is not a christian. and 'tis true, that he that is a christian, that is, hee that hath already obliged himself to receive our saviour when he shall come, for his king, shal tempt god too much in choosing for king in this world, one that hee knoweth will endeavour, both by terrour, and perswasion to make him violate his faith. but, it is (saith hee) the same danger, to choose one that is not a christian, for king, and not to depose him, when hee is chosen. to this i say, the question is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the justice of deposing him. to choose him, may in some cases bee unjust; but to depose him, when he is chosen, is in no case just. for it is alwaies violation of faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal law of god. nor doe wee read, that any such doctrine was accounted christian in the time of the apostles; nor in the time of the romane emperours, till the popes had the civill soveraignty of rome. but to this he hath replyed, that the christians of old, deposed not nero, nor diocletian, nor julian, nor valens an arrian, for this cause onely, that they wanted temporall forces. perhaps so. but did our saviour, who for calling for, might have had twelve legions of immortall, invulnerable angels to assist him, want forces to depose caesar, or at least pilate, that unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the jews to bee crucified? or if the apostles wanted temporall forces to depose nero, was it therefore necessary for them in their epistles to the new made christians, to teach them, (as they did) to obey the powers constituted over them, (whereof nero in that time was one,) and that they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience sake? shall we say they did not onely obey, but also teach what they meant not, for want of strength? it is not therefore for want of strength, but for conscience sake, that christians are to tolerate their heathen princes, or princes (for i cannot call any one whose doctrine is the publique doctrine, an haeretique) that authorize the teaching of an errour. and whereas for the temporall power of the pope, he alledgeth further, that st. paul (1 cor. 6.) appointed judges under the heathen princes of those times, such as were not ordained by those princes; it is not true. for st. paul does but advise them, to take some of their brethren to compound their differences, as arbitrators, rather than to goe to law one with another before the heathen judges; which is a wholsome precept, and full of charity, fit to bee practised also in the best christian common-wealths. and for the danger that may arise to religion, by the subjects tolerating of an heathen, or an erring prince, it is a point, of which a subject is no competent judge; or if hee bee, the popes temporall subjects may judge also of the popes doctrine. for every christian prince, as i have formerly proved, is no lesse supreme pastor of his own subjects, than the pope of his. the fourth argument, is taken from the baptisme of kings; wherein, that they may be made christians they submit their scepters to christ; and promise to keep, and defend the christian faith. this is true; for christian kings are no more but christs subjects: but they may, for all that, bee the popes fellowes; for they are supreme pastors of their own subjects; and the pope is no more but king, and pastor, even in rome it selfe. the fifth argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our saviour, feed my sheep; by which was give all power necessary for a pastor; as the power to chase away wolves, such as are haeretiques; the power to shut up rammes, if they be mad, or push at the other sheep with their hornes, such as are evill (though christian) kings; and power to give the flock convenient food: from whence hee inferreth, that st. peter had these three powers given him by christ. to which i answer, that the last of these powers, is no more than the power, or rather command to teach. for the first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, haeretiques, the place hee quoteth is (matth. 7.15.) "beware of false prophets which come to you in sheeps clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves." but neither are haeretiques false prophets, or at all prophets: nor (admitting haeretiques for the wolves there meant,) were the apostles commanded to kill them, or if they were kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and avoid them: nor was it to st. peter, nor to any of the apostles, but to the multitude of the jews that followed him into the mountain, men for the most part not yet converted, that hee gave this counsell, to beware of false prophets: which therefore if it conferre a power of chasing away kings, was given, not onely to private men; but to men that were not at all christians. and as to the power of separating, and shutting up of furious rammes, (by which hee meaneth christian kings that refuse to submit themselves to the roman pastor,) our saviour refused to take upon him that power in this world himself, but advised to let the corn and tares grow up together till the day of judgment: much lesse did hee give it to st. peter, or can s. peter give it to the popes. st. peter, and all other pastors, are bidden to esteem those christians that disobey the church, that is, (that disobey the christian soveraigne) as heathen men, and as publicans. seeing then men challenge to the pope no authority over heathen princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are to bee esteemed as heathen. but from the power to teach onely, hee inferreth also a coercive power in the pope, over kings. the pastor (saith he) must give his flock convenient food: therefore the pope may, and ought to compell kings to doe their duty. out of which it followeth, that the pope, as pastor of christian men, is king of kings: which all christian kings ought indeed either to confesse, or else they ought to take upon themselves the supreme pastorall charge, every one in his own dominion. his sixth, and last argument, is from examples. to which i answer, first, that examples prove nothing; secondly, that the examples he alledgeth make not so much as a probability of right. the fact of jehoiada, in killing athaliah (2 kings 11.) was either by the authority of king joash, or it was a horrible crime in the high priest, which (ever after the election of king saul) was a mere subject. the fact of st. ambrose, in excommunicating theodosius the emperour, (if it were true hee did so,) was a capitall crime. and for the popes, gregory 1. greg. 2. zachary, and leo 3. their judgments are void, as given in their own cause; and the acts done by them conformably to this doctrine, are the greatest crimes (especially that of zachary) that are incident to humane nature. and thus much of power ecclesiasticall; wherein i had been more briefe, forbearing to examine these arguments of bellarmine, if they had been his, as a private man, and not as the champion of the papacy, against all other christian princes, and states. chapter xliii. of what is necessary for a mans reception into the kingdome of heaven. the difficulty of obeying god and man both at once the most frequent praetext of sedition, and civill warre, in christian common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both god, and man, then when their commandements are one contrary to the other. it is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawfull soveraign (whether a monarch, or a soveraign assembly,) or the command of his father. the difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men when they are commanded in the name of god, know not in divers cases, whether the command be from god, or whether he that commandeth, doe but abuse gods name for some private ends of his own. for as there ware in the church of the jews, many false prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned dreams, and visions; so there have been in all times in the church of christ, false teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by phantasticall and false doctrines; and by such reputation (as is the nature of ambition,) to govern them for their private benefit. is none to them that distinguish between what is, and what is not necessary to salvation but this difficulty of obeying both god, and the civill soveraign on earth, to those that can distinguish between what is necessary, and what is not necessary for their reception into the kingdome of god, is of no moment. for if the command of the civill soveraign bee such, as that it may be obeyed, without the forfeiture of life eternall; not to obey it is unjust; and the precept of the apostle takes place; "servants obey your masters in all things;" and, "children obey your parents in all things;" and the precept of our saviour, "the scribes and pharisees sit in moses chaire, all therefore they shall say, that observe, and doe." but if the command be such, as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to eternall death, then it were madnesse to obey it, and the counsell of our saviour takes place, (mat. 10. 28.) "fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soule." all men therefore that would avoid, both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted, for disobedience to their earthly soveraign, and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to god, have need be taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not necessary to eternall salvation. all that is necessary to salvation is contained in faith and obedience all that is necessary to salvation, is contained in two vertues, faith in christ, and obedience to laws. the latter of these, if it were perfect, were enough to us. but because wee are all guilty of disobedience to gods law, not onely originally in adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not onely obedience for the rest of our time, but also a remission of sins for the time past; which remission is the reward of our faith in christ. that nothing else is necessarily required to salvation, is manifest from this, that the kingdome of heaven, is shut to none but to sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the law; nor to them, in case they repent, and beleeve all the articles of christian faith, necessary to salvation. what obedience is necessary; the obedience required at our hands by god, that accepteth in all our actions the will for the deed, is a serious endeavour to obey him; and is called also by all such names as signifie that endeavour. and therefore obedience, is sometimes called by the names of charity, and love, because they imply a will to obey; and our saviour himself maketh our love to god, and to one another, a fulfilling of the whole law: and sometimes by the name of righteousnesse; for righteousnesse is but the will to give to every one his owne, that is to say, the will to obey the laws: and sometimes by the name of repentance; because to repent, implyeth a turning away from sinne, which is the same, with the return of the will to obedience. whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfill the commandements of god, or repenteth him truely of his transgressions, or that loveth god with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself, hath all the obedience necessary to his reception into the kingdome of god: for if god should require perfect innocence, there could no flesh be saved. and to what laws but what commandements are those that god hath given us? are all those laws which were given to the jews by the hand of moses, the commandements of god? if they bee, why are not christians taught to obey them? if they be not, what others are so, besides the law of nature? for our saviour christ hath not given us new laws, but counsell to observe those wee are subject to; that is to say, the laws of nature, and the laws of our severall soveraigns: nor did he make any new law to the jews in his sermon on the mount, but onely expounded the laws of moses, to which they were subject before. the laws of god therefore are none but the laws of nature, whereof the principall is, that we should not violate our faith, that is, a commandement to obey our civill soveraigns, which wee constituted over us, by mutuall pact one with another. and this law of god, that commandeth obedience to the law civill, commandeth by consequence obedience to all the precepts of the bible, which (as i have proved in the precedent chapter) is there onely law, where the civill soveraign hath made it so; and in other places but counsell; which a man at his own perill, may without injustice refuse to obey. in the faith of a christian, who is the person beleeved knowing now what is the obedience necessary to salvation, and to whom it is due; we are to consider next concerning faith, whom, and why we beleeve; and what are the articles, or points necessarily to be beleeved by them that shall be saved. and first, for the person whom we beleeve, because it is impossible to beleeve any person, before we know what he saith, it is necessary he be one that wee have heard speak. the person therefore, whom abraham, isaac, jacob, moses and the prophets beleeved, was god himself, that spake unto them supernaturally: and the person, whom the apostles and disciples that conversed with christ beleeved, was our saviour himself. but of them, to whom neither god the father, nor our saviour ever spake, it cannot be said, that the person whom they beleeved, was god. they beleeved the apostles, and after them the pastors and doctors of the church, that recommended to their faith the history of the old and new testament: so that the faith of christians ever since our saviours time, hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the old and new testament to be received for the rule of faith; which none could do but christian soveraignes; who are therefore the supreme pastors, and the onely persons, whom christians now hear speak from god; except such as god speaketh to, in these days supernaturally. but because there be many false prophets "gone out into the world," other men are to examine such spirits (as st. john advised us, 1 epistle, chap. 4. ver.1.) "whether they be of god, or not." and therefore, seeing the examination of doctrines belongeth to the supreme pastor, the person which all they that have no speciall revelation are to beleeve, is (in every common-wealth) the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civill soveraigne. the causes of christian faith the causes why men beleeve any christian doctrine, are various; for faith is the gift of god; and he worketh it in each severall man, by such wayes, as it seemeth good unto himself. the most ordinary immediate cause of our beleef, concerning any point of christian faith, is, that wee beleeve the bible to be the word of god. but why wee beleeve the bible to be the word of god, is much disputed, as all questions must needs bee, that are not well stated. for they make not the question to be, "why we beleeve it," but "how wee know it;" as if beleeving and knowing were all one. and thence while one side ground their knowledge upon the infallibility of the church, and the other side, on the testimony of the private spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. for how shall a man know the infallibility of the church, but by knowing first the infallibility of the scripture? or how shall a man know his own private spirit to be other than a beleef, grounded upon the authority, and arguments of his teachers; or upon a presumption of his own gifts? besides, there is nothing in the scripture, from which can be inferred the infallibility of the church; much lesse, of any particular church; and least of all, the infallibility of any particular man. faith comes by hearing it is manifest, therefore, that christian men doe not know, but onely beleeve the scripture to be the word of god; and that the means of making them beleeve which god is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of nature, that is to say, from their teachers. it is the doctrine of st. paul concerning christian faith in generall, (rom. 10.17.) "faith cometh by hearing," that is, by hearing our lawfull pastors. he saith also (ver. 14,15. of the same chapter) "how shall they beleeve in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except they be sent?" whereby it is evident, that the ordinary cause of beleeving that the scriptures are the word of god, is the same with the cause of the beleeving of all other articles of our faith, namely, the hearing of those that are by the law allowed and appointed to teach us, as our parents in their houses, and our pastors in the churches: which also is made more manifest by experience. for what other cause can there bee assigned, why in christian common-wealths all men either beleeve, or at least professe the scripture to bee the word of god, and in other common-wealths scarce any; but that in christian common-wealths they are taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught otherwise? but if teaching be the cause of faith, why doe not all beleeve? it is certain therefore that faith is the gift of god, and hee giveth it to whom he will. neverthelesse, because of them to whom he giveth it, he giveth it by the means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is hearing. in a school where many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the cause of learning in them that profit, is the master; yet it cannot be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of god. all good things proceed from god; yet cannot all that have them, say they are inspired; for that implies a gift supernaturall, and the immediate hand of god; which he that pretends to, pretends to be a prophet, and is subject to the examination of the church. but whether men know, or beleeve, or grant the scriptures to be the word of god; if out of such places of them, as are without obscurity, i shall shew what articles of faith are necessary, and onely necessary for salvation, those men must needs know, beleeve, or grant the same. the onely necessary article of christian faith, the (unum necessarium) onely article of faith, which the scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation, is this, that jesus is the christ. by the name of christ, is understood the king, which god had before promised by the prophets of the old testament, to send into the world, to reign (over the jews, and over such of other nations as should beleeve in him) under himself eternally; and to give them that eternall life, which was lost by the sin of adam. which when i have proved out of scripture, i will further shew when, and in what sense some other articles may bee also called necessary. proved from the scope of the evangelists for proof that the beleef of this article, jesus is the christ, is all the faith required to salvation, my first argument shall bee from the scope of the evangelists; which was by the description of the life of our saviour, to establish that one article, jesus is the christ. the summe of st. matthews gospell is this, that jesus was of the stock of david; born of a virgin; which are the marks of the true christ: that the magi came to worship him as king of the jews: that herod for the same cause sought to kill him: that john baptist proclaimed him: that he preached by himselfe, and his apostles that he was that king; that he taught the law, not as a scribe, but as a man of authority: that he cured diseases by his word onely, and did many other miracles, which were foretold the christ should doe: that he was saluted king when he entered into jerusalem: that he fore-warned them to beware of all others that should pretend to be christ: that he was taken, accused, and put to death, for saying, hee was king: that the cause of his condemnation written on the crosse, was jesus of nazareth, the king of the jewes. all which tend to no other end than this, that men should beleeve, that jesus is the christ. such therefore was the scope of st. matthews gospel. but the scope of all the evangelists (as may appear by reading them) was the same. therefore the scope of the whole gospell, was the establishing of that onely article. and st. john expressely makes it his conclusion, john 20. 31. "these things are written, that you may know that jesus is the christ, the son of the living god." from the sermons of the apostles: my second argument is taken from the subject of the sermons of the apostles, both whilest our saviour lived on earth, and after his ascension. the apostles in our saviours time were sent, luke 9.2. to preach the kingdome of god: for neither there, nor mat. 10.7. giveth he any commission to them, other than this, "as ye go, preach, saying, the kingdome of heaven is at hand;" that is, that jesus is the messiah, the christ, the king which was to come. that their preaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest out of acts 17.6. "they drew (saith st. luke) jason and certain brethren unto the rulers of the city, crying, these that have turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom jason hath received. and these all do contrary to the decrees of caesar, saying, that there is another king, one jesus:" and out of the 2.&3. verses of the same chapter, where it is said, that st. paul "as his manner was, went in unto them; and three sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the scriptures; opening and alledging, that christ must needs have suffered, and risen againe from the dead, and that this jesus (whom he preached) is christ." from the easinesse of the doctrine: the third argument is, from those places of scripture, by which all the faith required to salvation is declared to be easie. for if an inward assent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning christian faith now taught, (whereof the greatest part are disputed,) were necessary to salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard, as to be a christian. the thief upon the crosse though repenting, could not have been saved for saying, "lord remember me when thou commest into thy kingdome;" by which he testified no beleefe of any other article, but this, that jesus was the king. nor could it bee said (as it is mat. 11. 30.) that "christs yoke is easy, and his burthen light:" nor that "little children beleeve in him," as it is matth. 18.6. nor could st. paul have said (1 cor. 1. 21.) "it pleased god by the foolishnesse of preaching, to save them that beleeve:" nor could st. paul himself have been saved, much lesse have been so great a doctor of the church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of transsubstantiation, nor purgatory, nor many other articles now obtruded. from formall and cleer texts the fourth argument is taken from places expresse, and such as receive no controversie of interpretation; as first, john 5. 39. "search the scriptures, for in them yee thinke yee have eternall life; and they are they that testifie of mee." our saviour here speaketh of the scriptures onely of the old testament; for the jews at that time could not search the scriptures of the new testament, which were not written. but the old testament hath nothing of christ, but the markes by which men might know him when hee came; as that he should descend from david, be born at bethlehem, and of a virgin; doe great miracles, and the like. therefore to beleeve that this jesus was he, was sufficient to eternall life: but more than sufficient is not necessary; and consequently no other article is required. again, (john 11. 26.) "whosoever liveth and beleeveth in mee, shall not die eternally," therefore to beleeve in christ, is faith sufficient to eternall life; and consequently no more faith than that is necessary, but to beleeve in jesus, and to beleeve that jesus is the christ, is all one, as appeareth in the verses immediately following. for when our saviour (verse 26.) had said to martha, "beleevest thou this?" she answereth (verse 27.) "yea lord, i beleeve that thou art the christ, the son of god, which should come into the world;" therefore this article alone is faith sufficient to life eternall; and more than sufficient is not necessary. thirdly, john 20. 31. "these things are written that yee might beleeve, that jesus is the christ, the son of god, and that beleeving yee might have life through his name." there, to beleeve that jesus is the christ, is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life; and therefore no other article is necessary. fourthly, 1 john 4. 2. "every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come in the flesh, is of god." and 1 joh. 5. 1. "whosoever beleeveth that jesus is the christ, is born of god." and verse 5. "who is hee that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth that jesus is the son of god?" fiftly, act. 8. ver. 36, 37. "see (saith the eunuch) here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? and philip said, if thou beleevest with all thy heart thou mayst. and hee answered and said, i beleeve that jesus christ is the son of god." therefore this article beleeved, jesus is the christ, is sufficient to baptisme, that is to say, to our reception into the kingdome of god, and by consequence, onely necessary. and generally in all places where our saviour saith to any man, "thy faith hath saved thee," the cause he saith it, is some confession, which directly, or by consequence, implyeth a beleef, that jesus is the christ. from that it is the foundation of all other articles the last argument is from the places, where this article is made the foundation of faith: for he that holdeth the foundation shall bee saved. which places are first, mat. 24.23. "if any man shall say unto you, loe, here is christ, or there, beleeve it not, for there shall arise false christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signes and wonders, &c." here wee see, this article jesus is the christ, must bee held, though hee that shall teach the contrary should doe great miracles. the second place is gal. 1. 8. "though we, or an angell from heaven preach any other gospell unto you, than that wee have preached unto you, let him bee accursed." but the gospell which paul, and the other apostles, preached, was onely this article, that jesus is the christ; therefore for the beleef of this article, we are to reject the authority of an angell from heaven; much more of any mortall man, if he teach the contrary. this is therefore the fundamentall article of christian faith. a third place is, 1 joh. 4.1. "beloved, beleeve not every spirit. hereby yee shall know the spirit of god; every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come in the flesh, is of god." by which it is evident, that this article, is the measure, and rule, by which to estimate, and examine all other articles; and is therefore onely fundamentall. a fourth is, matt. 16.18. where after st. peter had professed this article, saying to our saviour, "thou art christ the son of the living god," our saviour answered, "thou art peter, and upon this rock i will build my church:" from whence i inferre, that this article is that, on which all other doctrines of the church are built, as on their foundation. a fift is (1 cor. 3. ver. 11, 12, &c.) "other foundation can no man lay, than that which is laid, jesus is the christ. now if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, pretious stones, wood, hay, stubble; every mans work shall be made manifest; for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every mans work, of what sort it is. if any mans work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward: if any mans work shall bee burnt, he shall suffer losse; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." which words, being partly plain and easie to understand, and partly allegoricall and difficult; out of that which is plain, may be inferred, that pastors that teach this foundation, that jesus is the christ, though they draw from it false consequences, (which all men are sometimes subject to,) they may neverthelesse bee saved; much more that they may bee saved, who being no pastors, but hearers, beleeve that which is by their lawfull pastors taught them. therefore the beleef of this article is sufficient; and by consequence there is no other article of faith necessarily required to salvation. now for the part which is allegoricall, as "that the fire shall try every mans work," and that "they shall be saved, but so as by fire," or "through fire," (for the originall is dia puros,) it maketh nothing against this conclusion which i have drawn from the other words, that are plain. neverthelesse, because upon this place there hath been an argument taken, to prove the fire of purgatory, i will also here offer you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this triall of doctrines, and saving of men as by fire. the apostle here seemeth to allude to the words of the prophet zachary, ch. 13. 8,9. who speaking of the restauration of the kingdome of god, saith thus, "two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; and i will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tryed; they shall call on the name of the lord, and i will hear them." the day of judgment, is the day of the restauration of the kingdome of god; and at that day it is, that st. peter tells us (2 pet. 3. v.7, 10, 12.) shall be the conflagration of the world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which god will save, shall passe through that fire, unhurt, and be therein (as silver and gold are refined by the fire from their drosse) tryed, and refined from their idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the true god. alluding whereto st. paul here saith, that the day (that is, the day of judgment, the great day of our saviours comming to restore the kingdome of god in israel) shall try every mans doctrine, by judging, which are gold, silver, pretious stones, wood, hay, stubble; and then they that have built false consequences on the true foundation, shall see their doctrines condemned; neverthelesse they themselves shall be saved, and passe unhurt through this universall fire, and live eternally, to call upon the name of the true and onely god. in which sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of holy scripture, or any glimpse of the fire of purgatory. in what sense other articles may be called necessary but a man may here aske, whether it bee not as necessary to salvation, to beleeve, that god is omnipotent; creator of the world; that jesus christ is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day; as to beleeve, that jesus is the christ. to which i answer, they are; and so are many more articles: but they are such, as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more, or lesse difficulty. for who is there that does not see, that they who beleeve jesus to be the son of the god of israel, and that the israelites had for god the omnipotent creator of all things, doe therein also beleeve, that god is the omnipotent creator of all things? or how can a man beleeve, that jesus is the king that shall reign eternally, unlesse hee beleeve him also risen again from the dead? for a dead man cannot exercise the office of a king. in summe, he that holdeth this foundation, jesus is the christ, holdeth expressely all that hee seeth rightly deduced from it, and implicitely all that is consequent thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence. and therefore it holdeth still good, that the beleef of this one article is sufficient faith to obtaine remission of sinnes to the penitent, and consequently to bring them into the kingdome of heaven. that faith, and obedience are both of them necessary to salvation now that i have shewn, that all the obedience required to salvation, consisteth in the will to obey the law of god, that is to say, in repentance; and all the faith required to the same, is comprehended in the beleef of this article, jesus is the christ; i will further alledge those places of the gospell, that prove, that all that is necessary to salvation is contained in both these joined together. the men to whom st. peter preached on the day of pentecost, next after the ascension of our saviour, asked him, and the rest of the apostles, saying, (act. 2.37.) "men and brethren what shall we doe?" to whom st. peter answered (in the next verse) "repent, and be baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the holy ghost." therefore repentance, and baptisme, that is, beleeving that jesus is the christ, is all that is necessary to salvation. again, our saviour being asked by a certain ruler, (luke 18.18.) "what shall i doe to inherit eternall life?" answered (verse 20) "thou knowest the commandements, doe not commit adultery, doe not kill, doe not steal, doe not bear false witnesse, honor thy father, and thy mother;" which when he said he had observed, our saviour added, "sell all thou hast, give it to the poor, and come and follow me:" which was as much as to say, relye on me that am the king: therefore to fulfill the law, and to beleeve that jesus is the king, is all that is required to bring a man to eternall life. thirdly, st. paul saith (rom. 1.17.) "the just shall live by faith;" not every one, but the just; therefore faith and justice (that is, the will to be just, or repentance) are all that is necessary to life eternall. and (mark 1.15.) our saviour preached, saying, "the time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of god is at hand, repent and beleeve the evangile," that is, the good news that the christ was come. therefore to repent, and to beleeve that jesus is the christ, is all that is required to salvation. what each of them contributes thereunto seeing then it is necessary that faith, and obedience (implyed in the word repentance) do both concurre to our salvation; the question by which of the two we are justified, is impertinently disputed. neverthelesse, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be justified by the one, and by the other. and first, if by righteousnesse be understood the justice of the works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the law of god. and therefore when wee are said to be justified by works, it is to be understood of the will, which god doth alwaies accept for the work it selfe, as well in good, as in evill men. and in this sense onely it is, that a man is called just, or unjust; and that his justice justifies him, that is, gives him the title, in gods acceptation, of just; and renders him capable of living by his faith, which before he was not. so that justice justifies in that that sense, in which to justifie, is the same that to denominate a man just; and not in the signification of discharging the law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust. but a man is then also said to be justified, when his plea, though in it selfe unsufficient, is accepted; as when we plead our will, our endeavour to fulfill the law, and repent us of our failings, and god accepteth it for the performance it selfe: and because god accepteth not the will for the deed, but onely in the faithfull; it is therefore faith that makes good our plea; and in this sense it is, that faith onely justifies: so that faith and obedience are both necessary to salvation; yet in severall senses each of them is said to justifie. obedience to god and to the civill soveraign not inconsistent whether christian, having thus shewn what is necessary to salvation; it is not hard to reconcile our obedience to the civill soveraign; who is either christian, or infidel. if he bee a christian, he alloweth the beleefe of this article, that jesus is the christ; and of all the articles that are contained in, or are evident consequence deduced from it: which is all the faith necessary to salvation. and because he is a soveraign, he requireth obedience to all his owne, that is, to all the civill laws; in which also are contained all the laws of nature, that is, all the laws of god: for besides the laws of nature, and the laws of the church, which are part of the civill law, (for the church that can make laws is the common-wealth,) there bee no other laws divine. whosoever therefore obeyeth his christian soveraign, is not thereby hindred, neither from beleeving, nor from obeying god. but suppose that a christian king should from this foundation, jesus is the christ, draw some false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of hay, or stubble, and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing st. paul says, he shal be saved; much more shall he be saved, that teacheth them by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but onely beleeves his lawfull teacher. and in case a subject be forbidden by the civill soveraign to professe some of those his opinions, upon what grounds can he disobey? christian kings may erre in deducing a consequence, but who shall judge? shall a private man judge, when the question is of his own obedience? or shall any man judg but he that is appointed thereto by the church, that is, by the civill soveraign that representeth it? or if the pope, or an apostle judge, may he not erre in deducing of a consequence? did not one of the two, st. peter, or st. paul erre in a superstructure, when st. paul withstood st. peter to his face? there can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of god, and the laws of a christian common-wealth. or infidel and when the civill soveraign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the laws of god (for such as are the laws of nature,) and rejecteth the counsell of the apostles, that admonisheth all christians to obey their princes, and all children and servants to obey they parents, and masters, in all things. and for their faith, it is internall, and invisible; they have the licence that naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. but if they do, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of their lawfull soveraign; much lesse make warre upon him. for he that is not glad of any just occasion of martyrdome, has not the faith be professeth, but pretends it onely, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. but what infidel king is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a subject, that waiteth for the second comming of christ, after the present world shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent of beleeving that jesus is the christ,) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the laws of that infidel king, (which all christians are obliged in conscience to doe,) to put to death, or to persecute such a subject? and thus much shall suffice, concerning the kingdome of god, and policy ecclesiasticall. wherein i pretend not to advance any position of my own, but onely to shew what are the consequences that seem to me deducible from the principles of christian politiques, (which are the holy scriptures,) in confirmation of the power of civill soveraigns, and the duty of their subjects. and in the allegation of scripture, i have endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure, or controverted interpretation; and to alledge none, but is such sense as is most plain, and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole bible; which was written for the re-establishment of the kingdome of god in christ. for it is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer that giveth the true light, by which any writing is to bee interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main designe, can derive no thing from them cleerly; but rather by casting atomes of scripture, as dust before mens eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage. chapter xliv. of spirituall darknesse from misinterpretation of scripture the kingdome of darknesse what besides these soveraign powers, divine, and humane, of which i have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in scripture of another power, namely, (eph. 6. 12.), that of "the rulers of the darknesse of this world," (mat. 12. 26.), "the kingdome of satan," and, (mat. 9. 34.), "the principality of beelzebub over daemons," that is to say, over phantasmes that appear in the air: for which cause satan is also called (eph. 2. 2.) "the prince of the power of the air;" and (because he ruleth in the darknesse of this world) (joh. 16. 11.) "the prince of this world;" and in consequence hereunto, they who are under his dominion, in opposition to the faithfull (who are the children of the light) are called the children of darknesse. for seeing beelzebub is prince of phantasmes, inhabitants of his dominion of air and darknesse, the children of darknesse, and these daemons, phantasmes, or spirits of illusion, signifie allegorically the same thing. this considered, the kingdome of darknesse, as it is set forth in these, and other places of the scripture, is nothing else but a "confederacy of deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature, and of the gospell; and so to dis-prepare them for the kingdome of god to come." the church not yet fully freed of darknesse as men that are utterly deprived from their nativity, of the light of the bodily eye, have no idea at all, of any such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some time, or other perceived by his outward senses: so also is it of the light of the gospel, and of the light of the understanding, that no man can conceive there is any greater degree of it, than that which he hath already attained unto. and from hence it comes to passe, that men have no other means to acknowledge their owne darknesse, but onely by reasoning from the un-forseen mischances, that befall them in their ways; the darkest part of the kingdome of satan, is that which is without the church of god; that is to say, amongst them that beleeve not in jesus christ. but we cannot say, that therefore the church enjoyeth (as the land of goshen) all the light, which to the performance of the work enjoined us by god, is necessary. whence comes it, that in christendome there has been, almost from the time of the apostles, such justling of one another out of their places, both by forraign, and civill war? such stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men? and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark, felicity, if it be not night amongst us, or at least a mist? wee are therefore yet in the dark. four causes of spirituall darknesse the enemy has been here in the night of our naturall ignorance, and sown the tares of spirituall errors; and that, first, by abusing, and putting out the light of the scriptures: for we erre, not knowing the scriptures. secondly, by introducing the daemonology of the heathen poets, that is to say, their fabulous doctrine concerning daemons, which are but idols, or phantasms of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy; such as are dead mens ghosts, and fairies, and other matter of old wives tales. thirdly, by mixing with the scripture divers reliques of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy of the greeks, especially of aristotle. fourthly, by mingling with both these, false, or uncertain traditions, and fained, or uncertain history. and so we come to erre, by "giving heed to seducing spirits," and the daemonology of such "as speak lies in hypocrisie," (or as it is in the originall, 1 tim. 4.1,2. "of those that play the part of lyars") "with a seared conscience," that is, contrary to their own knowledge. concerning the first of these, which is the seducing of men by abuse of scripture, i intend to speak briefly in this chapter. errors from misinterpreting the scriptures, concerning the kingdome of god the greatest, and main abuse of scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the kingdome of god, mentioned so often in the scripture, is the present church, or multitude of christian men now living, or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the kingdome of god was first instituted by the ministery of moses, over the jews onely; who were therefore called his peculiar people; and ceased afterward, in the election of saul, when they refused to be governed by god any more, and demanded a king after the manner of the nations; which god himself consented unto, as i have more at large proved before, in the 35. chapter. after that time, there was no other kingdome of god in the world, by any pact, or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be king, of all men, and of all creatures, as governing according to his will, by his infinite power. neverthelesse, he promised by his prophets to restore this his government to them again, when the time he hath in his secret counsell appointed for it shall bee fully come, and when they shall turn unto him by repentance, and amendment of life; and not onely so, but he invited also the gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happinesse of his reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance; and hee promised also to send his son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine, to receive him at his second coming: which second coming not yet being, the kingdome of god is not yet come, and wee are not now under any other kings by pact, but our civill soveraigns; saving onely, that christian men are already in the kingdome of grace, in as much as they have already the promise of being received at his comming againe. as that the kingdome of god is the present church consequent to this errour, that the present church is christs kingdome, there ought to be some one man, or assembly, by whose mouth our saviour (now in heaven) speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person to all christians, or divers men, or divers assemblies that doe the same to divers parts of christendome. this power regal under christ, being challenged, universally by that pope, and in particular common-wealths by assemblies of the pastors of the place, (when the scripture gives it to none but to civill soveraigns,) comes to be so passionately disputed, that it putteth out the light of nature, and causeth so great a darknesse in mens understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience. and that the pope is his vicar generall consequent to this claim of the pope to vicar generall of christ in the present church, (supposed to be that kingdom of his, to which we are addressed in the gospel,) is the doctrine, that it is necessary for a christian king, to receive his crown by a bishop; as if it were from that ceremony, that he derives the clause of dei gratia in his title; and that then onely he is made king by the favour of god, when he is crowned by the authority of gods universall viceregent on earth; and that every bishop whosoever be his soveraign, taketh at his consecration an oath of absolute obedience to the pope, consequent to the same, is the doctrine of the fourth councell of lateran, held under pope innocent the third, (chap. 3. de haereticis.) "that if a king at the popes admonition, doe not purge his kingdome of haeresies, and being excommunicate for the same, doe not give satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience." where, by haeresies are understood all opinions which the church of rome hath forbidden to be maintained. and by this means, as often as there is any repugnancy between the politicall designes of the pope, and other christian princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a mist amongst their subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawfull prince, from him whom they had themselves placed there; and in this darknesse of mind, are made to fight one against another, without discerning their enemies from their friends, under the conduct of another mans ambition. and that the pastors are the clergy from the same opinion, that the present church is the kingdome of god, it proceeds that pastours, deacons, and all other ministers of the church, take the name to themselves of the clergy, giving to other christians the name of laity, that is, simply people. for clergy signifies those, whose maintenance is that revenue, which god having reserved to himselfe during his reigne over the israelites, assigned to the tribe of levi (who were to be his publique ministers, and had no portion of land set them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their inheritance. the pope therefore, (pretending the present church to be, as the realme of israel, the kingdome of god) challenging to himselfe and his subordinate ministers, the like revenue, as the inheritance of god, the name of clergy was sutable to that claime. and thence it is, that tithes, or other tributes paid to the levites, as gods right, amongst the israelites, have a long time been demanded, and taken of christians, by ecclesiastiques, jure divino, that is, in gods right. by which meanes, the people every where were obliged to a double tribute; one to the state, another to the clergy; whereof, that to the clergy, being the tenth of their revenue, is double to that which a king of athens (and esteemed a tyrant) exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all publique charges: for he demanded no more but the twentieth part; and yet abundantly maintained therewith the commonwealth. and in the kingdome of the jewes, during the sacerdotall reigne of god, the tithes and offerings were the whole publique revenue. from the same mistaking of the present church for the kingdom of god, came in the distinction betweene the civill and the canon laws: the civil law being the acts of soveraigns in their own dominions, and the canon law being the acts of the pope in the same dominions. which canons, though they were but canons, that is, rules propounded, and but voluntarily received by christian princes, till the translation of the empire to charlemain; yet afterwards, as the power of the pope encreased, became rules commanded, and the emperours themselves (to avoyd greater mischiefes, which the people blinded might be led into) were forced to let them passe for laws. from hence it is, that in all dominions, where the popes ecclesiasticall power is entirely received, jewes, turkes, and gentiles, are in the roman church tolerated in their religion, as farre forth, as in the exercise and profession thereof they offend not against the civill power: whereas in a christian, though a stranger, not to be of the roman religion, is capitall; because the pope pretendeth that all christians are his subjects. for otherwise it were as much against the law of nations, to persecute a christian stranger, for professing the religion of his owne country, as an infidell; or rather more, in as much as they that are not against christ, are with him. from the same it is, that in every christian state there are certaine men, that are exempt, by ecclesiasticall liberty, from the tributes, and from the tribunals of the civil state; for so are the secular clergy, besides monks and friars, which in many places, bear so great a proportion to the common people, as if need were, there might be raised out of them alone, an army, sufficient for any warre the church militant should imploy them in, against their owne, or other princes. error from mistaking consecration for conjuration a second generall abuse of scripture, is the turning of consecration into conjuration, or enchantment. to consecrate, is in scripture, to offer, give, or dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a man, or any other thing to god, by separating of it from common use; that is to say, to sanctifie, or make it gods, and to be used only by those, whom god hath appointed to be his publike ministers, (as i have already proved at large in the 35. chapter;) and thereby to change, not the thing consecrated, but onely the use of it, from being profane and common, to be holy, and peculiar to gods service. but when by such words, the nature of qualitie of the thing it selfe, is pretended to be changed, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary worke of god, or a vaine and impious conjuration. but seeing (for the frequency of pretending the change of nature in their consecrations,) it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a conjuration or incantation, whereby they would have men to beleeve an alteration of nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of mans sight, and of all the rest of his senses. as for example, when the priest, in stead of consecrating bread and wine to gods peculiar service in the sacrament of the lords supper, (which is but a separation of it from the common use, to signifie, that is, to put men in mind of their redemption, by the passion of christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the crosse for our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of the words of our saviour, "this is my body," and "this is my blood," the nature of bread is no more there, but his very body; notwithstanding there appeared not to the sight, or other sense of the receiver, any thing that appeareth not before the consecration. the egyptian conjurers, that are said to have turned their rods to serpents, and the water into bloud, are thought but to have deluded the senses of the spectators by a false shew of things, yet are esteemed enchanters: but what should wee have thought of them, if there had appeared in their rods nothing like a serpent, and in the water enchanted, nothing like bloud, nor like any thing else but water, but that they had faced down the king, that they were serpents that looked like rods, and that it was bloud that seemed water? that had been both enchantment, and lying. and yet in this daily act of the priest, they doe the very same, by turning the holy words into the manner of a charme, which produceth nothing now to the sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned the bread into a man; nay more, into a god; and require men to worship it, as if it were our saviour himself present god and man, and thereby to commit most grosse idolatry. for if it bee enough to excuse it of idolatry, to say it is no more bread, but god; why should not the same excuse serve the egyptians, in case they had the faces to say, the leeks, and onyons they worshipped, were not very leeks, and onyons, but a divinity under their species, or likenesse. the words, "this is my body," are aequivalent to these, "this signifies, or represents my body;" and it is an ordinary figure of speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor though so taken, can it extend any further, than to the bread which christ himself with his own hands consecrated. for hee never said, that of what bread soever, any priest whatsoever, should say, "this is my body," or, "this is christs body," the same should presently be transubstantiated. nor did the church of rome ever establish this transubstantiation, till the time of innocent the third; which was not above 500. years agoe, when the power of popes was at the highest, and the darknesse of the time grown so great, as men discerned not the bread that was given them to eat, especially when it was stamped with the figure of christ upon the crosse, as if they would have men beleeve it were transubstantiated, not onely into the body of christ, but also into the wood of his crosse, and that they did eat both together in the sacrament. incantation in the ceremonies of baptisme the like incantation, in stead of consecration, is used also in the sacrament of baptisme: where the abuse of gods name in each severall person, and in the whole trinity, with the sign of the crosse at each name, maketh up the charm: as first, when they make the holy water, the priest saith, "i conjure thee, thou creature of water, in the name of god the father almighty, and in the name of jesus christ his onely son our lord, and in vertue of the holy ghost, that thou become conjured water, to drive away all the powers of the enemy, and to eradicate, and supplant the enemy, &c." and the same in the benediction of the salt to be mingled with it; "that thou become conjured salt, that all phantasmes, and knavery of the devills fraud may fly and depart from the place wherein thou art sprinkled; and every unclean spirit bee conjured by him that shall come to judge the quicke and the dead." the same in the benediction of the oyle. "that all the power of the enemy, all the host of the devill, all assaults and phantasmes of satan, may be driven away by this creature of oyle." and for the infant that is to be baptized, he is subject to many charms; first, at the church dore the priest blows thrice in the childs face, and sayes, "goe out of him unclean spirit, and give place to the holy ghost the comforter." as if all children, till blown on by the priest were daemoniaques: again, before his entrance into the church, he saith as before, "i conjure thee, &c. to goe out, and depart from this servant of god:" and again the same exorcisme is repeated once more before he be baptized. these, and some other incantations, and consecrations, in administration of the sacraments of baptisme, and the lords supper; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy men (except the unhallowed spittle of the priest) hath some set form of exorcisme. in marriage, in visitation of the sick, and in consecration of places nor are the other rites, as of marriage, of extreme unction, of visitation of the sick, of consecrating churches, and church-yards, and the like, exempt from charms; in as much as there is in them the use of enchanted oyle, and water, with the abuse of the crosse, and of the holy word of david, "asperges me domine hyssopo," as things of efficacy to drive away phantasmes, and imaginery spirits. errors from mistaking eternall life, and everlasting death another generall error, is from the misinterpretation of the words eternall life, everlasting death, and the second death. for though we read plainly in holy scripture, that god created adam in an estate of living for ever, which was conditionall, that is to say, if he disobeyed not his commandement; which was not essentiall to humane nature, but consequent to the vertue of the tree of life; whereof hee had liberty to eat, as long as hee had not sinned; and that hee was thrust out of paradise after he had sinned, lest hee should eate thereof, and live for ever; and that christs passion is a discharge of sin to all that beleeve on him; and by consequence, a restitution of eternall life, to all the faithfull, and to them onely: yet the doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by nature, in as much as his soul is immortall: so that the flaming sword at the entrance of paradise, though it hinder a man from coming to the tree of life, hinders him not from the immortality which god took from him for his sin; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of christ, for the recovering of the same; and consequently, not onely the faithfull and righteous, but also the wicked, and the heathen, shall enjoy eternall life, without any death at all; much lesse a second, and everlasting death. to salve this, it is said, that by second, and everlasting death, is meant a second, and everlasting life, but in torments; a figure never used, but in this very case. all which doctrine is founded onely on some of the obscurer places of the new testament; which neverthelesse, the whole scope of the scripture considered, are cleer enough in a different sense, and unnecessary to the christian faith. for supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth nothing of him but his carkasse; cannot god that raised inanimated dust and clay into a living creature by his word, as easily raise a dead carkasse to life again, and continue him alive for ever, or make him die again, by another word? the soule in scripture, signifieth alwaies, either the life, or the living creature; and the body and soule jointly, the body alive. in the fift day of the creation, god said, let the water produce reptile animae viventis, the creeping thing that hath in it a living soule; the english translate it, "that hath life:" and again, god created whales, "& omnem animam viventem;" which in the english is, "every living creature:" and likewise of man, god made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, "& factus est homo in animam viventem," that is, "and man was made a living creature;" and after noah came out of the arke, god saith, hee will no more smite "omnem animam viventem," that is "every living creature;" and deut. 12.23. "eate not the bloud, for the bloud is the soule;" that is "the life." from which places, if by soule were meant a substance incorporeall, with an existence separated from the body, it might as well be inferred of any other living creature, as of man. but that the souls of the faithfull, are not of their own nature, but by gods speciall grace, to remaine in their bodies, from the resurrection to all eternity, i have already i think sufficiently proved out of the scriptures, in the 38. chapter. and for the places of the new testament, where it is said that any man shall be cast body and soul into hell fire, it is no more than body and life; that is to say, they shall be cast alive into the perpetuall fire of gehenna. as the doctrine of purgatory, and exorcismes, and invocation of saints this window it is, that gives entrance to the dark doctrine, first, of eternall torments; and afterwards of purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad, especially in places consecrated, solitary, or dark, of the ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of exorcisme and conjuration of phantasmes; as also of invocation of men dead; and to the doctrine of indulgences; that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for ever, from the fire of purgatory, wherein these incorporeall substances are pretended by burning to be cleansed, and made fit for heaven. for men being generally possessed before the time of our saviour, by contagion of the daemonology of the greeks, of an opinion, that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies, and therefore that when the body was dead, the soule of every man, whether godly, or wicked, must subsist somewhere by vertue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein any supernaturall gift of gods; the doctors of the church doubted a long time, what was the place, which they were to abide in, till they should be re-united to their bodies in the resurrection; supposing for a while, they lay under the altars: but afterward the church of rome found it more profitable, to build for them this place of purgatory; which by some other churches in this later age, has been demolished. the texts alledged for the doctrines aforementioned have been answered before let us now consider, what texts of scripture seem most to confirm these three generall errors, i have here touched. as for those which cardinall bellarmine hath alledged, for the present kingdome of god administred by the pope, (than which there are none that make a better show of proof,) i have already answered them; and made it evident, that the kingdome of god, instituted by moses, ended in the election of saul: after which time the priest of his own authority never deposed any king. that which the high priest did to athaliah, was not done in his own right, but in the right of the young king joash her son: but solomon in his own right deposed the high priest abiathar, and set up another in his place. the most difficult place to answer, of all those than can be brought, to prove the kingdome of god by christ is already in this world, is alledged, not by bellarmine, nor any other of the church of rome; but by beza; that will have it to begin from the resurrection of christ. but whether hee intend thereby, to entitle the presbytery to the supreme power ecclesiasticall in the common-wealth of geneva, (and consequently to every presbytery in every other common-wealth,) or to princes, and other civill soveraignes, i doe not know. for the presbytery hath challenged the power to excommunicate their owne kings, and to bee the supreme moderators in religion, in the places where they have that form of church government, no lesse then the pope challengeth it universally. answer to the text on which beza infereth that the kingdome of christ began at the resurrection the words are (marke 9.1.) "verily, i say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, which shall not tast of death, till they have seene the kingdome of god come with power." which words, if taken grammatically, make it certaine, that either some of those men that stood by christ at that time, are yet alive; or else, that the kingdome of god must be now in this present world. and then there is another place more difficult: for when the apostles after our saviours resurrection, and immediately before his ascension, asked our saviour, saying, (acts.1.6.) "wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdome to israel," he answered them, "it is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the father hath put in his own power; but ye shall receive power by the comming of the holy ghost upon you, and yee shall be my (martyrs) witnesses both in jerusalem, & in all judaea, and in samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth:" which is as much as to say, my kingdome is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come, for it shall come as a theefe in the night; but i will send you the holy ghost, and by him you shall have power to beare witnesse to all the world (by your preaching) of my resurrection, and the workes i have done, and the doctrine i have taught, that they may beleeve in me, and expect eternall life, at my comming againe: how does this agree with the comming of christs kingdome at the resurrection? and that which st. paul saies (1 thessal. 1.9, 10.) "that they turned from idols, to serve the living and true god, and to waite for his sonne from heaven:" where to waite for his sonne from heaven, is to wait for his comming to be king in power; which were not necessary, if this kingdome had beene then present. againe, if the kingdome of god began (as beza on that place (mark 9.1.) would have it) at the resurrection; what reason is there for christians ever since the resurrection to say in their prayers, "let thy kingdome come"? it is therefore manifest, that the words of st. mark are not so to be interpreted. there be some of them that stand here (saith our saviour) that shall not tast of death till they have seen the kingdome of god come in power. if then this kingdome were to come at the resurrection of christ, why is it said, "some of them" rather than all? for they all lived till after christ was risen. explication of the place in mark 9.1 but they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them interpret first the like words of our saviour to st. peter concerning st. john, (chap. 21.22.) "if i will that he tarry till i come, what is that to thee?" upon which was grounded a report that hee should not dye: neverthelesse the truth of that report was neither confirmed, as well grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a saying not understood. the same difficulty is also in the place of st. marke. and if it be lawfull to conjecture at their meaning, by that which immediately followes, both here, and in st. luke, where the same is againe repeated, it is not unprobable, to say they have relation to the transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following; where it is said, that "after six dayes jesus taketh with him peter, and james, and john (not all, but some of his disciples) and leadeth them up into an high mountaine apart by themselves, and was transfigured before them. and his rayment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no fuller on earth can white them. and there appeared unto them elias with moses, and they were talking with jesus, &c." so that they saw christ in glory and majestie, as he is to come; insomuch as "they were sore afraid." and thus the promise of our saviour was accomplished by way of vision: for it was a vision, as may probably bee inferred out of st. luke, that reciteth the same story (ch. 9. ve. 28.) and saith, that peter and they that were with him, were heavy with sleep; but most certainly out of matth. 17.9. (where the same is again related;) for our saviour charged them, saying, "tell no man the vision untill the son of man be risen from the dead." howsoever it be, yet there can from thence be taken no argument, to prove that the kingdome of god taketh beginning till the day of judgement. abuse of some other texts in defence of the power of the pope as for some other texts, to prove the popes power over civill soveraignes (besides those of bellarmine;) as that the two swords that christ and his apostles had amongst them, were the spirituall and the temporall sword, which they say st. peter had given him by christ: and, that of the two luminaries, the greater signifies the pope, and the lesser the king; one might as well inferre out of the first verse of the bible, that by heaven is meant the pope, and by earth the king: which is not arguing from scripture, but a wanton insulting over princes, that came in fashion after the time the popes were growne so secure of their greatnesse, as to contemne all christian kings; and treading on the necks of emperours, to mocke both them, and the scripture, in the words of the 91. psalm, "thou shalt tread upon the lion and the adder, the young lion and the dragon thou shalt trample under thy feet." the manner of consecrations in the scripture, was without exorcisms as for the rites of consecration, though they depend for the most part upon the discretion and judgement of the governors of the church, and not upon the scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction, as the nature of the action it selfe requireth; as that the ceremonies, words, and gestures, be both decent, and significant, or at least conformable to the action. when moses consecrated the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels belonging to them (exod. 40.) he anointed them with the oyle which god had commanded to bee made for that purpose; and they were holy; there was nothing exorcised, to drive away phantasmes. the same moses (the civill soveraigne of israel) when he consecrated aaron (the high priest,) and his sons, did wash them with water, (not exorcised water,) put their garments upon them, and anointed them with oyle; and they were sanctified, to minister unto the lord in the priests office; which was a simple and decent cleansing, and adorning them, before hee presented them to god, to be his servants. when king solomon, (the civill soveraigne of israel) consecrated the temple hee had built, (2 kings 8.) he stood before all the congregation of israel; and having blessed them, he gave thanks to god, for putting into the heart of his father, to build it; and for giving to himselfe the grace to accomplish the same; and then prayed unto him, first, to accept that house, though it were not sutable to his infinite greatnesse; and to hear the prayers of his servants that should pray therein, or (if they were absent) towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of peace-offering, and the house was dedicated. here was no procession; the king stood still in his first place; no exorcised water; no asperges me, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another occasion; but a decent, and rationall speech, and such as in making to god a present of his new built house, was most conformable to the occasion. we read not that st. john did exorcise the water of jordan; nor philip the water of the river wherein he baptized the eunuch; nor that any pastor in the time of the apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to the nose of the person to be baptized, and say, "in odorem suavitatis," that is, "for a sweet savour unto the lord;" wherein neither the ceremony of spittle, for the uncleannesse; nor the application of that scripture for the levity, can by any authority of man be justified. the immortality of mans soule, not proved by scripture to be of nature, but of grace to prove that the soule separated from the body liveth eternally, not onely the soules of the elect, by especiall grace, and restauration of the eternall life which adam lost by sinne, and our saviour restored by the sacrifice of himself, to the faithfull, but also the soules of reprobates, as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without other grace of god, but that which is universally given to all mankind; there are divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn: but such, as when i compare them with that which i have before (chapter 38.) alledged out of the 14 of job, seem to mee much more subject to a divers interpretation, than the words of job. and first there are the words of solomon (ecclesiastes 12.7.) "then shall the dust return to dust, as it was, and the spirit shall return to god that gave it." which may bear well enough (if there be no other text directly against it) this interpretation, that god onely knows, (but man not,) what becomes of a mans spirit, when he expireth; and the same solomon, in the same book, (chap. 3. ver. 20,21.) delivereth in the same sentence in the sense i have given it: his words are, "all goe, (man and beast) to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knoweth that the spirit of man goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth?" that is, none knows but god; nor is it an unusuall phrase to say of things we understand not, "god knows what," and "god knows where." that of gen. 5.24. "enoch walked with god, and he was not; for god took him;" which is expounded heb. 13.5. "he was translated, that he should not die; and was not found, because god had translated him. for before his translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased god," making as much for the immortality of the body, as of the soule, proveth, that this his translation was peculiar to them that please god; not common to them with the wicked; and depending on grace, not on nature. but on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give, besides the literall sense of the words of solomon (eccles. 3.19.) "that which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dyeth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one breath (one spirit;) so that a man hath no praeeminence above a beast, for all is vanity." by the literall sense, here is no naturall immortality of the soule; nor yet any repugnancy with the life eternall, which the elect shall enjoy by grace. and (chap. 4. ver.3.) "better is he that hath not yet been, than both they;" that is, than they that live, or have lived; which, if the soule of all them that have lived, were immortall, were a hard saying; for then to have an immortall soule, were worse than to have no soule at all. and againe,(chapt. 9.5.) "the living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing;" that is, naturally, and before the resurrection of the body. another place which seems to make for a naturall immortality of the soule, is that, where our saviour saith, that abraham, isaac, and jacob are living: but this is spoken of the promise of god, and of their certitude to rise again, not of a life then actuall; and in the same sense that god said to adam, that on the day hee should eate of the forbidden fruit, he should certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence; but not by execution, till almost a thousand years after. so abraham, isaac, and jacob were alive by promise, then, when christ spake; but are not actually till the resurrection. and the history of dives and lazarus, make nothing against this, if wee take it (as it is) for a parable. but there be other places of the new testament, where an immortality seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. for it is evident, that they shall all rise to judgement. and it is said besides in many places, that they shall goe into "everlasting fire, everlasting torments, everlasting punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dyeth;" and all this is comprehended in the word everlasting death, which is ordinarily interpreted everlasting life in torments: and yet i can find no where that any man shall live in torments everlastingly. also, it seemeth hard, to say, that god who is the father of mercies, that doth in heaven and earth all that hee will; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing; that worketh in men both to doe, and to will; and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good, nor repentance of evill, should punish mens transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine, and more. we are therefore to consider, what the meaning is, of everlasting fire, and other the like phrases of scripture. i have shewed already, that the kingdome of god by christ beginneth at the day of judgment: that in that day, the faithfull shall rise again, with glorious, and spirituall bodies, and bee his subjects in that his kingdome, which shall be eternall; that they shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, nor eate and drink, as they did in their naturall bodies; but live for ever in their individuall persons, without the specificall eternity of generation: and that the reprobates also shall rise again, to receive punishments for their sins: as also, that those of the elect, which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day, shall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made spirituall, and immortall. but that the bodies of the reprobate, who make the kingdome of satan, shall also be glorious, or spirituall bodies, or that they shall bee as the angels of god, neither eating, nor drinking, nor engendring; or that their life shall be eternall in their individuall persons, as the life of every faithfull man is, or as the life of adam had been if hee had not sinned, there is no place of scripture to prove it; save onely these places concerning eternall torments; which may otherwise be interpreted. from whence may be inferred, that as the elect after the resurrection shall be restored to the estate, wherein adam was before he had sinned; so the reprobate shall be in the estate, that adam, and his posterity were in after the sin committed; saving that god promised a redeemer to adam, and such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not to them that should die in their sins, as do the reprobate. eternall torments what these things considered, the texts that mention eternall fire, eternal torments, or the word that never dieth, contradict not the doctrine of a second, and everlasting death, in the proper and naturall sense of the word death. the fire, or torments prepared for the wicked in gehenna, tophet, or in what place soever, may continue for ever; and there may never want wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any one eternally. for the wicked being left in the estate they were in after adams sin, may at the resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, and have grosse and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the resurrection, as they did before: for there is no place of scripture to the contrary. for st. paul, speaking of the resurrection (1 cor. 15.) understandeth it onely of the resurrection to life eternall; and not the resurrection to punishment. and of the first, he saith that the body is "sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, raised in honour; sown in weaknesse, raised in power; sown a naturall body, raised a spirituall body:" there is no such thing can be said of the bodies of them that rise to punishment. the text is luke 20. verses 34,35,36. a fertile text. "the children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to obtaine that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage: neither can they die any more; for they are equall to the angells, and are the children of god, being the children of the resurrection:" the children of this world, that are in the estate which adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in marriage; that is corrupt, and generate successively; which is an immortality of the kind, but not of the persons of men: they are not worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute resurrection from the dead; but onely a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the end onely to receive condign punishment for their contumacy. the elect are the onely children of the resurrection; that is to say the sole heirs of eternall life: they only can die no more; it is they that are equall to the angels, and that are the children of god; and not the reprobate. to the reprobate there remaineth after the resurrection, a second, and eternall death: between which resurrection, and their second, and eternall death, is but a time of punishment and torment; and to last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of man by propagation shall endure, which is eternally. answer of the texts alledged for purgatory upon this doctrine of the naturall eternity of separated soules, is founded (as i said) the doctrine of purgatory. for supposing eternall life by grace onely, there is no life, but the life of the body; and no immortality till the resurrection. the texts for purgatory alledged by bellarmine out of the canonicall scripture of the old testament, are first, the fasting of david for saul and jonathan, mentioned (2 kings, 1. 12.); and againe, (2 sam. 3. 35.) for the death of abner. this fasting of david, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at gods hands, after their death; because after he had fasted to procure the recovery of his owne child, assoone as he know it was dead, he called for meate. seeing then the soule hath an existence separate from the body, and nothing can be obtained by mens fasting for the soules that are already either in heaven, or hell, it followeth that there be some soules of dead men, what are neither in heaven, nor in hell; and therefore they must bee in some third place, which must be purgatory. and thus with hard straining, hee has wrested those places to the proofe of a purgatory; whereas it is manifest, that the ceremonies of mourning, and fasting, when they are used for the death of men, whose life was not profitable to the mourners, they are used for honours sake to their persons; and when tis done for the death of them by whose life the mourners had benefit, it proceeds from their particular dammage: and so david honoured saul, and abner, with his fasting; and in the death of his owne child, recomforted himselfe, by receiving his ordinary food. in the other places, which he alledgeth out of the old testament, there is not so much as any shew, or colour of proofe. he brings in every text wherein there is the word anger, or fire, or burning, or purging, or clensing, in case any of the fathers have but in a sermon rhetorically applied it to the doctrine of purgatory, already beleeved. the first verse of psalme, 37. "o lord rebuke me not in thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure:" what were this to purgatory, if augustine had not applied the wrath to the fire of hell, and the displeasure, to that of purgatory? and what is it to purgatory, that of psalme, 66. 12. "wee went through fire and water, and thou broughtest us to a moist place;" and other the like texts, (with which the doctors of those times entended to adorne, or extend their sermons, or commentaries) haled to their purposes by force of wit? places of the new testament for purgatory answered but he alledgeth other places of the new testament, that are not so easie to be answered: and first that of matth. 12.32. "whosoever speaketh a word against the sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the holy ghost, it shall not bee forgiven him neither in this world, nor in the world to come:" where he will have purgatory to be the world to come, wherein some sinnes may be forgiven, which in this world were not forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are but three worlds; one from the creation to the flood, which was destroyed by water, and is called in scripture the old world; another from the flood to the day of judgement, which is the present world, and shall bee destroyed by fire; and the third, which shall bee from the day of judgement forward, everlasting, which is called the world to come; and in which it is agreed by all, there shall be no purgatory; and therefore the world to come, and purgatory, are inconsistent. but what then can bee the meaning of those our saviours words? i confesse they are very hardly to bee reconciled with all the doctrines now unanimously received: nor is it any shame, to confesse the profoundnesse of the scripture, to bee too great to be sounded by the shortnesse of humane understanding. neverthelesse, i may propound such things to the consideration of more learned divines, as the text it selfe suggesteth. and first, seeing to speake against the holy ghost, as being the third person of the trinity, is to speake against the church, in which the holy ghost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made, betweene the easinesse of our saviour, in bearing with offences done to him while he was on earth, and the severity of the pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority, which was from the holy ghost: as if he should say, you that deny my power; nay you that shall crucifie me, shall be pardoned by mee, as often as you turne unto mee by repentance: but if you deny the power of them that teach you hereafter, by vertue of the holy ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive you, but persecute you in this world, and leave you without absolution, (though you turn to me, unlesse you turn also to them,) to the punishments (as much as lies in them) of the world to come: and so the words may be taken as a prophecy, or praediction concerning the times, as they have along been in the christian church: or if this be not the meaning, (for i am not peremptory in such difficult places,) perhaps there may be place left after the resurrection for the repentance of some sinners: and there is also another place, that seemeth to agree therewith. for considering the words of st. paul (1 cor. 15. 29.) "what shall they doe which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why also are they baptized for the dead?" a man may probably inferre, as some have done, that in st. pauls time, there was a custome by receiving baptisme for the dead, (as men that now beleeve, are sureties and undertakers for the faith of infants, that are not capable of beleeving,) to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey, and receive our saviour for their king, at his coming again; and then the forgivenesse of sins in the world to come, has no need of a purgatory. but in both these interpretations, there is so much of paradox, that i trust not to them; but propound them to those that are throughly versed in the scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them. onely of thus much, i see evident scripture, to perswade men, that there is neither the word, nor the thing of purgatory, neither in this, nor any other text; nor any thing that can prove a necessity of a place for the soule without the body; neither for the soule of lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the soules of them which the romane church pretend to be tormented now in purgatory. for god, that could give a life to a peece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten carkasse, into a glorious, spirituall, and immortall body. another place is that of 1 cor. 3. where it is said that they which built stubble, hay, &c. on the true foundation, their work shall perish; but "they themselves shall be saved; but as through fire:" this fire, he will have to be the fire of purgatory. the words, as i have said before, are an allusion to those of zach. 13. 9. where he saith, "i will bring the third part through the fire, and refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tryed;" which is spoken of the comming of the messiah in power and glory; that is, at the day of judgment, and conflagration of the present world; wherein the elect shall not be consumed, but be refined; that is, depose their erroneous doctrines, and traditions, and have them as it were sindged off; and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true god. in like manner, the apostle saith of them, that holding this foundation jesus is the christ, shall build thereon some other doctrines that be erroneous, that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but shall passe through it to salvation; but so, as to see, and relinquish their former errours. the builders, are the pastors; the foundation, that jesus is the christ; the stubble and hay, false consequences drawn from it through ignorance, or frailty; the gold, silver, and pretious stones, are their true doctrines; and their refining or purging, the relinquishing of their errors. in all which there is no colour at all for the burning of incorporeall, that is to say, impatible souls. baptisme for the dead, how understood a third place is that of 1 cor. 15. before mentioned, concerning baptisme for the dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that prayers for the dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a fire of purgatory: but neither of them rightly. for of many interpretations of the word baptisme, he approveth this in the first place, that by baptisme is meant (metaphorically) a baptisme of penance; and that men are in this sense baptized, when they fast, and pray, and give almes: and so baptisme for the dead, and prayer of the dead, is the same thing. but this is a metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the scripture, nor in any other use of language; and which is also discordant to the harmony, and scope of the scripture. the word baptisme is used (mar. 10. 38. & luk. 12. 59.) for being dipped in ones own bloud, as christ was upon the cross, and as most of the apostles were, for giving testimony of him. but it is hard to say, that prayer, fasting, and almes, have any similitude with dipping. the same is used also mat. 3. 11. (which seemeth to make somewhat for purgatory) for a purging with fire. but it is evident the fire and purging here mentioned, is the same whereof the prophet zachary speaketh (chap. 13. v. 9.) "i will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them, &c." and st. peter after him (1 epist. 1. 7.) "that the triall of your faith, which is much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tryed with fire, might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory at the appearing of jesus christ;" and st. paul (1 cor. 3. 13.) the fire shall trie every mans work of what sort it is." but st. peter, and st. paul speak of the fire that shall be at the second appearing of christ; and the prophet zachary of the day of judgment: and therefore this place of s. mat. may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be no necessity of the fire of purgatory. another interpretation of baptisme for the dead, is that which i have before mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of probability; and thence also he inferreth the utility of prayer for the dead. for if after the resurrection, such as have not heard of christ, or not beleeved in him, may be received into christs kingdome; it is not in vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them, till they should be risen. but granting that god, at the prayers of the faithfull, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard christ preached, and consequently cannot have rejected christ, and that the charity of men in that point, cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth nothing for purgatory, because to rise from death to life, is one thing; to rise from purgatory to life is another; and being a rising from life to life, from a life in torments to a life in joy. a fourth place is that of mat. 5. 25. "agree with thine adversary quickly, whilest thou art in the way with him, lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. verily i say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou has paid the uttermost farthing." in which allegory, the offender is the sinner; both the adversary and the judge is god; the way is this life; the prison is the grave; the officer, death; from which, the sinner shall not rise again to life eternall, but to a second death, till he have paid the utmost farthing, or christ pay it for him by his passion, which is a full ransome for all manner of sin, as well lesser sins, as greater crimes; both being made by the passion of christ equally veniall. the fift place, is that of matth. 5. 22. "whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be guilty in judgment. and whosoever shall say to his brother, racha, shall be guilty in the councel. but whosoever shall say, thou foole, shall be guilty to hell fire." from which words he inferreth three sorts of sins, and three sorts of punishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be punished with hell fire; and consequently, that after this life, there is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory. of which inference, there is no colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given to them: shall there be a distinction after this life of courts of justice, as there was amongst the jews in our saviours time, to hear, and determine divers sorts of crimes; as the judges, and the councell? shall not all judicature appertain to christ, and his apostles? to understand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the words precedent, and subsequent. our saviour in this chapter interpreteth the law of moses; which the jews thought was then fulfilled, when they had not transgressed the grammaticall sense thereof, howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence, or meaning of the legislator. therefore whereas they thought the sixth commandement was not broken, but by killing a man; nor the seventh, but when a man lay with a woman, not his wife; our saviour tells them, the inward anger of a man against his brother, if it be without just cause, is homicide: you have heard (saith hee) the law of moses, "thou shalt not kill," and that "whosoever shall kill, shall be condemned before the judges," or before the session of the seventy: but i say unto you, to be angry with ones brother without cause; or to say unto him racha, or foole, is homicide, and shall be punished at the day of judgment, and session of christ, and his apostles, with hell fire: so that those words were not used to distinguish between divers crimes, and divers courts of justice, and divers punishments; but to taxe the distinction between sin, and sin, which the jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying god, but from the difference of their temporall courts of justice; and to shew them that he that had the will to hurt his brother, though the effect appear but in reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by the judges, and by the session, which shall be the same, not different courts at the day of judgment. this considered, what can be drawn from this text, to maintain purgatory, i cannot imagine. the sixth place is luke 16. 9. "make yee friends of the unrighteous mammon, that when yee faile, they may receive you into everlasting tabernacles." this he alledges to prove invocation of saints departed. but the sense is plain, that we should make friends with our riches, of the poore, and thereby obtain their prayers whilest they live. "he that giveth to the poore, lendeth to the lord. "the seventh is luke 23. 42. "lord remember me when thou commest into thy kingdome:" therefore, saith hee, there is remission of sins after this life. but the consequence is not good. our saviour then forgave him; and at his comming againe in glory, will remember to raise him againe to life eternall. the eight is acts 2. 24. where st. peter saith of christ, "that god had raised him up, and loosed the paines of death, because it was not possible he should be holden of it;" which hee interprets to bee a descent of christ into purgatory, to loose some soules there from their torments; whereas it is manifest, that it was christ that was loosed; it was hee that could not bee holden of death, or the grave; and not the souls in purgatory. but if that which beza sayes in his notes on this place be well observed, there is none that will not see, that in stead of paynes, it should be bands; and then there is no further cause to seek for purgatory in this text. chapter xlv. of daemonology, and other reliques of the religion of the gentiles the originall of daemonology the impression made on the organs of sight, by lucide bodies, either in one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from opaque, or refracted in the passage through diaphanous bodies, produceth in living creatures, in whom god hath placed such organs, an imagination of the object, from whence the impression proceedeth; which imagination is called sight; and seemeth not to bee a meer imagination, but the body it selfe without us; in the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth but himselfe; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but onely a motion in the interiour organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so. and the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call imagination, and memory, and (in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by sicknesse, or violence) a dream: of which things i have already spoken briefly, in the second and third chapters. this nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to naturall knowledge; much lesse by those that consider not things so remote (as that knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy, and in the sense, otherwise, than of things really without us: which some (because they vanish away, they know not whither, nor how,) will have to be absolutely incorporeall, that is to say immateriall, of formes without matter; colour and figure, without any coloured or figured body; and that they can put on aiery bodies (as a garment) to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and others say, are bodies, and living creatures, but made of air, or other more subtile and aethereall matter, which is, then, when they will be seen, condensed. but both of them agree on one generall appellation of them, daemons. as if the dead of whom they dreamed, were not inhabitants of their own brain, but of the air, or of heaven, or hell; not phantasmes, but ghosts; with just as much reason, as if one should say, he saw his own ghost in a looking-glasse, or the ghosts of the stars in a river; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun, of the quantity of about a foot, the daemon, or ghost of that great sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world: and by that means have feared them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to doe them good, or harme; and consequently, given occasion to the governours of the heathen common-wealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that daemonology (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were specially employed, or reverenced) to the publique peace, and to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some of them good daemons, and others evill; the one as a spurre to the observance, the other, as reines to withhold them from violation of the laws. what were the daemons of the ancients what kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of daemons, appeareth partly in the genealogie of their gods, written by hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the graecians; and partly in other histories; of which i have observed some few before, in the 12. chapter of this discourse. how that doctrine was spread the graecians, by their colonies and conquests, communicated their language and writings into asia, egypt, and italy; and therein, by necessary consequence their daemonology, or (as st. paul calles it) "their doctrines of devils;" and by that meanes, the contagion was derived also to the jewes, both of judaea, and alexandria, and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. but the name of daemon they did not (as the graecians) attribute to spirits both good, and evill; but to the evill onely: and to the good daemons they gave the name of the spirit of god; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entred to be prophets. in summe, all singularity if good, they attributed to the spirit of god; and if evill, to some daemon, but a kakodaimen, an evill daemon, that is, a devill. and therefore, they called daemoniaques, that is, possessed by the devill, such as we call madmen or lunatiques; or such as had the falling sicknesse; or that spoke any thing, which they for want of understanding, thought absurd: as also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he had an unclean spirit; of a dumbe man, that he had a dumbe devill; and of john baptist (math. 11. 18.) for the singularity of his fasting, that he had a devill; and of our saviour, because he said, hee that keepeth his sayings should not see death in aeternum, (john 8. 52.) "now we know thou hast a devill; abraham is dead, and the prophets are dead:" and again, because he said (john 7. 20.) "they went about to kill him," the people answered, "thou hast a devill, who goeth about to kill thee?" whereby it is manifest, that the jewes had the same opinions concerning phantasmes, namely, that they were not phantasmes that is, idols of the braine, but things reall, and independent on the fancy. why our saviour controlled it not which doctrine if it be not true, why (may some say) did not our saviour contradict it, and teach the contrary? nay why does he use on diverse occasions, such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? to this i answer, that first, where christ saith, "a spirit hath not flesh and bone," though hee shew that there be spirits, yet he denies not that they are bodies: and where st. paul sais, "we shall rise spirituall bodies," he acknowledgeth the nature of spirits, but that they are bodily spirits; which is not difficult to understand. for air and many other things are bodies, though not flesh and bone, or any other grosse body, to bee discerned by the eye. but when our saviour speaketh to the devill, and commandeth him to go out of a man, if by the devill, be meant a disease, as phrenesy, or lunacy, or a corporeal spirit, is not the speech improper? can diseases heare? or can there be a corporeall spirit in a body of flesh and bone, full already of vitall and animall spirits? are there not therefore spirits, that neither have bodies, nor are meer imaginations? to the first i answer, that the addressing of our saviours command to the madnesse, or lunacy he cureth, is no more improper, then was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind, and sea; for neither do these hear: or than was the command of god, to the light, to the firmament, to the sunne, and starres, when he commanded them to bee; for they could not heare before they had a beeing. but those speeches are not improper, because they signifie the power of gods word: no more therefore is it improper, to command madnesse, or lunacy (under the appellation of devils, by which they were then commonly understood,) to depart out of a mans body. to the second, concerning their being incorporeall, i have not yet observed any place of scripture, from whence it can be gathered, that any man was ever possessed with any other corporeal spirit, but that of his owne, by which his body is naturally moved. the scriptures doe not teach that spirits are incorporeall our saviour, immediately after the holy ghost descended upon him in the form of a dove, is said by st. matthew (chapt. 4. 1.) to have been "led up by the spirit into the wildernesse;" and the same is recited (luke 4. 1.) in these words, "jesus being full of the holy ghost, was led in the spirit into the wildernesse;" whereby it is evident, that by spirit there, is meant the holy ghost. this cannot be interpreted for a possession: for christ, and the holy ghost, are but one and the same substance; which is no possession of one substance, or body, by another. and whereas in the verses following, he is said "to have been taken up by the devill into the holy city, and set upon a pinnacle of the temple," shall we conclude thence that hee was possessed of the devill, or carryed thither by violence? and again, "carryed thence by the devill into an exceeding high mountain, who shewed him them thence all the kingdomes of the world:" herein, wee are not to beleeve he was either possessed, or forced by the devill; nor that any mountaine is high enough, (according to the literall sense,) to shew him one whole hemisphere. what then can be the meaning of this place, other than that he went of himself into the wildernesse; and that this carrying of him up and down, from the wildernesse to the city, and from thence into a mountain, was a vision? conformable whereunto, is also the phrase of st. luke, that hee was led into the wildernesse, not by, but in the spirit: whereas concerning his being taken up into the mountaine, and unto the pinnacle of the temple, hee speaketh as st. matthew doth. which suiteth with the nature of a vision. again, where st. luke sayes of judas iscariot, that "satan entred into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with the chief priests, and captaines, how he might betray christ unto them:" it may be answered, that by the entring of satan (that is the enemy) into him, is meant, the hostile and traiterous intention of selling his lord and master. for as by the holy ghost, is frequently in scripture understood, the graces and good inclinations given by the holy ghost; so by the entring of satan, may bee understood the wicked cogitations, and designes of the adversaries of christ, and his disciples. for as it is hard to say, that the devill was entred into judas, before he had any such hostile designe; so it is impertinent to say, he was first christs enemy in his heart, and that the devill entred into him afterwards. therefore the entring of satan, and his wicked purpose, was one and the same thing. but if there be no immateriall spirit, nor any possession of mens bodies by any spirit corporeall, it may again be asked, why our saviour and his apostles did not teach the people so; and in such cleer words, as they might no more doubt thereof. but such questions as these, are more curious, than necessary for a christian mans salvation. men may as well aske, why christ that could have given to all men faith, piety, and all manner of morall vertues, gave it to some onely, and not to all: and why he left the search of naturall causes, and sciences, to the naturall reason and industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally; and many other such questions: of which neverthelesse there may be alledged probable and pious reasons. for as god, when he brought the israelites into the land of promise, did not secure them therein, by subduing all the nations round about them; but left many of them, as thornes in their sides, to awaken from time to time their piety and industry: so our saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly kingdome, did not destroy all the difficulties of naturall questions; but left them to exercise our industry, and reason; the scope of his preaching, being onely to shew us this plain and direct way to salvation, namely, the beleef of this article, "that he was the christ, the son of the living god, sent into the world to sacrifice himselfe for our sins, and at his comming again, gloriously to reign over his elect, and to save them from their enemies eternally:" to which, the opinion of possession by spirits, or phantasmes, are no impediment in the way; though it be to some an occasion of going out of the way, and to follow their own inventions. if wee require of the scripture an account of all questions, which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of gods commands; we may as well complaine of moses for not having set downe the time of the creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth, and sea, and of men, and beasts. to conclude, i find in scripture that there be angels, and spirits, good and evill; but not that they are incorporeall, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream, or vision; which the latines call spectra, and took for daemons. and i find that there are spirits corporeal, (though subtile and invisible;) but not that any mans body was possessed, or inhabited by them; and that the bodies of the saints shall be such, namely, spirituall bodies, as st. paul calls them. the power of casting out devills, not the same it was in the primitive church neverthelesse, the contrary doctrine, namely, that there be incorporeall spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the church, that the use of exorcisme, (that is to say, of ejection of devills by conjuration) is thereupon built; and (though rarely and faintly practised) is not yet totally given over. that there were many daemoniaques in the primitive church, and few mad-men, and other such singular diseases; whereas in these times we hear of, and see many mad-men, and few daemoniaques, proceeds not from the change of nature; but of names. but how it comes to passe, that whereas heretofore the apostles, and after them for a time, the pastors of the church, did cure those singular diseases, which now they are not seen to doe; as likewise, why it is not in the power of every true beleever now, to doe all that the faithfull did then, that is to say, as we read (mark 16. 17.) "in christs name to cast out devills, to speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison without harm taking, and to cure the sick by the laying on of their hands," and all this without other words, but "in the name of jesus," is another question. and it is probable, that those extraordinary gifts were given to the church, for no longer a time, than men trusted wholly to christ, and looked for their felicity onely in his kingdome to come; and consequently, that when they sought authority, and riches, and trusted to their own subtilty for a kingdome of this world, these supernaturall gifts of god were again taken from them. another relique of gentilisme, worshipping images, left in the church not brought into it another relique of gentilisme, is the worship of images, neither instituted by moses in the old, nor by christ in the new testament; nor yet brought in from the gentiles; but left amongst them, after they had given their names to christ. before our saviour preached, it was the generall religion of the gentiles, to worship for gods, those apparences that remain in the brain from the impression of externall bodies upon the organs of their senses, which are commonly called ideas, idols, phantasmes, conceits, as being representations of those externall bodies, which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a dream: and this is the reason why st. paul says, "wee know that an idol is nothing:" not that he thought that an image of metall, stone, or wood, was nothing; but that the thing which they honored, or feared in the image, and held for a god, was a meer figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence, but in the motions of the brain. and the worship of these with divine honour, is that which is in the scripture called idolatry, and rebellion against god. for god being king of the jews, and his lieutenant being first moses, and afterward the high priest; if the people had been permitted to worship, and pray to images, (which are representations of their own fancies,) they had had no farther dependence on the true god, of whom there can be no similitude; nor on his prime ministers, moses, and the high priests; but every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion of the common-wealth, and their own destruction for want of union. and therefore the first law of god was, "they should not take for gods, alienos deos, that is, the gods of other nations, but that onely true god, who vouchsafed to commune with moses, and by him to give them laws and directions, for their peace, and for their salvation from their enemies." and the second was, that "they should not make to themselves any image to worship, of their own invention." for it is the same deposing of a king, to submit to another king, whether he be set up by a neighbour nation, or by our selves. answer to certain seeming texts for images the places of scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of images, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where god is worshipped, are first, two examples; one of the cherubins over the ark of god; the other of the brazen serpent: secondly, some texts whereby we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation to god; as to worship his footstool: and lastly, some other texts, by which is authorized, a religious honoring of holy things. but before i examine the force of those places, to prove that which is pretended, i must first explain what is to be understood by worshipping, and what by images, and idols. what is worship i have already shewn in the 20 chapter of this discourse, that to honor, is to value highly the power of any person: and that such value is measured, by our comparing him with others. but because there is nothing to be compared with god in power; we honor him not but dishonour him by any value lesse than infinite. and thus honor is properly of its own nature, secret, and internall in the heart. but the inward thoughts of men, which appeare outwardly in their words and actions, are the signes of our honoring, and these goe by the name of worship, in latine, cultus. therefore, to pray to, to swear by, to obey, to bee diligent, and officious in serving: in summe, all words and actions that betoken fear to offend, or desire to please, is worship, whether those words and actions be sincere, or feigned: and because they appear as signes of honoring, are ordinarily also called honor. distinction between divine and civill worship the worship we exhibite to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings, and men in authority, is civill worship: but the worship we exhibite to that which we think to bee god, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions be, is divine worship. to fall prostrate before a king, in him that thinks him but a man, is but civill worship: and he that but putteth off his hat in the church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the house of god, worshippeth with divine worship. they that seek the distinction of divine and civill worship, not in the intention of the worshipper, but in the words douleia, and latreia, deceive themselves. for whereas there be two sorts of servants; that sort, which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters, as slaves taken in war, and their issue, whose bodies are not in their own power, (their lives depending on the will of their masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience,) and that are bought and sold as beasts, were called douloi, that is properly, slaves, and their service, douleia: the other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their masters) voluntarily; are called thetes; that is, domestique servants; to whose service the masters have no further right, than is contained in the covenants made betwixt them. these two kinds of servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by another, whether, as a slave, or a voluntary servant: and the word latris, is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether, as a slave, or a voluntary servant: so that latreia signifieth generally all service; but douleia the service of bondmen onely, and the condition of slavery: and both are used in scripture (to signifie our service of god) promiscuously. douleia, because we are gods slaves; latreia, because wee serve him: and in all kinds of service is contained, not onely obedience, but also worship, that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signifie honor. an image what phantasmes an image (in the most strict signification of the word) is the resemblance of some thing visible: in which sense the phantasticall formes, apparitions, or seemings of visible bodies to the sight, are onely images; such as are the shew of a man, or other thing in the water, by reflexion, or refraction; or of the sun, or stars by direct vision in the air; which are nothing reall in the things seen, nor in the place where thy seem to bee; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of sight, or by glasses; and are present oftentimes in our imagination, and in our dreams, when the object is absent; or changed into other colours, and shapes, as things that depend onely upon the fancy. and these are the images which are originally and most properly called ideas, and idols, and derived from the language of the graecians, with whom the word eido signifieth to see. they are also called phantasmes, which is in the same language, apparitions. and from these images it is that one of the faculties of mans nature, is called the imagination. and from hence it is manifest, that there neither is, nor can bee any image made of a thing invisible. it is also evident, that there can be no image of a thing infinite: for all the images, and phantasmes that are made by the impression of things visible, are figured: but figure is a quantity every way determined: and therefore there can bee no image of god: nor of the soule of man; nor of spirits, but onely of bodies visible, that is, bodies that have light in themselves, or are by such enlightened. fictions; materiall images and whereas a man can fancy shapes he never saw; making up a figure out of the parts of divers creatures; as the poets make their centaures, chimaeras, and other monsters never seen: so can he also give matter to those shapes, and make them in wood, clay or metall. and these are also called images, not for the resemblance of any corporeall thing, but for the resemblance of some phantasticall inhabitants of the brain of the maker. but in these idols, as they are originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the materiall body made by art, may be said to be the image of the phantasticall idoll made by nature. but in a larger use of the word image, is contained also, any representation of one thing by another. so an earthly soveraign may be called the image of god: and an inferiour magistrate the image of an earthly soveraign. and many times in the idolatry of the gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their materiall idoll to the idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the image of it. for a stone unhewn has been set up for neptune, and divers other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their gods. and at this day we see many images of the virgin mary, and other saints, unlike one another, and without correspondence to any one mans fancy; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no more but by the names onely, to represent the persons mentioned in the history; to which every man applyeth a mentall image of his owne making, or none at all. and thus an image in the largest sense, is either the resemblance, or the representation of some thing visible; or both together, as it happeneth for the most part. but the name of idoll is extended yet further in scripture, to signifie also the sunne, or a starre, or any other creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped for gods. idolatry what having shewn what is worship, and what an image; i will now put them together, and examine what that idolatry is, which is forbidden in the second commandement, and other places of the scripture. to worship an image, is voluntarily to doe those externall acts, which are signes of honoring either the matter of the image, which is wood, stone, or metall, or some other visible creature; or the phantasme of the brain, for the resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was formed and figured; or both together, as one animate body, composed of the matter and the phantasme, as of a body and soule. to be uncovered, before a man of power and authority, or before the throne of a prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to worship that man, or prince with civill worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the person; and is not idolatry. but if hee that doth it, should suppose the soule of the prince to be in the stool, or should present a petition to the stool, it were divine worship, and idolatry. to pray to a king for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves before him, is but civill worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane: but voluntarily to pray unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which god onely can doe for us, is divine worship, and idolatry. on the other side, if a king compell a man to it by the terrour of death, or other great corporall punishment, it is not idolatry: for the worship which the soveraign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the terrour of his laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a god, but that he is desirous to save himselfe from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internall honor, is no worship; and therefore no idolatry. neither can it bee said, that hee that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block before his brother; because how wise, or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of the soveraign. to worship god, in some peculiar place, or turning a mans face towards an image, or determinate place, is not to worship, or honor the place, or image; but to acknowledge it holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the image, or the place to be set apart from common use: for that is the meaning of the word holy; which implies no new quality in the place, or image; but onely a new relation by appropriation to god; and therefore is not idolatry; no more than it was idolatry to worship god before the brazen serpent; or for the jews when they were out of their owne countrey, to turn their faces (when they prayed) toward the temple of jerusalem; or for moses to put off his shoes when he was before the flaming bush, the ground appertaining to mount sinai; which place god had chosen to appear in, and to give his laws to the people of israel, and was therefore holy ground, not by inhaerent sanctity, but by separation to gods use; or for christians to worship in the churches, which are once solemnly dedicated to god for that purpose, by the authority of the king, or other true representant of the church. but to worship god, is inanimating, or inhibiting, such image, or place; that is to say, an infinite substance in a finite place, is idolatry: for such finite gods, are but idols of the brain, nothing reall; and are commonly called in the scripture by the names of vanity, and lyes, and nothing. also to worship god, not as inanimating, or present in the place, or image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or of some works of his, in case the place, or image be dedicated, or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our soveraign pastors, is idolatry. for the commandement is, "thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven image." god commanded moses to set up the brazen serpent; hee did not make it to himselfe; it was not therefore against the commandement. but the making of the golden calfe by aaron, and the people, as being done without authority from god, was idolatry; not onely because they held it for god, but also because they made it for a religious use, without warrant either from god their soveraign, or from moses, that was his lieutenant. the gentiles worshipped for gods, jupiter, and others; that living, were men perhaps that had done great and glorious acts; and for the children of god, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an immortall deity, and a mortall man. this was idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no authority from god, neither in his eternall law of reason, nor in his positive and revealed will. but though our saviour was a man, whom wee also beleeve to bee god immortall, and the son of god; yet this is no idolatry; because wee build not that beleef upon our own fancy, or judgment, but upon the word of god revealed in the scriptures. and for the adoration of the eucharist, if the words of christ, "this is my body," signifie, "that he himselfe, and the seeming bread in his hand; and not onely so, but that all the seeming morsells of bread that have ever since been, and any time hereafter shall bee consecrated by priests, bee so many christs bodies, and yet all of them but one body," then is that no idolatry, because it is authorized by our saviour: but if that text doe not signifie that, (for there is no other that can be alledged for it,) then, because it is a worship of humane institution, it is idolatry. for it is not enough to say, god can transubstantiate the bread into christs body: for the gentiles also held god to be omnipotent; and might upon that ground no lesse excuse their idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, as transubstantiation of their wood, and stone into god almighty. whereas there be, that pretend divine inspiration, to be a supernaturall entring of the holy ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of gods grace, by doctrine, and study; i think they are in a very dangerous dilemma. for if they worship not the men whom they beleeve to be so inspired, they fall into impiety; as not adoring gods supernaturall presence. and again, if they worship them, they commit idolatry; for the apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped. therefore the safest way is to beleeve, that by the descending of the dove upon the apostles; and by christs breathing on them, when hee gave them the holy ghost; and by the giving of it by imposition of hands, are understood the signes which god hath been pleased to use, or ordain to be used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach his kingdome, and in their conversation, that it might not be scandalous, but edifying to others. scandalous worship of images besides the idolatrous worship of images, there is also a scandalous worship of them; which is also a sin; but not idolatry. for idolatry is to worship by signes of an internall, and reall honour: but scandalous worship, is but seeming worship; and may sometimes bee joined with an inward, and hearty detestation, both of the image, and of the phantasticall daemon, or idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed onely from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is neverthelesse a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are looked at by others, as lights to guide them by; because following their ways, they cannot but stumble, and fall in the way of religion: whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution; and consequently are no causes of our falling. if therefore a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, doe externall honor to an idol for fear; unlesse he make his feare, and unwillingnesse to it, as evident as the worship; he scandalizeth his brother, by seeming to approve idolatry. for his brother, arguing from the action of his teacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to bee lawfull in it selfe. and this scandall, is sin, and a scandall given. but if one being no pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in christian doctrine, doe the same, and another follow him; this is no scandall given; for he had no cause to follow such example: but is a pretence of scandall which hee taketh of himselfe for an excuse before men: for an unlearned man, that is in the power of an idolatrous king, or state, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an idoll, hee detesteth the idoll in his heart, hee doth well; though if he had the fortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should doe better. but if a pastor, who as christs messenger, has undertaken to teach christs doctrine to all nations, should doe the same, it were not onely a sinfull scandall, in respect of other christian mens consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge. the summe of that which i have said hitherto, concerning the worship of images, is that, that he that worshippeth in an image, or any creature, either the matter thereof, or any fancy of his own, which he thinketh to dwell in it; or both together; or beleeveth that such things hear his prayers, or see his devotions, without ears, or eyes, committeth idolatry: and he that counterfeiteth such worship for fear of punishment, if he bee a man whose example hath power amongst his brethren, committeth a sin: but he that worshippeth the creator of the world before such an image, or in such a place as he hath not made, or chosen of himselfe, but taken from the commandement of gods word, as the jewes did in worshipping god before the cherubins, and before the brazen serpent for a time, and in, or towards the temple of jerusalem, which was also but for a time, committeth not idolatry. now for the worship of saints, and images, and reliques, and other things at this day practised in the church of rome, i say they are not allowed by the word of god, not brought into the church of rome, from the doctrine there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of the gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by the bishops of rome. answer to the argument from the cherubins, and brazen serpent as for the proofs alledged out of scripture, namely, those examples of images appointed by god to bee set up; they were not set up for the people, or any man to worship; but that they should worship god himselfe before them: as before the cherubins over the ark, and the brazen serpent. for we read not, that the priest, or any other did worship the cherubins; but contrarily wee read (2 kings 18.4.) that hezekiah brake in pieces the brazen serpent which moses had set up, because the people burnt incense to it. besides, those examples are not put for our imitation, that we also should set up images, under pretence of worshipping god before them; because the words of the second commandement, "thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven image, &c." distinguish between the images that god commanded to be set up, and those which wee set up to our selves. and therefore from the cherubins, or brazen serpent, to the images of mans devising; and from the worship commanded by god, to the will-worship of men, the argument is not good. this also is to bee considered, that as hezekiah brake in pieces the brazen serpent, because the jews did worship it, to the end they should doe so no more; so also christian soveraigns ought to break down the images which their subjects have been accustomed to worship; that there be no more occasion of such idolatry. for at this day, the ignorant people, where images are worshipped, doe really beleeve there is a divine power in the images; and are told by their pastors, that some of them have spoken; and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them; which they apprehend as done by the saint, which they think either is the image it self, or in it. the israelites, when they worshipped the calfe, did think they worshipped the god that brought them out of egypt; and yet it was idolatry, because they thought the calfe either was that god, or had him in his belly. and though some man may think it impossible for people to be so stupid, as to think the image to be god, or a saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is manifest in scripture to the contrary; where when the golden calfe was made, the people said, (exod. 32. 2.) "these are thy gods o israel;" and where the images of laban (gen. 31.30.) are called his gods. and wee see daily by experience in all sorts of people, that such men as study nothing but their food and ease, are content to beleeve any absurdity, rather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as it were by entaile unalienable, except by an expresse and new law. painting of fancies no idolatry: abusing them to religious worship is but they inferre from some other places, that it is lawfull to paint angels, and also god himselfe: as from gods walking in the garden; from jacobs seeing god at the top of the ladder; and from other visions, and dreams. but visions, and dreams whether naturall, or supernaturall, are but phantasmes: and he that painteth an image of any of them, maketh not an image of god, but of his own phantasm, which is, making of an idol. i say not, that to draw a picture after a fancy, is a sin; but when it is drawn, to hold it for a representation of god, is against the second commandement; and can be of no use, but to worship. and the same may be said of the images of angels, and of men dead; unlesse as monuments of friends, or of men worthy remembrance: for such use of an image, is not worship of the image; but a civill honoring of the person, not that is, but that was: but when it is done to the image which we make of a saint, for no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is pleased with the honour wee doe him, when dead, and without sense, wee attribute to him more than humane power; and therefore it is idolatry. seeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the law of moses, nor in the gospel, for the religious worship of images, or other representations of god, which men set up to themselves; or for the worship of the image of any creature in heaven, or earth, or under the earth: and whereas christian kings, who are living representants of god, are not to be worshipped by their subjects, by any act, that signifieth a greater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortall man is capable of; it cannot be imagined, that the religious worship now in use, was brought into the church, by misunderstanding of the scripture. it resteth therefore, that it was left in it, by not destroying the images themselves, in the conversion of the gentiles that worshipped them. how idolatry was left in the church the cause whereof, was the immoderate esteem, and prices set upon the workmanship of them, which made the owners (though converted, from worshipping them as they had done religiously for daemons) to retain them still in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honor of christ, of the virgin mary, and of the apostles, and other the pastors of the primitive church; as being easie, by giving them new names, to make that an image of the virgin mary, and of her sonne our saviour, which before perhaps was called the image of venus, and cupid; and so of a jupiter to make a barnabas, and of mercury a paul, and the like. and as worldly ambition creeping by degrees into the pastors, drew them to an endeavour of pleasing the new made christians; and also to a liking of this kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease, as well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the images of christ and his apostles, grow more and more idolatrous; save that somewhat after the time of constantine, divers emperors, and bishops, and generall councells observed, and opposed the unlawfulnesse thereof; but too late, or too weakly. canonizing of saints the canonizing of saints, is another relique of gentilisme: it is neither a misunderstanding of scripture, nor a new invention of the roman church, but a custome as ancient as the common-wealth of rome it self. the first that ever was canonized at rome, was romulus, and that upon the narration of julius proculus, that swore before the senate, he spake with him after his death, and was assured by him, he dwelt in heaven, and was there called quirinius, and would be propitious to the state of their new city: and thereupon the senate gave publique testimony of his sanctity. julius caesar, and other emperors after him, had the like testimony; that is, were canonized for saints; now defined; and is the same with the apotheosis of the heathen. the name of pontifex it is also from the roman heathen, that the popes have received the name, and power of pontifex maximus. this was the name of him that in the ancient common-wealth of rome, had the supreme authority under the senate and people, of regulating all ceremonies, and doctrines concerning their religion: and when augustus caesar changed the state into a monarchy, he took to himselfe no more but this office, and that of tribune of the people, (than is to say, the supreme power both in state, and religion;) and the succeeding emperors enjoyed the same. but when the emperour constantine lived, who was the first that professed and authorized christian religion, it was consonant to his profession, to cause religion to be regulated (under his authority) by the bishop of rome: though it doe not appear they had so soon the name of pontifex; but rather, that the succeeding bishops took it of themselves, to countenance the power they exercised over the bishops of the roman provinces. for it is not any priviledge of st. peter, but the priviledge of the city of rome, which the emperors were alwaies willing to uphold; that gave them such authority over other bishops; as may be evidently seen by that, that the bishop of constantinople, when the emperour made that city the seat of the empire, pretended to bee equall to the bishop of rome; though at last, not without contention, the pope carryed it, and became the pontifex maximus; but in right onely of the emperour; and not without the bounds of the empire; nor any where, after the emperour had lost his power in rome; though it were the pope himself that took his power from him. from whence wee may by the way observe, that there is no place for the superiority of the pope over other bishops, except in the territories whereof he is himself the civill soveraign; and where the emperour having soveraign power civill, hath expressely chosen the pope for the chief pastor under himselfe, of his christian subjects. procession of images the carrying about of images in procession, is another relique of the religion of the greeks, and romans: for they also carried their idols from place to place, in a kind of chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use, which the latines called thensa, and vehiculum deorum; and the image was placed in a frame, or shrine, which they called ferculum: and that which they called pompa, is the same that now is named procession: according whereunto, amongst the divine honors which were given to julius caesar by the senate, this was one, that in the pompe (or procession) at the circaean games, he should have thensam & ferculum, a sacred chariot, and a shrine; which was as much, as to be carried up and down as a god: just as at this day the popes are carried by switzers under a canopie. wax candles, and torches lighted to these processions also belonged the bearing of burning torches, and candles, before the images of the gods, both amongst the greeks, and romans. for afterwards the emperors of rome received the same honor; as we read of caligula, that at his reception to the empire, he was carried from misenum to rome, in the midst of a throng of people, the wayes beset with altars, and beasts for sacrifice, and burning torches: and of caracalla that was received into alexandria with incense, and with casting of flowers, and dadouchiais, that is, with torches; for dadochoi were they that amongst the greeks carried torches lighted in the processions of their gods: and in processe of time, the devout, but ignorant people, did many times honor their bishops with the like pompe of wax candles, and the images of our saviour, and the saints, constantly, in the church it self. and thus came in the use of wax candles; and was also established by some of the ancient councells. the heathens had also their aqua lustralis, that is to say, holy water. the church of rome imitates them also in their holy dayes. they had their bacchanalia; and we have our wakes, answering to them: they their saturnalia, and we our carnevalls, and shrove-tuesdays liberty of servants: they their procession of priapus; wee our fetching in, erection, and dancing about may-poles; and dancing is one kind of worship: they had their procession called ambarvalia; and we our procession about the fields in the rogation week. nor do i think that these are all the ceremonies that have been left in the church, from the first conversion of the gentiles: but they are all that i can for the present call to mind; and if a man would wel observe that which is delivered in the histories, concerning the religious rites of the greeks and romanes, i doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty bottles of gentilisme, which the doctors of the romane church, either by negligence, or ambition, have filled up again with the new wine of christianity, that will not faile in time to break them. chapter xlvi. of darknesse from vain philosophy, and fabulous traditions what philosophy is by philosophy is understood "the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from the manner of the generation of any thing, to the properties; or from the properties, to some possible way of generation of the same; to the end to bee able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force permit, such effects, as humane life requireth." so the geometrician, from the construction of figures, findeth out many properties thereof; and from the properties, new ways of their construction, by reasoning; to the end to be able to measure land and water; and for infinite other uses. so the astronomer, from the rising, setting, and moving of the sun, and starres, in divers parts of the heavens, findeth out the causes of day, and night, and of the different seasons of the year; whereby he keepeth an account of time: and the like of other sciences. prudence no part of philosophy by which definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any part thereof, that originall knowledge called experience, in which consisteth prudence: because it is not attained by reasoning, but found as well in brute beasts, as in man; and is but a memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent: whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but generall, eternall, and immutable truth. no false doctrine is part of philosophy nor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions: for he that reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an error: no more is revelation supernaturall nor to that which any man knows by supernaturall revelation; because it is not acquired by reasoning: nor learning taken upon credit of authors nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books; because it is not by reasoning from the cause to the effect, nor from the effect to the cause; and is not knowledge, but faith. of the beginnings and progresse of philosophy the faculty of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech, it was not possible, but that there should have been some generall truthes found out by reasoning, as ancient almost as language it selfe. the savages of america, are not without some good morall sentences; also they have a little arithmetick, to adde, and divide in numbers not too great: but they are not therefore philosophers. for as there were plants of corn and wine in small quantity dispersed in the fields and woods, before men knew their vertue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted them apart in fields, and vineyards; in which time they fed on akorns, and drank water: so also there have been divers true, generall, and profitable speculations from the beginning; as being the naturall plants of humane reason: but they were at first but few in number; men lived upon grosse experience; there was no method; that is to say, no sowing, nor planting of knowledge by it self, apart from the weeds, and common plants of errour and conjecture: and the cause of it being the want of leasure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great common-wealths, it should be otherwise. leasure is the mother of philosophy; and common-wealth, the mother of peace, and leasure: where first were great and flourishing cities, there was first the study of philosophy. the gymnosophists of india, the magi of persia, and the priests of chaldea and egypt, are counted the most ancient philosophers; and those countreys were the most ancient of kingdomes. philosophy was not risen to the graecians, and other people of the west, whose common-wealths (no greater perhaps then lucca, or geneva) had never peace, but when their fears of one another were equall; nor the leasure to observe any thing but one another. at length, when warre had united many of these graecian lesser cities, into fewer, and greater; then began seven men, of severall parts of greece, to get the reputation of being wise; some of them for morall and politique sentences; and others for the learning of the chaldeans and egyptians, which was astronomy, and geometry. but we hear not yet of any schools of philosophy. of the schools of philosophy amongst the athenians after the athenians by the overthrow of the persian armies, had gotten the dominion of the sea; and thereby, of all the islands, and maritime cities of the archipelago, as well of asia as europe; and were grown wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home, nor abroad, had little else to employ themselves in, but either (as st. luke says, acts 17.21.) "in telling and hearing news," or in discoursing of philosophy publiquely to the youth of the city. every master took some place for that purpose. plato in certaine publique walks called academia, from one academus: aristotle in the walk of the temple of pan, called lycaeum: others in the stoa, or covered walk, wherein the merchants goods were brought to land: others in other places; where they spent the time of their leasure, in teaching or in disputing of their opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of the city together to hear them talk. and this was it which carneades also did at rome, when he was ambassadour: which caused cato to advise the senate to dispatch him quickly, for feare of corrupting the manners of the young men that delighted to hear him speak (as they thought) fine things. from this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed, was called schola, which in their tongue signifieth leasure; and their disputations, diatribae, that is to say, passing of the time. also the philosophers themselves had the name of their sects, some of them from these their schools: for they that followed plato's doctrine, were called academiques; the followers of aristotle, peripatetiques, from the walk hee taught in; and those that zeno taught, stoiques, from the stoa: as if we should denominate men from more-fields, from pauls-church, and from the exchange, because they meet there often, to prate and loyter. neverthelesse, men were so much taken with this custome, that in time it spread it selfe over all europe, and the best part of afrique; so as there were schools publiquely erected, and maintained for lectures, and disputations, almost in every common-wealth. of the schools of the jews there were also schools, anciently, both before, and after the time of our saviour, amongst the jews: but they were schools of their law. for though they were called synagogues, that is to say, congregations of the people; yet in as much as the law was every sabbath day read, expounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in name onely from publique schools; and were not onely in jerusalem, but in every city of the gentiles, where the jews inhabited. there was such a schoole at damascus, whereinto paul entred, to persecute. there were others at antioch, iconium and thessalonica, whereinto he entred, to dispute: and such was the synagogue of the libertines, cyrenians, alexandrians, cilicians, and those of asia; that is to say, the schoole of libertines, and of jewes, that were strangers in jerusalem: and of this schoole they were that disputed with saint steven. the schoole of graecians unprofitable but what has been the utility of those schools? what science is there at this day acquired by their readings and disputings? that wee have of geometry, which is the mother of all naturall science, wee are not indebted for it to the schools. plato that was the best philosopher of the greeks, forbad entrance into his schoole, to all that were not already in some measure geometricians. there were many that studied that science to the great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their schools; nor was there any sect of geometricians; nor did they then passe under the name of philosophers. the naturall philosophy of those schools, was rather a dream than science, and set forth in senselesse and insignificant language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach philosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in geometry: for nature worketh by motion; the wayes, and degrees whereof cannot be known, without the knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines, and figures. their morall philosophy is but a description of their own passions. for the rule of manners, without civill government, is the law of nature; and in it, the law civill; that determineth what is honest, and dishonest; what is just, and unjust; and generally what is good, and evill: whereas they make the rules of good, and bad, by their own liking, and disliking: by which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of common-wealth. their logique which should bee the method of reasoning, is nothing else but captions of words, and inventions how to puzzle such as should goe about to pose them. to conclude there is nothing so absurd, that the old philosophers (as cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some of them maintained. and i beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall philosophy, than that which now is called aristotles metaphysiques, nor more repugnant to government, than much of that hee hath said in his politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his ethiques. the schools of the jews unprofitable the schoole of the jews, was originally a schoole of the law of moses; who commanded (deut. 31.10.) that at the end of every seventh year, at the feast of the tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they might hear, and learn it: therefore the reading of the law (which was in use after the captivity) every sabbath day, ought to have had no other end, but the acquainting of the people with the commandements which they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the prophets. but it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our saviour, that they corrupted the text of the law with their false commentaries, and vain traditions; and so little understood the prophets, that they did neither acknowledge christ, nor the works he did; for which the prophets prophecyed. so that by their lectures and disputations in their synagogues, they turned the doctrine of their law into a phantasticall kind of philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible nature of god, and of spirits; which they compounded of the vain philosophy and theology of the graecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer places of the scripture, and which might most easily bee wrested to their purpose; and from the fabulous traditions of their ancestors. university what it is that which is now called an university, is a joyning together, and an incorporation under one government of many publique schools, in one and the same town or city. in which, the principal schools were ordained for the three professions, that is to say, of the romane religion, of the romane law, and of the art of medicine. and for the study of philosophy it hath no otherwise place, then as a handmaid to the romane religion: and since the authority of aristotle is onely current there, that study is not properly philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on authors,) but aristotelity. and for geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigide truth. and if any man by the ingenuity of his owne nature, had attained to any degree of perfection therein, hee was commonly thought a magician, and his art diabolicall. errors brought into religion from aristotles metaphysiques now to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to the universities, and thence into the church, partly from aristotle, partly from blindnesse of understanding; i shall first consider their principles. there is a certain philosophia prima, on which all other philosophy ought to depend; and consisteth principally, in right limiting of the significations of such appellations, or names, as are of all others the most universall: which limitations serve to avoid ambiguity, and aequivocation in reasoning; and are commonly called definitions; such as are the definitions of body, time, place, matter, forme, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and divers others, necessary to the explaining of a mans conceptions concerning the nature and generation of bodies. the explication (that is, the setling of the meaning) of which, and the like terms, is commonly in the schools called metaphysiques; as being a part of the philosophy of aristotle, which hath that for title: but it is in another sense; for there it signifieth as much, as "books written, or placed after his naturall philosophy:" but the schools take them for books of supernaturall philosophy: for the word metaphysiques will bear both these senses. and indeed that which is there written, is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood, and so repugnant to naturall reason, that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to bee understood by it, must needs think it supernaturall. errors concerning abstract essences from these metaphysiques, which are mingled with the scripture to make schoole divinity, wee are told, there be in the world certaine essences separated from bodies, which they call abstract essences, and substantiall formes: for the interpreting of which jargon, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. also i ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of discourse, for applying my selfe to those that are. the world, (i mean not the earth onely, that denominates the lovers of it worldly men, but the universe, that is, the whole masse of all things that are) is corporeall, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, bredth, and depth: also every part of body, is likewise body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the universe, is body, and that which is not body, is no part of the universe: and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing; and consequently no where. nor does it follow from hence, that spirits are nothing: for they have dimensions, and are therefore really bodies; though that name in common speech be given to such bodies onely, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some degree of opacity: but for spirits, they call them incorporeall; which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety bee attributed to god himselfe; in whom wee consider not what attribute expresseth best his nature, which is incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire to honour him. to know now upon what grounds they say there be essences abstract, or substantiall formes, wee are to consider what those words do properly signifie. the use of words, is to register to our selves, and make manifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. of which words, some are the names of the things conceived; as the names of all sorts of bodies, that work upon the senses, and leave an impression in the imagination: others are the names of the imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those ideas, or mentall images we have of all things wee see, or remember: and others againe are names of names; or of different sorts of speech: as universall, plurall, singular, negation, true, false, syllogisme, interrogation, promise, covenant, are the names of certain forms of speech. others serve to shew the consequence, or repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, "a man is a body," hee intendeth that the name of body is necessarily consequent to the name of man; as being but severall names of the same thing, man; which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word is. and as wee use the verbe is; so the latines use their verbe est, and the greeks their esti through all its declinations. whether all other nations of the world have in their severall languages a word that answereth to it, or not, i cannot tell; but i am sure they have not need of it: for the placing of two names in order may serve to signifie their consequence, if it were the custome, (for custome is it, that give words their force,) as well as the words is, or bee, or are, and the like. and if it were so, that there were a language without any verb answerable to est, or is, or bee; yet the men that used it would bee not a jot the lesse capable of inferring, concluding, and of all kind of reasoning, than were the greeks, and latines. but what then would become of these terms, of entity, essence, essentiall, essentially, that are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applyed as most commonly they are? they are therefore no names of things; but signes, by which wee make known, that wee conceive the consequence of one name or attribute to another: as when we say, "a man, is, a living body," wee mean not that the man is one thing, the living body another, and the is, or beeing a third: but that the man, and the living body, is the same thing: because the consequence, "if hee bee a man, hee is a living body," is a true consequence, signified by that word is. therefore, to bee a body, to walke, to bee speaking, to live, to see, and the like infinitives; also corporeity, walking, speaking, life, sight, and the like, that signifie just the same, are the names of nothing; as i have elsewhere more amply expressed. but to what purpose (may some man say) is such subtilty in a work of this nature, where i pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience? it is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain philosophy of aristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their countrey, with empty names; as men fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. for it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soule (that is his life) can walk separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. upon the same ground they say, that the figure, and colour, and tast of a peece of bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no bread: and upon the same ground they say, that faith, and wisdome, and other vertues are sometimes powred into a man, sometimes blown into him from heaven; as if the vertuous, and their vertues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of subjects on the soveraign power of their countrey. for who will endeavour to obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be powred or blown into him? or who will not obey a priest, that can make god, rather than his soveraign; nay than god himselfe? or who, that is in fear of ghosts, will not bear great respect to those that can make the holy water, that drives them from him? and this shall suffice for an example of the errors, which are brought into the church, from the entities, and essences of aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their religion; and fearing the fate of socrates. being once fallen into this error of separated essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. for seeing they will have these forms to be reall, they are obliged to assign them some place. but because they hold them incorporeall, without all dimension of quantity, and all men know that place is dimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is corporeall; they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where circumscriptive, but definitive: which terms being meer words, and in this occasion insignificant, passe onely in latine, that the vanity of them may bee concealed. for the circumscription of a thing, is nothing else but the determination, or defining of its place; and so both the terms of the distinction are the same. and in particular, of the essence of a man, which (they say) is his soule, they affirm it, to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part (how small soever) of his body; and yet no more soule in the whole body, than in any one of those parts. can any man think that god is served with such absurdities? and yet all this is necessary to beleeve, to those that will beleeve the existence of an incorporeall soule, separated from the body. and when they come to give account, how an incorporeall substance can be capable of pain, and be tormented in the fire of hell, or purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can burn soules. again, whereas motion is change of place, and incorporeall substances are not capable of place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a soule can goe hence, without the body to heaven, hell, or purgatory; and how the ghosts of men (and i may adde of their clothes which they appear in) can walk by night in churches, church-yards, and other places of sepulture. to which i know not what they can answer, unlesse they will say, they walke definitive, not circumscriptive, or spiritually, not temporally: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatsoever. nunc-stans for the meaning of eternity, they will not have it to be an endlesse succession of time; for then they should not be able to render a reason how gods will, and praeordaining of things to come, should not be before his praescience of the same, as the efficient cause before the effect, or agent before the action; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning the incomprehensible nature of god. but they will teach us, that eternity is the standing still of the present time, a nunc-stans (as the schools call it;) which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they would a hic-stans for an infinite greatnesse of place. one body in many places, and many bodies in one place at once and whereas men divide a body in their thought, by numbring parts of it, and in numbring those parts, number also the parts of the place it filled; it cannot be, but in making many parts, wee make also many places of those parts; whereby there cannot bee conceived in the mind of any man, more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have us beleeve, that by the almighty power of god, one body may be at one and the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same time in one place; as if it were an acknowledgment of the divine power, to say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. and these are but a small part of the incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing philosophically, in stead of admiring, and adoring of the divine and incomprehensible nature; whose attributes cannot signifie what he is, but ought to signifie our desire to honour him, with the best appellations we can think on. but they that venture to reason of his nature, from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when a man ignorant of the ceremonies of court, comming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himselfe from falling, lets slip his cloake; to recover his cloake, lets fall his hat; and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity. absurdities in naturall philosophy, as gravity the cause of heavinesse then for physiques, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate, and secundary causes of naturall events; they render none at all, but empty words. if you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the earth, and others goe naturally from it; the schools will tell you out of aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards, are heavy; and that this heavinesse is it that causes them to descend: but if you ask what they mean by heavinesse, they will define it to bee an endeavour to goe to the center of the earth: so that the cause why things sink downward, is an endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say, that bodies descend, or ascend, because they doe. or they will tell you the center of the earth is the place of rest, and conservation for heavy things; and therefore they endeavour to be there: as if stones, and metalls had a desire, or could discern the place they would bee at, as man does; or loved rest, as man does not; or that a peece of glasse were lesse safe in the window, than falling into the street. quantity put into body already made if we would know why the same body seems greater (without adding to it) one time, than another; they say, when it seems lesse, it is condensed; when greater, rarefied. what is that condensed, and rarefied? condensed, is when there is in the very same matter, lesse quantity than before; and rarefied, when more. as if there could be matter, that had not some determined quantity; when quantity is nothing else but the determination of matter; that is to say of body, by which we say one body is greater, or lesser than another, by thus, or thus much. or as if a body were made without any quantity at all, and that afterwards more, or lesse were put into it, according as it is intended the body should be more, or lesse dense. powring in of soules for the cause of the soule of man, they say, creatur infundendo, and creando infunditur: that is, "it is created by powring it in," and "powred in by creation." ubiquity of apparition for the cause of sense, an ubiquity of species; that is, of the shews or apparitions of objects; which when they be apparitions to the eye, is sight; when to the eare, hearing; to the palate, tast; to the nostrill, smelling; and to the rest of the body, feeling. will, the cause of willing for cause of the will, to doe any particular action, which is called volitio, they assign the faculty, that is to say, the capacity in generall, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called voluntas; making the power the cause of the act: as if one should assign for cause of the good or evill acts of men, their ability to doe them. ignorance an occult cause and in many occasions they put for cause of naturall events, their own ignorance, but disguised in other words: as when they say, fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause: and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities; that is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also (as they thinke) to no man else. and to sympathy, antipathy, antiperistasis, specificall qualities, and other like termes, which signifie neither the agent that produceth them, nor the operation by which they are produced. if such metaphysiques, and physiques as this, be not vain philosophy, there was never any; nor needed st. paul to give us warning to avoid it. one makes the things incongruent, another the incongruity and for their morall, and civill philosophy, it hath the same, or greater absurdities. if a man doe an action of injustice, that is to say, an action contrary to the law, god they say is the prime cause of the law, and also the prime cause of that, and all other actions; but no cause at all of the injustice; which is the inconformity of the action to the law. this is vain philosophy. a man might as well say, that one man maketh both a streight line, and a crooked, and another maketh their incongruity. and such is the philosophy of all men that resolve of their conclusions, before they know their premises; pretending to comprehend, that which is incomprehensible; and of attributes of honour to make attributes of nature; as this distinction was made to maintain the doctrine of free-will, that is, of a will of man, not subject to the will of god. private appetite the rule of publique good: aristotle, and other heathen philosophers define good, and evill, by the appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own law: for in the condition of men that have no other law but their own appetites, there can be no generall rule of good, and evill actions. but in a common-wealth this measure is false: not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state is the measure. and yet is this doctrine still practised; and men judge the goodnesse, or wickednesse of their own, and of other mens actions, and of the actions of the common-wealth it selfe, by their own passions; and no man calleth good or evill, but that which is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the publique laws; except onely monks, and friers, that are bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superiour, to which every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civill soveraign. and this private measure of good, is a doctrine, not onely vain, but also pernicious to the publique state. and that lawfull marriage is unchastity it is also vain and false philosophy, to say the work of marriage is repugnant to chastity, or continence, and by consequence to make them morall vices; as they doe, that pretend chastity, and continence, for the ground of denying marriage to the clergy. for they confesse it is no more, but a constitution of the church, that requireth in those holy orders that continually attend the altar, and administration of the eucharist, a continuall abstinence from women, under the name of continuall chastity, continence, and purity. therefore they call the lawfull use of wives, want of chastity, and continence; and so make marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure, and unclean, as to render a man unfit for the altar. if the law were made because the use of wives is incontinence, and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice; if because it is a thing too impure, and unclean for a man consecrated to god; much more should other naturall, necessary, and daily works which all men doe, render men unworthy to bee priests, because they are more unclean. but the secret foundation of this prohibition of marriage of priests, is not likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errours in morall philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdome of st. paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of persecution were preachers of the gospel, and forced to fly from one countrey to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children; but upon the design of the popes, and priests of after times, to make themselves the clergy, that is to say, sole heirs of the kingdome of god in this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of marriage, because our saviour saith, that at the coming of his kingdome the children of god shall "neither marry, nor bee given in marriage, but shall bee as the angels in heaven;" that is to say, spirituall. seeing then they had taken on them the name of spirituall, to have allowed themselves (when there was no need) the propriety of wives, had been an incongruity. and that all government but popular, is tyranny from aristotles civill philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of common-wealths but the popular, (such as was at that time the state of athens,) tyranny. all kings they called tyrants; and the aristocracy of the thirty governours set up there by the lacedemonians that subdued them, the thirty tyrants: as also to call the condition of the people under the democracy, liberty. a tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a monarch: but when afterwards in most parts of greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signifie, not onely the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the popular states bare towards it: as also the name of king became odious after the deposing of the kings in rome, as being a thing naturall to all men, to conceive some great fault to be signified in any attribute, that is given in despight, and to a great enemy. and when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the democracy, or aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to expresse their anger in; but call readily the one anarchy, and the other oligarchy, or the tyranny of a few. and that which offendeth the people, is no other thing, but that they are governed, not as every one of them would himselfe, but as the publique representant, be it one man, or an assembly of men thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government: for which they give evill names to their superiors; never knowing (till perhaps a little after a civill warre) that without such arbitrary government, such warre must be perpetuall; and that it is men, and arms, not words, and promises, that make the force and power of the laws. that not men, but law governs and therefore this is another errour of aristotles politiques, that in a wel ordered common-wealth, not men should govern, but the laws. what man, that has his naturall senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and beleeves can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? or that beleeves the law can hurt him; that is, words, and paper, without the hands, and swords of men? and this is of the number of pernicious errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like not their governours, to adhaere to those that call them tyrants, and to think it lawfull to raise warre against them: and yet they are many times cherished from the pulpit, by the clergy. laws over the conscience there is another errour in their civill philosophy (which they never learned of aristotle, nor cicero, nor any other of the heathen,) to extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions onely, to the very thoughts, and consciences of men, by examination, and inquisition of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and actions: by which, men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment. it is true, that the civill magistrate, intending to employ a minister in the charge of teaching, may enquire of him, if hee bee content to preach such, and such doctrines; and in case of refusall, may deny him the employment: but to force him to accuse himselfe of opinions, when his actions are not by law forbidden, is against the law of nature; and especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to eternall and extream torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an article of the christian faith. for who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in an error, when the naturall care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation? private interpretation of law for a private man, without the authority of the common-wealth, that is to say, without permission from the representant thereof, to interpret the law by his own spirit, is another error in the politiques; but not drawn from aristotle, nor from any other of the heathen philosophers. for none of them deny, but that in the power of making laws, is comprehended also the power of explaining them when there is need. and are not the scriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority of the common-wealth, and consequently, a part of the civill law? of the same kind it is also, when any but the soveraign restraineth in any man that power which the common-wealth hath not restrained: as they do, that impropriate the preaching of the gospell to one certain order of men, where the laws have left it free. if the state give me leave to preach, or teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. if i find my selfe amongst the idolaters of america, shall i that am a christian, though not in orders, think it a sin to preach jesus christ, till i have received orders from rome? or when i have preached, shall not i answer their doubts, and expound the scriptures to them; that is shall i not teach? but for this may some say, as also for administring to them the sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient mission; which is true: but this is true also, that for whatsoever, a dispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation, when there is no law that forbids it. therefore to deny these functions to those, to whom the civill soveraigne hath not denyed them, is a taking away of a lawfull liberty, which is contrary to the doctrine of civill government. language of schoole-divines more examples of vain philosophy, brought into religion by the doctors of schoole-divinity, might be produced; but other men may if they please observe them of themselves. i shall onely adde this, that the writings of schoole-divines, are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant traines of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used, then in the common use of the latine tongue; such as would pose cicero, and varro, and all the grammarians of ancient rome. which if any man would see proved, let him (as i have said once before) see whether he can translate any schoole-divine into any of the modern tongues, as french, english, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in most of these be made intelligible, is no intelligible in the latine. which insignificancy of language, though i cannot note it for false philosophy; yet it hath a quality, not onely to hide the truth, but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further search. errors from tradition lastly, for the errors brought in from false, or uncertain history, what is all the legend of fictitious miracles, in the lives of the saints; and all the histories of apparitions, and ghosts, alledged by the doctors of the romane church, to make good their doctrines of hell, and purgatory, the power of exorcisme, and other doctrines which have no warrant, neither in reason, nor scripture; as also all those traditions which they call the unwritten word of god; but old wives fables? whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the writings of the ancient fathers; yet those fathers were men, that might too easily beleeve false reports; and the producing of their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they beleeved, hath no other force with them that (according to the counsell of st. john 1 epist. chap. 4. verse 1.) examine spirits, than in all things that concern the power of the romane church, (the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it,) to discredit their testimony, in respect of too rash beleef of reports; which the most sincere men, without great knowledge of naturall causes, (such as the fathers were) are commonly the most subject to: for naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. gregory the pope, and s. bernard have somewhat of apparitions of ghosts, that said they were in purgatory; and so has our beda: but no where, i beleeve, but by report from others. but if they, or any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby confirm the more such vain reports; but discover their own infirmity, or fraud. suppression of reason with the introduction of false, we may joyn also the suppression of true philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawfull authority, nor sufficient study, are competent judges of the truth. our own navigations make manifest, and all men learned in humane sciences, now acknowledge there are antipodes: and every day it appeareth more and more, that years, and dayes are determined by motions of the earth. neverthelesse, men that have in their writings but supposed such doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for, and against it, have been punished for it by authority ecclesiasticall. but what reason is there for it? is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? that cannot be, if they be true. let therefore the truth be first examined by competent judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. is it because they be contrary to the religion established? let them be silenced by the laws of those, to whom the teachers of them are subject; that is, by the laws civill: for disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that against the laws teach even true philosophy. is it because they tend to disorder in government, as countenancing rebellion, or sedition? then let them be silenced, and the teachers punished by vertue of his power to whom the care of the publique quiet is committed; which is the authority civill. for whatsoever power ecclesiastiques take upon themselves (in any place where they are subject to the state) in their own right, though they call it gods right, is but usurpation. chapter xlvii. of the benefit that proceedeth from such darknesse, and to whom it accreweth he that receiveth benefit by a fact, is presumed to be the author cicero maketh honorable mention of one of the cassii, a severe judge amongst the romans, for a custome he had, in criminal causes, (when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient,) to ask the accusers, cui bono; that is to say, what profit, honor, or other contentment, the accused obtained, or expected by the fact. for amongst praesumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the author, as doth the benefit of the action. by the same rule i intend in this place to examine, who they may be, that have possessed the people so long in this part of christendome, with these doctrines, contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind. that the church militant is the kingdome of god, was first taught by the church of rome and first, to this error, that the present church now militant on earth, is the kingdome of god, (that is, the kingdome of glory, or the land of promise; not the kingdome of grace, which is but a promise of the land,) are annexed these worldly benefits, first, that the pastors, and teachers of the church, are entitled thereby, as gods publique ministers, to a right of governing the church; and consequently (because the church, and common-wealth are the same persons) to be rectors, and governours of the common-wealth. by this title it is, that the pope prevailed with the subjects of all christian princes, to beleeve, that to disobey him, was to disobey christ himselfe; and in all differences between him and other princes, (charmed with the word power spirituall,) to abandon their lawfull soveraigns; which is in effect an universall monarchy over all christendome. for though they were first invested in the right of being supreme teachers of christian doctrine, by, and under christian emperors, within the limits of the romane empire (as is acknowledged by themselves) by the title of pontifex maximus, who was an officer subject to the civill state; yet after the empire was divided, and dissolved, it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subject to them, another title, namely, the right of st. peter; not onely to save entire their pretended power; but also to extend the same over the same christian provinces, though no more united in the empire of rome. this benefit of an universall monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear rule) is a sufficient presumption, that the popes that pretended to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the authors of the doctrine, by which it was obtained; namely, that the church now on earth, is the kingdome of christ. for that granted, it must be understood, that christ hath some lieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his commandements. after that certain churches had renounced this universall power of the pope, one would expect in reason, that the civill soveraigns in all those churches, should have recovered so much of it, as (before they had unadvisedly let it goe) was their own right, and in their own hands. and in england it was so in effect; saving that they, by whom the kings administred the government of religion, by maintaining their imployment to be in gods right, seemed to usurp, if not a supremacy, yet an independency on the civill power: and they but seemed to usurp it, in as much as they acknowledged a right in the king, to deprive them of the exercise of their functions at his pleasure. and maintained also by the presbytery but in those places where the presbytery took that office, though many other doctrines of the church of rome were forbidden to be taught; yet this doctrine, that the kingdome of christ is already come, and that it began at the resurrection of our saviour, was still retained. but cui bono? what profit did they expect from it? the same which the popes expected: to have a soveraign power over the people. for what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful king, but to keep him from all places of gods publique service in his own kingdom? and with force to resist him, when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? or what is it, without authority from the civill soveraign, to excommunicate any person, but to take from him his lawfull liberty, that is, to usurpe an unlawfull power over their brethren? the authors therefore of this darknesse in religion, are the romane, and the presbyterian clergy. infallibility to this head, i referre also all those doctrines, that serve them to keep the possession of this spirituall soveraignty after it is gotten. as first, that the pope in his publique capacity cannot erre. for who is there, that beleeving this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatsoever he commands? subjection of bishops secondly, that all other bishops, in what common-wealth soever, have not their right, neither immediately from god, nor mediately from their civill soveraigns, but from the pope, is a doctrine, by which there comes to be in every christian common-wealth many potent men, (for so are bishops,) that have their dependance on the pope, and owe obedience to him, though he be a forraign prince; by which means he is able, (as he hath done many times) to raise a civill war against the state that submits not it self to be governed according to his pleasure and interest. exemptions of the clergy thirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other priests, and of all monkes, and fryers, from the power of the civill laws. for by this means, there is a great part of every common-wealth, that enjoy the benefit of the laws, and are protected by the power of the civill state, which neverthelesse pay no part of the publique expence; nor are lyable to the penalties, as other subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently, stand not in fear of any man, but the pope; and adhere to him onely, to uphold his universall monarchy. the names of sacerdotes, and sacrifices fourthly, the giving to their priests (which is no more in the new testament but presbyters, that is, elders) the name of sacerdotes, that is, sacrificers, which was the title of the civill soveraign, and his publique ministers, amongst the jews, whilest god was their king. also, the making the lords supper a sacrifice, serveth to make the people beleeve the pope hath the same power over all christian, that moses and aaron had over the jews; that is to say, all power, both civill and ecclesiasticall, as the high priest then had. the sacramentation of marriage fiftly, the teaching that matrimony is a sacrament, giveth to the clergy the judging of the lawfulnesse of marriages; and thereby, of what children are legitimate; and consequently, of the right of succession to haereditary kingdomes. the single life of priests sixtly, the deniall of marriage to priests, serveth to assure this power of the pope over kings. for if a king be a priest, he cannot marry, and transmit his kingdome to his posterity; if he be not a priest then the pope pretendeth this authority ecclesiasticall over him, and over his people. auricular confession seventhly, from auricular confession, they obtain, for the assurance of their power, better intelligence of the designs of princes, and great persons in the civill state, than these can have of the designs of the state ecclesiasticall. canonization of saints, and declaring of martyrs eighthly, by the canonization of saints, and declaring who are martyrs, they assure their power, in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civill soveraigns even to death, if by the popes excommunication, they be declared heretiques or enemies to the church; that is, (as they interpret it,) to the pope. transubstantiation, penance, absolution ninthly, they assure the same, by the power they ascribe to every priest, of making christ; and by the power of ordaining pennance; and of remitting, and retaining of sins. purgatory, indulgences, externall works tenthly, by the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by externall works, and of indulgences, the clergy is enriched. daemonology and exorcism eleventhly, by their daemonology, and the use of exorcisme, and other things appertaining thereto, they keep (or thinke they keep) the people more in awe of their power. school-divinity lastly, the metaphysiques, ethiques, and politiques of aristotle, the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the schoolmen, taught in the universities, (which have been all erected and regulated by the popes authority,) serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the ignis fatuus of vain philosophy, for the light of the gospell. the authors of spirituall darknesse, who they be to these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up of an unlawfull power over the lawfull soveraigns of christian people; or for the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly riches, honour, and authority of those that sustain it. and therefore by the aforesaid rule, of cui bono, we may justly pronounce for the authors of all this spirituall darknesse, the pope, and roman clergy, and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the mindes of men this erroneous doctrine, that the church now on earth, is that kingdome of god mentioned in the old and new testament. but the emperours, and other christian soveraigns, under whose government these errours, and the like encroachments of ecclesiastiques upon their office, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions, and of the tranquillity of their subjects, though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the sequel, and of insight into the designs of their teachers, may neverthelesse bee esteemed accessories to their own, and the publique dammage; for without their authority there could at first no seditious doctrine have been publiquely preached. i say they might have hindred the same in the beginning: but when the people were once possessed by those spirituall men, there was no humane remedy to be applyed, that any man could invent: and for the remedies that god should provide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the machinations of men against the truth, wee are to attend his good pleasure, that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence thereof openeth the eyes, which the warinesse of their predecessours had before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let goe all, as peters net was broken, by the struggling of too great a multitude of fishes; whereas the impatience of those, that strive to resist such encroachment, before their subjects eyes were opened, did but encrease the power they resisted. i doe not therefore blame the emperour frederick for holding the stirrop to our countryman pope adrian; for such was the disposition of his subjects then, as if hee had not doe it, hee was not likely to have succeeded in the empire: but i blame those, that in the beginning, when their power was entire, by suffering such doctrines to be forged in the universities of their own dominions, have holden the stirrop to all the succeeding popes, whilest they mounted into the thrones of all christian soveraigns, to ride, and tire, both them, and their people, at their pleasure. but as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out; the way is the same, but the order is inverted: the web begins at the first elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and other vertues of the apostles, whom the people converted, obeyed, out of reverence, not by obligation: their consciences were free, and their words and actions subject to none but the civill power. afterwards the presbyters (as the flocks of christ encreased) assembling to consider what they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing against the decrees of their assemblies, made it to be thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their doctrine, and when they refused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called excommunication,) not as being infidels, but as being disobedient: and this was the first knot upon their liberty. and the number of presbyters encreasing, the presbyters of the chief city or province, got themselves an authority over the parochiall presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of bishops: and this was a second knot on christian liberty. lastly, the bishop of rome, in regard of the imperiall city, took upon him an authority (partly by the wills of the emperours themselves, and by the title of pontifex maximus, and at last when the emperours were grown weak, by the priviledges of st. peter) over all other bishops of the empire: which was the third and last knot, and the whole synthesis and construction of the pontificall power. and therefore the analysis, or resolution is by the same way; but beginning with the knot that was last tyed; as wee may see in the dissolution of the praeterpoliticall church government in england. first, the power of the popes was dissolved totally by queen elizabeth; and the bishops, who before exercised their functions in right of the pope, did afterwards exercise the same in right of the queen and her successours; though by retaining the phrase of jure divino, they were thought to demand it by immediate right from god: and so was untyed the first knot. after this, the presbyterians lately in england obtained the putting down of episcopacy: and so was the second knot dissolved: and almost at the same time, the power was taken also from the presbyterians: and so we are reduced to the independency of the primitive christians to follow paul, or cephas, or apollos, every man as he liketh best: which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the doctrine of christ, by our affection to the person of his minister, (the fault which the apostle reprehended in the corinthians,) is perhaps the best: first, because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men, but of the word it selfe, working faith in every one, not alwayes according to the purpose of them that plant and water, but of god himself, that giveth the increase: and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little errour, to require of a man endued with reason of his own, to follow the reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; which is little better, then to venture his salvation at crosse and pile. nor ought those teachers to be displeased with this losse of their antient authority: for there is none should know better then they, that power is preserved by the same vertues by which it is acquired; that is to say, by wisdome, humility, clearnesse of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation; and not by suppression of the naturall sciences, and of the morality of naturall reason; nor by obscure language; nor by arrogating to themselves more knowledge than they make appear; nor by pious frauds; nor by such other faults, as in the pastors of gods church are not only faults, but also scandalls, apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their authority. comparison of the papacy with the kingdome of fayries but after this doctrine, "that the church now militant, is the kingdome of god spoken of in the old and new testament," was received in the world; the ambition, and canvasing for the offices that belong thereunto, and especially for that great office of being christs lieutenant, and the pompe of them that obtained therein the principal publique charges, became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward reverence due to the pastorall function: in so much as the wisest men, of them that had any power in the civill state, needed nothing but the authority of their princes, to deny them any further obedience. for, from the time that the bishop of rome had gotten to be acknowledged for bishop universall, by pretence of succession to st. peter, their whole hierarchy, or kingdome of darknesse, may be compared not unfitly to the kingdome of fairies; that is, to the old wives fables in england, concerning ghosts and spirits, and the feats they play in the night. and if a man consider the originall of this great ecclesiasticall dominion, he will easily perceive, that the papacy, is no other, than the ghost of the deceased romane empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof: for so did the papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruines of that heathen power. the language also, which they use, both in the churches, and in their publique acts, being latine, which is not commonly used by any nation now in the world, what is it but the ghost of the old romane language. the fairies in what nation soever they converse, have but one universall king, which some poets of ours call king oberon; but the scripture calls beelzebub, prince of daemons. the ecclesiastiques likewise, in whose dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one universall king, the pope. the ecclesiastiques are spirituall men, and ghostly fathers. the fairies are spirits, and ghosts. fairies and ghosts inhabite darknesse, solitudes, and graves. the ecclesiastiques walke in obscurity of doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and churchyards. the ecclesiastiques have their cathedral churches; which, in what towne soever they be erected, by vertue of holy water, and certain charmes called exorcismes, have the power to make those townes, cities, that is to say, seats of empire. the fairies also have their enchanted castles, and certain gigantique ghosts, that domineer over the regions round about them. the fairies are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the hurt they do. so also the ecclesiastiques vanish away from the tribunals of civill justice. the ecclesiastiques take from young men, the use of reason, by certain charms compounded of metaphysiques, and miracles, and traditions, and abused scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute what they command them. the fairies likewise are said to take young children out of their cradles, and to change them into naturall fools, which common people do therefore call elves, and are apt to mischief. in what shop, or operatory the fairies make their enchantment, the old wives have not determined. but the operatories of the clergy, are well enough known to be the universities, that received their discipline from authority pontificall. when the fairies are displeased with any body, they are said to send their elves, to pinch them. the ecclesiastiques, when they are displeased with any civill state, make also their elves, that is, superstitious, enchanted subjects, to pinch their princes, by preaching sedition; or one prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another. the fairies marry not; but there be amongst them incubi, that have copulation with flesh and bloud. the priests also marry not. the ecclesiastiques take the cream of the land, by donations of ignorant men, that stand in aw of them, and by tythes: so also it is in the fable of fairies, that they enter into the dairies, and feast upon the cream, which they skim from the milk. what kind of money is currant in the kingdome of fairies, is not recorded in the story. but the ecclesiastiques in their receipts accept of the same money that we doe; though when they are to make any payment, it is in canonizations, indulgences, and masses. to this, and such like resemblances between the papacy, and the kingdome of fairies, may be added this, that as the fairies have no existence, but in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the traditions of old wives, or old poets: so the spirituall power of the pope (without the bounds of his own civill dominion) consisteth onely in the fear that seduced people stand in, of their excommunication; upon hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of the scripture. it was not therefore a very difficult matter, for henry 8. by his exorcisme; nor for qu. elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. but who knows that this spirit of rome, now gone out, and walking by missions through the dry places of china, japan, and the indies, that yeeld him little fruit, may not return, or rather an assembly of spirits worse than he, enter, and inhabite this clean swept house, and make the end thereof worse than the beginning? for it is not the romane clergy onely, that pretends the kingdome of god to be of this world, and thereby to have a power therein, distinct from that of the civill state. and this is all i had a designe to say, concerning the doctrine of the politiques. which when i have reviewed, i shall willingly expose it to the censure of my countrey. a review, and conclusion from the contrariety of some of the naturall faculties of the mind, one to another, as also of one passion to another, and from their reference to conversation, there has been an argument taken, to inferre an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civill duty. the severity of judgment, they say, makes men censorious, and unapt to pardon the errours and infirmities of other men: and on the other side, celerity of fancy, makes the thoughts lesse steddy than is necessary, to discern exactly between right and wrong. again, in all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning, is necessary: for without it, the resolutions of men are rash, and their sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull eloquence, which procureth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little. but these are contrary faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of truth; the other upon opinions already received, true, or false; and upon the passions and interests of men, which are different, and mutable. and amongst the passions, courage, (by which i mean the contempt of wounds, and violent death) enclineth men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the publique peace; and timorousnesse, many times disposeth to the desertion of the publique defence. both these they say cannot stand together in the same person. and to consider the contrariety of mens opinions, and manners in generall, it is they say, impossible to entertain a constant civill amity with all those, with whom the businesse of the world constrains us to converse: which businesse consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetuall contention for honor, riches, and authority. to which i answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities: for by education, and discipline, they may bee, and are sometimes reconciled. judgment, and fancy may have place in the same man; but by turnes; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. as the israelites in egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw: so also may the judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the fancy at another time wandring about the world. so also reason, and eloquence, (though not perhaps in the naturall sciences, yet in the morall) may stand very well together. for wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of errour, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the laws, and not fearing a publique enemy; nor between abstaining from injury, and pardoning it in others. there is therefore no such inconsistence of humane nature, with civill duties, as some think. i have known cleernesse of judgment, and largenesse of fancy; strength of reason, and gracefull elocution; a courage for the warre, and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honored friend mr. sidney godolphin; who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civill warre, in the publique quarrel, by an indiscerned, and an undiscerning hand. to the laws of nature, declared in the 15. chapter, i would have this added, "that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in warre, the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of peace." for he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his owne body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is preserved: it is a manifest contradiction of himselfe. and though this law may bee drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there already mentioned; yet the times require to have it inculcated, and remembred. and because i find by divers english books lately printed, that the civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it is, that a subject becomes obliged to the conquerour; nor what is conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his laws: therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, i say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes subject of a conquerour, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. when it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, i have showed before in the end of the 21. chapter; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former soveraign but that of an ordinary subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. seeing therefore such contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, (notwithstanding it be an assistance to the enemy,) esteemed lawfull; as totall submission, which is but an assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawfull. besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their submission, or composition an assistance; but rather a detriment to the enemy. but if a man, besides the obligation of a subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a souldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his armies, or garrisons: for in this case, he cannot complain of want of protection, and means to live as a souldier: but when that also failes, a souldier also may seek his protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself to his new master. and so much for the time when he may do it lawfully, if hee will. if therefore he doe it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject: for a contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken. by this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to be conquered; and in what the nature of conquest, and the right of a conquerour consisteth: for this submission is it implyeth them all. conquest, is not the victory it self; but the acquisition by victory, of a right, over the persons of men. he therefore that is slain, is overcome, but not conquered; he that is taken, and put into prison, or chaines, is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy, and may save himself if hee can: but he that upon promise of obedience, hath his life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered, and a subject; and not before. the romanes used to say, that their generall had pacified such a province, that is to say, in english, conquered it; and that the countrey was pacified by victory, when the people of it had promised imperata facere, that is, to doe what the romane people commanded them: this was to be conquered. but this promise may be either expresse, or tacite: expresse, by promise: tacite, by other signes. as for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an expresse promise, (because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable;) yet if he live under their protection openly, hee is understood to submit himselfe to the government: but if he live there secretly, he is lyable to any thing that may bee done to a spie, and enemy of the state. i say not, hee does any injustice, (for acts of open hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death. likewise, if a man, when his country is conquered, be out of it, he is not conquered, nor subject: but if at his return, he submit to the government, he is bound to obey it. so that conquest (to define it) is the acquiring of the right of soveraignty by victory. which right, is acquired, in the peoples submission, by which they contract with the victor, promising obedience, for life and liberty. in the 29th chapter i have set down for one of the causes of the dissolutions of common-wealths, their imperfect generation, consisting in the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power; for want whereof, the civill soveraign is fain to handle the sword of justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: one reason whereof (which i have not there mentioned) is this, that they will all of them justifie the war, by which their power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their right dependeth, and not on the possession. as if, for example, the right of the kings of england did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of william the conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the subjects obedience to their soveraign at this day in all the world: wherein whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves, they justifie all the successefull rebellions that ambition shall at any time raise against them, and their successors. therefore i put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the death of any state, that the conquerours require not onely a submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified. and because the name of tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, than the name of soveraignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to bee angry with them they call tyrants; i think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny, is a toleration of hatred to common-wealth in general, and another evill seed, not differing much from the former. for to the justification of the cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered, is for the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the obligation of the conquered. and thus much i have thought fit to say upon the review of the first and second part of this discourse. in the 35th chapter, i have sufficiently declared out of the scripture, that in the common-wealth of the jewes, god himselfe was made the soveraign, by pact with the people; who were therefore called his peculiar people, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom god reigned not by their consent, but by his own power: and that in this kingdome moses was gods lieutenant on earth; and that it was he that told them what laws god appointed to doe execution; especially in capitall punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration, as i find it since. wee know that generally in all common-wealths, the execution of corporeall punishments, was either put upon the guards, or other souldiers of the soveraign power; or given to those, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardnesse of heart, concurred, to make them sue for such an office. but amongst the israelites it was a positive law of god their soveraign, that he that was convicted of a capitall crime, should be stoned to death by the people; and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after the witnesses, then the rest of the people. this was a law that designed who were to be the executioners; but not that any one should throw a stone at him before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was judge. the witnesses were neverthelesse to be heard before they proceeded to execution, unlesse the fact were committed in the presence of the congregation it self, or in sight of the lawfull judges; for then there needed no other witnesses but the judges themselves. neverthelesse, this manner of proceeding being not throughly understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, is some cases, by a right of zeal; as if the executions done upon offenders in the kingdome of god in old time, proceeded not from the soveraign command, but from the authority of private zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary. first, where the levites fell upon the people, that had made and worshipped the golden calfe, and slew three thousand of them; it was by the commandement of moses, from the mouth of god; as is manifest, exod. 32.27. and when the son of a woman of israel had blasphemed god, they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before moses, who put him under custody, till god should give sentence against him; as appears, levit. 25.11, 12. again, (numbers 25.6, 7.) when phinehas killed zimri and cosbi, it was not by right of private zeale: their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; there needed no witnesse; the law was known, and he the heir apparent to the soveraignty; and which is the principall point, the lawfulnesse of his act depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification by moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. and this presumption of a future ratification, is sometimes necessary to the safety [of] a common-wealth; as in a sudden rebellion, any man that can suppresse it by his own power in the countrey where it begins, may lawfully doe it, and provide to have it ratified, or pardoned, whilest it is in doing, or after it is done. also numb. 35.30. it is expressely said, "whosoever shall kill the murtherer, shall kill him upon the word of witnesses:" but witnesses suppose a formall judicature, and consequently condemn that pretence of jus zelotarum. the law of moses concerning him that enticeth to idolatry, (that is to say, in the kingdome of god to a renouncing of his allegiance) (deut. 13.8.) forbids to conceal him, and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be condemned. and (deut. 17. ver.4, 5, 6.) the processe against idolatry is exactly set down: for god there speaketh to the people, as judge, and commandeth them, when a man is accused of idolatry, to enquire diligently of the fact, and finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the witnesse throweth the first stone. this is not private zeal, but publique condemnation. in like manner when a father hath a rebellious son, the law is (deut. 21. 18.) that he shall bring him before the judges of the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. lastly, by pretence of these laws it was, that st. steven was stoned, and not by pretence of private zeal: for before hee was carried away to execution, he had pleaded his cause before the high priest. there is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the bible, to countenance executions by private zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of ignorance and passion, is against both the justice and peace of a common-wealth. in the 36th chapter i have said, that it is not declared in what manner god spake supernaturally to moses: not that he spake not to him sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernaturall voice, as to other prophets: for the manner how he spake unto him from the mercy-seat, is expressely set down (numbers 7.89.) in these words, "from that time forward, when moses entred into the tabernacle of the congregation to speak with god, he heard a voice which spake unto him from over the mercy-seate, which is over the arke of the testimony, from between the cherubins he spake unto him." but it is not declared in what consisted the praeeminence of the manner of gods speaking to moses, above that of his speaking to other prophets, as to samuel, and to abraham, to whom he also spake by a voice, (that is, by vision) unlesse the difference consist in the cleernesse of the vision. for face to face, and mouth to mouth, cannot be literally understood of the infinitenesse, and incomprehensibility of the divine nature. and as to the whole doctrine, i see not yet, but the principles of it are true and proper; and the ratiocination solid. for i ground the civill right of soveraigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, upon the known naturall inclinations of mankind, and upon the articles of the law of nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. and for the power ecclesiasticall of the same soveraigns, i ground it on such texts, as are both evident in themselves, and consonant to the scope of the whole scripture. and therefore am perswaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose onely to be informed, shall be informed by it. but for those that by writing, or publique discourse, or by their eminent actions, have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not bee so easily satisfied. for in such cases, it is naturall for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read before: of which, in a time wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old,) there cannot choose but be very many. in that part which treateth of a christian common-wealth, there are some new doctrines, which, it may be, in a state where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a subject without leave to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a teacher. but in this time, that men call not onely for peace, but also for truth, to offer such doctrines as i think true, and that manifestly tend to peace and loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to offer new wine, to bee put into new cask, that bothe may be preserved together. and i suppose, that then, when novelty can breed no trouble, nor disorder in a state, men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of antiquity, as to preferre ancient errors, before new and well proved truth. there is nothing i distrust more than my elocution; which neverthelesse i am confident (excepting the mischances of the presse) is not obscure. that i have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators, and philosophers, contrary to the custome of late time, (whether i have done well or ill in it,) proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. for first, all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon reason, or upon scripture; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any writer. secondly, the matters in question are not of fact, but of right, wherein there is no place for witnesses. there is scarce any of those old writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself, and others; which makes their testimonies insufficient. fourthly, such opinions as are taken onely upon credit of antiquity, are not intrinsically the judgment of those that cite them, but words that passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth. fiftly, it is many times with a fraudulent designe that men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other mens wit. sixtly, i find not that the ancients they cite, took it for an ornament, to doe the like with those that wrote before them. seventhly, it is an argument of indigestion, when greek and latine sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to doe, unchanged. lastly, though i reverence those men of ancient time, that either have written truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out our selves; yet to the antiquity it self i think nothing due: for if we will reverence the age, the present is the oldest. if the antiquity of the writer, i am not sure, that generally they to whom such honor is given, were more ancient when they wrote, than i am that am writing: but if it bee well considered, the praise of ancient authors, proceeds not from the reverence of the dead, but from the competition, and mutuall envy of the living. to conclude, there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in that i writ before of the same subject in latine, as far as i can perceive, contrary either to the word of god, or to good manners; or to the disturbance of the publique tranquillity. therefore i think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth. for seeing the universities are the fountains of civill, and morall doctrine, from whence the preachers, and the gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit, and in their conversation) upon the people, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the venime of heathen politicians, and from the incantation of deceiving spirits. and by that means the most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the state; and be the lesse grieved with the contributions necessary for their peace, and defence; and the governours themselves have the lesse cause, to maintain at the common charge any greater army, than is necessary to make good the publique liberty, against the invasions and encroachments of forraign enemies. and thus i have brought to an end my discourse of civill and ecclesiasticall government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall relation between protection and obedience; of which the condition of humane nature, and the laws divine, (both naturall and positive) require an inviolable observation. and though in the revolution of states, there can be no very good constellation for truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new;) yet i cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the publique judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of publique peace. and in this hope i return to my interrupted speculation of bodies naturall; wherein, (if god give me health to finish it,) i hope the novelty will as much please, as in the doctrine of this artificiall body it useth to offend. for such truth, as opposeth no man profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome. finis laws by plato translated by benjamin jowett introduction and analysis. the genuineness of the laws is sufficiently proved (1) by more than twenty citations of them in the writings of aristotle, who was residing at athens during the last twenty years of the life of plato, and who, having left it after his death (b.c. 347), returned thither twelve years later (b.c. 335); (2) by the allusion of isocrates (oratio ad philippum missa, p.84: to men tais paneguresin enochlein kai pros apantas legein tous sunprechontas en autais pros oudena legein estin, all omoios oi toioutoi ton logon (sc. speeches in the assembly) akuroi tugchanousin ontes tois nomois kai tais politeiais tais upo ton sophiston gegrammenais.) --writing 346 b.c., a year after the death of plato, and probably not more than three or four years after the composition of the laws--who speaks of the laws and republics written by philosophers (upo ton sophiston); (3) by the reference (athen.) of the comic poet alexis, a younger contemporary of plato (fl. b.c 356-306), to the enactment about prices, which occurs in laws xi., viz that the same goods should not be offered at two prices on the same day (ou gegone kreitton nomothetes tou plousiou aristonikou tithesi gar nuni nomon, ton ichthuopolon ostis an polon tini ichthun upotimesas apodot elattonos es eipe times, eis to desmoterion euthus apagesthai touton, ina dedoikotes tes axias agaposin, e tes esperas saprous apantas apopherosin oikade. meineke, frag. com. graec.); (4) by the unanimous voice of later antiquity and the absence of any suspicion among ancient writers worth speaking of to the contrary; for it is not said of philippus of opus that he composed any part of the laws, but only that he copied them out of the waxen tablets, and was thought by some to have written the epinomis (diog. laert.) that the longest and one of the best writings bearing the name of plato should be a forgery, even if its genuineness were unsupported by external testimony, would be a singular phenomenon in ancient literature; and although the critical worth of the consensus of late writers is generally not to be compared with the express testimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be attributed to their consent in the present instance, because the admission of the laws is combined with doubts about the epinomis, a spurious writing, which is a kind of epilogue to the larger work probably of a much later date. this shows that the reception of the laws was not altogether undiscriminating. the suspicion which has attached to the laws of plato in the judgment of some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in the style and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and opinion which they observe in them. their suspicion is increased by the fact that these differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking to passages in other platonic writings. they are sensible of a want of point in the dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas, plan, manners, and style. they miss the poetical flow, the dramatic verisimilitude, the life and variety of the characters, the dialectic subtlety, the attic purity, the luminous order, the exquisite urbanity; instead of which they find tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency, sermonizing, rhetorical declamation, pedantry, egotism, uncouth forms of sentences, and peculiarities in the use of words and idioms. they are unable to discover any unity in the patched, irregular structure. the speculative element both in government and education is superseded by a narrow economical or religious vein. the grace and cheerfulness of athenian life have disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious intolerance has taken their place. the charm of youth is no longer there; the mannerism of age makes itself unpleasantly felt. the connection is often imperfect; and there is a want of arrangement, exhibited especially in the enumeration of the laws towards the end of the work. the laws are full of flaws and repetitions. the greek is in places very ungrammatical and intractable. a cynical levity is displayed in some passages, and a tone of disappointment and lamentation over human things in others. the critics seem also to observe in them bad imitations of thoughts which are better expressed in plato's other writings. lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived the republic could have left the critias, hermocrates, and philosophus incomplete or unwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the laws. the questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be considered by us under five or six heads: i, the characters; ii, the plan; iii, the style; iv, the imitations of other writings of plato; v; the more general relation of the laws to the republic and the other dialogues; and vi, to the existing athenian and spartan states. i. already in the philebus the distinctive character of socrates has disappeared; and in the timaeus, sophist, and statesman his function of chief speaker is handed over to the pythagorean philosopher timaeus, and to the eleatic stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent. more and more plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character and method of socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his own philosophy. he is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a hesitating enquirer,' but one who speaks with the authority of a legislator. even in the republic we have seen that the argument which is carried on by socrates in the old style with thrasymachus in the first book, soon passes into the form of exposition. in the laws he is nowhere mentioned. yet so completely in the tradition of antiquity is socrates identified with plato, that in the criticism of the laws which we find in the so-called politics of aristotle he is supposed by the writer still to be playing his part of the chief speaker (compare pol.). the laws are discussed by three representatives of athens, crete, and sparta. the athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief speaker, while the second place is assigned to the cretan, who, as one of the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the conversation. at least four-fifths of the answers are put into his mouth. the spartan is every inch a soldier, a man of few words himself, better at deeds than words. the athenian talks to the two others, although they are his equals in age, in the style of a master discoursing to his scholars; he frequently praises himself; he entertains a very poor opinion of the understanding of his companions. certainly the boastfulness and rudeness of the laws is the reverse of the refined irony and courtesy which characterize the earlier dialogues. we are no longer in such good company as in the phaedrus and symposium. manners are lost sight of in the earnestness of the speakers, and dogmatic assertions take the place of poetical fancies. the scene is laid in crete, and the conversation is held in the course of a walk from cnosus to the cave and temple of zeus, which takes place on one of the longest and hottest days of the year. the companions start at dawn, and arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates the fourth book, about noon. the god to whose temple they are going is the lawgiver of crete, and this may be supposed to be the very cave at which he gave his oracles to minos. but the externals of the scene, which are briefly and inartistically described, soon disappear, and we plunge abruptly into the subject of the dialogue. we are reminded by contrast of the higher art of the phaedrus, in which the summer's day, and the cool stream, and the chirping of the grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the agnus castus, and the legends of the place are present to the imagination throughout the discourse. the typical athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen 'to spin a long discussion out of slender materials,' and in a similar spirit the lacedaemonian megillus apologizes for the spartan brevity (compare thucydid.), acknowledging at the same time that there may be occasions when long discourses are necessary. the family of megillus is the proxenus of athens at sparta; and he pays a beautiful compliment to the athenian, significant of the character of the work, which, though borrowing many elements from sparta, is also pervaded by an athenian spirit. a good athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because he is inspired by nature and not manufactured by law. the love of listening which is attributed to the timocrat in the republic is also exhibited in him. the athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to the lacedaemonian of the struggle in which their ancestors were jointly engaged against the persians. a connexion with athens is likewise intimated by the cretan cleinias. he is the relative of epimenides, whom, by an anachronism of a century,--perhaps arising as zeller suggests (plat. stud.) out of a confusion of the visit of epimenides and diotima (symp.),--he describes as coming to athens, not after the attempt of cylon, but ten years before the persian war. the cretan and lacedaemonian hardly contribute at all to the argument of which the athenian is the expounder; they only supply information when asked about the institutions of their respective countries. a kind of simplicity or stupidity is ascribed to them. at first, they are dissatisfied with the free criticisms which the athenian passes upon the laws of minos and lycurgus, but they acquiesce in his greater experience and knowledge of the world. they admit that there can be no objection to the enquiry; for in the spirit of the legislator himself, they are discussing his laws when there are no young men present to listen. they are unwilling to allow that the spartan and cretan lawgivers can have been mistaken in honouring courage as the first part of virtue, and are puzzled at hearing for the first time that 'goods are only evil to the evil.' several times they are on the point of quarrelling, and by an effort learn to restrain their natural feeling (compare shakespeare, henry v, act iii. sc. 2). in book vii., the lacedaemonian expresses a momentary irritation at the accusation which the athenian brings against the spartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women, but he is reminded by the cretan that the permission to criticize them freely has been given, and cannot be retracted. his only criterion of truth is the authority of the spartan lawgiver; he is 'interested,' in the novel speculations of the athenian, but inclines to prefer the ordinances of lycurgus. the three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old men, which forms a pleasant bond of union between them. they have the feelings of old age about youth, about the state, about human things in general. nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they are spectators rather than actors, and men in general appear to the athenian speaker to be the playthings of the gods and of circumstances. still they have a fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed by sentiments of religion. they would give confidence to the aged by an increasing use of wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their tongues and make them sing. the prospect of the existence of the soul after death is constantly present to them; though they can hardly be said to have the cheerful hope and resignation which animates socrates in the phaedo or cephalus in the republic. plato appears to be expressing his own feelings in remarks of this sort. for at the time of writing the first book of the laws he was at least seventy-four years of age, if we suppose him to allude to the victory of the syracusans under dionysius the younger over the locrians, which occurred in the year 356. such a sadness was the natural effect of declining years and failing powers, which make men ask, 'after all, what profit is there in life?' they feel that their work is beginning to be over, and are ready to say, 'all the world is a stage;' or, in the actual words of plato, 'let us play as good plays as we can,' though 'we must be sometimes serious, which is not agreeable, but necessary.' these are feelings which have crossed the minds of reflective persons in all ages, and there is no reason to connect the laws any more than other parts of plato's writings with the very uncertain narrative of his life, or to imagine that this melancholy tone is attributable to disappointment at having failed to convert a sicilian tyrant into a philosopher. ii. the plan of the laws is more irregular and has less connexion than any other of the writings of plato. as aristotle says in the politics, 'the greater part consists of laws'; in books v, vi, xi, xii the dialogue almost entirely disappears. large portions of them are rather the materials for a work than a finished composition which may rank with the other platonic dialogues. to use his own image, 'some stones are regularly inserted in the building; others are lying on the ground ready for use.' there is probably truth in the tradition that the laws were not published until after the death of plato. we can easily believe that he has left imperfections, which would have been removed if he had lived a few years longer. the arrangement might have been improved; the connexion of the argument might have been made plainer, and the sentences more accurately framed. something also may be attributed to the feebleness of old age. even a rough sketch of the phaedrus or symposium would have had a very different look. there is, however, an interest in possessing one writing of plato which is in the process of creation. we must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through this comparative disorder. the first four books are described by plato himself as the preface or preamble. having arrived at the conclusion that each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at the end of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the preamble of the whole. this preamble or introduction may be abridged as follows:-the institutions of sparta and crete are admitted by the lacedaemonian and cretan to have one aim only: they were intended by the legislator to inspire courage in war. to this the athenian objects that the true lawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not to one only. better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he who has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils, than he who is a good soldier only. better, too, is peace than war; the reconciliation than the defeat of an enemy. and he who would attain all virtue should be trained amid pleasures as well as pains. hence there should be convivial intercourse among the citizens, and a man's temperance should be tested in his cups, as we test his courage amid dangers. he should have a fear of the right sort, as well as a courage of the right sort. at the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to education, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline imparted by the means of pleasure and pain. the discipline of pleasure is implanted chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance. of these the forms should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle breath of the multitude. there will be choruses of boys, girls, and grown-up persons, and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that 'virtue is happiness.' one of them will give the law to the rest; this will be the chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful and the most useful of songs. they will require a little wine, to mellow the austerity of age, and make them amenable to the laws. after having laid down as the first principle of politics, that peace, and not war, is the true aim of the legislator, and briefly discussed music and festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book plato makes a digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society. he describes, first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage, which is an aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular cities, like ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and political system, like that of sparta, with which he identifies argos and messene, dating from the return of the heraclidae. but the aims of states should be good, or else, like the prayer of theseus, they may be ruinous to themselves. this was the case in two out of three of the heracleid kingdoms. they did not understand that the powers in a state should be balanced. the balance of powers saved sparta, while the excess of tyranny in persia and the excess of liberty at athens have been the ruin of both...this discourse on politics is suddenly discovered to have an immediate practical use; for cleinias the cretan is about to give laws to a new colony. at the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the circumstances and situation of the colony, the athenian proceeds to make further reflections. chance, and god, and the skill of the legislator, all co-operate in the formation of states. and the most favourable condition for the foundation of a new one is when the government is in the hands of a virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great legislator. but a virtuous tyrant is a contradiction in terms; we can at best only hope to have magistrates who are the servants of reason and the law. this leads to the enquiry, what is to be the polity of our new state. and the answer is, that we are to fear god, and honour our parents, and to cultivate virtue and justice; these are to be our first principles. laws must be definite, and we should create in the citizens a predisposition to obey them. the legislator will teach as well as command; and with this view he will prefix preambles to his principal laws. the fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher preamble about the honour due to the soul, whence are deduced the duties of a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger. he should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts, forgiving to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary; and he should have a true taste. the noblest life has the greatest pleasures and the fewest pains...having finished the preamble, and touched on some other preliminary considerations, we proceed to the laws, beginning with the constitution of the state. this is not the best or ideal state, having all things common, but only the second-best, in which the land and houses are to be distributed among 5040 citizens divided into four classes. there is to be no gold or silver among them, and they are to have moderate wealth, and to respect number and numerical order in all things. in the first part of the sixth book, plato completes his sketch of the constitution by the appointment of officers. he explains the manner in which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town and country, ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be appointed; and also in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted, and omissions in the law to be supplied. next--and at this point the laws strictly speaking begin--there follow enactments respecting marriage and the procreation of children, respecting property in slaves as well as of other kinds, respecting houses, married life, common tables for men and women. the question of age in marriage suggests the consideration of a similar question about the time for holding offices, and for military service, which had been previously omitted. resuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the previous book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the seventh book. education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be continued for a time by mothers and nurses under the supervision of the state; finally, to comprehend music and gymnastics. under music is included reading, writing, playing on the lyre, arithmetic, geometry, and a knowledge of astronomy sufficient to preserve the minds of the citizens from impiety in after-life. gymnastics are to be practised chiefly with a view to their use in war. the discussion of education, which was lightly touched upon in book ii, is here completed. the eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with festivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the like. on such occasions plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together, and hence he is led into discussing the relations of the sexes, the evil consequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the remedies for them. then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and trades, of buying and selling, and of foreign commerce. the remaining books of the laws, ix-xii, are chiefly concerned with criminal offences. in the first class are placed offences against the gods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples: next follow offences against the state,--conspiracy, treason, theft. the mention of thefts suggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and incurable offences. proceeding to the greater crime of homicide, plato distinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, which is partly voluntary and partly involuntary, and murder, which arises from avarice, ambition, fear. he also enumerates murders by kindred, murders by slaves, wounds with or without intent to kill, wounds inflicted in anger, crimes of or against slaves, insults to parents. to these, various modes of purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and the terrors of another world are also invoked against them. at the beginning of book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege, are summed up in a single law. the law is preceded by an admonition, in which the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act or said an unlawful word while he retained his belief in the existence of the gods; but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they took no care of man, or that they might be turned from their course by sacrifices and prayers. the remainder of the book is devoted to the refutation of these three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the means to be taken for their reformation, and the announcement of their punishments if they continue obstinate and impenitent. the eleventh book is taken up with laws and with admonitions relating to individuals, which follow one another without any exact order. there are laws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves and freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments, poisonings, magical arts, and the like. in the twelfth book the same subjects are continued. laws are passed concerning violations of military discipline, concerning the high office of the examiners and their burial; concerning oaths and the violation of them, and the punishments of those who neglect their duties as citizens. foreign travel is then discussed, and the permission to be accorded to citizens of journeying in foreign parts; the strangers who may come to visit the city are also spoken of, and the manner in which they are to be received. laws are added respecting sureties, searches for property, right of possession by prescription, abduction of witnesses, theatrical competition, waging of private warfare, and bribery in offices. rules are laid down respecting taxation, respecting economy in sacred rites, respecting judges, their duties and sentences, and respecting sepulchral places and ceremonies. here the laws end. lastly, a nocturnal council is instituted for the preservation of the state, consisting of older and younger members, who are to exhibit in their lives that virtue which is the basis of the state, to know the one in many, and to be educated in divine and every other kind of knowledge which will enable them to fulfil their office. iii. the style of the laws differs in several important respects from that of the other dialogues of plato: (1) in the want of character, power, and lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms (compare introduction to the philebus); (3) in the form and rhythm of the sentences; (4) in the use of words. on the other hand, there are many passages (5) which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur; and (6) in which, perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a greater reach of practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of plato's writings. 1. the discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an old man's game of play. yet there is little of the liveliness of a game in their mode of treating the subject. they do not throw the ball to and fro, but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is constantly asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge, and apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of speech. he will 'carry them over the stream;' he will answer for them when the argument is beyond their comprehension; he is afraid of their ignorance of mathematics, and thinks that gymnastic is likely to be more intelligible to them;--he has repeated his words several times, and yet they cannot understand him. the subject did not properly take the form of dialogue, and also the literary vigour of plato had passed away. the old men speak as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is a touch of dramatic truth. plato has given the laws that form or want of form which indicates the failure of natural power. there is no regular plan--none of that consciousness of what has preceded and what is to follow, which makes a perfect style,--but there are several attempts at a plan; the argument is 'pulled up,' and frequent explanations are offered why a particular topic was introduced. the fictions of the laws have no longer the verisimilitude which is characteristic of the phaedrus and the timaeus, or even of the statesman. we can hardly suppose that an educated athenian would have placed the visit of epimenides to athens ten years before the persian war, or have imagined that a war with messene prevented the lacedaemonians from coming to the rescue of hellas. the narrative of the origin of the dorian institutions, which are said to have been due to a fear of the growing power of the assyrians, is a plausible invention, which may be compared with the tale of the island of atlantis and the poem of solon, but is not accredited by similar arts of deception. the other statement that the dorians were achaean exiles assembled by dorieus, and the assertion that troy was included in the assyrian empire, have some foundation (compare for the latter point, diod. sicul.). nor is there anywhere in the laws that lively enargeia, that vivid mise en scene, which is as characteristic of plato as of some modern novelists. the old men are afraid of the ridicule which 'will fall on their heads more than enough,' and they do not often indulge in a joke. in one of the few which occur, the book of the laws, if left incomplete, is compared to a monster wandering about without a head. but we no longer breathe the atmosphere of humour which pervades the symposium and the euthydemus, in which we pass within a few sentences from the broadest aristophanic joke to the subtlest refinement of wit and fancy; instead of this, in the laws an impression of baldness and feebleness is often left upon our minds. some of the most amusing descriptions, as, for example, of children roaring for the first three years of life; or of the athenians walking into the country with fighting-cocks under their arms; or of the slave doctor who knocks about his patients finely; and the gentleman doctor who courteously persuades them; or of the way of keeping order in the theatre, 'by a hint from a stick,' are narrated with a commonplace gravity; but where we find this sort of dry humour we shall not be far wrong in thinking that the writer intended to make us laugh. the seriousness of age takes the place of the jollity of youth. life should have holidays and festivals; yet we rebuke ourselves when we laugh, and take our pleasures sadly. the irony of the earlier dialogues, of which some traces occur in the tenth book, is replaced by a severity which hardly condescends to regard human things. 'let us say, if you please, that man is of some account, but i was speaking of him in comparison with god.' the imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not assisted by the surrounding phraseology. we have seen how in the republic, and in the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the wave,' 'the drone,' 'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at intervals. notes are struck which are repeated from time to time, as in a strain of music. there is none of this subtle art in the laws. the illustrations, such as the two kinds of doctors, 'the three kinds of funerals,' the fear potion, the puppet, the painter leaving a successor to restore his picture, the 'person stopping to consider where three ways meet,' the 'old laws about water of which he will not divert the course,' can hardly be said to do much credit to plato's invention. the citations from the poets have lost that fanciful character which gave them their charm in the earlier dialogues. we are tired of images taken from the arts of navigation, or archery, or weaving, or painting, or medicine, or music. yet the comparisons of life to a tragedy, or of the working of mind to the revolution of the self-moved, or of the aged parent to the image of a god dwelling in the house, or the reflection that 'man is made to be the plaything of god, and that this rightly considered is the best of him,' have great beauty. 2. the clumsiness of the style is exhibited in frequent mannerisms and repetitions. the perfection of the platonic dialogue consists in the accuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another, and the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one another. this finish of style is no longer discernible in the laws. there is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out of the respondents but 'yes' or 'no,' 'true,' 'to be sure,' etc.; the insipid forms, 'what do you mean?' 'to what are you referring?' are constantly returning. again and again the speaker is charged, or charges himself, with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will explain his views more clearly. the process of thought which should be latent in the mind of the writer appears on the surface. in several passages the athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner, very unlike the irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares that 'the laws are a divine work given by some inspiration of the gods,' and that 'youth should commit them to memory instead of the compositions of the poets.' the prosopopoeia which is adopted by plato in the protagoras and other dialogues is repeated until we grow weary of it. the legislator is always addressing the speakers or the youth of the state, and the speakers are constantly making addresses to the legislator. a tendency to a paradoxical manner of statement is also observable. 'we must have drinking,' 'we must have a virtuous tyrant'--this is too much for the duller wits of the lacedaemonian and cretan, who at first start back in surprise. more than in any other writing of plato the tone is hortatory; the laws are sermons as well as laws; they are considered to have a religious sanction, and to rest upon a religious sentiment in the mind of the citizens. the words of the athenian are attributed to the lacedaemonian and cretan, who are supposed to have made them their own, after the manner of the earlier dialogues. resumptions of subjects which have been half disposed of in a previous passage constantly occur: the arrangement has neither the clearness of art nor the freedom of nature. irrelevant remarks are made here and there, or illustrations used which are not properly fitted in. the dialogue is generally weak and laboured, and is in the later books fairly given up, apparently, because unsuited to the subject of the work. the long speeches or sermons of the athenian, often extending over several pages, have never the grace and harmony which are exhibited in the earlier dialogues. for plato is incapable of sustained composition; his genius is dramatic rather than oratorical; he can converse, but he cannot make a speech. even the timaeus, which is one of his most finished works, is full of abrupt transitions. there is the same kind of difference between the dialogue and the continuous discourse of plato as between the narrative and speeches of thucydides. 3. the perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease, clearness, the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the scale of human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift of language possessed by plato in the symposium and phaedrus. from this there are many fallings-off in the laws: first, in the structure of the sentences, which are rhythmical and monotonous,--the formal and sophistical manner of the age is superseding the natural genius of plato: secondly, many of them are of enormous length, and the latter end often forgets the beginning of them,--they seem never to have received the second thoughts of the author; either the emphasis is wrongly placed, or there is a want of point in a clause; or an absolute case occurs which is not properly separated from the rest of the sentence; or words are aggregated in a manner which fails to show their relation to one another; or the connecting particles are omitted at the beginning of sentences; the uses of the relative and antecedent are more indistinct, the changes of person and number more frequent, examples of pleonasm, tautology, and periphrasis, antitheses of positive and negative, false emphasis, and other affectations, are more numerous than in the other writings of plato; there is also a more common and sometimes unmeaning use of qualifying formulae, os epos eipein, kata dunamin, and of double expressions, pante pantos, oudame oudamos, opos kai ope--these are too numerous to be attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an over-curious adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet, and other artificial forms of cadence and expression take the place of natural variety: thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is remarkable--the style is not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of a debased rhetorical kind, patched on to instead of growing out of the subject; there is a great command of words, and a laboured use of them; forced attempts at metaphor occur in several passages,--e.g. parocheteuein logois; ta men os tithemena ta d os paratithemena; oinos kolazomenos upo nephontos eterou theou; the plays on the word nomos = nou dianome, ode etara: fourthly, there is a foolish extravagance of language in other passages,--'the swinish ignorance of arithmetic;' 'the justice and suitableness of the discourse on laws;' over-emphasis; 'best of greeks,' said of all the greeks, and the like: fifthly, poor and insipid illustrations are also common: sixthly, we may observe an excessive use of climax and hyperbole, aischron legein chre pros autous doulon te kai doulen kai paida kai ei pos oion te olen ten oikian: dokei touto to epitedeuma kata phusin tas peri ta aphrodisia edonas ou monon anthropon alla kai therion diephtharkenai. 4. the peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the laws have been collected by zeller (platonische studien) and stallbaum (legg.): first, in the use of nouns, such as allodemia, apeniautesis, glukuthumia, diatheter, thrasuxenia, koros, megalonoia, paidourgia: secondly, in the use of adjectives, such as aistor, biodotes, echthodopos, eitheos, chronios, and of adverbs, such as aniditi, anatei, nepoivei: thirdly, in the use of verbs, such as athurein, aissein (aixeien eipein), euthemoneisthai, parapodizesthai, sebein, temelein, tetan. these words however, as stallbaum remarks, are formed according to analogy, and nearly all of them have the support of some poetical or other authority. zeller and stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the laws, differing from the forms of the same words which occur in other places: e.g. blabos for blabe, abios for abiotos, acharistos for acharis, douleios for doulikos, paidelos for paidikos, exagrio for exagriaino, ileoumai for ilaskomai, and the ionic word sophronistus, meaning 'correction.' zeller has noted a fondness for substantives ending in -ma and -sis, such as georgema, diapauma, epithumema, zemioma, komodema, omilema; blapsis, loidoresis, paraggelsis, and others; also a use of substantives in the plural, which are commonly found only in the singular, maniai, atheotetes, phthonoi, phoboi, phuseis; also, a peculiar use of prepositions in composition, as in eneirgo, apoblapto, dianomotheteo, dieiretai, dieulabeisthai, and other words; also, a frequent occurrence of the ionic datives plural in -aisi and -oisi, perhaps used for the sake of giving an ancient or archaic effect. to these peculiarities of words he has added a list of peculiar expressions and constructions. among the most characteristic are the following: athuta pallakon spermata; amorphoi edrai; osa axiomata pros archontas; oi kata polin kairoi; muthos, used in several places of 'the discourse about laws;' and connected with this the frequent use of paramuthion and paramutheisthai in the general sense of 'address,' 'addressing'; aimulos eros; ataphoi praxeis; muthos akephalos; ethos euthuporon. he remarks also on the frequent employment of the abstract for the concrete; e.g. uperesia for uperetai, phugai for phugades, mechanai in the sense of 'contrivers,' douleia for douloi, basileiai for basileis, mainomena kedeumata for ganaika mainomenen; e chreia ton paidon in the sense of 'indigent children,' and paidon ikanotes; to ethos tes apeirias for e eiothuia apeiria; kuparitton upse te kai kalle thaumasia for kuparittoi mala upselai kai kalai. he further notes some curious uses of the genitive case, e.g. philias omologiai, maniai orges, laimargiai edones, cheimonon anupodesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and of the dative, omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and of the dative omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai epitropois; and also some rather uncommon periphrases, thremmata neilou, xuggennetor teknon for alochos, mouses lexis for poiesis, zographon paides, anthropon spermata and the like; the fondness for particles of limitation, especially tis and ge, sun tisi charisi, tois ge dunamenois and the like; the pleonastic use of tanun, of os, of os eros eipein, of ekastote; and the periphrastic use of the preposition peri. lastly, he observes the tendency to hyperbata or transpositions of words, and to rhythmical uniformity as well as grammatical irregularity in the structure of the sentences. for nearly all the expressions which are adduced by zeller as arguments against the genuineness of the laws, stallbaum finds some sort of authority. there is no real ground for doubting that the work was written by plato, merely because several words occur in it which are not found in his other writings. an imitator may preserve the usual phraseology of a writer better than he would himself. but, on the other hand, the fact that authorities may be quoted in support of most of these uses of words, does not show that the diction is not peculiar. several of them seem to be poetical or dialectical, and exhibit an attempt to enlarge the limits of greek prose by the introduction of homeric and tragic expressions. most of them do not appear to have retained any hold on the later language of greece. like several experiments in language of the writers of the elizabethan age, they were afterwards lost; and though occasionally found in plutarch and imitators of plato, they have not been accepted by aristotle or passed into the common dialect of greece. 5. unequal as the laws are in style, they contain a few passages which are very grand and noble. for example, the address to the poets: 'best of strangers, we also are poets of the best and noblest tragedy; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.' or again, the sight of young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another, suggesting the dangers to which youth is liable from the violence of passion; or the eloquent denunciation of unnatural lusts in the same passage; or the charming thought that the best legislator 'orders war for the sake of peace and not peace for the sake of war;' or the pleasant allusion, 'o athenian--inhabitant of attica, i will not say, for you seem to me worthy to be named after the goddess athene because you go back to first principles;' or the pithy saying, 'many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors, but education is never suicidal;' or the fine expression that 'the walls of a city should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them;' or the remark that 'god is the measure of all things in a sense far higher than any man can be;' or that 'a man should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible;' or the principle repeatedly laid down, that 'the sins of the fathers are not to be visited on the children;' or the description of the funeral rites of those priestly sages who depart in innocence; or the noble sentiment, that we should do more justice to slaves than to equals; or the curious observation, founded, perhaps, on his own experience, that there are a few 'divine men in every state however corrupt, whose conversation is of inestimable value;' or the acute remark, that public opinion is to be respected, because the judgments of mankind about virtue are better than their practice; or the deep religious and also modern feeling which pervades the tenth book (whatever may be thought of the arguments); the sense of the duty of living as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the will of god, who takes care of the least things as well as the greatest; and the picture of parents praying for their children--not as we may say, slightly altering the words of plato, as if there were no truth or reality in the gentile religions, but as if there were the greatest--are very striking to us. we must remember that the laws, unlike the republic, do not exhibit an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human motives and feelings; they are also on the level of the popular religion, though elevated and purified: hence there is an attempt made to show that the pleasant is also just. but, on the other hand, the priority of the soul to the body, and of god to the soul, is always insisted upon as the true incentive to virtue; especially with great force and eloquence at the commencement of book v. and the work of legislation is carried back to the first principles of morals. 6. no other writing of plato shows so profound an insight into the world and into human nature as the laws. that 'cities will never cease from ill until they are better governed,' is the text of the laws as well as of the statesman and republic. the principle that the balance of power preserves states; the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life in disbelief of the gods; the remark that the characters of men are best seen in convivial intercourse; the observation that the people must be allowed to share not only in the government, but in the administration of justice; the desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only, but to all virtue; the clear perception that education begins with birth, or even, as he would say, before birth; the attempt to purify religion; the modern reflections, that punishment is not vindictive, and that limits must be set to the power of bequest; the impossibility of undeceiving the victims of quacks and jugglers; the provision for water, and for other requirements of health, and for concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living; above all, perhaps, the distinct consciousness that under the actual circumstances of mankind the ideal cannot be carried out, and yet may be a guiding principle--will appear to us, if we remember that we are still in the dawn of politics, to show a great depth of political wisdom. iv. the laws of plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble other passages in his writings. and at first sight a suspicion arises that the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator. for why should a writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had already said in his most finished style and manner? and yet it may be urged on the other side that an author whose original powers are beginning to decay will be very liable to repeat himself, as in conversation, so in books. he may have forgotten what he had written before; he may be unconscious of the decline of his own powers. hence arises a question of great interest, bearing on the genuineness of ancient writers. is there any criterion by which we can distinguish the genuine resemblance from the spurious, or, in other words, the repetition of a thought or passage by an author himself from the appropriation of it by another? the question has, perhaps, never been fully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise answer. a few general considerations on the subject may be offered:-(a) is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different times of life or under different circumstances?--there would be nothing surprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own originality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his age. 'what a genius i had when i wrote that book!' was the pathetic exclamation of a famous english author, when in old age he chanced to take up one of his early works. there would be nothing surprising again in his losing somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less capable of framing language into a harmonious whole. there would also be a strong presumption that if the variation of style was uniform, it was attributable to some natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator. the inferiority might be the result of feebleness and of want of activity of mind. but the natural weakness of a great author would commonly be different from the artificial weakness of an imitator; it would be continuous and uniform. the latter would be apt to fill his work with irregular patches, sometimes taken verbally from the writings of the author whom he personated, but rarely acquiring his spirit. his imitation would be obvious, irregular, superficial. the patches of purple would be easily detected among his threadbare and tattered garments. he would rarely take the pains to put the same thought into other words. there were many forgeries in english literature which attained a considerable degree of success 50 or 100 years ago; but it is doubtful whether attempts such as these could now escape detection, if there were any writings of the same author or of the same age to be compared with them. and ancient forgers were much less skilful than modern; they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and had rarely any motive for being so. (b) but, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of understanding or imitating that part of a great writer which is most characteristic of him. in every man's writings there is something like himself and unlike others, which gives individuality. to appreciate this latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study and observation. there are a class of similarities which may be called undesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of being borrowed from one another, and yet, when they are compared, find a natural explanation in their being the work of the same mind. the imitator might copy the turns of style--he might repeat images or illustrations, but he could not enter into the inner circle of platonic philosophy. he would understand that part of it which became popular in the next generation, as for example, the doctrine of ideas or of numbers: he might approve of communism. but the higher flights of plato about the science of dialectic, or the unity of virtue, or a person who is above the law, would be unintelligible to him. (c) the argument from imitation assumes a different character when the supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the impress of original genius. the strength of the argument from undesigned coincidences of style is much increased when they are found side by side with thoughts and expressions which can only have come from a great original writer. the great excellence, not only of the whole, but even of the parts of writings, is a strong proof of their genuineness--for although the great writer may fall below, the forger or imitator cannot rise much above himself. whether we can attribute the worst parts of a work to a forger and the best to a great writer,--as for example, in the case of some of shakespeare's plays,--depends upon the probability that they have been interpolated, or have been the joint work of two writers; and this can only be established either by express evidence or by a comparison of other writings of the same class. if the interpolation or double authorship of greek writings in the time of plato could be shown to be common, then a question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not whether the whole, but whether parts of the platonic dialogues are genuine, and, if parts only, which parts. hebrew prophecies and homeric poems and laws of manu may have grown together in early times, but there is no reason to think that any of the dialogues of plato is the result of a similar process of accumulation. it is therefore rash to say with oncken (die staatslehre des aristoteles) that the form in which aristotle knew the laws of plato must have been different from that in which they have come down to us. it must be admitted that these principles are difficult of application. yet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on probabilities or impressions. great disputes will arise about the merits of different passages, about what is truly characteristic and original or trivial and borrowed. many have thought the laws to be one of the greatest of platonic writings, while in the judgment of mr. grote they hardly rise above the level of the forged epistles. the manner in which a writer would or would not have written at a particular time of life must be acknowledged to be a matter of conjecture. but enough has been said to show that similarities of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to detect them or not, may be such as must be attributed to an original writer, and not to a mere imitator. (d) applying these principles to the case of the laws, we have now to point out that they contain the class of refined or unconscious similarities which are indicative of genuineness. the parallelisms are like the repetitions of favourite thoughts into which every one is apt to fall unawares in conversation or in writing. they are found in a work which contains many beautiful and remarkable passages. we may therefore begin by claiming this presumption in their favour. such undesigned coincidences, as we may venture to call them, are the following. the conception of justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage (laws; republic): the latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion of dividing laws after the kinds of virtue (laws); the approval of the method of looking at one idea gathered from many things, 'than which a truer was never discovered by any man' (compare republic): or again the description of the laws as parents (laws; republic): the assumption that religion has been already settled by the oracle of delphi (laws; republic), to which an appeal is also made in special cases (laws): the notion of the battle with self, a paradox for which plato in a manner apologizes both in the laws and the republic: the remark (laws) that just men, even when they are deformed in body, may still be perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds (compare republic): the argument that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be carried out (laws; republic): the near approach to the idea of good in 'the principle which is common to all the four virtues,' a truth which the guardians must be compelled to recognize (laws; compare republic): or again the recognition by reason of the right pleasure and pain, which had previously been matter of habit (laws; republic): or the blasphemy of saying that the excellency of music is to give pleasure (laws; republic): again the story of the sidonian cadmus (laws), which is a variation of the phoenician tale of the earth-born men (republic): the comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-dog, both in the republic and in the laws: the remark that no man can practise two trades (laws; republic): or the advantage of the middle condition (laws; republic): the tendency to speak of principles as moulds or forms; compare the ekmageia of song (laws), and the tupoi of religion (republic): or the remark (laws) that 'the relaxation of justice makes many cities out of one,' which may be compared with the republic: or the description of lawlessness 'creeping in little by little in the fashions of music and overturning all things,'--to us a paradox, but to plato's mind a fixed idea, which is found in the laws as well as in the republic: or the figure of the parts of the human body under which the parts of the state are described (laws; republic): the apology for delay and diffuseness, which occurs not unfrequently in the republic, is carried to an excess in the laws (compare theaet.): the remarkable thought (laws) that the soul of the sun is better than the sun, agrees with the relation in which the idea of good stands to the sun in the republic, and with the substitution of mind for the idea of good in the philebus: the passage about the tragic poets (laws) agrees generally with the treatment of them in the republic, but is more finely conceived, and worked out in a nobler spirit. some lesser similarities of thought and manner should not be omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years' old students in the republic, and the fifty years' old choristers in the laws; or the making of the citizens out of wax (laws) compared with the other image (republic); or the number of the tyrant (729), which is nearly equal with the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the 'slight correction' of the sacred number 5040, which is divisible by all the numbers from 1 to 12 except 11, and divisible by 11, if two families be deducted; or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid geometry of which he complains in the republic and the puzzle about fractions with the difficulty in the laws about commensurable and incommensurable quantities--and the malicious emphasis on the word gunaikeios (laws) with the use of the same word (republic). these and similar passages tend to show that the author of the republic is also the author of the laws. they are echoes of the same voice, expressions of the same mind, coincidences too subtle to have been invented by the ingenuity of any imitator. the force of the argument is increased, if we remember that no passage in the laws is exactly copied,--nowhere do five or six words occur together which are found together elsewhere in plato's writings. in other dialogues of plato, as well as in the republic, there are to be found parallels with the laws. such resemblances, as we might expect, occur chiefly (but not exclusively) in the dialogues which, on other grounds, we may suppose to be of later date. the punishment of evil is to be like evil men (laws), as he says also in the theaetetus. compare again the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he gives the reason in the laws--'for serious things cannot be understood without laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either'; here he puts forward the principle which is the groundwork of the thesis of socrates in the symposium, 'that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of comedy ought to be a writer of tragedy also.' there is a truth and right which is above law (laws), as we learn also from the statesman. that men are the possession of the gods (laws), is a reflection which likewise occurs in the phaedo. the remark, whether serious or ironical (laws), that 'the sons of the gods naturally believed in the gods, because they had the means of knowing about them,' is found in the timaeus. the reign of cronos, who is the divine ruler (laws), is a reminiscence of the statesman. it is remarkable that in the sophist and statesman (soph.), plato, speaking in the character of the eleatic stranger, has already put on the old man. the madness of the poets, again, is a favourite notion of plato's, which occurs also in the laws, as well as in the phaedrus, ion, and elsewhere. there are traces in the laws of the same desire to base speculation upon history which we find in the critias. once more, there is a striking parallel with the paradox of the gorgias, that 'if you do evil, it is better to be punished than to be unpunished,' in the laws: 'to live having all goods without justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if life be immortal, but not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.' the point to be considered is whether these are the kind of parallels which would be the work of an imitator. would a forger have had the wit to select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of plato; would he have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly borrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed them into a whole such as the laws; would he have given another the credit which he might have obtained for himself; would he have remembered and made use of other passages of the platonic writings and have never deviated into the phraseology of them? without pressing such arguments as absolutely certain, we must acknowledge that such a comparison affords a new ground of real weight for believing the laws to be a genuine writing of plato. v. the relation of the republic to the laws is clearly set forth by plato in the laws. the republic is the best state, the laws is the best possible under the existing conditions of the greek world. the republic is the ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may not have existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some god, or son of a god (who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of all other states and the exemplar of human life. the laws distinctly acknowledge what the republic partly admits, that the ideal is inimitable by us, but that we should 'lift up our eyes to the heavens' and try to regulate our lives according to the divine image. the citizens are no longer to have wives and children in common, and are no longer to be under the government of philosophers. but the spirit of communism or communion is to continue among them, though reverence for the sacredness of the family, and respect of children for parents, not promiscuous hymeneals, are now the foundation of the state; the sexes are to be as nearly on an equality as possible; they are to meet at common tables, and to share warlike pursuits (if the women will consent), and to have a common education. the legislator has taken the place of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained, who are to fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of life. the addition of younger persons to this council by co-optation is an improvement on the governing body of the republic. the scheme of education in the laws is of a far lower kind than that which plato had conceived in the republic. there he would have his rulers trained in all knowledge meeting in the idea of good, of which the different branches of mathematical science are but the hand-maidens or ministers; here he treats chiefly of popular education, stopping short with the preliminary sciences,--these are to be studied partly with a view to their practical usefulness, which in the republic he holds cheap, and even more with a view to avoiding impiety, of which in the republic he says nothing; he touches very lightly on dialectic, which is still to be retained for the rulers. yet in the laws there remain traces of the old educational ideas. he is still for banishing the poets; and as he finds the works of prose writers equally dangerous, he would substitute for them the study of his own laws. he insists strongly on the importance of mathematics as an educational instrument. he is no more reconciled to the greek mythology than in the republic, though he would rather say nothing about it out of a reverence for antiquity; and he is equally willing to have recourse to fictions, if they have a moral tendency. his thoughts recur to a golden age in which the sanctity of oaths was respected and in which men living nearer the gods were more disposed to believe in them; but we must legislate for the world as it is, now that the old beliefs have passed away. though he is no longer fired with dialectical enthusiasm, he would compel the guardians to 'look at one idea gathered from many things,' and to 'perceive the principle which is the same in all the four virtues.' he still recognizes the enormous influence of music, in which every youth is to be trained for three years; and he seems to attribute the existing degeneracy of the athenian state and the laxity of morals partly to musical innovation, manifested in the unnatural divorce of the instrument and the voice, of the rhythm from the words, and partly to the influence of the mob who ruled at the theatres. he assimilates the education of the two sexes, as far as possible, both in music and gymnastic, and, as in the republic, he would give to gymnastic a purely military character. in marriage, his object is still to produce the finest children for the state. as in the statesman, he would unite in wedlock dissimilar natures--the passionate with the dull, the courageous with the gentle. and the virtuous tyrant of the statesman, who has no place in the republic, again appears. in this, as in all his writings, he has the strongest sense of the degeneracy and incapacity of the rulers of his own time. in the laws, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are at least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the regulation of human life. it must however be remembered that the religion of plato is co-extensive with morality, and is that purified religion and mythology of which he speaks in the second book of the republic. there is no real discrepancy in the two works. in a practical treatise, he speaks of religion rather than of philosophy; just as he appears to identify virtue with pleasure, and rather seeks to find the common element of the virtues than to maintain his old paradoxical theses that they are one, or that they are identical with knowledge. the dialectic and the idea of good, which even glaucon in the republic could not understand, would be out of place in a less ideal work. there may also be a change in his own mind, the purely intellectual aspect of philosophy having a diminishing interest to him in his old age. some confusion occurs in the passage in which plato speaks of the republic, occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he proposes (d.v.) hereafter to expound. like many other thoughts in the laws, the allusion is obscure from not being worked out. aristotle (polit.) speaks of a state which is neither the best absolutely, nor the best under existing conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior to either, destitute, as he supposes, of the necessaries of life--apparently such a beginning of primitive society as is described in laws iii. but it is not clear that by this the third state of plato is intended. it is possible that plato may have meant by his third state an historical sketch, bearing the same relation to the laws which the unfinished critias would have borne to the republic; or he may, perhaps, have intended to describe a state more nearly approximating than the laws to existing greek states. the statesman is a mere fragment when compared with the laws, yet combining a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is wanting in the larger work. several points of similarity and contrast may be observed between them. in some respects the statesman is even more ideal than the republic, looking back to a former state of paradisiacal life, in which the gods ruled over mankind, as the republic looks forward to a coming kingdom of philosophers. of this kingdom of cronos there is also mention in the laws. again, in the statesman, the eleatic stranger rises above law to the conception of the living voice of the lawgiver, who is able to provide for individual cases. a similar thought is repeated in the laws: 'if in the order of nature, and by divine destiny, a man were able to apprehend the truth about these things, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order above knowledge, nor can mind without impiety be deemed the subject or slave of any, but rather the lord of all.' the union of opposite natures, who form the warp and the woof of the political web, is a favourite thought which occurs in both dialogues (laws; statesman). the laws are confessedly a second-best, an inferior ideal, to which plato has recourse, when he finds that the city of philosophers is no longer 'within the horizon of practical politics.' but it is curious to observe that the higher ideal is always returning (compare arist. polit.), and that he is not much nearer the actual fact, nor more on the level of ordinary life in the laws than in the republic. it is also interesting to remark that the new ideal is always falling away, and that he hardly supposes the one to be more capable of being realized than the other. human beings are troublesome to manage; and the legislator cannot adapt his enactments to the infinite variety of circumstances; after all he must leave the administration of them to his successors; and though he would have liked to make them as permanent as they are in egypt, he cannot escape from the necessity of change. at length plato is obliged to institute a nocturnal council which is supposed to retain the mind of the legislator, and of which some of the members are even supposed to go abroad and inspect the institutions of foreign countries, as a foundation for changes in their own. the spirit of such changes, though avoiding the extravagance of a popular assembly, being only so much change as the conservative temper of old members is likely to allow, is nevertheless inconsistent with the fixedness of egypt which plato wishes to impress upon hellenic institutions. he is inconsistent with himself as the truth begins to dawn upon him that 'in the execution things for the most part fall short of our conception of them' (republic). and is not this true of ideals of government in general? we are always disappointed in them. nothing great can be accomplished in the short space of human life; wherefore also we look forward to another (republic). as we grow old, we are sensible that we have no power actively to pursue our ideals any longer. we have had our opportunity and do not aspire to be more than men: we have received our 'wages and are going home.' neither do we despair of the future of mankind, because we have been able to do so little in comparison of the whole. we look in vain for consistency either in men or things. but we have seen enough of improvement in our own time to justify us in the belief that the world is worth working for and that a good man's life is not thrown away. such reflections may help us to bring home to ourselves by inward sympathy the language of plato in the laws, and to combine into something like a whole his various and at first sight inconsistent utterances. vi. the republic may be described as the spartan constitution appended to a government of philosophers. but in the laws an athenian element is also introduced. many enactments are taken from the athenian; the four classes are borrowed from the constitution of cleisthenes, which plato regards as the best form of athenian government, and the guardians of the law bear a certain resemblance to the archons. in the constitution of the laws nearly all officers are elected by a vote more or less popular and by lot. but the assembly only exists for the purposes of election, and has no legislative or executive powers. the nocturnal council, which is the highest body in the state, has several of the functions of the ancient athenian areopagus, after which it appears to be modelled. life is to wear, as at athens, a joyous and festive look; there are to be bacchic choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged in moderate potations. on the other hand, the common meals, the public education, the crypteia are borrowed from sparta and not from athens, and the superintendence of private life, which was to be practised by the governors, has also its prototype in sparta. the extravagant dislike which plato shows both to a naval power and to extreme democracy is the reverse of athenian. the best-governed hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to individual lawgivers. these were real persons, though we are uncertain how far they originated or only modified the institutions which are ascribed to them. but the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea in the mind of the greek,--as fixed as the trojan war or the earth-born cadmus. 'this was what solon meant or said'--was the form in which the athenian expressed his own conception of right and justice, or argued a disputed point of law. and the constant reference in the laws of plato to the lawgiver is altogether in accordance with greek modes of thinking and speaking. there is also, as in the republic, a pythagorean element. the highest branch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly bodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements, is an important part of religion; the lives of the citizens are to have a common measure, as also their vessels and coins; the great blessing of the state is the number 5040. plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity of egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and dance. and he is also struck by the progress which the egyptians had made in the mathematical sciences--in comparison of them the greeks appeared to him to be little better than swine. yet he censures the egyptian meanness and inhospitality to strangers. he has traced the growth of states from their rude beginnings in a philosophical spirit; but of any life or growth of the hellenic world in future ages he is silent. he has made the reflection that past time is the maker of states (book iii.); but he does not argue from the past to the future, that the process is always going on, or that the institutions of nations are relative to their stage of civilization. if he could have stamped indelibly upon hellenic states the will of the legislator, he would have been satisfied. the utmost which he expects of future generations is that they should supply the omissions, or correct the errors which younger statesmen detect in his enactments. when institutions have been once subjected to this process of criticism, he would have them fixed for ever. the preamble. book i. strangers, let me ask a question of you--was a god or a man the author of your laws? 'a god, stranger. in crete, zeus is said to have been the author of them; in sparta, as megillus will tell you, apollo.' you cretans believe, as homer says, that minos went every ninth year to converse with his olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from him. 'yes; and there was rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among us to have been a most righteous judge.' that is a reputation worthy of the son of zeus. and as you and megillus have been trained under these laws, i may ask you to give me an account of them. we can talk about them in our walk from cnosus to the cave and temple of zeus. i am told that the distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places under the trees, where, being no longer young, we may often rest and converse. 'yes, stranger, a little onward there are beautiful groves of cypresses, and green meadows in which we may repose.' my first question is, why has the law ordained that you should have common meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms? 'my answer is, that all our institutions are of a military character. we lead the life of the camp even in time of peace, keeping up the organization of an army, and having meals in common; and as our country, owing to its ruggedness, is ill-suited for heavy-armed cavalry or infantry, our soldiers are archers, equipped with bows and arrows. the legislator was under the idea that war was the natural state of all mankind, and that peace is only a pretence; he thought that no possessions had any value which were not secured against enemies.' and do you think that superiority in war is the proper aim of government? 'certainly i do, and my spartan friend will agree with me.' and are there wars, not only of state against state, but of village against village, of family against family, of individual against individual? 'yes.' and is a man his own enemy? 'there you come to first principles, like a true votary of the goddess athene; and this is all the better, for you will the sooner recognize the truth of what i am saying--that all men everywhere are the enemies of all, and each individual of every other and of himself; and, further, that there is a victory and defeat--the best and the worst--which each man sustains, not at the hands of another, but of himself.' and does this extend to states and villages as well as to individuals? 'certainly; there is a better in them which conquers or is conquered by the worse.' whether the worse ever really conquers the better, is a question which may be left for the present; but your meaning is, that bad citizens do sometimes overcome the good, and that the state is then conquered by herself, and that when they are defeated the state is victorious over herself. or, again, in a family there may be several brothers, and the bad may be a majority; and when the bad majority conquer the good minority, the family are worse than themselves. the use of the terms 'better or worse than himself or themselves' may be doubtful, but about the thing meant there can be no dispute. 'very true.' such a struggle might be determined by a judge. and which will be the better judge--he who destroys the worse and lets the better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the others voluntarily obey; or, thirdly, he who destroys no one, but reconciles the two parties? 'the last, clearly.' but the object of such a judge or legislator would not be war. 'true.' and as there are two kinds of war, one without and one within a state, of which the internal is by far the worse, will not the legislator chiefly direct his attention to this latter? he will reconcile the contending factions, and unite them against their external enemies. 'certainly.' every legislator will aim at the greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war, whether civil or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the body health is preferable to the purgation of disease. he who makes war his object instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of peace, is not a true statesman. 'and yet, stranger, the laws both of crete and sparta aim entirely at war.' perhaps so; but do not let us quarrel about your legislators--let us be gentle; they were in earnest quite as much as we are, and we must try to discover their meaning. the poet tyrtaeus (you know his poems in crete, and my lacedaemonian friend is only too familiar with them)--he was an athenian by birth, and a spartan citizen:--'well,' he says, 'i sing not, i care not about any man, however rich or happy, unless he is brave in war.' now i should like, in the name of us all, to ask the poet a question. oh tyrtaeus, i would say to him, we agree with you in praising those who excel in war, but which kind of war do you mean?--that dreadful war which is termed civil, or the milder sort which is waged against foreign enemies? you say that you abominate 'those who are not eager to taste their enemies' blood,' and you seem to mean chiefly their foreign enemies. 'certainly he does.' but we contend that there are men better far than your heroes, tyrtaeus, concerning whom another poet, theognis the sicilian, says that 'in a civil broil they are worth their weight in gold and silver.' for in a civil war, not only courage, but justice and temperance and wisdom are required, and all virtue is better than a part. the mercenary soldier is ready to die at his post; yet he is commonly a violent, senseless creature. and the legislator, whether inspired or uninspired, will make laws with a view to the highest virtue; and this is not brute courage, but loyalty in the hour of danger. the virtue of tyrtaeus, although needful enough in his own time, is really of a fourth-rate description. 'you are degrading our legislator to a very low level.' nay, we degrade not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the laws of lycurgus and minos had a view to war only. a divine lawgiver would have had regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and have arranged his laws in corresponding classes, and not in the modern fashion, which only makes them after the want of them is felt,--about inheritances and heiresses and assaults, and the like. as you truly said, virtue is the business of the legislator; but you went wrong when you referred all legislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part. for the object of laws, whether the cretan or any other, is to make men happy. now happiness or good is of two kinds--there are divine and there are human goods. he who has the divine has the human added to him; but he who has lost the greater is deprived of both. the lesser goods are health, beauty, strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind god, pluto, but one who has eyes to see and follow wisdom. for mind or wisdom is the most divine of all goods; and next comes temperance, and justice springs from the union of wisdom and temperance with courage, which is the fourth or last. these four precede other goods, and the legislator will arrange all his ordinances accordingly, the human going back to the divine, and the divine to their leader mind. there will be enactments about marriage, about education, about all the states and feelings and experiences of men and women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and peace; upon all the law will fix a stamp of praise and blame. there will also be regulations about property and expenditure, about contracts, about rewards and punishments, and finally about funeral rites and honours of the dead. the lawgiver will appoint guardians to preside over these things; and mind will harmonize his ordinances, and show them to be in agreement with temperance and justice. now i want to know whether the same principles are observed in the laws of lycurgus and minos, or, as i should rather say, of apollo and zeus. we must go through the virtues, beginning with courage, and then we will show that what has preceded has relation to virtue. 'i wish,' says the lacedaemonian, 'that you, stranger, would first criticize cleinias and the cretan laws.' yes, is the reply, and i will criticize you and myself, as well as him. tell me, megillus, were not the common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator with a view to war? 'yes; and next in the order of importance comes hunting, and fourth the endurance of pain in boxing contests, and in the beatings which are the punishment of theft. there is, too, the so-called crypteia or secret service, in which our youth wander about the country night and day unattended, and even in winter go unshod and have no beds to lie on. moreover they wrestle and exercise under a blazing sun, and they have many similar customs.' well, but is courage only a combat against fear and pain, and not against pleasure and flattery? 'against both, i should say.' and which is worse,--to be overcome by pain, or by pleasure? 'the latter.' but did the lawgivers of crete and sparta legislate for a courage which is lame of one leg,--able to meet the attacks of pain but not those of pleasure, or for one which can meet both? 'for a courage which can meet both, i should say.' but if so, where are the institutions which train your citizens to be equally brave against pleasure and pain, and superior to enemies within as well as without? 'we confess that we have no institutions worth mentioning which are of this character.' i am not surprised, and will therefore only request forbearance on the part of us all, in case the love of truth should lead any of us to censure the laws of the others. remember that i am more in the way of hearing criticisms of your laws than you can be; for in well-ordered states like crete and sparta, although an old man may sometimes speak of them in private to a ruler or elder, a similar liberty is not allowed to the young. but now being alone we shall not offend your legislator by a friendly examination of his laws. 'take any freedom which you like.' my first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to endure hardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline would run away from those who had. but he ought to have considered further, that those who had never learned to resist pleasure would be equally at the mercy of those who had, and these are often among the worst of mankind. pleasure, like fear, would overcome them and take away their courage and freedom. 'perhaps; but i must not be hasty in giving my assent.' next as to temperance: what institutions have you which are adapted to promote temperance? 'there are the common meals and gymnastic exercises.' these are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine, what is good at one time and for one person, is bad at another time and for another person. now although gymnastics and common meals do good, they are also a cause of evil in civil troubles, and they appear to encourage unnatural love, as has been shown at miletus, in boeotia, and at thurii. and the cretans are said to have invented the tale of zeus and ganymede in order to justify their evil practices by the example of the god who was their lawgiver. leaving the story, we may observe that all law has to do with pleasure and pain; these are two fountains which are ever flowing in human nature, and he who drinks of them when and as much as he ought, is happy, and he who indulges in them to excess, is miserable. 'you may be right, but i still incline to think that the lacedaemonian lawgiver did well in forbidding pleasure, if i may judge from the result. for there is no drunken revelry in sparta, and any one found in a state of intoxication is severely punished; he is not excused as an athenian would be at athens on account of a festival. i myself have seen the athenians drunk at the dionysia--and at our colony, tarentum, on a similar occasion, i have beheld the whole city in a state of intoxication.' i admit that these festivals should be properly regulated. yet i might reply, 'yes, spartans, that is not your vice; but look at home and remember the licentiousness of your women.' and to all such accusations every one of us may reply in turn:--'wonder not, stranger; there are different customs in different countries.' now this may be a sufficient answer; but we are speaking about the wisdom of lawgivers and not about the customs of men. to return to the question of drinking: shall we have total abstinence, as you have, or hard drinking, like the scythians and thracians, or moderate potations like the persians? 'give us arms, and we send all these nations flying before us.' my good friend, be modest; victories and defeats often arise from unknown causes, and afford no proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. the stronger overcomes the weaker, as the athenians have overcome the ceans, or the syracusans the locrians, who are, perhaps, the best governed state in that part of the world. people are apt to praise or censure practices without enquiring into the nature of them. this is the way with drink: one person brings many witnesses, who sing the praises of wine; another declares that sober men defeat drunkards in battle; and he again is refuted in turn. i should like to conduct the argument on some other method; for if you regard numbers, there are two cities on one side, and ten thousand on the other. 'i am ready to pursue any method which is likely to lead us to the truth.' let me put the matter thus: somebody praises the useful qualities of a goat; another has seen goats running about wild in a garden, and blames a goat or any other animal which happens to be without a keeper. 'how absurd!' would a pilot who is sea-sick be a good pilot? 'no.' or a general who is sick and drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general? 'a general of old women he ought to be.' but can any one form an estimate of any society, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees in an unruly and lawless state? 'no.' there is a convivial form of society--is there not? 'yes.' and has this convivial society ever been rightly ordered? of course you spartans and cretans have never seen anything of the kind, but i have had wide experience, and made many enquiries about such societies, and have hardly ever found anything right or good in them. 'we acknowledge our want of experience, and desire to learn of you.' will you admit that in all societies there must be a leader? 'yes.' and in time of war he must be a man of courage and absolutely devoid of fear, if this be possible? 'certainly.' but we are talking now of a general who shall preside at meetings of friends--and as these have a tendency to be uproarious, they ought above all others to have a governor. 'very good.' he should be a sober man and a man of the world, who will keep, make, and increase the peace of the society; a drunkard in charge of drunkards would be singularly fortunate if he avoided doing a serious mischief. 'indeed he would.' suppose a person to censure such meetings--he may be right, but also he may have known them only in their disorderly state, under a drunken master of the feast; and a drunken general or pilot cannot save his army or his ships. 'true; but although i see the advantage of an army having a good general, i do not equally see the good of a feast being well managed.' if you mean to ask what good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or a single chorus, i should reply, 'not much'; but if you ask what is the good of education in general, i answer, that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly and overcome their enemies in battle. victory is often suicidal to the victors, because it creates forgetfulness of education, but education itself is never suicidal. 'you imply that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part of education; how will you prove this?' i will tell you. but first let me offer a word of apology. we athenians are always thought to be fond of talking, whereas the lacedaemonian is celebrated for brevity, and the cretan is considered to be sagacious and reserved. now i fear that i may be charged with spinning a long discourse out of slender materials. for drinking cannot be rightly ordered without correct principles of music, and music runs up into education generally, and to discuss all these matters may be tedious; if you like, therefore, we will pass on to another part of our subject. 'are you aware, athenian, that our family is your proxenus at sparta, and that from my boyhood i have regarded athens as a second country, and having often fought your battles in my youth, i have become attached to you, and love the sound of the attic dialect? the saying is true, that the best athenians are more than ordinarily good, because they are good by nature; therefore, be assured that i shall be glad to hear you talk as much as you please.' 'i, too,' adds cleinias, 'have a tie which binds me to you. you know that epimenides, the cretan prophet, came and offered sacrifices in your city by the command of an oracle ten years before the persian war. he told the athenians that the persian host would not come for ten years, and would go away again, having suffered more harm than they had inflicted. now epimenides was of my family, and when he visited athens he entered into friendship with your forefathers.' i see that you are willing to listen, and i have the will to speak, if i had only the ability. but, first, i must define the nature and power of education, and by this road we will travel on to the god dionysus. the man who is to be good at anything must have early training;--the future builder must play at building, and the husbandman at digging; the soldier must learn to ride, and the carpenter to measure and use the rule,--all the thoughts and pleasures of children should bear on their after-profession.--do you agree with me? 'certainly.' and we must remember further that we are speaking of the education, not of a trainer, or of the captain of a ship, but of a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and how to obey; and such an education aims at virtue, and not at wealth or strength or mere cleverness. to the good man, education is of all things the most precious, and is also in constant need of renovation. 'we agree.' and we have before agreed that good men are those who are able to control themselves, and bad men are those who are not. let me offer you an illustration which will assist our argument. man is one; but in one and the same man are two foolish counsellors who contend within him--pleasure and pain, and of either he has expectations which we call hope and fear; and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason, when affirmed by the state, becomes law. 'we cannot follow you.' let me put the matter in another way: every creature is a puppet of the gods--whether he is a mere plaything or has any serious use we do not know; but this we do know, that he is drawn different ways by cords and strings. there is a soft golden cord which draws him towards virtue--this is the law of the state; and there are other cords made of iron and hard materials drawing him other ways. the golden reasoning influence has nothing of the nature of force, and therefore requires ministers in order to vanquish the other principles. this explains the doctrine that cities and citizens both conquer and are conquered by themselves. the individual follows reason, and the city law, which is embodied reason, either derived from the gods or from the legislator. when virtue and vice are thus distinguished, education will be better understood, and in particular the relation of education to convivial intercourse. and now let us set wine before the puppet. you admit that wine stimulates the passions? 'yes.' and does wine equally stimulate the reasoning faculties? 'no; it brings the soul back to a state of childhood.' in such a state a man has the least control over himself, and is, therefore, worst. 'very true.' then how can we believe that drinking should be encouraged? 'you seem to think that it ought to be.' and i am ready to maintain my position. 'we should like to hear you prove that a man ought to make a beast of himself.' you are speaking of the degradation of the soul: but how about the body? would any man willingly degrade or weaken that? 'certainly not.' and yet if he goes to a doctor or a gymnastic master, does he not make himself ill in the hope of getting well? for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or always to be in training. 'true.' and may not convivial meetings have a similar remedial use? and if so, are they not to be preferred to other modes of training because they are painless? 'but have they any such use?' let us see: are there not two kinds of fear--fear of evil and fear of an evil reputation? 'there are.' the latter kind of fear is opposed both to the fear of pain and to the love of pleasure. this is called by the legislator reverence, and is greatly honoured by him and by every good man; whereas confidence, which is the opposite quality, is the worst fault both of individuals and of states. this sort of fear or reverence is one of the two chief causes of victory in war, fearlessness of enemies being the other. 'true.' then every one should be both fearful and fearless? 'yes.' the right sort of fear is infused into a man when he comes face to face with shame, or cowardice, or the temptations of pleasure, and has to conquer them. he must learn by many trials to win the victory over himself, if he is ever to be made perfect. 'that is reasonable enough.' and now, suppose that the gods had given mankind a drug, of which the effect was to exaggerate every sort of evil and danger, so that the bravest man entirely lost his presence of mind and became a coward for a time:--would such a drug have any value? 'but is there such a drug?' no; but suppose that there were; might not the legislator use such a mode of testing courage and cowardice? 'to be sure.' the legislator would induce fear in order to implant fearlessness; and would give rewards or punishments to those who behaved well or the reverse, under the influence of the drug? 'certainly.' and this mode of training, whether practised in the case of one or many, whether in solitude or in the presence of a large company--if a man have sufficient confidence in himself to drink the potion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not taking too much,--would be an equally good test of temperance? 'very true.' let us return to the lawgiver and say to him, 'well, lawgiver, no such fear-producing potion has been given by god or invented by man, but there is a potion which will make men fearless.' 'you mean wine.' yes; has not wine an effect the contrary of that which i was just now describing,--first mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him with confidence, making him ready to say or do anything? 'certainly.' let us not forget that there are two qualities which should be cultivated in the soul--first, the greatest fearlessness, and, secondly, the greatest fear, which are both parts of reverence. courage and fearlessness are trained amid dangers; but we have still to consider how fear is to be trained. we desire to attain fearlessness and confidence without the insolence and boldness which commonly attend them. for do not love, ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they stimulate courage, also madden and intoxicate the soul? what better and more innocent test of character is there than festive intercourse? would you make a bargain with a man in order to try whether he is honest? or would you ascertain whether he is licentious by putting your wife or daughter into his hands? no one would deny that the test proposed is fairer, speedier, and safer than any other. and such a test will be particularly useful in the political science, which desires to know human natures and characters. 'very true.' book ii. and are there any other uses of well-ordered potations? there are; but in order to explain them, i must repeat what i mean by right education; which, if i am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse. 'a high assumption.' i believe that virtue and vice are originally present to the mind of children in the form of pleasure and pain; reason and fixed principles come later, and happy is he who acquires them even in declining years; for he who possesses them is the perfect man. when pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are rightly implanted in the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment of reason are discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the soul is virtue, and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, i call education. but the finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be impaired in the course of life; and therefore the gods, pitying the toils and sorrows of mortals, have allowed them to have holidays, and given them the muses and apollo and dionysus for leaders and playfellows. all young creatures love motion and frolic, and utter sounds of delight; but man only is capable of taking pleasure in rhythmical and harmonious movements. with these education begins; and the uneducated is he who has never known the discipline of the chorus, and the educated is he who has. the chorus is partly dance and partly song, and therefore the well-educated must sing and dance well. but when we say, 'he sings and dances well,' we mean that he sings and dances what is good. and if he thinks that to be good which is really good, he will have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a far greater master of imitation in sound and gesture than he who is not of this opinion. 'true.' then, if we know what is good and bad in song and dance, we shall know what education is? 'very true.' let us now consider the beauty of figure, melody, song, and dance. will the same figures or sounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly when they are in trouble? 'how can they be, when the very colours of their faces are different?' figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are adapted to the expression of different feelings (i may remark, by the way, that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters, is not really applicable to music). and one class of harmonies is akin to courage and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice. 'we agree.' and do all men equally like all dances? 'far otherwise.' do some figures, then, appear to be beautiful which are not? for no one will admit that the forms of vice are more beautiful than the forms of virtue, or that he prefers the first kind to the second. and yet most persons say that the merit of music is to give pleasure. but this is impiety. there is, however, a more plausible account of the matter given by others, who make their likes or dislikes the criterion of excellence. sometimes nature crosses habit, or conversely, and then they say that such and such fashions or gestures are pleasant, but they do not like to exhibit them before men of sense, although they enjoy them in private. 'very true.' and do vicious measures and strains do any harm, or good measures any good to the lovers of them? 'probably.' say, rather 'certainly': for the gentle indulgence which we often show to vicious men inevitably makes us become like them. and what can be worse than this? 'nothing.' then in a well-administered city, the poet will not be allowed to make the songs of the people just as he pleases, or to train his choruses without regard to virtue and vice. 'certainly not.' and yet he may do this anywhere except in egypt; for there ages ago they discovered the great truth which i am now asserting, that the young should be educated in forms and strains of virtue. these they fixed and consecrated in their temples; and no artist or musician is allowed to deviate from them. they are literally the same which they were ten thousand years ago. and this practice of theirs suggests the reflection that legislation about music is not an impossible thing. but the particular enactments must be the work of god or of some god-inspired man, as in egypt their ancient chants are said to be the composition of the goddess isis. the melodies which have a natural truth and correctness should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty is not strong enough to change the old fashions. is not the origin of music as follows? we rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think that we prosper when we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but our young men dance dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have lost the elasticity of youth, regale themselves with the memory of the past, while they contemplate the life and activity of the young. 'most true.' people say that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals is to win the palm: are they right? 'possibly.' let us not be hasty in deciding, but first imagine a festival at which the lord of the festival, having assembled the citizens, makes a proclamation that he shall be crowned victor who gives the most pleasure, from whatever source derived. we will further suppose that there are exhibitions of rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic poets, and even marionette-players--which of the pleasure-makers will win? shall i answer for you?--the marionette-players will please the children; youths will decide for comedy; young men, educated women, and people in general will prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of homer and hesiod. now which of them is right? if you and i are asked, we shall certainly say that the old men's way of thinking ought to prevail. 'very true.' so far i agree with the many that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated, or better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man. the true judge must have both wisdom and courage. for he must lead the multitude and not be led by them, and must not weakly yield to the uproar of the theatre, nor give false judgment out of that mouth which has just appealed to the gods. the ancient custom of hellas, which still prevails in italy and sicily, left the judgment to the spectators, but this custom has been the ruin of the poets, who seek only to please their patrons, and has degraded the audience by the representation of inferior characters. what is the inference? the same which we have often drawn, that education is the training of the young idea in what the law affirms and the elders approve. and as the soul of a child is too young to be trained in earnest, a kind of education has been invented which tempts him with plays and songs, as the sick are tempted by pleasant meats and drinks. and the wise legislator will compel the poet to express in his poems noble thoughts in fitting words and rhythms. 'but is this the practice elsewhere than in crete and lacedaemon? in other states, as far as i know, dances and music are constantly changed at the pleasure of the hearers.' i am afraid that i misled you; not liking to be always finding fault with mankind as they are, i described them as they ought to be. but let me understand: you say that such customs exist among the cretans and lacedaemonians, and that the rest of the world would be improved by adopting them? 'much improved.' and you compel your poets to declare that the righteous are happy, and that the wicked man, even if he be as rich as midas, is unhappy? or, in the words of tyrtaeus, 'i sing not, i care not about him' who is a great warrior not having justice; if he be unjust, 'i would not have him look calmly upon death or be swifter than the wind'; and may he be deprived of every good--that is, of every true good. for even if he have the goods which men regard, these are not really goods: first health; beauty next; thirdly wealth; and there are others. a man may have every sense purged and improved; he may be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever: but you and i will maintain that all these things are goods to the just, but to the unjust the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; not so great if he live for a short time only. if a man had health and wealth, and power, and was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he might be fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely, and if basely evilly, and if evilly painfully. 'there i cannot agree with you.' then may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for i am as convinced of the truth of what i say as that crete is an island; and, if i were a lawgiver, i would exercise a censorship over the poets, and i would punish them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that injustice is profitable. and these are not the only matters in which i should make my citizens talk in a different way to the world in general. if i asked zeus and apollo, the divine legislators of crete and sparta,--'are the just and pleasant life the same or not the same'?--and they replied,--'not the same'; and i asked again--'which is the happier'? and they said'--'the pleasant life,' this is an answer not fit for a god to utter, and therefore i ought rather to put the same question to some legislator. and if he replies 'the pleasant,' then i should say to him, 'o my father, did you not tell me that i should live as justly as possible'? and if to be just is to be happy, what is that principle of happiness or good which is superior to pleasure? is the approval of gods and men to be deemed good and honourable, but unpleasant, and their disapproval the reverse? or is the neither doing nor suffering evil good and honourable, although not pleasant? but you cannot make men like what is not pleasant, and therefore you must make them believe that the just is pleasant. the business of the legislator is to clear up this confusion. he will show that the just and the unjust are identical with the pleasurable and the painful, from the point of view of the just man, of the unjust the reverse. and which is the truer judgment? surely that of the better soul. for if not the truth, it is the best and most moral of fictions; and the legislator who desires to propagate this useful lie, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind have believed the story of cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he may be assured that he can make them believe anything, and need only consider what fiction will do the greatest good. that the happiest is also the holiest, this shall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three choruses alike. first will enter the choir of children, who will lift up their voices on high; and after them the young men, who will pray the god paean to be gracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their words; then will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and sixty; and, lastly, there will be the old men, and they will tell stories enforcing the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle. 'whom do you mean by the third chorus?' you remember how i spoke at first of the restless nature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a disorderly manner, and i said that no other animal attained any perception of rhythm; but that to us the gods gave apollo and the muses and dionysus to be our playfellows. of the two first choruses i have already spoken, and i have now to speak of the third, or dionysian chorus, which is composed of those who are between thirty and sixty years old. 'let us hear.' we are agreed (are we not?) that men, women, and children should be always charming themselves with strains of virtue, and that there should be a variety in the strains, that they may not weary of them? now the fairest and most useful of strains will be uttered by the elder men, and therefore we cannot let them off. but how can we make them sing? for a discreet elderly man is ashamed to hear the sound of his own voice in private, and still more in public. the only way is to give them drink; this will mellow the sourness of age. no one should be allowed to taste wine until they are eighteen; from eighteen to thirty they may take a little; but when they have reached forty years, they may be initiated into the mystery of drinking. thus they will become softer and more impressible; and when a man's heart is warm within him, he will be more ready to charm himself and others with song. and what songs shall he sing? 'at crete and lacedaemon we only know choral songs.' yes; that is because your way of life is military. your young men are like wild colts feeding in a herd together; no one takes the individual colt and trains him apart, and tries to give him the qualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier. he who was thus trained would be a greater warrior than those of whom tyrtaeus speaks, for he would be courageous, and yet he would know that courage was only fourth in the scale of virtue. 'once more, i must say, stranger, that you run down our lawgivers.' not intentionally, my good friend, but whither the argument leads i follow; and i am trying to find some style of poetry suitable for those who dislike the common sort. 'very good.' in all things which have a charm, either this charm is their good, or they have some accompanying truth or advantage. for example, in eating and drinking there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say, health; and in learning there is a pleasure and also truth. there is a pleasure or charm, too, in the imitative arts, as well as a law of proportion or equality; but the pleasure which they afford, however innocent, is not the criterion of their truth. the test of pleasure cannot be applied except to that which has no other good or evil, no truth or falsehood. but that which has truth must be judged of by the standard of truth, and therefore imitation and proportion are to be judged of by their truth alone. 'certainly.' and as music is imitative, it is not to be judged by the criterion of pleasure, and the muse whom we seek is the muse not of pleasure but of truth, for imitation has a truth. 'doubtless.' and if so, the judge must know what is being imitated before he decides on the quality of the imitation, and he who does not know what is true will not know what is good. 'he will not.' will any one be able to imitate the human body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or figure of the limbs? 'how can he?' but suppose we know some picture or figure to be an exact resemblance of a man, should we not also require to know whether the picture is beautiful or not? 'quite right.' the judge of the imitation is required to know, therefore, first the original, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution? 'true.' then let us not weary in the attempt to bring music to the standard of the muses and of truth. the muses are not like human poets; they never spoil or mix rhythms or scales, or mingle instruments and human voices, or confuse the manners and strains of men and women, or of freemen and slaves, or of rational beings and brute animals. they do not practise the baser sorts of musical arts, such as the 'matured judgments,' of whom orpheus speaks, would ridicule. but modern poets separate metre from music, and melody and rhythm from words, and use the instrument alone without the voice. the consequence is, that the meaning of the rhythm and of the time are not understood. i am endeavouring to show how our fifty-year-old choristers are to be trained, and what they are to avoid. the opinion of the multitude about these matters is worthless; they who are only made to step in time by sheer force cannot be critics of music. 'impossible.' then our newly-appointed minstrels must be trained in music sufficiently to understand the nature of rhythms and systems; and they should select such as are suitable to men of their age, and will enable them to give and receive innocent pleasure. this is a knowledge which goes beyond that either of the poets or of their auditors in general. for although the poet must understand rhythm and music, he need not necessarily know whether the imitation is good or not, which was the third point required in a judge; but our chorus of elders must know all three, if they are to be the instructors of youth. and now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as follows: a convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking proceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and fancies that he can rule the whole world. 'doubtless.' and did we not say that the souls of the drinkers, when subdued by wine, are made softer and more malleable at the hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them. at times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out of their turn, and interrupting one another. and the business of the legislator is to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame, in opposition to this disorderly boldness. but in order to discipline them there must be guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals who shall take charge of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in drinking as in fighting, and he who disobeys these dionysiac commanders will be equally disgraced. 'very good.' if a drinking festival were well regulated, men would go away, not as they now do, greater enemies, but better friends. of the greatest gift of dionysus i hardly like to speak, lest i should be misunderstood. 'what is that?' according to tradition dionysus was driven mad by his stepmother here, and in order to revenge himself he inspired mankind with bacchic madness. but these are stories which i would rather not repeat. however i do acknowledge that all men are born in an imperfect state, and are at first restless, irrational creatures: this, as you will remember, has been already said by us. 'i remember.' and that apollo and the muses and dionysus gave us harmony and rhythm? 'very true.' the other story implies that wine was given to punish us and make us mad; but we contend that wine is a balm and a cure; a spring of modesty in the soul, and of health and strength in the body. again, the work of the chorus is co-extensive with the work of education; rhythm and melody answer to the voice, and the motions of the body correspond to all three, and the sound enters in and educates the soul in virtue. 'yes.' and the movement which, when pursued as an amusement, is termed dancing, when studied with a view to the improvement of the body, becomes gymnastic. shall we now proceed to speak of this? 'what cretan or lacedaemonian would approve of your omitting gymnastic?' your question implies assent; and you will easily understand a subject which is familiar to you. gymnastic is based on the natural tendency of every animal to rapid motion; and man adds a sense of rhythm, which is awakened by music; music and dancing together form the choral art. but before proceeding i must add a crowning word about drinking. like other pleasures, it has a lawful use; but if a state or an individual is inclined to drink at will, i cannot allow them. i would go further than crete or lacedaemon and have the law of the carthaginians, that no slave of either sex should drink wine at all, and no soldier while he is on a campaign, and no magistrate or officer while he is on duty, and that no one should drink by daylight or on a bridal night. and there are so many other occasions on which wine ought to be prohibited, that there will not be many vines grown or vineyards required in the state. book iii. if a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he should behold them from the point of view of time. thousands of cities have come into being and have passed away again in infinite ages, every one of them having had endless forms of government; and if we can ascertain the cause of these changes in states, that will probably explain their origin. what do you think of ancient traditions about deluges and destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant? 'every one believes in them.' then let us suppose the world to have been destroyed by a deluge. the survivors would be hill-shepherds, small sparks of the human race, dwelling in isolation, and unacquainted with the arts and vices of civilization. we may further suppose that the cities on the plain and on the coast have been swept away, and that all inventions, and every sort of knowledge, have perished. 'why, if all things were as they now are, nothing would have ever been invented. all our famous discoveries have been made within the last thousand years, and many of them are but of yesterday.' yes, cleinias, and you must not forget epimenides, who was really of yesterday; he practised the lesson of moderation and abstinence which hesiod only preached. 'true.' after the great destruction we may imagine that the earth was a desert, in which there were a herd or two of oxen and a few goats, hardly enough to support those who tended them; while of politics and governments the survivors would know nothing. and out of this state of things have arisen arts and laws, and a great deal of virtue and a great deal of vice; little by little the world has come to be what it is. at first, the few inhabitants would have had a natural fear of descending into the plains; although they would want to have intercourse with one another, they would have a difficulty in getting about, having lost the arts, and having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or of felling timber; for even if they had saved any tools, these would soon have been worn out, and they could get no more until the art of metallurgy had been again revived. faction and war would be extinguished among them, for being solitary they would incline to be friendly; and having abundance of pasture and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have nothing to quarrel about. we may assume that they had also dwellings, clothes, pottery, for the weaving and plastic arts do not require the use of metals. in those days they were neither poor nor rich, and there was no insolence or injustice among them; for they were of noble natures, and lived up to their principles, and believed what they were told; knowing nothing of land or naval warfare, or of legal practices or party conflicts, they were simpler and more temperate, and also more just than the men of our day. 'very true.' i am showing whence the need of lawgivers arises, for in primitive ages they neither had nor wanted them. men lived according to the customs of their fathers, in a simple manner, under a patriarchal government, such as still exists both among hellenes and barbarians, and is described in homer as prevailing among the cyclopes:-'they have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains, and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves about one another.' 'that is a charming poet of yours, though i know little of him, for in crete foreign poets are not much read.' 'but he is well known in sparta, though he describes ionian rather than dorian manners, and he seems to take your view of primitive society.' may we not suppose that government arose out of the union of single families who survived the destruction, and were under the rule of patriarchs, because they had originally descended from a single father and mother? 'that is very probable.' as time went on, men increased in number, and tilled the ground, living in a common habitation, which they protected by walls against wild beasts; but the several families retained the laws and customs which they separately received from their first parents. they would naturally like their own laws better than any others, and would be already formed by them when they met in a common society: thus legislation imperceptibly began among them. for in the next stage the associated families would appoint plenipotentiaries, who would select and present to the chiefs those of all their laws which they thought best. the chiefs in turn would make a further selection, and would thus become the lawgivers of the state, which they would form into an aristocracy or a monarchy. 'probably.' in the third stage various other forms of government would arise. this state of society is described by homer in speaking of the foundation of dardania, which, he says, 'was built at the foot of many-fountained ida, for ilium, the city of the plain, as yet was not.' here, as also in the account of the cyclopes, the poet by some divine inspiration has attained truth. but to proceed with our tale. ilium was built in a wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams descending from ida. this shows that many ages must have passed; for the men who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the mercy of the waters. when mankind began to multiply, many other cities were built in similar situations. these cities carried on a ten years' war against troy, by sea as well as land, for men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army were at troy, their homes fell into confusion. the youth revolted and refused to receive their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued. under the new name of dorians, which they received from their chief dorieus, the exiles returned: the rest of the story is part of the history of sparta. thus, after digressing from the subject of laws into music and drinking, we return to the settlement of sparta, which in laws and institutions is the sister of crete. we have seen the rise of a first, second, and third state, during the lapse of ages; and now we arrive at a fourth state, and out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature of laws and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them. 'if,' replies the spartan, 'our new discussion is likely to be as good as the last, i would think the longest day too short for such an employment.' let us imagine the time when lacedaemon, and argos, and messene were all subject, megillus, to your ancestors. afterwards, they distributed the army into three portions, and made three cities--argos, messene, lacedaemon. 'yes.' temenus was the king of argos, cresphontes of messene, procles and eurysthenes ruled at lacedaemon. 'just so.' and they all swore to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was subverted. 'yes.' but did we not say that kingdoms or governments can only be subverted by themselves? 'that is true.' yes, and the truth is now proved by facts: there were certain conditions upon which the three kingdoms were to assist one another; the government was to be mild and the people obedient, and the kings and people were to unite in assisting either of the two others when they were wronged. this latter condition was a great security. 'clearly.' such a provision is in opposition to the common notion that the lawgiver should make only such laws as the people like; but we say that he should rather be like a physician, prepared to effect a cure even at the cost of considerable suffering. 'very true.' the early lawgivers had another great advantage--they were saved from the reproach which attends a division of land and the abolition of debts. no one could quarrel with the dorians for dividing the territory, and they had no debts of long standing. 'they had not.' then what was the reason why their legislation signally failed? for there were three kingdoms, two of them quickly lost their original constitution. that is a question which we cannot refuse to answer, if we mean to proceed with our old man's game of enquiring into laws and institutions. and the dorian institutions are more worthy of consideration than any other, having been evidently intended to be a protection not only to the peloponnese, but to all the hellenes against the barbarians. for the capture of troy by the achaeans had given great offence to the assyrians, of whose empire it then formed part, and they were likely to retaliate. accordingly the royal heraclid brothers devised their military constitution, which was organised on a far better plan than the old trojan expedition; and the dorians themselves were far superior to the achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had been conquered by them. such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared with one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the delphian oracle, under the guidance of the heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of permanence. 'naturally.' yet this has not proved to be the case. instead of the three being one, they have always been at war; had they been united, in accordance with the original intention, they would have been invincible. and what caused their ruin? did you ever observe that there are beautiful things of which men often say, 'what wonders they would have effected if rightly used?' and yet, after all, this may be a mistake. and so i say of the heraclidae and their expedition, which i may perhaps have been justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me the general reflection,--'what wonders might not strength and military resources have accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use them!' for consider: if the generals of the army had only known how to arrange their forces, might they not have given their subjects everlasting freedom, and the power of doing what they would in all the world? 'very true.' suppose a person to express his admiration of wealth or rank, does he not do so under the idea that by the help of these he can attain his desires? all men wish to obtain the control of all things, and they are always praying for what they desire. 'certainly.' and we ask for our friends what they ask for themselves. 'yes.' dear is the son to the father, and yet the son, if he is young and foolish, will often pray to obtain what the father will pray that he may not obtain. 'true.' and when the father, in the heat of youth or the dotage of age, makes some rash prayer, the son, like hippolytus, may have reason to pray that the word of his father may be ineffectual. 'you mean that a man should pray to have right desires, before he prays that his desires may be fulfilled; and that wisdom should be the first object of our prayers?' yes; and you will remember my saying that wisdom should be the principal aim of the legislator; but you said that defence in war came first. and i replied, that there were four virtues, whereas you acknowledged one only--courage, and not wisdom which is the guide of all the rest. and i repeat--in jest if you like, but i am willing that you should receive my words in earnest--that 'the prayer of a fool is full of danger.' i will prove to you, if you will allow me, that the ruin of those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war, but by ignorance of human affairs. 'pray proceed: our attention will show better than compliments that we prize your words.' i maintain that ignorance is, and always has been, the ruin of states; wherefore the legislator should seek to banish it from the state; and the greatest ignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of what is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of pleasure and reason in the soul. i say the greatest, because affecting the greater part of the soul; for the passions are in the individual what the people are in a state. and when they become opposed to reason or law, and instruction no longer avails--that is the last and greatest ignorance of states and men. 'i agree.' let this, then, be our first principle:--that the citizen who does not know how to choose between good and evil must not have authority, although he possess great mental gifts, and many accomplishments; for he is really a fool. on the other hand, he who has this knowledge may be unable either to read or swim; nevertheless, he shall be counted wise and permitted to rule. for how can there be wisdom where there is no harmony?--the wise man is the saviour, and he who is devoid of wisdom is the destroyer of states and households. there are rulers and there are subjects in states. and the first claim to rule is that of parents to rule over their children; the second, that of the noble to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder must govern the younger; in the fourth place, the slave must obey his master; fifthly, there is the power of the stronger, which the poet pindar declares to be according to nature; sixthly, there is the rule of the wiser, which is also according to nature, as i must inform pindar, if he does not know, and is the rule of law over obedient subjects. 'most true.' and there is a seventh kind of rule which the gods love,--in this the ruler is elected by lot. then, now, we playfully say to him who fancies that it is easy to make laws:--you see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to authority; here is a spring of troubles which you must stay. and first of all you must help us to consider how the kings of argos and messene in olden days destroyed their famous empire--did they forget the saying of hesiod, that 'the half is better than the whole'? and do we suppose that the ignorance of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples? 'probably the evil is increased by their way of life.' the kings of those days transgressed the laws and violated their oaths. their deeds were not in harmony with their words, and their folly, which seemed to them wisdom, was the ruin of the state. and how could the legislator have prevented this evil?--the remedy is easy to see now, but was not easy to foresee at the time. 'what is the remedy?' the institutions of sparta may teach you, megillus. wherever there is excess, whether the vessel has too large a sail, or the body too much food, or the mind too much power, there destruction is certain. and similarly, a man who possesses arbitrary power is soon corrupted, and grows hateful to his dearest friends. in order to guard against this evil, the god who watched over sparta gave you two kings instead of one, that they might balance one another; and further to lower the pulse of your body politic, some human wisdom, mingled with divine power, tempered the strength and self-sufficiency of youth with the moderation of age in the institution of your senate. a third saviour bridled your rising and swelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to officers elected by lot: and thus the kingly power was preserved, and became the preserver of all the rest. had the constitution been arranged by the original legislators, not even the portion of aristodemus would have been saved; for they had no political experience, and imagined that a youthful spirit invested with power could be restrained by oaths. now that god has instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in seeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event. but if the coming danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then no persian or other enemy would have dared to attack hellas; and indeed there was not so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit in our disloyalty to one another. for of the three cities one only fought on behalf of hellas; and of the two others, argos refused her aid; and messenia was actually at war with sparta: and if the lacedaemonians and athenians had not united, the hellenes would have been absorbed in the persian empire, and dispersed among the barbarians. we make these reflections upon past and present legislators because we desire to find out what other course could have been followed. we were saying just now, that a state can only be free and wise and harmonious when there is a balance of powers. there are many words by which we express the aims of the legislator,--temperance, wisdom, friendship; but we need not be disturbed by the variety of expression,--these words have all the same meaning. 'i should like to know at what in your opinion the legislator should aim.' hear me, then. there are two mother forms of states--one monarchy, and the other democracy: the persians have the first in the highest form, and the athenians the second; and no government can be well administered which does not include both. there was a time when both the persians and athenians had more the character of a constitutional state than they now have. in the days of cyrus the persians were freemen as well as lords of others, and their soldiers were free and equal, and the kings used and honoured all the talent which they could find, and so the nation waxed great, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of soul. but cyrus, though a wise general, never troubled himself about the education of his family. he was a soldier from his youth upward, and left his children who were born in the purple to be educated by women, who humoured and spoilt them. 'a rare education, truly!' yes, such an education as princesses who had recently grown rich might be expected to give them in a country where the men were solely occupied with warlike pursuits. 'likely enough.' their father had possessions of men and animals, and never considered that the race to whom he was about to make them over had been educated in a very different school, not like the persian shepherd, who was well able to take care of himself and his own. he did not see that his children had been brought up in the median fashion, by women and eunuchs. the end was that one of the sons of cyrus slew the other, and lost the kingdom by his own folly. observe, again, that darius, who restored the kingdom, had not received a royal education. he was one of the seven chiefs, and when he came to the throne he divided the empire into seven provinces; and he made equal laws, and implanted friendship among the people. hence his subjects were greatly attached to him, and cheerfully helped him to extend his empire. next followed xerxes, who had received the same royal education as cambyses, and met with a similar fate. the reflection naturally occurs to us--how could darius, with all his experience, have made such a mistake! the ruin of xerxes was not a mere accident, but the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator has seriously to consider. justly may the lacedaemonians be praised for not giving special honour to birth or wealth; for such advantages are not to be highly esteemed without virtue, and not even virtue is to be esteemed unless it be accompanied by temperance. 'explain.' no one would like to live in the same house with a courageous man who had no control over himself, nor with a clever artist who was a rogue. nor can justice and wisdom ever be separated from temperance. but considering these qualities with reference to the honour and dishonour which is to be assigned to them in states, would you say, on the other hand, that temperance, if existing without the other virtues in the soul, is worth anything or nothing? 'i cannot tell.' you have answered well. it would be absurd to speak of temperance as belonging to the class of honourable or of dishonourable qualities, because all other virtues in their various classes require temperance to be added to them; having the addition, they are honoured not in proportion to that, but to their own excellence. and ought not the legislator to determine these classes? 'certainly.' suppose then that, without going into details, we make three great classes of them. most honourable are the goods of the soul, always assuming temperance as a condition of them; secondly, those of the body; thirdly, external possessions. the legislator who puts them in another order is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing. these remarks were suggested by the history of the persian kings; and to them i will now return. the ruin of their empire was caused by the loss of freedom and the growth of despotism; all community of feeling disappeared. hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the people no longer fought heartily for their masters; the rulers, finding their myriads useless on the field of battle, resorted to mercenaries as their only salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances to proclaim the stupidest of falsehoods--that virtue is a trifle in comparison of money. but enough of the persians: a different lesson is taught by the athenians, whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than an unlimited. ancient athens, at the time of the persian invasion, had such a limited freedom. the people were divided into four classes, according to the amount of their property, and the universal love of order, as well as the fear of the approaching host, made them obedient and willing citizens. for darius had sent datis and artaphernes, commanding them under pain of death to subjugate the eretrians and athenians. a report, whether true or not, came to athens that all the eretrians had been 'netted'; and the athenians in terror sent all over hellas for assistance. none came to their relief except the lacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late, when the battle of marathon had been already fought. in process of time xerxes came to the throne, and the athenians heard of nothing but the bridge over the hellespont, and the canal of athos, and the innumerable host and fleet. they knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of marathon. their case seemed desperate, for there was no hellene likely to assist them by land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand vessels;--their only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they relied upon themselves and upon the gods. their common danger, and the influence of their ancient constitution, greatly tended to promote harmony among them. reverence and fear--that fear which the coward never knows--made them fight for their altars and their homes, and saved them from being dispersed all over the world. 'your words, athenian, are worthy of your country.' and you megillus, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, are worthy to hear them. let me ask you to take the moral of my tale. the persians have lost their liberty in absolute slavery, and we in absolute freedom. in ancient times the athenian people were not the masters, but the servants of the laws. 'of what laws?' in the first place, there were laws about music, and the music was of various kinds: there was one kind which consisted of hymns, another of lamentations; there was also the paean and the dithyramb, and the so-called 'laws' (nomoi) or strains, which were played upon the harp. the regulation of such matters was not left to the whistling and clapping of the crowd; there was silence while the judges decided, and the boys, and the audience in general, were kept in order by raps of a stick. but after a while there arose a new race of poets, men of genius certainly, however careless of musical truth and propriety, who made pleasure the only criterion of excellence. that was a test which the spectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience, instead of being mute, became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the place of an aristocracy. could the judges have been free, there would have been no great harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough--but conceit has been our ruin. everybody knows everything, and is ready to say anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence and licentiousness has succeeded. 'most true.' and with this freedom comes disobedience to rulers, parents, elders,--in the latter days to the law also; the end returns to the beginning, and the old titanic nature reappears--men have no regard for the gods or for oaths; and the evils of the human race seem as if they would never cease. whither are we running away? once more we must pull up the argument with bit and curb, lest, as the proverb says, we should fall off our ass. 'good.' our purpose in what we have been saying is to prove that the legislator ought to aim at securing for a state three things--freedom, friendship, wisdom. and we chose two states;--one was the type of freedom, and the other of despotism; and we showed that when in a mean they attained their highest perfection. in a similar spirit we spoke of the dorian expedition, and of the settlement on the hills and in the plains of troy; and of music, and the use of wine, and of all that preceded. and now, has our discussion been of any use? 'yes, stranger; for by a singular coincidence the cretans are about to send out a colony, of which the settlement has been confided to the cnosians. ten commissioners, of whom i am one, are to give laws to the colonists, and we may give any which we please--cretan or foreign. and therefore let us make a selection from what has been said, and then proceed with the construction of the state.' very good: i am quite at your service. 'and i too,' says megillus. book iv. and now, what is this city? i do not want to know what is to be the name of the place (for some accident,--a river or a local deity, will determine that), but what the situation is, whether maritime or inland. 'the city will be about eleven miles from the sea.' are there harbours? 'excellent.' and is the surrounding country self-supporting? 'almost.' any neighbouring states? 'no; and that is the reason for choosing the place, which has been deserted from time immemorial.' and is there a fair proportion of hill and plain and wood? 'like crete in general, more hill than plain.' then there is some hope for your citizens; had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support on other countries, no human power could have preserved you from corruption. even the distance of eleven miles is hardly enough. for the sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous companion, and a highway of strange morals and manners as well as of commerce. but as the country is only moderately fertile there will be no great export trade and no great returns of gold and silver, which are the ruin of states. is there timber for ship-building? 'there is no pine, nor much cypress; and very little stone-pine or plane wood for the interior of ships.' that is good. 'why?' because the city will not be able to imitate the bad ways of her enemies. 'what is the bearing of that remark?' to explain my meaning, i would ask you to remember what we said about the cretan laws, that they had an eye to war only; whereas i maintained that they ought to have included all virtue. and i hope that you in your turn will retaliate upon me if i am false to my own principle. for i consider that the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue. what further i mean, when i speak of the imitation of enemies, i will illustrate by the story of minos, if our cretan friend will allow me to mention it. minos, who was a great sea-king, imposed upon the athenians a cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they had no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate their enemies'; and better far, as i maintain, would it have been for them to have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the tribute than to have turned soldiers into sailors. naval warfare is not a very praiseworthy art; men should not be taught to leap on shore, and then again to hurry back to their ships, or to find specious excuses for throwing away their arms; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine words. and retreat is always bad, as we are taught in homer, when he introduces odysseus, setting forth to agamemnon the danger of ships being at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. an army of lions trained in such ways would fly before a herd of deer. further, a city which owes its preservation to a crowd of pilots and oarsmen and other undeserving persons, cannot bestow rewards of honour properly; and this is the ruin of states. 'still, in crete we say that the battle of salamis was the salvation of hellas.' such is the prevailing opinion. but i and megillus say that the battle of marathon began the deliverance, and that the battle of plataea completed it; for these battles made men better, whereas the battles of salamis and artemisium made them no better. and we further affirm that mere existence is not the great political good of individuals or states, but the continuance of the best existence. 'certainly.' let us then endeavour to follow this principle in colonization and legislation. and first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? may any one come from any city of crete? for you would surely not send a general invitation to all hellas. yet i observe that in crete there are people who have come from argos and aegina and other places. 'our recruits will be drawn from all crete, and of other hellenes we should prefer peloponnesians. as you observe, there are argives among the cretans; moreover the gortynians, who are the best of all cretans, have come from gortys in peloponnesus.' colonization is in some ways easier when the colony goes out in a swarm from one country, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or war. in this case there is the advantage that the new colonists have a community of race, language, and laws. but then again, they are less obedient to the legislator; and often they are anxious to keep the very laws and customs which caused their ruin at home. a mixed multitude, on the other hand, is more tractable, although there is a difficulty in making them pull together. there is nothing, however, which perfects men's virtue more than legislation and colonization. and yet i have a word to say which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'what is that?' i was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all sorts are the true legislators,--wars and pestilences and famines and the frequent recurrence of bad seasons. the observer will be inclined to say that almost all human things are chance; and this is certainly true about navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. but there is another thing which may equally be said. 'what is it?' that god governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with him. and according to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a storm it is well to have a pilot? and the same is true of legislation: even if circumstances are favourable, a skilful lawgiver is still necessary. 'most true.' all artists would pray for certain conditions under which to exercise their art: and would not the legislator do the same? 'certainly?' come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the conditions which you would have? he will answer, grant me a city which is ruled by a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, mindful, teachable, courageous, magnanimous; and let him have the inseparable condition of all virtue, which is temperance--not prudence, but that natural temperance which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly reckoned among goods--with this he must be endowed, if the state is to acquire the form most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner. and i must add one other condition: the tyrant must be fortunate, and his good fortune must consist in his having the co-operation of a great legislator. when god has done all this, he has done the best which he can for a state; not so well if he has given them two legislators instead of one, and less and less well if he has given them a great many. an orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect state; in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, a democracy; an oligarchy is worst of all. 'i do not understand.' i suppose that you have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? 'i have no desire to see one.' you would have seen what i am describing, if you ever had. the tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix the stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the citizens readily follow the example which he sets. there is no quicker way of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. it is hard to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any powerful form of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy. in olden days there were chiefs like nestor, who was the most eloquent and temperate of mankind, but there is no one his equal now. if such an one ever arises among us, blessed will he be, and blessed they who listen to his words. for where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one, there are the best laws and constitutions. i am endeavouring to show you how easy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other, is the task of giving a city good laws. 'how do you mean?' let us old men attempt to mould in words a constitution for your new state, as children make figures out of wax. 'proceed. what constitution shall we give--democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?' to which of these classes, megillus, do you refer your own state? 'the spartan constitution seems to me to contain all these elements. our state is a democracy and also an aristocracy; the power of the ephors is tyrannical, and we have an ancient monarchy.' 'much the same,' adds cleinias, 'may be said of cnosus.' the reason is that you have polities, but other states are mere aggregations of men dwelling together, which are named after their several ruling powers; whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should be called a theocracy. a tale of old will explain my meaning. there is a tradition of a golden age, in which all things were spontaneous and abundant. cronos, then lord of the world, knew that no mortal nature could endure the temptations of power, and therefore he appointed demons or demi-gods, who are of a superior race, to have dominion over man, as man has dominion over the animals. they took care of us with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us; and the tradition says that only when god, and not man, is the ruler, can the human race cease from ill. this was the manner of life which prevailed under cronos, and which we must strive to follow so far as the principle of immortality still abides in us and we live according to law and the dictates of right reason. but in an oligarchy or democracy, when the governing principle is athirst for pleasure, the laws are trampled under foot, and there is no possibility of salvation. is it not often said that there are as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they have no concern either with any one virtue or with all virtue, but are relative to the will of the government? which is as much as to say that 'might makes right.' 'what do you mean?' i mean that governments enact their own laws, and that every government makes self-preservation its principal aim. he who transgresses the laws is regarded as an evil-doer, and punished accordingly. this was one of the unjust principles of government which we mentioned when speaking of the different claims to rule. we were agreed that parents should rule their children, the elder the younger, the noble the ignoble. but there were also several other principles, and among them pindar's 'law of violence.' to whom then is our state to be entrusted? for many a government is only a victorious faction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share to the conquered, lest when they get into office they should remember their wrongs. such governments are not polities, but parties; nor are any laws good which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not of the whole. and in our state i mean to protest against making any man a ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble. but those who are obedient to the laws, and who win the victory of obedience, shall be promoted to the service of the gods according to the degree of their obedience. when i call the ruler the servant or minister of the law, this is not a mere paradox, but i mean to say that upon a willingness to obey the law the existence of the state depends. 'truly, stranger, you have a keen vision.' why, yes; every man when he is old has his intellectual vision most keen. and now shall we call in our colonists and make a speech to them? friends, we say to them, god holds in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and he moves in a straight line towards the accomplishment of his will. justice always bears him company, and punishes those who fall short of his laws. he who would be happy follows humbly in her train; but he who is lifted up with pride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by god, and, being deserted, he lives in confusion and disorder. to many he seems a great man; but in a short time he comes to utter destruction. wherefore, seeing these things, what ought we to do or think? 'every man ought to follow god.' what life, then, is pleasing to god? there is an old saying that 'like agrees with like, measure with measure,' and god ought to be our measure in all things. the temperate man is the friend of god because he is like him, and the intemperate man is not his friend, because he is not like him. and the conclusion is, that the best of all things for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the gods; but the bad man has a polluted soul; and therefore his service is wasted upon the gods, while the good are accepted of them. i have told you the mark at which we ought to aim. you will say, how, and with what weapons? in the first place we affirm, that after the olympian gods and the gods of the state, honour should be given to the gods below, and to them should be offered everything in even numbers and of the second choice; the auspicious odd numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved for the gods above. next demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and then heroes, and after them family gods, who will be worshipped at their local seats according to law. further, the honour due to parents should not be forgotten; children owe all that they have to them, and the debt must be repaid by kindness and attention in old age. no unbecoming word must be uttered before them; for there is an avenging angel who hears them when they are angry, and the child should consider that the parent when he has been wronged has a right to be angry. after their death let them have a moderate funeral, such as their fathers have had before them; and there shall be an annual commemoration of them. living on this wise, we shall be accepted of the gods, and shall pass our days in good hope. the law will determine all our various duties towards relatives and friends and other citizens, and the whole state will be happy and prosperous. but if the legislator would persuade as well as command, he will add prefaces to his laws which will predispose the citizens to virtue. even a little accomplished in the way of gaining the hearts of men is of great value. for most men are in no particular haste to become good. as hesiod says: 'long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue, but when you have reached the top the rest is easy.' 'those are excellent words.' yes; but may i tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me? i will express my meaning in an address to the lawgiver:--o lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do and say, you can surely tell us;--you are not like the poet, who, as you were just now saying, does not know the effect of his own words. and the poet may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the muses he is not in his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed to say all sorts of opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is true. but this licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver. for example, there are three kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another mean, a third moderate, and you say that the last is right. now if i had a rich wife, and she told me to bury her, and i were to sing of her burial, i should praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would commend a funeral of the meaner sort, and a man of moderate means would prefer a moderate funeral. but you, as legislator, would have to say exactly what you meant by 'moderate.' 'very true.' and is our lawgiver to have no preamble or interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice to his subjects, after the manner of some doctors? for of doctors are there not two kinds? the one gentle and the other rough, doctors who are freemen and learn themselves and teach their pupils scientifically, and doctor's assistants who get their knowledge empirically by attending on their masters? 'of course there are.' and did you ever observe that the gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine themselves to slaves? the latter go about the country or wait for the slaves at the dispensaries. they hold no parley with their patients about their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule of thumb, and give their decrees in the most arbitrary manner. when they have doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with equal assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care of his sick slaves. but the other doctor, who practises on freemen, proceeds in quite a different way. he takes counsel with his patient and learns from him, and never does anything until he has persuaded him of what he is doing. he trusts to influence rather than force. now is not the use of both methods far better than the use of either alone? and both together may be advantageously employed by us in legislation. we may illustrate our proposal by an example. the laws relating to marriage naturally come first, and therefore we may begin with them. the simple law would be as follows:--a man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall be fined or deprived of certain privileges. the double law would add the reason why: forasmuch as man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of children, no one should deprive himself of his share in this good. he who obeys the law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer by his celibacy; and therefore he shall pay a yearly fine, and shall not be allowed to receive honour from the young. that is an example of what i call the double law, which may enable us to judge how far the addition of persuasion to threats is desirable. 'lacedaemonians in general, stranger, are in favour of brevity; in this case, however, i prefer length. but cleinias is the real lawgiver, and he ought to be first consulted.' 'thank you, megillus.' whether words are to be many or few, is a foolish question:--the best and not the shortest forms are always to be approved. and legislators have never thought of the advantages which they might gain by using persuasion as well as force, but trust to force only. and i have something else to say about the matter. here have we been from early dawn until noon, discoursing about laws, and all that we have been saying is only the preamble of the laws which we are about to give. i tell you this, because i want you to observe that songs and strains have all of them preludes, but that laws, though called by the same name (nomoi), have never any prelude. now i am disposed to give preludes to laws, dividing them into two parts--one containing the despotic command, which i described under the image of the slave doctor--the other the persuasive part, which i term the preamble. the legislator should give preludes or preambles to his laws. 'that shall be the way in my colony.' i am glad that you agree with me; this is a matter which it is important to remember. a preamble is not always necessary to a law: the lawgiver must determine when it is needed, as the musician determines when there is to be a prelude to a song. 'most true: and now, having a preamble, let us recommence our discourse.' enough has been said of gods and parents, and we may proceed to consider what relates to the citizens--their souls, bodies, properties,--their occupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education. the first word of the laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought which is present to the mind of plato throughout the work, namely, that law is of divine origin. in the words of a great english writer--'her seat is the bosom of god, her voice the harmony of the world.' though the particular laws of sparta and crete had a narrow and imperfect aim, this is not true of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of human nature, and not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment. they have their natural divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue; very unlike the discordant enactments of an athenian assembly or of an english parliament. yet we may observe two inconsistencies in plato's treatment of the subject: first, a lesser, inasmuch as he does not clearly distinguish the cretan and spartan laws, of which the exclusive aim is war, from those other laws of zeus and apollo which are said to be divine, and to comprehend all virtue. secondly, we may retort on him his own complaint against sparta and crete, that he has himself given us a code of laws, which for the most part have a military character; and that we cannot point to 'obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure;' at least there is only one such, that which relates to the regulation of convivial intercourse. the military spirit which is condemned by him in the beginning of the laws, reappears in the seventh and eighth books. the mention of minos the great lawgiver, and of rhadamanthus the righteous administrator of the law, suggests the two divisions of the laws into enactments and appointments of officers. the legislator and the judge stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly distinguished. for the judge is in some sort a legislator, at any rate in small matters; and his decisions growing into precedents, must determine the innumerable details which arise out of the conflict of circumstances. these plato proposes to leave to a younger generation of legislators. the action of courts of law in making law seems to have escaped him, probably because the athenian law-courts were popular assemblies; and, except in a mythical form, he can hardly be said to have had before his eyes the ideal of a judge. in reading the laws of plato, or any other ancient writing about laws, we should consider how gradual the process is by which not only a legal system, but the administration of a court of law, becomes perfected. there are other subjects on which plato breaks ground, as his manner is, early in the work. first, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws; they are to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from birth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly executed in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of describing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony. secondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so great an influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers especially to the great offence--which he mentions again, and which he had condemned in the republic--of varying the modes and rhythms, as well as to that of separating the words from the music. thirdly, he reprobates the prevalence of unnatural loves in sparta and crete, which he attributes to the practice of syssitia and gymnastic exercises, and considers to be almost inseparable from them. to this subject he again returns in the eighth book. fourthly, the virtues are affirmed to be inseparable from one another, even if not absolutely one; this, too, is a principle which he reasserts at the conclusion of the work. as in the beginnings of plato's other writings, we have here several 'notes' struck, which form the preludes of longer discussions, although the hint is less ingeniously given, and the promise more imperfectly fulfilled than in the earlier dialogues. the distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon plato's mind. to him, law is still floating in a region between the two. he would have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should have regard to all virtue. but he did not see that politics and law are subject to their own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by natural differences. the actions of which politics take cognisance are necessarily collective or representative; and law is limited to external acts which affect others as well as the agents. ethics, on the other hand, include the whole duty of man in relation both to himself and others. but plato has never reflected on these differences. he fancies that the life of the state can be as easily fashioned as that of the individual. he is favourable to a balance of power, but never seems to have considered that power might be so balanced as to produce an absolute immobility in the state. nor is he alive to the evils of confounding vice and crime; or to the necessity of governments abstaining from excessive interference with their subjects. yet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer side. if unable to grasp some important distinctions, plato is at any rate seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down the principles of men to their practice, or narrow the conception of the state to the immediate necessities of politics. political ideals of freedom and equality, of a divine government which has been or will be in some other age or country, have greatly tended to educate and ennoble the human race. and if not the first author of such ideals (for they are as old as hesiod), plato has done more than any other writer to impress them on the world. to those who censure his idealism we may reply in his own words--'he is not the worse painter who draws a perfectly beautiful figure, because no such figure of a man could ever have existed' (republic). a new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time exercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books of the laws it is forgotten or overlooked. as true courage is allied to temperance, so there must be an education which shall train mankind to resist pleasure as well as to endure pain. no one can be on his guard against that of which he has no experience. the perfectly trained citizen should have been accustomed to look his enemy in the face, and to measure his strength against her. this education in pleasure is to be given, partly by festive intercourse, but chiefly by the song and dance. youth are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained and tested at drinking parties. according to the old proverb, in vino veritas, they will then be open and visible to the world in their true characters; and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more easily moulded by the hand of the legislator. the first reason is curious enough, though not important; the second can hardly be thought deserving of much attention. yet if plato means to say that society is one of the principal instruments of education in after-life, he has expressed in an obscure fashion a principle which is true, and to his contemporaries was also new. that at a banquet a degree of moral discipline might be exercised is an original thought, but plato has not yet learnt to express his meaning in an abstract form. he is sensible that moderation is better than total abstinence, and that asceticism is but a one-sided training. he makes the sagacious remark, that 'those who are able to resist pleasure may often be among the worst of mankind.' he is as much aware as any modern utilitarian that the love of pleasure is the great motive of human action. this cannot be eradicated, and must therefore be regulated,--the pleasure must be of the right sort. such reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly expressed, groundwork of the discussion. as in the juxtaposition of the bacchic madness and the great gift of dionysus, or where he speaks of the different senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative art, or in the illustration of the failure of the dorian institutions from the prayer of theseus, we have to gather his meaning as well as we can from the connexion. the feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several other passages of the laws. plato has arrived at the time when men sit still and look on at life; and he is willing to allow himself and others the few pleasures which remain to them. wine is to cheer them now that their limbs are old and their blood runs cold. they are the best critics of dancing and music, but cannot be induced to join in song unless they have been enlivened by drinking. youth has no need of the stimulus of wine, but age can only be made young again by its invigorating influence. total abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing potations for the old, is plato's principle. the fire, of which there is too much in the one, has to be brought to the other. drunkenness, like madness, had a sacredness and mystery to the greek; if, on the one hand, as in the case of the tarentines, it degraded a whole population, it was also a mode of worshipping the god dionysus, which was to be practised on certain occasions. moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit of the vine was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness which prevail among some modern nations. the physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine within narrow limits. he would tell us that you cannot restore strength by a stimulus. wine may call back the vital powers in disease, but cannot reinvigorate old age. in his maxims of health and longevity, though aware of the importance of a simple diet, plato has omitted to dwell on the perfect rule of moderation. his commendation of wine is probably a passing fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits or tastes. if so, he is not the only philosopher whose theory has been based upon his practice. plato's denial of wine to the young and his approval of it for their elders has some points of view which may be illustrated by the temperance controversy of our own times. wine may be allowed to have a religious as well as a festive use; it is commended both in the old and new testament; it has been sung of by nearly all poets; and it may be truly said to have a healing influence both on body and mind. yet it is also very liable to excess and abuse, and for this reason is prohibited by mahometans, as well as of late years by many christians, no less than by the ancient spartans; and to sound its praises seriously seems to partake of the nature of a paradox. but we may rejoin with plato that the abuse of a good thing does not take away the use of it. total abstinence, as we often say, is not the best rule, but moderate indulgence; and it is probably true that a temperate use of wine may contribute some elements of character to social life which we can ill afford to lose. it draws men out of their reserve; it helps them to forget themselves and to appear as they by nature are when not on their guard, and therefore to make them more human and greater friends to their fellow-men. it gives them a new experience; it teaches them to combine self-control with a measure of indulgence; it may sometimes restore to them the simplicity of childhood. we entirely agree with plato in forbidding the use of wine to the young; but when we are of mature age there are occasions on which we derive refreshment and strength from moderate potations. it is well to make abstinence the rule, but the rule may sometimes admit of an exception. we are in a higher, as well as in a lower sense, the better for the use of wine. the question runs up into wider ones--what is the general effect of asceticism on human nature? and, must there not be a certain proportion between the aspirations of man and his powers?--questions which have been often discussed both by ancient and modern philosophers. so by comparing things old and new we may sometimes help to realize to ourselves the meaning of plato in the altered circumstances of our own life. like the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his depreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue appears to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated. but he is speaking of courage in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or temperance. he does not insist in this passage, as in the protagoras, on the unity of the virtues; or, as in the laches, on the identity of wisdom and courage. but he says that they all depend upon their leader mind, and that, out of the union of wisdom and temperance with courage, springs justice. elsewhere he is disposed to regard temperance rather as a condition of all virtue than as a particular virtue. he generalizes temperance, as in the republic he generalizes justice. the nature of the virtues is to run up into one another, and in many passages plato makes but a faint effort to distinguish them. he still quotes the poets, somewhat enlarging, as his manner is, or playing with their meaning. the martial poet tyrtaeus, and the oligarch theognis, furnish him with happy illustrations of the two sorts of courage. the fear of fear, the division of goods into human and divine, the acknowledgment that peace and reconciliation are better than the appeal to the sword, the analysis of temperance into resistance of pleasure as well as endurance of pain, the distinction between the education which is suitable for a trade or profession, and for the whole of life, are important and probably new ethical conceptions. nor has plato forgotten his old paradox (gorgias) that to be punished is better than to be unpunished, when he says, that to the bad man death is the only mitigation of his evil. he is not less ideal in many passages of the laws than in the gorgias or republic. but his wings are heavy, and he is unequal to any sustained flight. there is more attempt at dramatic effect in the first book than in the later parts of the work. the outburst of martial spirit in the lacedaemonian, 'o best of men'; the protest which the cretan makes against the supposed insult to his lawgiver; the cordial acknowledgment on the part of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly by those who live under their rule; the difficulty which they alike experience in following the speculations of the athenian, are highly characteristic. in the second book, plato pursues further his notion of educating by a right use of pleasure. he begins by conceiving an endless power of youthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and rhythm. men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of musical discipline. but music, like all art, must be truly imitative, and imitative of what is true and good. art and morality agree in rejecting pleasure as the criterion of good. true art is inseparable from the highest and most ennobling ideas. plato only recognizes the identity of pleasure and good when the pleasure is of the higher kind. he is the enemy of 'songs without words,' which he supposes to have some confusing or enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also opposed to the modern degeneracy of the drama, which he would probably have illustrated, like aristophanes, from euripides and agathon. from this passage may be gathered a more perfect conception of art than from any other of plato's writings. he understands that art is at once imitative and ideal, an exact representation of truth, and also a representation of the highest truth. the same double view of art may be gathered from a comparison of the third and tenth books of the republic, but is here more clearly and pointedly expressed. we are inclined to suspect that both here and in the republic plato exaggerates the influence really exercised by the song and the dance. but we must remember also the susceptible nature of the greek, and the perfection to which these arts were carried by him. further, the music had a sacred and pythagorean character; the dance too was part of a religious festival. and only at such festivals the sexes mingled in public, and the youths passed under the eyes of their elders. at the beginning of the third book, plato abruptly asks the question, what is the origin of states? the answer is, infinite time. we have already seen--in the theaetetus, where he supposes that in the course of ages every man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, greeks and barbarians; and in the critias, where he says that nine thousand years have elapsed since the island of atlantis fought with athens--that plato is no stranger to the conception of long periods of time. he imagines human society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions; and beginning from the last of these, he traces the steps by which the family has grown into the state, and the original scattered society, becoming more and more civilised, has finally passed into military organizations like those of crete and sparta. his conception of the origin of states is far truer in the laws than in the republic; but it must be remembered that here he is giving an historical, there an ideal picture of the growth of society. modern enquirers, like plato, have found in infinite ages the explanation not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the world itself; like him, also, they have detected in later institutions the vestiges of a patriarchal state still surviving. thus far plato speaks as 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' who may be thought by some divine instinct to have guessed at truths which were hereafter to be revealed. he is far above the vulgar notion that hellas is the civilized world (statesman), or that civilization only began when the hellenes appeared on the scene. but he has no special knowledge of 'the days before the flood'; and when he approaches more historical times, in preparing the way for his own theory of mixed government, he argues partially and erroneously. he is desirous of showing that unlimited power is ruinous to any state, and hence he is led to attribute a tyrannical spirit to the first dorian kings. the decay of argos and the destruction of messene are adduced by him as a manifest proof of their failure; and sparta, he thinks, was only preserved by the limitations which the wisdom of successive legislators introduced into the government. but there is no more reason to suppose that the dorian rule of life which was followed at sparta ever prevailed in argos and messene, than to assume that dorian institutions were framed to protect the greeks against the power of assyria; or that the empire of assyria was in any way affected by the trojan war; or that the return of the heraclidae was only the return of achaean exiles, who received a new name from their leader dorieus. such fancies were chiefly based, as far as they had any foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great part in the dawn of historical and geographical research. because there was a persian empire which was the natural enemy of the greek, there must also have been an assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility; and not only the fable of the island of atlantis, but the trojan war, in plato's mind derived some features from the persian struggle. so herodotus makes the nile answer to the ister, and the valley of the nile to the red sea. in the republic, plato is flying in the air regardless of fact and possibility--in the laws, he is making history by analogy. in the former, he appears to be like some modern philosophers, absolutely devoid of historical sense; in the latter, he is on a level, not with thucydides, or the critical historians of greece, but with herodotus, or even with ctesias. the chief object of plato in tracing the origin of society is to show the point at which regular government superseded the patriarchical authority, and the separate customs of different families were systematized by legislators, and took the form of laws consented to by them all. according to plato, the only sound principle on which any government could be based was a mixture or balance of power. the balance of power saved sparta, when the two other heraclid states fell into disorder. here is probably the first trace of a political idea, which has exercised a vast influence both in ancient and modern times. and yet we might fairly ask, a little parodying the language of plato--o legislator, is unanimity only 'the struggle for existence'; or is the balance of powers in a state better than the harmony of them? in the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and plato begins to ascend to the height of his great argument. the reign of cronos has passed away, and various forms of government have succeeded, which are all based on self-interest and self-preservation. right and wrong, instead of being measured by the will of god, are created by the law of the state. the strongest assertions are made of the purely spiritual nature of religion--'without holiness no man is accepted of god'; and of the duty of filial obedience,--'honour thy parents.' the legislator must teach these precepts as well as command them. he is to be the educator as well as the lawgiver of future ages, and his laws are themselves to form a part of the education of the state. unlike the poet, he must be definite and rational; he cannot be allowed to say one thing at one time, and another thing at another--he must know what he is about. and yet legislation has a poetical or rhetorical element, and must find words which will wing their way to the hearts of men. laws must be promulgated before they are put in execution, and mankind must be reasoned with before they are punished. the legislator, when he promulgates a particular law, will courteously entreat those who are willing to hear his voice. upon the rebellious only does the heavy blow descend. a sermon and a law in one, blending the secular punishment with the religious sanction, appeared to plato a new idea which might have a great result in reforming the world. the experiment had never been tried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any preambles, and plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his discovery. in these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of morals and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time. they all go back to mind and god, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of all things in his hand. the adjustment of the divine and human elements in the world is conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy, differing not much in the mode of expression. at first sight the legislator appears to be impotent, for all things are the sport of chance. but we admit also that god governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with him (compare the saying, that chance is the name of the unknown cause). lastly, while we acknowledge that god and chance govern mankind and provide the conditions of human action, experience will not allow us to deny a place to art. we know that there is a use in having a pilot, though the storm may overwhelm him; and a legislator is required to provide for the happiness of a state, although he will pray for favourable conditions under which he may exercise his art. book v. hear now, all ye who heard the laws about gods and ancestors: of all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man's own. for in every man there are two parts--a better which rules, and an inferior which serves; and the ruler is to be preferred to the servant. wherefore i bid every one next after the gods to honour his own soul, and he can only honour her by making her better. a man does not honour his soul by flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of knowledge, nor when he blames others for his own errors; nor when he indulges in pleasure or refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, because he fears the world below, which, far from being an evil, may be the greatest good; nor when he prefers beauty to virtue--not reflecting that the soul, which came from heaven, is more honourable than the body, which is earth-born; nor when he covets dishonest gains, of which no amount is equal in value to virtue;--in a word, when he counts that which the legislator pronounces evil to be good, he degrades his soul, which is the divinest part of him. he does not consider that the real punishment of evil-doing is to grow like evil men, and to shun the conversation of the good: and that he who is joined to such men must do and suffer what they by nature do and say to one another, which suffering is not justice but retribution. for justice is noble, but retribution is only the companion of injustice. and whether a man escapes punishment or not, he is equally miserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in the other case he perishes that the rest may be saved. the glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior. and the soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil and dwell with the good. wherefore also the soul is second only to the gods in honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which often has a false honour. for honour is not to be given to the fair or the strong, or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy, any more than to their opposites, but to the mean states of all these habits; and so of property and external goods. no man should heap up riches that he may leave them to his children. the best condition for them as for the state is a middle one, in which there is a freedom without luxury. and the best inheritance of children is modesty. but modesty cannot be implanted by admonition only--the elders must set the example. he who would train the young must first train himself. he who honours his kindred and family may fairly expect that the gods will give him children. he who would have friends must think much of their favours to him, and little of his to them. he who prefers to an olympic, or any other victory, to win the palm of obedience to the laws, serves best both the state and his fellow-citizens. engagements with strangers are to be deemed most sacred, because the stranger, having neither kindred nor friends, is immediately under the protection of zeus, the god of strangers. a prudent man will not sin against the stranger; and still more carefully will he avoid sinning against the suppliant, which is an offence never passed over by the gods. i will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and blame only, and which, although not enforced by the law, greatly affect the disposition to obey the law. truth has the first place among the gifts of gods and men, for truth begets trust; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. neither the ignorant nor the untrustworthy man is happy; for they have no friends in life, and die unlamented and untended. good is he who does no injustice--better who prevents others from doing any--best of all who joins the rulers in punishing injustice. and this is true of goods and virtues in general; he who has and communicates them to others is the man of men; he who would, if he could, is second-best; he who has them and is jealous of imparting them to others is to be blamed, but the good or virtue which he has is to be valued still. let every man contend in the race without envy; for the unenvious man increases the strength of the city; himself foremost in the race, he harms no one with calumny. whereas the envious man is weak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his slanders, thus depriving the whole city of incentives to the exercise of virtue, and tarnishing her glory. every man should be gentle, but also passionate; for he must have the spirit to fight against incurable and malignant evil. but the evil which is remediable should be dealt with more in sorrow than anger. he who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for no man voluntarily does evil or allows evil to exist in his soul. and therefore he who deals with the curable sort must be long-suffering and forbearing; but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured out upon him. the greatest of all evils is self-love, which is thought to be natural and excusable, and is enforced as a duty, and yet is the cause of many errors. the lover is blinded about the beloved, and prefers his own interests to truth and right; but the truly great man seeks justice before all things. self-love is the source of that ignorant conceit of knowledge which is always doing and never succeeding. wherefore let every man avoid self-love, and follow the guidance of those who are better than himself. there are lesser matters which a man should recall to mind; for wisdom is like a stream, ever flowing in and out, and recollection flows in when knowledge is failing. let no man either laugh or grieve overmuch; but let him control his feelings in the day of goodor ill-fortune, believing that the gods will diminish the evils and increase the blessings of the righteous. these are thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind; he should remember them both in lighter and in more serious hours, and remind others of them. so much of divine matters and the relation of man to god. but man is man, and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true taste respecting either is a great matter. and what is a true taste? this can only be explained by a comparison of one life with another. pleasure is an object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of pain is to be preferred to pain, but not to pleasure. there are infinite kinds and degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more pleasure and avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life in which the elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced with pain. all the lives which we desire are pleasant; the choice of any others is due to inexperience. now there are four lives--the temperate, the rational, the courageous, the healthful; and to these let us oppose four others--the intemperate, the foolish, the cowardly, the diseased. the temperate life has gentle pains and pleasures and placid desires, the intemperate life has violent delights, and still more violent desires. and the pleasures of the temperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed the pleasures. but if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate, but all who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in self-control: for men always choose the life which (as they think) exceeds in pleasure. the wise, the healthful, the courageous life have a similar advantage--they also exceed their opposites in pleasure. and, generally speaking, the life of virtue is far more pleasurable and honourable, fairer and happier far, than the life of vice. let this be the preamble of our laws; the strain will follow. as in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be stronger than their half-educated subjects. let us suppose, then, that in the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment of the rulers, and the laws which they have to administer. but, before going further, there are some preliminary matters which have to be considered. as of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made; the bad breed must be got rid of, and the good retained. the legislator must purify them, and if he be not a despot he will find this task to be a difficult one. the severer kinds of purification are practised when great offenders are punished by death or exile, but there is a milder process which is necessary when the poor show a disposition to attack the property of the rich, for then the legislator will send them off to another land, under the name of a colony. in our case, however, we shall only need to purify the streams before they meet. this is often a troublesome business, but in theory we may suppose the operation performed, and the desired purity attained. evil men we will hinder from coming, and receive the good as friends. like the old heraclid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition of debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous questions. but, perhaps, now that we are speaking of the subject, we ought to say how, if the danger existed, the legislator should try to avert it. he would have recourse to prayers, and trust to the healing influence of time. he would create a kindly spirit between creditors and debtors: those who have should give to those who have not, and poverty should be held to be rather the increase of a man's desires than the diminution of his property. good-will is the only safe and enduring foundation of the political society; and upon this our city shall be built. the lawgiver, if he is wise, will not proceed with the arrangement of the state until all disputes about property are settled. and for him to introduce fresh grounds of quarrel would be madness. let us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the size of the territory and the number of the allotments. the territory should be sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the population should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes to aid their neighbours. we will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to which the number of houses and portions of land shall correspond. let the number be divided into two parts and then into three; for it is very convenient for the purposes of distribution, and is capable of fifty-nine divisions, ten of which proceed without interval from one to ten. here are numbers enough for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings. these properties of numbers are true, and should be ascertained with a view to use. in carrying out the distribution of the land, a prudent legislator will be careful to respect any provision for religious worship which has been sanctioned by ancient tradition or by the oracles of delphi, dodona, or ammon. all sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their origin, should remain as they are. every division should have a patron god or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated, and at their temples the inhabitants of the districts should meet together from time to time, for the sake of mutual help and friendship. all the citizens of a state should be known to one another; for where men are in the dark about each other's characters, there can be no justice or right administration. every man should be true and single-minded, and should not allow himself to be deceived by others. and now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces. at first sight, our constitution may appear singular and ill-adapted to a legislator who has not despotic power; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be, if not the very best, the second best. for there are three forms of government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which cleinias has now to choose. the first and highest form is that in which friends have all things in common, including wives and property,--in which they have common fears, hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or their hands their own. this is the ideal state; than which there never can be a truer or better--a state, whether inhabited by gods or sons of gods, which will make the dwellers therein blessed. here is the pattern on which we must ever fix our eyes; but we are now concerned with another, which comes next to it, and we will afterwards proceed to a third. inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to receive the saying, friends have all things in common, let them retain their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their country, who is their god and parent, and of the gods and demigods of the land. their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots. this may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of a lot dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will become the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the gods and to the family, to the living and to the dead. of the remaining children, the females must be given in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no children of their own. how to equalize families and allotments will be one of the chief cares of the guardians of the laws. when parents have too many children they may give to those who have none, or couples may abstain from having children, or, if there is a want of offspring, special care may be taken to obtain them; or if the number of citizens becomes excessive, we may send away the surplus to found a colony. if, on the other hand, a war or plague diminishes the number of inhabitants, new citizens must be introduced; and these ought not, if possible, to be men of low birth or inferior training; but even god, it is said, cannot always fight against necessity. wherefore we will thus address our citizens:--good friends, honour order and equality, and above all the number 5040. secondly, respect the original division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and selling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and is given to him by god. and priests and priestesses will offer frequent sacrifices and pray that he who alienates either house or lot may receive the punishment which he deserves, and their prayers shall be inscribed on tablets of cypress-wood for the instruction of posterity. the guardians will keep a vigilant watch over the citizens, and they will punish those who disobey god and the law. to appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be well educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state, in which all illiberal occupations are forbidden to freemen. the law also provides that no private person shall have gold or silver, except a little coin for daily use, which will not pass current in other countries. the state must also possess a common hellenic currency, but this is only to be used in defraying the expenses of expeditions, or of embassies, or while a man is on foreign travels; but in the latter case he must deliver up what is over, when he comes back, to the treasury in return for an equal amount of local currency, on pain of losing the sum in question; and he who does not inform against an offender is to be mulcted in a like sum. no money is to be given or taken as a dowry, or to be lent on interest. the law will not protect a man in recovering either interest or principal. all these regulations imply that the aim of the legislator is not to make the city as rich or as mighty as possible, but the best and happiest. now men can hardly be at the same time very virtuous and very rich. and why? because he who makes twice as much and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving where he ought not and not spending where he ought, will be at least twice as rich as he who makes money where he ought, and spends where he ought. on the other hand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate and poor, while he who acquires honestly, and spends what he acquires on noble objects, can hardly be very rich. a very rich man is therefore not a good man, and therefore not a happy one. but the object of our laws is to make the citizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they cannot be if they are always at law and injuring each other in the pursuit of gain. and therefore we say that there is to be no silver or gold in the state, nor usury, nor the rearing of the meaner kinds of live-stock, but only agriculture, and only so much of this as will not lead men to neglect that for the sake of which money is made, first the soul and afterwards the body; neither of which are good for much without music and gymnastic. money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest interests being those of the soul, and in the second class are to be ranked those of the body. this is the true order of legislation, which would be inverted by placing health before temperance, and wealth before health. it might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal property; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes of offence by having property valued and by equalizing taxation. to this end, let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed according to the measure of their original property, and the changes of their fortune. the greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the law will say, is caused by extremes of poverty or wealth. the limit of poverty shall be the lot, which must not be diminished, and may be increased fivefold, but not more. he who exceeds the limit must give up the excess to the state; but if he does not, and is informed against, the surplus shall be divided between the informer and the gods, and he shall pay a sum equal to the surplus out of his own property. all property other than the lot must be inscribed in a register, so that any disputes which arise may be easily determined. the city shall be placed in a suitable situation, as nearly as possible in the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards. first, we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which shall be placed the temples of hestia, and zeus, and athene. from this shall be drawn lines dividing the city, and also the country, into twelve sections, and the country shall be subdivided into 5040 lots. each lot shall contain two parts, one at a distance, the other near the city; and the distance of one part shall be compensated by the nearness of the other, the badness and goodness by the greater or less size. twelve lots will be assigned to twelve gods, and they will give their names to the tribes. the divisions of the city shall correspond to those of the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one near the centre of the country, the other at the extremity. the objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we have been speaking will never concur. the citizens will not tolerate a settlement in which they are deprived of gold and silver, and have the number of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed by law. it will be said that our city is a mere image of wax. and the legislator will answer: 'i know it, but i maintain that we ought to set forth an ideal which is as perfect as possible. if difficulties arise in the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the remainder. but the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea without interruption.' the number twelve, which we have chosen for the number of division, must run through all parts of the state,--phratries, villages, ranks of soldiers, coins, and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made commensurable with one another. there is no meanness in requiring that the smallest vessels should have a common measure; for the divisions of number are useful in measuring height and depth, as well as sounds and motions, upwards or downwards, or round and round. the legislator should impress on his citizens the value of arithmetic. no instrument of education has so much power; nothing more tends to sharpen and inspire the dull intellect. but the legislator must be careful to instil a noble and generous spirit into the students, or they will tend to become cunning rather than wise. this may be proved by the example of the egyptians and phoenicians, who, notwithstanding their knowledge of arithmetic, are degraded in their general character; whether this defect in them is due to some natural cause or to a bad legislator. for it is clear that there are great differences in the power of regions to produce good men: heat and cold, and water and food, have great effects both on body and soul; and those spots are peculiarly fortunate in which the air is holy, and the gods are pleased to dwell. to all this the legislator must attend, so far as in him lies. book vi. and now we are about to consider (1) the appointment of magistrates; (2) the laws which they will have to administer must be determined. i may observe by the way that laws, however good, are useless and even injurious unless the magistrates are capable of executing them. and therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary state should be tested from their youth upwards until the time of their election; and (2) those who are to elect them ought to be trained in habits of law, that they may form a right judgment of good and bad men. but uneducated colonists, who are unacquainted with each other, will not be likely to choose well. what, then, shall we do? i will tell you: the colony will have to be intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you are one, and i will help you and them, which is my reason for inventing this romance. and i cannot bear that the tale should go wandering about the world without a head,--it will be such an ugly monster. 'very good.' yes; and i will be as good as my word, if god be gracious and old age permit. but let us not forget what a courageously mad creation this our city is. 'what makes you say so?' why, surely our courage is shown in imagining that the new colonists will quietly receive our laws? for no man likes to receive laws when they are first imposed: could we only wait until those who had been educated under them were grown up, and of an age to vote in the public elections, there would be far greater reason to expect permanence in our institutions. 'very true.' the cnosian founders should take the utmost pains in the matter of the colony, and in the election of the higher officers, particularly of the guardians of the law. the latter should be appointed in this way: the cnosians, who take the lead in the colony, together with the colonists, will choose thirty-seven persons, of whom nineteen will be colonists, and the remaining eighteen cnosians--you must be one of the eighteen yourself, and become a citizen of the new state. 'why do not you and megillus join us?' athens is proud, and sparta too; and they are both a long way off. but let me proceed with my scheme. when the state is permanently established, the mode of election will be as follows: all who are serving, or have served, in the army will be electors; and the election will be held in the most sacred of the temples. the voter will place on the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon the name of the candidate whom he prefers, and of his father, tribe, and ward, writing at the side of them his own name in like manner; and he may take away any tablet which does not appear written to his mind, and place it in the agora for thirty days. the 300 who obtain the greatest number of votes will be publicly announced, and out of them there will be a second election of 100; and out of the 100 a third and final election of thirty-seven, accompanied by the solemnity of the electors passing through victims. but then who is to arrange all this? there is a common saying, that the beginning is half the whole; and i should say a good deal more than half. 'most true.' the only way of making a beginning is from the parent city; and though in after ages the tie may be broken, and quarrels may arise between them, yet in early days the child naturally looks to the mother for care and education. and, as i said before, the cnosians ought to take an interest in the colony, and select 100 elders of their own citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the colonists, to arrange and supervise the first elections and scrutinies; and when the colony has been started, the cnosians may return home and leave the colonists to themselves. the thirty-seven magistrates who have been elected in the manner described, shall have the following duties: first, they shall be guardians of the law; secondly, of the registers of property in the four classes--not including the one, two, three, four minae, which are allowed as a surplus. he who is found to possess what is not entered in the registers, in addition to the confiscation of such property shall be proceeded against by law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share in the public property and in distributions of money; and his sentence shall be inscribed in some public place. the guardians are to continue in office twenty years only, and to commence holding office at fifty years, or if elected at sixty they are not to remain after seventy. generals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and brigadiers of foot. the generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the guardians of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the age for military service. any one may challenge the person nominated and start another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better qualified. the three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall be elected. the generals thus elected shall propose the taxiarchs or brigadiers, and the challenge may be made, and the voting shall take place, in the same manner as before. the elective assembly will be presided over in the first instance, and until the prytanes and council come into being, by the guardians of the law in some holy place; and they shall divide the citizens into three divisions,--hoplites, cavalry, and the rest of the army--placing each of them by itself. all are to vote for generals and cavalry officers. the brigadiers are to be voted for only by the hoplites. next, the cavalry are to choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains of archers and other irregular troops are to be appointed by the generals themselves. the cavalry-officers shall be proposed and voted upon by the same persons who vote for the generals. the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be leaders of all the horse. disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice, but, if a third time, the presiding officers shall decide. the council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into four sections, making ninety councillors of each class. in the first place, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class; and they shall be compelled to vote under pain of a fine. this shall be the business of the first day. on the second day a similar selection shall be made from the second class under the same conditions. on the third day, candidates shall be selected from the third class; but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the voters of the first three classes. on the fourth day, members of the council shall be selected from the fourth class; they shall be selected by all, but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the second class, who, if they do not vote, shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and to the first class, who shall pay a quadruple fine. on the fifth day, the names shall be exhibited, and out of them shall be chosen by all the citizens 180 of each class: these are severally to be reduced by lot to ninety, and 90 x 4 will form the council for the year. the mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state. for servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes friendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality. one of them is the rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher equality, which is the judgment of zeus. of this he grants but little to mortal men; yet that little is the source of the greatest good to cities and individuals. it is proportioned to the nature of each man; it gives more to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political justice; to this we in our state desire to look, as every legislator should, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs. but justice cannot always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to be substituted: and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be endured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which god must be entreated to guide. these are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual care will also be required. when a ship is sailing on the sea, vigilance must not be relaxed night or day; and the vessel of state is tossing in a political sea, and therefore watch must continually succeed watch, and rulers must join hands with rulers. a small body will best perform this duty, and therefore the greater part of the 360 senators may be permitted to go and manage their own affairs, but a twelfth portion must be set aside in each month for the administration of the state. their business will be to receive information and answer embassies; also they must endeavour to prevent or heal internal disorders; and with this object they must have the control of all assemblies of the citizens. besides the council, there must be wardens of the city and of the agora, who will superintend houses, ways, harbours, markets, and fountains, in the city and the suburbs, and prevent any injury being done to them by man or beast. the temples, also, will require priests and priestesses. those who hold the priestly office by hereditary tenure shall not be disturbed; but as there will probably be few or none such in a new colony, priests and priestesses shall be appointed for the gods who have no servants. some of these officers shall be elected by vote, some by lot; and all classes shall mingle in a friendly manner at the elections. the appointment of priests should be left to god,--that is, to the lot; but the person elected must prove that he is himself sound in body and of legitimate birth, and that his family has been free from homicide or any other stain of impurity. priests and priestesses are to be not less than sixty years of age, and shall hold office for a year only. the laws which are to regulate matters of religion shall be brought from delphi, and interpreters appointed to superintend their execution. these shall be elected in the following manner:--the twelve tribes shall be formed into three bodies of four, each of which shall select four candidates, and this shall be done three times: of each twelve thus selected the three who receive the largest number of votes, nine in all, after undergoing a scrutiny shall go to delphi, in order that the god may elect one out of each triad. they shall be appointed for life; and when any of them dies, another shall be elected by the four tribes who made the original appointment. there shall also be treasurers of the temples; three for the greater temples, two for the lesser, and one for those of least importance. the defence of the city should be committed to the generals and other officers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora. the defence of the country shall be on this wise:--the twelve tribes shall allot among themselves annually the twelve divisions of the country, and each tribe shall appoint five wardens and commanders of the watch. the five wardens in each division shall choose out of their own tribe twelve guards, who are to be between twenty-five and thirty years of age. both the wardens and the guards are to serve two years; and they shall make a round of the divisions, staying a month in each. they shall go from west to east during the first year, and back from east to west during the second. thus they will gain a perfect knowledge of the country at every season of the year. while on service, their first duty will be to see that the country is well protected by means of fortifications and entrenchments; they will use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot, taking care however not to interfere with the regular course of agriculture. but while they thus render the country as inaccessible as possible to enemies, they will also make it as accessible as possible to friends by constructing and maintaining good roads. they will restrain and preserve the rain which comes down from heaven, making the barren places fertile, and the wet places dry. they will ornament the fountains with plantations and buildings, and provide water for irrigation at all seasons of the year. they will lead the streams to the temples and groves of the gods; and in such spots the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged; there the rustic worn with toil will receive a kindly welcome, and be far better treated than at the hands of an unskilful doctor. these works will be both useful and ornamental; but the sixty wardens must not fail to give serious attention to other duties. for they must watch over the districts assigned to them, and also act as judges. in small matters the five commanders shall decide: in greater matters up to three minae, the five commanders and the twelve guards. like all other judges, except those who have the final decision, they shall be liable to give an account. if the wardens impose unjust tasks on the villagers, or take by force their crops or implements, or yield to flattery or bribes in deciding suits, let them be publicly dishonoured. in regard to any other wrong-doing, if the question be of a mina, let the neighbours decide; but if the accused person will not submit, trusting that his monthly removals will enable him to escape payment, and also in suits about a larger amount, the injured party may have recourse to the common court; in the former case, if successful, he may exact a double penalty. the wardens and guards, while on their two years' service, shall live and eat together, and the guard who is absent from the daily meals without permission or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a deserter, and may be punished by any one who meets him. if any of the commanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole sixty shall have him punished; and he of them who screens him shall suffer a still heavier penalty than the offender himself. now by service a man learns to rule; and he should pride himself upon serving well the laws and the gods all his life, and upon having served ancient and honourable men in his youth. the twelve and the five should be their own servants, and use the labour of the villagers only for the good of the public. let them search the country through, and acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality; with this view, hunting and field sports should be encouraged. next we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and of the city. the wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they shall have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, and also of the water-supply. they shall be chosen out of the highest class, and when the number of candidates has been reduced to six who have the greatest number of votes, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after a scrutiny, shall be admitted to their office. the wardens of the agora shall be five in number--ten are to be first elected, and every one shall vote for all the vacant places; the ten shall be afterwards reduced to five by lot, as in the former election. the first and second class shall be compelled to go to the assembly, but not the third and fourth, unless they are specially summoned. the wardens of the agora shall have the care of the temples and fountains which are in the agora, and shall punish those who injure them by stripes and bonds, if they be slaves or strangers; and by fines, if they be citizens. and the wardens of the city shall have a similar power of inflicting punishment and fines in their own department. in the next place, there must be directors of music and gymnastic; one class of them superintending gymnasia and schools, and the attendance and lodging of the boys and girls--the other having to do with contests of music and gymnastic. in musical contests there shall be one kind of judges of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists, flute-players, harp-players and the like, and another of choruses. there shall be choruses of men and boys and maidens--one director will be enough to introduce them all, and he should not be less than forty years of age; secondly, of solos also there shall be one director, aged not less than thirty years; he will introduce the competitors and give judgment upon them. the director of the choruses is to be elected in an assembly at which all who take an interest in music are compelled to attend, and no one else. candidates must only be proposed for their fitness, and opposed on the ground of unfitness. ten are to be elected by vote, and the one of these on whom the lot falls shall be director for a year. next shall be elected out of the second and third classes the judges of gymnastic contests, who are to be three in number, and are to be tested, after being chosen by lot out of twenty who have been elected by the three highest classes--these being compelled to attend at the election. one minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of education. he must be not less than fifty years old, and be himself the father of children born in wedlock. his office must be regarded by all as the highest in the state. for the right growth of the first shoot in plants and animals is the chief cause of matured perfection. man is supposed to be a tame animal, but he becomes either the gentlest or the fiercest of creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated. wherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best man possible. he shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected out of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates with the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be held by ballot in the temple of apollo. when a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another shall be elected in his place; and, if the guardian of an orphan dies, the relations shall appoint another within ten days, or be fined a drachma a day for neglect. the city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a judge who sits in silence and leaves the enquiry to the litigants, as in arbitrations, is not a good judge. a few judges are better than many, but the few must be good. the matter in dispute should be clearly elicited; time and examination will find out the truth. causes should first be tried before a court of neighbours: if the decision is unsatisfactory, let them be referred to a higher court; or, if necessary, to a higher still, of which the decision shall be final. every magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day on which he is deciding the suit. this will therefore be an appropriate place to speak of judges and their functions. the supreme tribunal will be that on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other tribunals, one for public and the other for private causes. the high court of appeal shall be composed as follows:--all the officers of state shall meet on the last day but one of the year in some temple, and choose for a judge the best man out of every magistracy: and those who are elected, after they have undergone a scrutiny, shall be judges of appeal. they shall give their decisions openly, in the presence of the magistrates who have elected them; and the public may attend. if anybody charges one of them with having intentionally decided wrong, he shall lay his accusation before the guardians of the law, and if the judge be found guilty he shall pay damages to the extent of half the injury, unless the guardians of the law deem that he deserves a severer punishment, in which case the judges shall assess the penalty. as the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they should share in the trial of them. such causes should originate with the people and be decided by them: the enquiry shall take place before any three of the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff can agree. also in private suits all should judge as far as possible, and therefore there should be a court of law in every ward; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, believes that he has no share in the state. the judges in these courts shall be elected by lot and give their decision at once. the final judgment in all cases shall rest with the court of appeal. and so, having done with the appointment of courts and the election of officers, we will now make our laws. 'your way of proceeding, stranger, is admirable.' then so far our old man's game of play has gone off well. 'say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.' perhaps; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in which painters put in and rub out colour: yet their endless labour will last but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who will restore the picture and remove its defects. 'certainly.' and have we not a similar object at the present moment? we are old ourselves, and therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved and perfected by the next generation; not only making laws for our guardians, but making them lawgivers. 'we must at least do our best.' let us address them as follows. beloved saviours of the laws, we give you an outline of legislation which you must fill up, according to a rule which we will prescribe for you. megillus and cleinias and i are agreed, and we hope that you will agree with us in thinking, that the whole energies of a man should be devoted to the attainment of manly virtue, whether this is to be gained by study, or habit, or desire, or opinion. and rather than accept institutions which tend to degrade and enslave him, he should fly his country and endure any hardship. these are our principles, and we would ask you to judge of our laws, and praise or blame them, accordingly as they are or are not capable of improving our citizens. and first of laws concerning religion. we have already said that the number 5040 has many convenient divisions: and we took a twelfth part of this (420), which is itself divisible by twelve, for the number of the tribe. every divisor is a gift of god, and corresponds to the months of the year and to the revolution of the universe. all cities have a number, but none is more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by all numbers up to 12, with the exception of 11, and even by 11, if two families are deducted. and now let us divide the state, assigning to each division some god or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them, and sacrifices offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held in their honour, twelve for the tribes, and twelve for the city, corresponding to their divisions. the object of them will be first to promote religion, secondly to encourage friendship and intercourse between families; for families must be acquainted before they marry into one another, or great mistakes will occur. at these festivals there shall be innocent dances of young men and maidens, who may have the opportunity of seeing one another in modest undress. to the details of all this the masters of choruses and the guardians will attend, embodying in laws the results of their experience; and, after ten years, making the laws permanent, with the consent of the legislator, if he be alive, or, if he be not alive, of the guardians of the law, who shall perfect them and settle them once for all. at least, if any further changes are required, the magistrates must take the whole people into counsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles. whenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five wants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which we will address to him:-my son, you ought to marry, but not in order to gain wealth or to avoid poverty; neither should you, as men are wont to do, choose a wife who is like yourself in property and character. you ought to consult the interests of the state rather than your own pleasure; for by equal marriages a society becomes unequal. and yet to enact a law that the rich and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the quick shall be united to the slow, and the slow to the quick, will arouse anger in some persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand that opposite elements ought to be mingled in the state, as wine should be mingled with water. the object at which we aim must therefore be left to the influence of public opinion. and do not forget our former precept, that every one should seek to attain immortality and raise up a fair posterity to serve god.--let this be the prelude of the law about the duty of marriage. but if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five years of age is still unmarried, he shall pay an annual fine: if he be of the first class, 100 drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third, 60; and if of the fourth, 30. this fine shall be sacred to here; and if he refuse to pay, a tenfold penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of here, who shall be responsible for the payment. further, the unmarried man shall receive no honour or obedience from the young, and he shall not retain the right of punishing others. a man is neither to give nor receive a dowry beyond a certain fixed sum; in our state, for his consolation, if he be poor, let him know that he need neither receive nor give one, for every citizen is provided with the necessaries of life. again, if the woman is not rich, her husband will not be her humble servant. he who disobeys this law shall pay a fine according to his class, which shall be exacted by the treasurers of here and zeus. the betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin, or if there are none, by the guardians. the offerings and ceremonies of marriage shall be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites. let the wedding party be moderate; five male and five female friends, and a like number of kinsmen, will be enough. the expense should not exceed, for the first class, a mina; and for the second, half a mina; and should be in like proportion for the other classes. extravagance is to be regarded as vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties. much wine is only to be drunk at the festivals of dionysus, and certainly not on the occasion of a marriage. the bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great step in life, ought to have all their wits about them; they should be especially careful of the night on which god may give them increase, and which this will be none can say. their bodies and souls should be in the most temperate condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of the nature of disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary. there is an original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper respect. he who marries should make one of the two houses on the lot the nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father and mother, and then his affection for them will be only increased by absence. he will go forth as to a colony, and will there rear up his offspring, handing on the torch of life to another generation. about property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception of property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful character. the slavery of the helots is approved by some and condemned by others; and there is some doubt even about the slavery of the mariandynians at heraclea and of the thessalian penestae. this makes us ask, what shall we do about slaves? to which every one would agree in replying,--let us have the best and most attached whom we can get. all of us have heard stories of slaves who have been better to their masters than sons or brethren. yet there is an opposite doctrine, that slaves are never to be trusted; as homer says, 'slavery takes away half a man's understanding.' and different persons treat them in different ways: there are some who never trust them, and beat them like dogs, until they make them many times more slavish than they were before; and others pursue the opposite plan. man is a troublesome animal, as has been often shown, megillus, notably in the revolts of the messenians; and great mischiefs have arisen in countries where there are large bodies of slaves of one nationality. two rules may be given for their management: first that they should not, if possible, be of the same country or have a common language; and secondly, that they should be treated by their master with more justice even than equals, out of regard to himself quite as much as to them. for he who is righteous in the treatment of his slaves, or of any inferiors, will sow in them the seed of virtue. masters should never jest with their slaves: this, which is a common but foolish practice, increases the difficulty and painfulness of managing them. next as to habitations. these ought to have been spoken of before; for no man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house for them to live in. let us supply the omission. the temples should be placed round the agora, and the city built in a circle on the heights. near the temples, which are holy places and the habitations of the gods, should be buildings for the magistrates, and the courts of law, including those in which capital offences are to be tried. as to walls, megillus, i agree with sparta that they should sleep in the earth; 'cold steel is the best wall,' as the poet finely says. besides, how absurd to be sending out our youth to fortify and guard the borders of our country, and then to build a city wall, which is very unhealthy, and is apt to make people fancy that they may run there and rest in idleness, not knowing that true repose comes from labour, and that idleness is only a renewal of trouble. if, however, there must be a wall, the private houses had better be so arranged as to form one wall; this will have an agreeable aspect, and the building will be safer and more defensible. these objects should be attended to at the foundation of the city. the wardens of the city must see that they are carried out; and they must also enforce cleanliness, and preserve the public buildings from encroachments. moreover, they must take care to let the rain flow off easily, and must regulate other matters concerning the general administration of the city. if any further enactments prove to be necessary, the guardians of the law must supply them. and now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens, we will proceed to speak of their mode of life. in a well-constituted state, individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please. why do i say this? because i am going to enact that the bridegroom shall not absent himself from the common meals. they were instituted originally on the occasion of some war, and, though deemed singular when first founded, they have tended greatly to the security of states. there was a difficulty in introducing them, but there is no difficulty in them now. there is, however, another institution about which i would speak, if i dared. i may preface my proposal by remarking that disorder in a state is the source of all evil, and order of all good. now in sparta and crete there are common meals for men, and this, as i was saying, is a divine and natural institution. but the women are left to themselves; they live in dark places, and, being weaker, and therefore wickeder, than men, they are at the bottom of a good deal more than half the evil of states. this must be corrected, and the institution of common meals extended to both sexes. but, in the present unfortunate state of opinion, who would dare to establish them? and still more, who can compel women to eat and drink in public? they will defy the legislator to drag them out of their holes. and in any other state such a proposal would be drowned in clamour, but in our own i think that i can show the attempt to be just and reasonable. 'there is nothing which we should like to hear better.' listen, then; having plenty of time, we will go back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us. 'right.' either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never have an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into being is all but infinite. 'no doubt.' and in this infinity of time there have been changes of every kind, both in the order of the seasons and in the government of states and in the customs of eating and drinking. vines and olives were at length discovered, and the blessings of demeter and persephone, of which one triptolemus is said to have been the minister; before his time the animals had been eating one another. and there are nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow-men, and other nations in which they lead a kind of orphic existence, and will not sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow--they offer fruits or cakes moistened with honey. perhaps you will ask me what is the bearing of these remarks? 'we would gladly hear.' i will endeavour to explain their drift. i see that the virtue of human life depends on the due regulation of three wants or desires. the first is the desire of meat, the second of drink; these begin with birth, and make us disobedient to any voice other than that of pleasure. the third and fiercest and greatest need is felt latest; this is love, which is a madness setting men's whole nature on fire. these three disorders of mankind we must endeavour to restrain by three mighty influences--fear, and law, and reason, which, with the aid of the muses and the gods of contests, may extinguish our lusts. but to return. after marriage let us proceed to the generation of children, and then to their nurture and education--thus gradually approaching the subject of syssitia. there are, however, some other points which are suggested by the three words--meat, drink, love. 'proceed,' the bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a brave offspring. now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore the bridegroom ought to take special care of the bride, and the bride of the bridegroom, at the time when their children are about to be born. and let there be a committee of matrons who shall meet every day at the temple of eilithyia at a time fixed by the magistrates, and inform against any man or woman who does not observe the laws of married life. the time of begetting children and the supervision of the parents shall last for ten years only; if at the expiration of this period they have no children, they may part, with the consent of their relatives and the official matrons, and with a due regard to the interests of either; if a dispute arise, ten of the guardians of the law shall be chosen as arbiters. the matrons shall also have power to enter the houses of the young people, if necessary, and to advise and threaten them. if their efforts fail, let them go to the guardians of the law; and if they too fail, the offender, whether man or woman, shall be forbidden to be present at all family ceremonies. if when the time for begetting children has ceased, either husband or wife have connexion with others who are of an age to beget children, they shall be liable to the same penalties as those who are still having a family. but when both parties have ceased to beget children there shall be no penalties. if men and women live soberly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; punishment is necessary only when there is great disorder of manners. the first year of children's lives is to be registered in their ancestral temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed on a whited wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members of the phratry close to them, to be erased at their decease. the proper time of marriage for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for a man, from thirty to thirty-five (compare republic). the age of holding office for a woman is to be forty, for a man thirty years. the time for military service for a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a woman, from the time that she has ceased to bear children until fifty. book vii. now that we have married our citizens and brought their children into the world, we have to find nurture and education for them. this is a matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely regulated by the legislator. for minute regulations are apt to be transgressed, and frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience to the laws. i speak darkly, but i will also try to exhibit my wares in the light of day. am i not right in saying that a good education tends to the improvement of body and mind? 'certainly.' and the body is fairest which grows up straight and well-formed from the time of birth. 'very true.' and we observe that the first shoot of every living thing is the greatest; many even contend that man is not at twenty-five twice the height that he was at five. 'true.' and growth without exercise of the limbs is the source of endless evils in the body. 'yes.' the body should have the most exercise when growing most. 'what, the bodies of young infants?' nay, the bodies of unborn infants. i should like to explain to you this singular kind of gymnastics. the athenians are fond of cock-fighting, and the people who keep cocks carry them about in their hands or under their arms, and take long walks, to improve, not their own health, but the health of the birds. here is a proof of the usefulness of motion, whether of rocking, swinging, riding, or tossing upon the wave; for all these kinds of motion greatly increase strength and the powers of digestion. hence we infer that our women, when they are with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo; and the children, when born, should be carried by strong nurses,--there must be more than one of them,--and should not be suffered to walk until they are three years old. shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these rules? the greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty of making the nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves. 'then why speak of such matters?' in the hope that heads of families may learn that the due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order in the state. and now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first repeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for the young creature. this is proved by the corybantian cure of motion, and by the practice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at the same time in sweet strains. and the reason of this is obvious. the affections, both of the bacchantes and of the children, arise from fear, and this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on within them. now a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent internal one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving to the children sleep, and bringing back the bacchantes to their right minds by the help of dances and acceptable sacrifices. but if fear has such power, will not a child who is always in a state of terror grow up timid and cowardly, whereas if he learns from the first to resist fear he will develop a habit of courage? 'very true.' and we may say that the use of motion will inspire the souls of children with cheerfulness and therefore with courage. 'of course.' softness enervates and irritates the temper of the young, and violence renders them mean and misanthropical. 'but how is the state to educate them when they are as yet unable to understand the meaning of words?' why, surely they roar and cry, like the young of any other animal, and the nurse knows the meaning of these intimations of the child's likes or dislikes, and the occasions which call them forth. about three years is passed by children in a state of imperfect articulation, which is quite long enough time to make them either goodor ill-tempered. and, therefore, during these first three years, the infant should be as free as possible from fear and pain. 'yes, and he should have as much pleasure as possible.' there, i think, you are wrong; for the influence of pleasure in the beginning of education is fatal. a man should neither pursue pleasure nor wholly avoid pain. he should embrace the mean, and cultivate that state of calm which mankind, taught by some inspiration, attribute to god; and he who would be like god should neither be too fond of pleasure himself, nor should he permit any other to be thus given; above all, not the infant, whose character is just in the making. it may sound ridiculous, but i affirm that a woman in her pregnancy should be carefully tended, and kept from excessive pleasures and pains. 'i quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and following the mean.' let us consider a further point. the matters which are now in question are generally called customs rather than laws; and we have already made the reflection that, though they are not, properly speaking, laws, yet neither can they be neglected. for they fill up the interstices of law, and are the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole building depends. laws without customs never last; and we must not wonder if habit and custom sometimes lengthen out our laws. 'very true.' up to their third year, then, the life of children may be regulated by customs such as we have described. from three to six their minds have to be amused; but they must not be allowed to become self-willed and spoilt. if punishment is necessary, the same rule will hold as in the case of slaves; they must neither be punished in hot blood nor ruined by indulgence. the children of that age will have their own modes of amusing themselves; they should be brought for their play to the village temples, and placed under the care of nurses, who will be responsible to twelve matrons annually chosen by the women who have authority over marriage. these shall be appointed, one out of each tribe, and their duty shall be to keep order at the meetings: slaves who break the rules laid down by them, they shall punish by the help of some of the public slaves; but citizens who dispute their authority shall be brought before the magistrates. after six years of age there shall be a separation of the sexes; the boys will go to learn riding and the use of arms, and the girls may, if they please, also learn. here i note a practical error in early training. mothers and nurses foolishly believe that the left hand is by nature different from the right, whereas the left leg and foot are acknowledged to be the same as the right. but the truth is that nature made all things to balance, and the power of using the left hand, which is of little importance in the case of the plectrum of the lyre, may make a great difference in the art of the warrior, who should be a skilled gymnast and able to fight and balance himself in any position. if a man were a briareus, he should use all his hundred hands at once; at any rate, let everybody employ the two which they have. to these matters the magistrates, male and female, should attend; the women superintending the nursing and amusement of the children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound, wind and limb, and not spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits. education has two branches--gymnastic, which is concerned with the body; and music, which improves the soul. and gymnastic has two parts, dancing and wrestling. of dancing one kind imitates musical recitation and aims at stateliness and freedom; another kind is concerned with the training of the body, and produces health, agility, and beauty. there is no military use in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the names of antaeus and cercyon, or in the tricks of boxing, which are attributed to amycus and epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of extricating the neck, hands, and sides, should be diligently learnt and taught. in our dances imitations of war should be practised, as in the dances of the curetes in crete and of the dioscuri at sparta, or as in the dances in complete armour which were taught us athenians by the goddess athene. youths who are not yet of an age to go to war should make religious processions armed and on horseback; and they should also engage in military games and contests. these exercises will be equally useful in peace and war, and will benefit both states and families. next follows music, to which we will once more return; and here i shall venture to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence on laws. he who has been taught to play at the same games and with the same playthings will be content with the same laws. there is no greater evil in a state than the spirit of innovation. in the case of the seasons and winds, in the management of our bodies and in the habits of our minds, change is a dangerous thing. and in everything but what is bad the same rule holds. we all venerate and acquiesce in the laws to which we are accustomed; and if they have continued during long periods of time, and there is no remembrance of their ever having been otherwise, people are absolutely afraid to change them. now how can we create this quality of immobility in the laws? i say, by not allowing innovations in the games and plays of children. the children who are always having new plays, when grown up will be always having new laws. changes in mere fashions are not serious evils, but changes in our estimate of men's characters are most serious; and rhythms and music are representations of characters, and therefore we must avoid novelties in dance and song. for securing permanence no better method can be imagined than that of the egyptians. 'what is their method?' they make a calendar for the year, arranging on what days the festivals of the various gods shall be celebrated, and for each festival they consecrate an appropriate hymn and dance. in our state a similar arrangement shall in the first instance be framed by certain individuals, and afterwards solemnly ratified by all the citizens. he who introduces other hymns or dances shall be excluded by the priests and priestesses and the guardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he may be prosecuted for impiety. but we must not be too ready to speak about such great matters. even a young man, when he hears something unaccustomed, stands and looks this way and that, like a traveller at a place where three ways meet; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of his ground in so singular an argument. 'very true.' then, leaving the subject for further examination at some future time, let us proceed with our laws about education, for in this manner we may probably throw light upon our present difficulty. 'let us do as you say.' the ancients used the term nomoi to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they fancied that there was a connexion between the songs and laws of a country. and we say--whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a transgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of the law and by the priests and priestesses. 'very good.' how can we legislate about these consecrated strains without incurring ridicule? moulds or types must be first framed, and one of the types shall be--abstinence from evil words at sacrifices. when a son or brother blasphemes at a sacrifice there is a sound of ill-omen heard in the family; and many a chorus stands by the altar uttering inauspicious words, and he is crowned victor who excites the hearers most with lamentations. such lamentations should be reserved for evil days, and should be uttered only by hired mourners; and let the singers not wear circlets or ornaments of gold. to avoid every evil word, then, shall be our first type. 'agreed.' our second law or type shall be, that prayers ever accompany sacrifices; and our third, that, inasmuch as all prayers are requests, they shall be only for good; this the poets must be made to understand. 'certainly.' have we not already decided that no gold or silver plutus shall be allowed in our city? and did not this show that we were dissatisfied with the poets? and may we not fear that, if they are allowed to utter injudicious prayers, they will bring the greatest misfortunes on the state? and we must therefore make a law that the poet is not to contradict the laws or ideas of the state; nor is he to show his poems to any private persons until they have first received the imprimatur of the director of education. a fourth musical law will be to the effect that hymns and praises shall be offered to gods, and to heroes and demigods. still another law will permit eulogies of eminent citizens, whether men or women, but only after their death. as to songs and dances, we will enact as follows:--there shall be a selection made of the best ancient musical compositions and dances; these shall be chosen by judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age. they will accept some, and reject or amend others, for which purpose they will call, if necessary, the poets themselves into council. the severe and orderly music is the style in which to educate children, who, if they are accustomed to this, will deem the opposite kind to be illiberal, but if they are accustomed to the other, will count this to be cold and unpleasing. 'true.' further, a distinction should be made between the melodies of men and women. nature herself teaches that the grand or manly style should be assigned to men, and to women the moderate and temperate. so much for the subjects of education. but to whom are they to be taught, and when? i must try, like the shipwright, who lays down the keel of a vessel, to build a secure foundation for the vessel of the soul in her voyage through life. human affairs are hardly serious, and yet a sad necessity compels us to be serious about them. let us, therefore, do our best to bring the matter to a conclusion. 'very good.' i say then, that god is the object of a man's most serious endeavours. but man is created to be the plaything of the gods; and therefore the aim of every one should be to pass through life, not in grim earnest, but playing at the noblest of pastimes, in another spirit from that which now prevails. for the common opinion is, that work is for the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there is neither amusement nor instruction worth speaking of. the life of peace is that which men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve. they should live sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating gods and heroes. i have already told you the types of song and dance which they should follow: and 'some things,' as the poet well says, 'you will devise for yourself--others, god will suggest to you.' these words of his may be applied to our pupils. they will partly teach themselves, and partly will be taught by god, the art of propitiating him; for they are his puppets, and have only a small portion in truth. 'you have a poor opinion of man.' no wonder, when i compare him with god; but, if you are offended, i will place him a little higher. next follow the building for gymnasia and schools; these will be in the midst of the city, and outside will be riding-schools and archery-grounds. in all of them there ought to be instructors of the young, drawn from foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music and war. education shall be compulsory; the children must attend school, whether their parents like it or not; for they belong to the state more than to their parents. and i say further, without hesitation, that the same education in riding and gymnastic shall be given both to men and women. the ancient tradition about the amazons confirms my view, and at the present day there are myriads of women, called sauromatides, dwelling near the pontus, who practise the art of riding as well as archery and the use of arms. but if i am right, nothing can be more foolish than our modern fashion of training men and women differently, whereby the power the city is reduced to a half. for reflect--if women are not to have the education of men, some other must be found for them, and what other can we propose? shall they, like the women of thrace, tend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin and weave, and take care of the house? or shall they follow the spartan custom, which is between the two?--there the maidens share in gymnastic exercises and in music; and the grown women, no longer engaged in spinning, weave the web of life, although they are not skilled in archery, like the amazons, nor can they imitate our warrior goddess and carry shield or spear, even in the extremity of their country's need. compared with our women, the sauromatides are like men. but your legislators, megillus, as i maintain, only half did their work; they took care of the men, and left the women to take care of themselves. 'shall we suffer the stranger, cleinias, to run down sparta in this way?' 'why, yes; for we cannot withdraw the liberty which we have already conceded to him.' what will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed from the toils of agriculture and business, and having common tables for themselves and their families which are under the inspection of magistrates, male and female? are men who have these institutions only to eat and fatten like beasts? if they do, how can they escape the fate of a fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other beast more valiant than himself? true, theirs is not the perfect way of life, for they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life also confers great blessings. even those who live in the second state have a work to do twice as great as the work of any pythian or olympic victor; for their labour is for the body only, but ours both for body and soul. and this higher work ought to be pursued night and day to the exclusion of every other. the magistrates who keep the city should be wakeful, and the master of the household should be up early and before all his servants; and the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens, and not be awakened by them. much sleep is not required either for our souls or bodies. when a man is asleep, he is no better than if he were dead; and he who loves life and wisdom will take no more sleep than is necessary for health. magistrates who are wide awake at night are terrible to the bad; but they are honoured by the good, and are useful to themselves and the state. when the morning dawns, let the boy go to school. as the sheep need the shepherd, so the boy needs a master; for he is at once the most cunning and the most insubordinate of creatures. let him be taken away from mothers and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a freeman in that he learns and is taught, but as a slave in that he may be chastised by all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to chastise him shall be disgraced. all these matters will be under the supervision of the director of education. him we will address as follows: we have spoken to you, o illustrious teacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial strains; but of the learning of letters and of prose writings, and of music, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes we have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning divine things--such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements of days, months, and years, of which the true calculation is necessary in order that seasons and festivals may proceed in regular course, and arouse and enliven the city, rendering to the gods their due, and making men know them better. there are, we say, many things about which we have not as yet instructed you--and first, as to reading and music: shall the pupil be a perfect scholar and musician, or not even enter on these studies? he should certainly enter on both:--to letters he will apply himself from the age of ten to thirteen, and at thirteen he will begin to handle the lyre, and continue to learn music until he is sixteen; no shorter and no longer time will be allowed, however fond he or his parents may be of the pursuit. the study of letters he should carry to the extent of simple reading and writing, but he need not care for calligraphy and tachygraphy, if his natural gifts do not enable him to acquire them in the three years. and here arises a question as to the learning of compositions when unaccompanied with music, i mean, prose compositions. they are a dangerous species of literature. speak then, o guardians of the law, and tell us what we shall do about them. 'you seem to be in a difficulty.' yes; it is difficult to go against the opinion of all the world. 'but have we not often already done so?' very true. and you imply that the road which we are taking, though disagreeable to many, is approved by those whose judgment is most worth having. 'certainly.' then i would first observe that we have many poets, comic as well as tragic, with whose compositions, as people say, youth are to be imbued and saturated. some would have them learn by heart entire poets; others prefer extracts. now i believe, and the general opinion is, that some of the things which they learn are good, and some bad. 'then how shall we reject some and select others?' a happy thought occurs to me; this long discourse of ours is a sample of what we want, and is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem. i am naturally pleased in reflecting upon all our words, which appear to me to be just the thing for a young man to hear and learn. i would venture, then, to offer to the director of education this treatise of laws as a pattern for his guidance; and in case he should find any similar compositions, written or oral, i would have him carefully preserve them, and commit them in the first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them (he should turn off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate the lesson to the young. i have said enough to the teacher of letters; and now we will proceed to the teacher of the lyre. he must be reminded of the advice which we gave to the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive the rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the opposite. with a view to the attainment of this object, the pupil and his instructor are to use the lyre because its notes are pure; the voice and string should coincide note for note: nor should there be complex harmonies and contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms. three years' study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these intricacies; and our pupils will have many things of more importance to learn. the tunes and hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival have been already determined by us. having given these instructions to the director of music, let us now proceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and girls by masters and mistresses. our minister of education will have a great deal to do; and being an old man, how will he get through so much work? there is no difficulty;--the law will provide him with assistants, male and female; and he will consider how important his office is, and how great the responsibility of choosing them. for if education prospers, the vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education fails, the consequences are not even to be mentioned. of dancing and gymnastics something has been said already. we include under the latter military exercises, the various uses of arms, all that relates to horsemanship, and military evolutions and tactics. there should be public teachers of both arts, paid by the state, and women as well as men should be trained in them. the maidens should learn the armed dance, and the grown-up women be practised in drill and the use of arms, if only in case of extremity, when the men are gone out to battle, and they are left to guard their families. birds and beasts defend their young, but women instead of fighting run to the altars, thus degrading man below the level of the animals. 'such a lack of education, stranger, is both unseemly and dangerous.' wrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of this, and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action is combined with words. next follows dancing, which is of two kinds; imitative, first, of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the ludicrous and grotesque. the first kind may be further divided into the dance of war and the dance of peace. the former is called the pyrrhic; in this the movements of attack and defence are imitated in a direct and manly style, which indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind. the latter of the two, the dance of peace, is suitable to orderly and law-abiding men. these must be distinguished from the bacchic dances which imitate drunken revelry, and also from the dances by which purifications are effected and mysteries celebrated. such dances cannot be characterized either as warlike or peaceful, and are unsuited to a civilized state. now the dances of peace are of two classes:--the first of them is the more violent, being an expression of joy and triumph after toil and danger; the other is more tranquil, symbolizing the continuance and preservation of good. in speaking or singing we naturally move our bodies, and as we have more or less courage or self-control we become less or more violent and excited. thus from the imitation of words in gestures the art of dancing arises. now one man imitates in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner: and so the peaceful kinds of dance have been appropriately called emmeleiai, or dances of order, as the warlike have been called pyrrhic. in the latter a man imitates all sorts of blows and the hurling of weapons and the avoiding of them; in the former he learns to bear himself gracefully and like a gentleman. the types of these dances are to be fixed by the legislator, and when the guardians of the law have assigned them to the several festivals, and consecrated them in due order, no further change shall be allowed. thus much of the dances which are appropriate to fair forms and noble souls. comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered. for the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be understood without opposites. but a man of repute will desire to avoid doing what is ludicrous. he should leave such performances to slaves,--they are not fit for freemen; and there should be some element of novelty in them. concerning tragedy, let our law be as follows: when the inspired poet comes to us with a request to be admitted into our state, we will reply in courteous words--we also are tragedians and your rivals; and the drama which we enact is the best and noblest, being the imitation of the truest and noblest life, with a view to which our state is ordered. and we cannot allow you to pitch your stage in the agora, and make your voices to be heard above ours, or suffer you to address our women and children and the common people on opposite principles to our own. come then, ye children of the lydian muse, and present yourselves first to the magistrates, and if they decide that your hymns are as good or better than ours, you shall have your chorus; but if not, not. there remain three kinds of knowledge which should be learnt by freemen--arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly, astronomy. few need make an accurate study of such sciences; and of special students we will speak at another time. but most persons must be content with the study of them which is absolutely necessary, and may be said to be a necessity of that nature against which god himself is unable to contend. 'what are these divine necessities of knowledge?' necessities of a knowledge without which neither gods, nor demigods, can govern mankind. and far is he from being a divine man who cannot distinguish one, two, odd and even; who cannot number day and night, and is ignorant of the revolutions of the sun and stars; for to every higher knowledge a knowledge of number is necessary--a fool may see this; how much, is a matter requiring more careful consideration. 'very true.' but the legislator cannot enter into such details, and therefore we must defer the more careful consideration of these matters to another occasion. 'you seem to fear our habitual want of training in these subjects.' still more do i fear the danger of bad training, which is often worse than none at all. 'very true.' i think that a gentleman and a freeman may be expected to know as much as an egyptian child. in egypt, arithmetic is taught to children in their sports by a distribution of apples or garlands among a greater or less number of people; or a calculation is made of the various combinations which are possible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or they distribute cups among the children, sometimes of gold, brass, and silver intermingled, sometimes of one metal only. the knowledge of arithmetic which is thus acquired is a great help, either to the general or to the manager of a household; wherever measure is employed, men are more wide-awake in their dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous ignorance. 'what do you mean?' i have observed this ignorance among my countrymen--they are like pigs--and i am heartily ashamed both on my own behalf and on that of all the hellenes. 'in what respect?' let me ask you a question. you know that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth? 'yes.' and the hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1) with themselves, and (2) with each other; whereas they are only commensurable with themselves. but if this is true, then we are in an unfortunate case, and may well say to our compatriots that not to possess necessary knowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing very grand. 'certainly.' the discussion of arithmetical problems is a much better amusement for old men than their favourite game of draughts. 'true.' mathematics, then, will be one of the subjects in which youth should be trained. they may be regarded as an amusement, as well as a useful and innocent branch of knowledge;--i think that we may include them provisionally. 'yes; that will be the way.' the next question is, whether astronomy shall be made a part of education. about the stars there is a strange notion prevalent. men often suppose that it is impious to enquire into the nature of god and the world, whereas the very reverse is the truth. 'how do you mean?' what i am going to say may seem absurd and at variance with the usual language of age, and yet if true and advantageous to the state, and pleasing to god, ought not to be withheld. 'let us hear.' my dear friend, how falsely do we and all the hellenes speak about the sun and moon! 'in what respect?' we are always saying that they and certain of the other stars do not keep the same path, and we term them planets. 'yes; and i have seen the morning and evening stars go all manner of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we know that they always do. but i wish that you would explain your meaning further.' you will easily understand what i have had no difficulty in understanding myself, though we are both of us past the time of learning. 'true; but what is this marvellous knowledge which youth are to acquire, and of which we are ignorant?' men say that the sun, moon, and stars are planets or wanderers; but this is the reverse of the fact. each of them moves in one orbit only, which is circular, and not in many; nor is the swiftest of them the slowest, as appears to human eyes. what an insult should we offer to olympian runners if we were to put the first last and the last first! and if that is a ridiculous error in speaking of men, how much more in speaking of the gods? they cannot be pleased at our telling falsehoods about them. 'they cannot.' then people should at least learn so much about them as will enable them to avoid impiety. enough of education. hunting and similar pursuits now claim our attention. these require for their regulation that mixture of law and admonition of which we have often spoken; e.g., in what we were saying about the nurture of young children. and therefore the whole duty of the citizen will not consist in mere obedience to the laws; he must regard not only the enactments but also the precepts of the legislator. i will illustrate my meaning by an example. of hunting there are many kinds--hunting of fish and fowl, man and beast, enemies and friends; and the legislator can neither omit to speak about these things, nor make penal ordinances about them all. 'what is he to do then?' he will praise and blame hunting, having in view the discipline and exercise of youth. and the young man will listen obediently and will regard his praises and censures; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him. the legislator will express himself in the form of a pious wish for the welfare of the young:--o my friends, he will say, may you never be induced to hunt for fish in the waters, either by day or night; or for men, whether by sea or land. never let the wish to steal enter into your minds; neither be ye fowlers, which is not an occupation for gentlemen. as to land animals, the legislator will discourage hunting by night, and also the use of nets and snares by day; for these are indolent and unmanly methods. the only mode of hunting which he can praise is with horses and dogs, running, shooting, striking at close quarters. enough of the prelude: the law shall be as follows:-let no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly hunters who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited. let the fowler confine himself to waste places and to the mountains. the fisherman is also permitted to exercise his calling, except in harbours and sacred streams, marshes and lakes; in all other places he may fish, provided he does not make use of poisonous mixtures. book viii. next, with the help of the delphian oracle, we will appoint festivals and sacrifices. there shall be 365 of them, one for every day in the year; and one magistrate, at least, shall offer sacrifice daily according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and interpreters, who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and supply what the legislator has omitted. moreover there shall be twelve festivals to the twelve gods after whom the twelve tribes are named: these shall be celebrated every month with appropriate musical and gymnastic contests. there shall also be festivals for women, to be distinguished from the men's festivals. nor shall the gods below be forgotten, but they must be separated from the gods above--pluto shall have his own in the twelfth month. he is not the enemy, but the friend of man, who releases the soul from the body, which is at least as good a work as to unite them. further, those who have to regulate these matters should consider that our state has leisure and abundance, and wishing to be happy, like an individual, should lead a good life; for he who leads such a life neither does nor suffers injury, of which the first is very easy, and the second very difficult of attainment, and is only to be acquired by perfect virtue. a good city has peace, but the evil city is full of wars within and without. to guard against the danger of external enemies the citizens should practise war at least one day in every month; they should go out en masse, including their wives and children, or in divisions, as the magistrates determine, and have mimic contests, imitating in a lively manner real battles; they should also have prizes and encomiums of valour, both for the victors in these contests, and for the victors in the battle of life. the poet who celebrates the victors should be fifty years old at least, and himself a man who has done great deeds. of such an one the poems may be sung, even though he is not the best of poets. to the director of education and the guardians of the law shall be committed the judgment, and no song, however sweet, which has not been licensed by them shall be recited. these regulations about poetry, and about military expeditions, apply equally to men and to women. the legislator may be conceived to make the following address to himself:--with what object am i training my citizens? are they not strivers for mastery in the greatest of combats? certainly, will be the reply. and if they were boxers or wrestlers, would they think of entering the lists without many days' practice? would they not as far as possible imitate all the circumstances of the contest; and if they had no one to box with, would they not practise on a lifeless image, heedless of the laughter of the spectators? and shall our soldiers go out to fight for life and kindred and property unprepared, because sham fights are thought to be ridiculous? will not the legislator require that his citizens shall practise war daily, performing lesser exercises without arms, while the combatants on a greater scale will carry arms, and take up positions, and lie in ambuscade? and let their combats be not without danger, that opportunity may be given for distinction, and the brave man and the coward may receive their meed of honour or disgrace. if occasionally a man is killed, there is no great harm done--there are others as good as he is who will replace him; and the state can better afford to lose a few of her citizens than to lose the only means of testing them. 'we agree, stranger, that such warlike exercises are necessary.' but why are they so rarely practised? or rather, do we not all know the reasons? one of them (1) is the inordinate love of wealth. this absorbs the soul of a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit. knowledge is valued by him only as it tends to the attainment of wealth. all is lost in the desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do anything, right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and the indulgence of his animal passions. 'most true.' this is one of the causes which prevents a man being a good soldier, or anything else which is good; it converts the temperate and orderly into shopkeepers or servants, and the brave into burglars or pirates. many of these latter are men of ability, and are greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long. the bad forms of government (2) are another reason--democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which, as i was saying, are not states, but states of discord, in which the rulers are afraid of their subjects, and therefore do not like them to become rich, or noble, or valiant. now our state will escape both these causes of evil; the society is perfectly free, and has plenty of leisure, and is not allowed by the laws to be absorbed in the pursuit of wealth; hence we have an excellent field for a perfect education, and for the introduction of martial pastimes. let us proceed to describe the character of these pastimes. all gymnastic exercises in our state must have a military character; no other will be allowed. activity and quickness are most useful in war; and yet these qualities do not attain their greatest efficiency unless the competitors are armed. the runner should enter the lists in armour, and in the races which our heralds proclaim, no prize is to be given except to armed warriors. let there be six courses--first, the stadium; secondly, the diaulos or double course; thirdly, the horse course; fourthly, the long course; fifthly, races (1) between heavy-armed soldiers who shall pass over sixty stadia and finish at a temple of ares, and (2) between still more heavily-armed competitors who run over smoother ground; sixthly, a race for archers, who shall run over hill and dale a distance of a hundred stadia, and their goal shall be a temple of apollo and artemis. there shall be three contests of each kind--one for boys, another for youths, a third for men; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for the youths at two-thirds of the entire length. women shall join in the races: young girls who are not grown up shall run naked; but after thirteen they shall be suitably dressed; from thirteen to eighteen they shall be obliged to share in these contests, and from eighteen to twenty they may if they please and if they are unmarried. as to trials of strength, single combats in armour, or battles between two and two, or of any number up to ten, shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy exercises. and there must be umpires, as there are now in wrestling, to determine what is a fair hit and who is conqueror. instead of the pancratium, let there be contests in which the combatants carry bows and wear light shields and hurl javelins and throw stones. the next provision of the law will relate to horses, which, as we are in crete, need be rarely used by us, and chariots never; our horse-racing prizes will only be given to single horses, whether colts, half-grown, or full-grown. their riders are to wear armour, and there shall be a competition between mounted archers. women, if they have a mind, may join in the exercises of men. but enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music. all musical contests will take place at festivals, whether every third or every fifth year, which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the judges of the games, and the director of education, who for this purpose shall become legislators and arrange times and conditions. the principles on which such contests are to be ordered have been often repeated by the first legislator; no more need be said of them, nor are the details of them important. but there is another subject of the highest importance, which, if possible, should be determined by the laws, not of man, but of god; or, if a direct revelation is impossible, there is need of some bold man who, alone against the world, will speak plainly of the corruption of human nature, and go to war with the passions of mankind. 'we do not understand you.' i will try to make my meaning plainer. in speaking of education, i seemed to see young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another; and there arose in my mind a natural fear about a state, in which the young of either sex are well nurtured, and have little to do, and occupy themselves chiefly with festivals and dances. how can they be saved from those passions which reason forbids them to indulge, and which are the ruin of so many? the prohibition of wealth, and the influence of education, and the all-seeing eye of the ruler, will alike help to promote temperance; but they will not wholly extirpate the unnatural loves which have been the destruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can be devised? lacedaemon and crete give no assistance here; on the subject of love, as i may whisper in your ear, they are against us. suppose a person were to urge that you ought to restore the natural use which existed before the days of laius; he would be quite right, but he would not be supported by public opinion in either of your states. or try the matter by the test which we apply to all laws,--who will say that the permission of such things tends to virtue? will he who is seduced learn the habit of courage; or will the seducer acquire temperance? and will any legislator be found to make such actions legal? but to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love and friendship, which may take very different forms. for we speak of friendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue; secondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when in excess, is termed love. the first kind is gentle and sociable; the second is fierce and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is akin to both, and is under the dominion of opposite principles. the one is of the body, and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who is under the influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker rather than a lover, and desires only with his soul to be knit to the soul of his friend; while the intermediate sort is both of the body and of the soul. here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to prohibit all of them equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain? 'the latter, clearly.' i expected to gain your approval; but i will reserve the task of convincing our friend cleinias for another occasion. 'very good.' to make right laws on this subject is in one point of view easy, and in another most difficult; for we know that in some cases most men abstain willingly from intercourse with the fair. the unwritten law which prohibits members of the same family from such intercourse is strictly obeyed, and no thought of anything else ever enters into the minds of men in general. a little word puts out the fire of their lusts. 'what is it?' the declaration that such things are hateful to the gods, and most abominable and unholy. the reason is that everywhere, in jest and earnest alike, this is the doctrine which is repeated to all from their earliest youth. they see on the stage that an oedipus or a thyestes or a macareus, when undeceived, are ready to kill themselves. there is an undoubted power in public opinion when no breath is heard adverse to the law; and the legislator who would enslave these enslaving passions must consecrate such a public opinion all through the city. 'good: but how can you create it?' a fair objection; but i promised to try and find some means of restraining loves to their natural objects. a law which would extirpate unnatural love as effectually as incest is at present extirpated, would be the source of innumerable blessings, because it would be in accordance with nature, and would get rid of excess in eating and drinking and of adulteries and frenzies, making men love their wives, and having other excellent effects. i can imagine that some lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out in abusive terms that we are legislating for impossibilities. and so a person might have said of the syssitia, or common meals; but this is refuted by facts, although even now they are not extended to women. 'true.' there is no impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as i shall endeavour to prove. 'do so.' will not a man find abstinence more easy when his body is sound than when he is in ill-condition? 'yes.' have we not heard of iccus of tarentum and other wrestlers who abstained wholly for a time? yet they were infinitely worse educated than our citizens, and far more lusty in their bodies. and shall they have abstained for the sake of an athletic contest, and our citizens be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory,--the victory over pleasure, which is true happiness? will not the fear of impiety enable them to conquer that which many who were inferior to them have conquered? 'i dare say.' and therefore the law must plainly declare that our citizens should not fall below the other animals, who live all together in flocks, and yet remain pure and chaste until the time of procreation comes, when they pair, and are ever after faithful to their compact. but if the corruption of public opinion is too great to allow our first law to be carried out, then our guardians of the law must turn legislators, and try their hand at a second law. they must minimize the appetites, diverting the vigour of youth into other channels, allowing the practice of love in secret, but making detection shameful. three higher principles may be brought to bear on all these corrupt natures. 'what are they?' religion, honour, and the love of the higher qualities of the soul. perhaps this is a dream only, yet it is the best of dreams; and if not the whole, still, by the grace of god, a part of what we desire may be realized. either men may learn to abstain wholly from any loves, natural or unnatural, except of their wedded wives; or, at least, they may give up unnatural loves; or, if detected, they shall be punished with loss of citizenship, as aliens from the state in their morals. 'i entirely agree with you,' said megillus, 'but cleinias must speak for himself.' 'i will give my opinion by-and-by.' we were speaking of the syssitia, which will be a natural institution in a cretan colony. whether they shall be established after the model of crete or lacedaemon, or shall be different from either, is an unimportant question which may be determined without difficulty. we may, therefore, proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens, which will be far less complex than in other cities; a state which is inland and not maritime requires only half the number of laws. there is no trouble about trade and commerce, and a thousand other things. the legislator has only to regulate the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds, which will be easily arranged, now that the principal questions, such as marriage, education, and government, have been settled. let us begin with husbandry: first, let there be a law of zeus against removing a neighbour's landmark, whether he be a citizen or stranger. for this is 'to move the immoveable'; and zeus, the god of kindred, witnesses to the wrongs of citizens, and zeus, the god of strangers, to the wrongs of strangers. the offence of removing a boundary shall receive two punishments--the first will be inflicted by the god himself; the second by the judges. in the next place, the differences between neighbours about encroachments must be guarded against. he who encroaches shall pay twofold the amount of the injury; of all such matters the wardens of the country shall be the judges, in lesser cases the officers, and in greater the whole number of them belonging to any one division. any injury done by cattle, the decoying of bees, the careless firing of woods, the planting unduly near a neighbour's ground, shall all be visited with proper damages. such details have been determined by previous legislators, and need not now be mixed up with greater matters. husbandmen have had of old excellent rules about streams and waters; and we need not 'divert their course.' anybody may take water from a common stream, if he does not thereby cut off a private spring; he may lead the water in any direction, except through a house or temple, but he must do no harm beyond the channel. if land is without water the occupier shall dig down to the clay, and if at this depth he find no water, he shall have a right of getting water from his neighbours for his household; and if their supply is limited, he shall receive from them a measure of water fixed by the wardens of the country. if there be heavy rains, the dweller on the higher ground must not recklessly suffer the water to flow down upon a neighbour beneath him, nor must he who lives upon lower ground or dwells in an adjoining house refuse an outlet. if the two parties cannot agree, they shall go before the wardens of the city or country, and if a man refuse to abide by their decision, he shall pay double the damage which he has caused. in autumn god gives us two boons--one the joy of dionysus not to be laid up--the other to be laid up. about the fruits of autumn let the law be as follows: he who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of arcturus, shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to dionysus, if he gathers on his own ground; if on his neighbour's ground, a mina, and two-thirds of a mina if on that of any one else. the grapes or figs not used for storing a man may gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that of others he must pay the penalty of removing what he has not laid down. if he be a slave who has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig. a metic must purchase the choice fruit; but a stranger may pluck for himself and his attendant. this right of hospitality, however, does not extend to storing grapes. a slave who eats of the storing grapes or figs shall be beaten, and the freeman be dismissed with a warning. pears, apples, pomegranates, may be taken secretly, but he who is detected in the act of taking them shall be lightly beaten off, if he be not more than thirty years of age. the stranger and the elder may partake of them, but not carry any away; the latter, if he does not obey the law, shall fail in the competition of virtue, if anybody brings up his offence against him. water is also in need of protection, being the greatest element of nutrition, and, unlike the other elements--soil, air, and sun--which conspire in the growth of plants, easily polluted. and therefore he who spoils another's water, whether in springs or reservoirs, either by trenching, or theft, or by means of poisonous substances, shall pay the damage and purify the stream. at the getting-in of the harvest everybody shall have a right of way over his neighbour's ground, provided he is careful to do no damage beyond the trespass, or if he himself will gain three times as much as his neighbour loses. of all this the magistrates are to take cognizance, and they are to assess the damage where the injury does not exceed three minae; cases of greater damage can be tried only in the public courts. a charge against a magistrate is to be referred to the public courts, and any one who is found guilty of deciding corruptly shall pay twofold to the aggrieved person. matters of detail relating to punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses, and witnesses to summonses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged legislator; the younger generation may determine them according to their experience; but when once determined, they shall remain unaltered. the following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts:--no citizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them. for the citizen has already an art and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no man can practise two arts, or practise one and superintend another. no smith should be a carpenter, and no carpenter, having many slaves who are smiths, should look after them himself; but let each man practise one art which shall be his means of livelihood. the wardens of the city should see to this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary deprival of his rights--the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined, exiled. any disputes about contracts shall be determined by the wardens of the city up to fifty drachmae--above that sum by the public courts. no customs are to be exacted either on imports or exports. nothing unnecessary is to be imported from abroad, whether for the service of the gods or for the use of man--neither purple, nor other dyes, nor frankincense,--and nothing needed in the country is to be exported. these things are to be decided on by the twelve guardians of the law who are next in seniority to the five elders. arms and the materials of war are to be imported and exported only with the consent of the generals, and then only by the state. there is to be no retail trade either in these or any other articles. for the distribution of the produce of the country, the cretan laws afford a rule which may be usefully followed. all shall be required to distribute corn, grain, animals, and other valuable produce, into twelve portions. each of these shall be subdivided into three parts--one for freemen, another for servants, and the third shall be sold for the supply of artisans, strangers, and metics. these portions must be equal whether the produce be much or little; and the master of a household may distribute the two portions among his family and his slaves as he pleases--the remainder is to be measured out to the animals. next as to the houses in the country--there shall be twelve villages, one in the centre of each of the twelve portions; and in every village there shall be temples and an agora--also shrines for heroes or for any old magnesian deities who linger about the place. in every division there shall be temples of hestia, zeus, and athene, as well as of the local deity, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the guard-houses of the rural police. the dwellings of the artisans will be thus arranged:--the artisans shall be formed into thirteen guilds, one of which will be divided into twelve parts and settled in the city; of the rest there shall be one in each division of the country. and the magistrates will fix them on the spots where they will cause the least inconvenience and be most serviceable in supplying the wants of the husbandmen. the care of the agora will fall to the wardens of the agora. their first duty will be the regulation of the temples which surround the market-place; and their second to see that the markets are orderly and that fair dealing is observed. they will also take care that the sales which the citizens are required to make to strangers are duly executed. the law shall be, that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to whom the sale is entrusted shall offer grain; and at this sale a twelfth part of the whole shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his wants for a month. on the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and on the twenty-third of animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and other things which husbandmen have to sell and foreigners want to buy. none of these commodities, any more than barley or flour, or any other food, may be retailed by a citizen to a citizen; but foreigners may sell them to one another in the foreigners' market. there must also be butchers who will sell parts of animals to foreigners and craftsmen, and their servants; and foreigners may buy firewood wholesale of the commissioners of woods, and may sell retail to foreigners. all other goods must be sold in the market, at some place indicated by the magistrates, and shall be paid for on the spot. he who gives credit, and is cheated, will have no redress. in buying or selling, any excess or diminution of what the law allows shall be registered. the same rule is to be observed about the property of metics. anybody who practises a handicraft may come and remain twenty years from the day on which he is enrolled; at the expiration of this time he shall take what he has and depart. the only condition which is to be imposed upon him as the tax of his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay any tax for being allowed to buy or sell. but if he wants to extend the time of his sojourn, and has done any service to the state, and he can persuade the council and assembly to grant his request, he may remain. the children of metics may also be metics; and the period of twenty years, during which they are permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case, from their fifteenth year. no mention occurs in the laws of the doctrine of ideas. the will of god, the authority of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have taken their place in the mind of plato. if we ask what is that truth or principle which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed him most, like the idea of good in the republic, or of beauty in the symposium, or of the unity of virtue in the protagoras, we should answer--the priority of the soul to the body: his later system mainly hangs upon this. in the laws, as in the sophist and statesman, we pass out of the region of metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of psychology. the opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style, is one of the most elevated passages in plato. the religious feeling which he seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the blessedness of living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living for himself, the pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil, the kindness due to the suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of christian philosophy. the remark that elder men, if they want to educate others, should begin by educating themselves; the necessity of creating a spirit of obedience in the citizens; the desirableness of limiting property; the importance of parochial districts, each to be placed under the protection of some god or demigod, have almost the tone of a modern writer. in many of his views of politics, plato seems to us, like some politicians of our own time, to be half socialist, half conservative. in the laws, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure and pain. there are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals may regard them: either like the stoics, and other ascetics, we may say that pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may affirm that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as aristotle says, 'to be brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises a great and paramount influence on human life' (arist. eth. nic.). or as plato says in the laws, 'a man will recognize the noblest life as having the greatest pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste.' if we admit that pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two modes of speaking is rather verbal than real; and in the greater part of the writings of plato they alternate with each other. in the republic, the mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received by socrates with a cry of abhorrence; but in the philebus, innocent pleasures vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods. in the protagoras, speaking in the person of socrates rather than in his own, plato admits the calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics, while in the phaedo he indignantly denies that the exchange of one pleasure for another is the exchange of virtue. so wide of the mark are they who would attribute to plato entire consistency in thoughts or words. he acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first--in this, at any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing eyes upon the ideal. several features of the first are retained in the second: the education of men and women is to be as far as possible the same; they are to have common meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the women with their children; and they are both to serve in the army; the citizens, if not actually communists, are in spirit communistic; they are to be lovers of equality; only a certain amount of wealth is permitted to them, and their burdens and also their privileges are to be proportioned to this. the constitution in the laws is a timocracy of wealth, modified by an aristocracy of merit. yet the political philosopher will observe that the first of these two principles is fixed and permanent, while the latter is uncertain and dependent on the opinion of the multitude. wealth, after all, plays a great part in the second republic of plato. like other politicians, he deems that a property qualification will contribute stability to the state. the four classes are derived from the constitution of athens, just as the form of the city, which is clustered around a citadel set on a hill, is suggested by the acropolis at athens. plato, writing under pythagorean influences, seems really to have supposed that the well-being of the city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on justice and moderation. but he is not prevented by pythagoreanism from observing the effects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of nations. he was doubtful in the republic whether the ideal or communistic state could be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that whether it existed or not made no difference to the philosopher, who will in any case regulate his life by it (republic). he has now lost faith in the practicability of his scheme--he is speaking to 'men, and not to gods or sons of gods' (laws). yet he still maintains it to be the true pattern of the state, which we must approach as nearly as possible: as aristotle says, 'after having created a more general form of state, he gradually brings it round to the other' (pol.). he does not observe, either here or in the republic, that in such a commonwealth there would be little room for the development of individual character. in several respects the second state is an improvement on the first, especially in being based more distinctly on the dignity of the soul. the standard of truth, justice, temperance, is as high as in the republic;--in one respect higher, for temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as the condition of all virtue. it is finally acknowledged that the virtues are all one and connected, and that if they are separated, courage is the lowest of them. the treatment of moral questions is less speculative but more human. the idea of good has disappeared; the excellences of individuals--of him who is faithful in a civil broil, of the examiner who is incorruptible, are the patterns to which the lives of the citizens are to conform. plato is never weary of speaking of the honour of the soul, which can only be honoured truly by being improved. to make the soul as good as possible, and to prepare her for communion with the gods in another world by communion with divine virtue in this, is the end of life. if the republic is far superior to the laws in form and style, and perhaps in reach of thought, the laws leave on the mind of the modern reader much more strongly the impression of a struggle against evil, and an enthusiasm for human improvement. when plato says that he must carry out that part of his ideal which is practicable, he does not appear to have reflected that part of an ideal cannot be detached from the whole. the great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he seeks to impress upon them. he had seen the athenian empire, almost within the limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems to have asked himself what would happen if, a century from the time at which he was writing, the greek character should have as much changed as in the century which had preceded. he fails to perceive that the greater part of the political life of a nation is not that which is given them by their legislators, but that which they give themselves. he has never reflected that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere order can only be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression. the possibility of a great nation or of an universal empire arising never occurred to him. he sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the hellenic world in his own later life, and thinks that the remedy is to make the laws unchangeable. the same want of insight is apparent in his judgments about art. he would like to have the forms of sculpture and of music fixed as in egypt. he does not consider that this would be fatal to the true principles of art, which, as socrates had himself taught, was to give life (xen. mem.). we wonder how, familiar as he was with the statues of pheidias, he could have endured the lifeless and half-monstrous works of egyptian sculpture. the 'chants of isis' (laws), we might think, would have been barbarous in an athenian ear. but although he is aware that there are some things which are not so well among 'the children of the nile,' he is deeply struck with the stability of egyptian institutions. both in politics and in art plato seems to have seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by taking a step backwards. antiquity, compared with the world in which he lived, had a sacredness and authority for him: the men of a former age were supposed by him to have had a sense of reverence which was wanting among his contemporaries. he could imagine the early stages of civilization; he never thought of what the future might bring forth. his experience is confined to two or three centuries, to a few greek states, and to an uncertain report of egypt and the east. there are many ways in which the limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the greeks. in criticism they were like children, having an acute vision of things which were near to them, blind to possibilities which were in the distance. the colony is to receive from the mother-country her original constitution, and some of the first guardians of the law. the guardians of the law are to be ministers of justice, and the president of education is to take precedence of them all. they are to keep the registers of property, to make regulations for trade, and they are to be superannuated at seventy years of age. several questions of modern politics, such as the limitation of property, the enforcement of education, the relations of classes, are anticipated by plato. he hopes that in his state will be found neither poverty nor riches; every man having the necessaries of life, he need not go fortune-hunting in marriage. almost in the spirit of the gospel he would say, 'how hardly can a rich man dwell in a perfect state.' for he cannot be a good man who is always gaining too much and spending too little (laws; compare arist. eth. nic.). plato, though he admits wealth as a political element, would deny that material prosperity can be the foundation of a really great community. a man's soul, as he often says, is more to be esteemed than his body; and his body than external goods. he repeats the complaint which has been made in all ages, that the love of money is the corruption of states. he has a sympathy with thieves and burglars, 'many of whom are men of ability and greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long;' but he has little sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers, although he makes the reflection, which sometimes occurs to ourselves, that such occupations, if they were carried on honestly by the best men and women, would be delightful and honourable. for traders and artisans a moderate gain was, in his opinion, best. he has never, like modern writers, idealized the wealth of nations, any more than he has worked out the problems of political economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown into a science. the isolation of greek states, their constant wars, the want of a free industrial population, and of the modern methods and instruments of 'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among them; and so hindered them from forming a theory of the laws which regulate the accumulation and distribution of wealth. the constitution of the army is aristocratic and also democratic; official appointment is combined with popular election. the two principles are carried out as follows: the guardians of the law nominate generals out of whom three are chosen by those who are or have been of the age for military service; and the generals elected have the nomination of certain of the inferior officers. but if either in the case of generals or of the inferior officers any one is ready to swear that he knows of a better man than those nominated, he may put the claims of his candidate to the vote of the whole army, or of the division of the service which he will, if elected, command. there is a general assembly, but its functions, except at elections, are hardly noticed. in the election of the boule, plato again attempts to mix aristocracy and democracy. this is effected, first as in the servian constitution, by balancing wealth and numbers; for it cannot be supposed that those who possessed a higher qualification were equal in number with those who had a lower, and yet they have an equal number of representatives. in the second place, all classes are compelled to vote in the election of senators from the first and second class; but the fourth class is not compelled to elect from the third, nor the third and fourth from the fourth. thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus chosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by lot; these form the council for the year. these political adjustments of plato's will be criticised by the practical statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual. he will observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy is the division into classes. the second of the three proposals, though ingenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which is often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little power in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most needed. at such political crises, all the lower classes would vote equally with the higher. the subtraction of half the persons chosen at the first election by the chances of the lot would not raise the character of the senators, and is open to the objection of uncertainty, which necessarily attends this and similar schemes of double representative government. nor can the voters be expected to retain the continuous political interest required for carrying out such a proposal as plato's. who could select 180 persons of each class, fitted to be senators? and whoever were chosen by the voter in the first instance, his wishes might be neutralized by the action of the lot. yet the scheme of plato is not really so extravagant as the actual constitution of athens, in which all the senators appear to have been elected by lot (apo kuamou bouleutai), at least, after the revolution made by cleisthenes; for the constitution of the senate which was established by solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their precise nature is unknown to us. the ancients knew that election by lot was the most democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the objectionable sense, that 'one man is as good as another.' plato, who is desirous of mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot, which he applies to candidates already elected by vote. he attempts also to devise a system of checks and balances such as he supposes to have been intended by the ancient legislators. we are disposed to say to him, as he himself says in a remarkable passage, that 'no man ever legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. the violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws.' and yet, as he adds, the true legislator is still required: he must co-operate with circumstances. many things which are ascribed to human foresight are the result of chance. ancient, and in a less degree modern political constitutions, are never consistent with themselves, because they are never framed on a single design, but are added to from time to time as new elements arise and gain the preponderance in the state. we often attribute to the wisdom of our ancestors great political effects which have sprung unforeseen from the accident of the situation. power, not wisdom, is most commonly the source of political revolutions. and the result, as in the roman republic, of the co-existence of opposite elements in the same state is, not a balance of power or an equable progress of liberal principles, but a conflict of forces, of which one or other may happen to be in the ascendant. in greek history, as well as in plato's conception of it, this 'progression by antagonism' involves reaction: the aristocracy expands into democracy and returns again to tyranny. the constitution of the laws may be said to consist, besides the magistrates, mainly of three elements,--an administrative council, the judiciary, and the nocturnal council, which is an intellectual aristocracy, composed of priests and the ten eldest guardians of the law and some younger co-opted members. to this latter chiefly are assigned the functions of legislation, but to be exercised with a sparing hand. the powers of the ordinary council are administrative rather than legislative. the whole number of 360, as in the athenian constitution, is distributed among the months of the year according to the number of the tribes. not more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once, so that the government would be made up of twelve administrations succeeding one another in the course of the year. they are to exercise a general superintendence, and, like the athenian counsellors, are to preside in monthly divisions over all assemblies. of the ecclesia over which they presided little is said, and that little relates to comparatively trifling duties. nothing is less present to the mind of plato than a house of commons, carrying on year by year the work of legislation. for he supposes the laws to be already provided. as little would he approve of a body like the roman senate. the people and the aristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies, but by officers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the law, who are elected for twenty years. the evils of this system are obvious. if in any state, as plato says in the statesman, it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than fifty good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council must be unfitted to rule. the unfitness would be increased by the short period during which they held office. there would be no traditions of government among them, as in a greek or italian oligarchy, and no individual would be responsible for any of their acts. everything seems to have been sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to which all have a turn of ruling and being ruled. in the constitution of the magnesian state plato has not emancipated himself from the limitations of ancient politics. his government may be described as a democracy of magistrates elected by the people. he never troubles himself about the political consistency of his scheme. he does indeed say that the greater part of the good of this world arises, not from equality, but from proportion, which he calls the judgment of zeus (compare aristotle's distributive justice), but he hardly makes any attempt to carry out the principle in practice. there is no attempt to proportion representation to merit; nor is there any body in his commonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole state. the manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the old democratic constitution of athens, of which it retains some of the worst features, such as the use of the lot, while by doing away with the political character of the popular assembly the mainspring of the machine is taken out. the guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number, of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the nocturnal council at the end of the twelfth book, are to be elected by the whole military class, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore have an oligarchical rather than a democratic character. nothing is said of the manner in which the functions of the nocturnal council are to be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law, or as to how the ordinary council is related to it. similar principles are applied to inferior offices. to some the appointment is made by vote, to others by lot. in the elections to the priesthood, plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner 'demus and not demus.' the commonwealth of the laws, like the republic, cannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both--the oracle of delphi. from this the laws about all divine things are to be derived. the final selection of the interpreters, the choice of an heir for a vacant lot, the punishment for removing a deposit, are also to be determined by it. plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts to revive religion in states. for, as he says in the laws, 'to institute religious rites is the work of a great intelligence.' though the council is framed on the model of the athenian boule, the law courts of plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the athenian dicasteries. plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:--this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a few judges only, but good ones. he is nevertheless aware that both in public and private suits there must be a popular element. he insists that the whole people must share in the administration of justice--in public causes they are to take the first step, and the final decision is to remain with them. in private suits they are also to retain a share; 'for the citizen who has no part in the administration of justice is apt to think that he has no share in the state. for this reason there is to be a court of law in every tribe (i.e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the judges are to be chosen by lot.' of the courts of law he gives what he calls a superficial sketch. nor, indeed is it easy to reconcile his various accounts of them. it is however clear that although some officials, like the guardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city, and country have power to inflict minor penalties, the administration of justice is in the main popular. the ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of law and fact between a judge and jury, which would have enabled plato to combine the popular element with the judicial, did not occur to him or to any other ancient political philosopher. though desirous of limiting the number of judges, and thereby confining the office to persons specially fitted for it, he does not seem to have understood that a body of law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments. he would have men in the first place seek justice from their friends and neighbours, because, as he truly remarks, they know best the questions at issue; these are called in another passage arbiters rather than judges. but if they cannot settle the matter, it is to be referred to the courts of the tribes, and a higher penalty is to be paid by the party who is unsuccessful in the suit. there is a further appeal allowed to the select judges, with a further increase of penalty. the select judges are to be appointed by the magistrates, who are to choose one from every magistracy. they are to be elected annually, and therefore probably for a year only, and are liable to be called to account before the guardians of the law. in cases of which death is the penalty, the trial takes place before a special court, which is composed of the guardians of the law and of the judges of appeal. in treating of the subject in book ix, he proposes to leave for the most part the methods of procedure to a younger generation of legislators; the procedure in capital causes he determines himself. he insists that the vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they are to hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. they are then to take evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine witnesses. the eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then the second, and then the third. the interrogatories are to continue for three days, and the evidence is to be written down. apparently he does not expect the judges to be professional lawyers, any more than he expects the members of the council to be trained statesmen. in forming marriage connexions, plato supposes that the public interest will prevail over private inclination. there was nothing in this very shocking to the notions of greeks, among whom the feeling of love towards the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance. married life is to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the state. the newly-married couple are not allowed to absent themselves from their respective syssitia, even during their honeymoon; they are to give their whole mind to the procreation of children; their duties to one another at a later period of life are not a matter about which the state is equally solicitous. divorces are readily allowed for incompatibility of temper. as in the republic, physical considerations seem almost to exclude moral and social ones. to modern feelings there is a degree of coarseness in plato's treatment of the subject. yet he also makes some shrewd remarks on marriage, as for example, that a man who does not marry for money will not be the humble servant of his wife. and he shows a true conception of the nature of the family, when he requires that the newly-married couple 'should leave their father and mother,' and have a separate home. he also provides against extravagance in marriage festivals, which in some states of society, for instance in the case of the hindoos, has been a social evil of the first magnitude. in treating of property, plato takes occasion to speak of property in slaves. they are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own sake, to be kept at a distance. the motive is not so much humanity to the slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although plato allows that many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than members of their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and citizen owes to himself (compare republic). if they commit crimes, they are doubly punished; if they inform against illegal practices of their masters, they are to receive a protection, which would probably be ineffectual, from the guardians of the law; in rare cases they are to be set free. plato still breathes the spirit of the old hellenic world, in which slavery was a necessity, because leisure must be provided for the citizen. the education propounded in the laws differs in several points from that of the republic. plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly on the importance of infancy as rousseau, or jean paul (compare the saying of the latter--'not the moment of death, but the moment of birth, is probably the more important'). he would fix the amusements of children in the hope of fixing their characters in after-life. in the spirit of the statesman who said, 'let me make the ballads of a country, and i care not who make their laws,' plato would say, 'let the amusements of children be unchanged, and they will not want to change the laws. the 'goddess harmonia' plays a great part in plato's ideas of education. the natural restless force of life in children, 'who do nothing but roar until they are three years old,' is gradually to be reduced to law and order. as in the republic, he fixes certain forms in which songs are to be composed: (1) they are to be strains of cheerfulness and good omen; (2) they are to be hymns or prayers addressed to the gods; (3) they are to sing only of the lawful and good. the poets are again expelled or rather ironically invited to depart; and those who remain are required to submit their poems to the censorship of the magistrates. youth are no longer compelled to commit to memory many thousand lyric and tragic greek verses; yet, perhaps, a worse fate is in store for them. plato has no belief in 'liberty of prophesying'; and having guarded against the dangers of lyric poetry, he remembers that there is an equal danger in other writings. he cannot leave his old enemies, the sophists, in possession of the field; and therefore he proposes that youth shall learn by heart, instead of the compositions of poets or prose writers, his own inspired work on laws. these, and music and mathematics, are the chief parts of his education. mathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the republic with a view to the science of the idea of good,--though the higher use of them is not altogether excluded,--but rather with a religious and political aim. they are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions of a state, and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not to blaspheme about astronomy. against three mathematical errors plato is in profound earnest. first, the error of supposing that the three dimensions of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable with one another. the difficulty which he feels is analogous to the difficulty which he formerly felt about the connexion of ideas, and is equally characteristic of ancient philosophy: he fixes his mind on the point of difference, and cannot at the same time take in the similarity. secondly, he is puzzled about the nature of fractions: in the republic, he is disposed to deny the possibility of their existence. thirdly, his optimism leads him to insist (unlike the spanish king who thought that he could have improved on the mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect or circular movement of the heavenly bodies. he appears to mean, that instead of regarding the stars as overtaking or being overtaken by one another, or as planets wandering in many paths, a more comprehensive survey of the heavens would enable us to infer that they all alike moved in a circle around a centre (compare timaeus; republic). he probably suspected, though unacquainted with the true cause, that the appearance of the heavens did not agree with the reality: at any rate, his notions of what was right or fitting easily overpowered the results of actual observation. to the early astronomers, who lived at the revival of science, as to plato, there was nothing absurd in a priori astronomy, and they would probably have made fewer real discoveries of they had followed any other track. (compare introduction to the republic.) the science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the laws, nor is anything said of the education of after-life. the child is to begin to learn at ten years of age: he is to be taught reading and writing for three years, from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years more, from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music. the great fault which plato finds in the contemporary education is the almost total ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the greeks would do well to take a lesson from the egyptians (compare republic). dancing and wrestling are to have a military character, and women as well as men are to be taught the use of arms. the military spirit which plato has vainly endeavoured to expel in the first two books returns again in the seventh and eighth. he has evidently a sympathy with the soldier, as well as with the poet, and he is no mean master of the art, or at least of the theory, of war (compare laws; republic), though inclining rather to the spartan than to the athenian practice of it (laws). of a supreme or master science which was to be the 'coping-stone' of the rest, few traces appear in the laws. he seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the outline which he had sketched. there is no requirement that the guardians of the law shall be philosophers, although they are to know the unity of virtue, and the connexion of the sciences. nor are we told that the leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to be devoted to any intellectual employment. in this respect we note a falling off from the republic, but also there is 'the returning to it' of which aristotle speaks in the politics. the public and family duties of the citizens are to be their main business, and these would, no doubt, take up a great deal more time than in the modern world we are willing to allow to either of them. plato no longer entertains the idea of any regular training to be pursued under the superintendence of the state from eighteen to thirty, or from thirty to thirty-five; he has taken the first step downwards on 'constitution hill' (republic). but he maintains as earnestly as ever that 'to men living under this second polity there remains the greatest of all works, the education of the soul,' and that no bye-work should be allowed to interfere with it. night and day are not long enough for the consummation of it. few among us are either able or willing to carry education into later life; five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university, or in the preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a lecture to which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare from house-keeping or money-making--these comprise, as a matter of fact, the education even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished 'more truly than heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again' (republic). the description which plato gives in the republic of the state of adult education among his contemporaries may be applied almost word for word to our own age. he does not however acquiesce in this widely-spread want of a higher education; he would rather seek to make every man something of a philosopher before he enters on the duties of active life. but in the laws he no longer prescribes any regular course of study which is to be pursued in mature years. nor does he remark that the education of after-life is of another kind, and must consist with the majority of the world rather in the improvement of character than in the acquirement of knowledge. it comes from the study of ourselves and other men: from moderation and experience: from reflection on circumstances: from the pursuit of high aims: from a right use of the opportunities of life. it is the preservation of what we have been, and the addition of something more. the power of abstract study or continuous thought is very rare, but such a training as this can be given by every one to himself. the singular passage in book vii., in which plato describes life as a pastime, like many other passages in the laws is imperfectly expressed. two thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind: first, the reflection, to which he returns at the end of the passage, that men are playthings or puppets, and that god only is the serious aim of human endeavours; this suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they are the playthings of the gods, and that this is the best of them. the cynical, ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious sentiment. in another passage he says that life is a game of which god, who is the player, shifts the pieces so as to procure the victory of good on the whole. or once more: tragedies are acted on the stage; but the best and noblest of them is the imitation of the noblest life, which we affirm to be the life of our whole state. again, life is a chorus, as well as a sort of mystery, in which we have the gods for playmates. men imagine that war is their serious pursuit, and they make war that they may return to their amusements. but neither wars nor amusements are the true satisfaction of men, which is to be found only in the society of the gods, in sacrificing to them and propitiating them. like a christian ascetic, plato seems to suppose that life should be passed wholly in the enjoyment of divine things. and after meditating in amazement on the sadness and unreality of the world, he adds, in a sort of parenthesis, 'be cheerful, sirs' (shakespeare, tempest.) in one of the noblest passages of plato, he speaks of the relation of the sexes. natural relations between members of the same family have been established of old; a 'little word' has put a stop to incestuous connexions. but unnatural unions of another kind continued to prevail at crete and lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the gods. they, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy and abominable could sink into the minds of men. the legislator is to cry aloud, and spare not, 'let not men fall below the level of the beasts.' plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from 'carrying on war against the mightiest lusts of mankind;' neither does he expect to extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural use and purpose, by the enactments of law, and by the influence of public opinion. he will not feed them by an over-luxurious diet, nor allow the healthier instincts of the soul to be corrupted by music and poetry. the prohibition of excessive wealth is, as he says, a very considerable gain in the way of temperance, nor does he allow of those enthusiastic friendships between older and younger persons which in his earlier writings appear to be alluded to with a certain degree of amusement and without reproof (compare introduction to the symposium). sappho and anacreon are celebrated by him in the charmides and the phaedrus; but they would have been expelled from the magnesian state. yet he does not suppose that the rule of absolute purity can be enforced on all mankind. something must be conceded to the weakness of human nature. he therefore adopts a 'second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable, having a second standard of right.' he would abolish altogether 'the connexion of men with men...as to women, if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges.' but feeling also that it is impossible wholly to control the mightiest passions of mankind,' plato, like other legislators, makes a compromise. the offender must not be found out; decency, if not morality, must be respected. in this he appears to agree with the practice of all civilized ages and countries. much may be truly said by the moralist on the comparative harm of open and concealed vice. nor do we deny that some moral evils are better turned out to the light, because, like diseases, when exposed, they are more easily cured. and secrecy introduces mystery which enormously exaggerates their power; a mere animal want is thus elevated into a sentimental ideal. it may very well be that a word spoken in season about things which are commonly concealed may have an excellent effect. but having regard to the education of youth, to the innocence of children, to the sensibilities of women, to the decencies of society, plato and the world in general are not wrong in insisting that some of the worst vices, if they must exist, should be kept out of sight; this, though only a second-best rule, is a support to the weakness of human nature. there are some things which may be whispered in the closet, but should not be shouted on the housetop. it may be said of this, as of many other things, that it is a great part of education to know to whom they are to be spoken of, and when, and where. book ix. punishments of offences and modes of procedure come next in order. we have a sense of disgrace in making regulations for all the details of crime in a virtuous and well-ordered state. but seeing that we are legislating for men and not for gods, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may have a heart, like the seed which has touched the ox's horn, so hard as to be impenetrable to the law. let our first enactment be directed against the robbing of temples. no well-educated citizen will be guilty of such a crime, but one of their servants, or some stranger, may, and with a view to him, and at the same time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity of human nature, i will lay down the law, beginning with a prelude. to the intending robber we will say--o sir, the complaint which troubles you is not human; but some curse has fallen upon you, inherited from the crimes of your ancestors, of which you must purge yourself: go and sacrifice to the gods, associate with the good, avoid the wicked; and if you are cured of the fatal impulse, well; but if not, acknowledge death to be better than life, and depart. these are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the would-be criminal. and if he will not listen, then cry aloud as with the sound of a trumpet: whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or foreigner shall be branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and cast naked beyond the border. and perhaps this may improve him: for the law aims either at the reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime. no punishment is designed to inflict useless injury. but if the offender be a citizen, he must be incurable, and for him death is the only fitting penalty. his iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children, nor shall his property be confiscated. as to the exaction of penalties, any person who is fined for an offence shall not be liable to pay the fine, unless he have property in excess of his lot. for the lots must never go uncultivated for lack of means; the guardians of the law are to provide against this. if a fine is inflicted upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends are unwilling to give security, he shall be imprisoned and otherwise dishonoured. but no criminal shall go unpunished:--whether death, or imprisonment, or stripes, or fines, or the stocks, or banishment to a remote temple, be the penalty. capital offences shall come under the cognizance of the guardians of the law, and a college of the best of the last year's magistrates. the order of suits and similar details we shall leave to the lawgivers of the future, and only determine the mode of voting. the judges are to sit in order of seniority, and the proceedings shall begin with the speeches of the plaintiff and the defendant; and then the judges, beginning with the eldest, shall ask questions and collect evidence during three days, which, at the end of each day, shall be deposited in writing under their seals on the altar of hestia; and when they have evidence enough, after a solemn declaration that they will decide justly, they shall vote and end the case. the votes are to be given openly in the presence of the citizens. next to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first object of the law. the greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to set up a tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in guilt is a magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to bring the offender to justice. any one who is good for anything will give information against traitors. the mode of proceeding at such trials will be the same as at trials for sacrilege; the penalty, death. but neither in this case nor in any other is the son to bear the iniquity of the father, unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of them been capitally convicted, and then the family of the criminal are to be sent off to the country of their ancestor, retaining their property, with the exception of the lot and its fixtures. and ten are to be selected from the younger sons of the other citizens--one of whom is to be chosen by the oracle of delphi to be heir of the lot. our third law will be a general one, concerning the procedure and the judges in cases of treason. as regards the remaining or departure of the family of the offender, the same law shall apply equally to the traitor, the sacrilegious, and the conspirator. a thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount, if he can do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to prison until he either pays the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft, the city, or they agree to forgive him. 'but should all kinds of theft incur the same penalty?' you remind me of what i know--that legislation is never perfect. the men for whom laws are now made may be compared to the slave who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the unscientific doctor. for the empirical practitioner, if he chance to meet the educated physician talking to his patient, and entering into the philosophy of his disease, would burst out laughing and say, as doctors delight in doing, 'foolish fellow, instead of curing the patient you are educating him!' 'and would he not be right?' perhaps; and he might add, that he who discourses in our fashion preaches to the citizens instead of legislating for them. 'true.' there is, however, one advantage which we possess--that being amateurs only, we may either take the most ideal, or the most necessary and utilitarian view. 'but why offer such an alternative? as if all our legislation must be done to-day, and nothing put off until the morrow. we may surely rough-hew our materials first, and shape and place them afterwards.' that will be the natural way of proceeding. there is a further point. of all writings either in prose or verse the writings of the legislator are the most important. for it is he who has to determine the nature of good and evil, and how they should be studied with a view to our instruction. and is it not as disgraceful for solon and lycurgus to lay down false precepts about the institutions of life as for homer and tyrtaeus? the laws of states ought to be the models of writing, and what is at variance with them should be deemed ridiculous. and we may further imagine them to express the affection and good sense of a father or mother, and not to be the fiats of a tyrant. 'very true.' let us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other crimes, for which we have already legislated in part. and this leads us to ask, first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the nature of the honourable and just. 'to what are you referring?' i will endeavour to explain. all are agreed that justice is honourable, whether in men or things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly men who is just, is in his mind fair, would be thought extravagant. 'very true.' but if honour is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings honourable, or only just actions? 'what do you mean?' our laws supply a case in point; for we enacted that the robber of temples and the traitor should die; and this was just, but the reverse of honourable. in this way does the language of the many rend asunder the just and honourable. 'that is true.' but is our own language consistent? i have already said that the evil are involuntarily evil; and the evil are the unjust. now the voluntary cannot be the involuntary; and if you two come to me and say, 'then shall we legislate for our city?' of course, i shall reply.--'then will you distinguish what crimes are voluntary and what involuntary, and shall we impose lighter penalties on the latter, and heavier on the former? or shall we refuse to determine what is the meaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain that our words have come down from heaven, and that they should be at once embodied in a law?' all states legislate under the idea that there are two classes of actions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there is great confusion about them in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless they are distinguished. either we must abstain from affirming that unjust actions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement. believing, then, that acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, i must endeavour to find some other mode of classifying them. hurts are voluntary and involuntary, but all hurts are not injuries: on the other hand, a benefit when wrongly conferred may be an injury. an act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just; but the legislator who has to decide whether the case is one of hurt or injury, must consider the animus of the agent; and when there is hurt, he must as far as possible, provide a remedy and reparation: but if there is injustice, he must, when compensation has been made, further endeavour to reconcile the two parties. 'excellent.' where injustice, like disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word or deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and penalties, or any other influence which may inspire man with the love of justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of law. but when the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will consider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself, and in two ways a good to society: first, as he becomes an example to others; secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such a case, but in no other, the legislator will punish with death. 'there is some truth in what you say. i wish, however, that you would distinguish more clearly the difference of injury and hurt, and the complications of voluntary and involuntary.' you will admit that anger is of a violent and destructive nature? 'certainly.' and further, that pleasure is different from anger, and has an opposite power, working by persuasion and deceit? 'yes.' ignorance is the third source of crimes; this is of two kinds--simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit of knowledge; the latter, when accompanied with power, is a source of terrible errors, but is excusable when only weak and childish. 'true.' we often say that one man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure and anger. 'just so.' but no one says that one man masters, and another is mastered by ignorance. 'you are right.' all these motives actuate men and sometimes drive them in different ways. 'that is so.' now, then, i am in a position to define the nature of just and unjust. by injustice i mean the dominion of anger and fear, pleasure and pain, envy and desire, in the soul, whether doing harm or not: by justice i mean the rule of the opinion of the best, whether in states or individuals, extending to the whole of life; although actions done in error are often thought to be involuntary injustice. no controversy need be raised about names at present; we are only desirous of fixing in our memories the heads of error. and the pain which is called fear and anger is our first head of error; the second is the class of pleasures and desires; and the third, of hopes which aim at true opinion about the best;--this latter falls into three divisions (i.e. (1) when accompanied by simple ignorance, (2) when accompanied by conceit of wisdom combined with power, or (3) with weakness), so that there are in all five. and the laws relating to them may be summed up under two heads, laws which deal with acts of open violence and with acts of deceit; to which may be added acts both violent and deceitful, and these last should be visited with the utmost rigour of the law. 'very properly.' let us now return to the enactment of laws. we have treated of sacrilege, and of conspiracy, and of treason. any of these crimes may be committed by a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood of old age. if this is proved to be the fact before the judges, the person in question shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be punished further, unless he have on his hands the stain of blood. in this case he shall be exiled for a year, and if he return before the expiration of the year, he shall be retained in the public prison two years. homicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary: and first of involuntary homicide. he who unintentionally kills another man at the games or in military exercises duly authorized by the magistrates, whether death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be acquitted, subject only to the purification required by the delphian oracle. any physician whose patient dies against his will shall in like manner be acquitted. any one who unintentionally kills the slave of another, believing that he is his own, with or without weapons, shall bear the master of the slave harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to twice the value of the slave, and to this let him add a purification greater than in the case of homicide at the games. if a man kill his own slave, a purification only is required of him. if he kill a freeman unintentionally, let him also make purification; and let him remember the ancient tradition which says that the murdered man is indignant when he sees the murderer walk about in his own accustomed haunts, and that he terrifies him with the remembrance of his crime. and therefore the homicide should keep away from his native land for a year, or, if he have slain a stranger, let him avoid the land of the stranger for a like period. if he complies with this condition, the nearest kinsman of the deceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled to him; but if he refuses to remain in exile, or visits the temples unpurified, then let the kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double penalty. the kinsman who neglects this duty shall himself incur the curse, and any one who likes may proceed against him, and compel him to leave his country for five years. if a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any one may proceed against him in the same manner: and the homicide, if he be a metic, shall be banished for a year; but if he be an entire stranger, whether he have murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall be banished for ever; and if he return, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall go to the next of kin of the murdered man. if he come back by sea against his will, he shall remain on the seashore, wetting his feet in the water while he waits for a vessel to sail; or if he be brought back by land, the magistrates shall send him unharmed beyond the border. next follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds--either arising out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or committed with premeditation, and unattended with remorse. the cause of both is anger, and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary. the one which is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly involuntary, bears the image of the involuntary, and is therefore the more excusable of the two, and should receive a gentler punishment. the act of him who nurses his wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more culpable. the degree of culpability depends on the presence or absence of intention, to which the degree of punishment should correspond. for the first kind of murder, that which is done on a momentary impulse, let two years' exile be the penalty; for the second, that which is accompanied with malice prepense, three. when the time of any one's exile has expired, the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land, who shall have authority to decide whether he may return or not. he who after returning repeats the offence, shall be exiled and return no more, and, if he return, shall be put to death, like the stranger in a similar case. he who in a fit of anger kills his own slave, shall purify himself; and he who kills another man's slave, shall pay to his master double the value. any one may proceed against the offender if he appear in public places, not having been purified; and may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and the homicide, and compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double penalty. if a slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master, in anger, the kinsmen of the murdered person may do with the murderer whatever they please, but they must not spare his life. if a father or mother kill their son or daughter in anger, let the slayer remain in exile for three years; and on the return of the exile let the parents separate, and no longer continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred rites with those whom he or she has deprived of a brother or sister. the same penalty is decreed against the husband who murders his wife, and also against the wife who murders her husband. let them be absent three years, and on their return never again share in the same sacred rites with their children, or sit at the same table with them. nor is a brother or sister who have lifted up their hands against a brother or sister, ever to come under the same roof or share in the same rites with those whom they have robbed of a child. if a son feels such hatred against his father or mother as to take the life of either of them, then, if the parent before death forgive him, he shall only suffer the penalty due to involuntary homicide; but if he be unforgiven, there are many laws against which he has offended; he is guilty of outrage, impiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put to death many times over. for if the law will not allow a man to kill the authors of his being even in self-defence, what other penalty than death can be inflicted upon him who in a fit of passion wilfully slays his father or mother? if a brother kill a brother in self-defence during a civil broil, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a stranger, let them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in battle. but if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide. in all cases, however, the forgiveness of the injured party shall acquit the agents; and then they shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a year. enough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger; let us proceed to voluntary and premeditated actions. the great source of voluntary crime is the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education; and this arises out of the false praise of riches, common both among hellenes and barbarians; they think that to be the first of goods which is really the third. for the body is not for the sake of wealth, but wealth for the body, as the body is for the soul. if this were better understood, the crime of murder, of which avarice is the chief cause, would soon cease among men. next to avarice, ambition is a source of crime, troublesome to the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief men of the state. and next to ambition, base fear is a motive, which has led many an one to commit murder in order that he may get rid of the witnesses of his crimes. let this be said as a prelude to all enactments about crimes of violence; and the tradition must not be forgotten, which tells that the murderer is punished in the world below, and that when he returns to this world he meets the fate which he has dealt out to others. if a man is deterred by the prelude and the fear of future punishment, he will have no need of the law; but in case he disobey, let the law be declared against him as follows:--he who of malice prepense kills one of his kindred, shall in the first place be outlawed; neither temple, harbour, nor agora shall be polluted by his presence. and if a kinsman of the deceased refuse to proceed against his slayer, he shall take the curse of pollution upon himself, and also be liable to be prosecuted by any one who will avenge the dead. the prosecutor, however, must observe the customary ceremonial before he proceeds against the offender. the details of these observances will be best determined by a conclave of prophets and interpreters and guardians of the law, and the judges of the cause itself shall be the same as in cases of sacrilege. he who is convicted shall be punished with death, and not be buried within the country of the murdered person. he who flies from the law shall undergo perpetual banishment; if he return, he may be put to death with impunity by any relative of the murdered man or by any other citizen, or bound and delivered to the magistrates. he who accuses a man of murder shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and if this is not forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison against the day of trial. if a man commit murder by the hand of another, he shall be tried in the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but if the offender be a citizen, his body after execution shall be buried within the land. if a slave kill a freeman, either with his own hand or by contrivance, let him be led either to the grave or to a place whence he can see the grave of the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand of the public executioner as the person who took him pleases; and if he survive he shall be put to death. if a slave be put out of the way to prevent his informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like that of a citizen. if there are any of those horrible murders of kindred which sometimes occur even in well-regulated societies, and of which the legislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will repeat the old myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of such atrocities. the myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he has done: if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children; if his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his offspring in another age of the world. such a preamble may terrify him; but if, notwithstanding, in some evil hour he murders father or mother or brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as follows:--him who is convicted, the officers of the judges shall lead to a spot without the city where three ways meet, and there slay him and expose his body naked; and each of the magistrates shall cast a stone upon his head and justify the city, and he shall be thrown unburied beyond the border. but what shall we say of him who takes the life which is dearest to him, that is to say, his own; and this not from any disgrace or calamity, but from cowardice and indolence? the manner of his burial and the purification of his crime is a matter for god and the interpreters to decide and for his kinsmen to execute. let him, at any rate, be buried alone in some uncultivated and nameless spot, and be without name or monument. if a beast kill a man, not in a public contest, let it be prosecuted for murder, and after condemnation slain and cast without the border. also inanimate things which have caused death, except in the case of lightning and other visitations from heaven, shall be carried without the border. if the body of a dead man be found, and the murderer remain unknown, the trial shall take place all the same, and the unknown murderer shall be warned not to set foot in the temples or come within the borders of the land; if discovered, he shall die, and his body shall be cast out. a man is justified in taking the life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator of women or youth; and he may take the life of another with impunity in defence of father, mother, brother, wife, or other relations. the nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men have been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which destroy life. there remain maiming, wounding, and the like, which admit of a similar division into voluntary and involuntary. about this class of actions the preamble shall be: whereas men would be like wild beasts unless they obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care of the public interests, which unite and preserve states, as private interests distract them. a man may know what is for the public good, but if he have absolute power, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure instead of virtue, and so darkness will come over his soul and over the state. if he had mind, he would have no need of law; for mind is the perfection of law. but such a freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is hardly to be found; and therefore law and order are necessary, which are the second-best, and they regulate things as they exist in part only, but cannot take in the whole. for actions have innumerable characteristics, which must be partly determined by the law and partly left to the judge. the judge must determine the fact; and to him also the punishment must sometimes be left. what shall the law prescribe, and what shall be left to the judge? a city is unfortunate in which the tribunals are either secret and speechless, or, what is worse, noisy and public, when the people, as if they were in a theatre, clap and hoot the various speakers. such courts a legislator would rather not have; but if he is compelled to have them, he will speak distinctly, and leave as little as possible to their discretion. but where the courts are good, and presided over by well-trained judges, the penalties to be inflicted may be in a great measure left to them; and as there are to be good courts among our colonists, we need not determine beforehand the exact proportion of the penalty and the crime. returning, then, to our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall run as follows:--he who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his object, shall be tried as if he had succeeded. but since god has favoured both him and his victim, instead of being put to death, he shall be allowed to go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to the sufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be the same as would have tried the case if death had ensued. if a child should intentionally wound a parent, or a servant his master, or brother or sister wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty shall be death. if a husband or wife wound one another with intent to kill, the penalty which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile; and if they have young children, the guardians shall take care of them and administer their property as if they were orphans. if they have no children, their kinsmen male and female shall meet, and after a consultation with the priests and guardians of the law, shall appoint an heir of the house; for the house and family belong to the state, being a 5040th portion of the whole. and the state is bound to preserve her families happy and holy; therefore, when the heir of a house has committed a capital offence, or is in exile for life, the house is to be purified, and then the kinsmen of the house and the guardians of the law are to find out a family which has a good name and in which there are many sons, and introduce one of them to be the heir and priest of the house. he shall assume the fathers and ancestors of the family, while the first son dies in dishonour and his name is blotted out. some actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary. those done from anger are of this class. if a man wound another in anger, let him pay double the damage, if the injury is curable; or fourfold, if curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold, if incurable; the amount is to be assessed by the judges. if the wounded person is rendered incapable of military service, the injurer, besides the other penalties, shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit for refusing to serve. if brother wounds brother, then their parents and kindred, of both sexes, shall meet and judge the crime. the damages shall be assessed by the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is disputed, an appeal shall be made to the male kindred; or in the last resort to the guardians of the law. parents who wound their children are to be tried by judges of at least sixty years of age, who have children of their own; and they are to determine whether death, or some lesser punishment, is to be inflicted upon them--no relatives are to take part in the trial. if a slave in anger smite a freeman, he is to be delivered up by his master to the injured person. if the master suspect collusion between the slave and the injured person, he may bring the matter to trial: and if he fail he shall pay three times the injury; or if he obtain a conviction, the contriver of the conspiracy shall be liable to an action for kidnapping. he who wounds another unintentionally shall only pay for the actual harm done. in all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded than the younger. an injury done by a younger man to an elder is abominable and hateful; but the younger man who is struck by an elder is to bear with him patiently, considering that he who is twenty years older is loco parentis, and remembering the reverence which is due to the gods who preside over birth. let him keep his hands, too, from the stranger; instead of taking upon himself to chastise him when he is insolent, he shall bring him before the wardens of the city, who shall examine into the case, and if they find him guilty, shall scourge him with as many blows as he has given; or if he be innocent, they shall warn and threaten his accuser. when an equal strikes an equal, whether an old man an old man, or a young man a young man, let them use only their fists and have no weapons. he who being above forty years of age commences a fight, or retaliates, shall be counted mean and base. to this preamble, let the law be added: if a man smite another who is his elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be older than the combatants, part them; or if he be younger than the person struck, or of the same age with him, let him defend him as he would a father or brother; and let the striker be brought to trial, and if convicted imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of the judges. if a stranger smite one who is his elder by twenty years or more, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and a metic, in like case, shall suffer three years' imprisonment. he who is standing by and gives no assistance, shall be punished according to his class in one of four penalties--a mina, fifty, thirty, twenty drachmas. the generals and other superior officers of the army shall form the court which tries this class of offences. laws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may be no need of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not be hindered from crime. the uttermost penalty will fall upon those who lay violent hands upon a parent, having no fear of the gods above, or of the punishments which will pursue them in the world below. they are too wise in their own conceits to believe in such things: wherefore the tortures which await them in another life must be anticipated in this. let the law be as follows:-if a man, being in his right mind, dare to smite his father and mother, or his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the rescue; and if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he shall have the first place at the games; or if he do not come to the rescue, he shall be a perpetual exile. let the citizen in the like case be praised or blamed, and the slave receive freedom or a hundred stripes. the wardens of the agora, the city, or the country, as the case may be, shall see to the execution of the law. and he who is an inhabitant of the same place and is present shall come to the rescue, or he shall fall under a curse. if a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished for ever from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred rites; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of the country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death. if any freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he returns to the city. if a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let the bystander be obliged to seize and deliver him into the hands of the injured person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he pleases, and shall then return him to his master. the law will be as follows:--the slave who strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master, and not set at liberty without the consent of the person whom he has injured. all these laws apply to women as well as to men. book x. the greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the greatest of all are committed against public temples; they are in the second degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in the third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree, when they are done against the authority or property of the rulers; in the fifth degree, when the rights of individuals are violated. most of these offences have been already considered; but there remains the question of admonition and punishment of offences against the gods. let the admonition be in the following terms:--no man who ever intentionally did or said anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the gods; but either he thought that there were no gods, or that they did not care about men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. 'what shall we say or do to such persons?' my good sir, let us first hear the jests which they in their superiority will make upon us. 'what will they say?' probably something of this kind:--'strangers you are right in thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of the gods; while others assert that they do not care for us, and others that they are propitiated by prayers and offerings. but we want you to argue with us before you threaten; you should prove to us by reasonable evidence that there are gods, and that they are too good to be bribed. poets, priests, prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak to us of atoning for evil, and not of avoiding it. from legislators who profess to be gentle we ask for instruction, which may, at least, have the persuasive power of truth, if no other.' what have you to say? 'well, there is no difficulty in proving the being of the gods. the sun, and earth, and stars, moving in their courses, the recurring seasons, furnish proofs of their existence; and there is the general opinion of mankind.' i fear that the unbelievers--not that i care for their opinion--will despise us. you are not aware that their impiety proceeds, not from sensuality, but from ignorance taking the garb of wisdom. 'what do you mean?' at athens there are tales current both in prose and verse of a kind which are not tolerated in a well-regulated state like yours. the oldest of them relate the origin of the world, and the birth and life of the gods. these narratives have a bad influence on family relations; but as they are old we will let them pass, and consider another kind of tales, invented by the wisdom of a younger generation, who, if any one argues for the existence of the gods and claims that the stars have a divine being, insist that these are mere earth and stones, which can have no care of human things, and that all theology is a cooking up of words. now what course ought we to take? shall we suppose some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the gods, and make a defence? or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the laws? 'there is no hurry, and we have often said that the shorter and worse method should not be preferred to the longer and better. the proof that there are gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the best preamble of all our laws.' come, let us talk with the impious, who have been brought up from their infancy in the belief of religion, and have heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking with the gods as if they were absolutely convinced of their existence; who have seen mankind prostrate in prayer at the rising and setting of the sun and moon and at every turn of fortune, and have dared to despise and disbelieve all this. can we keep our temper with them, when they compel us to argue on such a theme? we must; or like them we shall go mad, though with more reason. let us select one of them and address him as follows: o my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many of your opinions. do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the divine nature; and let me mention to you a fact which i know. you and your friends are not the first or the only persons who have had these notions about the gods. there are always a considerable number who are infected by them: i have known many myself, and can assure you that no one who was an unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in denying the existence of the gods. the two other opinions, first, that the gods exist and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for men, but may be propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last through life in a few instances, but even this is not common. i would beg of you to be patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and others; in the mean time abstain from impiety. 'so far, our discourse has gone well.' i will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the crown of philosophy. they affirm that all things come into being either by art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by nature and chance, and the lesser things by art, which receiving from nature the greater creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are termed works of art. their meaning is that fire, water, earth, and air all exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of these, according to certain chance affinities of opposites, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the earth have been framed, not by any action of mind, but by nature and chance only. thus, in their opinion, the heaven and earth were created, as well as the animals and plants. art came later, and is of mortal birth; by her power were invented certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, of which kind are the creations of musicians and painters: but they say that there are other arts which combine with nature, and have a deeper truth, such as medicine, husbandry, gymnastic. also the greater part of politics they imagine to co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, having more of art, while legislation is declared by them to be wholly a work of art. 'how do you mean?' in the first place, they say that the gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but by the laws of states, which are different in different countries; and that virtue is one thing by nature and another by convention; and that justice is altogether conventional, made by law, and having authority for the moment only. this is repeated to young men by sages and poets, and leads to impiety, and the pretended life according to nature and in disobedience to law; for nobody believes the gods to be such as the law affirms. 'how true! and oh! how injurious to states and to families!' but then, what should the lawgiver do? should he stand up in the state and threaten mankind with the severest penalties if they persist in their unbelief, while he makes no attempt to win them by persuasion? 'nay, stranger, the legislator ought never to weary of trying to persuade the world that there are gods; and he should declare that law and art exist by nature.' yes, cleinias; but these are difficult and tedious questions. 'and shall our patience, which was not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, fail now that we are discoursing about the gods? there may be a difficulty in framing laws, but when written down they remain, and time and diligence will make them clear; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor religion in rejecting them on account of their length.' most true. and the general spread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do something in vindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad men. 'he should.' you agree with me, cleinias, that the heresy consists in supposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things. these the heretics call nature, conceiving them to be prior to the soul. 'i agree.' you would further agree that natural philosophy is the source of this impiety--the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way. 'in what way do you mean?' the error consists in transposing first and second causes. they do not see that the soul is before the body, and before all other things, and the author and ruler of them all. and if the soul is prior to the body, then the things of the soul are prior to the things of the body. in other words, opinion, attention, mind, art, law, are prior to sensible qualities; and the first and greater works of creation are the results of art and mind, whereas the works of nature, as they are improperly termed, are secondary and subsequent. 'why do you say "improperly"?' because when they speak of nature they seem to mean the first creative power. but if the soul is first, and not fire and air, then the soul above all things may be said to exist by nature. and this can only be on the supposition that the soul is prior to the body. shall we try to prove that it is so? 'by all means.' i fear that the greenness of our argument will ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of our ages. but as we must go into the water, and the stream is strong, i will first attempt to cross by myself, and if i arrive at the bank, you shall follow. remembering that you are unaccustomed to such discussions, i will ask and answer the questions myself, while you listen in safety. but first i must pray the gods to assist at the demonstration of their own existence--if ever we are to call upon them, now is the time. let me hold fast to the rope, and enter into the depths: shall i put the question to myself in this form?--are all things at rest, and is nothing in motion? or are some things in motion, and some things at rest? 'the latter.' and do they move and rest, some in one place, some in more? 'yes.' there may be (1) motion in the same place, as in revolution on an axis, which is imparted swiftly to the larger and slowly to the lesser circle; and there may be motion in different places, having sometimes (2) one centre of motion and sometimes (3) more. (4) when bodies in motion come against other bodies which are at rest, they are divided by them, and (5) when they are caught between other bodies coming from opposite directions they unite with them; and (6) they grow by union and (7) waste by dissolution while their constitution remains the same, but are (8) destroyed when their constitution fails. there is a growth from one dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then becomes perceptible to sense; this process is called generation, and the opposite, destruction. we have now enumerated all possible motions with the exception of two. 'what are they?' just the two with which our enquiry is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul. there is one kind of motion which is only able to move other things; there is another which can move itself as well, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution, by generation and destruction. 'granted.' (9) that which moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of motion; (10) that which is self-moved and moves others is the tenth. and this tenth kind of motion is the mightiest, and is really the first, and is followed by that which was improperly called the ninth. 'how do you mean?' must not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that which is moved by itself? nothing can be affected by any transition prior to self-motion. then the first and eldest principle of motion, whether in things at rest or not at rest, will be the principle of self-motion; and that which is moved by others and can move others will be the second. 'true.' let me ask another question: what is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any material substance? 'life.' and soul too is life? 'very good.' and are there not three kinds of knowledge--a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2) of the definition, (3) of the name? and sometimes the name leads us to ask the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name. for example, number can be divided into equal parts, and when thus divided is termed even, and the definition of even and the word 'even' refer to the same thing. 'very true.' and what is the definition of the thing which is named 'soul'? must we not reply, 'the self-moved'? and have we not proved that the self-moved is the source of motion in other things? 'yes.' and the motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this? 'true.' and if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior and superior to the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to the soul? 'quite right.' and we agreed that if the soul was prior to the body, the things of the soul were prior to the things of the body? 'certainly.' and therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true opinions, and recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and force of bodies. 'to be sure.' in the next place, we acknowledge that the soul is the cause of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things? 'certainly.' and the soul which orders all things must also order the heavens? 'of course.' one soul or more? more; for less than two are inconceivable, one good, the other evil. 'most true.' the soul directs all things by her movements, which we call will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred, love, and similar affections. these are the primary movements, and they receive the secondary movements of bodies, and guide all things to increase and diminution, separation and union, and to all the qualities which accompany them--cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black, sweet, bitter; these and other such qualities the soul, herself a goddess, uses, when truly receiving the divine mind she leads all things rightly to their happiness; but under the impulse of folly she works out an opposite result. for the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the world is either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul, working in them. 'what do you mean?' if we say that the whole course and motion of heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and reasonings of mind, clearly the best soul must have the care of the heaven, and guide it along that better way. 'true.' but if the heavens move wildly and disorderly, then they must be under the guidance of the evil soul. 'true again.' what is the nature of the movement of the soul? we must not suppose that we can see and know the soul with our bodily eyes, any more than we can fix them on the midday sun; it will be safer to look at an image only. 'how do you mean?' let us find among the ten kinds of motion an image of the motion of the mind. you remember, as we said, that all things are divided into two classes; and some of them were moved and some at rest. 'yes.' and of those which were moved, some were moved in the same place, others in more places than one. 'just so.' the motion which was in one place was circular, like the motion of a spherical body; and such a motion in the same place, and in the same relations, is an excellent image of the motion of mind. 'very true.' the motion of the other sort, which has no fixed place or manner or relation or order or proportion, is akin to folly and nonsense. 'very true.' after what has been said, it is clear that, since the soul carries round all things, some soul which is either very good or the opposite carries round the circumference of heaven. but that soul can be no other than the best. again, the soul carries round the sun, moon, and stars, and if the sun has a soul, then either the soul of the sun is within and moves the sun as the human soul moves the body; or, secondly, the sun is contained in some external air or fire, which the soul provides and through which she operates; or, thirdly, the course of the sun is guided by the soul acting in a wonderful manner without a body. 'yes, in one of those ways the soul must guide all things.' and this soul of the sun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or employing any other agency, is by every man called a god? 'yes, by every man who has any sense.' and of the seasons, stars, moon, and year, in like manner, it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they derive their excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner of their working, no one can deny that all things are full of gods. 'no one.' and now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there are gods. either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all things, or he must live for the future in the belief that there are gods. next, as to the man who believes in the gods, but refuses to acknowledge that they take care of human things--let him too have a word of admonition. 'best of men,' we will say to him, 'some affinity to the gods leads you to honour them and to believe in them. but you have heard the happiness of wicked men sung by poets and admired by the world, and this has drawn you away from your natural piety. or you have seen the wicked growing old in prosperity, and leaving great offices to their children; or you have watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of crime; and considering all these things you have been led to believe in an irrational way that the gods take no care of human affairs. that your error may not increase, i will endeavour to purify your soul.' do you, megillus and cleinias, make answer for the youth, and when we come to a difficulty, i will carry you over the water as i did before. 'very good.' he will easily be convinced that the gods care for the small as well as the great; for he heard what was said of their goodness and of their having all things under their care. 'he certainly heard.' then now let us enquire what is meant by the virtue of the gods. to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice. 'that is what we say.' and is not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 'certainly.' and to the gods we ascribe virtues; but idleness and indolence are not virtues. 'of course not.' and is god to be conceived of as a careless, indolent fellow, such as the poet would compare to a stingless drone? 'impossible.' can we be right in praising any one who cares for great matters and leaves the small to take care of themselves? whether god or man, he who does so, must either think the neglect of such matters to be of no consequence, or he is indolent and careless. for surely neither of them can be charged with neglect if they fail to attend to something which is beyond their power? 'certainly not.' and now we will examine the two classes of offenders who admit that there are gods, but say,--the one that they may be appeased, the other that they take no care of small matters: do they not acknowledge that the gods are omnipotent and omniscient, and also good and perfect? 'certainly.' then they cannot be indolent, for indolence is the offspring of idleness, and idleness of cowardice, and there is no cowardice in god. 'true.' if the gods neglect small matters, they must either know or not know that such things are not to be regarded. but of course they know that they should be regarded, and knowing, they cannot be supposed to neglect their duty, overcome by the seductions of pleasure or pain. 'impossible.' and do not all human things share in soul, and is not man the most religious of animals and the possession of the gods? and the gods, who are the best of owners, will surely take care of their property, small or great. consider further, that the greater the power of perception, the less the power of action. for it is harder to see and hear the small than the great, but easier to control them. suppose a physician who had to cure a patient--would he ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little? 'impossible.' is not life made up of littles?--the pilot, general, householder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder will tell you that large stones do not lie well without small ones. and god is not inferior to mortal craftsmen, who in proportion to their skill are careful in the details of their work; we must not imagine the best and wisest to be a lazy good-for-nothing, who wearies of his work and hurries over small and easy matters. 'never, never!' he who charges the gods with neglect has been forced to admit his error; but i should like further to persuade him that the author of all has made every part for the sake of the whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed state of action or passion, and that the least action or passion of any part has a presiding minister. you, we say to him, are a minute fraction of this universe, created with a view to the whole; the world is not made for you, but you for the world; for the good artist considers the whole first, and afterwards the parts. and you are annoyed at not seeing how you and the universe are all working together for the best, so far as the laws of the common creation admit. the soul undergoes many changes from her contact with bodies; and all that the player does is to put the pieces into their right places. 'what do you mean?' i mean that god acts in the way which is simplest and easiest. had each thing been formed without any regard to the rest, the transposition of the cosmos would have been endless; but now there is not much trouble in the government of the world. for when the king saw the actions of the living souls and bodies, and the virtue and vice which were in them, and the indestructibility of the soul and body (although they were not eternal), he contrived so to arrange them that virtue might conquer and vice be overcome as far as possible; giving them a seat and room adapted to them, but leaving the direction of their separate actions to men's own wills, which make our characters to be what they are. 'that is very probable.' all things which have a soul possess in themselves the principle of change, and in changing move according to fate and law; natures which have undergone lesser changes move on the surface; but those which have changed utterly for the worse, sink into hades and the infernal world. and in all great changes for good and evil which are produced either by the will of the soul or the influence of others, there is a change of place. the good soul, which has intercourse with the divine nature, passes into a holier and better place; and the evil soul, as she grows worse, changes her place for the worse. this,--as we declare to the youth who fancies that he is neglected of the gods,--is the law of divine justice--the worse to the worse, the better to the better, like to like, in life and in death. and from this law no man will ever boast that he has escaped. even if you say--'i am small, and will creep into the earth,' or 'i am high, and will mount to heaven'--you are not so small or so high that you shall not pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world below. this is also the explanation of the seeming prosperity of the wicked, in whose actions as in a mirror you imagined that you saw the neglect of the gods, not considering that they make all things contribute to the whole. and how then could you form any idea of true happiness?--if cleinias and megillus and i have succeeded in persuading you that you know not what you say about the gods, god will help you; but if there is still any deficiency of proof, hear our answer to the third opponent. enough has been said to prove that the gods exist and care for us; that they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts, is not to be allowed or admitted for an instant. 'let us proceed with the argument.' tell me, by the gods, i say, how the gods are to be propitiated by us? are they not rulers, who may be compared to charioteers, pilots, perhaps generals, or physicians providing against the assaults of disease, husbandmen observing the perils of the seasons, shepherds watching their flocks? to whom shall we compare them? we acknowledged that the world is full both of good and evil, but having more of evil than of good. there is an immortal conflict going on, in which gods and demigods are our allies, and we their property; for injustice and folly and wickedness make war in our souls upon justice and temperance and wisdom. there is little virtue to be found on earth; and evil natures fawn upon the gods, like wild beasts upon their keepers, and believe that they can win them over by flattery and prayers. and this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is to the soul what disease is to the body, what pestilence is to the seasons, what injustice is to states. 'quite so.' and they who maintain that the gods can be appeased must say that they forgive the sins of men, if they are allowed to share in their spoils; as you might suppose wolves to mollify the dogs by throwing them a portion of the prey. 'that is the argument.' but let us apply our images to the gods--are they the pilots who are won by gifts to wreck their own ships--or the charioteers who are bribed to lose the race--or the generals, or doctors, or husbandmen, who are perverted from their duty--or the dogs who are silenced by wolves? 'god forbid.' are they not rather our best guardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of a moderate degree of human or even canine virtue, which will not betray justice for reward? 'impossible.' he, then, who maintains such a doctrine, is the most blasphemous of mankind. and now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that there are gods, (2) that they care for men, (3) that they cannot be bribed to do injustice. i have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this impiety of theirs should lead to a perversion of life. and our warmth will not have been in vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men to abominate themselves, and to change their ways. 'so let us hope.' then now that the preamble is completed, we will make a proclamation commanding the impious to renounce their evil ways; and in case they refuse, the law shall be added:--if a man is guilty of impiety in word or deed, let the bystander inform the magistrates, and let the magistrates bring the offender before the court; and if any of the magistrates refuses to act, he likewise shall be tried for impiety. any one who is found guilty of such an offence shall be fined at the discretion of the court, and shall also be punished by a term of imprisonment. there shall be three prisons--one for common offences against life and property; another, near by the spot where the nocturnal council will assemble, which is to be called the 'house of reformation'; the third, to be situated in some desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by a name indicating retribution. there are three causes of impiety, and from each of them spring impieties of two kinds, six in all. first, there is the impiety of those who deny the existence of the gods; these may be honest men, haters of evil, who are only dangerous because they talk loosely about the gods and make others like themselves; but there is also a more vicious class, who are full of craft and licentiousness. to this latter belong diviners, jugglers, despots, demagogues, generals, hierophants of private mysteries, and sophists. the first class shall be only imprisoned and admonished. the second class should be put to death, if they could be, many times over. the two other sorts of impiety, first of those who deny the care of the gods, and secondly, of those who affirm that they may be propitiated, have similar subdivisions, varying in degree of guilt. those who have learnt to blaspheme from mere ignorance shall be imprisoned in the house of reformation for five years at least, and not allowed to see any one but members of the nocturnal council, who shall converse with them touching their souls health. if any of the prisoners come to their right mind, at the end of five years let them be restored to sane company; but he who again offends shall die. as to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that the gods are negligent, or may be propitiated, but pretend to practise on the souls of quick and dead, and promise to charm the gods, and to effect the ruin of houses and states--he, i say, who is guilty of these things, shall be bound in the central prison, and shall have no intercourse with any freeman, receiving only his daily rations of food from the public slaves; and when he dies, let him be cast beyond the border; and if any freeman assist to bury him, he shall be liable to a suit for impiety. but the sins of the father shall not be visited upon his children, who, like other orphans, shall be educated by the state. further, let there be a general law which will have a tendency to repress impiety. no man shall have religious services in his house, but he shall go with his friends to pray and sacrifice in the temples. the reason of this is, that religious institutions can only be framed by a great intelligence. but women and weak men are always consecrating the event of the moment; they are under the influence of dreams and apparitions, and they build altars and temples in every village and in any place where they have had a vision. the law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter men from attempting to propitiate the gods by secret sacrifices, which only multiply their sins. therefore let the law run:--no one shall have private religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been previously noted for any impiety offend in this way, let them be admonished to remove their rites to a public temple; but if the offender be one of the obstinate sort, he shall be brought to trial before the guardians, and if he be found guilty, let him die. book xi. as to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is simple--thou shalt not take what is not thine; and shalt do to others as thou wouldst that they should do to thee. first, of treasure trove:--may i never desire to find, or lift, if i find, or be induced by the counsel of diviners to lift, a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has laid down; for i shall not gain so much in money as i shall lose in virtue. the saying, 'move not the immovable,' may be repeated in a new sense; and there is a common belief which asserts that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. to him who is careless of such consequences, and, despising the word of the wise, takes up a treasure which is not his--what will be done by the hand of the gods, god only knows,--but i would have the first person who sees the offender, inform the wardens of the city or the country; and they shall send to delphi for a decision, and whatever the oracle orders, they shall carry out. if the informer be a freeman, he shall be honoured, and if a slave, set free; but he who does not inform, if he be a freeman, shall be dishonoured, and if a slave, shall be put to death. if a man leave anywhere anything great or small, intentionally or unintentionally, let him who may find the property deem the deposit sacred to the goddess of ways. and he who appropriates the same, if he be a slave, shall be beaten with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay tenfold, and be held to have done a dishonourable action. if a person says that another has something of his, and the other allows that he has the property in dispute, but maintains it to be his own, let the ownership be proved out of the registers of property. if the property is registered as belonging to some one who is absent, possession shall be given to him who offers sufficient security on behalf of the absentee; or if the property is not registered, let it remain with the three eldest magistrates, and if it should be an animal, the defeated party must pay the cost of its keep. a man may arrest his own slave, and he may also imprison for safe-keeping the runaway slave of a friend. any one interfering with him must produce three sureties; otherwise, he will be liable to an action for violence, and if he be cast, must pay a double amount of damages to him from whom he has taken the slave. a freedman who does not pay due respect to his patron, may also be seized. due respect consists in going three times a month to the house of his patron, and offering to perform any lawful service for him; he must also marry as his master pleases; and if his property be greater than his master's, he must hand over to him the excess. a freedman may not remain in the state, except with the consent of the magistrates and of his master, for more than twenty years; and whenever his census exceeds that of the third class, he must in any case leave the country within thirty days, taking his property with him. if he break this regulation, the penalty shall be death, and his property shall be confiscated. suits about these matters are to be decided in the courts of the tribes, unless the parties have settled the matter before a court of neighbours or before arbiters. if anybody claim a beast, or anything else, let the possessor refer to the seller or giver of the property within thirty days, if the latter reside in the city, or, if the goods have been received from a stranger, within five months, of which the middle month shall include the summer solstice. all purchases and exchanges are to be made in the agora, and paid for on the spot; the law will not allow credit to be given. no law shall protect the money subscribed for clubs. he who sells anything of greater value than fifty drachmas shall abide in the city for ten days, and let his whereabouts be known to the buyer, in case of any reclamation. when a slave is sold who is subject to epilepsy, stone, or any other invisible disorder, the buyer, if he be a physician or trainer, or if he be warned, shall have no redress; but in other cases within six months, or within twelve months in epileptic disorders, he may bring the matter before a jury of physicians to be agreed upon by both parties; and the seller who loses the suit, if he be an expert, shall pay twice the price; or if he be a private person, the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall simply refund. if a person knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is informed of his character, there is no redress. but if the judges--who are to be the five youngest guardians of the law--decide that the purchaser was not aware, then the seller is to pay threefold, and to purify the house of the buyer. he who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant either of them to be sound and good. as in the case of other laws, let us have a preamble, relating to all this class of crime. adulteration is a kind of falsehood about which the many commonly say that at proper times the practice may often be right, but they do not define at what times. but the legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the gods when he is practising deceit or fraud, in word or deed. for he is the enemy of heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the gods by whom he swears, and secondly, he who lies to his superiors. (now the superiors are the betters of inferiors,--the elder of the younger, parents of children, men of women, and rulers of subjects.) the trader who cheats in the agora is a liar and is perjured--he respects neither the name of god nor the regulations of the magistrates. if after hearing this he will still be dishonest, let him listen to the law:--the seller shall not have two prices on the same day, neither must he puff his goods, nor offer to swear about them. if he break the law, any citizen not less than thirty years of age may smite him. if he sell adulterated goods, the slave or metic who informs against him shall have the goods; the citizen who brings such a charge, if he prove it, shall offer up the goods in question to the gods of the agora; or if he fail to prove it, shall be dishonoured. he who is detected in selling adulterated goods shall be deprived of them, and shall receive a stripe for every drachma of their value. the wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall take experienced persons into counsel, and draw up regulations for the agora. these shall be inscribed on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora.--as to the wardens of the city, enough has been said already. but if any omissions in the law are afterwards discovered, the wardens and the guardians shall supply them, and have them inscribed after the original regulations on a column before the court of the wardens of the city. next in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their natural use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a benefactor who reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion. money is the instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keeper, the merchant, and hotel-keeper do but supply the wants and equalize the possessions of mankind. why, then, does any dishonour attach to a beneficent occupation? let us consider the nature of the accusation first, and then see whether it can be removed. 'what is your drift?' dear cleinias, there are few men who are so gifted by nature, and improved by education, as to be able to control the desire of making money; or who are sober in their wishes and prefer moderation to accumulation. the great majority think that they can never have enough, and the consequence is that retail trade has become a reproach. whereas, however ludicrous the idea may seem, if noble men and noble women could be induced to open a shop, and to trade upon incorruptible principles, then the aspect of things would change, and retail traders would be regarded as nursing fathers and mothers. in our own day the trader goes and settles in distant places, and receives the weary traveller hospitably at first, but in the end treats him as an enemy and a captive, whom he only liberates for an enormous ransom. this is what has brought retail trade into disrepute, and against this the legislator ought to provide. men have said of old, that to fight against two opponents is hard; and the two opponents of whom i am thinking are wealth and poverty--the one corrupting men by luxury; the other, through misery, depriving them of the sense of shame. what remedies can a city find for this disease? first, to have as few retail traders as possible; secondly, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption will not injure the state; and thirdly, to restrain the insolence and meanness of the retailers. let us make the following laws:--(1) in the city of the magnetes none of the 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to any private persons who do not equally serve him, except to his father and mother and their fathers and mothers, and generally to his elders who are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. he who follows an illiberal pursuit may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept in bonds for a year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two years; and for every offence his punishment shall be doubled: (2) every retailer shall be a metic or a foreigner: (3) the guardians of the law shall have a special care of this part of the community, whose calling exposes them to peculiar temptations. they shall consult with persons of experience, and find out what prices will yield the traders a moderate profit, and fix them. when a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or other impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the tribes, if not previously settled by arbitration. the class of artisans is consecrated to hephaestus and athene; the makers of weapons to ares and athene: all of whom, remembering that the gods are their ancestors, should be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft. if any man is lazy in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, foolish fellow, that his patron god will not deal hardly with him, he will be punished by the god; and let the law follow:--he who fails in his undertaking shall pay the value, and do the work gratis in a specified time. the contractor, like the seller, is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his work; in a free city, art should be a true thing, and the artist must not practise on the ignorance of others. on the other hand, he who has ordered any work and does not pay the workman according to agreement, dishonours zeus and athene, and breaks the bonds of society. and if he does not pay at the time agreed, let him pay double; and although interest is forbidden in other cases, let the workman receive after the expiration of a year interest at the rate of an obol a month for every drachma (equal to 200 per cent. per ann.). and we may observe by the way, in speaking of craftsmen, that if our military craft do their work well, the state will praise those who honour them, and blame those who do not honour them. not that the first place of honour is to be assigned to the warrior; a higher still is reserved for those who obey the laws. most of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the exception of such as relate to orphans and guardianships. these lead us to speak of the intentions of the dying, about which we must make regulations. i say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to dispose of their property as they please, in ways at variance with one another and with law and custom. but a dying person is a strange being, and is not easily managed; he wants to be master of all he has, and is apt to use angry words. he will say,--'may i not do what i will with my own, and give much to my friends, and little to my enemies?' 'there is reason in that.' o cleinias, in my judgment the older lawgivers were too soft-hearted, and wanting in insight into human affairs. they were too ready to listen to the outcry of a dying man, and hence they were induced to give him an absolute power of bequest. but i would say to him:--o creature of a day, you know neither what is yours nor yourself: for you and your property are not your own, but belong to your whole family, past and to come, and property and family alike belong to the state. and therefore i must take out of your hands the charge of what you leave behind you, with a view to the interests of all. and i hope that you will not quarrel with us, now that you are going the way of all mankind; we will do our best for you and yours when you are no longer here. let this be our address to the living and dying, and let the law be as follows:--the father who has sons shall appoint one of them to be the heir of the lot; and if he has given any other son to be adopted by another, the adoption shall also be recorded; and if he has still a son who has no lot, and has a chance of going to a colony, he may give him what he has more than the lot; or if he has more than one son unprovided for, he may divide the money between them. a son who has a house of his own, and a daughter who is betrothed, are not to share in the bequest of money; and the son or daughter who, having inherited one lot, acquires another, is to bequeath the new inheritance to the next of kin. if a man have only daughters, he may adopt the husband of any one of them; or if he have lost a son, let him make mention of the circumstance in his will and adopt another. if he have no children, he may give away a tenth of his acquired property to whomsoever he likes; but he must adopt an heir to inherit the lot, and may leave the remainder to him. also he may appoint guardians for his children; or if he die without appointing them or without making a will, the nearest kinsmen,--two on the father's and two on the mother's side,--and one friend of the departed, shall be appointed guardians. the fifteen eldest guardians of the law are to have special charge of all orphans, the whole number of fifteen being divided into bodies of three, who will succeed one another according to seniority every year for five years. if a man dying intestate leave daughters, he must pardon the law which marries them for looking, first to kinship, and secondly to the preservation of the lot. the legislator cannot regard the character of the heir, which to the father is the first consideration. the law will therefore run as follows:--if the intestate leave daughters, husbands are to be found for them among their kindred according to the following table of affinity: first, their father's brothers; secondly, the sons of their father's brothers; thirdly, of their father's sisters; fourthly, their great-uncles; fifthly, the sons of a great-uncle; sixthly, the sons of a great-aunt. the kindred in such cases shall always be reckoned in this way; the relationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters and brothers' and sisters' children, and first the male line must be taken and then the female. if there is a dispute in regard to fitness of age for marriage, this the judge shall decide, after having made an inspection of the youth naked, and of the maiden naked down to the waist. if the maiden has no relations within the degree of third cousin, she may choose whom she likes, with the consent of her guardians; or she may even select some one who has gone to a colony, and he, if he be a kinsman, will take the lot by law; if not, he must have her guardians' consent, as well as hers. when a man dies without children and without a will, let a young man and a young woman go forth from the family and take up their abode in the desolate house. the woman shall be selected from the kindred in the following order of succession:--first, a sister of the deceased; second, a brother's daughter; third, a sister's daughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a daughter of a father's brother; sixth, a daughter of a father's sister. for the man the same order shall be observed as in the preceding case. the legislator foresees that laws of this kind will sometimes press heavily, and that his intention cannot always be fulfilled; as for example, when there are mental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to marry. but he must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the general principles of public interest with the particular circumstances of individuals; and he is willing to allow, in like manner, that the individual cannot always do what the lawgiver wishes. and then arbiters must be chosen, who will determine equitably the cases which may arise under the law: e.g. a rich cousin may sometimes desire a grander match, or the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a madwoman. to meet such cases let the following law be enacted:--if any one comes forward and says that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would not have required the carrying out of the law in a particular case, let him go to the fifteen eldest guardians of the law who have the care of orphans; but if he thinks that too much power is thus given to them, he may bring the case before the court of select judges. thus will orphans have a second birth. in order to make their sad condition as light as possible, the guardians of the law shall be their parents, and shall be admonished to take care of them. and what admonition can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly gave, that the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs? about this there are many ancient traditions, which may be taken on trust from the legislator. let men fear, in the first place, the gods above; secondly, the souls of the departed, who naturally care for their own descendants; thirdly, the aged living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family duties, especially in the case of orphans. for they are the holiest and most sacred of all deposits, and the peculiar care of guardians and magistrates; and those who try to bring them up well will contribute to their own good and to that of their families. he who listens to the preamble of the law will never know the severity of the legislator; but he who disobeys, and injures the orphan, will pay twice the penalty he would have paid if the parents had been alive. more laws might have been made about orphans, did we not suppose that the guardians have children and property of their own which are protected by the laws; and the duty of the guardian in our state is the same as that of a father, though his honour or disgrace is greater. a legal admonition and threat may, however, be of service: the guardian of the orphan and the guardian of the law who is over him, shall love the orphan as their own children, and take more care of his or her property than of their own. if the guardian of the child neglect his duty, the guardian of the law shall fine him; and the guardian may also have the magistrate tried for neglect in the court of select judges, and he shall pay, if convicted, a double penalty. further, the guardian of the orphan who is careless or dishonest may be fined on the information of any of the citizens in a fourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the prosecutor of the suit. when the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he has been ill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five years, and the penalty shall be fixed by the court. or if the magistrate has neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have defrauded him, he shall make compensation and also be deposed from his office of guardian of the law. if irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father may want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for imbecility: such violent separations only take place when the family are 'a bad lot'; if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do not grow to so great a height. but here arises a difficulty. although in any other state a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a citizen, in ours he does; for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040. and therefore he who is to suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured, not only by his father, but by the whole family. the law, then, should run as follows:--if any man's evil fortune or temper incline him to disinherit his son, let him not do so lightly or on the instant; but let him have a council of his own relations and of the maternal relations of his son, and set forth to them the propriety of disinheriting him, and allow his son to answer. and if more than half of the kindred male and female, being of full age, condemn the son, let him be disinherited. if any other citizen desires to adopt him, he may, for young men's characters often change in the course of life. but if, after ten years, he remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony. if disease, or old age, or evil disposition cause a man to go out of his mind, and he is ruining his house and property, and his son doubts about indicting him for insanity, let him lay the case before the eldest guardians of the law, and consult with them. and if they advise him to proceed, and the father is decided to be imbecile, he shall have no more control over his property, but shall live henceforward like a child in the house. if a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the law and ten of the matrons who regulate marriage shall take their case in hand, and reconcile them, if possible. if, however, their swelling souls cannot be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and the husband a new wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and should therefore be joined to milder natures. the younger of those who are separated should also select their partners with a view to the procreation of children; while the older should seek a companion for their declining years. if a woman dies, leaving children male or female, the law will advise, but not compel, the widower to abstain from a second marriage; if she leave no children, he shall be compelled to marry. also a widow, if she is not old enough to live honestly without marriage, shall marry again; and in case she have no children, she should marry for the sake of them. there is sometimes an uncertainty which parent the offspring is to follow: in unions of a female slave with a male slave, or with a freedman or free man, or of a free woman with a male slave, the offspring is to belong to the master; but if the master or mistress be themselves the parent of the child, the slave and the child are to be sent away to another land. concerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:--we honour the gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we thus propitiate them. but he who has an aged father or mother has a living image, which if he cherish it will do him far more good than any statue. 'what do you mean by cherishing them?' i will tell you. oedipus and amyntor and theseus cursed their children, and their curses took effect. this proves that the gods hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we doubt that they hear and fulfil their blessings too?' 'surely not.' and, as we were saying, no image is more honoured by the gods than an aged father and mother, to whom when honour is done, the god who hears their prayers is rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of the lifeless statue; for they pray that good or evil may come to us in proportion as they are honoured or dishonoured, but the statue is silent. 'excellent.' good men are glad when their parents live to extreme old age, or if they depart early, lament their loss; but to bad man their parents are always terrible. wherefore let every one honour his parents, and if this preamble fails of influencing him, let him hear the law:--if any one does not take sufficient care of his parents, let the aggrieved person inform the three eldest guardians of the law and three of the women who are concerned with marriages. women up to forty years of age, and men up to thirty, who thus offend, shall be beaten and imprisoned. after that age they are to be brought before a court composed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict any punishment upon them which they please. if the injured party cannot inform, let any freeman who hears of the case inform; a slave who does so shall be set free,--if he be the slave of the one of the parties, by the magistrate,--if owned by another, at the cost of the state; and let the magistrates, take care that he is not wronged by any one out of revenge. the injuries which one person does to another by the use of poisons are of two kinds;--one affects the body by the employment of drugs and potions; the other works on the mind by the practice of sorcery and magic. fatal cases of either sort have been already mentioned; and now we must have a law respecting cases which are not fatal. there is no use in arguing with a man whose mind is disturbed by waxen images placed at his own door, or on the sepulchre of his father or mother, or at a spot where three ways meet. but to the wizards themselves we must address a solemn preamble, begging them not to treat the world as if they were children, or compel the legislator to expose them, and to show men that the poisoner who is not a physician and the wizard who is not a prophet or diviner are equally ignorant of what they are doing. let the law be as follows:--he who by the use of poison does any injury not fatal to a man or his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not to another's cattle or bees, is to be punished with death if he be a physician, and if he be not a physician he is to suffer the punishment awarded by the court: and he who injures another by sorcery, if he be a diviner or prophet, shall be put to death; and, if he be not a diviner, the court shall determine what he ought to pay or suffer. any one who injures another by theft or violence shall pay damages at least equal to the injury; and besides the compensation, a suitable punishment shall be inflicted. the foolish youth who is the victim of others is to have a lighter punishment; he whose folly is occasioned by his own jealousy or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily. punishment is to be inflicted, not for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of prevention and reformation. and there should be a proportion between the punishment and the crime, in which the judge, having a discretion left him, must, by estimating the crime, second the legislator, who, like a painter, furnishes outlines for him to fill up. a madman is not to go about at large in the city, but is to be taken care of by his relatives. neglect on their part is to be punished in the first class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in the others. now madness is of various kinds; in addition to that which arises from disease there is the madness which originates in a passionate temperament, and makes men when engaged in a quarrel use foul and abusive language against each other. this is intolerable in a well-ordered state; and therefore our law shall be as follows:--no one is to speak evil of another, but when men differ in opinion they are to instruct one another without speaking evil. nor should any one seek to rouse the passions which education has calmed; for he who feeds and nurses his wrath is apt to make ribald jests at his opponent, with a loss of character or dignity to himself. and for this reason no one may use any abusive word in a temple, or at sacrifices, or games, or in any public assembly, and he who offends shall be censured by the proper magistrate; and the magistrate, if he fail to censure him, shall not claim the prize of virtue. in any other place the angry man who indulges in revilings, whether he be the beginner or not, may be chastised by an elder. the reviler is always trying to make his opponent ridiculous; and the use of ridicule in anger we cannot allow. we forbid the comic poet to ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of expulsion from the country or a fine of three minae. jest in which there is no offence may be allowed; but the question of offence shall be determined by the director of education, who is to be the licenser of theatrical performances. the righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in a well-ordered city; he will never be a beggar. nor is a man to be pitied, merely because he is hungry, unless he be temperate. therefore let the law be as follows:--let there be no beggars in our state; and he who begs shall be expelled by the magistrates both from town and country. if a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another, who is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the injury or give up the offending slave. but if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion, with the view of obtaining the slave, he may put the plaintiff on his trial for malpractices, and recover from him twice the value of the slave; or if he is cast he must make good the damage and deliver up the slave. the injury done by a horse or other animal shall be compensated in like manner. a witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he fail in appearing, he shall be liable for any harm which may ensue: if he swears that he does not know, he may leave the court. a judge who is called upon as a witness must not vote. a free woman, if she is over forty, may bear witness and plead, and, if she have no husband, she may also bring an action. a slave, male or female, and a child may witness and plead only in case of murder, but they must give sureties that they will appear at the trial, if they should be charged with false witness. such charges must be made pending the trial, and the accusations shall be sealed by both parties and kept by the magistrates until the trial for perjury comes off. if a man is twice convicted of perjury, he is not to be required, if three times, he is not to be allowed to bear witness, or, if he persists in bearing witness, is to be punished with death. when more than half the evidence is proved to be false there must be a new trial. the best and noblest things in human life are liable to be defiled and perverted. is not justice the civilizer of mankind? and yet upon the noble profession of the advocate has come an evil name. for he is said to make the worse appear the better cause, and only requires money in return for his services. such an art will be forbidden by the legislator, and if existing among us will be requested to depart to another city. to the disobedient let the voice of the law be heard saying:--he who tries to pervert justice in the minds of the judges, or to increase litigation, shall be brought before the supreme court. if he does so from contentiousness, let him be silenced for a time, and, if he offend again, put to death. if he have acted from a love of gain, let him be sent out of the country if he be a foreigner, or if he be a citizen let him be put to death. book xii. if a false message be taken to or brought from other states, whether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, they shall be indicted for having dishonoured their sacred office, and, if convicted, shall suffer a penalty.--stealing is mean; robbery is shameless. let no man deceive himself by the supposed example of the gods, for no god or son of a god ever really practised either force or fraud. on this point the legislator is better informed than all the poets put together. he who listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen shall have the following law directed against him:--he who steals much, or he who steals little of the public property is deserving of the same penalty; for they are both impelled by the same evil motive. when the law punishes one man more lightly than another, this is done under the idea, not that he is less guilty, but that he is more curable. now a thief who is a foreigner or slave may be curable; but the thief who is a citizen, and has had the advantages of education, should be put to death, for he is incurable. much consideration and many regulations are necessary about military expeditions; the great principal of all is that no one, male or female, in war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a commander. whether men stand or walk, or drill, or pursue, or retreat, or wash, or eat, they should all act together and in obedience to orders. we should practise from our youth upwards the habits of command and obedience. all dances, relaxations, endurances of meats and drinks, of cold and heat, and of hard couches, should have a view to war, and care should be taken not to destroy the natural covering and use of the head and feet by wearing shoes and caps; for the head is the lord of the body, and the feet are the best of servants. the soldier should have thoughts like these; and let him hear the law:--he who is enrolled shall serve, and if he absent himself without leave he shall be indicted for failure of service before his own branch of the army when the expedition returns, and if he be found guilty he shall suffer the penalty which the courts award, and never be allowed to contend for any prize of valour, or to accuse another of misbehaviour in military matters. desertion shall also be tried and punished in the same manner. after the courts for trying failure of service and desertion have been held, the generals shall hold another court, in which the several arms of the service will award prizes for the expedition which has just concluded. the prize is to be a crown of olive, which the victor shall offer up at the temple of his favourite war god...in any suit which a man brings, let the indictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an honourable maiden, to whom falsehood is naturally hateful. for example, when men are prosecuted for having lost their arms, great care should be taken by the witnesses to distinguish between cases in which they have been lost from necessity and from cowardice. if the hero patroclus had not been killed but had been brought back alive from the field, he might have been reproached with having lost the divine armour. and a man may lose his arms in a storm at sea, or from a fall, and under many other circumstances. there is a distinction of language to be observed in the use of the two terms, 'thrower away of a shield' (ripsaspis), and 'loser of arms' (apoboleus oplon), one being the voluntary, the other the involuntary relinquishment of them. let the law then be as follows:--if any one is overtaken by the enemy, having arms in his hands, and he leaves them behind him voluntarily, choosing base life instead of honourable death, let justice be done. the old legend of caeneus, who was changed by poseidon from a woman into a man, may teach by contraries the appropriate punishment. let the thrower away of his shield be changed from a man into a woman--that is to say, let him be all his life out of danger, and never again be admitted by any commander into the ranks of his army; and let him pay a heavy fine according to his class. and any commander who permits him to serve shall also be punished by a fine. all magistrates, whatever be their tenure of office, must give an account of their magistracy. but where shall we find the magistrate who is worthy to supervise them or look into their short-comings and crooked ways? the examiner must be more than man who is sufficient for these things. for the truth is that there are many causes of the dissolution of states; which, like ships or animals, have their cords, and girders, and sinews easily relaxed, and nothing tends more to their welfare and preservation than the supervision of them by examiners who are better than the magistrates; failing in this they fall to pieces, and each becomes many instead of one. wherefore let the people meet after the summer solstice, in the precincts of apollo and the sun, and appoint three men of not less than fifty years of age. they shall proceed as follows:--each citizen shall select some one, not himself, whom he thinks the best. the persons selected shall be reduced to one half, who have the greatest number of votes, if they are an even number; but if an odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes shall be previously withdrawn. the voting shall continue in the same manner until three only remain; and if the number of votes cast for them be equal, a distinction between the first, second, and third shall be made by lot. the three shall be crowned with an olive wreath, and proclamation made, that the city of the magnetes, once more preserved by the gods, presents her three best men to apollo and the sun, to whom she dedicates them as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. they shall choose in the first year of their office twelve examiners, to continue until they are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three shall be added annually. while they hold office, they shall dwell within the precinct of the god. they are to divide all the magistracies into twelve classes, and may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments which they please; in some cases singly, in other cases together, announcing the acquittal or punishment of the magistrate on a tablet which they will place in the agora. a magistrate who has been condemned by the examiners may appeal to the select judges, and, if he gain his suit, may in turn prosecute the examiners; but if the appellant is cast, his punishment shall be doubled, unless he was previously condemned to death. and what honours shall be paid to these examiners, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue? they shall have the first place at all sacrifices and other ceremonies, and in all assemblies and public places; they shall go on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive privilege of wearing a crown of laurel. they are priests of apollo and the sun, and he of their number who is judged first shall be high priest, and give his name to the year. the manner of their burial, too, shall be different from that of the other citizens. the colour of their funeral array shall be white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation, around the bier shall stand a chorus of fifteen boys and fifteen maidens, chanting hymns in honour of the deceased in alternate strains during an entire day; and at dawn a band of a hundred youths shall carry the bier to the grave, marching in the garb of warriors, and the boys in front of the bier shall sing their national hymn, while the maidens and women past child-bearing follow after. priests and priestesses may also follow, unless the pythian oracle forbids. the sepulchre shall be a vault built underground, which will last for ever, having couches of stone placed side by side; on one of these they shall lay the departed saint, and then cover the tomb with a mound, and plant trees on every side except one, where an opening shall be left for other interments. every year there shall be games--musical, gymnastic, or equestrian, in honour of those who have passed every ordeal. but if any of them, after having been acquitted on any occasion, begin to show the wickedness of human nature, he who pleases may bring them to trial before a court composed of the guardians of the law, and of the select judges, and of any of the examiners who are alive. if he be convicted he shall be deprived of his honours, and if the accuser do not obtain a fifth part of the votes, he shall pay a fine according to his class. what is called the judgment of rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of faith,' but not to our days. he knew that his contemporaries believed in the gods, for many of them were the sons of gods; and he thought that the easiest and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the decision to heaven. in our own day, men either deny the existence of gods or their care of men, or maintain that they may be bribed by attentions and gifts; and the procedure of rhadamanthus would therefore be out of date. when the religious ideas of mankind change, their laws should also change. thus oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff and defendant; simple statements of affirmation and denial should be substituted. for there is something dreadful in the thought, that nearly half the citizens of a state are perjured men. there is no objection to an oath, where a man has no interest in forswearing himself; as, for example, when a judge is about to give his decision, or in voting at an election, or in the judgment of games and contests. but where there would be a premium on perjury, oaths and imprecations should be prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. let the principles of justice be learned and taught without words of evil omen. the oaths of a stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because strangers are not permitted to become permanent residents in our state. trials in private causes are to be decided in the same manner as lesser offences against the state. the non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice, or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first instance remediable, and the defaulter may give security; but if he forfeits the security, the goods pledged shall be sold and the money given to the state. and for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall have the power of inflicting greater penalties. a city which is without trade or commerce must consider what it will do about the going abroad of its own people and the admission of strangers. for out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state it may be a great evil. yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion of strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of mankind. public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for the many are not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. even the worst of men have often a divine instinct, which enables them to judge of the differences between the good and bad. states are rightly advised when they desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest praise is that of virtue. and our cretan colony should, and probably will, have a character for virtue, such as few cities have. let this, then, be our law about foreign travel and the reception of strangers:--no one shall be allowed to leave the country who is under forty years of age--of course military service abroad is not included in this regulation--and no one at all except in a public capacity. to the olympic, and pythian, and nemean, and isthmian games, shall be sent the fairest and best and bravest, who shall support the dignity of the city in time of peace. these, when they come home, shall teach the youth the inferiority of all other governments. besides those who go on sacred missions, other persons shall be sent out by permission of the guardians to study the institutions of foreign countries. for a people which has no experience, and no knowledge of the characters of men or the reason of things, but lives by habit only, can never be perfectly civilized. moreover, in all states, bad as well as good, there are holy and inspired men; these the citizen of a well-ordered city should be ever seeking out; he should go forth to find them over sea and over land, that he may more firmly establish institutions in his own state which are good already and amend the bad. 'what will be the best way of accomplishing such an object?' in the first place, let the visitor of foreign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him be a citizen of repute, especially in military matters. on his return he shall appear before the nocturnal council: this is a body which sits from dawn to sunrise, and includes amongst its members the priests who have gained the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the law, and the director and past directors of education; each of whom has power to bring with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is between thirty and forty. the assembly thus constituted shall consider the laws of their own and other states, and gather information relating to them. anything of the sort which is approved by the elder members of the council shall be studied with all diligence by the younger; who are to be specially watched by the rest of the citizens, and shall receive honour, if they are deserving of honour, or dishonour, if they prove inferior. this is the assembly to which the visitor of foreign countries shall come and tell anything which he has heard from others in the course of his travels, or which he has himself observed. if he be made neither better nor worse, let him at least be praised for his zeal; and let him receive still more praise, and special honour after death, if he be improved. but if he be deteriorated by his travels, let him be prohibited from speaking to any one; and if he submit, he may live as a private individual: but if he be convicted of attempting to make innovations in education and the laws, let him die. next, as to the reception of strangers. of these there are four classes:--first, merchants, who, like birds of passage, find their way over the sea at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their wares. these should be received in markets and public buildings without the city, by proper officers, who shall see that justice is done them, and shall also watch against any political designs which they may entertain; no more intercourse is to be held with them than is absolutely necessary. secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals, who shall be entertained by hospitable persons at the temples for a reasonable time; the priests and ministers of the temples shall have a care of them. in small suits brought by them or against them, the priests shall be the judges; but in the more important, the wardens of the agora. thirdly, there are ambassadors of foreign states; these are to be honourably received by the generals and commanders, and placed under the care of the prytanes and of the persons with whom they are lodged. fourthly, there is the philosophical stranger, who, like our own spectators, from time to time goes to see what is rich and rare in foreign countries. like them he must be fifty years of age: and let him go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, that he may learn from them, and they from him. these are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the reception of strangers. let zeus, the god of hospitality, be honoured; and let not the stranger be excluded, as in egypt, from meals and sacrifices, or, (as at sparta,) driven away by savage proclamations. let guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses. the number of witnesses shall be three when the sum lent is under a thousand drachmas, or five when above. the agent and principal at a fraudulent sale shall be equally liable. he who would search another man's house for anything must swear that he expects to find it there; and he shall enter naked, or having on a single garment and no girdle. the owner shall place at the disposal of the searcher all his goods, sealed as well as unsealed; if he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value of the property, if it shall prove to be in his possession. if the owner be absent, the searcher may counter-seal the property which is under seal, and place watchers. if the owner remain absent more than five days, the searcher shall take the magistrates, and open the sealed property, and seal it up again in their presence. the recovery of goods disputed, except in the case of lands and houses, (about which there can be no dispute in our state), is to be barred by time. the public and unimpeached use of anything for a year in the city, or for five years in the country, or the private possession and domestic use for three years in the city, or for ten years in the country, is to give a right of ownership. but if the possessor have the property in a foreign country, there shall be no bar as to time. the proceedings of any trial are to be void, in which either the parties or the witnesses, whether bond or free, have been prevented by violence from attending:--if a slave be prevented, the suit shall be invalid; or if a freeman, he who is guilty of the violence shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall also be liable to an action for kidnapping. if one competitor forcibly prevents another from attending at the games, the other may be inscribed as victor in the temples, and the first, whether victor or not, shall be liable to an action for damages. the receiver of stolen goods shall undergo the same punishment as the thief. the receiver of an exile shall be punished with death. a man ought to have the same friends and enemies as his country; and he who makes war or peace for himself shall be put to death. and if a party in the state make war or peace, their leaders shall be indicted by the generals, and, if convicted, they shall be put to death. the ministers and officers of a country ought not to receive gifts, even as the reward of good deeds. he who disobeys shall die. with a view to taxation a man should have his property and income valued: and the government may, at their discretion, levy the tax upon the annual return, or take a portion of the whole. the good man will offer moderate gifts to the gods; his land or hearth cannot be offered, because they are already consecrated to all gods. gold and silver, which arouse envy, and ivory, which is taken from the dead body of an animal, are unsuitable offerings; iron and brass are materials of war. wood and stone of a single piece may be offered; also woven work which has not occupied one woman more than a month in making. white is a colour which is acceptable to the gods; figures of birds and similar offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the painter can execute in a day. next concerning lawsuits. judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed upon by the plaintiff and defendant; and if no decision is obtained from them, their fellow-tribesmen shall judge. at this stage there shall be an increase of the penalty: the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a fifth more than the damages claimed. if he further persist, and appeal a second time, the case shall be heard before the select judges; and he shall pay, if defeated, the penalty and half as much again. and the pursuer, if on the first appeal he is defeated, shall pay one fifth of the damages claimed by him; and if on the second, one half. other matters relating to trials, such as the assignment of judges to courts, the times of sitting, the number of judges, the modes of pleading and procedure, as we have already said, may be determined by younger legislators. these are to be the rules of private courts. as regards public courts, many states have excellent modes of procedure which may serve for models; these, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and made permanent by us. let the judge be accomplished in the laws. he should possess writings about them, and make a study of them; for laws are the highest instrument of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind (nous, nomos). they afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in verse or prose, in conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the vain disputes of men and their equally vain acquiescence in each other's opinions. the just judge, who imbibes their spirit, makes the city and himself to stand upright. he establishes justice for the good, and cures the tempers of the bad, if they can be cured; but denounces death, which is the only remedy, to the incurable, the threads of whose life cannot be reversed. when the suits of the year are completed, execution is to follow. the court is to award to the plaintiff the property of the defendant, if he is cast, reserving to him only his lot of land. if the plaintiff is not satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the property of the defendant. if the defendant fails in payment to the amount of a drachma, he shall lose the use and protection of the court; or if he rebel against the authority of the court, he shall be brought before the guardians of the law, and if found guilty he shall be put to death. man having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up children, and gone to law, fulfils the debt of nature. the rites which are to be celebrated after death in honour of the gods above and below shall be determined by the interpreters. the dead shall be buried in uncultivated places, where they will be out of the way and do least injury to the living. for no one either in life or after death has any right to deprive other men of the sustenance which mother earth provides for them. no sepulchral mound is to be piled higher than five men can raise it in five days, and the grave-stone shall not be larger than is sufficient to contain an inscription of four heroic verses. the dead are only to be exposed for three days, which is long enough to test the reality of death. the legislator will instruct the people that the body is a mere shadow or image, and that the soul, which is our true being, is gone to give an account of herself before the gods below. when they hear this, the good are full of hope, and the evil are terrified. it is also said that not much can be done for any one after death. and therefore while in life all man should be helped by their kindred to pass their days justly and holily, that they may depart in peace. when a man loses a son or a brother, he should consider that the beloved one has gone away to fulfil his destiny in another place, and should not waste money over his lifeless remains. let the law then order a moderate funeral of five minae for the first class, of three for the second, of two for the third, of one for the fourth. one of the guardians of the law, to be selected by the relatives, shall assist them in arranging the affairs of the deceased. there would be a want of delicacy in prescribing that there should or should not be mourning for the dead. but, at any rate, such mourning is to be confined to the house; there must be no processions in the streets, and the dead body shall be taken out of the city before daybreak. regulations about other forms of burial and about the non-burial of parricides and other sacrilegious persons have already been laid down. the work of legislation is therefore nearly completed; its end will be finally accomplished when we have provided for the continuance of the state. do you remember the names of the fates? lachesis, the giver of the lots, is the first of them; clotho, the spinster, the second; atropos, the unchanging one, is the third and last, who makes the threads of the web irreversible. and we too want to make our laws irreversible, for the unchangeable quality in them will be the salvation of the state, and the source of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens. 'but can such a quality be implanted?' i think that it may; and at any rate we must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric which has no foundation would be too ridiculous. 'what foundation would you lay?' we have already instituted an assembly which was composed of the ten oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who had received prizes of virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone abroad to enquire into the laws of other countries. moreover, each of the members was to choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of age, to be approved by the rest; and they were to meet at dawn, when all the world is at leisure. this assembly will be an anchor to the vessel of state, and provide the means of permanence; for the constitutions of states, like all other things, have their proper saviours, which are to them what the head and soul are to the living being. 'how do you mean?' mind in the soul, and sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the perfect union of mind and sense, may be justly called every man's salvation. 'certainly.' yes; but of what nature is this union? in the case of a ship, for example, the senses of the sailors are added to the intelligence of the pilot, and the two together save the ship and the men in the ship. again, the physician and the general have their objects; and the object of the one is health, of the other victory. states, too, have their objects, and the ruler must understand, first, their nature, and secondly, the means of attaining them, whether in laws or men. the state which is wanting in this knowledge cannot be expected to be wise when the time for action arrives. now what class or institution is there in our state which has such a saving power? 'i suspect that you are referring to the nocturnal council.' yes, to that council which is to have all virtue, and which should aim directly at the mark. 'very true.' the inconsistency of legislation in most states is not surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. one of them makes their rule of justice the government of a class; another aims at wealth; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some who call themselves philosophers maintain that you should seek for all of them at once. but our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is of four kinds. 'yes; and we said that mind is the chief and ruler of the three other kinds of virtue and of all else.' true, cleinias; and now, having already declared the object which is present to the mind of the pilot, the general, the physician, we will interrogate the mind of the statesman. tell me, i say, as the physician and general have told us their object, what is the object of the statesman. can you tell me? 'we cannot.' did we not say that there are four virtues--courage, wisdom, and two others, all of which are called by the common name of virtue, and are in a sense one? 'certainly we did.' the difficulty is, not in understanding the differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their unity. why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names of wisdom and courage? the reason is that courage is concerned with fear, and is found both in children and in brutes; for the soul may be courageous without reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise without reason. 'that is true.' i have explained to you the difference, and do you in return explain to me the unity. but first let us consider whether any one who knows the name of a thing without the definition has any real knowledge of it. is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of sense, especially where great and glorious truths are concerned? and can any subject be more worthy of the attention of our legislators than the four virtues of which we are speaking--courage, temperance, justice, wisdom? ought not the magistrates and officers of the state to instruct the citizens in the nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them to be taught by some chance poet or sophist? a city which is without instruction suffers the usual fate of cities in our day. what then shall we do? how shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how shall we give our state a head and eyes? 'yes, but how do you apply the figure?' the city will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men will mount into the head or acropolis and be our eyes; they will look about them, and inform the elders, who are the mind and use the younger men as their instruments: together they will save the state. shall this be our constitution, or shall all be educated alike, and the special training be given up? 'that is impossible.' let us then endeavour to attain to some more exact idea of education. did we not say that the true artist or guardian ought to have an eye, not only to the many, but to the one, and to order all things with a view to the one? can there be any more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things which are unlike to one idea? 'perhaps not.' say rather, 'certainly not.' and the rulers of our divine state ought to have an exact knowledge of the common principle in courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, which is called by the name of virtue; and unless we know whether virtue is one or many, we shall hardly know what virtue is. shall we contrive some means of engrafting this knowledge on our state, or give the matter up? 'anything rather than that.' let us begin by making an agreement. 'by all means, if we can.' well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought to know, not only how the good and the honourable are many, but also how they are one? 'yes, certainly.' the true guardian of the laws ought to know their truth, and should also be able to interpret and execute them? 'he should.' and is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the existence and power of the gods? the people may be excused for following tradition; but the guardian must be able to give a reason of the faith which is in him. and there are two great evidences of religion--the priority of the soul and the order of the heavens. for no man of sense, when he contemplates the universe, will be likely to substitute necessity for reason and will. those who maintain that the sun and the stars are inanimate beings are utterly wrong in their opinions. the men of a former generation had a suspicion, which has been confirmed by later thinkers, that things inanimate could never without mind have attained such scientific accuracy; and some (anaxagoras) even in those days ventured to assert that mind had ordered all things in heaven; but they had no idea of the priority of mind, and they turned the world, or more properly themselves, upside down, and filled the universe with stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. this led to great impiety, and the poets said many foolish things against the philosophers, whom they compared to 'yelping she-dogs,' besides making other abusive remarks. no man can now truly worship the gods who does not believe that the soul is eternal, and prior to the body, and the ruler of all bodies, and does not perceive also that there is mind in the stars; or who has not heard the connexion of these things with music, and has not harmonized them with manners and laws, giving a reason of things which are matters of reason. he who is unable to acquire this knowledge, as well as the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can only be a servant, and not a ruler in the state. let us then add another law to the effect that the nocturnal council shall be a guard set for the salvation of the state. 'very good.' to establish this will be our aim, and i hope that others besides myself will assist. 'let us proceed along the road in which god seems to guide us.' we cannot, megillus and cleinias, anticipate the details which will hereafter be needed; they must be supplied by experience. 'what do you mean?' first of all a register will have to be made of all those whose age, character, or education would qualify them to be guardians. the subjects which they are to learn, and the order in which they are to be learnt, are mysteries which cannot be explained beforehand, but not mysteries in any other sense. 'if that is the case, what is to be done?' we must stake our all on a lucky throw, and i will share the risk by stating my views on education. and i would have you, cleinias, who are the founder of the magnesian state, and will obtain the greatest glory if you succeed, and will at least be praised for your courage, if you fail, take especial heed of this matter. if we can only establish the nocturnal council, we will hand over the city to its keeping; none of the present company will hesitate about that. our dream will then become a reality; and our citizens, if they are carefully chosen and well educated, will be saviours and guardians such as the world hitherto has never seen. the want of completeness in the laws becomes more apparent in the later books. there is less arrangement in them, and the transitions are more abrupt from one subject to another. yet they contain several noble passages, such as the 'prelude to the discourse concerning the honour and dishonour of parents,' or the picture of the dangers attending the 'friendly intercourse of young men and maidens with one another,' or the soothing remonstrance which is addressed to the dying man respecting his right to do what he will with his own, or the fine description of the burial of the dead. the subject of religion in book x is introduced as a prelude to offences against the gods, and this portion of the work appears to be executed in plato's best manner. in the last four books, several questions occur for consideration: among them are (i) the detection and punishment of offences; (ii) the nature of the voluntary and involuntary; (iii) the arguments against atheism, and against the opinion that the gods have no care of human affairs; (iv) the remarks upon retail trade; (v) the institution of the nocturnal council. i. a weak point in the laws of plato is the amount of inquisition into private life which is to be made by the rulers. the magistrate is always watching and waylaying the citizens. he is constantly to receive information against improprieties of life. plato does not seem to be aware that espionage can only have a negative effect. he has not yet discovered the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of morality or social life. men will not tell of one another; nor will he ever be the most honoured citizen, who gives the most frequent information about offenders to the magistrates. as in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe the effect of age. plato becomes more conservative as he grows older, and he would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are above fifty years of age; for in them he hopes to find a principle of stability. he does not remark that, in destroying the freedom he is destroying also the life of the state. in reducing all the citizens to rule and measure, he would have been depriving the magnesian colony of those great men 'whose acquaintance is beyond all price;' and he would have found that in the worst-governed hellenic state, there was more of a carriere ouverte for extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own. plato has an evident dislike of the athenian dicasteries; he prefers a few judges who take a leading part in the conduct of trials to a great number who only listen in silence. he allows of two appeals--in each case however with an increase of the penalty. modern jurists would disapprove of the redress of injustice being purchased only at an increasing risk; though indirectly the burden of legal expenses, which seems to have been little felt among the athenians, has a similar effect. the love of litigation, which is a remnant of barbarism quite as much as a corruption of civilization, and was innate in the athenian people, is diminished in the new state by the imposition of severe penalties. if persevered in, it is to be punished with death. in the laws murder and homicide besides being crimes, are also pollutions. regarded from this point of view, the estimate of such offences is apt to depend on accidental circumstances, such as the shedding of blood, and not on the real guilt of the offender or the injury done to society. they are measured by the horror which they arouse in a barbarous age. for there is a superstition in law as well as in religion, and the feelings of a primitive age have a traditional hold on the mass of the people. on the other hand, plato is innocent of the barbarity which would visit the sins of the fathers upon the children, and he is quite aware that punishment has an eye to the future, and not to the past. compared with that of most european nations in the last century his penal code, though sometimes capricious, is reasonable and humane. a defect in plato's criminal jurisprudence is his remission of the punishment when the homicide has obtained the forgiveness of the murdered person; as if crime were a personal affair between individuals, and not an offence against the state. there is a ridiculous disproportion in his punishments. because a slave may fairly receive a blow for stealing one fig or one bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for selling adulterated goods to the value of one drachma, it is rather hard upon the slave that he should receive as many blows as he has taken grapes or figs, or upon the tradesman who has sold adulterated goods to the value of a thousand drachmas that he should receive a thousand blows. ii. but before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator must determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. the great question of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn threadbare with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by plato and aristotle--first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical point of view. they were puzzled by the degrees and kinds of crime; they observed also that the law only punished hurts which are inflicted by a voluntary agent on an involuntary patient. in attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury, plato says that mere hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit may sometimes injure, e.g. when conferred without regard to right and wrong, or to the good or evil consequences which may follow. he means to say that the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle which characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently described by the terms voluntary and involuntary. you may hurt another involuntarily, and no one would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him voluntarily, as in inflicting punishment--neither is this injury; but if you hurt him from motives of avarice, ambition, or cowardly fear, this is injury. injustice is also described as the victory of desire or passion or self-conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of them to reason. in some paradoxical sense plato is disposed to affirm all injustice to be involuntary; because no man would do injustice who knew that it never paid and could calculate the consequences of what he was doing. yet, on the other hand, he admits that the distinction of voluntary and involuntary, taken in another and more obvious sense, is the basis of legislation. his conception of justice and injustice is complicated (1) by the want of a distinction between justice and virtue, that is to say, between the quality which primarily regards others, and the quality in which self and others are equally regarded; (2) by the confusion of doing and suffering justice; (3) by the unwillingness to renounce the old socratic paradox, that evil is involuntary. iii. the laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they bear the stamp of primitive legislation. they do not escape the almost inevitable consequence of making irreligion penal. if laws are based upon religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion. hence the necessity for what in modern language, and according to a distinction which plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed persecution. but the spirit of persecution in plato, unlike that of modern religious bodies, arises out of the desire to enforce a true and simple form of religion, and is directed against the superstitions which tend to degrade mankind. sir thomas more, in his utopia, is in favour of tolerating all except the intolerant, though he would not promote to high offices those who disbelieved in the immortality of the soul. plato has not advanced quite so far as this in the path of toleration. but in judging of his enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of necromancy and divination were far greater than those of intolerance in the ancient world. human nature is always having recourse to the first; but only when organized into some form of priesthood falls into the other; although in primitive as in later ages the institution of a priesthood may claim probably to be an advance on some form of religion which preceded. the laws would have rested on a sounder foundation, if plato had ever distinctly realized to his mind the difference between crime and sin or vice. of this, as of many other controversies, a clear definition might have been the end. but such a definition belongs to a later age of philosophy. the arguments which plato uses for the being of a god, have an extremely modern character: first, the consensus gentium; secondly, the argument which has already been adduced in the phaedrus, of the priority of the self-moved. the answer to those who say that god 'cares not,' is, that he governs by general laws; and that he who takes care of the great will assuredly take care of the small. plato did not feel, and has not attempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with the general providence of god. yet he is on the road to a solution, when he regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together towards the final end. we are surprised to find that the scepticism, which we attribute to young men in our own day, existed then (compare republic); that the epicureanism expressed in the line of horace (borrowed from lucretius)-'namque deos didici securum agere aevum,' was already prevalent in the age of plato; and that the terrors of another world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other men in this. the same objection which struck the psalmist--'when i saw the prosperity of the wicked'--is supposed to lie at the root of the better sort of unbelief. and the answer is substantially the same which the modern theologian would offer:--that the ways of god in this world cannot be justified unless there be a future state of rewards and punishments. yet this future state of rewards and punishments is in plato's view not any addition of happiness or suffering imposed from without, but the permanence of good and evil in the soul: here he is in advance of many modern theologians. the greek, too, had his difficulty about the existence of evil, which in one solitary passage, remarkable for being inconsistent with his general system, plato explains, after the magian fashion, by a good and evil spirit (compare theaet., statesman). this passage is also remarkable for being at variance with the general optimism of the tenth book--not 'all things are ordered by god for the best,' but some things by a good, others by an evil spirit. the tenth book of the laws presents a picture of the state of belief among the greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live. plato is disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several causes. first, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he retains his disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is unwilling, as in the republic, wholly to proscribe them. secondly, he remarks the self-conceit of a newly-fledged generation of philosophers, who declare that the sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only; and who also maintain that the gods are made by the laws of the state. thirdly, he notes a confusion in the minds of men arising out of their misinterpretation of the appearances of the world around them: they do not always see the righteous rewarded and the wicked punished. so in modern times there are some whose infidelity has arisen from doubts about the inspiration of ancient writings; others who have been made unbelievers by physical science, or again by the seemingly political character of religion; while there is a third class to whose minds the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of god to man' has been the chief stumblingblock. plato is very much out of temper at the impiety of some of his contemporaries; yet he is determined to reason with the victims, as he regards them, of these illusions before he punishes them. his answer to the unbelievers is twofold: first, that the soul is prior to the body; secondly, that the ruler of the universe being perfect has made all things with a view to their perfection. the difficulties arising out of ancient sacred writings were far less serious in the age of plato than in our own. we too have our popular epicureanism, which would allow the world to go on as if there were no god. when the belief in him, whether of ancient or modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate him, either in theory or practice, into a distant heaven. they do not like expressly to deny god when it is more convenient to forget him; and so the theory of the epicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general. nor can we be said to be free from that which plato justly considers to be the worst unbelief--of those who put superstition in the place of true religion. for the larger half of christians continue to assert that the justice of god may be turned aside by gifts, and, if not by the 'odour of fat, and the sacrifice steaming to heaven,' still by another kind of sacrifice placed upon the altar--by masses for the quick and dead, by dispensations, by building churches, by rites and ceremonies--by the same means which the heathen used, taking other names and shapes. and the indifference of epicureanism and unbelief is in two ways the parent of superstition, partly because it permits, and also because it creates, a necessity for its development in religious and enthusiastic temperaments. if men cannot have a rational belief, they will have an irrational. and hence the most superstitious countries are also at a certain point of civilization the most unbelieving, and the revolution which takes one direction is quickly followed by a reaction in the other. so we may read 'between the lines' ancient history and philosophy into modern, and modern into ancient. whether we compare the theory of greek philosophy with the christian religion, or the practice of the gentile world with the practice of the christian world, they will be found to differ more in words and less in reality than we might have supposed. the greater opposition which is sometimes made between them seems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of the ideal of the one with the practice of the other. to the errors of superstition and unbelief plato opposes the simple and natural truth of religion; the best and highest, whether conceived in the form of a person or a principle--as the divine mind or as the idea of good--is believed by him to be the basis of human life. that all things are working together for good to the good and evil to the evil in this or in some other world to which human actions are transferred, is the sum of his faith or theology. unlike socrates, he is absolutely free from superstition. religion and morality are one and indivisible to him. he dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks, was not tolerated in crete, and perhaps (for the meaning of his words is not quite clear) at sparta. he gives no encouragement to individual enthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a mighty intellect.' like the hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the avoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the gods to the public temples. he would not have men and women consecrating the accidents of their lives. he trusts to human punishments and not to divine judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition that certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family.' he considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now be recalled. yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of religion, which he sees to be common to all mankind--barbarians as well as hellenes. he remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner or later, experiencing its power. to which we may add the further remark that the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the religious reaction. it is remarkable that plato's account of mind at the end of the laws goes beyond anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous writings. aristotle, in a well-known passage (met.) which is an echo of the phaedo, remarks on the inconsistency of anaxagoras in introducing the agency of mind, and yet having recourse to other and inferior, probably material causes. but plato makes the further criticism, that the error of anaxagoras consisted, not in denying the universal agency of mind, but in denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity of it. yet in the timaeus he had himself allowed that god made the world out of pre-existing materials: in the statesman he says that there were seeds of evil in the world arising out of the remains of a former chaos which could not be got rid of; and even in the tenth book of the laws he has admitted that there are two souls, a good and evil. in the meno, the phaedrus, and the phaedo, he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a former state of existence. but now he has attained to a clearer point of view: he has discarded these fancies. from meditating on the priority of the human soul to the body, he has learnt the nature of soul absolutely. the power of the best, of which he gave an intimation in the phaedo and in the republic, now, as in the philebus, takes the form of an intelligence or person. he no longer, like anaxagoras, supposes mind to be introduced at a certain time into the world and to give order to a pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the chaos, everlasting and evermoving, and the source of order and intelligence in all things. this appears to be the last form of plato's religious philosophy, which might almost be summed up in the words of kant, 'the starry heaven above and the moral law within.' or rather, perhaps, 'the starry heaven above and mind prior to the world.' iv. the remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about mendicity, have a very modern character. greek social life was more like our own than we are apt to suppose. there was the same division of ranks, the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, and, even in a democracy, the same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits. plato may be claimed as the first free trader, when he prohibits the imposition of customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly not aware of the importance of the principle which he enunciated. the discredit of retail trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders, and is inclined to believe that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which heaven forbid! retail trade might become honourable. he has hardly lighted upon the true reason, which appears to be the essential distinction between buyers and sellers, the one class being necessarily in some degree dependent on the other. when he proposes to fix prices 'which would allow a moderate gain,' and to regulate trade in several minute particulars, we must remember that this is by no means so absurd in a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which almost every one would know and become known to everybody else, as in our own vast population. among ourselves we are very far from allowing every man to charge what he pleases. of many things the prices are fixed by law. do we not often hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of employers? the objection to regulating them by law and thus avoiding the conflicts which continually arise between the buyers and sellers of labour, is not so much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing so. wherever free competition is not reconcileable either with the order of society, or, as in the case of adulteration, with common honesty, the government may lawfully interfere. the only question is,--whether the interference will be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may not be greater than the evil which is prevented by it. he would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no good man would be left to starve. this again is a prohibition which might have been easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the poor when the population is small. in our own times the difficulty of pauperism is rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by the facility of locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human life and suffering. and the only way of meeting the difficulty seems to be by modern nations subdividing themselves into small bodies having local knowledge and acting together in the spirit of ancient communities (compare arist. pol.) v. regarded as the framework of a polity the laws are deemed by plato to be a decline from the republic, which is the dream of his earlier years. he nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation. he is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns to his original idea. for the guardians of the republic, who were the elder citizens, and were all supposed to be philosophers, is now substituted a special body, who are to review and amend the laws, preserving the spirit of the legislator. these are the nocturnal council, who, although they are not specially trained in dialectic, are not wholly destitute of it; for they must know the relation of particular virtues to the general principle of virtue. plato has been arguing throughout the laws that temperance is higher than courage, peace than war, that the love of both must enter into the character of the good citizen. and at the end the same thought is summed up by him in an abstract form. the true artist or guardian must be able to reduce the many to the one, than which, as he says with an enthusiasm worthy of the phaedrus or philebus, 'no more philosophical method was ever devised by the wit of man.' but the sense of unity in difference can only be acquired by study; and plato does not explain to us the nature of this study, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a remarkable omission of the word, to be akin to the dialectic of the republic. the nocturnal council is to consist of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue, of the ten eldest guardians of the law, and of the director and ex-directors of education; each of whom is to select for approval a younger coadjutor. to this council the 'spectator,' who is sent to visit foreign countries, has to make his report. it is not an administrative body, but an assembly of sages who are to make legislation their study. plato is not altogether disinclined to changes in the law where experience shows them to be necessary; but he is also anxious that the original spirit of the constitution should never be lost sight of. the laws of plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in many respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life and the world. his theory of ideas in the next generation passed into one of numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the metaphysics of aristotle. of the speculative side of this theory there are no traces in the laws, but doubtless plato found the practical value which he attributed to arithmetic greatly confirmed by the possibility of applying number and measure to the revolution of the heavens, and to the regulation of human life. in the return to a doctrine of numbers there is a retrogression rather than an advance; for the most barren logical abstraction is of a higher nature than number and figure. philosophy fades away into the distance; in the laws it is confined to the members of the nocturnal council. the speculative truth which was the food of the guardians in the republic, is for the majority of the citizens to be superseded by practical virtues. the law, which is the expression of mind written down, takes the place of the living word of the philosopher. (compare the contrast of phaedrus, and laws; also the plays on the words nous, nomos, nou dianome; and the discussion in the statesman of the difference between the personal rule of a king and the impersonal reign of law.) the state is based on virtue and religion rather than on knowledge; and virtue is no longer identified with knowledge, being of the commoner sort, and spoken of in the sense generally understood. yet there are many traces of advance as well as retrogression in the laws of plato. the attempt to reconcile the ideal with actual life is an advance; to 'have brought philosophy down from heaven to earth,' is a praise which may be claimed for him as well as for his master socrates. and the members of the nocturnal council are to continue students of the 'one in many' and of the nature of god. education is the last word with which plato supposes the theory of the laws to end and the reality to begin. plato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs, and of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an indication not of a narrower, but of a maturer mind, which had become more conversant with realities. nor can we fairly attribute any want of originality to him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from sparta and athens. laws and institutions grow out of habits and customs; and they have 'better opinion, better confirmation,' if they have come down from antiquity and are not mere literary inventions. plato would have been the first to acknowledge that the book of laws was not the creation of his fancy, but a collection of enactments which had been devised by inspired legislators, like minos, lycurgus, and solon, to meet the actual needs of men, and had been approved by time and experience. in order to do justice therefore to the design of the work, it is necessary to examine how far it rests on an historical foundation and coincides with the actual laws of sparta and athens. the consideration of the historical aspect of the laws has been reserved for this place. in working out the comparison the writer has been greatly assisted by the excellent essays of c.f. hermann ('de vestigiis institutorum veterum, imprimis atticorum, per platonis de legibus libros indagandis,' and 'juris domestici et familiaris apud platonem in legibus cum veteris graeciae inque primis athenarum institutis comparatio': marburg, 1836), and by j.b. telfy's 'corpus juris attici' (leipzig, 1868). excursus on the relation of the laws of plato to the institutions of crete and lacedaemon and to the laws and constitution of athens. the laws of plato are essentially greek: unlike xenophon's cyropaedia, they contain nothing foreign or oriental. their aim is to reconstruct the work of the great lawgivers of hellas in a literary form. they partake both of an athenian and a spartan character. some of them too are derived from crete, and are appropriately transferred to a cretan colony. but of crete so little is known to us, that although, as montesquieu (esprit des lois) remarks, 'the laws of crete are the original of those of sparta and the laws of plato the correction of these latter,' there is only one point, viz. the common meals, in which they can be compared. most of plato's provisions resemble the laws and customs which prevailed in these three states (especially in the two former), and which the personifying instinct of the greeks attributed to minos, lycurgus, and solon. a very few particulars may have been borrowed from zaleucus (cic. de legibus), and charondas, who is said to have first made laws against perjury (arist. pol.) and to have forbidden credit (stob. florileg., gaisford). some enactments are plato's own, and were suggested by his experience of defects in the athenian and other greek states. the laws also contain many lesser provisions, which are not found in the ordinary codes of nations, because they cannot be properly defined, and are therefore better left to custom and common sense. 'the greater part of the work,' as aristotle remarks (pol.), 'is taken up with laws': yet this is not wholly true, and applies to the latter rather than to the first half of it. the book rests on an ethical and religious foundation: the actual laws begin with a hymn of praise in honour of the soul. and the same lofty aspiration after the good is perpetually recurring, especially in books x, xi, xii, and whenever plato's mind is filled with his highest themes. in prefixing to most of his laws a prooemium he has two ends in view, to persuade and also to threaten. they are to have the sanction of laws and the effect of sermons. and plato's 'book of laws,' if described in the language of modern philosophy, may be said to be as much an ethical and educational, as a political or legal treatise. but although the laws partake both of an athenian and a spartan character, the elements which are borrowed from either state are necessarily very different, because the character and origin of the two governments themselves differed so widely. sparta was the more ancient and primitive: athens was suited to the wants of a later stage of society. the relation of the two states to the laws may be conceived in this manner:--the foundation and ground-plan of the work are more spartan, while the superstructure and details are more athenian. at athens the laws were written down and were voluminous; more than a thousand fragments of them have been collected by telfy. like the roman or english law, they contained innumerable particulars. those of them which regulated daily life were familiarly known to the athenians; for every citizen was his own lawyer, and also a judge, who decided the rights of his fellow-citizens according to the laws, often after hearing speeches from the parties interested or from their advocates. it is to rome and not to athens that the invention of law, in the modern sense of the term, is commonly ascribed. but it must be remembered that long before the times of the twelve tables (b.c. 451), regular courts and forms of law had existed at athens and probably in the greek colonies. and we may reasonably suppose, though without any express proof of the fact, that many roman institutions and customs, like latin literature and mythology, were partly derived from hellas and had imperceptibly drifted from one shore of the ionian sea to the other (compare especially the constitutions of servius tullius and of solon). it is not proved that the laws of sparta were in ancient times either written down in books or engraved on tablets of marble or brass. nor is it certain that, if they had been, the spartans could have read them. they were ancient customs, some of them older probably than the settlement in laconia, of which the origin is unknown; they occasionally received the sanction of the delphic oracle, but there was a still stronger obligation by which they were enforced,--the necessity of self-defence: the spartans were always living in the presence of their enemies. they belonged to an age when written law had not yet taken the place of custom and tradition. the old constitution was very rarely affected by new enactments, and these only related to the duties of the kings or ephors, or the new relations of classes which arose as time went on. hence there was as great a difference as could well be conceived between the laws of athens and sparta: the one was the creation of a civilized state, and did not differ in principle from our modern legislation, the other of an age in which the people were held together and also kept down by force of arms, and which afterwards retained many traces of its barbaric origin 'surviving in culture.' nevertheless the lacedaemonian was the ideal of a primitive greek state. according to thucydides it was the first which emerged out of confusion and became a regular government. it was also an army devoted to military exercises, but organized with a view to self-defence and not to conquest. it was not quick to move or easily excited; but stolid, cautious, unambitious, procrastinating. for many centuries it retained the same character which was impressed upon it by the hand of the legislator. this singular fabric was partly the result of circumstances, partly the invention of some unknown individual in prehistoric times, whose ideal of education was military discipline, and who, by the ascendency of his genius, made a small tribe into a nation which became famous in the world's history. the other hellenes wondered at the strength and stability of his work. the rest of hellas, says thucydides, undertook the colonisation of heraclea the more readily, having a feeling of security now that they saw the lacedaemonians taking part in it. the spartan state appears to us in the dawn of history as a vision of armed men, irresistible by any other power then existing in the world. it can hardly be said to have understood at all the rights or duties of nations to one another, or indeed to have had any moral principle except patriotism and obedience to commanders. men were so trained to act together that they lost the freedom and spontaneity of human life in cultivating the qualities of the soldier and ruler. the spartan state was a composite body in which kings, nobles, citizens, perioeci, artisans, slaves, had to find a 'modus vivendi' with one another. all of them were taught some use of arms. the strength of the family tie was diminished among them by an enforced absence from home and by common meals. sparta had no life or growth; no poetry or tradition of the past; no art, no thought. the athenians started on their great career some centuries later, but the spartans would have been easily conquered by them, if athens had not been deficient in the qualities which constituted the strength (and also the weakness) of her rival. the ideal of athens has been pictured for all time in the speech which thucydides puts into the mouth of pericles, called the funeral oration. he contrasts the activity and freedom and pleasantness of athenian life with the immobility and severe looks and incessant drill of the spartans. the citizens of no city were more versatile, or more readily changed from land to sea or more quickly moved about from place to place. they 'took their pleasures' merrily, and yet, when the time for fighting arrived, were not a whit behind the spartans, who were like men living in a camp, and, though always keeping guard, were often too late for the fray. any foreigner might visit athens; her ships found a way to the most distant shores; the riches of the whole earth poured in upon her. her citizens had their theatres and festivals; they 'provided their souls with many relaxations'; yet they were not less manly than the spartans or less willing to sacrifice this enjoyable existence for their country's good. the athenian was a nobler form of life than that of their rivals, a life of music as well as of gymnastic, the life of a citizen as well as of a soldier. such is the picture which thucydides has drawn of the athenians in their glory. it is the spirit of this life which plato would infuse into the magnesian state and which he seeks to combine with the common meals and gymnastic discipline of sparta. the two great types of athens and sparta had deeply entered into his mind. he had heard of sparta at a distance and from common hellenic fame: he was a citizen of athens and an athenian of noble birth. he must often have sat in the law-courts, and may have had personal experience of the duties of offices such as he is establishing. there is no need to ask the question, whence he derived his knowledge of the laws of athens: they were a part of his daily life. many of his enactments are recognized to be athenian laws from the fragments preserved in the orators and elsewhere: many more would be found to be so if we had better information. probably also still more of them would have been incorporated in the magnesian code, if the work had ever been finally completed. but it seems to have come down to us in a form which is partly finished and partly unfinished, having a beginning and end, but wanting arrangement in the middle. the laws answer to plato's own description of them, in the comparison which he makes of himself and his two friends to gatherers of stones or the beginners of some composite work, 'who are providing materials and partly putting them together:--having some of their laws, like stones, already fixed in their places, while others lie about.' plato's own life coincided with the period at which athens rose to her greatest heights and sank to her lowest depths. it was impossible that he should regard the blessings of democracy in the same light as the men of a former generation, whose view was not intercepted by the evil shadow of the taking of athens, and who had only the glories of marathon and salamis and the administration of pericles to look back upon. on the other hand the fame and prestige of sparta, which had outlived so many crimes and blunders, was not altogether lost at the end of the life of plato. hers was the only great hellenic government which preserved something of its ancient form; and although the spartan citizens were reduced to almost one-tenth of their original number (arist. pol.), she still retained, until the rise of thebes and macedon, a certain authority and predominance due to her final success in the struggle with athens and to the victories which agesilaus won in asia minor. plato, like aristotle, had in his mind some form of a mean state which should escape the evils and secure the advantages of both aristocracy and democracy. it may however be doubted whether the creation of such a state is not beyond the legislator's art, although there have been examples in history of forms of government, which through some community of interest or of origin, through a balance of parties in the state itself, or through the fear of a common enemy, have for a while preserved such a character of moderation. but in general there arises a time in the history of a state when the struggle between the few and the many has to be fought out. no system of checks and balances, such as plato has devised in the laws, could have given equipoise and stability to an ancient state, any more than the skill of the legislator could have withstood the tide of democracy in england or france during the last hundred years, or have given life to china or india. the basis of the magnesian constitution is the equal division of land. in the new state, as in the republic, there was to be neither poverty nor riches. every citizen under all circumstances retained his lot, and as much money as was necessary for the cultivation of it, and no one was allowed to accumulate property to the amount of more than five times the value of the lot, inclusive of it. the equal division of land was a spartan institution, not known to have existed elsewhere in hellas. the mention of it in the laws of plato affords considerable presumption that it was of ancient origin, and not first introduced, as mr. grote and others have imagined, in the reformation of cleomenes iii. but at sparta, if we may judge from the frequent complaints of the accumulation of property in the hands of a few persons (arist. pol.), no provision could have been made for the maintenance of the lot. plutarch indeed speaks of a law introduced by the ephor epitadeus soon after the peloponnesian war, which first allowed the spartans to sell their land (agis): but from the manner in which aristotle refers to the subject, we should imagine this evil in the state to be of a much older standing. like some other countries in which small proprietors have been numerous, the original equality passed into inequality, and, instead of a large middle class, there was probably at sparta greater disproportion in the property of the citizens than in any other state of hellas. plato was aware of the danger, and has improved on the spartan custom. the land, as at sparta, must have been tilled by slaves, since other occupations were found for the citizens. bodies of young men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty were engaged in making biennial peregrinations of the country. they and their officers are to be the magistrates, police, engineers, aediles, of the twelve districts into which the colony was divided. their way of life may be compared with that of the spartan secret police or crypteia, a name which plato freely applies to them without apparently any consciousness of the odium which has attached to the word in history. another great institution which plato borrowed from sparta (or crete) is the syssitia or common meals. these were established in both states, and in some respects were considered by aristotle to be better managed in crete than at lacedaemon (pol.). in the laws the cretan custom appears to be adopted (this is not proved, as hermann supposes ('de vestigiis,' etc.)): that is to say, if we may interpret plato by aristotle, the cost of them was defrayed by the state and not by the individuals (arist. pol); so that the members of the mess, who could not pay their quota, still retained their rights of citizenship. but this explanation is hardly consistent with the laws, where contributions to the syssitia from private estates are expressly mentioned. plato goes further than the legislators of sparta and crete, and would extend the common meals to women as well as men: he desires to curb the disorders, which existed among the female sex in both states, by the application to women of the same military discipline to which the men were already subject. it was an extension of the custom of syssitia from which the ancient legislators shrank, and which plato himself believed to be very difficult of enforcement. like sparta, the new colony was not to be surrounded by walls,--a state should learn to depend upon the bravery of its citizens only--a fallacy or paradox, if it is not to be regarded as a poetical fancy, which is fairly enough ridiculed by aristotle (pol.). women, too, must be ready to assist in the defence of their country: they are not to rush to the temples and altars, but to arm themselves with shield and spear. in the regulation of the syssitia, in at least one of his enactments respecting property, and in the attempt to correct the licence of women, plato shows, that while he borrowed from the institutions of sparta and favoured the spartan mode of life, he also sought to improve upon them. the enmity to the sea is another spartan feature which is transferred by plato to the magnesian state. he did not reflect that a non-maritime power would always be at the mercy of one which had a command of the great highway. their many island homes, the vast extent of coast which had to be protected by them, their struggles first of all with the phoenicians and carthaginians, and secondly with the persian fleets, forced the greeks, mostly against their will, to devote themselves to the sea. the islanders before the inhabitants of the continent, the maritime cities before the inland, the corinthians and athenians before the spartans, were compelled to fit out ships: last of all the spartans, by the pressure of the peloponnesian war, were driven to establish a naval force, which, after the battle of aegospotami, for more than a generation commanded the aegean. plato, like the spartans, had a prejudice against a navy, because he regarded it as the nursery of democracy. but he either never considered, or did not care to explain, how a city, set upon an island and 'distant not more than ten miles from the sea, having a seaboard provided with excellent harbours,' could have safely subsisted without one. neither the spartans nor the magnesian colonists were permitted to engage in trade or commerce. in order to limit their dealings as far as possible to their own country, they had a separate coinage; the magnesians were only allowed to use the common currency of hellas when they travelled abroad, which they were forbidden to do unless they received permission from the government. like the spartans, plato was afraid of the evils which might be introduced into his state by intercourse with foreigners; but he also shrinks from the utter exclusiveness of sparta, and is not unwilling to allow visitors of a suitable age and rank to come from other states to his own, as he also allows citizens of his own state to go to foreign countries and bring back a report of them. such international communication seemed to him both honourable and useful. we may now notice some points in which the commonwealth of the laws approximates to the athenian model. these are much more numerous than the previous class of resemblances; we are better able to compare the laws of plato with those of athens, because a good deal more is known to us of athens than of sparta. the information which we possess about athenian law, though comparatively fuller, is still fragmentary. the sources from which our knowledge is derived are chiefly the following:-(1) the orators,--antiphon, andocides, lysias, isocrates, demosthenes, aeschines, lycurgus, and others. (2) herodotus, thucydides, xenophon, plato, aristotle, as well as later writers, such as cicero de legibus, plutarch, aelian, pausanias. (3) lexicographers, such as harpocration, pollux, hesychius, suidas, and the compiler of the etymologicum magnum, many of whom are of uncertain date, and to a great extent based upon one another. their writings extend altogether over more than eight hundred years, from the second to the tenth century. (4) the scholia on aristophanes, plato, demosthenes. (5) a few inscriptions. our knowledge of a subject derived from such various sources and for the most part of uncertain date and origin, is necessarily precarious. no critic can separate the actual laws of solon from those which passed under his name in later ages. nor do the scholiasts and lexicographers attempt to distinguish how many of these laws were still in force at the time when they wrote, or when they fell into disuse and were to be found in books only. nor can we hastily assume that enactments which occur in the laws of plato were also a part of athenian law, however probable this may appear. there are two classes of similarities between plato's laws and those of athens: (i) of institutions (ii) of minor enactments. (i) the constitution of the laws in its general character resembles much more nearly the athenian constitution of solon's time than that which succeeded it, or the extreme democracy which prevailed in plato's own day. it was a mean state which he hoped to create, equally unlike a syracusan tyranny or the mob-government of the athenian assembly. there are various expedients by which he sought to impart to it the quality of moderation. (1) the whole people were to be educated: they could not be all trained in philosophy, but they were to acquire the simple elements of music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; they were also to be subject to military discipline, archontes kai archomenoi. (2) the majority of them were, or had been at some time in their lives, magistrates, and had the experience which is given by office. (3) the persons who held the highest offices were to have a further education, not much inferior to that provided for the guardians in the republic, though the range of their studies is narrowed to the nature and divisions of virtue: here their philosophy comes to an end. (4) the entire number of the citizens (5040) rarely, if ever, assembled, except for purposes of elections. the whole people were divided into four classes, each having the right to be represented by the same number of members in the council. the result of such an arrangement would be, as in the constitution of servius tullius, to give a disproportionate share of power to the wealthier classes, who may be supposed to be always much fewer in number than the poorer. this tendency was qualified by the complicated system of selection by vote, previous to the final election by lot, of which the object seems to be to hand over to the wealthy few the power of selecting from the many poor, and vice versa. (5) the most important body in the state was the nocturnal council, which is borrowed from the areopagus at athens, as it existed, or was supposed to have existed, in the days before ephialtes and the eumenides of aeschylus, when its power was undiminished. in some particulars plato appears to have copied exactly the customs and procedure of the areopagus: both assemblies sat at night (telfy). there was a resemblance also in more important matters. like the areopagus, the nocturnal council was partly composed of magistrates and other state officials, whose term of office had expired. (7) the constitution included several diverse and even opposing elements, such as the assembly and the nocturnal council. (8) there was much less exclusiveness than at sparta; the citizens were to have an interest in the government of neighbouring states, and to know what was going on in the rest of the world.--all these were moderating influences. a striking similarity between athens and the constitution of the magnesian colony is the use of the lot in the election of judges and other magistrates. that such a mode of election should have been resorted to in any civilized state, or that it should have been transferred by plato to an ideal or imaginary one, is very singular to us. the most extreme democracy of modern times has never thought of leaving government wholly to chance. it was natural that socrates should scoff at it, and ask, 'who would choose a pilot or carpenter or flute-player by lot' (xen. mem.)? yet there were many considerations which made this mode of choice attractive both to the oligarch and to the democrat:--(1) it seemed to recognize that one man was as good as another, and that all the members of the governing body, whether few or many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word. (2) to the pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven (compare laws). (3) it afforded a protection against corruption and intrigue...it must also be remembered that, although elected by lot, the persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered on their office, and were therefore liable, after election, if disqualified, to be rejected (laws). they were, moreover, liable to be called to account after the expiration of their office. in the election of councillors plato introduces a further check: they are not to be chosen directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body previously elected by vote. in plato's state at least, as we may infer from his silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed their duties without pay, which was a guarantee both of their disinterestedness and of their belonging probably to the higher class of citizens (compare arist. pol.). hence we are not surprised that the use of the lot prevailed, not only in the election of the athenian council, but also in many oligarchies, and even in plato's colony. the evil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if the magistrates so elected do not, like the dicasts at athens, receive pay from the state. another parallel is that of the popular assembly, which at athens was omnipotent, but in the laws has only a faded and secondary existence. in plato it was chiefly an elective body, having apparently no judicial and little political power entrusted to it. at athens it was the mainspring of the democracy; it had the decision of war or peace, of life and death; the acts of generals or statesmen were authorized or condemned by it; no office or person was above its control. plato was far from allowing such a despotic power to exist in his model community, and therefore he minimizes the importance of the assembly and narrows its functions. he probably never asked himself a question, which naturally occurs to the modern reader, where was to be the central authority in this new community, and by what supreme power would the differences of inferior powers be decided. at the same time he magnifies and brings into prominence the nocturnal council (which is in many respects a reflection of the areopagus), but does not make it the governing body of the state. between the judicial system of the laws and that of athens there was very great similarity, and a difference almost equally great. plato not unfrequently adopts the details when he rejects the principle. at athens any citizen might be a judge and member of the great court of the heliaea. this was ordinarily subdivided into a number of inferior courts, but an occasion is recorded on which the whole body, in number six thousand, met in a single court (andoc. de myst.). plato significantly remarks that a few judges, if they are good, are better than a great number. he also, at least in capital cases, confines the plaintiff and defendant to a single speech each, instead of allowing two apiece, as was the common practice at athens. on the other hand, in all private suits he gives two appeals, from the arbiters to the courts of the tribes, and from the courts of the tribes to the final or supreme court. there was nothing answering to this at athens. the three courts were appointed in the following manner:--the arbiters were to be agreed upon by the parties to the cause; the judges of the tribes to be elected by lot; the highest tribunal to be chosen at the end of each year by the great officers of state out of their own number--they were to serve for a year, to undergo a scrutiny, and, unlike the athenian judges, to vote openly. plato does not dwell upon methods of procedure: these are the lesser matters which he leaves to the younger legislators. in cases of murder and some other capital offences, the cause was to be tried by a special tribunal, as was the custom at athens: military offences, too, as at athens, were decided by the soldiers. public causes in the laws, as sometimes at athens, were voted upon by the whole people: because, as plato remarks, they are all equally concerned in them. they were to be previously investigated by three of the principal magistrates. he believes also that in private suits all should take part; 'for he who has no share in the administration of justice is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all.' the wardens of the country, like the forty at athens, also exercised judicial power in small matters, as well as the wardens of the agora and city. the department of justice is better organized in plato than in an ordinary greek state, proceeding more by regular methods, and being more restricted to distinct duties. the executive of plato's laws, like the athenian, was different from that of a modern civilized state. the difference chiefly consists in this, that whereas among ourselves there are certain persons or classes of persons set apart for the execution of the duties of government, in ancient greece, as in all other communities in the earlier stages of their development, they were not equally distinguished from the rest of the citizens. the machinery of government was never so well organized as in the best modern states. the judicial department was not so completely separated from the legislative, nor the executive from the judicial, nor the people at large from the professional soldier, lawyer, or priest. to aristotle (pol.) it was a question requiring serious consideration--who should execute a sentence? there was probably no body of police to whom were entrusted the lives and properties of the citizens in any hellenic state. hence it might be reasonably expected that every man should be the watchman of every other, and in turn be watched by him. the ancients do not seem to have remembered the homely adage that, 'what is every man's business is no man's business,' or always to have thought of applying the principle of a division of labour to the administration of law and to government. every athenian was at some time or on some occasion in his life a magistrate, judge, advocate, soldier, sailor, policeman. he had not necessarily any private business; a good deal of his time was taken up with the duties of office and other public occupations. so, too, in plato's laws. a citizen was to interfere in a quarrel, if older than the combatants, or to defend the outraged party, if his junior. he was especially bound to come to the rescue of a parent who was ill-treated by his children. he was also required to prosecute the murderer of a kinsman. in certain cases he was allowed to arrest an offender. he might even use violence to an abusive person. any citizen who was not less than thirty years of age at times exercised a magisterial authority, to be enforced even by blows. both in the magnesian state and at athens many thousand persons must have shared in the highest duties of government, if a section only of the council, consisting of thirty or of fifty persons, as in the laws, or at athens after the days of cleisthenes, held office for a month, or for thirty-five days only. it was almost as if, in our own country, the ministry or the houses of parliament were to change every month. the average ability of the athenian and magnesian councillors could not have been very high, considering there were so many of them. and yet they were entrusted with the performance of the most important executive duties. in these respects the constitution of the laws resembles athens far more than sparta. all the citizens were to be, not merely soldiers, but politicians and administrators. (ii) there are numerous minor particulars in which the laws of plato resemble those of athens. these are less interesting than the preceding, but they show even more strikingly how closely in the composition of his work plato has followed the laws and customs of his own country. (1) evidence. (a) at athens a child was not allowed to give evidence (telfy). plato has a similar law: 'a child shall be allowed to give evidence only in cases of murder.' (b) at athens an unwilling witness might be summoned; but he was not required to appear if he was ready to declare on oath that he knew nothing about the matter in question (telfy). so in the laws. (c) athenian law enacted that when more than half the witnesses in a case had been convicted of perjury, there was to be a new trial (anadikos krisis--telfy). there is a similar provision in the laws. (d) false-witness was punished at athens by atimia and a fine (telfy). plato is at once more lenient and more severe: 'if a man be twice convicted of false-witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he has been convicted three times,...he shall be punished with death.' (2) murder. (a) wilful murder was punished in athenian law by death, perpetual exile, and confiscation of property (telfy). plato, too, has the alternative of death or exile, but he does not confiscate the murderer's property. (b) the parricide was not allowed to escape by going into exile at athens (telfy), nor, apparently, in the laws. (c) a homicide, if forgiven by his victim before death, received no punishment, either at athens (telfy), or in the magnesian state. in both (telfy) the contriver of a murder is punished as severely as the doer; and persons accused of the crime are forbidden to enter temples or the agora until they have been tried (telfy). (d) at athens slaves who killed their masters and were caught red-handed, were not to be put to death by the relations of the murdered man, but to be handed over to the magistrates (telfy). so in the laws, the slave who is guilty of wilful murder has a public execution: but if the murder is committed in anger, it is punished by the kinsmen of the victim. (3) involuntary homicide. (a) the guilty person, according to the athenian law, had to go into exile, and might not return, until the family of the man slain were conciliated. then he must be purified (telfy). if he is caught before he has obtained forgiveness, he may be put to death. these enactments reappear in the laws. (b) the curious provision of plato, that a stranger who has been banished for involuntary homicide and is subsequently wrecked upon the coast, must 'take up his abode on the sea-shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing,' recalls the procedure of the judicium phreatteum at athens, according to which an involuntary homicide, who, having gone into exile, is accused of a wilful murder, was tried at phreatto for this offence in a boat by magistrates on the shore. (c) a still more singular law, occurring both in the athenian and magnesian code, enacts that a stone or other inanimate object which kills a man is to be tried, and cast over the border (telfy). (4) justifiable or excusable homicide. plato and athenian law agree in making homicide justifiable or excusable in the following cases:--(1) at the games (telfy); (2) in war (telfy); (3) if the person slain was found doing violence to a free woman (telfy); (4) if a doctor's patient dies; (5) in the case of a robber (telfy); (6) in self-defence (telfy). (5) impiety. death or expulsion was the athenian penalty for impiety (telfy). in the laws it is punished in various cases by imprisonment for five years, for life, and by death. (6) sacrilege. robbery of temples at athens was punished by death, refusal of burial in the land, and confiscation of property (telfy). in the laws the citizen who is guilty of such a crime is to 'perish ingloriously and be cast beyond the borders of the land,' but his property is not confiscated. (7) sorcery. the sorcerer at athens was to be executed (telfy): compare laws, where it is enacted that the physician who poisons and the professional sorcerer shall be punished with death. (8) treason. both at athens and in the laws the penalty for treason was death (telfy), and refusal of burial in the country (telfy). (9) sheltering exiles. 'if a man receives an exile, he shall be punished with death.' so, too, in athenian law (telfy.). (10) wounding. athenian law compelled a man who had wounded another to go into exile; if he returned, he was to be put to death (telfy). plato only punishes the offence with death when children wound their parents or one another, or a slave wounds his master. (11) bribery. death was the punishment for taking a bribe, both at athens (telfy) and in the laws; but athenian law offered an alternative--the payment of a fine of ten times the amount of the bribe. (12) theft. plato, like athenian law (telfy), punishes the theft of public property by death; the theft of private property in both involves a fine of double the value of the stolen goods (telfy). (13) suicide. he 'who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend,' is regarded in the same spirit by plato and by athenian law. plato would have him 'buried ingloriously on the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless,' and 'no column or inscription is to mark the place of his interment.' athenian law enacted that the hand which did the deed should be separated from the body and be buried apart (telfy). (14) injury. in cases of wilful injury, athenian law compelled the guilty person to pay double the damage; in cases of involuntary injury, simple damages (telfy). plato enacts that if a man wounds another in passion, and the wound is curable, he shall pay double the damage, if incurable or disfiguring, fourfold damages. if, however, the wounding is accidental, he shall simply pay for the harm done. (15) treatment of parents. athenian law allowed any one to indict another for neglect or illtreatment of parents (telfy). so plato bids bystanders assist a father who is assaulted by his son, and allows any one to give information against children who neglect their parents. (16) execution of sentences. both plato and athenian law give to the winner of a suit power to seize the goods of the loser, if he does not pay within the appointed time (telfy). at athens the penalty was also doubled (telfy); not so in plato. plato however punishes contempt of court by death, which at athens seems only to have been visited with a further fine (telfy). (17) property. (a) both at athens and in the laws a man who has disputed property in his possession must give the name of the person from whom he received it (telfy); and any one searching for lost property must enter a house naked (telfy), or, as plato says, 'naked, or wearing only a short tunic and without a girdle. (b) athenian law, as well as plato, did not allow a father to disinherit his son without good reason and the consent of impartial persons (telfy). neither grants to the eldest son any special claim on the paternal estate (telfy). in the law of inheritance both prefer males to females (telfy). (c) plato and athenian law enacted that a tree should be planted at a fair distance from a neighbour's property (telfy), and that when a man could not get water, his neighbour must supply him (telfy). both at athens and in plato there is a law about bees, the former providing that a beehive must be set up at not less a distance than 300 feet from a neighbour's (telfy), and the latter forbidding the decoying of bees. (18) orphans. a ward must proceed against a guardian whom he suspects of fraud within five years of the expiration of the guardianship. this provision is common to plato and to athenian law (telfy). further, the latter enacted that the nearest male relation should marry or provide a husband for an heiress (telfy),--a point in which plato follows it closely. (19) contracts. plato's law that 'when a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance,--the other party may go to law with him,' according to pollux (quoted in telfy's note) prevailed also at athens. (20) trade regulations. (a) lying was forbidden in the agora both by plato and at athens (telfy). (b) athenian law allowed an action of recovery against a man who sold an unsound slave as sound (telfy). plato's enactment is more explicit: he allows only an unskilled person (i.e. one who is not a trainer or physician) to take proceedings in such a case. (c) plato diverges from athenian practice in the disapproval of credit, and does not even allow the supply of goods on the deposit of a percentage of their value (telfy). he enacts that 'when goods are exchanged by buying and selling, a man shall deliver them and receive the price of them at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter,' and that 'he who gives credit must be satisfied whether he obtain his money or not, for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law. (d) athenian law forbad an extortionate rate of interest (telfy); plato allows interest in one case only--if a contractor does not receive the price of his work within a year of the time agreed--and at the rate of 200 per cent. per annum for every drachma a monthly interest of an obol. (e) both at athens and in the laws sales were to be registered (telfy), as well as births (telfy). (21) sumptuary laws. extravagance at weddings (telfy), and at funerals (telfy) was forbidden at athens and also in the magnesian state. there remains the subject of family life, which in plato's laws partakes both of an athenian and spartan character. under this head may conveniently be included the condition of women and of slaves. to family life may be added citizenship. as at sparta, marriages are to be contracted for the good of the state; and they may be dissolved on the same ground, where there is a failure of issue,--the interest of the state requiring that every one of the 5040 lots should have an heir. divorces are likewise permitted by plato where there is an incompatibility of temper, as at athens by mutual consent. the duty of having children is also enforced by a still higher motive, expressed by plato in the noble words:--'a man should cling to immortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants of god in his place.' again, as at athens, the father is allowed to put away his undutiful son, but only with the consent of impartial persons (telfy), and the only suit which may be brought by a son against a father is for imbecility. the class of elder and younger men and women are still to regard one another, as in the republic, as standing in the relation of parents and children. this is a trait of spartan character rather than of athenian. a peculiar sanctity and tenderness was to be shown towards the aged; the parent or grandparent stricken with years was to be loved and worshipped like the image of a god, and was to be deemed far more able than any lifeless statue to bring good or ill to his descendants. great care is to be taken of orphans: they are entrusted to the fifteen eldest guardians of the law, who are to be 'lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural fathers,' as at athens they were entrusted to the archons. plato wishes to make the misfortune of orphanhood as little sad to them as possible. plato, seeing the disorder into which half the human race had fallen at athens and sparta, is minded to frame for them a new rule of life. he renounces his fanciful theory of communism, but still desires to place women as far as possible on an equality with men. they were to be trained in the use of arms, they are to live in public. their time was partly taken up with gymnastic exercises; there could have been little family or private life among them. their lot was to be neither like that of spartan women, who were made hard and common by excessive practice of gymnastic and the want of all other education,--nor yet like that of athenian women, who, at least among the upper classes, retired into a sort of oriental seclusion,--but something better than either. they were to be the perfect mothers of perfect children, yet not wholly taken up with the duties of motherhood, which were to be made easy to them as far as possible (compare republic), but able to share in the perils of war and to be the companions of their husbands. here, more than anywhere else, the spirit of the laws reverts to the republic. in speaking of them as the companions of their husbands we must remember that it is an athenian and not a spartan way of life which they are invited to share, a life of gaiety and brightness, not of austerity and abstinence, which often by a reaction degenerated into licence and grossness. in plato's age the subject of slavery greatly interested the minds of thoughtful men; and how best to manage this 'troublesome piece of goods' exercised his own mind a good deal. he admits that they have often been found better than brethren or sons in the hour of danger, and are capable of rendering important public services by informing against offenders--for this they are to be rewarded; and the master who puts a slave to death for the sake of concealing some crime which he has committed, is held guilty of murder. but they are not always treated with equal consideration. the punishments inflicted on them bear no proportion to their crimes. they are to be addressed only in the language of command. their masters are not to jest with them, lest they should increase the hardship of their lot. some privileges were granted to them by athenian law of which there is no mention in plato; they were allowed to purchase their freedom from their master, and if they despaired of being liberated by him they could demand to be sold, on the chance of falling into better hands. but there is no suggestion in the laws that a slave who tried to escape should be branded with the words--kateche me, pheugo, or that evidence should be extracted from him by torture, that the whole household was to be executed if the master was murdered and the perpetrator remained undetected: all these were provisions of athenian law. plato is more consistent than either the athenians or the spartans; for at sparta too the helots were treated in a manner almost unintelligible to us. on the one hand, they had arms put into their hands, and served in the army, not only, as at plataea, in attendance on their masters, but, after they had been manumitted, as a separate body of troops called neodamodes: on the other hand, they were the victims of one of the greatest crimes recorded in greek history (thucyd.). the two great philosophers of hellas sought to extricate themselves from this cruel condition of human life, but acquiesced in the necessity of it. a noble and pathetic sentiment of plato, suggested by the thought of their misery, may be quoted in this place:--'the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. and he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors.' all the citizens of the magnesian state were free and equal; there was no distinction of rank among them, such as is believed to have prevailed at sparta. their number was a fixed one, corresponding to the 5040 lots. one of the results of this is the requirement that younger sons or those who have been disinherited shall go out to a colony. at athens, where there was not the same religious feeling against increasing the size of the city, the number of citizens must have been liable to considerable fluctuations. several classes of persons, who were not citizens by birth, were admitted to the privilege. perpetual exiles from other countries, people who settled there to practise a trade (telfy), any one who had shown distinguished valour in the cause of athens, the plataeans who escaped from the siege, metics and strangers who offered to serve in the army, the slaves who fought at arginusae,--all these could or did become citizens. even those who were only on one side of athenian parentage were at more than one period accounted citizens. but at times there seems to have arisen a feeling against this promiscuous extension of the citizen body, an expression of which is to be found in the law of pericles--monous athenaious einai tous ek duoin athenaion gegonotas (plutarch, pericles); and at no time did the adopted citizen enjoy the full rights of citizenship--e.g. he might not be elected archon or to the office of priest (telfy), although this prohibition did not extend to his children, if born of a citizen wife. plato never thinks of making the metic, much less the slave, a citizen. his treatment of the former class is at once more gentle and more severe than that which prevailed at athens. he imposes upon them no tax but good behaviour, whereas at athens they were required to pay twelve drachmae per annum, and to have a patron: on the other hand, he only allows them to reside in the magnesian state on condition of following a trade; they were required to depart when their property exceeded that of the third class, and in any case after a residence of twenty years, unless they could show that they had conferred some great benefit on the state. this privileged position reflects that of the isoteleis at athens, who were excused from the metoikion. it is plato's greatest concession to the metic, as the bestowal of freedom is his greatest concession to the slave. lastly, there is a more general point of view under which the laws of plato may be considered,--the principles of jurisprudence which are contained in them. these are not formally announced, but are scattered up and down, to be observed by the reflective reader for himself. some of them are only the common principles which all courts of justice have gathered from experience; others are peculiar and characteristic. that judges should sit at fixed times and hear causes in a regular order, that evidence should be laid before them, that false witnesses should be disallowed, and corruption punished, that defendants should be heard before they are convicted,--these are the rules, not only of the hellenic courts, but of courts of law in all ages and countries. but there are also points which are peculiar, and in which ancient jurisprudence differs considerably from modern; some of them are of great importance...it could not be said at athens, nor was it ever contemplated by plato, that all men, including metics and slaves, should be equal 'in the eye of the law.' there was some law for the slave, but not much; no adequate protection was given him against the cruelty of his master...it was a singular privilege granted, both by the athenian and magnesian law, to a murdered man, that he might, before he died, pardon his murderer, in which case no legal steps were afterwards to be taken against him. this law is the remnant of an age in which the punishment of offences against the person was the concern rather of the individual and his kinsmen than of the state...plato's division of crimes into voluntary and involuntary and those done from passion, only partially agrees with the distinction which modern law has drawn between murder and manslaughter; his attempt to analyze them is confused by the socratic paradox, that 'all vice is involuntary'...it is singular that both in the laws and at athens theft is commonly punished by a twofold restitution of the article stolen. the distinction between civil and criminal courts or suits was not yet recognized...possession gives a right of property after a certain time...the religious aspect under which certain offences were regarded greatly interfered with a just and natural estimate of their guilt...as among ourselves, the intent to murder was distinguished by plato from actual murder...we note that both in plato and the laws of athens, libel in the market-place and personality in the theatre were forbidden...both in plato and athenian law, as in modern times, the accomplice of a crime is to be punished as well as the principal...plato does not allow a witness in a cause to act as a judge of it...oaths are not to be taken by the parties to a suit...both at athens and in plato's laws capital punishment for murder was not to be inflicted, if the offender was willing to go into exile...respect for the dead, duty towards parents, are to be enforced by the law as well as by public opinion...plato proclaims the noble sentiment that the object of all punishment is the improvement of the offender... finally, he repeats twice over, as with the voice of a prophet, that the crimes of the fathers are not to be visited upon the children. in this respect he is nobly distinguished from the oriental, and indeed from the spirit of athenian law (compare telfy,--dei kai autous kai tous ek touton atimous einai), as the hebrew in the age of ezekial is from the jewish people of former ages. of all plato's provisions the object is to bring the practice of the law more into harmony with reason and philosophy; to secure impartiality, and while acknowledging that every citizen has a right to share in the administration of justice, to counteract the tendency of the courts to become mere popular assemblies. ... thus we have arrived at the end of the writings of plato, and at the last stage of philosophy which was really his. for in what followed, which we chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of aristotle, the spirit of the master no longer survived. the doctrine of ideas passed into one of numbers; instead of advancing from the abstract to the concrete, the theories of plato were taken out of their context, and either asserted or refuted with a provoking literalism; the socratic or platonic element in his teaching was absorbed into the pythagorean or megarian. his poetry was converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial visions were assailed secundum artem by the rules of logic. his political speculations lost their interest when the freedom of hellas had passed away. of all his writings the laws were the furthest removed from the traditions of the platonic school in the next generation. both his political and his metaphysical philosophy are for the most part misinterpreted by aristotle. the best of him--his love of truth, and his 'contemplation of all time and all existence,' was soonest lost; and some of his greatest thoughts have slept in the ear of mankind almost ever since they were first uttered. we have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, from the beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of socrates in a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character of socrates had disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of plato's own mind upon hellas and upon philosophy. he, who was 'the last of the poets,' in his book of laws writes prose only; he has himself partly fallen under the rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was combating. the progress of his writings is also the history of his life; we have no other authentic life of him. they are the true self of the philosopher, stripped of the accidents of time and place. the great effort which he makes is, first, to realize abstractions, secondly, to connect them. in the attempt to realize them, he was carried into a transcendental region in which he isolated them from experience, and we pass out of the range of science into poetry or fiction. the fancies of mythology for a time cast a veil over the gulf which divides phenomena from onta (meno, phaedrus, symposium, phaedo). in his return to earth plato meets with a difficulty which has long ceased to be a difficulty to us. he cannot understand how these obstinate, unmanageable ideas, residing alone in their heaven of abstraction, can be either combined with one another, or adapted to phenomena (parmenides, philebus, sophist). that which is the most familiar process of our own minds, to him appeared to be the crowning achievement of the dialectical art. the difficulty which in his own generation threatened to be the destruction of philosophy, he has rendered unmeaning and ridiculous. for by his conquests in the world of mind our thoughts are widened, and he has furnished us with new dialectical instruments which are of greater compass and power. we have endeavoured to see him as he truly was, a great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of knowledge, not prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of dialogues ideas which he had long conceived, but contradictory, enquiring as he goes along, following the argument, first from one point of view and then from another, and therefore arriving at opposite conclusions, hovering around the light, and sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but always moving in the same element of ideal truth. we have seen him also in his decline, when the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but his experience of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation of the eternal to take a last sad look at human affairs. ... and so having brought into the world 'noble children' (phaedr.), he rests from the labours of authorship. more than two thousand two hundred years have passed away since he returned to the place of apollo and the muses. yet the echo of his words continues to be heard among men, because of all philosophers he has the most melodious voice. he is the inspired prophet or teacher who can never die, the only one in whom the outward form adequately represents the fair soul within; in whom the thoughts of all who went before him are reflected and of all who come after him are partly anticipated. other teachers of philosophy are dried up and withered,--after a few centuries they have become dust; but he is fresh and blooming, and is always begetting new ideas in the minds of men. they are one-sided and abstract; but he has many sides of wisdom. nor is he always consistent with himself, because he is always moving onward, and knows that there are many more things in philosophy than can be expressed in words, and that truth is greater than consistency. he who approaches him in the most reverent spirit shall reap most of the fruit of his wisdom; he who reads him by the light of ancient commentators will have the least understanding of him. we may see him with the eye of the mind in the groves of the academy, or on the banks of the ilissus, or in the streets of athens, alone or walking with socrates, full of those thoughts which have since become the common possession of mankind. or we may compare him to a statue hid away in some temple of zeus or apollo, no longer existing on earth, a statue which has a look as of the god himself. or we may once more imagine him following in another state of being the great company of heaven which he beheld of old in a vision (phaedr.). so, 'partly trifling, but with a certain degree of seriousness' (symp.), we linger around the memory of a world which has passed away (phaedr.). laws book i. persons of the dialogue: an athenian stranger, cleinias (a cretan), megillus (a lacedaemonian). athenian: tell me, strangers, is a god or some man supposed to be the author of your laws? cleinias: a god, stranger; in very truth a god: among us cretans he is said to have been zeus, but in lacedaemon, whence our friend here comes, i believe they would say that apollo is their lawgiver: would they not, megillus? megillus: certainly. athenian: and do you, cleinias, believe, as homer tells, that every ninth year minos went to converse with his olympian sire, and was inspired by him to make laws for your cities? cleinias: yes, that is our tradition; and there was rhadamanthus, a brother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he is reputed to have been the justest of men, and we cretans are of opinion that he earned this reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was alive. athenian: yes, and a noble reputation it was, worthy of a son of zeus. as you and megillus have been trained in these institutions, i dare say that you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government and laws; on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them, for i am told that the distance from cnosus to the cave and temple of zeus is considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under the lofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun. being no longer young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and get over the whole journey without difficulty, beguiling the time by conversation. cleinias: yes, stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green meadows, in which we may repose and converse. athenian: very good. cleinias: very good, indeed; and still better when we see them; let us move on cheerily. athenian: i am willing--and first, i want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms. cleinias: i think, stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to any one. look at the character of our country: crete is not like thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horsemen in thessaly, and we have runners--the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have runners you must have light arms--no one can carry a heavy weight when running, and bows and arrows are convenient because they are light. now all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to this in all his arrangements:--the common meals, if i am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the case compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection. he seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always at war with one another; and if in war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly appointed under others to protect an army, they should be continued in peace. for what men in general term peace would be said by him to be only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. and if you look closely, you will find that this was the intention of the cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view to war; in giving them he was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors. athenian: you appear to me, stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in the cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? you seem to imagine that a well-governed state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am i right in supposing this to be your meaning? cleinias: certainly; and our lacedaemonian friend, if i am not mistaken, will agree with me. megillus: why, my good friend, how could any lacedaemonian say anything else? athenian: and is what you say applicable only to states, or also to villages? cleinias: to both alike. athenian: the case is the same? cleinias: yes. athenian: and in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual? cleinias: the same. athenian: and should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy:--what shall we say? cleinias: o athenian stranger--inhabitant of attica i will not call you, for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself, because you go back to first principles,--you have thrown a light upon the argument, and will now be better able to understand what i was just saying,--that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man privately his own. (athenian: my good sir, what do you mean?)-cleinias:...moreover, there is a victory and defeat--the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats--which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us. athenian: let us now reverse the order of the argument: seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state? cleinias: you mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self? athenian: yes. cleinias: you are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case. athenian: whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the present. but i now quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good. cleinias: your remark, stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly deny it. athenian: here is another case for consideration;--in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority. cleinias: very possibly. athenian: and you and i ought not to raise a question of words as to whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when they conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not now considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws. cleinias: what you say, stranger, is most true. megillus: quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone. athenian: again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking? cleinias: certainly. athenian: now, which would be the better judge--one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? or third, i suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends. cleinias: the last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator. athenian: and yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war. cleinias: very true. athenian: and will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, every one would wish to be quit of as soon as possible? cleinias: he would have the latter chiefly in view. athenian: and would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established, and that, being reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies? cleinias: every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state. athenian: and would not that also be the desire of the legislator? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and would not every one always make laws for the sake of the best? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: but war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. and in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace. cleinias: i suppose that there is truth, stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet i am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our own institutions, and also of the lacedaemonian. athenian: i dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest. please follow me and the argument closely:--and first i will put forward tyrtaeus, an athenian by birth, but also a spartan citizen, who of all men was most eager about war: well, he says, 'i sing not, i care not, about any man, even if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and then he gives a whole list of them), if he be not at all times a brave warrior.' i imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our lacedaemonian friend has probably heard more than enough of them. megillus: very true. cleinias: and they have found their way from lacedaemon to crete. athenian: come now and let us all join in asking this question of tyrtaeus: o most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and i and megillus and cleinias of cnosus do, as i believe, entirely agree with you. but we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say? a far inferior man to tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds,--one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of warfare. cleinias: certainly, far milder. athenian: well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are you referring? i suppose that you must mean foreign war, if i am to judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those 'who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at their enemies.' and we shall naturally go on to say to him,--you, tyrtaeus, as it seems, praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and he must admit this. cleinias: evidently. athenian: they are good; but we say that there are still better men whose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. and we too have a poet whom we summon as a witness, theognis, citizen of megara in sicily: 'cyrnus,' he says, 'he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight in gold and silver.' and such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. but in the war of which tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. you will ask what the conclusion is, and what i am seeking to prove: i maintain that the divine legislator of crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. whereas, that virtue which tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth rate (i.e., it ranks after justice, temperance, and wisdom.). cleinias: stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank which is far beneath him. athenian: nay, i think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that lycurgus and minos laid down laws both in lacedaemon and crete mainly with a view to war. cleinias: what ought we to say then? athenian: what truth and what justice require of us, if i am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence;--that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters. but we maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and i admired the spirit of your exposition; for you were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but i thought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of virtue, and this called forth my subsequent remarks. will you allow me then to explain how i should have liked to have heard you expound the matter? cleinias: by all means. athenian: you ought to have said, stranger--the cretan laws are with reason famous among the hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every sort of good. now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the greater, has neither. of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god (pluto), but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion. for wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. all these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another, and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of each. in the next place, the legislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all this, and consider where justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. and the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things,--some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition. this is the spirit, stranger, in which i was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. and i want to know the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in the laws of zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the pythian apollo, which minos and lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by study or habit, although they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves. cleinias: how shall we proceed, stranger? athenian: i think that we must begin again as before, and first consider the habit of courage; and then we will go on and discuss another and then another form of virtue, if you please. in this way we shall have a model of the whole; and with these and similar discourses we will beguile the way. and when we have gone through all the virtues, we will show, by the grace of god, that the institutions of which i was speaking look to virtue. megillus: very good; and suppose that you first criticize this praiser of zeus and the laws of crete. athenian: i will try to criticize you and myself, as well as him, for the argument is a common concern. tell me,--were not first the syssitia, and secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war? megillus: yes. athenian: and what comes third, and what fourth? for that, i think, is the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the remaining parts of virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is, provided the meaning is clear. megillus: then i, or any other lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is third in order. athenian: let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth. megillus: i think that i can get as far as the fourth head, which is the frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us spartans in certain hand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a good beating; there is, too, the so-called crypteia, or secret service, in which wonderful endurance is shown,--our people wander over the whole country by day and by night, and even in winter have not a shoe to their foot, and are without beds to lie upon, and have to attend upon themselves. marvellous, too, is the endurance which our citizens show in their naked exercises, contending against the violent summer heat; and there are many similar practices, to speak of which in detail would be endless. athenian: excellent, o lacedaemonian stranger. but how ought we to define courage? is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax? megillus: i should say the latter. athenian: in what preceded, as you will remember, our cnosian friend was speaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves:--were you not, cleinias? cleinias: i was. athenian: now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain? cleinias: i should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is overcome by pain. athenian: but surely the lawgivers of crete and lacedaemon have not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right? cleinias: able to meet both, i should say. athenian: then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them, and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the better of them? where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws? tell me what there is of this nature among you:--what is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home? megillus: i was able to tell you, stranger, many laws which were directed against pain; but i do not know that i can point out any great or obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there are some lesser provisions, however, which i might mention. cleinias: neither can i show anything of that sort which is at all equally prominent in the cretan laws. athenian: no wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws of the others, we must not be offended, but take kindly what another says. cleinias: you are quite right, athenian stranger, and we will do as you say. athenian: at our time of life, cleinias, there should be no feeling of irritation. cleinias: certainly not. athenian: i will not at present determine whether he who censures the cretan or lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. but i believe that i can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. for assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will be the law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are right or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree that the laws are all good, for they came from god; and any one who says the contrary is not to be listened to. but an old man who remarks any defect in your laws may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no young man is present. cleinias: exactly so, stranger; and like a diviner, although not there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator, and to say what is most true. athenian: as there are no young men present, and the legislator has given old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these very matters now that we are alone. cleinias: true. and therefore you may be as free as you like in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong; he who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be all the better for it. athenian: very good; however, i am not going to say anything against your laws until to the best of my ability i have examined them, but i am going to raise doubts about them. for you are the only people known to us, whether greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amusements and never to touch them; whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided pains and fears and sorrows, when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were hardened in them, and would become their subjects. now the legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure; he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasures, and unused to endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear would overcome the former class; and in another, and even a worse manner, they will be the slaves of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. one half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free; and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen. tell me whether you assent to my words? cleinias: on first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters would be very childish and simple. athenian: suppose, cleinias and megillus, that we consider the virtue which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after courage comes temperance), what institutions shall we find relating to temperance, either in crete or lacedaemon, which, like your military institutions, differ from those of any ordinary state. megillus: that is not an easy question to answer; still i should say that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised for the promotion both of temperance and courage. athenian: there seems to be a difficulty, stranger, with regard to states, in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no dispute about them. as in the human body, the regimen which does good in one way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that any one course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. now the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of the milesian, and boeotian, and thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the beasts. the charge may be fairly brought against your cities above all others, and is true also of most other states which especially cultivate gymnastics. whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously, i think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse between men and women; but that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust. the cretans are always accused of having invented the story of ganymede and zeus because they wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. leaving the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in individuals: these are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from them where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this holds of men and animals--of individuals as well as states; and he who indulges in them ignorantly and at the wrong time, is the reverse of happy. megillus: i admit, stranger, that your words are well spoken, and i hardly know what to say in answer to you; but still i think that the spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. of the cretan laws, i shall leave the defence to my cnosian friend. but the laws of sparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, appear to me to be the best in the world; for that which leads mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and licence, and every other folly, the law has clean driven out; and neither in the country nor in towns which are under the control of sparta, will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind of pleasure which accompany them; and any one who meets a drunken and disorderly person, will immediately have him most severely punished, and will not let him off on any pretence, not even at the time of a dionysiac festival; although i have remarked that this may happen at your performances 'on the cart,' as they are called; and among our tarentine colonists i have seen the whole city drunk at a dionysiac festival; but nothing of the sort happens among us. athenian: o lacedaemonian stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they are under no regulations. in order to retaliate, an athenian has only to point out the licence which exists among your women. to all such accusations, whether they are brought against the tarentines, or us, or you, there is one answer which exonerates the practice in question from impropriety. when a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him:--wonder not, o stranger; this is our custom, and you may very likely have some other custom about the same things. now we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. let us then discourse a little more at length about intoxication, which is a very important subject, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legislator. i am not speaking of drinking, or not drinking, wine at all, but of intoxication. are we to follow the custom of the scythians, and persians, and carthaginians, and celts, and iberians, and thracians, who are all warlike nations, or that of your countrymen, for they, as you say, altogether abstain? but the scythians and thracians, both men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they pour on their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious institution. the persians, again, are much given to other practices of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation in them than the thracians and scythians. megillus: o best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and we send all these nations flying before us. athenian: nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as there always will be, flights and pursuits of which no account can be given, and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle affords more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. for when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the syracusans have done the locrians, who appear to be the best-governed people in their part of the world, or as the athenians have done the ceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the same sort of thing), all this is not to the point; let us endeavour rather to form a conclusion about each institution in itself and say nothing, at present, of victories and defeats. let us only say that such and such a custom is honourable, and another not. and first permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in reference to these very matters. megillus: how do you mean? athenian: all those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to proceed in a wrong way. let me give you an illustration of what i mean:--you may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind of food, whereupon another person instantly blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with what, or in what state and how, wheat is to be given. and that is just what we are doing in this discussion. at the very mention of the word intoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the other with their censures; which is absurd. for either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak with authority because we have many witnesses; and others because they see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this again is disputed by us. now i cannot say that i shall be satisfied, if we go on discussing each of the remaining laws in the same way. and about this very point of intoxication i should like to speak in another way, which i hold to be the right one; for if number is to be the criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to dispute the point with you, who are only two cities? megillus: i shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right. athenian: let me put the matter thus:--suppose a person to praise the keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to have, and then some one who had seen goats feeding without a goatherd in cultivated spots, and doing mischief, were to censure a goat or any other animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any sense or justice in such censure? megillus: certainly not. athenian: does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order to be a good captain, whether he is sea-sick or not? what do you say? megillus: i say that he is not a good captain if, although he have nautical skill, he is liable to sea-sickness. athenian: and what would you say of the commander of an army? will he be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear? megillus: impossible. athenian: and what if besides being a coward he has no skill? megillus: he is a miserable fellow, not fit to be a commander of men, but only of old women. athenian: and what would you say of some one who blames or praises any sort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is well enough when under his presidency? the critic, however, has never seen the society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a president, but always without a ruler or with a bad one:--when observers of this class praise or blame such meetings, are we to suppose that what they say is of any value? megillus: certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such a meeting when rightly ordered. athenian: reflect; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a kind of meeting? megillus: of course. athenian: and did any one ever see this sort of convivial meeting rightly ordered? of course you two will answer that you have never seen them at all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country; but i have come across many of them in many different places, and moreover i have made enquiries about them wherever i went, as i may say, and never did i see or hear of anything of the kind which was carried on altogether rightly; in some few particulars they might be right, but in general they were utterly wrong. cleinias: what do you mean, stranger, by this remark? explain. for we, as you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely not know, even if they came in our way, what was right or wrong in such societies. athenian: likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor: you would acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of mankind, of whatever sort, there ought to be a leader? cleinias: certainly i should. athenian: and we were saying just now, that when men are at war the leader ought to be a brave man? cleinias: we were. athenian: the brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by fears? cleinias: that again is true. athenian: and if there were a possibility of having a general of an army who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all means appoint him? cleinias: assuredly. athenian: now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is to command an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who is to regulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of peace. cleinias: true. athenian: and that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is apt to be unquiet. cleinias: certainly; the reverse of quiet. athenian: in the first place, then, the revellers as well as the soldiers will require a ruler? cleinias: to be sure; no men more so. athenian: and we ought, if possible, to provide them with a quiet ruler? cleinias: of course. athenian: and he should be a man who understands society; for his duty is to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion. cleinias: very true. athenian: must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of the revels? for if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and drunken, and not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will he be saved from doing some great evil. cleinias: it will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved. athenian: now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way possible in states, and that some one blames the very fact of their existence--he may very likely be right. but if he blames a practice which he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows in the first place that he is not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that everything done in this way will turn out to be wrong, because done without the superintendence of a sober ruler. do you not see that a drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot, army--anything, in short, of which he has the direction? cleinias: the last remark is very true, stranger; and i see quite clearly the advantage of an army having a good leader--he will give victory in war to his followers, which is a very great advantage; and so of other things. but i do not see any similar advantage which either individuals or states gain from the good management of a feast; and i want you to tell me what great good will be effected, supposing that this drinking ordinance is duly established. athenian: if you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus--when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any particular instance. but if you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer is easy--that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are good. education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education; for many have grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is never suicidal. cleinias: you seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when rightly ordered, are an important element of education. athenian: certainly i do. cleinias: and can you show that what you have been saying is true? athenian: to be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions, is an attribute of the gods not given to man, stranger; but i shall be very happy to tell you what i think, especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions. cleinias: your opinion, stranger, about the questions which are now being raised, is precisely what we want to hear. athenian: very good; i will try to find a way of explaining my meaning, and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. but first let me make an apology. the athenian citizen is reputed among all the hellenes to be a great talker, whereas sparta is renowned for brevity, and the cretans have more wit than words. now i am afraid of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small materials. for drinking indeed may appear to be a slight matter, and yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered according to nature, without correct principles of music; these are necessary to any clear or satisfactory treatment of the subject, and music again runs up into education generally, and there is much to be said about all this. what would you say then to leaving these matters for the present, and passing on to some other question of law? megillus: o athenian stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not know, that our family is the proxenus of your state. i imagine that from their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the proxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country; and this has certainly been my own feeling. i can well remember from the days of my boyhood, how, when any lacedaemonians praised or blamed the athenians, they used to say to me,--'see, megillus, how ill or how well,' as the case might be, 'has your state treated us'; and having always had to fight your battles against detractors when i heard you assailed, i became warmly attached to you. and i always like to hear the athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a good athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature, and is not manufactured. therefore be assured that i shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say. cleinias: yes, stranger; and when you have heard me speak, say boldly what is in your thoughts. let me remind you of a tie which unites you to crete. you must have heard here the story of the prophet epimenides, who was of my family, and came to athens ten years before the persian war, in accordance with the response of the oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the god commanded. the athenians were at that time in dread of the persian invasion; and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. at that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you; thus ancient is the friendship which i and my parents have had for you. athenian: you seem to be quite ready to listen; and i am also ready to perform as much as i can of an almost impossible task, which i will nevertheless attempt. at the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the god dionysus. cleinias: let us proceed, if you please. athenian: well, then, if i tell you what are my notions of education, will you consider whether they satisfy you? cleinias: let us hear. athenian: according to my view, any one who would be good at anything must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in its several branches: for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children's houses; he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; and those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. they should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. for example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise, for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. the most important part of education is right training in the nursery. the soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. do you agree with me thus far? cleinias: certainly. athenian: then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. at present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. for we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. this is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. but let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. and this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives. cleinias: very true; and we entirely agree with you. athenian: and we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not. cleinias: you are quite right. athenian: let me now proceed, if i can, to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which i will offer you. cleinias: proceed. athenian: do we not consider each of ourselves to be one? cleinias: we do. athenian: and each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain. cleinias: exactly. athenian: also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the state, is called law. cleinias: i am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if i were. megillus: i am in the like case. athenian: let us look at the matter thus: may we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose--which of the two we cannot certainly know? but we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. according to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the state; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which is law. for inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. and thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the meaning of the expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states. in this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. and when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary. cleinias: perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse. athenian: very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object. cleinias: proceed. athenian: suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,--what will be the effect on him? cleinias: having what in view do you ask that question? athenian: nothing as yet; but i ask generally, when the puppet is brought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow. i will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what i am now asking is this--does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves? cleinias: very greatly. athenian: and are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased? do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink? cleinias: yes, they entirely desert him. athenian: does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a young child? cleinias: he does. athenian: then at that time he will have the least control over himself? cleinias: the least. athenian: and will he not be in a most wretched plight? cleinias: most wretched. athenian: then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child? cleinias: well said, stranger. athenian: is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it? cleinias: i suppose that there is; you at any rate, were just now saying that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine. athenian: true, i was; and i am ready still, seeing that you have both declared that you are anxious to hear me. cleinias: to be sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox, which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation. athenian: are you speaking of the soul? cleinias: yes. athenian: and what would you say about the body, my friend? are you not surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude? cleinias: certainly. athenian: yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and takes medicine, is he not aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness? cleinias: yes, all that is well known. athenian: also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit? cleinias: very good. athenian: and we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: if such convivialities should turn out to have any advantage equal in importance to that of gymnastic, they are in their very nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no accompaniment of pain. cleinias: true; but i hardly think that we shall be able to discover any such benefits to be derived from them. athenian: that is just what we must endeavour to show. and let me ask you a question:--do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different? cleinias: what are they? athenian: there is the fear of expected evil. cleinias: yes. athenian: and there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame. cleinias: certainly. athenian: these are the two fears, as i called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures. cleinias: very true. athenian: and does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? this is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states. cleinias: true. athenian: does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? what is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? for there are two things which give victory--confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace before friends. cleinias: there are. athenian: then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why we should be either has now been determined. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears. cleinias: clearly. athenian: and when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms against them, and to overcome them? or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his own natural character,--since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been,--and are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, by word, deed, and act, will still be perfectly temperate? cleinias: a most unlikely supposition. athenian: suppose that some god had given a fear-potion to men, and that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at every draught as a child of misfortune, and that he feared everything happening or about to happen to him; and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence of the draught. cleinias: but has such a draught, stranger, ever really been known among men? athenian: no; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? might we not go and say to him, 'o legislator, whether you are legislating for the cretan, or for any other state, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?' cleinias: 'i should,' will be the answer of every one. athenian: 'and you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no great danger than the reverse?' cleinias: in that proposition every one may safely agree. athenian: 'and in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them; and also honouring them, but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? or would you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?' cleinias: he would be certain, stranger, to use the potion. athenian: this would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and he would do well who provided himself with the potion only, rather than with any number of other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in solitude, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force of his own nature and habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and display his power in conquering the irresistible change effected by the draught--his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion. cleinias: yes, stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show his self-control. athenian: let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:--'well, lawgiver, there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either received from the gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at our board. but is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting? cleinias: i suppose that he will say, yes,--meaning that wine is such a potion. athenian: is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other? when a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes, and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened, and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say anything. cleinias: i think that every one will admit the truth of your description. megillus: certainly. athenian: now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two things which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest courage; secondly, the greatest fear-cleinias: which you said to be characteristic of reverence, if i am not mistaken. athenian: thank you for reminding me. but now, as the habit of courage and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites. cleinias: that is probably the case. athenian: there are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible, and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base. cleinias: true. athenian: are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless such as these?--when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us? what is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the second place to train the character of a man, if care be taken in the use of it? what is there cheaper, or more innocent? for do but consider which is the greater risk:--would you rather test a man of a morose and savage nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the festival of dionysus? or would you, if you wanted to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, perilling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? i might mention numberless cases, in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport, and without paying dearly for experience. and i do not believe that either a cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other. cleinias: that is certainly true. athenian: and this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them; and that art, if i am not mistaken, is politics. cleinias: exactly so. book ii. athenian: and now we have to consider whether the insight into human nature is the only benefit derived from well-ordered potations, or whether there are not other advantages great and much to be desired. the argument seems to imply that there are. but how and in what way these are to be attained, will have to be considered attentively, or we may be entangled in error. cleinias: proceed. athenian: let me once more recall our doctrine of right education; which, if i am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse. cleinias: you talk rather grandly. athenian: pleasure and pain i maintain to be the first perceptions of children, and i say that they are the forms under which virtue and vice are originally present to them. as to wisdom and true and fixed opinions, happy is the man who acquires them, even when declining in years; and we may say that he who possesses them, and the blessings which are contained in them, is a perfect man. now i mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children;--when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her. this harmony of the soul, taken as a whole, is virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and love what you ought to love from the beginning of life to the end, may be separated off; and, in my view, will be rightly called education. cleinias: i think, stranger, that you are quite right in all that you have said and are saying about education. athenian: i am glad to hear that you agree with me; for, indeed, the discipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered, is a principle of education, has been often relaxed and corrupted in human life. and the gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed holy festivals, wherein men alternate rest with labour; and have given them the muses and apollo, the leader of the muses, and dionysus, to be companions in their revels, that they may improve their education by taking part in the festivals of the gods, and with their help. i should like to know whether a common saying is in our opinion true to nature or not. for men say that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies or in their voices; they are always wanting to move and cry out; some leaping and skipping, and overflowing with sportiveness and delight at something, others uttering all sorts of cries. but, whereas the animals have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are called, to us, the gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to be our companions in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them, joining hands together in dances and songs; and these they call choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheerfulness. shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through apollo and the muses? what do you say? cleinias: i assent. athenian: and the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus, and the educated is he who has been well trained? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song? cleinias: true. athenian: then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance well? cleinias: i suppose that he will. athenian: let us see; what are we saying? cleinias: what? athenian: he sings well and dances well; now must we add that he sings what is good and dances what is good? cleinias: let us make the addition. athenian: we will suppose that he knows the good to be good, and the bad to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly: which now is the better trained in dancing and music--he who is able to move his body and to use his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no delight in good or hatred of evil; or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and is offended at what is evil? cleinias: there is a great difference, stranger, in the two kinds of education. athenian: if we three know what is good in song and dance, then we truly know also who is educated and who is uneducated; but if not, then we certainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and whether there is any or not. cleinias: true. athenian: let us follow the scent like hounds, and go in pursuit of beauty of figure, and melody, and song, and dance; if these escape us, there will be no use in talking about true education, whether hellenic or barbarian. cleinias: yes. athenian: and what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody? when a manly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is in similar case, are they likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds? cleinias: how can they, when the very colours of their faces differ? athenian: good, my friend; i may observe, however, in passing, that in music there certainly are figures and there are melodies: and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or figure having good rhythm or good harmony--the term is correct enough; but to speak metaphorically of a melody or figure having a 'good colour,' as the masters of choruses do, is not allowable, although you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other. and not to be tedious, let us say that the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images of virtue, are without exception good, and those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good. cleinias: your suggestion is excellent; and let us answer that these things are so. athenian: once more, are all of us equally delighted with every sort of dance? cleinias: far otherwise. athenian: what, then, leads us astray? are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them? for no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character. and yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to give pleasure to our souls. but this is intolerable and blasphemous; there is, however, a much more plausible account of the delusion. cleinias: what? athenian: the adaptation of art to the characters of men. choric movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions, fortunes, dispositions,--each particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling them beautiful. but those whose natures, or ways, or habits are unsuited to them, cannot delight in them or applaud them, and they call them base. there are others, again, whose natures are right and their habits wrong, or whose habits are right and their natures wrong, and they praise one thing, but are pleased at another. for they say that all these imitations are pleasant, but not good. and in the presence of those whom they think wise, they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner, or of deliberately lending any countenance to such proceedings; and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them. cleinias: very true. athenian: and is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs, or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure? cleinias: i think that there is. athenian: 'i think' is not the word, but i would say, rather, 'i am certain.' for must they not have the same effect as when a man associates with bad characters, whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes, and only censures playfully because he has a suspicion of his own badness? in that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in whom he takes pleasure, even though he be ashamed to praise them. and what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo? cleinias: i know of none. athenian: then in a city which has good laws, or in future ages is to have them, bearing in mind the instruction and amusement which are given by music, can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in the dance anything which they themselves like, in the way of rhythm, or melody, or words, to the young children of any well-conditioned parents? is the poet to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to virtue or vice? cleinias: that is surely quite unreasonable, and is not to be thought of. athenian: and yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception of egypt. cleinias: and what are the laws about music and dancing in egypt? athenian: you will wonder when i tell you: long ago they appear to have recognized the very principle of which we are now speaking--that their young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue. these they fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples; and no painter or artist is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the traditional forms and invent new ones. to this day, no alteration is allowed either in these arts, or in music at all. and you will find that their works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago;--this is literally true and no exaggeration,--their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better or worse than the work of to-day, but are made with just the same skill. cleinias: how extraordinary! athenian: i should rather say, how statesmanlike, how worthy of a legislator! i know that other things in egypt are not so well. but what i am telling you about music is true and deserving of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without any fear of failure. to do this, however, must be the work of god, or of a divine person; in egypt they have a tradition that their ancient chants which have been preserved for so many ages are the composition of the goddess isis. and therefore, as i was saying, if a person can only find in any way the natural melodies, he may confidently embody them in a fixed and legal form. for the love of novelty which arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the old, has not strength enough to corrupt the consecrated song and dance, under the plea that they have become antiquated. at any rate, they are far from being corrupted in egypt. cleinias: your arguments seem to prove your point. athenian: may we not confidently say that the true use of music and of choral festivities is as follows: we rejoice when we think that we prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice? cleinias: exactly. athenian: and when rejoicing in our good fortune, we are unable to be still? cleinias: true. athenian: our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look on at them. having lost our agility, we delight in their sports and merry-making, because we love to think of our former selves; and gladly institute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of our youth. cleinias: very true. athenian: is it altogether unmeaning to say, as the common people do about festivals, that he should be adjudged the wisest of men, and the winner of the palm, who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and mirth? for on such occasions, and when mirth is the order of the day, ought not he to be honoured most, and, as i was saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to the greatest number? now is this a true way of speaking or of acting? cleinias: possibly. athenian: but, my dear friend, let us distinguish between different cases, and not be hasty in forming a judgment: one way of considering the question will be to imagine a festival at which there are entertainments of all sorts, including gymnastic, musical, and equestrian contests: the citizens are assembled; prizes are offered, and proclamation is made that any one who likes may enter the lists, and that he is to bear the palm who gives the most pleasure to the spectators--there is to be no regulation about the manner how; but he who is most successful in giving pleasure is to be crowned victor, and deemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates: what is likely to be the result of such a proclamation? cleinias: in what respect? athenian: there would be various exhibitions: one man, like homer, will exhibit a rhapsody, another a performance on the lute; one will have a tragedy, and another a comedy. nor would there be anything astonishing in some one imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a puppet-show. suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but innumerable others as well--can you tell me who ought to be the victor? cleinias: i do not see how any one can answer you, or pretend to know, unless he has heard with his own ears the several competitors; the question is absurd. athenian: well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall i answer this question which you deem so absurd? cleinias: by all means. athenian: if very small children are to determine the question, they will decide for the puppet show. cleinias: of course. athenian: the older children will be advocates of comedy; educated women, and young men, and people in general, will favour tragedy. cleinias: very likely. athenian: and i believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure in hearing a rhapsodist recite well the iliad and odyssey, or one of the hesiodic poems, and would award the victory to him. but, who would really be the victor?--that is the question. cleinias: yes. athenian: clearly you and i will have to declare that those whom we old men adjudge victors ought to win; for our ways are far and away better than any which at present exist anywhere in the world. cleinias: certainly. athenian: thus far i too should agree with the many, that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure. but the pleasure must not be that of chance persons; the fairest music is that which delights the best and best educated, and especially that which delights the one man who is pre-eminent in virtue and education. and therefore the judges must be men of character, for they will require both wisdom and courage; the true judge must not draw his inspiration from the theatre, nor ought he to be unnerved by the clamour of the many and his own incapacity; nor again, knowing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness carelessly to deliver a lying judgment, with the very same lips which have just appealed to the gods before he judged. he is sitting not as the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. the ancient and common custom of hellas, which still prevails in italy and sicily, did certainly leave the judgment to the body of spectators, who determined the victor by show of hands. but this custom has been the destruction of the poets; for they are now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste of their judges, and the result is that the spectators instruct themselves;--and also it has been the ruin of the theatre; they ought to be having characters put before them better than their own, and so receiving a higher pleasure, but now by their own act the opposite result follows. what inference is to be drawn from all this? shall i tell you? cleinias: what? athenian: the inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time is, that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason, which the law affirms, and which the experience of the eldest and best has agreed to be truly right. in order, then, that the soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at variance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the aged--in order, i say, to produce this effect, chants appear to have been invented, which really enchant, and are designed to implant that harmony of which we speak. and, because the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious training, they are called plays and songs, and are performed in play; just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats and drinks, but unwholesome diet in disagreeable things, in order that they may learn, as they ought, to like the one, and to dislike the other. and similarly the true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot persuade, will compel the poet to express, as he ought, by fair and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good men. cleinias: but do you really imagine, stranger, that this is the way in which poets generally compose in states at the present day? as far as i can observe, except among us and among the lacedaemonians, there are no regulations like those of which you speak; in other places novelties are always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and these pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the same. athenian: most true, cleinias; and i daresay that i may have expressed myself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that i was speaking of some really existing state of things, whereas i was only saying what regulations i would like to have about music; and hence there occurred a misapprehension on your part. for when evils are far gone and irremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at times necessary. but as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you whether you consider such institutions to be more prevalent among the cretans and lacedaemonians than among the other hellenes? cleinias: certainly they are. athenian: and if they were extended to the other hellenes, would it be an improvement on the present state of things? cleinias: a very great improvement, if the customs which prevail among them were such as prevail among us and the lacedaemonians, and such as you were just now saying ought to prevail. athenian: let us see whether we understand one another:--are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows: you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of cinyras or midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery? as the poet says, and with truth: i sing not, i care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him who 'draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a just man.' but if he be unjust, i would not have him 'look calmly upon bloody death,' nor 'surpass in swiftness the thracian boreas;' and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. for the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal. but you and i say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evils. for in truth, to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so great, if the bad man lives only a very short time. these are the truths which, if i am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. am i not right? for i plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. let me ask again, are you and i agreed about this? cleinias: i think that we partly agree and partly do not. athenian: when a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts, and when he is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of immortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature--of such an one you are, i suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable rather than happy. cleinias: that is quite true. athenian: once more: suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still, if he be unrighteous and insolent, would not both of you agree that he will of necessity live basely? you will surely grant so much? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and an evil life too? cleinias: i am not equally disposed to grant that. athenian: will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage? cleinias: how can i possibly say so? athenian: how! then may heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are of two. to me, dear cleinias, the truth of what i am saying is as plain as the fact that crete is an island. and, if i were a lawgiver, i would try to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain, and i would inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another; and there are many other matters about which i should make my citizens speak in a manner different from the cretans and lacedaemonians of this age, and i may say, indeed, from the world in general. for tell me, my good friends, by zeus and apollo tell me, if i were to ask these same gods who were your legislators,--is not the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there two lives, one of which is the justest and the other the pleasantest?--and they were to reply that there are two; and thereupon i proceeded to ask, (that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry), which are the happier--those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest life? and they replied, those who lead the pleasantest--that would be a very strange answer, which i should not like to put into the mouth of the gods. the words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore i will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. and to that i rejoin:--o my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible? and yet you also never ceased telling me that i should live as justly as possible. now, here the giver of the rule, whether he be legislator or father, will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavour to be consistent with himself. but if he were to declare that the justest life is also the happiest, every one hearing him would enquire, if i am not mistaken, what is that good and noble principle in life which the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure. for what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure? shall we say that glory and fame, coming from gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant? certainly not, sweet legislator. or shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honourable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that the doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base? cleinias: impossible. athenian: the view which identifies the pleasant and the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. and the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. but as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are shadows only, and that injustice, which seems opposed to justice, when contemplated by the unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant; but that from the just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance of both of them. cleinias: true. athenian: and which may be supposed to be the truer judgment--that of the inferior or of the better soul? cleinias: surely, that of the better soul. athenian: then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life? cleinias: that seems to be implied in the present argument. athenian: and even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the argument has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a better effect in making them do what is right, not on compulsion but voluntarily. cleinias: truth, stranger, is a noble thing and a lasting, but a thing of which men are hard to be persuaded. athenian: and yet the story of the sidonian cadmus, which is so improbable, has been readily believed, and also innumerable other tales. cleinias: what is that story? athenian: the story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth, which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long. but if you do not agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other side. cleinias: i do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of us against what you are now saying. athenian: the next suggestion which i have to offer is, that all our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children, reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken, or are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be, that the life which is by the gods deemed to be the happiest is also the best;--we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth; and the minds of our young disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours than any others which we might address to them. cleinias: i assent to what you say. athenian: first will enter in their natural order the sacred choir composed of children, which is to sing lustily the heaven-taught lay to the whole city. next will follow the choir of young men under the age of thirty, who will call upon the god paean to testify to the truth of their words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their hearts. thirdly, the choir of elder men, who are from thirty to sixty years of age, will also sing. there remain those who are too old to sing, and they will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle. cleinias: who are those who compose the third choir, stranger? for i do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them. athenian: and yet almost all that i have been saying has been said with a view to them. cleinias: will you try to be a little plainer? athenian: i was speaking at the commencement of our discourse, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young creatures: i said that they were unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a disorderly manner; and that no other animal attained to any perception of order, but man only. now the order of motion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and low are duly mingled, is called harmony; and both together are termed choric song. and i said that the gods had pity on us, and gave us apollo and the muses to be our playfellows and leaders in the dance; and dionysus, as i dare say that you will remember, was the third. cleinias: i quite remember. athenian: thus far i have spoken of the chorus of apollo and the muses, and i have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of dionysus. cleinias: how is that arranged? there is something strange, at any rate on first hearing, in a dionysiac chorus of old men, if you really mean that those who are above thirty, and may be fifty, or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to dance in his honour. athenian: very true; and therefore it must be shown that there is good reason for the proposal. cleinias: certainly. athenian: are we agreed thus far? cleinias: about what? athenian: that every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the whole city, should never cease charming themselves with the strains of which we have spoken; and that there should be every sort of change and variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary of them? cleinias: every one will agree. athenian: where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of age and intelligence, has the greatest influence, sing these fairest of strains, which are to do so much good? shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs? cleinias: but, says the argument, we cannot let them off. athenian: then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum? will this be the way? cleinias: what? athenian: when a man is advancing in years, he is afraid and reluctant to sing;--he has no pleasure in his own performances; and if compulsion is used, he will be more and more ashamed, the older and more discreet he grows;--is not this true? cleinias: certainly. athenian: well, and will he not be yet more ashamed if he has to stand up and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?--and if moreover when he is required to do so, like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry, he will certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very unwilling to exhibit. cleinias: no doubt. athenian: how, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing? shall we begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are eighteen years of age; we will tell them that fire must not be poured upon fire, whether in the body or in the soul, until they begin to go to work--this is a precaution which has to be taken against the excitableness of youth;--afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from intoxication and from excess of wine; when, at length, he has reached forty years, after dinner at a public mess, he may invite not only the other gods, but dionysus above all, to the mystery and festivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given men to lighten the sourness of old age; that in age we may renew our youth, and forget our sorrows; and also in order that the nature of the soul, like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and so more impressible. in the first place, will not any one who is thus mellowed be more ready and less ashamed to sing--i do not say before a large audience, but before a moderate company; nor yet among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to chant, and to enchant? cleinias: he will be far more ready. athenian: there will be no impropriety in our using such a method of persuading them to join with us in song. cleinias: none at all. athenian: and what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn? the strain should clearly be one suitable to them. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and what strain is suitable for heroes? shall they sing a choric strain? cleinias: truly, stranger, we of crete and lacedaemon know no strain other than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our chorus. athenian: i dare say; for you have never acquired the knowledge of the most beautiful kind of song, in your military way of life, which is modelled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in cities; and you have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts. no one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom to attend to him alone, and trains and rubs him down privately, and gives him the qualities in education which will make him not only a good soldier, but also a governor of a state and of cities. such an one, as we said at first, would be a greater warrior than he of whom tyrtaeus sings; and he would honour courage everywhere, but always as the fourth, and not as the first part of virtue, either in individuals or states. cleinias: once more, stranger, i must complain that you depreciate our lawgivers. athenian: not intentionally, if at all, my good friend; but whither the argument leads, thither let us follow; for if there be indeed some strain of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public theatres, i should like to impart it to those who, as we say, are ashamed of these, and want to have the best. cleinias: certainly. athenian: when things have an accompanying charm, either the best thing in them is this very charm, or there is some rightness or utility possessed by them;--for example, i should say that eating and drinking, and the use of food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure; but that this rightness and utility is just the healthfulness of the things served up to us, which is their true rightness. cleinias: just so. athenian: thus, too, i should say that learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure; but that the right and the profitable, the good and the noble, are qualities which the truth gives to it. cleinias: exactly. athenian: and so in the imitative arts--if they succeed in making likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said to have a charm? cleinias: yes. athenian: but equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness. cleinias: yes. athenian: then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying charm; and the term 'pleasure' is most appropriately applied to it when these other qualities are absent. cleinias: you are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not? athenian: yes; and this i term amusement, when doing neither harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of. cleinias: very true. athenian: then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is true of all equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical, because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to be judged of by the standard of truth, and by no other whatever. cleinias: quite true. athenian: do we not regard all music as representative and imitative? cleinias: certainly. athenian: then, when any one says that music is to be judged of by pleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be any music of which pleasure is the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or deemed to have any real excellence, but only that other kind of music which is an imitation of the good. cleinias: very true. athenian: and those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which is true; and the truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and every one will admit that musical compositions are all imitative and representative. will not poets and spectators and actors all agree in this? cleinias: they will. athenian: surely then he who would judge correctly must know what each composition is; for if he does not know what is the character and meaning of the piece, and what it represents, he will never discern whether the intention is true or false. cleinias: certainly not. athenian: and will he who does not know what is true be able to distinguish what is good and bad? my statement is not very clear; but perhaps you will understand me better if i put the matter in another way. cleinias: how? athenian: there are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight? cleinias: yes. athenian: and can he who does not know what the exact object is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed? i mean, for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body, and the true situation of the parts; what those proportions are, and how the parts fit into one another in due order; also their colours and conformations, or whether this is all confused in the execution: do you think that any one can know about this, who does not know what the animal is which has been imitated? cleinias: impossible. athenian: but even if we know that the thing pictured or sculptured is a man, who has received at the hand of the artist all his proper parts and colours and shapes, must we not also know whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in beauty? cleinias: if this were not required, stranger, we should all of us be judges of beauty. athenian: very true; and may we not say that in everything imitated, whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must possess three things;--he must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true; and thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms? cleinias: certainly. athenian: then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty of music. music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. for if a man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very inferior in character to the muses themselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the gestures and songs of women; nor after combining the melodies with the gestures of freemen would they add on the rhythms of slaves and men of the baser sort; nor, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, would they assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one. but human poets are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and so make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as orpheus says, 'are ripe for true pleasure.' the experienced see all this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody, setting bare words to metre, and also separating the melody and the rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute alone. for when there are no words, it is very difficult to recognize the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is imitated by them. and we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing, which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and uses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song, is exceedingly coarse and tasteless. the use of either instrument, when unaccompanied, leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. this is all rational enough. but we are considering not how our choristers, who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be over fifty, are not to use the muses, but how they are to use them. and the considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these fifty years' old choristers who are to sing, may be expected to be better trained. for they need to have a quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms; otherwise, how can they ever know whether a melody would be rightly sung to the dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the poet has assigned to it? cleinias: clearly they cannot. athenian: the many are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in proper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made to sing and step in rhythm by force; it never occurs to them that they are ignorant of what they are doing. now every melody is right when it has suitable harmony and rhythm, and wrong when unsuitable. cleinias: that is most certain. athenian: but can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying, know that the thing is right? cleinias: impossible. athenian: then now, as would appear, we are making the discovery that our newly-appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and, although they are their own masters, compel to sing, must be educated to such an extent as to be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of the song, that they may know the harmonies and rhythms, and be able to select what are suitable for men of their age and character to sing; and may sing them, and have innocent pleasure from their own performance, and also lead younger men to welcome with dutiful delight good dispositions. having such training, they will attain a more accurate knowledge than falls to the lot of the common people, or even of the poets themselves. for the poet need not know the third point, viz., whether the imitation is good or not, though he can hardly help knowing the laws of melody and rhythm. but the aged chorus must know all the three, that they may choose the best, and that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue. and now the original design of the argument which was intended to bring eloquent aid to the chorus of dionysus, has been accomplished to the best of our ability, and let us see whether we were right:--i should imagine that a drinking assembly is likely to become more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes on: this, as we were saying at first, will certainly be the case. cleinias: certainly. athenian: every man has a more than natural elevation; his heart is glad within him, and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody at such a time; he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all mankind. cleinias: quite true. athenian: were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the drinkers become like iron heated in the fire, and grow softer and younger, and are easily moulded by him who knows how to educate and fashion them, just as when they were young, and that this fashioner of them is the same who prescribed for them in the days of their youth, viz., the good legislator; and that he ought to enact laws of the banquet, which, when a man is confident, bold, and impudent, and unwilling to wait his turn and have his share of silence and speech, and drinking and music, will change his character into the opposite--such laws as will infuse into him a just and noble fear, which will take up arms at the approach of insolence, being that divine fear which we have called reverence and shame? cleinias: true. athenian: and the guardians of these laws and fellow-workers with them are the calm and sober generals of the drinkers; and without their help there is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting against enemies when the commander of an army is not himself calm; and he who is unwilling to obey them and the commanders of dionysiac feasts who are more than sixty years of age, shall suffer a disgrace as great as he who disobeys military leaders, or even greater. cleinias: right. athenian: if, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in this way, would not the companions of our revels be improved? they would part better friends than they were, and not, as now, enemies. their whole intercourse would be regulated by law and observant of it, and the sober would be the leaders of the drunken. cleinias: i think so too, if drinking were regulated as you propose. athenian: let us not then simply censure the gift of dionysus as bad and unfit to be received into the state. for wine has many excellences, and one pre-eminent one, about which there is a difficulty in speaking to the many, from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what is said. cleinias: to what do you refer? athenian: there is a tradition or story, which has somehow crept about the world, that dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother here, and that out of revenge he inspires bacchic furies and dancing madnesses in others; for which reason he gave men wine. such traditions concerning the gods i leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered (compare euthyph.; republic); i only know that no animal at birth is mature or perfect in intelligence; and in the intermediate period, in which he has not yet acquired his own proper sense, he rages and roars without rhyme or reason; and when he has once got on his legs he jumps about without rhyme or reason; and this, as you will remember, has been already said by us to be the origin of music and gymnastic. cleinias: to be sure, i remember. athenian: and did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm sprang from this beginning among men, and that apollo and the muses and dionysus were the gods whom we had to thank for them? cleinias: certainly. athenian: the other story implied that wine was given man out of revenge, and in order to make him mad; but our present doctrine, on the contrary, is, that wine was given him as a balm, and in order to implant modesty in the soul, and health and strength in the body. cleinias: that, stranger, is precisely what was said. athenian: then half the subject may now be considered to have been discussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half? cleinias: what is the other half, and how do you divide the subject? athenian: the whole choral art is also in our view the whole of education; and of this art, rhythms and harmonies form the part which has to do with the voice. cleinias: yes. athenian: the movement of the body has rhythm in common with the movement of the voice, but gesture is peculiar to it, whereas song is simply the movement of the voice. cleinias: most true. athenian: and the sound of the voice which reaches and educates the soul, we have ventured to term music. cleinias: we were right. athenian: and the movement of the body, when regarded as an amusement, we termed dancing; but when extended and pursued with a view to the excellence of the body, this scientific training may be called gymnastic. cleinias: exactly. athenian: music, which was one half of the choral art, may be said to have been completely discussed. shall we proceed to the other half or not? what would you like? cleinias: my good friend, when you are talking with a cretan and lacedaemonian, and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what answer are either of us likely to make to such an enquiry? athenian: an answer is contained in your question; and i understand and accept what you say not only as an answer, but also as a command to proceed with gymnastic. cleinias: you quite understand me; do as you say. athenian: i will; and there will not be any difficulty in speaking intelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more familiar than with music. cleinias: there will not. athenian: is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the tendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals; man, as we were saying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and invented dancing; and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed the choral art? cleinias: very true. athenian: and one part of this subject has been already discussed by us, and there still remains another to be discussed? cleinias: exactly. athenian: i have first a final word to add to my discourse about drink, if you will allow me to do so. cleinias: what more have you to say? athenian: i should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them--in this way all of them may be used. but if the state makes drinking an amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences, i shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should practise drinking. i would go further than the cretans and lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the law of the carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all, but that he should drink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female, should ever drink wine; and that no magistrates should drink during their year of office, nor should pilots of vessels or judges while on duty taste wine at all, nor any one who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance; nor in the day-time at all, unless in consequence of exercise or as medicine; nor again at night, when any one, either man or woman, is minded to get children. there are numberless other cases also in which those who have good sense and good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what i say is true, no city will need many vineyards. their husbandry and their way of life in general will follow an appointed order, and their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and the least common of their employments. and this, stranger, shall be the crown of my discourse about wine, if you agree. cleinias: excellent: we agree. book iii. athenian: enough of this. and what, then, is to be regarded as the origin of government? will not a man be able to judge of it best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good or evil? cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages. cleinias: how so? athenian: why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? cleinias: hardly. athenian: but are sure that it must be vast and incalculable? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being during this period and as many perished? and has not each of them had every form of government many times over, now growing larger, now smaller, and again improving or declining? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: let us endeavour to ascertain the cause of these changes; for that will probably explain the first origin and development of forms of government. cleinias: very good. you shall endeavour to impart your thoughts to us, and we will make an effort to understand you. athenian: do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions? cleinias: what traditions? athenian: the traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have been occasioned by deluges and pestilences, and in many other ways, and of the survival of a remnant? cleinias: every one is disposed to believe them. athenian: let us consider one of them, that which was caused by the famous deluge. cleinias: what are we to observe about it? athenian: i mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill shepherds,--small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of mountains. cleinias: clearly. athenian: such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts and the various devices which are suggested to the dwellers in cities by interest or ambition, and with all the wrongs which they contrive against one another. cleinias: very true. athenian: let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time. cleinias: very good. athenian: would not all implements have then perished and every other excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom have utterly disappeared? cleinias: why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been made even in the least particular? for it is evident that the arts were unknown during ten thousand times ten thousand years. and no more than a thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of daedalus, orpheus and palamedes,--since marsyas and olympus invented music, and amphion the lyre--not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday. athenian: have you forgotten, cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday? cleinias: i suppose that you mean epimenides. athenian: the same, my friend; he does indeed far overleap the heads of all mankind by his invention; for he carried out in practice, as you declare, what of old hesiod (works and days) only preached. cleinias: yes, according to our tradition. athenian: after the great destruction, may we not suppose that the state of man was something of this sort:--in the beginning of things there was a fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might be a few goats, these too hardly enough to maintain the shepherds who tended them? cleinias: true. athenian: and of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all? cleinias: none whatever. athenian: and out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have: cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue? cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their full development, whether of virtue or of vice? cleinias: i understand your meaning, and you are quite right. athenian: but, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to be what the world is. cleinias: very true. athenian: doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little by little, during a very long period of time. cleinias: a highly probable supposition. athenian: at first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain. cleinias: of course. athenian: the fewness of the survivors at that time would have made them all the more desirous of seeing one another; but then the means of travelling either by land or sea had been almost entirely lost, as i may say, with the loss of the arts, and there was great difficulty in getting at one another; for iron and brass and all metals were jumbled together and had disappeared in the chaos; nor was there any possibility of extracting ore from them; and they had scarcely any means of felling timber. even if you suppose that some implements might have been preserved in the mountains, they must quickly have worn out and vanished, and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived. cleinias: there could not have been. athenian: in how many generations would this be attained? cleinias: clearly, not for many generations. athenian: during this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts which require iron and brass and the like would disappear. cleinias: certainly. athenian: faction and war would also have died out in those days, and for many reasons. cleinias: how would that be? athenian: in the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and goodwill towards one another; and, secondly, they would have no occasion to quarrel about their subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases; and from their pasture-land they would obtain the greater part of their food in a primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh; moreover they would procure other food by the chase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. they would also have abundance of clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils either capable of standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and weaving arts do not require any use of iron: and god has given these two arts to man in order to provide him with all such things, that, when reduced to the last extremity, the human race may still grow and increase. hence in those days mankind were not very poor; nor was poverty a cause of difference among them; and rich they could not have been, having neither gold nor silver:--such at that time was their condition. and the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles; in it there is no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envyings. and therefore they were good, and also because they were what is called simple-minded; and when they were told about good and evil, they in their simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth and practised it. no one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now; but what they heard about gods and men they believed to be true, and lived accordingly; and therefore they were in all respects such as we have described them. cleinias: that quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend here. athenian: would not many generations living on in a simple manner, although ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and in particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed;--although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in these respects, would they not, i say, be simpler and more manly, and also more temperate and altogether more just? the reason has been already explained. cleinias: very true. athenian: i should wish you to understand that what has preceded and what is about to follow, has been, and will be said, with the intention of explaining what need the men of that time had of laws, and who was their lawgiver. cleinias: and thus far what you have said has been very well said. athenian: they could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet; nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no letters at this early period; they lived by habit and the customs of their ancestors, as they are called. cleinias: probably. athenian: but there was already existing a form of government which, if i am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and this still remains in many places, both among hellenes and barbarians (compare arist. pol.), and is the government which is declared by homer to have prevailed among the cyclopes:-'they have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in hollow caves on the tops of high mountains, and every one gives law to his wife and children, and they do not busy themselves about one another.' (odyss.) cleinias: that seems to be a charming poet of yours; i have read some other verses of his, which are very clever; but i do not know much of him, for foreign poets are very little read among the cretans. megillus: but they are in lacedaemon, and he appears to be the prince of them all; the manner of life, however, which he describes is not spartan, but rather ionian, and he seems quite to confirm what you are saying, when he traces up the ancient state of mankind by the help of tradition to barbarism. athenian: yes, he does confirm it; and we may accept his witness to the fact that such forms of government sometimes arise. cleinias: we may. athenian: and were not such states composed of men who had been dispersed in single habitations and families by the poverty which attended the devastations; and did not the eldest then rule among them, because with them government originated in the authority of a father and a mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, forming one troop under the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of their parents, which of all sovereignties is the most just? cleinias: very true. athenian: after this they came together in greater numbers, and increased the size of their cities, and betook themselves to husbandry, first of all at the foot of the mountains, and made enclosures of loose walls and works of defence, in order to keep off wild beasts; thus creating a single large and common habitation. cleinias: yes; at least we may suppose so. athenian: there is another thing which would probably happen. cleinias: what? athenian: when these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser original ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in the larger; every family would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their separation from one another, would have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them; and these customs would incline them to order, when the parents had the element of order in their nature, and to courage, when they had the element of courage. and they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon their children's children, their own likings; and, as we are saying, they would find their way into the larger society, having already their own peculiar laws. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well. cleinias: true. athenian: then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of legislation. cleinias: exactly. athenian: the next step will be that these persons who have met together, will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose those which they think best. these persons will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live. cleinias: yes, that would be the natural order of things. athenian: then, now let us speak of a third form of government, in which all other forms and conditions of polities and cities concur. cleinias: what is that? athenian: the form which in fact homer indicates as following the second. this third form arose when, as he says, dardanus founded dardania:-'for not as yet had the holy ilium been built on the plain to be a city of speaking men; but they were still dwelling at the foot of many-fountained ida.' for indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the cyclopes, he speaks the words of god and nature; for poets are a divine race, and often in their strains, by the aid of the muses and the graces, they attain truth. cleinias: yes. athenian: then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale, which will probably be found to illustrate in some degree our proposed design:--shall we do so? cleinias: by all means. athenian: ilium was built, when they descended from the mountain, in a large and fair plain, on a sort of low hill, watered by many rivers descending from ida. cleinias: such is the tradition. athenian: and we must suppose this event to have taken place many ages after the deluge? athenian: a marvellous forgetfulness of the former destruction would appear to have come over them, when they placed their town right under numerous streams flowing from the heights, trusting for their security to not very high hills, either. cleinias: there must have been a long interval, clearly. athenian: and, as population increased, many other cities would begin to be inhabited. cleinias: doubtless. athenian: those cities made war against troy--by sea as well as land--for at that time men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea. cleinias: clearly. athenian: the achaeans remained ten years, and overthrew troy. cleinias: true. athenian: and during the ten years in which the achaeans were besieging ilium, the homes of the besiegers were falling into an evil plight. their youth revolted; and when the soldiers returned to their own cities and families, they did not receive them properly, and as they ought to have done, and numerous deaths, murders, exiles, were the consequence. the exiles came again, under a new name, no longer achaeans, but dorians,--a name which they derived from dorieus; for it was he who gathered them together. the rest of the story is told by you lacedaemonians as part of the history of sparta. megillus: to be sure. athenian: thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to the same point, and presents to us another handle. for we have reached the settlement of lacedaemon; which, as you truly say, is in laws and in institutions the sister of crete. and we are all the better for the digression, because we have gone through various governments and settlements, and have been present at the foundation of a first, second, and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. and now there appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was once in process of settlement and has continued settled to this day. if, out of all this, we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what laws are the salvation and what are the destruction of cities, and what changes would make a state happy, o megillus and cleinias, we may now begin again, unless we have some fault to find with the previous discussion. megillus: if some god, stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry about legislation would be as good and full as the present, i would go a great way to hear such another, and would think that a day as long as this--and we are now approaching the longest day of the year--was too short for the discussion. athenian: then i suppose that we must consider this subject? megillus: certainly. athenian: let us place ourselves in thought at the moment when lacedaemon and argos and messene and the rest of the peloponnesus were all in complete subjection, megillus, to your ancestors; for afterwards, as the legend informs us, they divided their army into three portions, and settled three cities, argos, messene, lacedaemon. megillus: true. athenian: temenus was the king of argos, cresphontes of messene, procles and eurysthenes of lacedaemon. megillus: certainly. athenian: to these kings all the men of that day made oath that they would assist them, if any one subverted their kingdom. megillus: true. athenian: but can a kingship be destroyed, or was any other form of government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves? no indeed, by zeus. have we already forgotten what was said a little while ago? megillus: no. athenian: and may we not now further confirm what was then mentioned? for we have come upon facts which have brought us back again to the same principle; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not be enquiring about an empty theory, but about events which actually happened. the case was as follows:--three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were common to all of them: the rulers promised that as time and the race went forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary; and the subjects said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would never subvert or permit others to subvert those kingdoms; the kings were to assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like manner. is not this the fact? megillus: yes. athenian: and the three states to whom these laws were given, whether their kings or any others were the authors of them, had therefore the greatest security for the maintenance of their constitutions? megillus: what security? athenian: that the other two states were always to come to the rescue against a rebellious third. megillus: true. athenian: many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive; but this is just as if one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in an agreeable manner. megillus: exactly. athenian: whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of pain. megillus: certainly. athenian: there was also another advantage possessed by the men of that day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws. megillus: what advantage? athenian: the legislators of that day, when they equalized property, escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a person attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts, because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real equality. now, in general, when the legislator attempts to make a new settlement of such matters, every one meets him with the cry, that 'he is not to disturb vested interests,'--declaring with imprecations that he is introducing agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man is at his wits' end; whereas no one could quarrel with the dorians for distributing the land,--there was nothing to hinder them; and as for debts, they had none which were considerable or of old standing. megillus: very true. athenian: but then, my good friends, why did the settlement and legislation of their country turn out so badly? megillus: how do you mean; and why do you blame them? athenian: there were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted their original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained was the spartan. megillus: the question which you ask is not easily answered. athenian: and yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws, this being our old man's sober game of play, whereby we beguile the way, as i was saying when we first set out on our journey. megillus: certainly; and we must find out why this was. athenian: what laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have regulated such cities? or what settlements of states are greater or more famous? megillus: i know of none. athenian: can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions not only for the protection of peloponnesus, but of all the hellenes, in case they were attacked by the barbarian? for the inhabitants of the region about ilium, when they provoked by their insolence the trojan war, relied upon the power of the assyrians and the empire of ninus, which still existed and had a great prestige; the people of those days fearing the united assyrian empire just as we now fear the great king. and the second capture of troy was a serious offence against them, because troy was a portion of the assyrian empire. to meet the danger the single army was distributed between three cities by the royal brothers, sons of heracles,--a fair device, as it seemed, and a far better arrangement than the expedition against troy. for, firstly, the people of that day had, as they thought, in the heraclidae better leaders than the pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that their army was superior in valour to that which went against troy; for, although the latter conquered the trojans, they were themselves conquered by the heraclidae--achaeans by dorians. may we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their states? megillus: quite true. athenian: and would not men who had shared with one another many dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had taken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the delphian apollo, be likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly established? megillus: of course they would. athenian: yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were entertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away; with the exception, as i was saying, of that small part of them which existed in your land. and this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two others; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war. megillus: no doubt. athenian: but what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? here is a subject well worthy of consideration. megillus: certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of laws or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and noble interests, than are here presented to his view. athenian: then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and important question. megillus: very true. athenian: did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we ourselves at this moment, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing which might have effected wonders if any one had only known how to make a right use of it in some way; and yet this mode of looking at things may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in our own case or in any other? megillus: to what are you referring, and what do you mean? athenian: i was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid heracleid expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results for the hellenes, if only rightly used; and i was just laughing at myself. megillus: but were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we in assenting to you? athenian: perhaps; and yet i cannot help observing that any one who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that--'if the owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he achieve!' megillus: and would he not be justified? athenian: reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise appear just: first, in reference to the question in hand:--if the then commanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained success? would not this have been the way? they would have bound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their descendants desired. what other aim would they have had? megillus: very good. athenian: suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires. megillus: he would. athenian: well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind? megillus: what is it? athenian: the desire which a man has, that all things, if possible,--at any rate, things human,--may come to pass in accordance with his soul's desire. megillus: certainly. athenian: and having this desire always, and at every time of life, in youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it. megillus: no doubt. athenian: and we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves. megillus: we do. athenian: dear is the son to the father--the younger to the elder. megillus: of course. athenian: and yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain. megillus: when the son is young and foolish, you mean? athenian: yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under the influence of feelings akin to those of theseus when he cursed the unfortunate hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father's prayers? megillus: i understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. but every state and every individual ought to pray and strive for wisdom. athenian: yes; and i remember, and you will remember, what i said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war. and to this i replied that there were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest--i mean wisdom and mind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train. and now the argument returns to the same point, and i say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. and if you would rather receive my words in earnest, i am willing that you should; and you will find, i suspect, as i have said already, that not cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects; but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most important human affairs. that was then, and is still, and always will be the case, as i will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out and demonstrate as well as i am able to you who are my friends, in the course of the argument. cleinias: pray go on, stranger;--compliments are troublesome, but we will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will give them our best attention; and that is the way in which a freeman best shows his approval or disapproval. megillus: excellent, cleinias; let us do as you say. cleinias: by all means, if heaven wills. go on. athenian: well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, i say that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the dorian power, and that now, as then, ignorance is ruin. and if this be true, the legislator must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost of his power. cleinias: that is evident. athenian: then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. i should like to know whether you and megillus would agree with me in what i am about to say; for my opinion is-cleinias: what? athenian: that the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. this disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting the great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. and when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords, that i call folly, just as in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. all these cases i term the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. you will understand, stranger, that i am speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance of handicraftsmen. cleinias: yes, my friend, we understand and agree. athenian: let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. for, o my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? there is none; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a saviour of the state: he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom. let this, then, as i was saying, be laid down by us. cleinias: let it be so laid down. athenian: i suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? what are they, and how many in number? is there not one claim of authority which is always just,--that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to rule over their offspring? cleinias: there is. athenian: next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: and, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule? cleinias: of course. athenian: fifthly, if i am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled? cleinias: that is a rule not to be disobeyed. athenian: yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to nature, as the theban poet pindar once said; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, o thou most wise pindar, as i should reply him, this surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion. cleinias: most true. athenian: there is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and is dear to the gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject; and this we affirm to be quite just. cleinias: certainly. athenian: 'then now,' as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, 'you see, legislator, the principles of government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to each other. there we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you must attend. and, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of argos and messene violated these our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous hellenic power of the olden time. was it because they did not know how wisely hesiod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole? his meaning was, that when to take the whole would be dangerous, and to take the half would be the safe and moderate course, then the moderate or better was more than the immoderate or worse.' cleinias: very true. athenian: and may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal when found among kings than when among peoples? cleinias: the probability is that ignorance will be a disorder especially prevalent among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life. athenian: is it not palpable that the chief aim of the kings of that time was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in harmony with the principles which they had agreed to observe by word and oath? this want of harmony may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord. cleinias: very likely. athenian: good; and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken in order to avert this calamity? truly there is no great wisdom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours. megillus: what do you mean? athenian: any one who looks at what has occurred with you lacedaemonians, megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time. megillus: speak a little more clearly. athenian: nothing can be clearer than the observation which i am about to make. megillus: what is it? athenian: that if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess, runs in the one case to disorders, and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. i mean to say, my dear friends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power--no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends: when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him. and great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. as far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows:-megillus: what? athenian: a god, who watched over sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. in the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. but your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. since, if there had been only the original legislators, temenus, cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned not even the portion of aristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. now that god has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom, as i have already said, in judging after the event; there is no difficulty in learning from an example which has already occurred. but if any one could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived; and no persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have regarded hellas as a power to be despised. cleinias: true. athenian: there was small credit to us, cleinias, in defeating them; and the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not win glorious victories both by land and sea, but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was, first of all, the circumstance that of the three cities one only fought on behalf of hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against lacedaemon, and was thus preventing her from rendering assistance, while the city of argos, which had the precedence at the time of the distribution, when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian, would not answer to the call, or give aid. many things might be told about hellas in connexion with that war which are far from honourable; nor, indeed, can we rightly say that hellas repelled the invader; for the truth is, that unless the athenians and lacedaemonians, acting in concert, had warded off the impending yoke, all the tribes of hellas would have been fused in a chaos of hellenes mingling with one another, of barbarians mingling with hellenes, and hellenes with barbarians; just as nations who are now subject to the persian power, owing to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered, and live miserably. these, cleinias and megillus, are the reproaches which we have to make against statesmen and legislators, as they are called, past and present, if we would analyse the causes of their failure, and find out what else might have been done. we said, for instance, just now, that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers; and this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same; but we should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these aims are really the same; and if so, a variety in the modes of expression ought not to disturb us. cleinias: let us resume the argument in that spirit. and now, speaking of friendship and wisdom and freedom, i wish that you would tell me at what, in your opinion, the legislator should aim. athenian: hear me, then: there are two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly said to be derived; and one of them may be called monarchy and the other democracy: the persians have the highest form of the one, and we of the other; almost all the rest, as i was saying, are variations of these. now, if you are to have liberty and the combination of friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government in a measure; the argument emphatically declares that no city can be well governed which is not made up of both. cleinias: impossible. athenian: neither the one, if it be exclusively and excessively attached to monarchy, nor the other, if it be similarly attached to freedom, observes moderation; but your states, the laconian and cretan, have more of it; and the same was the case with the athenians and persians of old time, but now they have less. shall i tell you why? cleinias: by all means, if it will tend to elucidate our subject. athenian: hear, then:--there was a time when the persians had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and freedom. in the reign of cyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others: the rulers gave a share of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more ready in the hour of danger. and if there was any wise man among them, who was able to give good counsel, he imparted his wisdom to the public; for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech, and gave honour to those who could advise him in any matter. and the nation waxed in all respects, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of mind among them. cleinias: that certainly appears to have been the case. athenian: how, then, was this advantage lost under cambyses, and again recovered under darius? shall i try to divine? cleinias: the enquiry, no doubt, has a bearing upon our subject. athenian: i imagine that cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, had never given his mind to education, and never attended to the order of his household. cleinias: what makes you say so? athenian: i think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, and entrusted the education of his children to the women; and they brought them up from their childhood as the favourites of fortune, who were blessed already, and needed no more blessings. they thought that they were happy enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did. this was how they brought them up. cleinias: a splendid education truly! athenian: such an one as women were likely to give them, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, and in the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and dangers, and had no time to look after them. cleinias: what would you expect? athenian: their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and many herds of men and other animals, but he did not consider that those to whom he was about to make them over were not trained in his own calling, which was persian; for the persians are shepherds--sons of a rugged land, which is a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to live in the open air and go without sleep, and also to fight, if fighting is required (compare arist. pol.). he did not observe that his sons were trained differently; through the so-called blessing of being royal they were educated in the median fashion by women and eunuchs, which led to their becoming such as people do become when they are brought up unreproved. and so, after the death of cyrus, his sons, in the fulness of luxury and licence, took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he could not endure a rival; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through the medes and the eunuch, as they called him, who despised the folly of cambyses. cleinias: so runs the tale, and such probably were the facts. athenian: yes; and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the persians, through darius and the seven chiefs. cleinias: true. athenian: let us note the rest of the story. observe, that darius was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education. when he came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in his laws the settlement of the tribute which cyrus promised,--thus creating a feeling of friendship and community among all the persians, and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which cyrus had left behind him. darius was succeeded by his son xerxes; and he again was brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion. might we not most justly say: 'o darius, how came you to bring up xerxes in the same way in which cyrus brought up cambyses, and not to see his fatal mistake?' for xerxes, being the creation of the same education, met with much the same fortune as cambyses; and from that time until now there has never been a really great king among the persians, although they are all called great. and their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance, as i maintain; the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; for never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated. and this, i say, is what the legislator has to consider, and what at the present moment has to be considered by us. justly may you, o lacedaemonians, be praised, in that you do not give special honour or a special education to wealth rather than to poverty, or to a royal rather than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally commanded them to be given. for no man ought to have pre-eminent honour in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because he is swift of foot or fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temperance. megillus: what do you mean, stranger? athenian: i suppose that courage is a part of virtue? megillus: to be sure. athenian: then, now hear and judge for yourself:--would you like to have for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no control over himself? megillus: heaven forbid! athenian: or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue? megillus: certainly not. athenian: and surely justice does not grow apart from temperance? megillus: impossible. athenian: any more than our pattern wise man, whom we exhibited as having his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true reason, can be intemperate? megillus: no. athenian: there is a further consideration relating to the due and undue award of honours in states. megillus: what is it? athenian: i should like to know whether temperance without the other virtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be praised or blamed? megillus: i cannot tell. athenian: and that is the best answer; for whichever alternative you had chosen, i think that you would have gone wrong. megillus: i am fortunate. athenian: very good; a quality, which is a mere appendage of things which can be praised or blamed, does not deserve an expression of opinion, but is best passed over in silence. megillus: you are speaking of temperance? athenian: yes; but of the other virtues, that which having this appendage is also most beneficial, will be most deserving of honour, and next that which is beneficial in the next degree; and so each of them will be rightly honoured according to a regular order. megillus: true. athenian: and ought not the legislator to determine these classes? megillus: certainly he should. athenian: suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details. but the general division of laws according to their importance into a first and second and third class, we who are lovers of law may make ourselves. megillus: very good. athenian: we maintain, then, that a state which would be safe and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought to distribute honour and dishonour in the right way. and the right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance to be the condition of them; and to assign the second place to the goods of the body; and the third place to money and property. and if any legislator or state departs from this rule by giving money the place of honour, or in any way preferring that which is really last, may we not say, that he or the state is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing? megillus: yes; let that be plainly declared. athenian: the consideration of the persian governments led us thus far to enlarge. we remarked that the persians grew worse and worse. and we affirm the reason of this to have been, that they too much diminished the freedom of the people, and introduced too much of despotism, and so destroyed friendship and community of feeling. and when there is an end of these, no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects or of the people, but on behalf of themselves; and if they think that they can gain ever so small an advantage for themselves, they devastate cities, and send fire and desolation among friendly races. and as they hate ruthlessly and horribly, so are they hated; and when they want the people to fight for them, they find no community of feeling or willingness to risk their lives on their behalf; their untold myriads are useless to them on the field of battle, and they think that their salvation depends on the employment of mercenaries and strangers whom they hire, as if they were in want of more men. and they cannot help being stupid, since they proclaim by their actions that the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong which are made in a state are a trifle, when compared with gold and silver. megillus: quite true. athenian: and now enough of the persians, and their present mal-administration of their government, which is owing to the excess of slavery and despotism among them. megillus: good. athenian: next, we must pass in review the government of attica in like manner, and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all superior authority is not by any means so good as government by others when properly limited, which was our ancient athenian constitution at the time when the persians made their attack on hellas, or, speaking more correctly, on the whole continent of europe. there were four classes, arranged according to a property census, and reverence was our queen and mistress, and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws which then prevailed. also the vastness of the persian armament, both by sea and on land, caused a helpless terror, which made us more and more the servants of our rulers and of the laws; and for all these reasons an exceeding harmony prevailed among us. about ten years before the naval engagement at salamis, datis came, leading a persian host by command of darius, which was expressly directed against the athenians and eretrians, having orders to carry them away captive; and these orders he was to execute under pain of death. now datis and his myriads soon became complete masters of eretria, and he sent a fearful report to athens that no eretrian had escaped him; for the soldiers of datis had joined hands and netted the whole of eretria. and this report, whether well or ill founded, was terrible to all the hellenes, and above all to the athenians, and they dispatched embassies in all directions, but no one was willing to come to their relief, with the exception of the lacedaemonians; and they, either because they were detained by the messenian war, which was then going on, or for some other reason of which we are not told, came a day too late for the battle of marathon. after a while, the news arrived of mighty preparations being made, and innumerable threats came from the king. then, as time went on, a rumour reached us that darius had died, and that his son, who was young and hot-headed, had come to the throne and was persisting in his design. the athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was directed against them, in consequence of the battle of marathon; and hearing of the bridge over the hellespont, and the canal of athos, and the host of ships, considering that there was no salvation for them either by land or by sea, for there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first expedition, when the persians destroyed eretria, no one came to their help, or would risk the danger of an alliance with them, they thought that this would happen again, at least on land; nor, when they looked to the sea, could they descry any hope of salvation; for they were attacked by a thousand vessels and more. one chance of safety remained, slight indeed and desperate, but their only one. they saw that on the former occasion they had gained a seemingly impossible victory, and borne up by this hope, they found that their only refuge was in themselves and in the gods. all these things created in them the spirit of friendship; there was the fear of the moment, and there was that higher fear, which they had acquired by obedience to their ancient laws, and which i have several times in the preceding discourse called reverence, of which the good man ought to be a willing servant, and of which the coward is independent and fearless. if this fear had not possessed them, they would never have met the enemy, or defended their temples and sepulchres and their country, and everything that was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they would have been all scattered and dispersed. megillus: your words, athenian, are quite true, and worthy of yourself and of your country. athenian: they are true, megillus; and to you, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, i may properly speak of the actions of that day. and i would wish you and cleinias to consider whether my words have not also a bearing on legislation; for i am not discoursing only for the pleasure of talking, but for the argument's sake. please to remark that the experience both of ourselves and the persians was, in a certain sense, the same; for as they led their people into utter servitude, so we too led ours into all freedom. and now, how shall we proceed? for i would like you to observe that our previous arguments have good deal to say for themselves. megillus: true; but i wish that you would give us a fuller explanation. athenian: i will. under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not as now the master, but rather the willing servant of the laws. megillus: what laws do you mean? athenian: in the first place, let us speak of the laws about music,--that is to say, such music as then existed--in order that we may trace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning. now music was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. one sort consisted of prayers to the gods, which were called hymns; and there was another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and another, celebrating the birth of dionysus, called, i believe, 'dithyrambs.' and they used the actual word 'laws,' or nomoi, for another kind of song; and to this they added the term 'citharoedic.' all these and others were duly distinguished, nor were the performers allowed to confuse one style of music with another. and the authority which determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical shouts of the multitude, as in our days, nor in applause and clapping of hands. but the directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators should listen in silence to the end; and boys and their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by a hint from a stick. such was the good order which the multitude were willing to observe; they would never have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. and then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of vulgar and lawless innovation. they were men of genius, but they had no perception of what is just and lawful in music; raging like bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights--mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer (compare republic). and by composing such licentious works, and adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about melody and song. and in this way the theatres from being mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of good and bad in music and poetry; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of theatrocracy has grown up (compare arist. pol.). for if the democracy which judged had only consisted of educated persons, no fatal harm would have been done; but in music there first arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness;--freedom came following afterwards, and men, fancying that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. for what is this shamelessness, which is so evil a thing, but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty? megillus: very true. athenian: consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom, of disobedience to rulers (compare republic); and then the attempt to escape the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when near the end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the gods,--herein they exhibit and imitate the old so-called titanic nature, and come to the same point as the titans when they rebelled against god, leading a life of endless evils. but why have i said all this? i ask, because the argument ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says, fall off our ass. let us then once more ask the question, to what end has all this been said? megillus: very good. athenian: this, then, has been said for the sake-megillus: of what? athenian: we were maintaining that the lawgiver ought to have three things in view: first, that the city for which he legislates should be free; and secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have understanding;--these were our principles, were they not? megillus: certainly. athenian: with a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are considering which of them is the right form: we took a mean in both cases, of despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other, and we saw that in a mean they attained their perfection; but that when they were carried to the extreme of either, slavery or licence, neither party were the gainers. megillus: very true. athenian: and that was our reason for considering the settlement of the dorian army, and of the city built by dardanus at the foot of the mountains, and the removal of cities to the seashore, and of our mention of the first men, who were the survivors of the deluge. and all that was previously said about music and drinking, and what preceded, was said with the view of seeing how a state might be best administered, and how an individual might best order his own life. and now, megillus and cleinias, how can we put to the proof the value of our words? cleinias: stranger, i think that i see how a proof of their value may be obtained. this discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly fortunate, and just what i at this moment want; most auspiciously have you and my friend megillus come in my way. for i will tell you what has happened to me; and i regard the coincidence as a sort of omen. the greater part of crete is going to send out a colony, and they have entrusted the management of the affair to the cnosians; and the cnosian government to me and nine others. and they desire us to give them any laws which we please, whether taken from the cretan model or from any other; and they do not mind about their being foreign if they are better. grant me then this favour, which will also be a gain to yourselves:--let us make a selection from what has been said, and then let us imagine a state of which we will suppose ourselves to be the original founders. thus we shall proceed with our enquiry, and, at the same time, i may have the use of the framework which you are constructing, for the city which is in contemplation. athenian: good news, cleinias; if megillus has no objection, you may be sure that i will do all in my power to please you. cleinias: thank you. megillus: and so will i. cleinias: excellent; and now let us begin to frame the state. book iv. athenian: and now, what will this city be? i do not mean to ask what is or will hereafter be the name of the place; that may be determined by the accident of locality or of the original settlement--a river or fountain, or some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the newly-founded city; but i do want to know what the situation is, whether maritime or inland. cleinias: i should imagine, stranger, that the city of which we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea. athenian: and are there harbours on the seaboard? cleinias: excellent harbours, stranger; there could not be better. athenian: alas! what a prospect! and is the surrounding country productive, or in need of importations? cleinias: hardly in need of anything. athenian: and is there any neighbouring state? cleinias: none whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place; in days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region has been deserted from time immemorial. athenian: and has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and wood? cleinias: like the rest of crete in that. athenian: you mean to say that there is more rock than plain? cleinias: exactly. athenian: then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous: had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an importing rather than a producing country, some mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners (compare ar. pol.). but there is comfort in the eighty stadia; although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbours are so good. still we may be content. the sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has indeed also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways--making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations. there is a consolation, therefore, in the country producing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance. had there been abundance, there might have been a great export trade, and a great return of gold and silver; which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal results on a state whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments: this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous discussion. cleinias: i remember, and am of opinion that we both were and are in the right. athenian: well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber for ship-building? cleinias: there is no fir of any consequence, nor pine, and not much cypress; and you will find very little stone-pine or plane-wood, which shipwrights always require for the interior of ships. athenian: these are also natural advantages. cleinias: why so? athenian: because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies in what is mischievous. cleinias: how does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been speaking? athenian: remember, my good friend, what i said at first about the cretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, as you both agreed, was war; and i replied that such laws, in so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good; but in that they regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, i disapproved of them. and now i hope that you in your turn will follow and watch me if i legislate with a view to anything but virtue, or with a view to a part of virtue only. for i consider that the true lawgiver, like an archer, aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, when separated from virtue. i was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad thing; and i was thinking of a case in which a maritime people are harassed by enemies, as the athenians were by minos (i do not speak from any desire to recall past grievances); but he, as we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the inhabitants of attica to pay him a cruel tribute; and in those days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the country filled with ship-timber, and therefore they could not readily build them. hence they could not learn how to imitate their enemy at sea, and in this way, becoming sailors themselves, directly repel their enemies. better for them to have lost many times over the seven youths, than that heavy-armed and stationary troops should have been turned into sailors, and accustomed to be often leaping on shore, and again to come running back to their ships; or should have fancied that there was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying boldly; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of them, for a man throwing away his arms, and betaking himself to flight,--which is not dishonourable, as people say, at certain times. this is the language of naval warfare, and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise. for we should not teach bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. you may learn the evil of such a practice from homer, by whom odysseus is introduced, rebuking agamemnon, because he desires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the achaeans are hard pressed by the trojans,--he gets angry with him, and says: 'who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the well-benched ships into the sea, that the prayers of the trojans may be accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us. for the achaeans will not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn into the sea, but they will look behind and will cease from strife; in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious.' you see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neighbourhood of fighting men, to be an evil;--lions might be trained in that way to fly from a herd of deer. moreover, naval powers which owe their safety to ships, do not give honour to that sort of warlike excellence which is most deserving of it. for he who owes his safety to the pilot and the captain, and the oarsman, and all sorts of rather inferior persons, cannot rightly give honour to whom honour is due. but how can a state be in a right condition which cannot justly award honour? cleinias: it is hardly possible, i admit; and yet, stranger, we cretans are in the habit of saying that the battle of salamis was the salvation of hellas. athenian: why, yes; and that is an opinion which is widely spread both among hellenes and barbarians. but megillus and i say rather, that the battle of marathon was the beginning, and the battle of plataea the completion, of the great deliverance, and that these battles by land made the hellenes better; whereas the sea-fights of salamis and artemisium--for i may as well put them both together--made them no better, if i may say so without offence about the battles which helped to save us. and in estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both the situation of the country and the order of the laws, considering that the mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honourable thing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life, while we live; and that again, if i am not mistaken, is a remark which has been made already. cleinias: yes. athenian: then we have only to ask, whether we are taking the course which we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation of states. cleinias: the best by far. athenian: and now let me proceed to another question: who are to be the colonists? may any one come out of all crete; and is the idea that the population in the several states is too numerous for the means of subsistence? for i suppose that you are not going to send out a general invitation to any hellene who likes to come. and yet i observe that to your country settlers have come from argos and aegina and other parts of hellas. tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present enterprise? cleinias: they will come from all crete; and of other hellenes, peloponnesians will be most acceptable. for, as you truly observe, there are cretans of argive descent; and the race of cretans which has the highest character at the present day is the gortynian, and this has come from gortys in the peloponnesus. athenian: cities find colonization in some respects easier if the colonists are one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent out from a single country, either when friends leave friends, owing to some pressure of population or other similar necessity, or when a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. and there have been whole cities which have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. this, however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty. there is an element of friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common temples and rites of worship; but colonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any laws or any form of constitution differing from that which they had at home; and although the badness of their own laws may have been the cause of the factions which prevailed among them, yet from the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin, and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome and rebellious. on the other hand, the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then, to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the work of years. and yet there is nothing which tends more to the improvement of mankind than legislation and colonization. cleinias: no doubt; but i should like to know why you say so. athenian: my good friend, i am afraid that the course of my speculations is leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators; but if the word be to the purpose, there can be no harm. and yet, why am i disquieted, for i believe that the same principle applies equally to all human things? cleinias: to what are you referring? athenian: i was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. the violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws. and the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences, or when there has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years. any one who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which i was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything. and this may be said of the arts of the sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to be well said; and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal truth of all of them. cleinias: what is it? athenian: that god governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with him in the government of human affairs. there is, however, a third and less extreme view, that art should be there also; for i should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having the aid of the pilot's art. you would agree? cleinias: yes. athenian: and does not a like principle apply to legislation as well as to other things: even supposing all the conditions to be favourable which are needed for the happiness of the state, yet the true legislator must from time to time appear on the scene? cleinias: most true. athenian: in each case the artist would be able to pray rightly for certain conditions, and if these were granted by fortune, he would then only require to exercise his art? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were bidden to offer up each their special prayer, would do so? cleinias: of course. athenian: and the legislator would do likewise? cleinias: i believe that he would. athenian: 'come, legislator,' we will say to him; 'what are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?' how ought he to answer this question? shall i give his answer? cleinias: yes. athenian: he will say--'give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; let him have that quality which, as i said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.' cleinias: i suppose, megillus, that this companion virtue of which the stranger speaks, must be temperance? athenian: yes, cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; not that which in the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of whom some live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. i think that you must understand my meaning. cleinias: certainly. athenian: then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny. cleinias: by what possible arguments, stranger, can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine? athenian: there is surely no difficulty in seeing, cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature? cleinias: you would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature? athenian: yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. when this has been accomplished, god has done all that he ever does for a state which he desires to be eminently prosperous; he has done second best for a state in which there are two such rulers, and third best for a state in which there are three. the difficulty increases with the increase, and diminishes with the diminution of the number. cleinias: you mean to say, i suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and that the change from such a tyranny into a perfect form of government takes place most easily; less easily when from an oligarchy; and, in the third degree, from a democracy: is not that your meaning? athenian: not so; i mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort of democracy: fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. i am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the state; and when the ruling element is numerically small, and at the same time very strong, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid. cleinias: how? i do not understand. athenian: and yet i have repeated what i am saying a good many times; but i suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny? cleinias: no, and i cannot say that i have any great desire to see one. athenian: and yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that of which i am now speaking. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state: he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself indicating by his example the lines of conduct, praising and rewarding some actions and reproving others, and degrading those who disobey. cleinias: but how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example set to them; and how can he have this power both of persuading and of compelling them? athenian: let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker and easier way in which states change their laws than when the rulers lead: such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass in any other way. the real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages; but when once it is surmounted, ten thousand or rather all blessings follow. cleinias: of what are you speaking? athenian: the difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. you might as well hope to reproduce the character of nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. this, however, according to the tradition, was in the times of troy; in our own days there is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has or ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. and this may be said of power in general: when the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into being; but in no other way. and let what i have been saying be regarded as a kind of sacred legend or oracle, and let this be our proof that, in one point of view, there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected, granting our supposition. cleinias: how do you mean? athenian: let us try to amuse ourselves, old boys as we are, by moulding in words the laws which are suitable to your state. cleinias: let us proceed without delay. athenian: then let us invoke god at the settlement of our state; may he hear and be propitious to us, and come and set in order the state and the laws! cleinias: may he come! athenian: but what form of polity are we going to give the city? cleinias: tell us what you mean a little more clearly. do you mean some form of democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or monarchy? for we cannot suppose that you would include tyranny. athenian: which of you will first tell me to which of these classes his own government is to be referred? megillus: ought i to answer first, since i am the elder? cleinias: perhaps you should. megillus: and yet, stranger, i perceive that i cannot say, without more thought, what i should call the government of lacedaemon, for it seems to me to be like a tyranny,--the power of our ephors is marvellously tyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities the most democratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy (compare ar. pol.)? we have also a monarchy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, i cannot precisely say which form of government the spartan is. cleinias: i am in the same difficulty, megillus; for i do not feel confident that the polity of cnosus is any of these. athenian: the reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have polities, but the states of which we were just now speaking are merely aggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants of a part of their own state, and each of them is named after the dominant power; they are not polities at all. but if states are to be named after their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the god who rules over wise men. cleinias: and who is this god? athenian: may i still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that i may be better able to answer your question: shall i? cleinias: by all means. athenian: in the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came into being whose settlements we have described, there is said to have been in the time of cronos a blessed rule and life, of which the best-ordered of existing states is a copy (compare statesman). cleinias: it will be very necessary to hear about that. athenian: i quite agree with you; and therefore i have introduced the subject. cleinias: most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, you will do well in giving us the whole story. athenian: i will do as you suggest. there is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. and of this the reason is said to have been as follows:--cronos knew what we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. for we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them. in like manner god, in his love of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing, made the tribes of men happy and united. and this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not god is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term 'law,' the distribution of mind. but if either a single person or an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires--wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder; and this evil spirit, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an individual,--then, as i was saying, salvation is hopeless. and now, cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this tale of mine. cleinias: certainly we will. athenian: you are aware,--are you not?--that there are often said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments, and of the latter we have already mentioned all those which are commonly recognized. now you must regard this as a matter of first-rate importance. for what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. men say that the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the established form of government; this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice. cleinias: how? athenian: justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger (republic). cleinias: speak plainer. athenian: i will:--'surely,' they say, 'the governing power makes whatever laws have authority in any state'? cleinias: true. athenian: 'well,' they would add, 'and do you suppose that tyranny or democracy, or any other conquering power, does not make the continuance of the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of their laws'? cleinias: how can they have any other? athenian: 'and whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil-doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just'? cleinias: naturally. athenian: 'this, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justice exists.' cleinias: certainly, if they are correct in their view. athenian: why, yes, this is one of those false principles of government to which we were referring. cleinias: which do you mean? athenian: those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to govern whom. did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the ignoble? and there were many other principles, if you remember, and they were not always consistent. one principle was this very principle of might, and we said that pindar considered violence natural and justified it. cleinias: yes; i remember. athenian: consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted. for there is a thing which has occurred times without number in states-cleinias: what thing? athenian: that when there has been a contest for power, those who gain the upper hand so entirely monopolize the government, as to refuse all share to the defeated party and their descendants--they live watching one another, the ruling class being in perpetual fear that some one who has a recollection of former wrongs will come into power and rise up against them. now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws right which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. states which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notions of justice are simply unmeaning. i say this, because i am going to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to any one because he is rich, or because he possesses any other advantage, such as strength, or stature, or again birth: but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm; and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods; and the second to him who bears the second palm; and on a similar principle shall all the other offices be assigned to those who come next in order. and when i call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, i give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because i certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the wellor ill-being of the state. for that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, i perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but i see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the gods can confer. cleinias: truly, stranger, you see with the keen vision of age. athenian: why, yes; every man when he is young has that sort of vision dullest, and when he is old keenest. cleinias: very true. athenian: and now, what is to be the next step? may we not suppose the colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them? cleinias: certainly. athenian: 'friends,' we say to them,--'god, as the old tradition declares, holding in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, travels according to his nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of his end. justice always accompanies him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. to justice, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, i say, is left deserted of god; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think'? cleinias: every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of god; there can be no doubt of that. athenian: then what life is agreeable to god, and becoming in his followers? one only, expressed once for all in the old saying that 'like agrees with like, with measure measure,' but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have. now god ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man (compare crat.; theaet.), as men commonly say (protagoras): the words are far more true of him. and he who would be dear to god must, as far as is possible, be like him and such as he is. wherefore the temperate man is the friend of god, for he is like him; and the intemperate man is unlike him, and different from him, and unjust. and the same applies to other things; and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings,--that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the gods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. but with the bad man, the opposite of this is true: for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure; and from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor god can without impropriety receive gifts. wherefore the unholy do only waste their much service upon the gods, but when offered by any holy man, such service is most acceptable to them. this is the mark at which we ought to aim. but what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them? in the first place, we affirm that next after the olympian gods and the gods of the state, honour should be given to the gods below; they should receive everything in even numbers, and of the second choice, and ill omen, while the odd numbers, and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. next to these gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the private and ancestral gods, who are worshipped as the law prescribes in the places which are sacred to them. next comes the honour of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister to them, first, in his property, secondly, in his person, and thirdly, in his soul, in return for the endless care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. and all his life long he ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them; for of light and fleeting words the penalty is most severe; nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over all such matters. when they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed, he should give way to them; for a father who thinks that he has been wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. at their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents. and let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring them chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the gods and those who are above us (i.e. the demons); and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. and how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and friends and fellow-citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of all these duties, with a view to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life--these things, i say, the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. but of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of my way of thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be out of place--of this i think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to the work of legislation. now, what will be the form of such prefaces? there may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but i think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing. cleinias: what is that? athenian: i should wish the citizens to be as readily persuaded to virtue as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all his laws. cleinias: certainly. athenian: the proposal appears to me to be of some value; and i think that a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and is always worth having. for there is no great inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as quickly good, as possible. the case of the many proves the wisdom of hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and can be travelled without perspiring, because it is so very short: 'but before virtue the immortal gods have placed the sweat of labour, and long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first; but when you have reached the top, although difficult before, it is then easy.' (works and days.) cleinias: yes; and he certainly speaks well. athenian: very true: and now let me tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me. cleinias: proceed. athenian: suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator, and say to him--'o, legislator, speak; if you know what we ought to say and do, you can surely tell.' cleinias: of course he can. athenian: 'did we not hear you just now saying, that the legislator ought not to allow the poets to do what they liked? for that they would not know in which of their words they went against the laws, to the hurt of the state.' cleinias: that is true. athenian: may we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets? cleinias: what answer shall we make to him? athenian: that the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows to flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing that he has said than in another. this is not the case in a law; the legislator must give not two rules about the same thing, but one only. take an example from what you have just been saying. of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too extravagant, another is too niggardly, the third in a mean; and you choose and approve and order the last without qualification. but if i had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me bury her and describe her burial in a poem, i should praise the extravagant sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the man of moderate means, who was himself moderate, would praise a moderate funeral. now you in the capacity of legislator must not barely say 'a moderate funeral,' but you must define what moderation is, and how much; unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law. cleinias: certainly not. athenian: and is our legislator to have no preface to his laws, but to say at once do this, avoid that--and then holding the penalty in terrorem, to go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or exhortation to those for whom he is legislating, after the manner of some doctors? for of doctors, as i may remind you, some have a gentler, others a ruder method of cure; and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. what i mean to say is, that besides doctors there are doctors' servants, who are also styled doctors. cleinias: very true. athenian: and whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference; they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their masters; empirically and not according to the natural way of learning, as the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves the art which they impart scientifically to their pupils. you are aware that there are these two classes of doctors? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: and did you ever observe that there are two classes of patients in states, slaves and freemen; and the slave doctors run about and cure the slaves, or wait for them in the dispensaries--practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients individually, or let them talk about their own individual complaints? the slave doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests, as if he had exact knowledge; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who is ill; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of his invalid slaves. but the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practices upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at once getting information from the sick man, and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. now which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer? is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder and inferior? cleinias: i should say, stranger, that the double way is far better. athenian: should you like to see an example of the double and single method in legislation? cleinias: certainly i should. athenian: what will be our first law? will not the legislator, observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about births? cleinias: he will. athenian: in all states the birth of children goes back to the connexion of marriage? cleinias: very true. athenian: and, according to the true order, the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state? cleinias: quite so. athenian: then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form; it may run as follows:--a man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. this would be the simple law about marriage. the double law would run thus:--a man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that in a manner the human race naturally partakes of immortality, which every man is by nature inclined to desire to the utmost; for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. now mankind are coeval with all time, and are ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and so they are immortal, because they leave children's children behind them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. and for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is impiety. he who obeys the law shall be free, and shall pay no fine; but he who is disobedient, and does not marry, when he has arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a yearly fine of a certain amount, in order that he may not imagine his celibacy to bring ease and profit to him; and he shall not share in the honours which the young men in the state give to the aged. comparing now the two forms of the law, you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws--whether they should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of half the length. megillus: the shorter form, stranger, would be more in accordance with lacedaemonian custom; although, for my own part, if any one were to ask me which i myself prefer in the state, i should certainly determine in favour of the longer; and i would have every law made after the same pattern, if i had to choose. but i think that cleinias is the person to be consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws. cleinias: thank you, megillus. athenian: whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a very foolish question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be approved; nor is length at all to be regarded. of the two forms of law which have been recited, the one is not only twice as good in practical usefulness as the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds of doctors, which i was just now mentioning. and yet legislators never appear to have considered that they have two instruments which they might use in legislation--persuasion and force; for in dealing with the rude and uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can; they do not mingle persuasion with coercion, but employ force pure and simple. moreover, there is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to be, and never is, regarded in our existing laws. cleinias: what is it? athenian: a point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes into my mind in some mysterious way. all this time, from early dawn until noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat: now we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. why do i mention this? for this reason:--because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be performed; lyric measures and music of every other kind have preludes framed with wonderful care. but of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or published any, as though there was no such thing in nature. whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there is;--these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of the law. the arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of doctors, whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple; and that which preceded, and was described by our friend here as being hortatory only, was, although in fact, an exhortation, likewise analogous to the preamble of a discourse. for i imagine that all this language of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom he addressed, in order that, by reason of this good-will, he might more intelligently receive his command, that is to say, the law. and therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the law. and i must further proceed to observe, that to all his laws, and to each separately, the legislator should prefix a preamble; he should remember how great will be the difference between them, according as they have, or have not, such preambles, as in the case already given. cleinias: the lawgiver, if he asks my opinion, will certainly legislate in the form which you advise. athenian: i think that you are right, cleinias, in affirming that all laws have preambles, and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation every single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that which is to follow is most important, and it makes all the difference whether we clearly remember the preambles or not. yet we should be wrong in requiring that all laws, small and great alike, should have preambles of the same kind, any more than all songs or speeches; although they may be natural to all, they are not always necessary, and whether they are to be employed or not has in each case to be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician, or, in the present instance, of the lawgiver. cleinias: that i think is most true. and now, stranger, without delay let us return to the argument, and, as people say in play, make a second and better beginning, if you please, with the principles which we have been laying down, which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before, but of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider them to be chance topics of discourse. let us acknowledge, then, that we have a preamble. about the honour of the gods and the respect of parents, enough has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics which follow next in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete; and after that you shall go through the laws themselves. athenian: i understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble about gods and demigods, and about parents living or dead; and now you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day? cleinias: exactly. athenian: after this, as is meet and for the interest of us all, i the speaker, and you the listeners, will try to estimate all that relates to the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens, as regards both their occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies, at the nature of education. these then are the topics which follow next in order. cleinias: very good. book v. athenian: listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about gods, and about our dear forefathers:--of all the things which a man has, next to the gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. now in every man there are two parts: the better and superior, which rules, and the worse and inferior, which serves; and the ruling part of him is always to be preferred to the subject. wherefore i am right in bidding every one next to the gods, who are our masters, and those who in order follow them (i.e. the demons), to honour his own soul, which every one seems to honour, but no one honours as he ought; for honour is a divine good, and no evil thing is honourable; and he who thinks that he can honour the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honour her, but honours her not at all. for example, every man, from his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that he honours his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. but i mean to say that in acting thus he injures his soul, and is far from honouring her; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honour her as second only to the gods. again, when a man thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed from time to time, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honouring his soul; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. and when, disregarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honouring her; he only dishonours her, and fills her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honour the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honour her, but yet once more he dishonours her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the gods below, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul? for such a preference implies that the body is more honourable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful possession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts--far otherwise; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold; but all the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. in a word, i may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other to the utmost of his power, does not know that in all these respects he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part of man; for no one, as i may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing--namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad. and he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another,--a suffering which is not justice but retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon injustice; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable,--in the former case, because he is not cured; while in the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved. speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, as far as this is possible. and of all human possessions, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, and track out and find the chief good; which when a man has found, he should take up his abode with it during the remainder of his life. wherefore the soul also is second (or next to god) in honour; and third, as every one will perceive, comes the honour of the body in natural order. having determined this, we have next to consider that there is a natural honour of the body, and that of honours some are true and some are counterfeit. to decide which are which is the business of the legislator; and he, i suspect, would intimate that they are as follows:--honour is not to be given to the fair body, or to the strong or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy body (although many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites; but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other, illiberal and base; and money, and property, and distinction all go to the same tune. the excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. and, therefore, i would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. for the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. the condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. let parents, then, bequeath to their children not a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence. we, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. but this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. a sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. the best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice. he who honours his kindred, and reveres those who share in the same gods and are of the same blood and family, may fairly expect that the gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken his seed. and he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do for him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favours to them less than theirs to him, will have their good-will in the intercourse of life. and surely in his relations to the state and his fellow citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than the olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country, and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life. in his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of god, than wrongs done to citizens; for the stranger, having no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by gods and men. wherefore, also, he who is most able to avenge him is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the genius and the god of the stranger, who follow in the train of zeus, the god of strangers. and for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. and of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants is the greatest. for the god who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged. thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the state, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and in what concerns the stranger. we will now consider what manner of man he must be who would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law, but of praise and blame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed. truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to gods and men; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. neither condition is enviable, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane: so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary.--worthy of honour is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour, if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. and yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can--he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. the same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed by him, but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power. let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. for the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states--he himself contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man; but the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. and so he makes the whole city to enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue, and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gentle. from the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done to him by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. as to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. for no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honourable part of himself. and the soul, as we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable. in the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils (compare republic). the unrighteous and vicious are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not getting into a passion, like a woman, and nursing ill-feeling. but upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out; wherefore i say that good men ought, when occasion demands, to be both gentle and passionate. of all evils the greatest is one which in the souls of most men is innate, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; i mean, what is expressed in the saying that 'every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend.' whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer himself to the truth. but he who would be a great man ought to regard, not himself or his interests, but what is just, whether the just act be his own or that of another. through a similar error men are induced to fancy that their own ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for us in what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. wherefore let every man avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow a better man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in the way. there are also minor precepts which are often repeated, and are quite as useful; a man should recollect them and remind himself of them. for when a stream is flowing out, there should be water flowing in too; and recollection flows in while wisdom is departing. therefore i say that a man should refrain from excess either of laughter or tears, and should exhort his neighbour to do the same; he should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave with propriety, whether the genius of his good fortune remains with him, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and steep places, the gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. still he may ever hope, in the case of good men, that whatever afflictions are to befall them in the future god will lessen, and that present evils he will change for the better; and as to the goods which are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be added to them, and that they will be fortunate. such should be men's hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never losing an opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others of all these things, both in jest and earnest. enough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the practices which men ought to follow, and as to the sort of persons who they ought severally to be. but of human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must; for to men we are discoursing and not to gods. pleasures and pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most eager interest. and therefore we must praise the noblest life, not only as the fairest in appearance, but as being one which, if a man will only taste, and not, while still in his youth, desert for another, he will find to surpass also in the very thing which we all of us desire,--i mean in having a greater amount of pleasure and less of pain during the whole of life. and this will be plain, if a man has a true taste of them, as will be quickly and clearly seen. but what is a true taste? that we have to learn from the argument--the point being what is according to nature, and what is not according to nature. one life must be compared with another, the more pleasurable with the more painful, after this manner:--we desire to have pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure but for pain; and we also wish for less pain and greater pleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not wish for; and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should desire. and all these differ or do not differ severally in number and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of choice, in relation to desire. and such being the necessary order of things, we wish for that life in which there are many great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which the pleasures are in excess, and do not wish for that in which the opposites exceed; nor, again, do we wish for that in which the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the pains exceed. and when, as i said before, there is a balance of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the balanced life; while other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. all the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider what sort of lives we by nature desire. and if we wish for any others, i say that we desire them only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist. now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites, and making of them a law, choosing, i say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible? let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous another, and the healthful another; and to these four let us oppose four other lives--the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the diseased. he who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid desires and loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in greatness and number and frequency. hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. and if this is true, the inference clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance, or from want of self-control, or both. and the same holds of the diseased and healthy life; they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. now our intention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we have determined to be the more pleasant life. and we should say that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and pain fewer and smaller and less frequent than the intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life, and the life of courage than the life of cowardice; one of each pair exceeding in pleasure and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing the cowardly, and the wise exceeding the foolish. and so the one class of lives exceeds the other class in pleasure; the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and intemperate and diseased lives; and generally speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and excellence and reputation, and causes him who lives accordingly to be infinitely happier than the opposite. enough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak more correctly, an outline of them. as, then, in the case of a web or any other tissue, the warp and the woof cannot be made of the same materials (compare statesman), but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger, and having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has a proper degree of elasticity;--in a similar manner those who are to hold great offices in states, should be distinguished truly in each case from those who have been but slenderly proven by education. let us suppose that there are two parts in the constitution of a state--one the creation of offices, the other the laws which are assigned to them to administer. but, before all this, comes the following consideration:--the shepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send away the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that his labours will be vain and have no effect, either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted, and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal, if he should neglect to purify them. now the case of other animals is not so important--they are only worth introducing for the sake of illustration; but what relates to man is of the highest importance; and the legislator should make enquiries, and indicate what is proper for each one in the way of purification and of any other procedure. take, for example, the purification of a city--there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect; but the legislator, who, not being a despot, sets up a new government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete his work. the best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in the last resort. for in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury of the whole state. but the milder form of purification is as follows:--when men who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich--these, who are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony. and every legislator should contrive to do this at once. our present case, however, is peculiar. for there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the circumstances in which we are placed. but as, when many streams flow together from many sources, whether springs or mountain torrents, into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble and danger. but, seeing that we are now only discoursing and not acting, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the desired purity attained. touching evil men, who want to join and be citizens of our state, after we have tested them by every sort of persuasion and for a sufficient time, we will prevent them from coming; but the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends with open arms. another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were saying, the heraclid colony had, and which is also ours,--that we have escaped division of land and the abolition of debts; for these are always a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven by necessity to legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet venture to alter them. we must have recourse to prayers, so to speak, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. and such a change can be accomplished by those who have abundance of land, and having also many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property. for this is the great beginning of salvation to a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the future administration of the country will be full of difficulties. that is a danger which, as i am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but freedom from avarice and a sense of justice--upon this rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. if there are quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. but that they to whom god has given, as he has to us, to be the founders of a new state as yet free from enmity--that they should create themselves enmities by their mode of distributing lands and houses, would be superhuman folly and wickedness. how then can we rightly order the distribution of the land? in the first place, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also the number and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed; and the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we can. the number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring states. the territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way of life--more than this is not required; and the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves against the injustice of their neighbours, and also to give them the power of rendering efficient aid to their neighbours when they are wronged. after having taken a survey of their's and their neighbours' territory, we will determine the limits of them in fact as well as in theory. and now, let us proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state. the number of our citizens shall be 5040--this will be a convenient number; and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment. the houses and the land will be divided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. let the whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three; and the number is further capable of being divided into four or five parts, or any number of parts up to ten. every legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely to be useful to all cities; and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. the whole of number has every possible division, and the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions of the land. these properties of number should be ascertained at leisure by those who are bound by law to know them; for they are true, and should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one, in respect of gods and temples,--the temples which are to be built in each city, and the gods or demi-gods after whom they are to be called,--if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in anything which the oracle of delphi, or dodona, or the god ammon, or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by apparitions or reputed inspiration of heaven, in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connexion with mystic rites, either originating on the spot, or derived from tyrrhenia or cyprus or some other place, and on the strength of which traditions they have consecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and portioned out a sacred domain for each of them. the least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator; but he should assign to the several districts some god, or demi-god, or hero, and, in the distribution of the soil, should give to these first their chosen domain and all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the several districts may meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply their various wants, and entertain one another with sacrifices, and become friends and acquaintances; for there is no greater good in a state than that the citizens should be known to one another. when not light but darkness and ignorance of each other's characters prevails among them, no one will receive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the justice to which he is fairly entitled: wherefore, in every state, above all things, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him, but that he be always true and simple; and that no deceitful person take any advantage of him. the next move in our pastime of legislation, like the withdrawal of the stone from the holy line in the game of draughts, being an unusual one, will probably excite wonder when mentioned for the first time. and yet, if a man will only reflect and weigh the matter with care, he will see that our city is ordered in a manner which, if not the best, is the second best. perhaps also some one may not approve this form, because he thinks that such a constitution is ill adapted to a legislator who has not despotic power. the truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best, the second and the third best, which we may just mention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement. following this method in the present instance, let us speak of the states which are respectively first, second, and third in excellence, and then we will leave the choice to cleinias now, or to any one else who may hereafter have to make a similar choice among constitutions, and may desire to give to his state some feature which is congenial to him and which he approves in his own country. the first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'friends have all things in common.' whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost (compare republic),--whether all this is possible or not, i say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. whether such a state is governed by gods or sons of gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this. the state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the grace of god, we will complete the third one. and we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second. let the citizens at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. but in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the whole city; and seeing that the earth is their parent, let them tend her more carefully than children do their mother. for she is a goddess and their queen, and they are her mortal subjects. such also are the feelings which they ought to entertain to the gods and demi-gods of the country. and in order that the distribution may always remain, they ought to consider further that the present number of families should be always retained, and neither increased nor diminished. this may be secured for the whole city in the following manner:--let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is his best beloved, and one only, to be the heir of his dwelling, and his successor in the duty of ministering to the gods, the state and the family, as well the living members of it as those who are departed when he comes into the inheritance; but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall distribute as sons to those citizens who have no children, and are disposed to receive them; or if there should be none such, and particular individuals have too many children, male or female, or too few, as in the case of barrenness--in all these cases let the highest and most honourable magistracy created by us judge and determine what is to be done with the redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses shall always remain the same. there are many ways of regulating numbers; for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain (compare arist. pol.), and, on the other hand, special care may be taken to increase the number of births by rewards and stigmas, or we may meet the evil by the elder men giving advice and administering rebuke to the younger--in this way the object may be attained. and if after all there be very great difficulty about the equal preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too great love of those who live together, and we are at our wits' end, there is still the old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony, which will part friends with us, and be composed of suitable persons. if, on the other hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become much fewer than the appointed number by reason of bereavement, we ought not to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be avoided; but even god is said not to be able to fight against necessity. wherefore let us suppose this 'high argument' of ours to address us in the following terms:--best of men, cease not to honour according to nature similarity and equality and sameness and agreement, as regards number and every good and noble quality. and, above all, observe the aforesaid number 5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not disparage the small and modest proportions of the inheritances which you received in the distribution, by buying and selling them to one another. for then neither will the god who gave you the lot be your friend, nor will the legislator; and indeed the law declares to the disobedient that these are the terms upon which he may or may not take the lot. in the first place, the earth as he is informed is sacred to the gods; and in the next place, priests and priestesses will offer up prayers over a first, and second, and even a third sacrifice, that he who buys or sells the houses or lands which he has received, may suffer the punishment which he deserves; and these their prayers they shall write down in the temples, on tablets of cypress-wood, for the instruction of posterity. moreover they will set a watch over all these things, that they may be observed;--the magistracy which has the sharpest eyes shall keep watch that any infringement of these commands may be discovered and punished as offences both against the law and the god. how great is the benefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which obey and are administered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old proverb says; but only a man of experience and good habits. for in such an order of things there will not be much opportunity for making money; no man either ought, or indeed will be allowed, to exercise any ignoble occupation, of which the vulgarity is a matter of reproach to a freeman, and should never want to acquire riches by any such means. further, the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess gold and silver, but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary in dealing with artisans, and for payment of hirelings, whether slaves or immigrants, by all those persons who require the use of them. wherefore our citizens, as we say, should have a coin passing current among themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with a view, however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands,--for embassies, or for any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald, the state must also possess a common hellenic currency. if a private person is ever obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of the magistrates and go; and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining, let him give the surplus back to the treasury, and receive a corresponding sum in the local currency. and if he is discovered to appropriate it, let it be confiscated, and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse and dishonour equally him who brought the money, and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought back. in marrying and giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all; and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest. that these principles are best, any one may see who compares them with the first principle and intention of a state. the intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator, namely, that the state for the true interests of which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land;--this they imagine to be the real object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. but they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible. the citizen must indeed be happy and good, and the legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. for they mean by 'the rich' the few who have the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them may quite well be a rogue. and if this is true, i can never assent to the doctrine that the rich man will be happy--he must be good as well as rich. and good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be. some one will ask, why not? and we shall answer--because acquisitions which come from sources which are just and unjust indifferently, are more than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums which are expended neither honourably nor disgracefully, are only half as great as those which are expended honourably and on honourable purposes. thus, if the one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he. the first--i am speaking of the saver and not of the spender--is not always bad; he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad, but, as i was saying, a good man he never is. for he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends neither nor unjustly, will be a rich man if he be also thrifty. on the other hand, the utterly bad is in general profligate, and therefore very poor; while he who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be very poor. our statement, then, is true, that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not good, they are not happy. but the intention of our laws was, that the citizens should be as happy as may be, and as friendly as possible to one another. and men who are always at law with one another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another, but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight. therefore we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by lending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist--i mean, soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts. for there are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the body; and, first of all, that of the soul; and the state which we are describing will have been rightly constituted if it ordains honours according to this scale. but if, in any of the laws which have been ordained, health has been preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly be wrong. wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question--'what do i want?' and 'do i attain my aim, or do i miss the mark?' in this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legislation. let the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have mentioned. it would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater possessions than another, for many reasons and in particular in order to preserve equality in special crises of the state, qualifications of property must be unequal, in order that offices and contributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels and disputes. to which end there should be four different standards appointed according to the amount of property: there should be a first and a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these or similar names: they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. the form of law which i should propose as the natural sequel would be as follows:--in a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues--not faction, but rather distraction;--there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. this the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much as four times the amount of this (compare arist. pol.). but if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure, if he give back the surplus to the state, and to the gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, any one who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the gods. and let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits about money may be easy and quite simple. the next thing to be noted is, that the city should be placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the country; we should choose a place which possesses what is suitable for a city, and this may easily be imagined and described. then we will divide the city into twelve portions, first founding temples to hestia, to zeus and to athene, in a spot which we will call the acropolis, and surround with a circular wall, making the division of the entire city and country radiate from this point. the twelve portions shall be equalized by the provision that those which are of good land shall be smaller, while those of inferior quality shall be larger. the number of the lots shall be 5040, and each of them shall be divided into two, and every allotment shall be composed of two such sections; one of land near the city, the other of land which is at a distance (compare arist. pol.). this arrangement shall be carried out in the following manner: the section which is near the city shall be added to that which is on the borders, and form one lot, and the portion which is next nearest shall be added to the portion which is next farthest; and so of the rest. moreover, in the two sections of the lots the same principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the badness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less. and the legislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the rest of their property, as far as possible, so as to form twelve equal parts; and there shall be a registration of all. after this they shall assign twelve lots to twelve gods, and call them by their names, and dedicate to each god their several portions, and call the tribes after them. and they shall distribute the twelve divisions of the city in the same way in which they divided the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one in the centre of the country, and the other at the extremity. enough of the manner of settlement. now we ought by all means to consider that there can never be such a happy concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can all things coincide as they are wanted. men who will not take offence at such a mode of living together, and will endure all their life long to have their property fixed at a moderate limit, and to beget children in accordance with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and other things which the legislator, as is evident from these enactments, will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the situation of the land with the city in the middle and dwellings round about;--all this is as if the legislator were telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens of wax. there is truth in these objections, and therefore every one should take to heart what i am going to say. once more, then, the legislator shall appear and address us:--'o my friends,' he will say to us, 'do not suppose me ignorant that there is a certain degree of truth in your words; but i am of opinion that, in matters which are not present but future, he who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims, should in nothing fall short of the fairest and truest; and that if he finds any part of this work impossible of execution he should avoid and not execute it, but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; you must allow the legislator to perfect his design, and when it is perfected, you should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient and what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to be deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-consistent.' having determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve parts, let us now see in what way this may be accomplished. there is no difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions of that which they include, or in seeing the other numbers which are consequent upon them, and are produced out of them up to 5040; wherefore the law ought to order phratries and demes and villages, and also military ranks and movements, as well as coins and measures, dry and liquid, and weights, so as to be commensurable and agreeable to one another. nor should we fear the appearance of minuteness, if the law commands that all the vessels which a man possesses should have a common measure, when we consider generally that the divisions and variations of numbers have a use in respect of all the variations of which they are susceptible, both in themselves and as measures of height and depth, and in all sounds, and in motions, as well those which proceed in a straight direction, upwards or downwards, as in those which go round and round. the legislator is to consider all these things and to bid the citizens, as far as possible, not to lose sight of numerical order; for no single instrument of youthful education has such mighty power, both as regards domestic economy and politics, and in the arts, as the study of arithmetic. above all, arithmetic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to learn, retentive, shrewd, and aided by art divine he makes progress quite beyond his natural powers (compare republic). all such things, if only the legislator, by other laws and institutions, can banish meanness and covetousness from the souls of men, so that they can use them properly and to their own good, will be excellent and suitable instruments of education. but if he cannot, he will unintentionally create in them, instead of wisdom, the habit of craft, which evil tendency may be observed in the egyptians and phoenicians, and many other races, through the general vulgarity of their pursuits and acquisitions, whether some unworthy legislator of theirs has been the cause, or some impediment of chance or nature. for we must not fail to observe, o megillus and cleinias, that there is a difference in places, and that some beget better men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly. some places are subject to strange and fatal influences by reason of diverse winds and violent heats, some by reason of waters; or, again, from the character of the food given by the earth, which not only affects the bodies of men for good or evil, but produces similar results in their souls. and in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is a divine inspiration, and in which the demigods have their appointed lots, and are propitious, not adverse, to the settlers in them. to all these matters the legislator, if he have any sense in him, will attend as far as man can, and frame his laws accordingly. and this is what you, cleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new country. cleinias: your words, athenian stranger, are excellent, and i will do as you say. book vi. athenian: and now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed to the appointment of magistracies. cleinias: very good. athenian: in the ordering of a state there are two parts: first, the number of the magistracies, and the mode of establishing them; and, secondly, when they have been established, laws again will have to be provided for each of them, suitable in nature and number. but before electing the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season about the election of them. cleinias: what have you got to say? athenian: this is what i have to say;--every one can see, that although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable offices, not only will there be no use in having the good laws,--not only will they be ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil will accrue from them. cleinias: of course. athenian: then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the constitution of out intended state. in the first place, you will acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, and their families, should severally have given satisfactory proof of what they are, from youth upward until the time of election; in the next place, those who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. but how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are strangers to one another, and also uneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates? cleinias: impossible. athenian: the matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn. i will tell you, then, what you and i will have to do, since you, as you tell me, with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on behalf of the people of crete, and i am to help you by the invention of the present romance. i certainly should not like to leave the tale wandering all over the world without a head;--a headless monster is such a hideous thing. cleinias: excellent, stranger. athenian: yes; and i will be as good as my word. cleinias: let us by all means do as you propose. athenian: that we will, by the grace of god, if old age will only permit us. cleinias: but god will be gracious. athenian: yes; and under his guidance let us consider a further point. cleinias: what is it? athenian: let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is. cleinias: what had you in your mind when you said that? athenian: i had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. now a man need not be very wise, cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. but if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state; i say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance--then, i think that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent. cleinias: a reasonable supposition. athenian: then let us consider if we can find any way out of the difficulty; for i maintain, cleinias, that the cnosians, above all the other cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty to the colony, but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish the offices which are first created by them in the best and surest manner. above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law, who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the others are of less importance. cleinias: what method can we devise of electing them? athenian: this will be the method:--sons of the cretans, i shall say to them, inasmuch as the cnosians have precedence over the other states, they should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, and the remainder from the citizens of cnosus. of these latter the cnosians shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state; and if you and they cannot be persuaded to go, the cnosians may fairly use a little violence in order to make you. cleinias: but why, stranger, do not you and megillus take a part in our new city? athenian: o, cleinias, athens is proud, and sparta too; and they are both a long way off. but you and likewise the other colonists are conveniently situated as you describe. i have been speaking of the way in which the new citizens may be best managed under present circumstances; but in after-ages, if the city continues to exist, let the election be on this wise. all who are horse or foot soldiers, or have seen military service at the proper ages when they were severally fitted for it (compare arist. pol.), shall share in the election of magistrates; and the election shall be held in whatever temple the state deems most venerable, and every one shall carry his vote to the altar of the god, writing down on a tablet the name of the person for whom he votes, and his father's name, and his tribe, and ward; and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner. any one who pleases may take away any tablet which he does not think properly filled up, and exhibit it in the agora for a period of not less than thirty days. the tablets which are judged to be first, to the number of 300, shall be shown by the magistrates to the whole city, and the citizens shall in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this second selection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to the citizens; in the third, let any one who pleases select whom he pleases out of the 100, walking through the parts of victims, and let them choose for magistrates and proclaim the seven-and-thirty who have the greatest number of votes. but who, cleinias and megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies of them? if we reflect, we shall see that cities which are in process of construction like ours must have some such persons, who cannot possibly be elected before there are any magistrates; and yet they must be elected in some way, and they are not to be inferior men, but the best possible. for as the proverb says, 'a good beginning is half the business'; and 'to have begun well' is praised by all, and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the business, and has never been praised by any one enough. cleinias: that is very true. athenian: then let us recognize the difficulty, and make clear to our own minds how the beginning is to be accomplished. there is only one proposal which i have to offer, and that is one which, under our circumstances, is both necessary and expedient. cleinias: what is it? athenian: i maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother, who are no other than the colonizing state. well i know that many colonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. but in early days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time later when the tie is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them, and flies to his relatives for protection, and finds in them his only natural allies in time of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the cnosians, as is shown by their care of the new city; and there is a similar feeling on the part of the young city towards cnosus. and i repeat what i was saying--for there is no harm in repeating a good thing--that the cnosians should take a common interest in all these matters, and choose, as far as they can, the eldest and best of the colonists, to the number of not less than a hundred; and let there be another hundred of the cnosians themselves. these, i say, on their arrival, should have a joint care that the magistrates should be appointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should undergo a scrutiny. when this has been effected, the cnosians shall return home, and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and happiness. i would have the seven-and-thirty now, and in all future time, chosen to fulfil the following duties:--let them, in the first place, be the guardians of the law; and, secondly, of the registers in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three allowed to the second, two to the third, and a single mina to the fourth. and if any one, despising the laws for the sake of gain, be found to possess anything more which has not been registered, let all that he has in excess be confiscated, and let him be liable to a suit which shall be the reverse of honourable or fortunate. and let any one who will, indict him on the charge of loving base gains, and proceed against him before the guardians of the law. and if he be cast, let him lose his share of the public possessions, and when there is any public distribution, let him have nothing but his original lot; and let him be written down a condemned man as long as he lives, in some place in which any one who pleases can read about his offences. the guardian of the law shall not hold office longer than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten years only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he will be permitted to hold such an important office as that of guardian of the laws after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long. these are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law; as the work of legislation progresses, each law in turn will assign to them their further duties. and now we may proceed in order to speak of the election of other officers; for generals have to be elected, and these again must have their ministers, commanders, and colonels of horse, and commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called by their popular name of brigadiers. the guardians of the law shall propose as generals men who are natives of the city, and a selection from the candidates proposed shall be made by those who are or have been of the age for military service. and if one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who is, let him name whom he prefers in the place of whom, and make oath that he is better, and propose him; and whichever of them is approved by vote shall be admitted to the final selection; and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny, like the guardians of the law. and let the generals thus elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe; and there shall be a right of counter-proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way. until the prytanes and council are elected, the guardians of the law shall convene the assembly in some holy spot which is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. all are to vote for the generals (and for the colonels of horse), but the brigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields (i.e. the hoplites). let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the army, shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. there only remains the appointment of officers of cavalry: these shall be proposed by the same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and the counter-proposal of other candidates shall be arranged in the same way as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at the election; the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice; but if the dispute be raised a third time, the officers who preside at the several elections shall decide. the council shall consist of 30 x 12 members--360 will be a convenient number for sub-division. if we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety counsellors for each class. first, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. when the candidates have been selected, some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. and on the following day, candidates shall be selected from the second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous day; and on the third day a selection shall be made from the third class, at which every one may, if he likes vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. on the fourth day candidates shall be selected from the fourth and smallest class; they shall be selected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished;--he who is of the second class shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. on the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, for all the citizens to see, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny:--these are to form the council for the year. the mode of election which has been described is in a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean the state ought always to observe; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because they are declared to have equal privileges. for to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonised by measure; and both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions. the old saying, that 'equality makes friendship,' is happy and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. for there are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours: this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. but there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized. this is the judgment of zeus; among men it avails but little; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. for it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. and this is justice, and is ever the true principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. to this the legislator should look,--not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to justice always; which, as i was saying, is the distribution of natural equality among unequals in each case. but there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, 'just,' 'equal,' in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. for equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice. and this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people; and so we invoke god and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice. and therefore, although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible. thus, o my friends, and for the reasons given, should a state act which would endure and be saved. but as a ship sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and watchers with watchers, receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual succession. now a multitude can never fulfil a duty of this sort with anything like energy. moreover, the greater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. they will therefore have to be arranged in twelve portions, answering to the twelve months, and furnish guardians of the state, each portion for a single month. their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to put one of those questions, to which, when asked by other cities, a city should give an answer, and to which, if she ask them herself, she should receive an answer; or again, when there is a likelihood of internal commotions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other, they will, if they can, prevent their occurring; or if they have already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the city, and healing the evil. wherefore, also, this which is the presiding body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and of the dissolutions of them, ordinary as well as extraordinary. all this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always to keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions. thus will the city be fairly ordered. and now, who is to have the superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement? seeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed superintendents of the streets of the city, and of the houses, and buildings, and harbours, and the agora, and fountains, and sacred domains, and temples, and the like? cleinias: to be sure there ought. athenian: let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the temples, and priests and priestesses. there must also be superintendents of roads and buildings, who will have a care of men, that they may do no harm, and also of beasts, both within the enclosure and in the suburbs. three kinds of officers will thus have to be appointed, in order that the city may be suitably provided according to her needs. those who have the care of the city shall be called wardens of the city; and those who have the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and those who have the care of the temples shall be called priests. those who hold hereditary offices as priests or priestesses, shall not be disturbed; but if there be few or none such, as is probable at the foundation of a new city, priests and priestesses shall be appointed to be servants of the gods who have no servants. some of our officers shall be elected, and others appointed by lot, those who are of the people and those who are not of the people mingling in a friendly manner in every place and city, that the state may be as far as possible of one mind. the officers of the temples shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to god, that he may do what is agreeable to him. and he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. now the laws about all divine things should be brought from delphi, and interpreters appointed, under whose direction they should be used. the tenure of the priesthood should always be for a year and no longer; and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the laws of religion, must be not less than sixty years of age--the laws shall be the same about priestesses. as for the interpreters, they shall be appointed thus:--let the twelve tribes be distributed into groups of four, and let each group select four, one out of each tribe within the group, three times; and let the three who have the greatest number of votes (out of the twelve appointed by each group), after undergoing a scrutiny, nine in all, be sent to delphi, in order that the god may return one out of each triad; their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner; let them be interpreters for life, and when any one dies let the four tribes select another from the tribe of the deceased. moreover, besides priests and interpreters, there must be treasurers, who will take charge of the property of the several temples, and of the sacred domains, and shall have authority over the produce and the letting of them; and three of them shall be chosen from the highest classes for the greater temples, and two for the lesser, and one for the least of all; the manner of their election and the scrutiny of them shall be the same as that of the generals. this shall be the order of the temples. let everything have a guard as far as possible. let the defence of the city be commited to the generals, and taxiarchs, and hipparchs, and phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of the city, and of the agora, when the election of them has been completed. the defence of the country shall be provided for as follows:--the entire land has been already distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let the tribe allotted to a division provide annually for it five wardens of the country and commanders of the watch; and let each body of five have the power of selecting twelve others out of the youth of their own tribe,--these shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not more than thirty. and let there be allotted to them severally every month the various districts, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and experience of the whole country. the term of service for commanders and for watchers shall continue during two years. after having had their stations allotted to them, they will go from place to place in regular order, making their round from left to right as their commanders direct them; (when i speak of going to the right, i mean that they are to go to the east). and at the commencement of the second year, in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only get a knowledge of the country at any one season of the year, but may also have experience of the manner in which different places are affected at different seasons of the year, their then commanders shall lead them again towards the left, from place to place in succession, until they have completed the second year. in the third year other wardens of the country shall be chosen and commanders of the watch, five for each division, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve. while on service at each station, their attention shall be directed to the following points:--in the first place, they shall see that the country is well protected against enemies; they shall trench and dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall by fortifications keep off the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from doing any harm to the country or the property; they shall use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot: these will be their instruments whom they will superintend, taking them, as far as possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular business. they shall make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends (compare arist. pol.); there shall be ways for man and beasts of burden and for cattle, and they shall take care to have them always as smooth as they can; and shall provide against the rains doing harm instead of good to the land, when they come down from the mountains into the hollow dells; and shall keep in the overflow by the help of works and ditches, in order that the valleys, receiving and drinking up the rain from heaven, and providing fountains and streams in the fields and regions which lie underneath, may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. the fountains of water, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty; and let them bring together the streams in subterraneous channels, and make all things plenteous; and if there be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in the neighbourhood, they shall conduct the water to the actual temples of the gods, and so beautify them at all seasons of the year. everywhere in such places the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those labouring under disease--there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will receive a kindly welcome, far better than he would at the hands of a not over-wise doctor. the building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental; they will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a serious employment too; for the sixty wardens will have to guard their several divisions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to professing friends. when a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens, and any one whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the five wardens decide small matters on their own authority; but where the charge against another relates to greater matters, the seventeen composed of the fives and twelves, shall determine any charges which one man brings against another, not involving more than three minae. every judge and magistrate shall be liable to give an account of his conduct in office, except those who, like kings, have the final decision. moreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country, if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care, whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks, or by taking the produce of the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent; also if they receive anything in the way of a bribe, or decide suits unjustly, or if they yield to the influences of flattery, let them be publicly dishonoured; and in regard to any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the country, if the question be of a mina, let them submit to the decision of the villagers in the neighbourhood; but in suits of greater amount, or in case of lesser, if they refuse to submit, trusting that their monthly removal into another part of the country will enable them to escape--in such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court, and if he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant, who refused to submit, a double penalty. the wardens and the overseers of the country, while on their two years' service, shall have common meals at their several stations, and shall all live together; and he who is absent from the common meal, or sleeps out, if only for one day or night, unless by order of his commanders, or by reason of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and inscribe his name in the agora as not having kept his guard, let him be deemed to have betrayed the city, as far as lay in his power, and let him be disgraced and beaten with impunity by any one who meets him and is willing to punish him. if any of the commanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole company of sixty shall see to it, and he who is cognisant of the offence, and does not bring the offender to trial, shall be amenable to the same laws as the younger offender himself, and shall pay a heavier fine, and be incapable of ever commanding the young. the guardians of the law are to be careful inspectors of these matters, and shall either prevent or punish offenders. every man should remember the universal rule, that he who is not a good servant will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more upon serving well than upon commanding well: first upon serving the laws, which is also the service of the gods; in the second place, upon having served ancient and honourable men in the days of his youth. furthermore, during the two years in which any one is a warden of the country, his daily food ought to be of a simple and humble kind. when the twelve have been chosen, let them and the five meet together, and determine that they will be their own servants, and, like servants, will not have other slaves and servants for their own use, neither will they use those of the villagers and husbandmen for their private advantage, but for the public service only; and in general they should make up their minds to live independently by themselves, servants of each other and of themselves. further, at all seasons of the year, summer and winter alike, let them be under arms and survey minutely the whole country; thus they will at once keep guard, and at the same time acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality. there can be no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a man's own country; and for this as well as for more general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. the service to whom this is committed may be called the secret police or wardens of the country; the name does not much signify, but every one who has the safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this service. after the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of wardens of the agora and of the city. the wardens of the country were sixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will divide the twelve parts of the city into three; like the former, they shall have care of the ways, and of the different high roads which lead out of the country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be all made according to law;--also of the waters, which the guardians of the supply preserve and convey to them, care being taken that they may reach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the city. these also should be men of influence, and at leisure to take care of the public interest. let every man propose as warden of the city any one whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been given on them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according to the laws laid down for them. next, let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner, out of the first and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city:--these when they have undergone a scrutiny are to be declared magistrates. every one shall vote for every one, and he who will not vote, if he be informed against before the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. let any one who likes go to the assembly and to the general council; it shall be compulsory to go on citizens of the first and second class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their names at the assembly. but the third and fourth class shall be under no compulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless the magistrates have commanded all to be present, in consequence of some urgent necessity. the wardens of the agora shall observe the order appointed by law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples and fountains which are in the agora; and they shall see that no one injures anything, and punish him who does, with stripes and bonds, if he be a slave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way, they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the city up to double that amount. and let the wardens of the city have a similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own department; and let them impose fines by their own department; and let them impose fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two minae with the consent of the wardens of the agora. in the next place, it will be proper to appoint directors of music and gymnastic, two kinds of each--of the one kind the business will be education, of the other, the superintendence of contests. in speaking of education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school, and of school buildings for boys and girls; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music; these again are divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gymnastics; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men, shall judge of horses; but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo singing, and of imitation--i mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choral song. first of all, we must choose directors for the choruses of boys, and men, and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and for our other musical arrangements;--one director will be enough for the choruses, and he should be not less than forty years of age. one director will also be enough to introduce the solo singers, and to give judgment on the competitors, and he ought not to be less than thirty years of age. the director and manager of the choruses shall be elected after the following manner:--let any persons who commonly take an interest in such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be compelled. the elector shall propose as director some one who understands music, and he in the scrutiny may be challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill, and defended on the other hand by those who say that he has. ten are to be elected by vote, and he of the ten who is chosen by lot shall undergo a scrutiny, and lead the choruses for a year according to law. and in like manner the competitor who wins the lot shall be leader of the solo and concert music for that year; and he who is thus elected shall deliver the award to the judges. in the next place, we have to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men; these shall be selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens, and three first classes shall be compelled to go to the election, but the lowest may stay away with impunity; and let there be three elected by lot out of the twenty who have been chosen previously, and they must also have the vote and approval of the examiners. but if any one is rejected in the scrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same manner, and undergo a similar scrutiny. there remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he too will rule according to law; one such minister will be sufficient, and he must be fifty years old, and have children lawfully begotten, both boys and girls by preference, at any rate, one or the other. he who is elected, and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the great offices of state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant, if it makes a good start towards the attainment of its natural excellence, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants, but of animals wild and tame, and also of men. man, as we say, is a tame or civilized animal; nevertheless, he requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized (arist. pol.); but if he be insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures. wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental matter. in the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them, should begin by taking care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every way best; him the legislator shall do his utmost to appoint guardian and superintendent. to this end all the magistrates, with the exception of the council and prytanes, shall go to the temple of apollo, and elect by ballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally think will be the best superintendent of education. and he who has the greatest number of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all the magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the guardians of the law,--shall hold office for five years; and in the sixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office. if any one dies while he is holding a public office, and more than thirty days before his term of office expires, let those whose business it is elect another to the office in the same manner as before. and if any one who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on the father's and mother's side, who are residing at home, including cousins, appoint another guardian within ten days, or be fined a drachma a day for neglect to do so. a city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings than the litigants, as is the case in arbitrations, he will never be able to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are bad. the point in dispute between the parties should be made clear; and time, and deliberation, and repeated examination, greatly tend to clear up doubts. for this reason, he who goes to law with another, should go first of all to his neighbours and friends who know best the questions at issue. and if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse to another court; and if the two courts cannot settle the matter, let a third put an end to the suit. now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some things; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is determining a suit. regarding then the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants appoint in common for themselves, choosing certain persons by agreement. and let there be two other tribunals: one for private causes, when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and wishes to get a decision; the other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. and we must not forget to mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be. in the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows:--all the officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer period, when the new year is about to commence, in the month following after the summer solstice, on the last day but one of the year, shall meet in some temple, and calling god to witness, shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their first-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner. and when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another shall be chosen in the same manner. those who have undergone the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. the councillors and other magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and spectators of the causes; and any one else may be present who pleases. if one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the party who brought the suit. in the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. such causes ought to originate with the people, and the ought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. and in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all. and for this reason there shall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot;--they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties. the final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit: this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbours or of the tribes. thus much of the courts of law, which, as i was saying, cannot be precisely defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and others omitted. for the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation;--let us then expect them at the end. hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices. perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part. at present we have reached the election of magistrates, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what preceded. and now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the work of legislation. cleinias: i like what you have said, stranger; and i particularly like your manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end of the former one. athenian: thus far, then, the old men's rational pastime has gone off well. cleinias: you mean, i suppose, their serious and noble pursuit? athenian: perhaps; but i should like to know whether you and i are agreed about a certain thing. cleinias: about what thing? athenian: you know the endless labour which painters expend upon their pictures--they are always putting in or taking out colours, or whatever be the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would never cease touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more beautiful. cleinias: i know something of these matters from report, although i have never had any great acquaintance with the art. athenian: no matter; we may make use of the illustration notwithstanding:--suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in the most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing would always improve as time went on--do you not see that being a mortal, unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may introduce, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will further brighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour will last but a short time? cleinias: true. athenian: and is not the aim of the legislator similar? first, he desires that his laws should be written down with all possible exactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? do you imagine that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily omitted, which some one coming after him must correct, if the constitution and the order of government is not to deteriorate, but to improve in the state which he has established? cleinias: assuredly, that is the sort of thing which every one would desire. athenian: and if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws, he should finish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete. cleinias: by all means. athenian: and is not this what you and i have to do at the present moment? cleinias: what have we to do? athenian: as we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators themselves, as far as this is possible. cleinias: certainly; if we can. athenian: at any rate, we must do our best. cleinias: of course. athenian: we will say to them--o friends and saviours of our laws, in laying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit, and this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to describe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall fill up. and i will explain on what principle you are to act. megillus and cleinias and i have often spoken to one another touching these matters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. and we hope that you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian of the law ought to keep in view. there was one main point about which we were agreed--that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man, whether this was to be gained by study, or habit, or some mode of acquisition, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge--and this applies equally to men and women, old and young--the aim of all should always be such as i have described; anything which may be an impediment, the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards. and if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly, an exile he must be and endure all such trials, rather than accept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse. these are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise and blame the laws--blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different kind. let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in religion. and we must first return to the number 5040--the entire number had, and has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number of the tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by 21 x 20 (5040/(21 x 20), i.e., 5040/420 = 12), also has them. and not only is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the number of each tribe is divisible by twelve. now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of heaven, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the universe (compare tim.). every city has a guiding and sacred principle given by nature, but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others, and has been more sacred and fortunate. in our opinion, nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven, and that admits of a very easy correction; for if, turning to the dividend (5040), we deduct two families, the defect in the division is cured. and the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. but for the present, trusting to the mere assertion of this principle, let us divide the state; and assigning to each portion some god or son of a god, let us give them altars and sacred rites, and at the altars let us hold assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month--twelve assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their divisions; the first in honour of the gods and divine things, and the second to promote friendship and 'better acquaintance,' as the phrase is, and every sort of good fellowship with one another. for people must be acquainted with those into whose families and whom they marry and with those to whom they give in marriage; in such matters, as far as possible, a man should deem it all important to avoid a mistake, and with this serious purpose let games be instituted (compare republic) in which youths and maidens shall dance together, seeing one another and being seen naked, at a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modesty. the directors of choruses will be the superintendents and regulators of these games, and they, together with the guardians of the law, will legislate in any matters which we have omitted; for, as we said, where there are numerous and minute details, the legislator must leave out something. and the annual officers who have experience, and know what is wanted, must make arrangements and improvements year by year, until such enactments and provisions are sufficiently determined. a ten years' experience of sacrifices and dances, if extending to all particulars, will be quite sufficient; and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate with him, but if he be dead then the several officers shall refer the omissions which come under their notice to the guardians of the law, and correct them, until all is perfect; and from that time there shall be no more change, and they shall establish and use the new laws with the others which the legislator originally gave them, and of which they are never, if they can help, to change aught; or, if some necessity overtakes them, the magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people, and they must go to all the oracles of the gods; and if they are all agreed, in that case they may make the change, but if they are not agreed, by no manner of means, and any one who dissents shall prevail, as the law ordains. whenever any one over twenty-five years of age, having seen and been seen by others, believes himself to have found a marriage connexion which is to his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let him marry if he be still under the age of five-and-thirty years; but let him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable and appropriate (compare arist. pol.). for, as cleinias says, every law should have a suitable prelude. cleinias: you recollect at the right moment, stranger, and do not miss the opportunity which the argument affords of saying a word in season. athenian: i thank you. we will say to him who is born of good parents--o my son, you ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve. now they would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to desire a rich one; but if other things are equal, always to honour inferiors, and with them to form connexions;--this will be for the benefit of the city and of the families which are united; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed. and he who is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly parents; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek the opposite alliance. let there be one word concerning all marriages:--every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the state. for somehow every one is by nature prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition; and hence there arise in most states the very results which we least desire to happen. now, to add to the law an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich family, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken anger as well as laughter in the minds of many; for there is a difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which the maddening wine is hot and fiery, but when chastened by a soberer god, receives a fair associate and becomes an excellent and temperate drink (compare statesman). yet in marriage no one is able to see that the same result occurs. wherefore also the law must let alone such matters, but we should try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of making a rich marriage we should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law. let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us remember what was said before--that a man should cling to immortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants of god in his place for ever. all this and much more may be truly said by way of prelude about the duty of marriage. but if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still unmarried at thirty-five years of age, let him pay a yearly fine;--he who of the highest class shall pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he who is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae; the third class shall pay sixty drachmae, and the fourth thirty drachmae, and let the money be sacred to here; he who does not pay the fine annually shall owe ten times the sum, which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact; and if he fails in doing so, let him be answerable and give an account of the money at his audit. he who refuses to marry shall be thus punished in money, and also be deprived of all honour which the younger show to the elder; let no young man voluntarily obey him, and, if he attempt to punish any one, let every one come to the rescue and defend the injured person, and he who is present and does not come to the rescue, shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a bad citizen. of the marriage portion i have already spoken; and again i say for the instruction of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of poverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our state are provided with the necessaries of life, and wives will be less likely to be insolent, and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on account of property. and he who obeys this law will do a noble action; but he who will not obey, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the price of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest, or more than a mina, or a mina-and-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes, or two minae if he be of the highest class, shall owe to the public treasury a similar sum, and that which is given or received shall be sacred to here and zeus; and let the treasurers of these gods exact the money, as was said before about the unmarried--that the treasurers of here were to exact the money, or pay the fine themselves. the betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a grandfather in the second degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by brothers who have the same father; but if there are none of these alive, the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases of unexampled fatality, the next of kin and the guardians shall have authority. what are to be the rites before marriages, or any other sacred acts, relating either to future, present, or past marriages, shall be referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice may be satisfied. touching the marriage festival, they shall assemble not more than five male and five female friends of both families; and a like number of members of the family of either sex, and no man shall spend more than his means will allow; he who is of the richest class may spend a mina,--he who is of the second, half a mina, and in the same proportion as the census of each decreases: all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law; but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians of the law as a man wanting in true taste, and uninstructed in the laws of bridal song. drunkenness is always improper, except at the festivals of the god who gave wine; and peculiarly dangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of marriage; at such a crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to have all their wits about them--they ought to take care that their offspring may be born of reasonable beings; for on what day or night heaven will give them increase, who can say? moreover, they ought not to begetting children when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but their offspring should be compact and solid, quiet and compounded properly; whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and beside himself both in body and soul. wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad and unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget offspring who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected to walk straight either in body or mind. hence during the whole year and all his life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he ought to take care and not intentionally do what is injurious to health, or what involves insolence and wrong; for he cannot help leaving the impression of himself on the souls and bodies of his offspring, and he begets children in every way inferior. and especially on the day and night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. for the beginning, which is also a god dwelling in man, preserves all things, if it meet with proper respect from each individual. he who marries is further to consider, that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young, and there he is to marry and make a home for himself and bring up his children, going away from his father and mother. for in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order to cement and bind together diversities of character; but excessive intercourse not having the desire which is created by time, insensibly dissolves friendships from a feeling of satiety; wherefore a man and his wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own dwelling-places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and visit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another, and worshipping the gods according to law for ever. in the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most convenient. there is no difficulty either in understanding or acquiring most kinds of property, but there is great difficulty in what relates to slaves. and the reason is, that we speak about them in a way which is right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves is consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them. megillus: i do not understand, stranger, what you mean. athenian: i am not surprised, megillus, for the state of the helots among the lacedaemonians is of all hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the heracleots, who have subjugated the mariandynians, and about the thessalian penestae. looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning property in slaves? i made a remark, in passing, which naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. it was this:--we know that all would agree that we should have the best and most attached slaves whom we can get. for many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren or sons, and many times they have saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole house--such tales are well known. megillus: to be sure. athenian: but may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly corrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them? and the wisest of our poets, speaking of zeus, says: 'far-seeing zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day of slavery subdues.' different persons have got these two different notions of slaves in their minds--some of them utterly distrust their servants, and, as if they were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their souls three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before;--and others do just the opposite. megillus: true. cleinias: then what are we to do in our own country, stranger, seeing that there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners? athenian: well, cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a troublesome animal, and therefore he is not very manageable, nor likely to become so, when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman, and master. cleinias: that is obvious. athenian: he is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown by the frequent revolts of the messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the numerous robberies and lawless life of the italian banditti, as they are called. a man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. two remedies alone remain to us,--not to have the slaves of the same country, nor if possible, speaking the same language (compare aris. pol.); in this way they will more easily be held in subjection: secondly, we should tend them carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to ourselves. and the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. and he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited. the language used to a servant ought always to be that of a command (compare arist. pol.), and we ought not to jest with them, whether they are males or females--this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life of servitude more disagreeable both for them and for their masters. cleinias: true. athenian: now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible, with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has to do, we may next proceed to describe their dwellings. cleinias: very good. athenian: the city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be taken of all the buildings, and the manner of building each of them, and also of the temples and walls. these, cleinias, were matters which properly came before the marriages;--but, as we are only talking, there is no objection to changing the order. if, however, our plan of legislation is ever to take effect, then the house shall precede the marriage if god so will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage; but at present we are only describing these matters in a general outline. cleinias: quite true. athenian: the temples are to be placed all round the agora, and the whole city built on the heights in a circle (compare arist. pol.), for the sake of defence and for the sake of purity. near the temples are to be placed buildings for the magistrates and the courts of law; in these plaintiff and defendant will receive their due, and the places will be regarded as most holy, partly because they have to do with holy things: and partly because they are the dwelling-places of holy gods: and in them will be held the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offences may fitly take place. as to the walls, megillus, i agree with sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them (compare arist. pol.); there is a poetical saying, which is finely expressed, that 'walls ought to be of steel and iron, and not of earth;' besides, how ridiculous of us to be sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench, and to keep off the enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means conducive to the health of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy in the minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither instead of repelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they were not meant to labour, and did not know that true repose comes from labour, and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind is only the renewal of trouble. but if men must have walls, the private houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be one wall, having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their uniformity and equality towards the streets (compare arist. pol.). the form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable aspect, and being easily guarded will be infinitely better for security. until the original building is completed, these should be the principal objects of the inhabitants; and the wardens of the city should superintend the work, and should impose a fine on him who is negligent; and in all that relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness, and not allow a private person to encroach upon any public property either by buildings or excavations. further, they ought to take care that the rains from heaven flow off easily, and of any other matters which may have to be administered either within or without the city. the guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary, and supply any other points in which the law may be deficient. and now that these matters, and the buildings about the agora, and the gymnasia, and places of instruction, and theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars and spectators, let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of legislation. cleinias: by all means. athenian: assuming that marriages exist already, cleinias, the mode of life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will follow next in order. in what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which is to be superior to other cities, is a matter not at all easy for us to determine. there have been many difficulties already, but this will be the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the many. still i cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true, cleinias. cleinias: certainly. athenian: he who imagines that he can give laws for the public conduct of states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of itself; who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they please, and that there is no necessity of order in all things; he, i say, who gives up the control of their private lives, and supposes that they will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake. why have i made this remark? why, because i am going to enact that the bridegrooms should live at the common tables, just as they did before marriage. this was a singularity when first enacted by the legislator in your parts of the world, megillus and cleinias, as i should suppose, on the occasion of some war or other similar danger, which caused the passing of the law, and which would be likely to occur in thinly-peopled places, and in times of pressure. but when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience showed that the institution greatly conduced to security; and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose among you. cleinias: likely enough. athenian: i said that there may have been singularity and danger in imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same difficulty. there is, however, another institution which is the natural sequel to this, and would be excellent, if it existed anywhere, but at present it does not. the institution of which i am about to speak is not easily described or executed; and would be like the legislator 'combing wool into the fire,' as people say, or performing any other impossible and useless feat. cleinias: what is the cause, stranger, of this extreme hesitation? athenian: you shall hear without any fruitless loss of time. that which has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which is disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is well-ordered; and at this point the argument is now waiting. for with you, cleinias and megillus, the common tables of men are, as i said, a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. they have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness--i mean the female sex--has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. and, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better, if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter (arist. pol.), but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity for virtue, in that degree the consequence of such neglect is more than twice as important. the careful consideration of this matter, and the arranging and ordering on a common principle of all our institutions relating both to men and women, greatly conduces to the happiness of the state. but at present, such is the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense will even venture to speak of common tables in places and cities in which they have never been established at all; and how can any one avoid being utterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show in public how much they eat and drink? there is nothing at which the sex is more likely to take offence. for women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. and therefore, as i said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken without raising a tremendous outcry, but in this state perhaps they may. and if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been mere idle talk, i should like to prove to you, if you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper; but if you had rather not, i will refrain. cleinias: there is nothing which we should both of us like better, stranger, than to hear what you have to say. athenian: very good; and you must not be surprised if i go back a little, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering in every point of view the subject of law. cleinias: true. athenian: then let us return once more to what we were saying at first. every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; or that it began an immense while ago. cleinias: certainly. athenian: well, and have there not been constitutions and destructions of states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly and disorderly, and diverse desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and all sorts of changes of the seasons in which animals may be expected to have undergone innumerable transformations of themselves? cleinias: no doubt. athenian: and may we not suppose that vines appeared, which had previously no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of demeter and her daughter, of which one triptolemus was the minister, and that, before these existed, animals took to devouring each other as they do still? cleinias: true. athenian: again, the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists among many nations; while, on the other hand, we hear of other human beings who did not even venture to taste the flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits dipped in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no flesh of animals; from these they abstained under the idea that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars of the gods with blood. for in those days men are said to have lived a sort of orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but abstaining from all living things. cleinias: such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely true. athenian: some one might say to us, what is the drift of all this? cleinias: a very pertinent question, stranger. athenian: and therefore i will endeavour, cleinias, if i can, to draw the natural inference. cleinias: proceed. athenian: i see that among men all things depend upon three wants and desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led by them, or the opposite if wrongly. now these are eating and drinking, which begin at birth--every animal has a natural desire for them, and is violently excited, and rebels against him who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appetites, and get rid of all the corresponding pains--and the third and greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of wantonness and madness. and these three disorders we must endeavour to master by the three great principles of fear and law and right reason; turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best, using the muses and the gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx. but to return:--after marriage let us speak of the birth of children, and after their birth of their nurture and education. in the course of discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at last arrive at the common tables. whether such associations are to be confined to men, or extended to women also, we shall see better when we approach and take a nearer view of them; and we may then determine what previous institutions are required and will have to precede them. as i said before, we shall see them more in detail, and shall be better able to lay down the laws which are proper or suited to them. cleinias: very true. athenian: let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for hereafter there may be need of them. cleinias: what do you bid us keep in mind? athenian: that which we comprehended under the three words--first, eating, secondly, drinking, thirdly, the excitement of love. cleinias: we shall be sure to remember, stranger. athenian: very good. then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach persons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they disobey, with the terrors of the law. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: the bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to produce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which they can. now all men who are associated in any action always succeed when they attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when they do not give their mind or have no mind, they fail; wherefore let the bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children, and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom, and particularly at the time when their children are not yet born. and let the women whom we have chosen be the overseers of such matters, and let them in whatever number, large or small, and at whatever time the magistrates may command, assemble every day in the temple of eileithyia during a third part of the day, and being there assembled, let them inform one another of any one whom they see, whether man or woman, of those who are begetting children, disregarding the ordinances given at the time when the nuptial sacrifices and ceremonies were performed. let the begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no longer, during the time when marriage is fruitful. but if any continue without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred and with the women holding the office of overseer and be divorced for their mutual benefit. if, however, any dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either party, they shall choose ten of the guardians of the law and abide by their permission and appointment. the women who preside over these matters shall enter into the houses of the young, and partly by admonitions and partly by threats make them give over their folly and error: if they persist, let the women go and tell the guardians of the law, and the guardians shall prevent them. but if they too cannot prevent them, they shall bring the matter before the people; and let them write up their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and such an one; and let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court of law convict those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of the privileges of a citizen in the following respects:--let him not go to weddings nor to the thanksgivings after the birth of children; and if he go, let any one who pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same regulations hold about women: let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honour, or go to nuptial and birthday festivals, if she in like manner be written up as acting disorderly and cannot obtain a verdict. and if, when they themselves have done begetting children according to the law, a man or woman have connexion with another man or woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and when the time for procreation has passed let the man or woman who refrains in such matters be held in esteem, and let those who do not refrain be held in the contrary of esteem--that is to say, disesteem. now, if the greater part of mankind behave modestly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution. to every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to be written down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning of existence to every child, whether boy or girl. let every phratria have inscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom the years are reckoned. and near to them let the living members of the phratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased. the limit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty years at the longest,--for a man, from thirty to thirty-five years; and let a woman hold office at forty, and a man at thirty years. let a man go out to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there appear any need to make use of her in military service, let the time of service be after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years of age; and let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each. book vii. and now, assuming children of both sexes to have been born, it will be proper for us to consider, in the next place, their nurture and education; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be thought a subject fitted rather for precept and admonition than for law. in private life there are many little things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and pains and desires of individuals, which run counter to the intention of the legislator, and make the characters of the citizens various and dissimilar:--this is an evil in states; for by reason of their smallness and frequent occurrence, there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law; and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law because mankind get the habit of frequently transgressing the law in small matters. the result is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you be silent. i speak somewhat darkly, but i shall endeavour also to bring my wares into the light of day, for i acknowledge that at present there is a want of clearness in what i am saying. cleinias: very true. athenian. am i not right in maintaining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body? cleinias: undoubtedly. athenian: and nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies are those which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and do we not further observe that the first shoot of every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest? many will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not reach twice the height which he attained at five. cleinias: true. athenian: well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source endless evils in the body? cleinias: yes. athenian: and the body should have the most exercise when it receives most nourishment? cleinias: but, stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise upon newly-born infants? athenian: nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn. cleinias: what do you mean, my good sir? in the process of gestation? athenian: exactly. i am not at all surprised that you have never heard of this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little creatures, which, although strange, i will endeavour to explain to you. cleinias: by all means. athenian: the practice is more easy for us to understand than for you, by reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess by us at athens. not only boys, but often older persons, are in the habit of keeping quails and cocks (compare republic), which they train to fight one another. and they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise; for, in addition to this, they carry them about tucked beneath their armpits, holding the smaller birds in their hands, the larger under their arms, and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own health, but the health of the birds; whereby they prove to any intelligent person, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and movements, when they are moved without weariness, whether the motion proceeds from themselves, or is caused by a swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or by other bodies in whatever way moving, and that thus gaining the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart beauty and health and strength. but admitting all this, what follows? shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman shall walk about and fashion the embryo within as we fashion wax before it hardens, and after birth swathe the infant for two years? suppose that we compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always carrying the children somewhere or other, either to the temples, or into the country, or to their relations' houses, until they are well able to stand, and to take care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning on them when they are too young (compare arist. pol.),--they should continue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year; the nurses should be strong, and there should be more than one of them. shall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them? no, no; the penalty of which we were speaking will fall upon our own heads more than enough. cleinias: what penalty? athenian: ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine and servant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply. cleinias: then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all? athenian: the reason is, that masters and freemen in states, when they hear of it, are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without due regulation of private life in cities, stability in the laying down of laws is hardly to be expected (compare republic); and he who makes this reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and, adopting them, may order his house and state well and be happy. cleinias: likely enough. athenian: and therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we have determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young children, in the same manner in which we have begun to go through the rules relating to their bodies. cleinias: by all means. athenian: let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to the body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and moving about by day and night is good for them all, and that the younger they are, the more they will need it (compare arist. pol.); infants should live, if that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea. this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion--rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. cleinias: well, stranger, and what is the reason of this? athenian: the reason is obvious. cleinias: what? athenian: the affection both of the bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. and when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy. and, to express what i mean in a word, there is a good deal to be said in favour of this treatment. cleinias: certainly. athenian: but if fear has such a power we ought to infer from these facts, that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with fears, will be made more liable to fear (compare republic), and every one will allow that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not of courage. cleinias: no doubt. athenian: and, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our youth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be an exercise of courage. cleinias: true. athenian: and we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the earliest years of life greatly contributes to create a part of virtue in the soul. cleinias: quite true. athenian: further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be regarded as having much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cowardice on the other. cleinias: to be sure. athenian: then now we must endeavour to show how and to what extent we may, if we please, without difficulty implant either character in the young. cleinias: certainly. athenian: there is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition of youth discontented and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles; that on the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and abject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates. cleinias: but how must the state educate those who do not as yet understand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of appreciating any sort of instruction? athenian: i will tell you how:--every animal that is born is wont to utter some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also affected with the inclination to weep more than any other animal. cleinias: quite true. athenian: do not nurses, when they want to know what an infant desires, judge by these signs?--when anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. for tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate. now the time which is thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable portion of life to be passed ill or well. cleinias: true. athenian: does not the discontented and ungracious nature appear to you to be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be? cleinias: certainly. athenian: well, but if during these three years every possible care were taken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in general of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood to make his soul more gentle and cheerful? (compare arist. pol.) cleinias: to be sure, stranger--more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures. athenian: there i can no longer agree, cleinias: you amaze me. to bring him up in such a way would be his utter ruin; for the beginning is always the most critical part of education. let us see whether i am right. cleinias: proceed. athenian: the point about which you and i differ is of great importance, and i hope that you, megillus, will help to decide between us. for i maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state (compare republic), which i just spoke of as gentle and benign, and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to god. now, i say, he among men, too, who would be divine ought to pursue after this mean habit--he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow any one, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrained by habit. nay, more, if i were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, i would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains, and should at that time cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness. cleinias: you need not ask megillus, stranger, which of us has most truly spoken; for i myself agree that all men ought to avoid the life of unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course. and having spoken well, may i add that you have been well answered? athenian: very good, cleinias; and now let us all three consider a further point. cleinias: what is it? athenian: that all the matters which we are now describing are commonly called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature. and the reflection which lately arose in our minds, that we can neither call these things laws, nor yet leave them unmentioned, is justified; for they are the bonds of the whole state, and come in between the written laws which are or are hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancestral customs of great antiquity, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, shield and preserve the previously existing written law; but if they depart from right and fall into disorder, then they are like the props of builders which slip away out of their place and cause a universal ruin--one part drags another down, and the fair super-structure falls because the old foundations are undermined. reflecting upon this, cleinias, you ought to bind together the new state in every possible way, omitting nothing, whether great or small, of what are called laws or manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together, and all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another; and, therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently trifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws. cleinias: very true: we are disposed to agree with you. athenian: up to the age of three years, whether of boy or girl, if a person strictly carries out our previous regulations and makes them a principal aim, he will do much for the advantage of the young creatures. but at three, four, five, and even six years the childish nature will require sports; now is the time to get rid of self-will in him, punishing him, but not so as to disgrace him. we were saying about slaves, that we ought neither to add insult to punishment so as to anger them, nor yet to leave them unpunished lest they become self-willed; and a like rule is to be observed in the case of the free-born. children at that age have certain natural modes of amusement which they find out for themselves when they meet. and all the children who are between the ages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages, the several families of a village uniting on one spot. the nurses are to see that the children behave properly and orderly--they themselves and all their companies are to be under the control of twelve matrons, one for each company, who are annually selected to inspect them from the women previously mentioned [i.e. the women who have authority over marriage], whom the guardians of the law appoint. these matrons shall be chosen by the women who have authority over marriage, one out of each tribe; all are to be of the same age; and let each of them, as soon as she is appointed, hold office and go to the temples every day, punishing all offenders, male or female, who are slaves or strangers, by the help of some of the public slaves; but if any citizen disputes the punishment, let her bring him before the wardens of the city; or, if there be no dispute, let her punish him herself. after the age of six years the time has arrived for the separation of the sexes--let boys live with boys, and girls in like manner with girls. now they must begin to learn--the boys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow, the javelin, and sling, and the girls too, if they do not object, at any rate until they know how to manage these weapons, and especially how to handle heavy arms; for i may note, that the practice which now prevails is almost universally misunderstood. cleinias: in what respect? athenian: in that the right and left hand are supposed to be by nature differently suited for our various uses of them; whereas no difference is found in the use of the feet and the lower limbs; but in the use of the hands we are, as it were, maimed by the folly of nurses and mothers; for although our several limbs are by nature balanced, we create a difference in them by bad habit. in some cases this is of no consequence, as, for example, when we hold the lyre in the left hand, and the plectrum in the right, but it is downright folly to make the same distinction in other cases. the custom of the scythians proves our error; for they not only hold the bow from them with the left hand and draw the arrow to them with their right, but use either hand for both purposes. and there are many similar examples in charioteering and other things, from which we may learn that those who make the left side weaker than the right act contrary to nature. in the case of the plectrum, which is of horn only, and similar instruments, as i was saying, it is of no consequence, but makes a great difference, and may be of very great importance to the warrior who has to use iron weapons, bows and javelins, and the like; above all, when in heavy armour, he has to fight against heavy armour. and there is a very great difference between one who has learnt and one who has not, and between one who has been trained in gymnastic exercises and one who has not been. for as he who is perfectly skilled in the pancratium or boxing or wrestling, is not unable to fight from his left side, and does not limp and draggle in confusion when his opponent makes him change his position, so in heavy-armed fighting, and in all other things, if i am not mistaken, the like holds--he who has these double powers of attack and defence ought not in any case to leave them either unused or untrained, if he can help; and if a person had the nature of geryon or briareus he ought to be able with his hundred hands to throw a hundred darts. now, the magistrates, male and female, should see to all these things, the women superintending the nursing and amusements of the children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound hand and foot, and may not, if they can help, spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits. education has two branches--one of gymnastic, which is concerned with the body, and the other of music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul. and gymnastic has also two branches--dancing and wrestling; and one sort of dancing imitates musical recitation, and aims at preserving dignity and freedom, the other aims at producing health, agility, and beauty in the limbs and parts of the body, giving the proper flexion and extension to each of them, a harmonious motion being diffused everywhere, and forming a suitable accompaniment to the dance. as regards wrestling, the tricks which antaeus and cercyon devised in their systems out of a vain spirit of competition, or the tricks of boxing which epeius or amycus invented, are useless and unsuitable for war, and do not deserve to have much said about them; but the art of wrestling erect and keeping free the neck and hands and sides, working with energy and constancy, with a composed strength, for the sake of health--these are always useful, and are not to be neglected, but to be enjoined alike on masters and scholars, when we reach that part of legislation; and we will desire the one to give their instructions freely, and the others to receive them thankfully. nor, again, must we omit suitable imitations of war in our choruses; here in crete you have the armed dances of the curetes, and the lacedaemonians have those of the dioscuri. and our virgin lady, delighting in the amusement of the dance, thought it not fit to amuse herself with empty hands; she must be clothed in a complete suit of armour, and in this attire go through the dance; and youths and maidens should in every respect imitate her, esteeming highly the favour of the goddess, both with a view to the necessities of war, and to festive occasions: it will be right also for the boys, until such time as they go out to war, to make processions and supplications to all the gods in goodly array, armed and on horseback, in dances and marches, fast or slow, offering up prayers to the gods and to the sons of gods; and also engaging in contests and preludes of contests, if at all, with these objects. for these sorts of exercises, and no others, are useful both in peace and war, and are beneficial alike to states and to private houses. but other labours and sports and exercises of the body are unworthy of freemen, o megillus and cleinias. i have now completely described the kind of gymnastic which i said at first ought to be described; if you know of any better, will you communicate your thoughts? cleinias: it is not easy, stranger, to put aside these principles of gymnastic and wrestling and to enunciate better ones. athenian: now we must say what has yet to be said about the gifts of the muses and of apollo: before, we fancied that we had said all, and that gymnastic alone remained; but now we see clearly what points have been omitted, and should be first proclaimed; of these, then, let us proceed to speak. cleinias: by all means. athenian: let me tell you once more--although you have heard me say the same before--that caution must be always exercised, both by the speaker and by the hearer, about anything that is very singular and unusual. for my tale is one which many a man would be afraid to tell, and yet i have a confidence which makes me go on. cleinias: what have you to say, stranger? athenian: i say that in states generally no one has observed that the plays of childhood have a great deal to do with the permanence or want of permanence in legislation. for when plays are ordered with a view to children having the same plays, and amusing themselves after the same manner, and finding delight in the same playthings, the more solemn institutions of the state are allowed to remain undisturbed. whereas if sports are disturbed, and innovations are made in them, and they constantly change, and the young never speak of their having the same likings, or the same established notions of good and bad taste, either in the bearing of their bodies or in their dress, but he who devises something new and out of the way in figures and colours and the like is held in special honour, we may truly say that no greater evil can happen in a state; for he who changes the sports is secretly changing the manners of the young, and making the old to be dishonoured among them and the new to be honoured. and i affirm that there is nothing which is a greater injury to all states than saying or thinking thus. will you hear me tell how great i deem the evil to be? cleinias: you mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states? athenian: exactly. cleinias: if you are speaking of that, you will find in us hearers who are disposed to receive what you say not unfavourably but most favourably. athenian: i should expect so. cleinias: proceed. athenian: well, then, let us give all the greater heed to one another's words. the argument affirms that any change whatever except from evil is the most dangerous of all things; this is true in the case of the seasons and of the winds, in the management of our bodies and the habits of our minds--true of all things except, as i said before, of the bad. he who looks at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any sort of meat, or drink any drink, or to do any work which they can get, may see that they are at first disordered by them, but afterwards, as time goes on, their bodies grow adapted to them, and they learn to know and like variety, and have good health and enjoyment of life; and if ever afterwards they are confined again to a superior diet, at first they are troubled with disorders, and with difficulty become habituated to their new food. a similar principle we may imagine to hold good about the minds of men and the natures of their souls. for when they have been brought up in certain laws, which by some divine providence have remained unchanged during long ages, so that no one has any memory or tradition of their ever having been otherwise than they are, then every one is afraid and ashamed to change that which is established. the legislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and i would propose the following way: people are apt to fancy, as i was saying before, that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change; and they readily comply with the child's wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men, will be different from the last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws; and no one of them reflects that there will follow what i just now called the greatest of evils to states. changes in bodily fashions are no such serious evils, but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners are the greatest of evils, and require the utmost prevision. cleinias: to be sure. athenian: and now do we still hold to our former assertion, that rhythms and music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men? what say you? cleinias: that is the only doctrine which we can admit. athenian: must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song? nor must any one be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures. cleinias: most true. athenian: can any of us imagine a better mode of effecting this object than that of the egyptians? cleinias: what is their method? athenian: to consecrate every sort of dance or melody. first we should ordain festivals--calculating for the year what they ought to be, and at what time, and in honour of what gods, sons of gods, and heroes they ought to be celebrated; and, in the next place, what hymns ought to be sung at the several sacrifices, and with what dances the particular festival is to be honoured. this has to be arranged at first by certain persons, and, when arranged, the whole assembly of the citizens are to offer sacrifices and libations to the fates and all the other gods, and to consecrate the several odes to gods and heroes: and if any one offers any other hymns or dances to any one of the gods, the priests and priestesses, acting in concert with the guardians of the law, shall, with the sanction of religion and the law, exclude him, and he who is excluded, if he do not submit, shall be liable all his life long to have a suit of impiety brought against him by any one who likes. cleinias: very good. athenian: in the consideration of this subject, let us remember what is due to ourselves. cleinias: to what are you referring? athenian: i mean that any young man, and much more any old one, when he sees or hears anything strange or unaccustomed, does not at once run to embrace the paradox, but he stands considering, like a person who is at a place where three paths meet, and does not very well know his way--he may be alone or he may be walking with others, and he will say to himself and them, 'which is the way?' and will not move forward until he is satisfied that he is going right. and this is what we must do in the present instance: a strange discussion on the subject of law has arisen, which requires the utmost consideration, and we should not at our age be too ready to speak about such great matters, or be confident that we can say anything certain all in a moment. cleinias: most true. athenian: then we will allow time for reflection, and decide when we have given the subject sufficient consideration. but that we may not be hindered from completing the natural arrangement of our laws, let us proceed to the conclusion of them in due order; for very possibly, if god will, the exposition of them, when completed, may throw light on our present perplexity. cleinias: excellent, stranger; let us do as you propose. athenian: let us then affirm the paradox that strains of music are our laws (nomoi), and this latter being the name which the ancients gave to lyric songs, they probably would not have very much objected to our proposed application of the word. some one, either asleep or awake, must have had a dreamy suspicion of their nature. and let our decree be as follows: no one in singing or dancing shall offend against public and consecrated models, and the general fashion among the youth, any more than he would offend against any other law. and he who observes this law shall be blameless; but he who is disobedient, as i was saying, shall be punished by the guardians of the laws, and by the priests and priestesses. suppose that we imagine this to be our law. cleinias: very good. athenian: can any one who makes such laws escape ridicule? let us see. i think that our only safety will be in first framing certain models for composers. one of these models shall be as follows: if when a sacrifice is going on, and the victims are being burnt according to law--if, i say, any one who may be a son or brother, standing by another at the altar and over the victims, horribly blasphemes, will not his words inspire despondency and evil omens and forebodings in the mind of his father and of his other kinsmen? cleinias: of course. athenian: and this is just what takes place in almost all our cities. a magistrate offers a public sacrifice, and there come in not one but many choruses, who take up a position a little way from the altar, and from time to time pour forth all sorts of horrible blasphemies on the sacred rites, exciting the souls of the audience with words and rhythms and melodies most sorrowful to hear; and he who at the moment when the city is offering sacrifice makes the citizens weep most, carries away the palm of victory. now, ought we not to forbid such strains as these? and if ever our citizens must hear such lamentations, then on some unblest and inauspicious day let there be choruses of foreign and hired minstrels, like those hirelings who accompany the departed at funerals with barbarous carian chants. that is the sort of thing which will be appropriate if we have such strains at all; and let the apparel of the singers be, not circlets and ornaments of gold, but the reverse. enough of all this. i will simply ask once more whether we shall lay down as one of our principles of song-cleinias: what? athenian: that we should avoid every word of evil omen; let that kind of song which is of good omen be heard everywhere and always in our state. i need hardly ask again, but shall assume that you agree with me. cleinias: by all means; that law is approved by the suffrages of us all. athenian: but what shall be our next musical law or type? ought not prayers to be offered up to the gods when we sacrifice? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and our third law, if i am not mistaken, will be to the effect that our poets, understanding prayers to be requests which we make to the gods, will take especial heed that they do not by mistake ask for evil instead of good. to make such a prayer would surely be too ridiculous. cleinias: very true. athenian: were we not a little while ago quite convinced that no silver or golden plutus should dwell in our state? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: and what has it been the object of our argument to show? did we not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what is good or evil? and if one of them utters a mistaken prayer in song or words, he will make our citizens pray for the opposite of what is good in matters of the highest import; than which, as i was saying, there can be few greater mistakes. shall we then propose as one of our laws and models relating to the muses-cleinias: what? will you explain the law more precisely? athenian: shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state? nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals, until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them. as to the persons whom we appoint to be our legislators about music and as to the director of education, these have been already indicated. once more then, as i have asked more than once, shall this be our third law, and type, and model--what do you say? cleinias: let it be so, by all means. athenian: then it will be proper to have hymns and praises of the gods, intermingled with prayers; and after the gods prayers and praises should be offered in like manner to demigods and heroes, suitable to their several characters. cleinias: certainly. athenian: in the next place there will be no objection to a law, that citizens who are departed and have done good and energetic deeds, either with their souls or with their bodies, and have been obedient to the laws, should receive eulogies; this will be very fitting. cleinias: quite true. athenian: but to honour with hymns and panegyrics those who are still alive is not safe; a man should run his course, and make a fair ending, and then we will praise him; and let praise be given equally to women as well as men who have been distinguished in virtue. the order of songs and dances shall be as follows: there are many ancient musical compositions and dances which are excellent, and from these the newly-founded city may freely select what is proper and suitable; and they shall choose judges of not less than fifty years of age, who shall make the selection, and any of the old poems which they deem sufficient they shall include; any that are deficient or altogether unsuitable, they shall either utterly throw aside, or examine and amend, taking into their counsel poets and musicians, and making use of their poetical genius; but explaining to them the wishes of the legislator in order that they may regulate dancing, music, and all choral strains, according to the mind of the judges; and not allowing them to indulge, except in some few matters, their individual pleasures and fancies. now the irregular strain of music is always made ten thousand times better by attaining to law and order, and rejecting the honeyed muse--not however that we mean wholly to exclude pleasure, which is the characteristic of all music. and if a man be brought up from childhood to the age of discretion and maturity in the use of the orderly and severe music, when he hears the opposite he detests it, and calls it illiberal; but if trained in the sweet and vulgar music, he deems the severer kind cold and displeasing. so that, as i was saying before, while he who hears them gains no more pleasure from the one than from the other, the one has the advantage of making those who are trained in it better men, whereas the other makes them worse. cleinias: very true. athenian: again, we must distinguish and determine on some general principle what songs are suitable to women, and what to men, and must assign to them their proper melodies and rhythms. it is shocking for a whole harmony to be inharmonical, or for a rhythm to be unrhythmical, and this will happen when the melody is inappropriate to them. and therefore the legislator must assign to these also their forms. now both sexes have melodies and rhythms which of necessity belong to them; and those of women are clearly enough indicated by their natural difference. the grand, and that which tends to courage, may be fairly called manly; but that which inclines to moderation and temperance, may be declared both in law and in ordinary speech to be the more womanly quality. this, then, will be the general order of them. let us now speak of the manner of teaching and imparting them, and the persons to whom, and the time when, they are severally to be imparted. as the shipwright first lays down the lines of the keel, and thus, as it were, draws the ship in outline, so do i seek to distinguish the patterns of life, and lay down their keels according to the nature of different men's souls; seeking truly to consider by what means, and in what ways, we may go through the voyage of life best. now human affairs are hardly worth considering in earnest, and yet we must be in earnest about them--a sad necessity constrains us. and having got thus far, there will be a fitness in our completing the matter, if we can only find some suitable method of doing so. but what do i mean? some one may ask this very question, and quite rightly, too. cleinias: certainly. athenian: i say that about serious matters a man should be serious, and about a matter which is not serious he should not be serious; and that god is the natural and worthy object of our most serious and blessed endeavours, for man, as i said before, is made to be the plaything of god, and this, truly considered, is the best of him; wherefore also every man and woman should walk seriously, and pass life in the noblest of pastimes, and be of another mind from what they are at present. cleinias: in what respect? athenian: at present they think that their serious pursuits should be for the sake of their sports, for they deem war a serious pursuit, which must be managed well for the sake of peace; but the truth is, that there neither is, nor has been, nor ever will be, either amusement or instruction in any degree worth speaking of in war, which is nevertheless deemed by us to be the most serious of our pursuits. and therefore, as we say, every one of us should live the life of peace as long and as well as he can. and what is the right way of living? are we to live in sports always? if so, in what kind of sports? we ought to live sacrificing, and singing, and dancing, and then a man will be able to propitiate the gods, and to defend himself against his enemies and conquer them in battle. the type of song or dance by which he will propitiate them has been described, and the paths along which he is to proceed have been cut for him. he will go forward in the spirit of the poet: 'telemachus, some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart, but other things god will suggest; for i deem that thou wast not born or brought up without the will of the gods.' and this ought to be the view of our alumni; they ought to think that what has been said is enough for them, and that any other things their genius and god will suggest to them--he will tell them to whom, and when, and to what gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform dances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to the appointment of nature; being for the most part puppets, but having some little share of reality. megillus: you have a low opinion of mankind, stranger. athenian: nay, megillus, be not amazed, but forgive me: i was comparing them with the gods; and under that feeling i spoke. let us grant, if you wish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is worthy of some consideration. next follow the buildings for gymnasia and schools open to all; these are to be in three places in the midst of the city; and outside the city and in the surrounding country, also in three places, there shall be schools for horse exercise, and large grounds arranged with a view to archery and the throwing of missiles, at which young men may learn and practise. of these mention has already been made; and if the mention be not sufficiently explicit, let us speak further of them and embody them in laws. in these several schools let there be dwellings for teachers, who shall be brought from foreign parts by pay, and let them teach those who attend the schools the art of war and the art of music, and the children shall come not only if their parents please, but if they do not please; there shall be compulsory education, as the saying is, of all and sundry, as far as this is possible; and the pupils shall be regarded as belonging to the state rather than to their parents. my law would apply to females as well as males; they shall both go through the same exercises. i assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic and horsemanship are as suitable to women as to men. of the truth of this i am persuaded from ancient tradition, and at the present day there are said to be countless myriads of women in the neighbourhood of the black sea, called sauromatides, who not only ride on horseback like men, but have enjoined upon them the use of bows and other weapons equally with the men. and i further affirm, that if these things are possible, nothing can be more absurd than the practice which prevails in our own country, of men and women not following the same pursuits with all their strength and with one mind, for thus the state, instead of being a whole, is reduced to a half, but has the same imposts to pay and the same toils to undergo; and what can be a greater mistake for any legislator to make than this? cleinias: very true; yet much of what has been asserted by us, stranger, is contrary to the custom of states; still, in saying that the discourse should be allowed to proceed, and that when the discussion is completed, we should choose what seems best, you spoke very properly, and i now feel compunction for what i have said. tell me, then, what you would next wish to say. athenian: i should wish to say, cleinias, as i said before, that if the possibility of these things were not sufficiently proven in fact, then there might be an objection to the argument, but the fact being as i have said, he who rejects the law must find some other ground of objection; and, failing this, our exhortation will still hold good, nor will any one deny that women ought to share as far as possible in education and in other ways with men. for consider; if women do not share in their whole life with men, then they must have some other order of life. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is preferable to this community which we are now assigning to them? shall we prefer that which is adopted by the thracians and many other races who use their women to till the ground and to be shepherds of their herds and flocks, and to minister to them like slaves? or shall we do as we and people in our part of the world do--getting together, as the phrase is, all our goods and chattels into one dwelling, we entrust them to our women, who are the stewards of them, and who also preside over the shuttles and the whole art of spinning? or shall we take a middle course, as in lacedaemon, megillus--letting the girls share in gymnastic and music, while the grown-up women, no longer employed in spinning wool, are hard at work weaving the web of life, which will be no cheap or mean employment, and in the duty of serving and taking care of the household and bringing up the children, in which they will observe a sort of mean, not participating in the toils of war; and if there were any necessity that they should fight for their city and families, unlike the amazons, they would be unable to take part in archery or any other skilled use of missiles, nor could they, after the example of the goddess, carry shield or spear, or stand up nobly for their country when it was being destroyed, and strike terror into their enemies, if only because they were seen in regular order? living as they do, they would never dare at all to imitate the sauromatides, who, when compared with ordinary women, would appear to be like men. let him who will, praise your legislators, but i must say what i think. the legislator ought to be whole and perfect, and not half a man only; he ought not to let the female sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life, while he takes the utmost care of the male sex, and leaves half of life only blest with happiness, when he might have made the whole state happy. megillus: what shall we do, cleinias? shall we allow a stranger to run down sparta in this fashion? cleinias: yes; for as we have given him liberty of speech we must let him go on until we have perfected the work of legislation. megillus: very true. athenian: then now i may proceed? cleinias: by all means. athenian: what will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation, and who have entrusted the practice of the arts to others, and whose husbandry committed to slaves paying a part of the produce, brings them a return sufficient for men living temperately; who, moreover, have common tables in which the men are placed apart, and near them are the common tables of their families, of their daughters and mothers, which day by day, the officers, male and female, are to inspect--they shall see to the behaviour of the company, and so dismiss them; after which the presiding magistrate and his attendants shall honour with libations those gods to whom that day and night are dedicated, and then go home? to men whose lives are thus ordered, is there no work remaining to be done which is necessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live fattening like a beast? such a life is neither just nor honourable, nor can he who lives it fail of meeting his due; and the due reward of the idle fatted beast is that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by brave deeds and toil. these regulations, if we duly consider them, will never be exactly carried into execution under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can attain the second-best form of polity, we shall be very well off. and to men living under this second polity there remains a work to be accomplished which is far from being small or insignificant, but is the greatest of all works, and ordained by the appointment of righteous law. for the life which may be truly said to be concerned with the virtue of body and soul is twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble as the pursuit after pythian and olympic victories, which debars a man from every employment of life. for there ought to be no bye-work interfering with the greater work of providing the necessary exercise and nourishment for the body, and instruction and education for the soul. night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their perfection and consummation; and therefore to this end all freemen ought to arrange the way in which they will spend their time during the whole course of the day, from morning till evening and from evening till the morning of the next sunrise. there may seem to be some impropriety in the legislator determining minutely the numberless details of the management of the house, including such particulars as the duty of wakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city; for that any citizen should continue during the whole of any night in sleep, instead of being seen by all his servants, always the first to awake and get up--this, whether the regulation is to be called a law or only a practice, should be deemed base and unworthy of a freeman; also that the mistress of the house should be awakened by her hand-maidens instead of herself first awakening them, is what the slaves, male and female, and the serving-boys, and, if that were possible, everybody and everything in the house should regard as base. if they rise early, they may all of them do much of their public and of their household business, as magistrates in the city, and masters and mistresses in their private houses, before the sun is up. much sleep is not required by nature, either for our souls or bodies, or for the actions which they perform. for no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were dead; but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps awake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is expedient for health; and much sleep is not required, if the habit of moderation be once rightly formed. magistrates in states who keep awake at night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are honoured and reverenced by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and to the whole state. a night which is passed in such a manner, in addition to all the above-mentioned advantages, infuses a sort of courage into the minds of the citizens. when the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go to their schoolmasters. now neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters. and of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inasmuch as he has the fountain of reason in him not yet regulated; he is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals. wherefore he must be bound with many bridles; in the first place, when he gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the management of tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness; then, again, being a freeman, he must be controlled by teachers, no matter what they teach, and by studies; but he is also a slave, and in that regard any freeman who comes in his way may punish him and his tutor and his instructor, if any of them does anything wrong; and he who comes across him and does not inflict upon him the punishment which he deserves, shall incur the greatest disgrace; and let the guardian of the law, who is the director of education, see to him who coming in the way of the offences which we have mentioned, does not chastise them when he ought, or chastises them in a way which he ought not; let him keep a sharp look-out, and take especial care of the training of our children, directing their natures, and always turning them to good according to the law. but how can our law sufficiently train the director of education himself; for as yet all has been imperfect, and nothing has been said either clear or satisfactory? now, as far as possible, the law ought to leave nothing to him, but to explain everything, that he may be an interpreter and tutor to others. about dances and music and choral strains, i have already spoken both as to the character of the selection of them, and the manner in which they are to be amended and consecrated. but we have not as yet spoken, o illustrious guardian of education, of the manner in which your pupils are to use those strains which are written in prose, although you have been informed what martial strains they are to learn and practise; what relates in the first place to the learning of letters, and secondly, to the lyre, and also to calculation, which, as we were saying, is needful for them all to learn, and any other things which are required with a view to war and the management of house and city, and, looking to the same object, what is useful in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies--the stars and sun and moon, and the various regulations about these matters which are necessary for the whole state--i am speaking of the arrangements of days in periods of months, and of months in years, which are to be observed, in order that seasons and sacrifices and festivals may have their regular and natural order, and keep the city alive and awake, the gods receiving the honours due to them, and men having a better understanding about them: all these things, o my friend, have not yet been sufficiently declared to you by the legislator. attend, then, to what i am now going to say: we were telling you, in the first place, that you were not sufficiently informed about letters, and the objection was to this effect--that you were never told whether he who was meant to be a respectable citizen should apply himself in detail to that sort of learning, or not apply himself at all; and the same remark holds good of the study of the lyre. but now we say that he ought to attend to them. a fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three years; the age of thirteen is the proper time for him to begin to handle the lyre, and he may continue at this for another three years, neither more nor less, and whether his father or himself like or dislike the study, he is not to be allowed to spend more or less time in learning music than the law allows. and let him who disobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honours of which we shall hereafter speak. hear, however, first of all, what the young ought to learn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to teach them. they ought to be occupied with their letters until they are able to read and write; but the acquisition of perfect beauty or quickness in writing, if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these accomplishments in the given number of years, they should let alone. and as to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are not set to the lyre, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions, compositions in prose, as they are termed, having no rhythm or harmony--seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by many writers of this class--what will you do with them, o most excellent guardians of the law? or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them? i believe that he will be in great difficulty. cleinias: what troubles you, stranger? and why are you so perplexed in your mind? athenian: you naturally ask, cleinias, and to you and megillus, who are my partners in the work of legislation, i must state the more difficult as well as the easier parts of the task. cleinias: to what do you refer in this instance? athenian: i will tell you. there is a difficulty in opposing many myriads of mouths. cleinias: well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments? athenian: that is quite true; and you mean to imply that the road which we are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to as many others, or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to the others, and in company with them you bid me, at whatever risk, to proceed along the path of legislation which has opened out of our present discourse, and to be of good cheer, and not to faint. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and i do not faint; i say, indeed, that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures--some who are serious, others who aim only at raising a laugh--and all mankind declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up in them and saturated with them; some insist that they should be constantly hearing them read aloud, and always learning them, so as to get by heart entire poets; while others select choice passages and long speeches, and make compendiums of them, saying that these ought to be committed to memory, if a man is to be made good and wise by experience and learning of many things. and you want me now to tell them plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong. cleinias: yes, i do. athenian: but how can i in one word rightly comprehend all of them? i am of opinion, and, if i am not mistaken, there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well; and if this be true, then i do affirm that much learning is dangerous to youth. cleinias: how would you advise the guardian of the law to act? athenian: in what respect? cleinias: i mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. do not shrink from answering. athenian: my good cleinias, i rather think that i am fortunate. cleinias: how so? athenian: i think that i am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when i consider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now, and which, as i believe, have been inspired by heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. when i reflected upon all these words of ours, i naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which i have ever learnt or heard, either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear; i cannot imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law who is also the director of education can have. he cannot do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these words and any which are of a like nature, if he should happen to find them, either in poetry or prose, or if he come across unwritten discourses akin to ours, he should certainly preserve them, and commit them to writing. and, first of all, he shall constrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of them who will not, shall not be employed by him, but those whom he finds agreeing in his judgment, he shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. and here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end. cleinias: i do not think, stranger, that we have wandered out of the proposed limits of the argument; but whether we are right or not in our whole conception, i cannot be very certain. athenian: the truth, cleinias, may be expected to become clearer when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of the whole discussion about laws. cleinias: yes. athenian: and now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the teacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us. cleinias: certainly. athenian: i think that we have only to recollect our previous discussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching all this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre. cleinias: to what do you refer? athenian: we were saying, if i remember rightly, that the sixty years old choristers of dionysus were to be specially quick in their perceptions of rhythm and musical composition, that they might be able to distinguish good and bad imitation, that is to say, the imitation of the good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the one and displaying the other in hymns and songs, charming the souls of youth, and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of imitation. cleinias: very true. athenian: and with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use the sounds of the lyre, because its notes are pure, the player who teaches and his pupil rendering note for note in unison; but complexity, and variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or composer of the melody gives another--also when they make concords and harmonies in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or high and low notes, are combined--or, again, when they make complex variations of rhythms, which they adapt to the notes of the lyre--all that sort of thing is not suited to those who have to acquire speedy and useful knowledge of music in three years; for opposite principles are confusing, and create a difficulty in learning, and our young men should learn quickly, and their mere necessary acquirements are not few or trifling, as will be shown in due course. let the director of education attend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. as to the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to teach and the character of them, they have been already described by us, and are the same which, when consecrated and adapted to the different festivals, we said were to benefit cities by affording them an innocent amusement. cleinias: that, again, is true. athenian: then let him who has been elected a director of music receive these rules from us as containing the very truth; and may he prosper in his office! let us now proceed to lay down other rules in addition to the preceding about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. having said what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak in like manner about gymnastic. for boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practise gymnastic exercises--ought they not? cleinias: yes. athenian: then the boys ought to have dancing masters, and the girls dancing mistresses to exercise them. cleinias: very good. athenian: then once more let us summon him who has the chief concern in the business, the superintendent of youth [i.e. the director of education]; he will have plenty to do, if he is to have the charge of music and gymnastic. cleinias: but how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges? athenian: o my friend, there will be no difficulty, for the law has already given and will give him permission to select as his assistants in this charge any citizens, male or female, whom he desires; and he will know whom he ought to choose, and will be anxious not to make a mistake, from a due sense of responsibility, and from a consciousness of the importance of his office, and also because he will consider that if young men have been and are well brought up, then all things go swimmingly, but if not, it is not meet to say, nor do we say, what will follow, lest the regarders of omens should take alarm about our infant state. many things have been said by us about dancing and about gymnastic movements in general; for we include under gymnastics all military exercises, such as archery, and all hurling of weapons, and the use of the light shield, and all fighting with heavy arms, and military evolutions, and movements of armies, and encampings, and all that relates to horsemanship. of all these things there ought to be public teachers, receiving pay from the state, and their pupils should be the men and boys in the state, and also the girls and women, who are to know all these things. while they are yet girls they should have practised dancing in arms and the whole art of fighting--when grown-up women, they should apply themselves to evolutions and tactics, and the mode of grounding and taking up arms; if for no other reason, yet in case the whole military force should have to leave the city and carry on operations of war outside, that those who will have to guard the young and the rest of the city may be equal to the task; and, on the other hand, when enemies, whether barbarian or hellenic, come from without with mighty force and make a violent assault upon them, and thus compel them to fight for the possession of the city, which is far from being an impossibility, great would be the disgrace to the state, if the women had been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young, as birds will, against any creature however strong, and die or undergo any danger, but must instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the altars and shrines, and bring upon human nature the reproach, that of all animals man is the most cowardly! cleinias: such a want of education, stranger, is certainly an unseemly thing to happen in a state, as well as a great misfortune. athenian: suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that women ought not to neglect military matters, but that all citizens, male and female alike, shall attend to them? cleinias: i quite agree. athenian: of wrestling we have spoken in part, but of what i should call the most important part we have not spoken, and cannot easily speak without showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we mean; when word and action combine, and not till then, we shall explain clearly what has been said, pointing out that of all movements wrestling is most akin to the military art, and is to be pursued for the sake of this, and not this for the sake of wrestling. cleinias: excellent. athenian: enough of wrestling; we will now proceed to speak of other movements of the body. such motion may be in general called dancing, and is of two kinds: one of nobler figures, imitating the honourable, the other of the more ignoble figures, imitating the mean; and of both these there are two further subdivisions. of the serious, one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action, and is the exercise of a noble person and a manly heart; the other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures, and may be truly called and is the dance of peace. the warrior dance is different from the peaceful one, and may be rightly termed pyrrhic; this imitates the modes of avoiding blows and missiles by dropping or giving way, or springing aside, or rising up or falling down; also the opposite postures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows. and when the imitation is of brave bodies and souls, and the action is direct and muscular, giving for the most part a straight movement to the limbs of the body--that, i say, is the true sort; but the opposite is not right. in the dance of peace what we have to consider is whether a man bears himself naturally and gracefully, and after the manner of men who duly conform to the law. but before proceeding i must distinguish the dancing about which there is any doubt, from that about which there is no doubt. which is the doubtful kind, and how are the two to be distinguished? there are dances of the bacchic sort, both those in which, as they say, they imitate drunken men, and which are named after the nymphs, and pan, and silenuses, and satyrs; and also those in which purifications are made or mysteries celebrated--all this sort of dancing cannot be rightly defined as having either a peaceful or a warlike character, or indeed as having any meaning whatever, and may, i think, be most truly described as distinct from the warlike dance, and distinct from the peaceful, and not suited for a city at all. there let it lie; and so leaving it to lie, we will proceed to the dances of war and peace, for with these we are undoubtedly concerned. now the unwarlike muse, which honours in dance the gods and the sons of the gods, is entirely associated with the consciousness of prosperity; this class may be subdivided into two lesser classes, of which one is expressive of an escape from some labour or danger into good, and has greater pleasures, the other expressive of preservation and increase of former good, in which the pleasure is less exciting--in all these cases, every man when the pleasure is greater, moves his body more, and less when the pleasure is less; and, again, if he be more orderly and has learned courage from discipline he moves less, but if he be a coward, and has no training or self-control, he makes greater and more violent movements, and in general when he is speaking or singing he is not altogether able to keep his body still; and so out of the imitation of words in gestures the whole art of dancing has arisen. and in these various kinds of imitation one man moves in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner; and as the ancients may be observed to have given many names which are according to nature and deserving of praise, so there is an excellent one which they have given to the dances of men who in their times of prosperity are moderate in their pleasures--the giver of names, whoever he was, assigned to them a very true, and poetical, and rational name, when he called them emmeleiai, or dances of order, thus establishing two kinds of dances of the nobler sort, the dance of war which he called the pyrrhic, and the dance of peace which he called emmeleia, or the dance of order; giving to each their appropriate and becoming name. these things the legislator should indicate in general outline, and the guardian of the law should enquire into them and search them out, combining dancing with music, and assigning to the several sacrificial feasts that which is suitable to them; and when he has consecrated all of them in due order, he shall for the future change nothing, whether of dance or song. thenceforward the city and the citizens shall continue to have the same pleasures, themselves being as far as possible alike, and shall live well and happily. i have described the dances which are appropriate to noble bodies and generous souls. but it is necessary also to consider and know uncomely persons and thoughts, and those which are intended to produce laughter in comedy, and have a comic character in respect of style, song, and dance, and of the imitations which these afford. for serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either; but he cannot carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of virtue. and for this very reason he should learn them both, in order that he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and out of place--he should command slaves and hired strangers to imitate such things, but he should never take any serious interest in them himself, nor should any freeman or freewoman be discovered taking pains to learn them; and there should always be some element of novelty in the imitation. let these then be laid down, both in law and in our discourse, as the regulations of laughable amusements which are generally called comedy. and, if any of the serious poets, as they are termed, who write tragedy, come to us and say--'o strangers, may we go to your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our poetry--what is your will about these matters?'--how shall we answer the divine men? i think that our answer should be as follows: best of strangers, we will say to them, we also according to our ability are tragic poets, and our tragedy is the best and noblest; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy. you are poets and we are poets, both makers of the same strains, rivals and antagonists in the noblest of dramas, which true law can alone perfect, as our hope is. do not then suppose that we shall all in a moment allow you to erect your stage in the agora, or introduce the fair voices of your actors, speaking above our own, and permit you to harangue our women and children, and the common people, about our institutions, in language other than our own, and very often the opposite of our own. for a state would be mad which gave you this licence, until the magistrates had determined whether your poetry might be recited, and was fit for publication or not. wherefore, o ye sons and scions of the softer muses, first of all show your songs to the magistrates, and let them compare them with our own, and if they are the same or better we will give you a chorus; but if not, then, my friends, we cannot. let these, then, be the customs ordained by law about all dances and the teaching of them, and let matters relating to slaves be separated from those relating to masters, if you do not object. cleinias: we can have no hesitation in assenting when you put the matter thus. athenian: there still remain three studies suitable for freemen. arithmetic is one of them; the measurement of length, surface, and depth is the second; and the third has to do with the revolutions of the stars in relation to one another. not every one has need to toil through all these things in a strictly scientific manner, but only a few, and who they are to be we will hereafter indicate at the end, which will be the proper place; not to know what is necessary for mankind in general, and what is the truth, is disgraceful to every one: and yet to enter into these matters minutely is neither easy, nor at all possible for every one; but there is something in them which is necessary and cannot be set aside, and probably he who made the proverb about god originally had this in view when he said, that 'not even god himself can fight against necessity;' he meant, if i am not mistaken, divine necessity; for as to the human necessities of which the many speak, when they talk in this manner, nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the words. cleinias: and what necessities of knowledge are there, stranger, which are divine and not human? athenian: i conceive them to be those of which he who has no use nor any knowledge at all cannot be a god, or demi-god, or hero to mankind, or able to take any serious thought or charge of them. and very unlike a divine man would he be, who is unable to count one, two, three, or to distinguish odd and even numbers, or is unable to count at all, or reckon night and day, and who is totally unacquainted with the revolution of the sun and moon, and the other stars. there would be great folly in supposing that all these are not necessary parts of knowledge to him who intends to know anything about the highest kinds of knowledge; but which these are, and how many there are of them, and when they are to be learned, and what is to be learned together and what apart, and the whole correlation of them, must be rightly apprehended first; and these leading the way we may proceed to the other parts of knowledge. for so necessity grounded in nature constrains us, against which we say that no god contends, or ever will contend. cleinias: i think, stranger, that what you have now said is very true and agreeable to nature. athenian: yes, cleinias, that is so. but it is difficult for the legislator to begin with these studies; at a more convenient time we will make regulations for them. cleinias: you seem, stranger, to be afraid of our habitual ignorance of the subject: there is no reason why that should prevent you from speaking out. athenian: i certainly am afraid of the difficulties to which you allude, but i am still more afraid of those who apply themselves to this sort of knowledge, and apply themselves badly. for entire ignorance is not so terrible or extreme an evil, and is far from being the greatest of all; too much cleverness and too much learning, accompanied with an ill bringing up, are far more fatal. cleinias: true. athenian: all freemen i conceive, should learn as much of these branches of knowledge as every child in egypt is taught when he learns the alphabet. in that country arithmetical games have been invented for the use of mere children, which they learn as a pleasure and amusement. they have to distribute apples and garlands, using the same number sometimes for a larger and sometimes for a lesser number of persons; and they arrange pugilists and wrestlers as they pair together by lot or remain over, and show how their turns come in natural order. another mode of amusing them is to distribute vessels, sometimes of gold, brass, silver, and the like, intermixed with one another, sometimes of one metal only; as i was saying they adapt to their amusement the numbers in common use, and in this way make more intelligible to their pupils the arrangements and movements of armies and expeditions, and in the management of a household they make people more useful to themselves, and more wide awake; and again in measurements of things which have length, and breadth, and depth, they free us from that natural ignorance of all these things which is so ludicrous and disgraceful. cleinias: what kind of ignorance do you mean? athenian: o my dear cleinias, i, like yourself, have late in life heard with amazement of our ignorance in these matters; to me we appear to be more like pigs than men, and i am quite ashamed, not only of myself, but of all hellenes. cleinias: about what? say, stranger, what you mean. athenian: i will; or rather i will show you my meaning by a question, and do you please to answer me: you know, i suppose, what length is? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and what breadth is? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: and you know that these are two distinct things, and that there is a third thing called depth? cleinias: of course. athenian: and do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with themselves? cleinias: yes. athenian: that is to say, length is naturally commensurable with length, and breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth? cleinias: undoubtedly. athenian: but if some things are commensurable and others wholly incommensurable, and you think that all things are commensurable, what is your position in regard to them? cleinias: clearly, far from good. athenian: concerning length and breadth when compared with depth, or breadth and length when compared with one another, are not all the hellenes agreed that these are commensurable with one another in some way? cleinias: quite true. athenian: but if they are absolutely incommensurable, and yet all of us regard them as commensurable, have we not reason to be ashamed of our compatriots; and might we not say to them: o ye best of hellenes, is not this one of the things of which we were saying that not to know them is disgraceful, and of which to have a bare knowledge only is no great distinction? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and there are other things akin to these, in which there spring up other errors of the same family. cleinias: what are they? athenian: the natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in their relation to one another. a man who is good for anything ought to be able, when he thinks, to distinguish them; and different persons should compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a far better and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man's game of draughts. cleinias: i dare say; and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game of draughts. athenian: and these, as i maintain, cleinias, are the studies which our youth ought to learn, for they are innocent and not difficult; the learning of them will be an amusement, and they will benefit the state. if any one is of another mind, let him say what he has to say. cleinias: certainly. athenian: then if these studies are such as we maintain, we will include them; if not, they shall be excluded. cleinias: assuredly: but may we not now, stranger, prescribe these studies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws? athenian: they shall be regarded as pledges which may be hereafter redeemed and removed from our state, if they do not please either us who give them, or you who accept them. cleinias: a fair condition. athenian: next let us see whether we are or are not willing that the study of astronomy shall be proposed for our youth. cleinias: proceed. athenian: here occurs a strange phenomenon, which certainly cannot in any point of view be tolerated. cleinias: to what are you referring? athenian: men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme god and the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things, and that such enquiries are impious; whereas the very opposite is the truth. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: perhaps what i am saying may seem paradoxical, and at variance with the usual language of age. but when any one has any good and true notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way acceptable to god, he cannot abstain from expressing it. cleinias: your words are reasonable enough; but shall we find any good or true notion about the stars? athenian: my good friends, at this hour all of us hellenes tell lies, if i may use such an expression, about those great gods, the sun and the moon. cleinias: lies of what nature? athenian: we say that they and divers other stars do not keep the same path, and we call them planets or wanderers. cleinias: very true, stranger; and in the course of my life i have often myself seen the morning star and the evening star and divers others not moving in their accustomed course, but wandering out of their path in all manner of ways, and i have seen the sun and moon doing what we all know that they do. athenian: just so, megillus and cleinias; and i maintain that our citizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the gods in heaven, so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in pious language, and not to blaspheme about them. cleinias: there you are right, if such a knowledge be only attainable; and if we are wrong in our mode of speaking now, and can be better instructed and learn to use better language, then i quite agree with you that such a degree of knowledge as will enable us to speak rightly should be acquired by us. and now do you try to explain to us your whole meaning, and we, on our part, will endeavour to understand you. athenian: there is some difficulty in understanding my meaning, but not a very great one, nor will any great length of time be required. and of this i am myself a proof; for i did not know these things long ago, nor in the days of my youth, and yet i can explain them to you in a brief space of time; whereas if they had been difficult i could certainly never have explained them all, old as i am, to old men like yourselves. cleinias: true; but what is this study which you describe as wonderful and fitting for youth to learn, but of which we are ignorant? try and explain the nature of it to us as clearly as you can. athenian: i will. for, o my good friends, that other doctrine about the wandering of the sun and the moon and the other stars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth. each of them moves in the same path--not in many paths, but in one only, which is circular, and the varieties are only apparent. nor are we right in supposing that the swiftest of them is the slowest, nor conversely, that the slowest is the quickest. and if what i say is true, only just imagine that we had a similar notion about horses running at olympia, or about men who ran in the long course, and that we addressed the swiftest as the slowest and the slowest as the swiftest, and sang the praises of the vanquished as though he were the victor--in that case our praises would not be true, nor very agreeable to the runners, though they be but men; and now, to commit the same error about the gods which would have been ludicrous and erroneous in the case of men--is not that ludicrous and erroneous? cleinias: worse than ludicrous, i should say. athenian: at all events, the gods cannot like us to be spreading a false report of them. cleinias: most true, if such is the fact. athenian: and if we can show that such is really the fact, then all these matters ought to be learned so far as is necessary for the avoidance of impiety; but if we cannot, they may be let alone, and let this be our decision. cleinias: very good. athenian: enough of laws relating to education and learning. but hunting and similar pursuits in like manner claim our attention. for the legislator appears to have a duty imposed upon him which goes beyond mere legislation. there is something over and above law which lies in a region between admonition and law, and has several times occurred to us in the course of discussion; for example, in the education of very young children there were things, as we maintain, which are not to be defined, and to regard them as matters of positive law is a great absurdity. now, our laws and the whole constitution of our state having been thus delineated, the praise of the virtuous citizen is not complete when he is described as the person who serves the laws best and obeys them most, but the higher form of praise is that which describes him as the good citizen who passes through life undefiled and is obedient to the words of the legislator, both when he is giving laws and when he assigns praise and blame. this is the truest word that can be spoken in praise of a citizen; and the true legislator ought not only to write his laws, but also to interweave with them all such things as seem to him honourable and dishonourable. and the perfect citizen ought to seek to strengthen these no less than the principles of law which are sanctioned by punishments. i will adduce an example which will clear up my meaning, and will be a sort of witness to my words. hunting is of wide extent, and has a name under which many things are included, for there is a hunting of creatures in the water, and of creatures in the air, and there is a great deal of hunting of land animals of all kinds, and not of wild beasts only. the hunting after man is also worthy of consideration; there is the hunting after him in war, and there is often a hunting after him in the way of friendship, which is praised and also blamed; and there is thieving, and the hunting which is practised by robbers, and that of armies against armies. now the legislator, in laying down laws about hunting, can neither abstain from noting these things, nor can he make threatening ordinances which will assign rules and penalties about all of them. what is he to do? he will have to praise and blame hunting with a view to the exercise and pursuits of youth. and, on the other hand, the young man must listen obediently; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him, and he should regard as his standard of action the praises and injunctions of the legislator rather than the punishments which he imposes by law. this being premised, there will follow next in order moderate praise and censure of hunting; the praise being assigned to that kind which will make the souls of young men better, and the censure to that which has the opposite effect. and now let us address young men in the form of a prayer for their welfare: o friends, we will say to them, may no desire or love of hunting in the sea, or of angling or of catching the creatures in the waters, ever take possession of you, either when you are awake or when you are asleep, by hook or with weels, which latter is a very lazy contrivance; and let not any desire of catching men and of piracy by sea enter into your souls and make you cruel and lawless hunters. and as to the desire of thieving in town or country, may it never enter into your most passing thoughts; nor let the insidious fancy of catching birds, which is hardly worthy of freemen, come into the head of any youth. there remains therefore for our athletes only the hunting and catching of land animals, of which the one sort is called hunting by night, in which the hunters sleep in turn and are lazy; this is not to be commended any more than that which has intervals of rest, in which the wild strength of beasts is subdued by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a laborious spirit. thus, only the best kind of hunting is allowed at all--that of quadrupeds, which is carried on with horses and dogs and men's own persons, and they get the victory over the animals by running them down and striking them and hurling at them, those who have a care of godlike manhood taking them with their own hands. the praise and blame which is assigned to all these things has now been declared; and let the law be as follows: let no one hinder these who verily are sacred hunters from following the chase wherever and whithersoever they will; but the hunter by night, who trusts to his nets and gins, shall not be allowed to hunt anywhere. the fowler in the mountains and waste places shall be permitted, but on cultivated ground and on consecrated wilds he shall not be permitted; and any one who meets him may stop him. as to the hunter in waters, he may hunt anywhere except in harbours or sacred streams or marshes or pools, provided only that he do not pollute the water with poisonous juices. and now we may say that all our enactments about education are complete. cleinias: very good. book viii. athenian: next, with the help of the delphian oracle, we have to institute festivals and make laws about them, and to determine what sacrifices will be for the good of the city, and to what gods they shall be offered; but when they shall be offered, and how often, may be partly regulated by us. cleinias: the number--yes. athenian: then we will first determine the number; and let the whole number be 365--one for every day--so that one magistrate at least will sacrifice daily to some god or demi-god on behalf of the city, and the citizens, and their possessions. and the interpreters, and priests, and priestesses, and prophets shall meet, and, in company with the guardians of the law, ordain those things which the legislator of necessity omits; and i may remark that they are the very persons who ought to take note of what is omitted. the law will say that there are twelve feasts dedicated to the twelve gods, after whom the several tribes are named; and that to each of them they shall sacrifice every month, and appoint choruses, and musical and gymnastic contests, assigning them so as to suit the gods and seasons of the year. and they shall have festivals for women, distinguishing those which ought to be separated from the men's festivals, and those which ought not. further, they shall not confuse the infernal deities and their rites with the gods who are termed heavenly and their rites, but shall separate them, giving to pluto his own in the twelfth month, which is sacred to him, according to the law. to such a deity warlike men should entertain no aversion, but they should honour him as being always the best friend of man. for the connexion of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of them, as i am ready to maintain quite seriously. moreover, those who would regulate these matters rightly should consider, that our city among existing cities has no fellow, either in respect of leisure or command of the necessaries of life, and that like an individual she ought to live happily. and those who would live happily should in the first place do no wrong to one another, and ought not themselves to be wronged by others; to attain the first is not difficult, but there is great difficulty in acquiring the power of not being wronged. no man can be perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good; and cities are like individuals in this, for a city if good has a life of peace, but if evil, a life of war within and without. wherefore the citizens ought to practise war--not in time of war, but rather while they are at peace. and every city which has any sense, should take the field at least for one day in every month, and for more if the magistrates think fit, having no regard to winter cold or summer heat; and they should go out en masse, including their wives and their children, when the magistrates determine to lead forth the whole people, or in separate portions when summoned by them; and they should always provide that there should be games and sacrificial feasts, and they should have tournaments, imitating in as lively a manner as they can real battles. and they should distribute prizes of victory and valour to the competitors, passing censures and encomiums on one another according to the characters which they bear in the contests and in their whole life, honouring him who seems to be the best, and blaming him who is the opposite. and let poets celebrate the victors--not however every poet, but only one who in the first place is not less than fifty years of age; nor should he be one who, although he may have musical and poetical gifts, has never in his life done any noble or illustrious action; but those who are themselves good and also honourable in the state, creators of noble actions--let their poems be sung, even though they be not very musical. and let the judgment of them rest with the instructor of youth and the other guardians of the laws, who shall give them this privilege, and they alone shall be free to sing; but the rest of the world shall not have this liberty. nor shall any one dare to sing a song which has not been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws, not even if his strain be sweeter than the songs of thamyras and orpheus; but only such poems as have been judged sacred and dedicated to the gods, and such as are the works of good men, in which praise or blame has been awarded and which have been deemed to fulfil their design fairly. the regulations about war, and about liberty of speech in poetry, ought to apply equally to men and women. the legislator may be supposed to argue the question in his own mind: who are my citizens for whom i have set in order the city? are they not competitors in the greatest of all contests, and have they not innumerable rivals? to be sure, will be the natural reply. well, but if we were training boxers, or pancratiasts, or any other sort of athletes, would they never meet until the hour of contest arrived; and should we do nothing to prepare ourselves previously by daily practice? surely, if we were boxers, we should have been learning to fight for many days before, and exercising ourselves in imitating all those blows and wards which we were intending to use in the hour of conflict; and in order that we might come as near to reality as possible, instead of cestuses we should put on boxing-gloves, that the blows and the wards might be practised by us to the utmost of our power. and if there were a lack of competitors, the ridicule of fools would not deter us from hanging up a lifeless image and practising at that. or if we had no adversary at all, animate or inanimate, should we not venture in the dearth of antagonists to spar by ourselves? in what other manner could we ever study the art of self-defence? cleinias: the way which you mention, stranger, would be the only way. athenian: and shall the warriors of our city, who are destined when occasion calls to enter the greatest of all contests, and to fight for their lives, and their children, and their property, and the whole city, be worse prepared than boxers? and will the legislator, because he is afraid that their practising with one another may appear to some ridiculous, abstain from commanding them to go out and fight; will he not ordain that soldiers shall perform lesser exercises without arms every day, making dancing and all gymnastic tend to this end; and also will he not require that they shall practise some gymnastic exercises, greater as well as lesser, as often as every month; and that they shall have contests one with another in every part of the country, seizing upon posts and lying in ambush, and imitating in every respect the reality of war; fighting with boxing-gloves and hurling javelins, and using weapons somewhat dangerous, and as nearly as possible like the true ones, in order that the sport may not be altogether without fear, but may have terrors and to a certain degree show the man who has and who has not courage; and that the honour and dishonour which are assigned to them respectively, may prepare the whole city for the true conflict of life? if any one dies in these mimic contests, the homicide is involuntary, and we will make the slayer, when he has been purified according to law, to be pure of blood, considering that if a few men should die, others as good as they will be born; but that if fear is dead, then the citizens will never find a test of superior and inferior natures, which is a far greater evil to the state than the loss of a few. cleinias: we are quite agreed, stranger, that we should legislate about such things, and that the whole state should practise them. athenian: and what is the reason that dances and contests of this sort hardly ever exist in states, at least not to any extent worth speaking of? is this due to the ignorance of mankind and their legislators? cleinias: perhaps. athenian: certainly not, sweet cleinias; there are two causes, which are quite enough to account for the deficiency. cleinias: what are they? athenian: one cause is the love of wealth, which wholly absorbs men, and never for a moment allows them to think of anything but their own private possessions; on this the soul of every citizen hangs suspended, and can attend to nothing but his daily gain; mankind are ready to learn any branch of knowledge, and to follow any pursuit which tends to this end, and they laugh at every other: that is one reason why a city will not be in earnest about such contests or any other good and honourable pursuit. but from an insatiable love of gold and silver, every man will stoop to any art or contrivance, seemly or unseemly, in the hope of becoming rich; and will make no objection to performing any action, holy, or unholy and utterly base; if only like a beast he have the power of eating and drinking all kinds of things, and procuring for himself in every sort of way the gratification of his lusts. cleinias: true. athenian: let this, then, be deemed one of the causes which prevent states from pursuing in an efficient manner the art of war, or any other noble aim, but makes the orderly and temperate part of mankind into merchants, and captains of ships, and servants, and converts the valiant sort into thieves and burglars, and robbers of temples, and violent, tyrannical persons; many of whom are not without ability, but they are unfortunate. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled to pass through life always hungering? cleinias: then that is one cause, stranger; but you spoke of another. athenian: thank you for reminding me. cleinias: the insatiable lifelong love of wealth, as you were saying, is one cause which absorbs mankind, and prevents them from rightly practising the arts of war: granted; and now tell me, what is the other? athenian: do you imagine that i delay because i am in a perplexity? cleinias: no; but we think that you are too severe upon the money-loving temper, of which you seem in the present discussion to have a peculiar dislike. athenian: that is a very fair rebuke, cleinias; and i will now proceed to the second cause. cleinias: proceed. athenian: i say that governments are a cause--democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, concerning which i have often spoken in the previous discourse; or rather governments they are not, for none of them exercises a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects; but they may be truly called states of discord, in which while the government is voluntary, the subjects always obey against their will, and have to be coerced; and the ruler fears the subject, and will not, if he can help, allow him to become either noble, or rich, or strong, or valiant, or warlike at all. these two are the chief causes of almost all evils, and of the evils of which i have been speaking they are notably the causes. but our state has escaped both of them; for her citizens have the greatest leisure, and they are not subject to one another, and will, i think, be made by these laws the reverse of lovers of money. such a constitution may be reasonably supposed to be the only one existing which will accept the education which we have described, and the martial pastimes which have been perfected according to our idea. cleinias: true. athenian: then next we must remember, about all gymnastic contests, that only the warlike sort of them are to be practised and to have prizes of victory; and those which are not military are to be given up. the military sort had better be completely described and established by law; and first, let us speak of running and swiftness. cleinias: very good. athenian: certainly the most military of all qualities is general activity of body, whether of foot or hand. for escaping or for capturing an enemy, quickness of foot is required; but hand-to-hand conflict and combat need vigour and strength. cleinias: very true. athenian: neither of them can attain their greatest efficiency without arms. cleinias: how can they? athenian: then our herald, in accordance with the prevailing practice, will first summon the runner--he will appear armed, for to an unarmed competitor we will not give a prize. and he shall enter first who is to run the single course bearing arms; next, he who is to run the double course; third, he who is to run the horse-course; and fourthly, he who is to run the long course; the fifth whom we start, shall be the first sent forth in heavy armour, and shall run a course of sixty stadia to some temple of ares--and we will send forth another, whom we will style the more heavily armed, to run over smoother ground. there remains the archer; and he shall run in the full equipments of an archer a distance of 100 stadia over mountains, and across every sort of country, to a temple of apollo and artemis; this shall be the order of the contest, and we will wait for them until they return, and will give a prize to the conqueror in each. cleinias: very good. athenian: let us suppose that there are three kinds of contests--one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. for the youths we will fix the length of the contest at two-thirds, and for the boys at half of the entire course, whether they contend as archers or as heavy-armed. touching the women, let the girls who are not grown up compete naked in the stadium and the double course, and the horse-course and the long course, and let them run on the race-ground itself; those who are thirteen years of age and upwards until their marriage shall continue to share in contests if they are not more than twenty, and shall be compelled to run up to eighteen; and they shall descend into the arena in suitable dresses. let these be the regulations about contests in running both for men and women. respecting contests of strength, instead of wrestling and similar contests of the heavier sort, we will institute conflicts in armour of one against one, and two against two, and so on up to ten against ten. as to what a man ought not to suffer or do, and to what extent, in order to gain the victory--as in wrestling, the masters of the art have laid down what is fair and what is not fair, so in fighting in armour--we ought to call in skilful persons, who shall judge for us and be our assessors in the work of legislation; they shall say who deserves to be victor in combats of this sort, and what he is not to do or have done to him, and in like manner what rule determines who is defeated; and let these ordinances apply to women until they are married as well as to men. the pancration shall have a counterpart in a combat of the light-armed; they shall contend with bows and with light shields and with javelins and in the throwing of stones by slings and by hand: and laws shall be made about it, and rewards and prizes given to him who best fulfils the ordinances of the law. next in order we shall have to legislate about the horse contests. now we do not need many horses, for they cannot be of much use in a country like crete, and hence we naturally do not take great pains about the rearing of them or about horse races. there is no one who keeps a chariot among us, and any rivalry in such matters would be altogether out of place; there would be no sense nor any shadow of sense in instituting contests which are not after the manner of our country. and therefore we give our prizes for single horses--for colts who have not yet cast their teeth, and for those who are intermediate, and for the full-grown horses themselves; and thus our equestrian games will accord with the nature of the country. let them have conflict and rivalry in these matters in accordance with the law, and let the colonels and generals of horse decide together about all courses and about the armed competitors in them. but we have nothing to say to the unarmed either in gymnastic exercises or in these contests. on the other hand, the cretan bowman or javelin-man who fights in armour on horseback is useful, and therefore we may as well place a competition of this sort among our amusements. women are not to be forced to compete by laws and ordinances; but if from previous training they have acquired the habit and are strong enough and like to take part, let them do so, girls as well as boys, and no blame to them. thus the competition in gymnastic and the mode of learning it have been described; and we have spoken also of the toils of the contest, and of daily exercises under the superintendence of masters. likewise, what relates to music has been, for the most part, completed. but as to rhapsodes and the like, and the contests of choruses which are to perform at feasts, all this shall be arranged when the months and days and years have been appointed for gods and demi-gods, whether every third year, or again every fifth year, or in whatever way or manner the gods may put into men's minds the distribution and order of them. at the same time, we may expect that the musical contests will be celebrated in their turn by the command of the judges and the director of education and the guardians of the law meeting together for this purpose, and themselves becoming legislators of the times and nature and conditions of the choral contests and of dancing in general. what they ought severally to be in language and song, and in the admixture of harmony with rhythm and the dance, has been often declared by the original legislator; and his successors ought to follow him, making the games and sacrifices duly to correspond at fitting times, and appointing public festivals. it is not difficult to determine how these and the like matters may have a regular order; nor, again, will the alteration of them do any great good or harm to the state. there is, however, another matter of great importance and difficulty, concerning which god should legislate, if there were any possibility of obtaining from him an ordinance about it. but seeing that divine aid is not to be had, there appears to be a need of some bold man who specially honours plainness of speech, and will say outright what he thinks best for the city and citizens--ordaining what is good and convenient for the whole state amid the corruptions of human souls, opposing the mightiest lusts, and having no man his helper but himself standing alone and following reason only. cleinias: what is this, stranger, that you are saying? for we do not as yet understand your meaning. athenian: very likely; i will endeavour to explain myself more clearly. when i came to the subject of education, i beheld young men and maidens holding friendly intercourse with one another. and there naturally arose in my mind a sort of apprehension--i could not help thinking how one is to deal with a city in which youths and maidens are well nurtured, and have nothing to do, and are not undergoing the excessive and servile toils which extinguish wantonness, and whose only cares during their whole life are sacrifices and festivals and dances. how, in such a state as this, will they abstain from desires which thrust many a man and woman into perdition; and from which reason, assuming the functions of law, commands them to abstain? the ordinances already made may possibly get the better of most of these desires; the prohibition of excessive wealth is a very considerable gain in the direction of temperance, and the whole education of our youth imposes a law of moderation on them; moreover, the eye of the rulers is required always to watch over the young, and never to lose sight of them; and these provisions do, as far as human means can effect anything, exercise a regulating influence upon the desires in general. but how can we take precautions against the unnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come upon individuals and cities? how shall we devise a remedy and way of escape out of so great a danger? truly, cleinias, here is a difficulty. in many ways crete and lacedaemon furnish a great help to those who make peculiar laws; but in the matter of love, as we are alone, i must confess that they are quite against us. for if any one following nature should lay down the law which existed before the days of laius, and denounce these lusts as contrary to nature, adducing the animals as a proof that such unions were monstrous, he might prove his point, but he would be wholly at variance with the custom of your states. further, they are repugnant to a principle which we say that a legislator should always observe; for we are always enquiring which of our enactments tends to virtue and which not. and suppose we grant that these loves are accounted by law to the honourable, or at least not disgraceful, in what degree will they contribute to virtue? will such passions implant in the soul of him who is seduced the habit of courage, or in the soul of the seducer the principle of temperance? who will ever believe this? or rather, who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures and is unable to hold out against them? will not all men censure as womanly him who imitates the woman? and who would ever think of establishing such a practice by law? certainly no one who had in his mind the image of true law. how can we prove that what i am saying is true? he who would rightly consider these matters must see the nature of friendship and desire, and of these so-called loves, for they are of two kinds, and out of the two arises a third kind, having the same name; and this similarity of name causes all the difficulty and obscurity. cleinias: how is that? athenian: dear is the like in virtue to the like, and the equal to the equal; dear also, though unlike, is he who has abundance to him who is in want. and when either of these friendships becomes excessive, we term the excess love. cleinias: very true. athenian: the friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and has often no tie of communion; but that which arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion which lasts through life. as to the mixed sort which is made up of them both, there is, first of all, a difficulty in determining what he who is possessed by this third love desires; moreover, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt between the two principles; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of youth, and the other forbidding him. for the one is a lover of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and would fain satisfy himself without any regard to the character of the beloved; the other holds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving and with his soul desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness; he reverences and respects temperance and courage and magnanimity and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste object of his affection. now the sort of love which is made up of the other two is that which we have described as the third. seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among us? is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the state the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved youth to be the best possible; and the other two, if possible, we should hinder? what do you say, friend megillus? megillus: i think, stranger, that you are perfectly right in what you have been now saying. athenian: i knew well, my friend, that i should obtain your assent, which i accept, and therefore have no need to analyze your custom any further. cleinias shall be prevailed upon to give me his assent at some other time. enough of this; and now let us proceed to the laws. megillus: very good. athenian: upon reflection i see a way of imposing the law, which, in one respect, is easy, but, in another, is of the utmost difficulty. megillus: what do you mean? athenian: we are all aware that most men, in spite of their lawless natures, are very strictly and precisely restrained from intercourse with the fair, and this is not at all against their will, but entirely with their will. megillus: when do you mean? athenian: when any one has a brother or sister who is fair; and about a son or daughter the same unwritten law holds, and is a most perfect safeguard, so that no open or secret connexion ever takes place between them. nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all into the minds of most of them. megillus: very true. athenian: does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort? megillus: what word? athenian: the declaration that they are unholy, hated of god, and most infamous; and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said the opposite, but every one from his earliest childhood has heard men speaking in the same manner about them always and everywhere, whether in comedy or in the graver language of tragedy? when the poet introduces on the stage a thyestes or an oedipus, or a macareus having secret intercourse with his sister, he represents him, when found out, ready to kill himself as the penalty of his sin. megillus: you are very right in saying that tradition, if no breath of opposition ever assails it, has a marvellous power. athenian: am i not also right in saying that the legislator who wants to master any of the passions which master man may easily know how to subdue them? he will consecrate the tradition of their evil character among all, slaves and freemen, women and children, throughout the city: that will be the surest foundation of the law which he can make. megillus: yes; but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the same language about them? athenian: a good objection; but was i not just now saying that i had a way to make men use natural love and abstain from unnatural, not intentionally destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in stony places, in which they will take no root; and that i would command them to abstain too from any female field of increase in which that which is sown is not likely to grow? now if a law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an authority such as already prevents intercourse of parents and children--such a law, extending to other sensual desires, and conquering them, would be the source of ten thousand blessings. for, in the first place, moderation is the appointment of nature, and deters men from all frenzy and madness of love, and from all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks, and makes them good friends to their own wives. and innumerable other benefits would result if such a law could only be enforced. i can imagine some lusty youth who is standing by, and who, on hearing this enactment, declares in scurrilous terms that we are making foolish and impossible laws, and fills the world with his outcry. and therefore i said that i knew a way of enacting and perpetuating such a law, which was very easy in one respect, but in another most difficult. there is no difficulty in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way; for, as i was saying, the ordinance once consecrated would master the soul of every man, and terrify him into obedience. but matters have now come to such a pass that even then the desired result seems as if it could not be attained, just as the continuance of an entire state in the practice of common meals is also deemed impossible. and although this latter is partly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, still even in your cities the common meals of women would be regarded as unnatural and impossible. i was thinking of the rebelliousness of the human heart when i said that the permanent establishment of these things is very difficult. megillus: very true. athenian: shall i try and find some sort of persuasive argument which will prove to you that such enactments are possible, and not beyond human nature? cleinias: by all means. athenian: is a man more likely to abstain from the pleasures of love and to do what he is bidden about them, when his body is in a good condition, or when he is in an ill condition, and out of training? cleinias: he will be far more temperate when he is in training. athenian: and have we not heard of iccus of tarentum, who, with a view to the olympic and other contests, in his zeal for his art, and also because he was of a manly and temperate disposition, never had any connexion with a woman or a youth during the whole time of his training? and the same is said of crison and astylus and diopompus and many others; and yet, cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds than your and my citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty. cleinias: no doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by the ancients of these athletes. athenian: and had they the courage to abstain from what is ordinarily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, running, and the like; and shall our young men be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory, which is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this by tales and sayings and songs? cleinias: of what victory are you speaking? athenian: of the victory over pleasure, which if they win, they will live happily; or if they are conquered, the reverse of happily. and, further, may we not suppose that the fear of impiety will enable them to master that which other inferior people have mastered? cleinias: i dare say. athenian: and since we have reached this point in our legislation, and have fallen into a difficulty by reason of the vices of mankind, i affirm that our ordinance should simply run in the following terms: our citizens ought not to fall below the nature of birds and beasts in general, who are born in great multitudes, and yet remain until the age for procreation virgin and unmarried, but when they have reached the proper time of life are coupled, male and female, and lovingly pair together, and live the rest of their lives in holiness and innocence, abiding firmly in their original compact: surely, we will say to them, you should be better than the animals. but if they are corrupted by the other hellenes and the common practice of barbarians, and they see with their eyes and hear with their ears of the so-called free love everywhere prevailing among them, and they themselves are not able to get the better of the temptation, the guardians of the law, exercising the functions of lawgivers, shall devise a second law against them. cleinias: and what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed? athenian: clearly, cleinias, the one which would naturally follow. cleinias: what is that? athenian: our citizens should not allow pleasures to strengthen with indulgence, but should by toil divert the aliment and exuberance of them into other parts of the body; and this will happen if no immodesty be allowed in the practice of love. then they will be ashamed of frequent intercourse, and they will find pleasure, if seldom enjoyed, to be a less imperious mistress. they should not be found out doing anything of the sort. concealment shall be honourable, and sanctioned by custom and made law by unwritten prescription; on the other hand, to be detected shall be esteemed dishonourable, but not, to abstain wholly. in this way there will be a second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable, involving a second notion of right. three principles will comprehend all those corrupt natures whom we call inferior to themselves, and who form but one class, and will compel them not to transgress. cleinias: what are they? athenian: the principle of piety, the love of honour, and the desire of beauty, not in the body but in the soul. these are, perhaps, romantic aspirations; but they are the noblest of aspirations, if they could only be realised in all states, and, god willing, in the matter of love we may be able to enforce one of two things--either that no one shall venture to touch any person of the freeborn or noble class except his wedded wife, or sow the unconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots, or in barren and unnatural lusts; or at least we may abolish altogether the connection of men with men; and as to women, if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites, whether they be bought or acquired in any other way, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges, and be deemed to be, as he truly is, a stranger. let this law, then, whether it is one, or ought rather to be called two, be laid down respecting love in general, and the intercourse of the sexes which arises out of the desires, whether rightly or wrongly indulged. megillus: i, for my part, stranger, would gladly receive this law. cleinias shall speak for himself, and tell you what is his opinion. cleinias: i will, megillus, when an opportunity offers; at present, i think that we had better allow the stranger to proceed with his laws. megillus: very good. athenian: we had got about as far as the establishment of the common tables, which in most places would be difficult, but in crete no one would think of introducing any other custom. there might arise a question about the manner of them--whether they shall be such as they are here in crete, or such as they are in lacedaemon--or is there a third kind which may be better than either of them? the answer to this question might be easily discovered, but the discovery would do no great good, for at present they are very well ordered. leaving the common tables, we may therefore proceed to the means of providing food. now, in cities the means of life are gained in many ways and from divers sources, and in general from two sources, whereas our city has only one. for most of the hellenes obtain their food from sea and land, but our citizens from land only. and this makes the task of the legislator less difficult--half as many laws will be enough, and much less than half; and they will be of a kind better suited to free men. for he has nothing to do with laws about shipowners and merchants and retailers and inn-keepers and tax collectors and mines and moneylending and compound interest and innumerable other things--bidding good-bye to these, he gives laws to husbandmen and shepherds and bee-keepers, and to the guardians and superintendents of their implements; and he has already legislated for greater matters, as for example, respecting marriage and the procreation and nurture of children, and for education, and the establishment of offices--and now he must direct his laws to those who provide food and labour in preparing it. let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall be called the laws of husbandmen. and let the first of them be the law of zeus, the god of boundaries. let no one shift the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbour, or, if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger who is conterminous with him, considering that this is truly 'to move the immovable,' and every one should be more willing to move the largest rock which is not a landmark, than the least stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between neighbours; for zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the citizen, and zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and when aroused, terrible are the wars which they stir up. he who obeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobedience, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty, the first coming from the gods, and the second from the law. for let no one wilfully remove the boundaries of his neighbour's land, and if any one does, let him who will inform the landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be convicted of re-dividing the land by stealth or by force, let the court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. in the next place, many small injuries done by neighbours to one another, through their multiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, and make neighbourhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any offence against his neighbour, and especially of encroaching on his neighbour's land; for any man may easily do harm, but not every man can do good to another. he who encroaches on his neighbour's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make good the damage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured party. of these and the like matters the wardens of the country shall take cognizance, and be the judges of them and assessors of the damage; in the more important cases, as has been already said, the whole number of them belonging to any one of the twelve divisions shall decide, and in the lesser cases the commanders: or, again, if any one pastures his cattle on his neighbour's land, they shall see the injury, and adjudge the penalty. and if any one, by decoying the bees, gets possession of another's swarms, and draws them to himself by making noises, he shall pay the damage; or if any one sets fire to his own wood and takes no care of his neighbour's property, he shall be fined at the discretion of the magistrates. and if in planting he does not leave a fair distance between his own and his neighbour's land, he shall be punished, in accordance with the enactments of many lawgivers, which we may use, not deeming it necessary that the great legislator of our state should determine all the trifles which might be decided by any body; for example, husbandmen have had of old excellent laws about waters, and there is no reason why we should propose to divert their course: he who likes may draw water from the fountain-head of the common stream on to his own land, if he do not cut off the spring which clearly belongs to some other owner; and he may take the water in any direction which he pleases, except through a house or temple or sepulchre, but he must be careful to do no harm beyond the channel. and if there be in any place a natural dryness of the earth, which keeps in the rain from heaven, and causes a deficiency in the supply of water, let him dig down on his own land as far as the clay, and if at this depth he finds no water, let him obtain water from his neighbours, as much as is required for his servants' drinking, and if his neighbours, too, are limited in their supply, let him have a fixed measure, which shall be determined by the wardens of the country. this he shall receive each day, and on these terms have a share of his neighbours' water. if there be heavy rain, and one of those on the lower ground injures some tiller of the upper ground, or some one who has a common wall, by refusing to give them an outlet for water; or, again, if some one living on the higher ground recklessly lets off the water on his lower neighbour, and they cannot come to terms with one another, let him who will call in a warden of the city, if he be in the city, or if he be in the country, a warden of the country, and let him obtain a decision determining what each of them is to do. and he who will not abide by the decision shall suffer for his malignant and morose temper, and pay a fine to the injured party, equivalent to double the value of the injury, because he was unwilling to submit to the magistrates. now the participation of fruits shall be ordered on this wise. the goddess of autumn has two gracious gifts: one the joy of dionysus which is not treasured up; the other, which nature intends to be stored. let this be the law, then, concerning the fruits of autumn: he who tastes the common or storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the season of vintage which coincides with arcturus, either on his own land or on that of others--let him pay fifty drachmae, which shall be sacred to dionysus, if he pluck them from his own land; and if from his neighbour's land, a mina, and if from any others', two-thirds of a mina. and he who would gather the 'choice' grapes or the 'choice' figs, as they are now termed, if he take them off his own land, let him pluck them how and when he likes; but if he take them from the ground of others without their leave, let him in that case be always punished in accordance with the law which ordains that he should not move what he has not laid down. and if a slave touches any fruit of this sort, without the consent of the owner of the land, he shall be beaten with as many blows as there are grapes on the bunch, or figs on the fig-tree. let a metic purchase the 'choice' autumnal fruit, and then, if he pleases, he may gather it; but if a stranger is passing along the road, and desires to eat, let him take of the 'choice' grape for himself and a single follower without payment, as a tribute of hospitality. the law however forbids strangers from sharing in the sort which is not used for eating; and if any one, whether he be master or slave, takes of them in ignorance, let the slave be beaten, and the freeman dismissed with admonitions, and instructed to take of the other autumnal fruits which are unfit for making raisins and wine, or for laying by as dried figs. as to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and similar fruits, there shall be no disgrace in taking them secretly; but he who is caught, if he be of less than thirty years of age, shall be struck and beaten off, but not wounded; and no freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for such blows. of these fruits the stranger may partake, just as he may of the fruits of autumn. and if an elder, who is more than thirty years of age, eat of them on the spot, let him, like the stranger, be allowed to partake of all such fruits, but he must carry away nothing. if, however, he will not obey the law, let him run the risk of failing in the competition of virtue, in case any one takes notice of his actions before the judges at the time. water is the greatest element of nutrition in gardens, but is easily polluted. you cannot poison the soil, or the sun, or the air, which are the other elements of nutrition in plants, or divert them, or steal them; but all these things may very likely happen in regard to water, which must therefore be protected by law. and let this be the law: if any one intentionally pollutes the water of another, whether the water of a spring, or collected in reservoirs, either by poisonous substances, or by digging, or by theft, let the injured party bring the cause before the wardens of the city, and claim in writing the value of the loss; if the accused be found guilty of injuring the water by deleterious substances, let him not only pay damages, but purify the stream or the cistern which contains the water, in such manner as the laws of the interpreters order the purification to be made by the offender in each case. with respect to the gathering in of the fruits of the soil, let a man, if he pleases, carry his own fruits through any place in which he either does no harm to any one, or himself gains three times as much as his neighbour loses. now of these things the magistrates should be cognizant, as of all other things in which a man intentionally does injury to another or to the property of another, by fraud or force, in the use which he makes of his own property. all these matters a man should lay before the magistrates, and receive damages, supposing the injury to be not more than three minae; or if he have a charge against another which involves a larger amount, let him bring his suit into the public courts and have the evil-doer punished. but if any of the magistrates appear to adjudge the penalties which he imposes in an unjust spirit, let him be liable to pay double to the injured party. any one may bring the offences of magistrates, in any particular case, before the public courts. there are innumerable little matters relating to the modes of punishment, and applications for suits, and summonses and the witnesses to summonses--for example, whether two witnesses should be required for a summons, or how many--and all such details, which cannot be omitted in legislation, but are beneath the wisdom of an aged legislator. these lesser matters, as they indeed are in comparison with the greater ones, let a younger generation regulate by law, after the patterns which have preceded, and according to their own experience of the usefulness and necessity of such laws; and when they are duly regulated let there be no alteration, but let the citizens live in the observance of them. now of artisans, let the regulations be as follows: in the first place, let no citizen or servant of a citizen be occupied in handicraft arts; for he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state, has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, and does not admit of being made a secondary occupation; and hardly any human being is capable of pursuing two professions or two arts rightly, or of practising one art himself, and superintending some one else who is practising another. let this, then, be our first principle in the state: no one who is a smith shall also be a carpenter, and if he be a carpenter, he shall not superintend the smith's art rather than his own, under the pretext that in superintending many servants who are working for him, he is likely to superintend them better, because more revenue will accrue to him from them than from his own art; but let every man in the state have one art, and get his living by that. let the wardens of the city labour to maintain this law, and if any citizen incline to any other art rather than the study of virtue, let them punish him with disgrace and infamy, until they bring him back into his own right course; and if any stranger profess two arts, let them chastise him with bonds and money penalties, and expulsion from the state, until they compel him to be one only and not many. but as touching payments for hire, and contracts of work, or in case any one does wrong to any of the citizens, or they do wrong to any other, up to fifty drachmae, let the wardens of the city decide the case; but if a greater amount be involved, then let the public courts decide according to law. let no one pay any duty either on the importation or exportation of goods; and as to frankincense and similar perfumes, used in the service of the gods, which come from abroad, and purple and other dyes which are not produced in the country, or the materials of any art which have to be imported, and which are not necessary--no one should import them; nor, again, should any one export anything which is wanted in the country. of all these things let there be inspectors and superintendents, taken from the guardians of the law; and they shall be the twelve next in order to the five seniors. concerning arms, and all implements which are required for military purposes, if there be need of introducing any art, or plant, or metal, or chains of any kind, or animals for use in war, let the commanders of the horse and the generals have authority over their importation and exportation; the city shall send them out and also receive them, and the guardians of the law shall make fit and proper laws about them. but let there be no retail trade for the sake of moneymaking, either in these or any other articles, in the city or country at all. with respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the right and proper way seems to be nearly that which is the custom of crete; for all should be required to distribute the fruits of the soil into twelve parts, and in this way consume them. let the twelfth portion of each as for instance of wheat and barley, to which the rest of the fruits of the earth shall be added, as well as the animals which are for sale in each of the twelve divisions, be divided in due proportion into three parts; one part for freemen, another for their servants, and a third for craftsmen and in general for strangers, whether sojourners who may be dwelling in the city, and like other men must live, or those who come on some business which they have with the state, or with some individual. let only this third part of all necessaries be required to be sold; out of the other two-thirds no one shall be compelled to sell. and how will they be best distributed? in the first place, we see clearly that the distribution will be of equals in one point of view, and in another point of view of unequals. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean that the earth of necessity produces and nourishes the various articles of food, sometimes better and sometimes worse. cleinias: of course. athenian: such being the case, let no one of the three portions be greater than either of the other two--neither that which is assigned to masters or to slaves, nor again that of the stranger; but let the distribution to all be equal and alike, and let every citizen take his two portions and distribute them among slaves and freemen, he having power to determine the quantity and quality. and what remains he shall distribute by measure and number among the animals who have to be sustained from the earth, taking the whole number of them. in the second place, our citizens should have separate houses duly ordered; and this will be the order proper for men like them. there shall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth portion, and in each hamlet they shall first set apart a market-place, and the temples of the gods, and of their attendant demi-gods; and if there be any local deities of the magnetes, or holy seats of other ancient deities, whose memory has been preserved, to these let them pay their ancient honours. but hestia, and zeus, and athene will have temples everywhere together with the god who presides in each of the twelve districts. and the first erection of houses shall be around these temples, where the ground is highest, in order to provide the safest and most defensible place of retreat for the guards. all the rest of the country they shall settle in the following manner: they shall make thirteen divisions of the craftsmen; one of them they shall establish in the city, and this, again, they shall subdivide into twelve lesser divisions, among the twelve districts of the city, and the remainder shall be distributed in the country round about; and in each village they shall settle various classes of craftsmen, with a view to the convenience of the husbandmen. and the chief officers of the wardens of the country shall superintend all these matters, and see how many of them, and which class of them, each place requires; and fix them where they are likely to be least troublesome, and most useful to the husbandman. and the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in the city. now the wardens of the agora ought to see to the details of the agora. their first care, after the temples which are in the agora have been seen to, should be to prevent any one from doing any wrong in dealings between man and man; in the second place, as being inspectors of temperance and violence, they should chastise him who requires chastisement. touching articles of sale, they should first see whether the articles which the citizens are under regulations to sell to strangers are sold to them, as the law ordains. and let the law be as follows: on the first day of the month, the persons in charge, whoever they are, whether strangers or slaves, who have the charge on behalf of the citizens, shall produce to the strangers the portion which falls to them, in the first place, a twelfth portion of the corn--the stranger shall purchase corn for the whole month, and other cereals, on the first market day; and on the tenth day of the month the one party shall sell, and the other buy, liquids sufficient to last during the whole month; and on the twenty-third day there shall be a sale of animals by those who are willing to sell to the people who want to buy, and of implements and other things which husbandmen sell, (such as skins and all kinds of clothing, either woven or made of felt and other goods of the same sort) and which strangers are compelled to buy and purchase of others. as to the retail trade in these things, whether of barley or wheat set apart for meal and flour, or any other kind of food, no one shall sell them to citizens or their slaves, nor shall any one buy of a citizen; but let the stranger sell them in the market of strangers, to artisans and their slaves, making an exchange of wine and food, which is commonly called retail trade. and butchers shall offer for sale parts of dismembered animals to the strangers, and artisans, and their servants. let any stranger who likes buy fuel from day to day wholesale, from those who have the care of it in the country, and let him sell to the strangers as much as he pleases and when he pleases. as to other goods and implements which are likely to be wanted, they shall sell them in the common market, at any place which the guardians of the law and the wardens of the market and city, choosing according to their judgment, shall determine; at such places they shall exchange money for goods, and goods for money, neither party giving credit to the other; and he who gives credit must be satisfied, whether he obtain his money or not, for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law. but whenever property has been bought or sold, greater in quantity or value than is allowed by the law, which has determined within what limits a man may increase and diminish his possessions, let the excess be registered in the books of the guardians of the law; or in case of diminution, let there be an erasure made. and let the same rule be observed about the registration of the property of the metics. any one who likes may come and be a metic on certain conditions; a foreigner, if he likes, and is able to settle, may dwell in the land, but he must practise an art, and not abide more than twenty years from the time at which he has registered himself; and he shall pay no sojourner's tax, however small, except good conduct, nor any other tax for buying and selling. but when the twenty years have expired, he shall take his property with him and depart. and if in the course of these years he should chance to distinguish himself by any considerable benefit which he confers on the state, and he thinks that he can persuade the council and assembly, either to grant him delay in leaving the country, or to allow him to remain for the whole of his life, let him go and persuade the city, and whatever they assent to at his instance shall take effect. for the children of the metics, being artisans, and of fifteen years of age, let the time of their sojourn commence after their fifteenth year; and let them remain for twenty years, and then go where they like; but any of them who wishes to remain, may do so, if he can persuade the council and assembly. and if he depart, let him erase all the entries which have been made by him in the register kept by the magistrates. book ix. next to all the matters which have preceded in the natural order of legislation will come suits of law. of suits those which relate to agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not been described. having mentioned them severally under their usual names, we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each offence, and who are to be the judges of them. cleinias: very good. athenian: there is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of virtue. to assume that in such a state there will arise some one who will be guilty of crimes as heinous as any which are ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and threaten and make laws against him if he should arise, in order to deter him, and punish his acts, under the idea that he will arise--this, as i was saying, is in a manner disgraceful. yet seeing that we are not like the ancient legislators, who gave laws to heroes and sons of gods, being, according to the popular belief, themselves the offspring of the gods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine parents, but that we are only men who are legislating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, having a heart so hard that it cannot be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire. among our citizens there may be those who cannot be subdued by all the strength of the laws; and for their sake, though an ungracious task, i will proclaim my first law about the robbing of temples, in case any one should dare to commit such a crime. i do not expect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants may be guilty of many impieties. and with a view to them especially, and yet not without a provident eye to the weakness of human nature generally, i will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar incurable, or almost incurable, criminals. having already agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short prelude, we may speak to the criminal, whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, the fewest possible words of admonition and exhortation: o sir, we will say to him, the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a visitation of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and unexpiated crimes of his race, an ever-recurring curse--against this you must guard with all your might, and how you are to guard we will explain to you. when any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the gods who avert evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you; hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should honour the noble and the just. fly from the company of the wicked--fly and turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by these remedies, well and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence. such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has nothing to say. but to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a loud voice--he who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. and if he suffers this punishment he will probably return to his right mind and be improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who suffers either better or not so much worse as he would have been. but if any citizen be found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the gods, or his parents, or the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering that after receiving such an excellent education and training from youth upward, he has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. his punishment shall be death, which to him will be the least of evils; and his example will benefit others, if he perish ingloriously, and be cast beyond the borders of the land. but let his children and family, if they avoid the ways of their father, have glory, and let honourable mention be made of them, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. none of them should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots of the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal. touching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done anything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have anything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than that he shall not pay. and to secure exactness, let the guardians of the law refer to the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth, in order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money. but if any one seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him undergo a long and public imprisonment and be dishonoured, unless some of his friends are willing to be surety for him, and liberate him by assisting him to pay the fine. no criminal shall go unpunished, not even for a single offence, nor if he have fled the country; but let the penalty be according to his deserts--death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading places of sitting or standing, or removal to some temple on the borders of the land; or let him pay fines, as we said before. in cases of death, let the judges be the guardians of the law, and a court selected by merit from the last year's magistrates. but how the causes are to be brought into court, how the summonses are to be served, and the like, these things may be left to the younger generation of legislators to determine; the manner of voting we must determine ourselves. let the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the judges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant, and let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious interest in listening to such causes. first of all the plaintiff shall make one speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after the speeches have been made the eldest judge shall begin to examine the parties, and proceed to make an adequate enquiry into what has been said; and after the oldest has spoken, the rest shall proceed in order to examine either party as to what he finds defective in the evidence, whether of statement or omission; and he who has nothing to ask shall hand over the examination to another. and on so much of what has been said as is to the purpose all the judges shall set their seals, and place the writings on the altar of hestia. on the next day they shall meet again, and in like manner put their questions and go through the cause, and again set their seals upon the evidence; and when they have three times done this, and have had witnesses and evidence enough, they shall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by hestia that they will decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power; and so they shall put an end to the suit. next, after what relates to the gods, follows what relates to the dissolution of the state: whoever by permitting a man to power enslaves the laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the whole state. but he who takes no part in such proceedings, and, being one of the chief magistrates of the state, has no knowledge of treason, or, having knowledge of it, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on behalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. every man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the government. the judges of such cases shall be the same as of the robbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the same way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. but let there be a general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the children, except in the case of some one whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have successively undergone the penalty of death. such persons the city shall send away with all their possessions to the city and country of their ancestors, retaining only and wholly their appointed lot. and out of the citizens who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age, they shall select ten whom their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them send to delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom the god chooses they shall establish as heir of the house which has failed; and may he have better fortune than his predecessors! cleinias: very good. athenian: once more let there be a third general law respecting the judges who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits against those who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as concerning the remaining or departure of their descendants--there shall be one law for all three, for the traitor, and the robber of temples, and the subverter by violence of the laws of the state. for a thief, whether he steal much or little, let there be one law, and one punishment for all alike: in the first place, let him pay double the amount of the theft if he be convicted, and if he have so much over and above the allotment--if he have not, he shall be bound until he pay the penalty, or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to forgive him. but if a person be convicted of a theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city, or if he will pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds. cleinias: what makes you say, stranger, that a theft is all one, whether the thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred or secular places--and these are not the only differences in thefts--seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely different penalties? athenian: excellent. i was running on too fast, cleinias, and you impinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what, indeed, had occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet rightly worked out, as i may say in passing. do you remember the image in which i likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves? for of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient, and using the language almost of philosophy, beginning at the beginning of the disease and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a hearty laugh--he would say what most of those who are called doctors always have at their tongue's end: foolish fellow, he would say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him; and he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well. cleinias: and would he not be right? athenian: perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens education and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation. cleinias: very true. athenian: but we are fortunate. cleinias: in what way? athenian: inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary--which shall we do? cleinias: there is something ridiculous, stranger, in our proposing such an alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. but we, as i may by the grace of heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of some composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this, at our leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. let us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting them together. and we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand. athenian: certainly, in that case, cleinias, our view of law will be more in accordance with nature. for there is another matter affecting legislators, which i must earnestly entreat you to consider. cleinias: what is it? athenian: there are many writings to be found in cities, and among them there are discourses composed by legislators as well as by other persons. cleinias: to be sure. athenian: shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others--poets and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have recorded their advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings of legislators? or shall we give heed to them above all? cleinias: yes; to them far above all others. athenian: and ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy? cleinias: certainly not. athenian: and is it disgraceful for homer and tyrtaeus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for lycurgus and solon and others who were legislators as well as writers? is it not true that of all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous? we should consider whether the laws of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable--at any rate, we will show our readiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. and may the result be good, and if god be gracious, it will be good! cleinias: excellent; let us do as you say. athenian: then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. let us, if you please, consider these matters. cleinias: by all means. athenian: concerning all things honourable and just, let us then endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves. cleinias: what are the inconsistencies which you observe in us? athenian: i will endeavour to explain. if i am not mistaken, we are all agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this. cleinias: they would be quite right. athenian: perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which are just are fair and honourable, in the term 'all' we must include just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions. cleinias: and what is the inference? athenian: the inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the argument is consistently carried out? cleinias: true. athenian: but then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will not the just and the honourable disagree? cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: a thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying. cleinias: to what? athenian: we had enacted, if i am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. but we stopped short, because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. and if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition? cleinias: such appears to be the case. athenian: in this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just. cleinias: very true, stranger. athenian: then now, cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters. cleinias: consistent in what? athenian: i think that i have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if i did not, let me now state-cleinias: what? athenian: that all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this i must proceed to draw a further inference. cleinias: what is it? athenian: that the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. i too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, i do not agree with him. but, then, how can i avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, cleinias, and you, megillus, say to me--well, stranger, if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the magnetes--shall we legislate or not--what do you advise? certainly we will, i should reply. then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime? cleinias: very good, stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections? athenian: that is a very fair question. in the first place, let us-cleinias: do what? athenian: let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory. bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? for in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished--the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. but shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of god, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself? how can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? impossible. before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted. cleinias: i agree with you, stranger; for one of two things is certain: either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement. athenian: of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable--not to speak what i believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy. but if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, i must endeavour to find some other distinction between them. cleinias: very true, stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point. athenian: reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary. cleinias: certainly. athenian: i would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds--one, voluntary, and the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as many and as great as the voluntary. and please to consider whether i am right or quite wrong in what i am going to say; for i deny, cleinias and megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily, nor should i legislate about such an act under the idea that i am legislating for an involuntary injury. but i should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and, on the other hand, if i am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. for i maintain, o my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle and intention. on the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. and when compensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship. cleinias: very good. athenian: then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; and the cure of injustice will take the following direction. cleinias: what direction? athenian: when any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must in addition pay for the hurt. whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just--this is quite the noblest work of law. but if the legislator sees any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. he knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. in such cases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences. cleinias: what you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt and injustice, and the various complications of the voluntary and involuntary which enter into them? athenian: i will endeavour to do as you wish: concerning the soul, thus much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature is passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her, and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational force overturns many things. cleinias: very true. athenian: and pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite power, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all things. cleinias: quite true. athenian: a man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes. ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. this second kind of ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when attended with weakness, will only result in the errors of children and old men; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws. cleinias: you are perfectly right. athenian: we all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is true. cleinias: certainly. athenian: but no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and another inferior to ignorance. cleinias: very true. athenian: we are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of their will; although an individual may be often drawn by them in opposite directions at the same time. cleinias: yes, often. athenian: and now i can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what i mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them: when anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not--i call all this injustice. but when the opinion of the best, in whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just; although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice. leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory: one of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear. cleinias: quite right. athenian: there was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a third of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. the latter being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions, and for these five we will make laws of two kinds. cleinias: what are the two kinds? athenian: there is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity. cleinias: naturally. athenian: and now let us return from this digression and complete the work of legislation. laws have been already enacted by us concerning the robbers of the gods, and concerning traitors, and also concerning those who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. a man may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of madness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than a child. and if this be made evident to the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and he be judged to have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another; but he shall be exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have on his hands the stain of blood. and in that case he shall go to another land and country, and there dwell for a year; and if he return before the expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot at all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law in the public prison for two years, and then go free. having begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavour to lay down laws concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all, concerning violent and involuntary homicides. if any one in an athletic contest, and at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and he dies either at the time or afterwards of the blows which he has received; or if the like misfortune happens to any one in war, or military exercises, or mimic contests of which the magistrates enjoin the practice, whether with or without arms, when he has been purified according to the law brought from delphi relating to these matters, he shall be innocent. and so in the case of physicians: if their patient dies against their will, they shall be held guiltless by the law. and if one slay another with his own hand, but unintentionally, whether he be unarmed or have some instrument or dart in his hand; or if he kill him by administering food or drink, or by the application of fire or cold, or by suffocating him, whether he do the deed by his own hand, or by the agency of others, he shall be deemed the agent, and shall suffer one of the following penalties: if he kill the slave of another in the belief that he is his own, he shall bear the master of the dead man harmless from loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man, which the judges shall assess; but purifications must be used greater and more numerous than for those who committed homicide at the games--what they are to be, the interpreters whom the god appoints shall be authorised to declare. and if a man kills his own slave, when he has been purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. and if a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same purification as he did who killed the slave. but let him not forget also a tale of olden time, which is to this effect: he who has suffered a violent end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in life, is angry with the author of his death; and being himself full of fear and panic by reason of his violent end, when he sees his murderer walking about in his own accustomed haunts, he is stricken with terror and becomes disordered, and this disorder of his, aided by the guilty recollection of the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming force to the murderer and his deeds. wherefore also the murderer must go out of the way of his victim for the entire period of a year, and not himself be found in any spot which was familiar to him throughout the country. and if the dead man be a stranger, the homicide shall be kept from the country of the stranger during a like period. if any one voluntarily obeys this law, the next of kin to the deceased, seeing all that has happened, shall take pity on him, and make peace with him, and show him all gentleness. but if any one is disobedient, and either ventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice unpurified, or will not continue in exile during the appointed time, the next of kin to the deceased shall proceed against him for murder; and if he be convicted, every part of his punishment shall be doubled. and if the next of kin do not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the pollution shall be deemed to fall upon his own head--the murdered man will fix the guilt upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against him may compel him to be absent from his country during five years, according to law. if a stranger unintentionally kill a stranger who is dwelling in the city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to the same rules. if he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he be an entire stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he have slain a stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life from the country which is in possession of our laws. and if he return contrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death; and let them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next of kin to the sufferer. and if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast against his will, he shall take up his abode on the seashore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing; but if he be brought by land, and is not his own master, let the magistrate whom he first comes across in the city, release him and send him unharmed over the border. if any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a distinction. for a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly, and without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and the like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word, men pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry for the act. and, therefore, we must assume that these homicides are of two kinds, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said to be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time, they are neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow of either. he who treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an interval, is like the voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense, approaches to the involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether involuntary, but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary; wherefore about homicides committed in hot blood, there is a difficulty in determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary or as partly involuntary. the best and truest view is to regard them respectively as likenesses only of the voluntary and involuntary, and to distinguish them accordingly as they are done with or without premeditation. and we should make the penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation, and lighter for those who do not premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which is like a greater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like a less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of our laws. cleinias: certainly. athenian: let us proceed: if any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation, let the offender suffer in other respects as the involuntary homicide would have suffered, and also undergo an exile of two years, that he may learn to school his passions. but he who slays another from passion, yet with premeditation, shall in other respects suffer as the former; and to this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years--his punishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. the manner of their return shall be on this wise: (and here the law has difficulty in determining exactly; for in some cases the murderer who is judged by the law to be the worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged the less cruel may be really the worse, and may have executed the murder in a more savage manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. but in general the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. of all these things the guardians of the law must take cognizance): when a homicide of either kind has completed his term of exile, the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the interval shall have informed themselves of the actions of the criminals, and they shall judge respecting their pardon and reception; and the homicides shall abide by their judgment. but if after they have returned home, any one of them in a moment of anger repeats the deed, let him be an exile, and return no more; or if he returns, let him suffer as the stranger was to suffer in a similar case. he who kills his own slave shall undergo a purification, but if he kills the slave of another in anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. and if any homicide is disobedient to the law, and without purification pollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples, he who pleases may bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permitting him, and the murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact and the other to suffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and the accuser shall himself receive the fine in accordance with the law. if a slave in a fit of passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased man may do with the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they please, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who is not his master, the owner shall give up the slave to the relatives of the deceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death, but this may be done in any manner which they please. and if (which is a rare occurrence, but does sometimes happen) a father or a mother in a moment of passion slays a son or daughter by blows, or some other violence, the slayer shall undergo the same purification as in other cases, and be exiled during three years; but when the exile returns the wife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and they shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the same roof, or partake of the same sacred rites with those whom they have deprived of a child or of a brother. and he who is impious and disobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. if in a fit of anger a husband kills his wedded wife, or the wife her husband, the slayer shall undergo the same purification, and the term of exile shall be three years. and when he who has committed any such crime returns, let him have no communication in sacred rites with his children, neither let him sit at the same table with them, and the father or son who disobeys shall be liable to be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. if a brother or a sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister, they shall undergo purification and exile, as was the case with parents who killed their offspring: they shall not come under the same roof, or share in the sacred rites of those whom they have deprived of their brethren, or of their children. and he who is disobedient shall be justly liable to the law concerning impiety, which relates to these matters. if any one is so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness of his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the murdered person before dying freely forgives the murderer, let him undergo the purification which is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide, and do as they do, and he shall be pure. but if he be not acquitted, the perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws--he shall be amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety, and robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life; and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of passion has slain father or mother, undergo many deaths. how can he, whom, alone of all men, even in defence of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the legislator will command to endure any extremity rather than do this--how can he, i say, lawfully receive any other punishment? let death then be the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father or his mother. but if brother kills brother in a civil broil, or under other like circumstances, if the other has begun, and he only defends himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an enemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger. or if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a stranger in self-defence, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have killed a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law as he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other remission. whenever any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of homicide to another, under the idea that his act was involuntary, let the perpetrator of the deed undergo a purification and remain in exile for a year, according to law. enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of every kind and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures, and desires, and jealousies. cleinias: very good. athenian: let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their various kinds. the greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass of mankind: i mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of never-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition, and a miserable want of education. of this want of education, the false praise of wealth which is bruited about both among hellenes and barbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which in reality is only the third. and in this way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth about wealth should be spoken in all states--namely, that riches are for the sake of the body, as the body is for the sake of the soul. they are good, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the sake of them, and is therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence. this argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to be rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and then there would be no murders in states requiring to be purged away by other murders. but now, as i said at first, avarice is the chiefest cause and source of the worst trials for voluntary homicide. a second cause is ambition: this creates jealousies, which are troublesome companions, above all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree to the chiefs of the state. and a third cause is cowardly and unjust fear, which has been the occasion of many murders. when a man is doing or has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be doing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to inform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them. let this be said as a prelude concerning crimes of violence in general; and i must not omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by many, and has been received by them from those who are learned in the mysteries: they say that such deeds will be punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will pay the natural penalty which is due to the sufferer, and end their lives in like manner by the hand of another. if he who is about to commit murder believes this, and is made by the mere prelude to dread such a penalty, there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. but if he will not listen, let the following law be declared and registered against him: whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal privileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the harbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men or not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. and if a cousin or nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female side, does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and have him proclaimed an outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and incur the hatred of the gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the voices of men against him; and in the second place he shall be liable to be prosecuted by any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf of the dead. and he who would avenge a murder shall observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the god commands in cases of this kind. let him have proclamation made, and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice according to the law. now the legislator may easily show that these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain gods, who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. but who these gods are, and what should be the true manner of instituting such trials with due regard to religion, the guardians of the law, aided by the interpreters, and the prophets, and the god, shall determine, and when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. the cause shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide in the case of those who plunder temples. let him who is convicted be punished with death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for this would be shameless as well as impious. but if he fly and will not stand his trial, let him fly for ever; or, if he set foot anywhere on any part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the deceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him, kill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to those among the judges of the case who are magistrates, that they may put him to death. and let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes; three sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial. but if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the magistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the day of trial. if a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the death of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design, and he continues to dwell in the city, having his soul not pure of the guilt of murder, let him be tried in the same way, except in what relates to the sureties; and also, if he be found guilty, his body after execution may have burial in his native land, but in all other respects his case shall be as the former; and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there shall be no difference as touching murder by one's own hand or by contrivance, except in the matter of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be required of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at the time. if a slave be convicted of slaying a freeman voluntarily, either by his own hand or by contrivance, let the public executioner take him in the direction of the sepulchre, to a place whence he can see the tomb of the dead man, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who caught him orders, and if he survive, let him put him to death. and if any one kills a slave who has done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen. there are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate. if, for example, there should be murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by their contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which most often happen in ill-regulated and ill-educated states, and may perhaps occur even in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must repeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago, in the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain voluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable. for the myth, or saying, or whatever we ought to call it, has been plainly set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the justice which guards and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the law of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity suffer that which he has done. he who has slain a father shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children--if a mother, he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life at the hands of his offspring in after ages; for where the blood of a family has been polluted there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has given life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. these are the retributions of heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred. but if they are not deterred, and any one should be incited by some fatality to deprive his father, or mother, or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose, for him the earthly lawgiver legislates as follows: there shall be the same proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties which have been enacted in the former cases. but in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the city from pollution; after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to law. and what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend? i mean the suicide, who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable misfortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had to suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but who from sloth or want of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. for him, what ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial god knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of the laws thereto relating, and do according to their injunctions. they who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their interment. and if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening to a competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it beyond the borders. and if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the gods--whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. and he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said about the animals. if a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a diligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation as in the previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and having proceeded against him, they shall proclaim in the agora by a herald, that he who has slain such and such a person, and has been convicted of murder, shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all in the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered, he shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. let this one law then be laid down by us about murder; and let cases of this sort be so regarded. and now let us say in what cases and under what circumstances the murderer is rightly free from guilt: if a man catch a thief coming into his house by night to steal, and he take and kill him, or if he slay a footpad in self-defence, he shall be guiltless. and any one who does violence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the injured person, or by his or her father or brothers or sons. if a man find his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be guiltless in the eye of the law; or if a person kill another in warding off death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who are doing no wrong, he shall assuredly be guiltless. thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man, having which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without them, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are to be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. of the nurture and education of the body we have spoken before, and next in order we have to speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary, which men do to one another; these we will now distinguish, as far as we are able, according to their nature and number, and determine what will be the suitable penalties of each, and so assign to them their proper place in the series of our enactments. the poorest legislator will have no difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of wounds should follow next in order after deaths. let wounds be divided as homicides were divided--into those which are involuntary, and which are given in passion or from fear, and those inflicted voluntarily and with premeditation. concerning all this, we must make some such proclamation as the following: mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. and the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what is best. in the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public good (for public good binds together states, but private only distracts them); and that both the public and private good as well of individuals as of states is greater when the state and not the individual is first considered. in the second place, although a person knows in the abstract that this is true, yet if he be possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary. human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city. for if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. i speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. but then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best. these look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them. and therefore i have spoken as i have. and now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has hurt or wounded another. any one may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked in all such cases: what did he wound, or whom, or how, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly vary from one another. and to allow courts of law to determine all these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible. there is one particular which they must determine in all cases--the question of fact. and then, again, that the legislator should not permit them to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these cases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is next to impossible. cleinias: then what is to be the inference? athenian: the inference is, that some things should be left to courts of law; others the legislator must decide for himself. cleinias: and what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to leave to the courts of law? athenian: i may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad and mute, because the judges conceal their opinions and decide causes clandestinely; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy, as in a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator--i say that then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state. unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts, but where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to ordain the penalties for the smallest offences; if the state for which he is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into his own hands and speak distinctly. but when a state has good courts, and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. and we are not to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class of matters which judges far worse educated than ours would be able to determine, assigning to each offence what is due both to the perpetrator and to the sufferer. we believe those for whom we are legislating to be best able to judge, and therefore to them the greater part may be left. at the same time, as i have often said, we should exhibit to the judges, as we have done, the outline and form of the punishments to be inflicted, and then they will not transgress the just rule. that was an excellent practice, which we observed before, and which now that we are resuming the work of legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us. let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms: if any one has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and whom the law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be pitied--he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as a murderer and be tried for murder. still having respect to the fortune which has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an accursed fate and calamity--as a thank-offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his will--in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate to a neighbouring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain in the enjoyment of all his possessions. but if he have injured the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court deciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who would have decided if the man had died of his wounds. and if a child intentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be the penalty. and if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother or a sister, and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. and if a husband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him or her undergo perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are still young, the guardians shall take care of their property, and have charge of the children as orphans. if their sons are grown up, they shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they shall possess the property themselves. and if he who meets with such a misfortune has no children, the kindred of the exiled man to the degree of sons of cousins, both on the male and female side, shall meet together, and after taking counsel with the guardians of the law and the priests, shall appoint a 5040th citizen to be the heir of the house, considering and reasoning that no house of all the 5040 belongs to the inhabitant or to the whole family, but is the public and private property of the state. now the state should seek to have its houses as holy and happy as possible. and if any one of the houses be unfortunate, and stained with impiety, and the owner leave no posterity, but dies unmarried, or married and childless, having suffered death as the penalty of murder or some other crime committed against the gods or against his fellow-citizens, of which death is the penalty distinctly laid down in the law; or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile, and also childless, that house shall first of all be purified and undergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen of the house, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law, meet and consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest repute for virtue and also for good fortune, in which there are a number of sons; from that family let them take one and introduce him to the father and forefathers of the dead man as their son, and, for the sake of the omen, let him be called so, that he may be the continuer of their family, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred rites with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made this supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the offending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless when calamities such as these overtake him. now the boundaries of some things do not touch one another, but there is a borderland which comes in between, preventing them from touching. and we were saying that actions done from passion are of this nature, and come in between the voluntary and involuntary. if a person be convicted of having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall pay twice the amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if incurable, four times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be curable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the wounded person, he shall pay fourfold. and whenever any one in wounding another injures not only the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him incapable of defending his country against the enemy, he, besides the other penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has incurred. and the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of service, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take his place in war; or, if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted by law of refusal to serve. the compensation for the injury, whether to be twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who convict him. and if, in like manner, a brother wounds a brother, the parents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins, whether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have judged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to the parents, as is natural; and if the estimate be disputed, then the kinsmen on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot, they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. and when similar charges of wounding are brought by children against their parents, those who are more than sixty years of age, having children of their own, not adopted, shall be required to decide; and if any one is convicted, they shall determine whether he or she ought to die, or suffer some other punishment either greater than death, or, at any rate, not much less. a kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge the cause, not even if he be of the age which is prescribed by the law. if a slave in a fit of anger wound a freeman, the owner of the slave shall give him up to the wounded man, who may do as he pleases with him, and if he do not give him up he shall himself make good the injury. and if any one says that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring together, let him argue the point, and if he is cast, he shall pay for the wrong three times over, but if he gains his case, the freeman who conspired with the slave shall be liable to an action for kidnapping. and if any one unintentionally wounds another he shall simply pay for the harm, for no legislator is able to control chance. in such a case the judges shall be the same as those who are appointed in the case of children suing their parents; and they shall estimate the amount of the injury. all the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of violence; and every man, woman, or child ought to consider that the elder has the precedence of the younger in honour, both among the gods and also among men who would live in security and happiness. wherefore it is a foul thing and hateful to the gods to see an elder man assaulted by a younger in the city, and it is reasonable that a young man when struck by an elder should lightly endure his anger, laying up in store for himself a like honour when he is old. let this be the law: every one shall reverence his elder in word and deed; he shall respect any one who is twenty years older than himself, whether male or female, regarding him or her as his father or mother; and he shall abstain from laying hands on any one who is of an age to have been his father or mother, out of reverence to the gods who preside over birth; similarly he shall keep his hands from a stranger, whether he be an old inhabitant or newly arrived; he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows, either as the aggressor or in self-defence. if he thinks that some stranger has struck him out of wantonness or insolence, and ought to be punished, he shall take him to the wardens of the city, but let him not strike him, that the stranger may be kept far away from the possibility of lifting up his hand against a citizen, and let the wardens of the city take the offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the god of strangers, and in case the stranger appears to have struck the citizen unjustly, let them inflict upon him as many blows with the scourge as he was himself inflicted, and quell his presumption. but if he be innocent, they shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him, and let them both go. if a person strikes another of the same age or somewhat older than himself, who has no children, whether he be an old man who strikes an old man or a young man who strikes a young man, let the person struck defend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands only. he who, being more than forty years of age, dares to fight with another, whether he be the aggressor or in self-defence, shall be regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish--this will be a disgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. the obedient nature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient, who heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him: if any man smite another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more years, in the first place, he who is at hand, not being younger than the combatants, nor their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced according to law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is struck or younger, he shall defend the person injured as he would a brother or father or still older relative. further, let him who dares to smite an elder be tried for assault, as i have said, and if he be found guilty, let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or if the judges approve of a longer period, their decision shall be final. but if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or more, the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who is found guilty in such a suit, if he be a stranger but not resident, shall be imprisoned during a period of two years; and a metic who disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court assign him a longer term. and let him who was present in any of these cases and did not assist according to law be punished, if he be of the highest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or if he be of the second class, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class, by a fine of thirty drachmas; or if he be of the fourth class, by a fine of twenty drachmas; and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form the court in such cases. laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. these are the persons who cause the word to be spoken which i am about to utter; for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that there may be no need of his laws. he who shall dare to lay violent hands upon his father or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear either of the wrath of the gods above, or of the punishments that are spoken of in the world below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient and universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them, requires some extreme measure of prevention. now death is not the worst that can happen to men; far worse are the punishments which are said to pursue them in the world below. but although they are most true tales, they work on such souls no prevention; for if they had any effect there would be no slayers of mothers, or impious hands lifted up against parents; and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted during life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the terrors of the world below. let our enactment then be as follows: if a man dare to strike his father or his mother, or their fathers or mothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let any one who is at hand come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or stranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place in the games; but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of perpetual exile. he who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue, shall have praise, and if he do not come, blame. and if a slave come to the rescue, let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue, let him receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of the wardens of the agora, if the occurrence take place in the agora; or if somewhere in the city beyond the limits of the agora, any warden of the city who is in residence shall punish him; or if in the country, then the commanders of the wardens of the country. if those who are near at the time be inhabitants of the same place, whether they be youths, or men, or women, let them come to the rescue and denounce him as the impious one; and he who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of zeus, the god of kindred and of ancestors, according to law. and if any one is found guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be forever banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from the temples; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country shall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if he return he shall be put to death. and if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him have voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city, until he is purified; for he should consider that he has become tainted by a curse. and if he disobeys the law, and pollutes the city and the temples contrary to law, and one of the magistrates sees him and does not indict him, when he gives in his account this omission shall be a most serious charge. if a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let any one who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already mentioned; and let the bystanders bind him, and deliver him up to the injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and inflict on him as many stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he must surrender him to his master according to law, and not deprive him of his property. let the law be as follows: the slave who strikes a freeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive bound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the slave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be released. and let there be the same laws about women in relation to women, and about men and women in relation to one another. book x. and now having spoken of assaults, let us sum up all acts of violence under a single law, which shall be as follows: no one shall take or carry away any of his neighbour's goods, neither shall he use anything which is his neighbour's without the consent of the owner; for these are the offences which are and have been, and will ever be, the source of all the aforesaid evils. the greatest of them are excesses and insolences of youth, and are offences against the greatest when they are done against religion; and especially great when in violation of public and holy rites, or of the partly-common rites in which tribes and phratries share; and in the second degree great when they are committed against private rites and sepulchres, and in the third degree (not to repeat the acts formerly mentioned), when insults are offered to parents; the fourth kind of violence is when any one, regardless of the authority of the rulers, takes or carries away or makes use of anything which belongs to them, not having their consent; and the fifth kind is when the violation of the civil rights of an individual demands reparation. there should be a common law embracing all these cases. for we have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege, whether fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine what is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the gods. but first we must give them an admonition which may be in the following terms: no one who in obedience to the laws believed that there were gods, ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word; but he who did must have supposed one of three things--either that they did not exist--which is the first possibility, or secondly, that, if they did, they took no care of man, or thirdly, that they were easily appeased and turned aside from their purpose by sacrifices and prayers. cleinias: what shall we say or do to these persons? athenian: my good friend, let us first hear the jests which i suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us. cleinias: what jests? athenian: they will make some irreverent speech of this sort: 'o inhabitants of athens, and sparta, and cnosus,' they will reply, 'in that you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care about us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and convince us--you should first attempt to teach and persuade us that there are gods by reasonable evidences, and also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their course by gifts. for when we hear such things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and by innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and atoning for them. when lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of gods, if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to you? if then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge. cleinias: but is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the gods? athenian: how would you prove it? cleinias: how? in the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars and the universe, and the fair order of the seasons, and the division of them into years and months, furnish proofs of their existence, and also there is the fact that all hellenes and barbarians believe in them. athenian: i fear, my sweet friend, though i will not say that i much regard, the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us. for you do not understand the nature of their complaint, and you fancy that they rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure. cleinias: why, stranger, what other reason is there? athenian: one which you who live in a different atmosphere would never guess. cleinias: what is it? athenian: a very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the greatest wisdom. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: at athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state, as i am informed, refuses to admit. they speak of the gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the gods, and how after they were born they behaved to one another. whether these stories have in other ways a good or a bad influence, i should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but, looking at them with reference to the duties of children to their parents, i cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. of the words of the ancients i have nothing more to say; and i should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the gods. but as to our younger generation and their wisdom, i cannot let them off when they do mischief. for do but mark the effect of their words: when you and i argue for the existence of the gods, and produce the sun, moon, stars, and earth, claiming for them a divine being, if we would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say that they are earth and stones only, which can have no care at all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe. cleinias: one such teacher, o stranger, would be bad enough, and you imply that there are many of them, which is worse. athenian: well, then; what shall we say or do? shall we assume that some one is accusing us among unholy men, who are trying to escape from the effect of our legislation; and that they say of us--how dreadful that you should legislate on the supposition that there are gods! shall we make a defence of ourselves? or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the prelude should become longer than the law? for the discourse will certainly extend to great length, if we are to treat the impiously disposed as they desire, partly demonstrating to them at some length the things of which they demand an explanation, partly making them afraid or dissatisfied, and then proceed to the requisite enactments. cleinias: yes, stranger; but then how often have we repeated already that on the present occasion there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length; for who is 'at our heels?' as the saying goes, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. it is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men do. the demonstration of this would be the best and noblest prelude of all our laws. and therefore, without impatience, and without hurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter, summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess. athenian: seeing you thus in earnest, i would fain offer up a prayer that i may succeed: but i must proceed at once. who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of the gods? who can avoid hating and abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this argument; i speak of those who will not believe the tales which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, repeated by them both in jest and earnest, like charms, who have also heard them in the sacrificial prayers, and seen sights accompanying them--sights and sounds delightful to children--and their parents during the sacrifices showing an intense earnestness on behalf of their children and of themselves, and with eager interest talking to the gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence; who likewise see and hear the prostrations and invocations which are made by hellenes and barbarians at the rising and setting of the sun and moon, in all the vicissitudes of life, not as if they thought that there were no gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence, and no suspicion of their non-existence; when men, knowing all these things, despise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle of intelligence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying, how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the gods? yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that one half of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure, and the other half in their indignation at such persons. our address to these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason with him, smothering our anger: o my son, we will say to him, you are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse many of the opinions which you now hold. wait awhile, and do not attempt to judge at present of the highest things; and that is the highest of which you now think nothing--to know the gods rightly and to live accordingly. and in the first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great importance, and about which i cannot be deceived: you and your friends are not the first who have held this opinion about the gods. there have always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same disorder. i have known many of them, and can tell you, that no one who had taken up in youth this opinion, that the gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old; the two other notions certainly do continue in some cases, but not in many; the notion, i mean, that the gods exist, but take no heed of human things, and the other notion that they do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with sacrifices and prayers. as to the opinion about the gods which may some day become clear to you, i advise you to wait and consider if it be true or not; ask of others, and above all of the legislator. in the meantime take care that you do not offend against the gods. for the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters. cleinias: our address, stranger, thus far, is excellent. athenian: quite true, megillus and cleinias, but i am afraid that we have unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine. cleinias: what doctrine do you mean? athenian: the wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many. cleinias: i wish that you would speak plainer. athenian: the doctrine that all things do become, have become, and will become, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance. cleinias: is not that true? athenian: well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as well follow in their track, and examine what is the meaning of them and their disciples. cleinias: by all means. athenian: they say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art, which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial. cleinias: how is that? athenian: i will explain my meaning still more clearly. they say that fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order--earth, and sun, and moon, and stars--they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. the elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them--of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. after this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any god, or from art, but as i was saying, by nature and chance only. art sprang up afterwards and out of these, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced in play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity to one another, such as music and painting create and their companion arts. and there are other arts which have a serious purpose, and these co-operate with nature, such, for example, as medicine, and husbandry, and gymnastic. and they say that politics co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, and have more of art; also that legislation is entirely a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not true. cleinias: how do you mean? athenian: in the first place, my dear friend, these people would say that the gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made. these, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. they are told by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions, these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them. cleinias: what a dreadful picture, stranger, have you given, and how great is the injury which is thus inflicted on young men to the ruin both of states and families! athenian: true, cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind, proclaiming that if they will not say and think that the gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be extended generally to the honourable, the just, and to all the highest things, and to all that relates to virtue and vice), and if they will not make their actions conform to the copy which the law gives them, then he who refuses to obey the law shall die, or suffer stripes and bonds, or privation of citizenship, or in some cases be punished by loss of property and exile? should he not rather, when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can? cleinias: why, stranger, if such persuasion be at all possible, then a legislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of persuading men; he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the ancient opinion that there are gods, and of all those other truths which you were just now mentioning; he ought to support the law and also art, and acknowledge that both alike exist by nature, and no less than nature, if they are the creations of mind in accordance with right reason, as you appear to me to maintain, and i am disposed to agree with you in thinking. athenian: yes, my enthusiastic cleinias; but are not these things when spoken to a multitude hard to be understood, not to mention that they take up a dismal length of time? cleinias: why, stranger, shall we, whose patience failed not when drinking or music were the themes of discourse, weary now of discoursing about the gods, and about divine things? and the greatest help to rational legislation is that the laws when once written down are always at rest; they can be put to the test at any future time, and therefore, if on first hearing they seem difficult, there is no reason for apprehension about them, because any man however dull can go over them and consider them again and again; nor if they are tedious but useful, is there any reason or religion, as it seems to me, in any man refusing to maintain the principles of them to the utmost of his power. megillus: stranger, i like what cleinias is saying. athenian: yes, megillus, and we should do as he proposes; for if impious discourses were not scattered, as i may say, throughout the world, there would have been no need for any vindication of the existence of the gods--but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are needed; and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself? megillus: there is no more proper champion of them. athenian: well, then, tell me, cleinias--for i must ask you to be my partner--does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? these he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards; and this is not a mere conjecture of ours about his meaning, but is what he really means. cleinias: very true. athenian: then, by heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators; and i would have you examine their arguments with the utmost care, for their impiety is a very serious matter; they not only make a bad and mistaken use of argument, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion of them. cleinias: you are right; but i should like to know how this happens. athenian: i fear that the argument may seem singular. cleinias: do not hesitate, stranger; i see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. but if there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief that there are gods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take this way, my good sir. athenian: then i suppose that i must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the gods. cleinias: still i do not understand you. athenian: nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. and if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity prior to those which appertain to the body? cleinias: certainly. athenian: then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind. cleinias: but why is the word 'nature' wrong? athenian: because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise. cleinias: you are quite right. athenian: shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our attention should be directed? cleinias: by all means. athenian: let us be on our guard lest this most deceptive argument with its youthful looks, beguiling us old men, give us the slip and make a laughing-stock of us. who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, and fail of attaining the lesser? suppose that we three have to pass a rapid river, and i, being the youngest of the three and experienced in rivers, take upon me the duty of making the attempt first by myself; leaving you in safety on the bank, i am to examine whether the river is passable by older men like yourselves, and if such appears to be the case then i shall invite you to follow, and my experience will help to convey you across; but if the river is impassable by you, then there will have been no danger to anybody but myself--would not that seem to be a very fair proposal? i mean to say that the argument in prospect is likely to be too much for you, out of your depth and beyond your strength, and i should be afraid that the stream of my questions might create in you who are not in the habit of answering, giddiness and confusion of mind, and hence a feeling of unpleasantness and unsuitableness might arise. i think therefore that i had better first ask the questions and then answer them myself while you listen in safety; in that way i can carry on the argument until i have completed the proof that the soul is prior to the body. cleinias: excellent, stranger, and i hope that you will do as you propose. athenian: come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the gods, let us call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of their own existence. and so holding fast to the rope we will venture upon the depths of the argument. when questions of this sort are asked of me, my safest answer would appear to be as follows: some one says to me, 'o stranger, are all things at rest and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at rest?' to this i shall reply that some things are in motion and others at rest. 'and do not things which move move in a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in a place?' certainly. 'and some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one?' you mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the centre move in one place, just as the circumference goes round of globes which are said to be at rest? 'yes.' and we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. 'very true.' and when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes more than one because they turn upon their axis; and whenever they meet anything, if it be stationary, they are divided by it; but if they get in the midst between bodies which are approaching and moving towards the same spot from opposite directions, they unite with them. 'i admit the truth of what you are saying.' also when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste away--that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that fails, then there is a second reason of their dissolution. 'and when are all things created and how?' clearly, they are created when the first principle receives increase and attains to the second dimension, and from this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after reaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. everything which is thus changing and moving is in process of generation; only when at rest has it real existence, but when passing into another state it is destroyed utterly. have we not mentioned all motions that there are, and comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the exception, my friends, of two? cleinias: which are they? athenian: just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned. cleinias: speak plainer. athenian: i suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul? cleinias: very true. athenian: let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things, but not to move itself; that is one kind; and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution and generation and destruction--that is also one of the many kinds of motion. cleinias: granted. athenian: and we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and is coincident with every action and every passion, and is the true principle of change and motion in all that is--that we shall be inclined to call the tenth. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most efficient? cleinias: i must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others. athenian: very good; but may i make one or two corrections in what i have been saying? cleinias: what are they? athenian: when i spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite correct. cleinias: what was the error? athenian: according to the true order, the tenth was really the first in generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely enough termed the ninth by us. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean this: when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? how can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? impossible. but when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle? cleinias: very true, and i quite agree. athenian: or, to put the question in another way, making answer to ourselves: if, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them? cleinias: clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in themselves. athenian: then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. cleinias: quite true. athenian: at this stage of the argument let us put a question. cleinias: what question? athenian: if we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound--how should we describe it? cleinias: you mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? athenian: i do. cleinias: certainly we should. athenian: and when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same--must we not admit that this is life? cleinias: we must. athenian: and now, i beseech you, reflect--you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things? cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name--these are the three; and there are two questions which may be raised about anything. cleinias: how two? athenian: sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may give the definition and ask the name. i may illustrate what i mean in this way. cleinias: how? athenian: number like some other things is capable of being divided into equal parts; when thus divided, number is named 'even,' and the definition of the name 'even' is 'number divisible into two equal parts'? cleinias: true. athenian: i mean, that when we are asked about the definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition--in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak of the same thing, calling 'even' the number which is divided into two equal parts. cleinias: quite true. athenian: and what is the definition of that which is named 'soul'? can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given--the motion which can move itself? cleinias: you mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? athenian: yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? cleinias: certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. athenian: and is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? cleinias: exactly. athenian: then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler? cleinias: nothing can be more true. athenian: do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body? cleinias: certainly. athenian: then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body. cleinias: to be sure. athenian: in the next place, we must not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things? cleinias: we must. athenian: and as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens? cleinias: of course. athenian: one soul or more? more than one--i will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two--one the author of good, and the other of evil. cleinias: very true. athenian: yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms--will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of corporeal substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to their happiness; but when she is the companion of folly, she does the very contrary of all this. shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts? cleinias: there is no room at all for doubt. athenian: shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven and earth, and the whole world? that it is a principle of wisdom and virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? suppose that we make answer as follows: cleinias: how would you answer? athenian: if, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. cleinias: true. athenian: but if the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil soul guides it. cleinias: true again. athenian: of what nature is the movement of mind? to this question it is not easy to give an intelligent answer; and therefore i ought to assist you in framing one. cleinias: very good. athenian: then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the sun, making ourselves darkness at midday--i mean as if we were under the impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the nature of mind--it will be safer to look at the image only. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly resembles; this i will bring to your recollection, and will then make the answer on behalf of us all. cleinias: that will be excellent. athenian: you will surely remember our saying that all things were either at rest or in motion? cleinias: i do. athenian: and that of things in motion some were moving in one place, and others in more than one? cleinias: yes. athenian: of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place must move about a centre like globes made in a lathe, and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: in saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation to the same, and according to one proportion and order, and are like the motion of a globe, we invented a fair image, which does no discredit to our ingenuity. cleinias: it does us great credit. athenian: and the motion of the other sort which is not after the same manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly? cleinias: that is most true. athenian: then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven. cleinias: and judging from what has been said, stranger, there would be impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries round the heavens. athenian: you have understood my meaning right well, cleinias, and now let me ask you another question. cleinias: what are you going to ask? athenian: if the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them? cleinias: certainly. athenian: then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will apply to all. cleinias: which will you take? athenian: every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, nor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is great reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is circumfused around them all, but is perceived by mind; and therefore by mind and reflection only let us apprehend the following point. cleinias: what is that? athenian: if the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong in supposing one of three alternatives. cleinias: what are they? athenian: either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides within the circular and visible body, like the soul which carries us about every way; or the soul provides herself with an external body of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body; or thirdly, she is without such a body, but guides the sun by some extraordinary and wonderful power. cleinias: yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of these three ways. athenian: and this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed a god. cleinias: yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense. athenian: and of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are gods, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their existence--and will any one who admits all this venture to deny that all things are full of gods? cleinias: no one, stranger, would be such a madman. athenian: and now, megillus and cleinias, let us offer terms to him who has hitherto denied the existence of the gods, and leave him. cleinias: what terms? athenian: either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are gods. let us see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny that there are gods. cleinias: certainly, quite enough, stranger. athenian: then to them we will say no more. and now we are to address him who, believing that there are gods, believes also that they take no heed of human affairs: to him we say--o thou best of men, in believing that there are gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honour and believe in them. but the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are celebrated both by poets and prose writers--these draw you aside from your natural piety. perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their children's children in high offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith--you have known or heard or been yourself an eyewitness of many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by such criminal means from small beginnings attaining to sovereignty and the pinnacle of greatness; and considering all these things you do not like to accuse the gods of them, because they are your relatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an unwillingness to find fault with them, you have come to believe that they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. now, that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety, and that we may if possible use arguments which may conjure away the evil before it arrives, we will add another argument to that originally addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the gods. and do you, megillus and cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before; and if any impediment comes in our way, i will take the word out of your mouths, and carry you over the river as i did just now. cleinias: very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we can. athenian: there will probably be no difficulty in proving to him that the gods care about the small as well as about the great. for he was present and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them. cleinias: no doubt he heard that. athenian: let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this virtue which we ascribe to them. surely we should say that to be temperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice? cleinias: certainly. athenian: yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? cleinias: true. athenian: and the one is honourable, and the other dishonourable? cleinias: to be sure. athenian: and the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but the gods have no part in anything of the sort? cleinias: that again is what everybody will admit. athenian: but do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues? what do you think? cleinias: decidedly not. athenian: they rank under the opposite class? cleinias: yes. athenian: and their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite class? cleinias: yes. athenian: but are we to suppose that one who possesses all these good qualities will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones? cleinias: and the comparison is a most just one. athenian: surely god must not be supposed to have a nature which he himself hates? he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be tolerated for a moment. cleinias: of course not. how could he have? athenian: should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be god or man, must act from one of two principles. cleinias: what are they? athenian: either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is of no consequence to the whole, or if he knows that they are of consequence, and he neglects them, his neglect must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? for surely, when it is impossible for him to take care of all, he is not negligent if he fails to attend to these things great or small, which a god or some inferior being might be wanting in strength or capacity to manage? cleinias: certainly not. athenian: now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess that there are gods, but with a difference--the one saying that they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to them--in the first place, you both acknowledge that the gods hear and see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge: do you admit this? cleinias: yes. athenian: and do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have? cleinias: they will, of course, admit this also. athenian: and surely we three and they two--five in all--have acknowledged that they are good and perfect? cleinias: assuredly. athenian: but, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? for in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence. cleinias: most true. athenian: then not from inactivity and carelessness is any god ever negligent; for there is no cowardice in them. cleinias: that is very true. athenian: then the alternative which remains is, that if the gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters--what other alternative is there but the opposite of their knowing? cleinias: there is none. athenian: and, o most excellent and best of men, do i understand you to mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know, and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains? cleinias: impossible. athenian: do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? and is not man the most religious of all animals? cleinias: that is not to be denied. athenian: and we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the gods great or small--in either case it would not be natural for the gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners, to neglect us. there is also a further consideration. cleinias: what is it? athenian: sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more facility in moving and controlling and taking care of small and unimportant things than of their opposites. cleinias: far more. athenian: suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole--how will the whole fare at his hands if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are lesser? cleinias: decidedly not well. athenian: no better would be the result with pilots or generals, or householders or statesmen, or any other such class, if they neglected the small and regarded only the great--as the builders say, the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser. cleinias: of course not. athenian: let us not, then, deem god inferior to human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well as great, by one and the same art; or that god, the wisest of beings, who is both willing and able to take care, is like a lazy good-for-nothing, or a coward, who turns his back upon labour and gives no thought to smaller and easier matters, but to the greater only. cleinias: never, stranger, let us admit a supposition about the gods which is both impious and false. athenian: i think that we have now argued enough with him who delights to accuse the gods of neglect. cleinias: yes. athenian: he has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he still seems to me to need some words of consolation. cleinias: what consolation will you offer him? athenian: let us say to the youth: the ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it. over these, down to the least fraction of them, ministers have been appointed to preside, who have wrought out their perfection with infinitesimal exactness. and one of these portions of the universe is thine own, unhappy man, which, however little, contributes to the whole; and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may be blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. for every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. and you are annoyed because you are ignorant how what is best for you happens to you and to the universe, as far as the laws of the common creation admit. now, as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the pieces; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion. cleinias: in what way do you mean? athenian: in a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the gods. if any one were to form or fashion all things without any regard to the whole--if, for example, he formed a living element of water out of fire, instead of forming many things out of one or one out of many in regular order attaining to a first or second or third birth, the transmutation would have been infinite; but now the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task. cleinias: how so? athenian: i will explain: when the king saw that our actions had life, and that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that the soul and body, although not, like the gods of popular opinion, eternal, yet having once come into existence, were indestructible (for if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of living beings); and when he observed that the good of the soul was ever by nature designed to profit men, and the evil to harm them--he, seeing all this, contrived so to place each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole. and he contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room. but the formation of qualities he left to the wills of individuals. for every one of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul. cleinias: yes, that is probably true. athenian: then all things which have a soul change, and possess in themselves a principle of change, and in changing move according to law and to the order of destiny: natures which have undergone a lesser change move less and on the earth's surface, but those which have suffered more change and have become more criminal sink into the abyss, that is to say, into hades and other places in the world below, of which the very names terrify men, and which they picture to themselves as in a dream, both while alive and when released from the body. and whenever the soul receives more of good or evil from her own energy and the strong influence of others--when she has communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is carried into another and better place, which is perfect in holiness; but when she has communion with evil, then she also changes the place of her life. 'this is the justice of the gods who inhabit olympus.' o youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. this is the justice of heaven, which neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which the ordaining powers have specially ordained; take good heed thereof, for it will be sure to take heed of you. if you say: i am small and will creep into the depths of the earth, or i am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world below or in some still more savage place whither you shall be conveyed. this is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had grown great, and you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy; and in their actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect of the gods, not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to the great whole. and thinkest thou, bold man, that thou needest not to know this? he who knows it not can never form any true idea of the happiness or unhappiness of life or hold any rational discourse respecting either. if cleinias and this our reverend company succeed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the gods, then will god help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding whatsoever. for i think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the gods, and that they care for men: the other notion that they are appeased by the wicked, and take gifts, is what we must not concede to any one, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power. cleinias: very good; let us do as you say. athenian: well, then, by the gods themselves i conjure you to tell me--if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? who are they, and what is their nature? must they not be at least rulers who have to order unceasingly the whole heaven? cleinias: true. athenian: and to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them? how in the less can we find an image of the greater? are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be likened to physicians providing against the diseases which make war upon the body, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons on the growth of plants; or perhaps to shepherds of flocks. for as we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation; and the place of these latter is in the life of the gods, although some vestige of them may occasionally be discerned among mankind. but upon this earth we know that there dwell souls possessing an unjust spirit, who may be compared to brute animals, which fawn upon their keepers, whether dogs or shepherds, or the best and most perfect masters; for they in like manner, as the voices of the wicked declare, prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity. and this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or pestilence in years or seasons of the year, and in cities and governments has another name, which is injustice. cleinias: quite true. athenian: what else can he say who declares that the gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them? as if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. must not he who maintains that the gods can be propitiated argue thus? cleinias: precisely so. athenian: and to which of the above-mentioned classes of guardians would any man compare the gods without absurdity? will he say that they are like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty by 'libations of wine and the savour of fat,' and at last overturn both ship and sailors? cleinias: assuredly not. athenian: and surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots? cleinias: that would be a fearful image of the gods. athenian: nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or shepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have been silenced by wolves. cleinias: a thing not to be spoken of. athenian: and are not all the gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do they not guard our highest interests? cleinias: yes; the chiefest. athenian: and shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them? cleinias: certainly not; nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and characterized as of all impious men the wickedest and most impious. athenian: then are the three assertions--that the gods exist, and that they take care of men, and that they can never be persuaded to do injustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? may we say that they are? cleinias: you have our entire assent to your words. athenian: i have spoken with vehemence because i am zealous against evil men; and i will tell you, dear cleinias, why i am so. i would not have the wicked think that, having the superiority in argument, they may do as they please and act according to their various imaginations about the gods; and this zeal has led me to speak too vehemently; but if we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and love their opposites, the prelude of our laws about impiety will not have been spoken in vain. cleinias: so let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our argument will not discredit the lawgiver. athenian: after the prelude shall follow a discourse, which will be the interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons that they must depart from their ways and go over to the pious. and to those who disobey, let the law about impiety be as follows: if a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed, any one who happens to be present shall give information to the magistrates, in aid of the law; and let the magistrates who first receive the information bring him before the appointed court according to the law; and if a magistrate, after receiving information, refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at the instance of any one who is willing to vindicate the laws; and if any one be cast, the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of impiety; and let all such criminals be imprisoned. there shall be three prisons in the state: the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighbourhood of the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality of offenders; another is to be in the neighbourhood of the nocturnal council, and is to be called the 'house of reformation'; another, to be situated in some wild and desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by some name expressive of retribution. now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have been already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, which are worth distinguishing, and should not all have the same punishment. for he who does not believe in the gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. but they who besides believing that the world is devoid of gods are intemperate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, are worse; although both of them are unbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than by the other. the one may talk loosely about the gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself, if he be not punished. but the other who holds the same opinions and is called a clever man, is full of stratagem and deceit--men of this class deal in prophecy and jugglery of all kinds, and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the sophists, as they are termed, with their ingenious devices. there are many kinds of unbelievers, but two only for whom legislation is required; one the hypocritical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, while the other needs only bonds and admonition. in like manner also the notion that the gods take no thought of men produces two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may be propitiated produces two more. assuming these divisions, let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the house of reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not less than five years. and in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens, except with members of the nocturnal council, and with them let them converse with a view to the improvement of their soul's health. and when the time of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him be punished with death. as to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that there are no gods, or that they are negligent, or to be propitiated, but in contempt of mankind conjure the souls of the living and say that they can conjure the dead and promise to charm the gods with sacrifices and prayers, and will utterly overthrow individuals and whole houses and states for the sake of money--let him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the court to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the centre of the land, and let no freeman ever approach him, but let him receive the rations of food appointed by the guardians of the law from the hands of the public slaves; and when he is dead let him be cast beyond the borders unburied, and if any freeman assist in burying him, let him pay the penalty of impiety to any one who is willing to bring a suit against him. but if he leaves behind him children who are fit to be citizens, let the guardians of orphans take care of them, just as they would of any other orphans, from the day on which their father is convicted. in all these cases there should be one law, which will make men in general less liable to transgress in word or deed, and less foolish, because they will not be allowed to practise religious rites contrary to law. and let this be the simple form of the law: no man shall have sacred rites in a private house. when he would sacrifice, let him go to the temples and hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses, who see to the sanctity of such things, and let him pray himself, and let any one who pleases join with him in prayer. the reason of this is as follows: gods and temples are not easily instituted, and to establish them rightly is the work of a mighty intellect. and women especially, and men too, when they are sick or in danger, or in any sort of difficulty, or again on their receiving any good fortune, have a way of consecrating the occasion, vowing sacrifices, and promising shrines to gods, demigods, and sons of gods; and when they are awakened by terrible apparitions and dreams or remember visions, they find in altars and temples the remedies of them, and will fill every house and village with them, placing them in the open air, or wherever they may have had such visions; and with a view to all these cases we should obey the law. the law has also regard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that by the secret performance of these actions--by raising temples and by building altars in private houses, they can propitiate the god secretly with sacrifices and prayers, while they are really multiplying their crimes infinitely, bringing guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also upon those who permit them, and who are better men than they are; and the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their impiety, which, in a certain sense, is deserved. assuredly god will not blame the legislator, who will enact the following law: no one shall possess shrines of the gods in private houses, and he who is found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly authorised--supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not guilty of any other great and impious crime--shall be informed against by him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be announced by him to the guardians of the law; and let them issue orders that he or she shall carry away their private rites to the public temples, and if they do not persuade them, let them inflict a penalty on them until they comply. and if a person be proven guilty of impiety, not merely from childish levity, but such as grown-up men may be guilty of, whether he have sacrificed publicly or privately to any gods, let him be punished with death, for his sacrifice is impure. whether the deed has been done in earnest, or only from childish levity, let the guardians of the law determine, before they bring the matter into court and prosecute the offender for impiety. book xi. in the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated. the principle of them is very simple: thou shalt not, if thou canst help, touch that which is mine, or remove the least thing which belongs to me without my consent; and may i be of a sound mind, and do to others as i would that they should do to me. first, let us speak of treasure-trove: may i never pray the gods to find the hidden treasure, which another has laid up for himself and his family, he not being one of my ancestors, nor lift, if i should find, such a treasure. and may i never have any dealings with those who are called diviners, and who in any way or manner counsel me to take up the deposit entrusted to the earth, for i should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions, if i take up the prize, as i should grow in justice and virtue of soul, if i abstain; and this will be a better possession to me than the other in a better part of myself; for the possession of justice in the soul is preferable to the possession of wealth. and of many things it is well said--'move not the immovables,' and this may be regarded as one of them. and we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says, that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. now as to him who is careless about having children and regardless of the legislator, taking up that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his, without the consent of the depositor, violating the simplest and noblest of laws which was the enactment of no mean man: 'take not up that which was not laid down by thee'--of him, i say, who despises these two legislators, and takes up, not some small matter which he has not deposited, but perhaps a great heap of treasure, what he ought to suffer at the hands of the gods, god only knows; but i would have the first person who sees him go and tell the wardens of the city, if the occurrence has taken place in the city, or if the occurrence has taken place in the agora he shall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell the wardens of the country and their commanders. when information has been received the city shall send to delphi, and, whatever the god answers about the money and the remover of the money, that the city shall do in obedience to the oracle; the informer, if he be a freeman, shall have the honour of doing rightly, and he who informs not, the dishonour of doing wrongly; and if he be a slave who gives information, let him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his master the price of him; but if he do not inform he shall be punished with death. next in order shall follow a similar law, which shall apply equally to matters great and small: if a man happens to leave behind him some part of his property, whether intentionally or unintentionally, let him who may come upon the left property suffer it to remain, reflecting that such things are under the protection of the goddess of ways, and are dedicated to her by the law. but if any one defies the law, and takes the property home with him, let him, if the thing is of little worth, and the man who takes it a slave, be beaten with many stripes by him who meets him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age. or if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and a despiser of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of the treasure which he has moved to the leaver. and if some one accuses another of having anything which belongs to him, whether little or much, and the other admits that he has this thing, but denies that the property in dispute belongs to the other, if the property be registered with the magistrates according to law, the claimant shall summon the possessor, who shall bring it before the magistrates; and when it is brought into court, if it be registered in the public registers, to which of the litigants it belonged, let him take it and go his way. or if the property be registered as belonging to some one who is not present, whoever will offer sufficient surety on behalf of the absent person that he will give it up to him, shall take it away as the representative of the other. but if the property which is deposited be not registered with the magistrates, let it remain until the time of trial with three of the eldest of the magistrates; and if it be an animal which is deposited, then he who loses the suit shall pay the magistrates for its keep, and they shall determine the cause within three days. any one who is of sound mind may arrest his own slave, and do with him whatever he will of such things as are lawful; and he may arrest the runaway slave of any of his friends or kindred with a view to his safe-keeping. and if any one takes away him who is being carried off as a slave, intending to liberate him, he who is carrying him off shall let him go; but he who takes him away shall give three sufficient sureties; and if he give them, and not without giving them, he may take him away, but if he take him away after any other manner he shall be deemed guilty of violence, and being convicted shall pay as a penalty double the amount of the damages claimed to him who has been deprived of the slave. any man may also carry off a freedman, if he do not pay respect or sufficient respect to him who freed him. now the respect shall be, that the freedman go three times in the month to the hearth of the person who freed him, and offer to do whatever he ought, so far as he can; and he shall agree to make such a marriage as his former master approves. he shall not be permitted to have more property than he who gave him liberty, and what more he has shall belong to his master. the freedman shall not remain in the state more than twenty years, but like other foreigners shall go away, taking his entire property with him, unless he has the consent of the magistrates and of his former master to remain. if a freedman or any other stranger has a property greater than the census of the third class, at the expiration of thirty days from the day on which this comes to pass, he shall take that which is his and go his way, and in this case he shall not be allowed to remain any longer by the magistrates. and if any one disobeys this regulation, and is brought into court and convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall be confiscated. suits about these matters shall take place before the tribes, unless the plaintiff and defendant have got rid of the accusation either before their neighbours or before judges chosen by them. if a man lay claim to any animal or anything else which he declares to be his, let the possessor refer to the seller or to some honest and trustworthy person, who has given, or in some legitimate way made over the property to him; if he be a citizen or a metic, sojourning in the city, within thirty days, or, if the property have been delivered to him by a stranger, within five months, of which the middle month shall include the summer solstice. when goods are exchanged by selling and buying, a man shall deliver them, and receive the price of them, at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter; but he shall not buy or sell anywhere else, nor give credit. and if in any other manner or in any other place there be an exchange of one thing for another, and the seller give credit to the man who buys from him, he must do this on the understanding that the law gives no protection in cases of things sold not in accordance with these regulations. again, as to contributions, any man who likes may go about collecting contributions as a friend among friends, but if any difference arises about the collection, he is to act on the understanding that the law gives no protection in such cases. he who sells anything above the value of fifty drachmas shall be required to remain in the city for ten days, and the purchaser shall be informed of the house of the seller, with a view to the sort of charges which are apt to arise in such cases, and the restitutions which the law allows. and let legal restitution be on this wise: if a man sells a slave who is in a consumption, or who has the disease of the stone, or of strangury, or epilepsy, or some other tedious and incurable disorder of body or mind, which is not discernible to the ordinary man, if the purchaser be a physician or trainer, he shall have no right of restitution; nor shall there be any right of restitution if the seller has told the truth beforehand to the buyer. but if a skilled person sells to another who is not skilled, let the buyer appeal for restitution within six months, except in the case of epilepsy, and then the appeal may be made within a year. the cause shall be determined by such physicians as the parties may agree to choose; and the defendant, if he lose the suit, shall pay double the price at which he sold. if a private person sell to another private person, he shall have the right of restitution, and the decision shall be given as before, but the defendant, if he be cast, shall only pay back the price of the slave. if a person sells a homicide to another, and they both know of the fact, let there be no restitution in such a case, but if he do not know of the fact, there shall be a right of restitution, whenever the buyer makes the discovery; and the decision shall rest with the five youngest guardians of the law, and if the decision be that the seller was cognisant of the fact, he shall purify the house of the purchaser, according to the law of the interpreters, and shall pay back three times the purchase-money. if a man exchanges either money for money, or anything whatever for anything else, either with or without life, let him give and receive them genuine and unadulterated, in accordance with the law. and let us have a prelude about all this sort of roguery, like the preludes of our other laws. every man should regard adulteration as of one and the same class with falsehood and deceit, concerning which the many are too fond of saying that at proper times and places the practice may often be right. but they leave the occasion, and the when, and the where, undefined and unsettled, and from this want of definiteness in their language they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. now a legislator ought not to leave the matter undetermined; he ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. let this be the rule prescribed: no one shall call the gods to witness, when he says or does anything false or deceitful or dishonest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind to them. and he is most hateful to them who takes a false oath, and pays no heed to the gods; and in the next degree, he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors. now better men are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the superiors of the young; wherefore also parents are the superiors of their offspring, and men of women and children, and rulers of their subjects; for all men ought to reverence any one who is in any position of authority, and especially those who are in state offices. and this is the reason why i have spoken of these matters. for every one who is guilty of adulteration in the agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he invokes the gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens of the agora, he does but swear without any respect for god or man. certainly, it is an excellent rule not lightly to defile the names of the gods, after the fashion of men in general, who care little about piety and purity in their religious actions. but if a man will not conform to this rule, let the law be as follows: he who sells anything in the agora shall not ask two prices for that which he sells, but he shall ask one price, and if he do not obtain this, he shall take away his goods; and on that day he shall not value them either at more or less; and there shall be no praising of any goods, or oath taken about them. if a person disobeys this command, any citizen who is present, not being less than thirty years of age, may with impunity chastise and beat the swearer, but if instead of obeying the laws he takes no heed, he shall be liable to the charge of having betrayed them. if a man sells any adulterated goods and will not obey these regulations, he who knows and can prove the fact, and does prove it in the presence of the magistrates, if he be a slave or a metic, shall have the adulterated goods; but if he be a citizen, and do not pursue the charge, he shall be called a rogue, and deemed to have robbed the gods of the agora; or if he proves the charge, he shall dedicate the goods to the gods of the agora. he who is proved to have sold any adulterated goods, in addition to losing the goods themselves, shall be beaten with stripes--a stripe for a drachma, according to the price of the goods; and the herald shall proclaim in the agora the offence for which he is going to be beaten. the wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall obtain information from experienced persons about the rogueries and adulterations of the sellers, and shall write up what the seller ought and ought not to do in each case; and let them inscribe their laws on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora, that they may be clear instructors of those who have business in the agora. enough has been said in what has preceded about the wardens of the city, and if anything seems to be wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the law, and write down the omission, and place on a column in the court of the wardens of the city the primary and secondary regulations which are laid down for them about their office. after the practices of adulteration naturally follow the practices of retail trade. concerning these, we will first of all give a word of counsel and reason, and the law shall come afterwards. retail trade in a city is not by nature intended to do any harm, but quite the contrary; for is not he a benefactor who reduces the inequalities and incommensurabilities of goods to equality and common measure? and this is what the power of money accomplishes, and the merchant may be said to be appointed for this purpose. the hireling and the tavern-keeper, and many other occupations, some of them more and others less seemly--all alike have this object--they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our possessions. let us then endeavour to see what has brought retail trade into ill-odour, and wherein lies the dishonour and unseemliness of it, in order that if not entirely, we may yet partially, cure the evil by legislation. to effect this is no easy matter, and requires a great deal of virtue. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: dear cleinias, the class of men is small--they must have been rarely gifted by nature, and trained by education--who, when assailed by wants and desires, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and prefer a moderate to a large gain. but the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates to retail trade, and merchandise, and the keeping of taverns, is denounced and numbered among dishonourable things. for if what i trust may never be and will not be, we were to compel, if i may venture to say a ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in consequence of some fate or necessity, the best women were compelled to follow similar callings, then we should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are; and if all such occupations were managed on incorrupt principles, they would be honoured as we honour a mother or a nurse. but now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which can only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and receives strangers who are in need at the welcome resting-place, and gives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool shade in the heat; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and showing the duties of hospitality to his guests, treats them as enemies and captives who are at his mercy, and will not release them until they have paid the most unjust, abominable, and extortionate ransom--these are the sort of practises, and foul evils they are, which cast a reproach upon the succour of adversity. and the legislator ought always to be devising a remedy for evils of this nature. there is an ancient saying, which is also a true one--'to fight against two opponents is a difficult thing,' as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. and in this case also the war is against two enemies--wealth and poverty; one of whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury, while the other drives him by pain into utter shamelessness. what remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? in the first place, they must have as few retail traders as possible; and in the second place, they must assign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state; and in the third place, they must devise some way whereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness. after this preface let our law run as follows, and may fortune favour us: no landowner among the magnetes, whose city the god is restoring and resettling--no one, that is, of the 5040 families, shall become a retail trader either voluntarily or involuntarily; neither shall he be a merchant, or do any service for private persons unless they equally serve him, except for his father or his mother, and their fathers and mothers; and in general for his elders who are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. now it is difficult to determine accurately the things which are worthy or unworthy of a freeman, but let those who have obtained the prize of virtue give judgment about them in accordance with their feelings of right and wrong. he who in any way shares in the illiberality of retail trades may be indicted for dishonouring his race by any one who likes, before those who have been judged to be the first in virtue; and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father's house by an unworthy occupation, let him be imprisoned for a year and abstain from that sort of thing; and if he repeat the offence, for two years; and every time that he is convicted let the length of his imprisonment be doubled. this shall be the second law: he who engages in retail trade must be either a metic or a stranger. and a third law shall be: in order that the retail trader who dwells in our city may be as good or as little bad as possible, the guardians of the law shall remember that they are not only guardians of those who may be easily watched and prevented from becoming lawless or bad, because they are well-born and bred; but still more should they have a watch over those who are of another sort, and follow pursuits which have a very strong tendency to make men bad. and, therefore, in respect of the multifarious occupations of retail trade, that is to say, in respect of such of them as are allowed to remain, because they seem to be quite necessary in a state--about these the guardians of the law should meet and take counsel with those who have experience of the several kinds of retail trade, as we before commanded concerning adulteration (which is a matter akin to this), and when they meet they shall consider what amount of receipts, after deducting expenses, will produce a moderate gain to the retail trades, and they shall fix in writing and strictly maintain what they find to be the right percentage of profit; this shall be seen to by the wardens of the agora, and by the wardens of the city, and by the wardens of the country. and so retail trade will benefit every one, and do the least possible injury to those in the state who practise it. when a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance, the other party may go to law with him in the courts of the tribes, for not having completed his agreement, if the parties are not able previously to come to terms before arbiters or before their neighbours. the class of craftsmen who have furnished human life with the arts is dedicated to hephaestus and athene; and there is a class of craftsmen who preserve the works of all craftsmen by arts of defence, the votaries of ares and athene, to which divinities they too are rightly dedicated. all these continue through life serving the country and the people; some of them are leaders in battle; others make for hire implements and works, and they ought not to deceive in such matters, out of respect to the gods who are their ancestors. if any craftsman through indolence omit to execute his work in a given time, not reverencing the god who gives him the means of life, but considering, foolish fellow, that he is his own god and will let him off easily, in the first place, he shall suffer at the hands of the god, and in the second place, the law shall follow in a similar spirit. he shall owe to him who contracted with him the price of the works which he has failed in performing, and he shall begin again and execute them gratis in the given time. when a man undertakes a work, the law gives him the same advice which was given to the seller, that he should not attempt to raise the price, but simply ask the value; this the law enjoins also on the contractor; for the craftsman assuredly knows the value of his work. wherefore, in free states the man of art ought not to attempt to impose upon private individuals by the help of his art, which is by nature a true thing; and he who is wronged in a matter of this sort, shall have a right of action against the party who has wronged him. and if any one lets out work to a craftsman, and does not pay him duly according to the lawful agreement, disregarding zeus the guardian of the city and athene, who are the partners of the state, and overthrows the foundations of society for the sake of a little gain, in his case let the law and the gods maintain the common bonds of the state. and let him who, having already received the work in exchange, does not pay the price in the time agreed, pay double the price; and if a year has elapsed, although interest is not to be taken on loans, yet for every drachma which he owes to the contractor let him pay a monthly interest of an obol. suits about these matters are to be decided by the courts of the tribes; and by the way, since we have mentioned craftsmen at all, we must not forget that other craft of war, in which generals and tacticians are the craftsmen, who undertake voluntarily or involuntarily the work of our safety, as other craftsmen undertake other public works--if they execute their work well the law will never tire of praising him who gives them those honours which are the just rewards of the soldier; but if any one, having already received the benefit of any noble service in war, does not make the due return of honour, the law will blame him. let this then be the law, having an ingredient of praise, not compelling but advising the great body of the citizens to honour the brave men who are the saviours of the whole state, whether by their courage or by their military skill--they should honour them, i say, in the second place; for the first and highest tribute of respect is to be given to those who are able above other men to honour the words of good legislators. the greater part of the dealings between man and man have been now regulated by us with the exception of those that relate to orphans and the supervision of orphans by their guardians. these follow next in order, and must be regulated in some way. but to arrive at them we must begin with the testamentary wishes of the dying and the case of those who may have happened to die intestate. when i said, cleinias, that we must regulate them, i had in my mind the difficulty and perplexity in which all such matters are involved. you cannot leave them unregulated, for individuals would make regulations at variance with one another, and repugnant to the laws and habits of the living and to their own previous habits, if a person were simply allowed to make any will which he pleased, and this were to take effect in whatever state he may have been at the end of his life; for most of us lose our senses in a manner, and feel crushed when we think that we are about to die. cleinias: what do you mean, stranger? athenian: o cleinias, a man when he is about to die is an intractable creature, and is apt to use language which causes a great deal of anxiety and trouble to the legislator. cleinias: in what way? athenian: he wants to have the entire control of all his property, and will use angry words. cleinias: such as what? athenian: o ye gods, he will say, how monstrous that i am not allowed to give, or not to give, my own to whom i will--less to him who has been bad to me, and more to him who has been good to me, and whose badness and goodness have been tested by me in time of sickness or in old age and in every other sort of fortune! cleinias: well, stranger, and may he not very fairly say so? athenian: in my opinion, cleinias, the ancient legislators were too good-natured, and made laws without sufficient observation or consideration of human things. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean, my friend, that they were afraid of the testator's reproaches, and so they passed a law to the effect that a man should be allowed to dispose of his property in all respects as he liked; but you and i, if i am not mistaken, will have something better to say to our departing citizens. cleinias: what? athenian: o my friends, we will say to them, hard is it for you, who are creatures of a day, to know what is yours--hard too, as the delphic oracle says, to know yourselves at this hour. now i, as the legislator, regard you and your possessions, not as belonging to yourselves, but as belonging to your whole family, both past and future, and yet more do i regard both family and possessions as belonging to the state; wherefore, if some one steals upon you with flattery, when you are tossed on the sea of disease or old age, and persuades you to dispose of your property in a way that is not for the best, i will not, if i can help, allow this; but i will legislate with a view to the whole, considering what is best both for the state and for the family, esteeming as i ought the feelings of an individual at a lower rate; and i hope that you will depart in peace and kindness towards us, as you are going the way of all mankind; and we will impartially take care of all your concerns, not neglecting any of them, if we can possibly help. let this be our prelude and consolation to the living and dying, cleinias, and let the law be as follows: he who makes a disposition in a testament, if he be the father of a family, shall first of all inscribe as his heir any one of his sons whom he may think fit; and if he gives any of his children to be adopted by another citizen, let the adoption be inscribed. and if he has a son remaining over and above who has not been adopted upon any lot, and who may be expected to be sent out to a colony according to law, to him his father may give as much as he pleases of the rest of his property, with the exception of the paternal lot and the fixtures on the lot. and if there are other sons, let him distribute among them what there is more than the lot in such portions as he pleases. and if one of the sons has already a house of his own, he shall not give him of the money, nor shall he give money to a daughter who has been betrothed, but if she is not betrothed he may give her money. and if any of the sons or daughters shall be found to have another lot of land in the country, which has accrued after the testament has been made, they shall leave the lot which they have inherited to the heir of the man who has made the will. if the testator has no sons, but only daughters, let him choose the husband of any one of his daughters whom he pleases, and leave and inscribe him as his son and heir. and if a man have lost his son, when he was a child, and before he could be reckoned among grown up men, whether his own or an adopted son, let the testator make mention of the circumstance and inscribe whom he will to be his second son in hope of better fortune. if the testator has no children at all, he may select and give to any one whom he pleases the tenth part of the property which he has acquired; but let him not be blamed if he gives all the rest to his adopted son, and makes a friend of him according to the law. if the sons of a man require guardians, and the father when he dies leaves a will appointing guardians, those who have been named by him, whoever they are and whatever their number be, if they are able and willing to take charge of the children, shall be recognised according to the provisions of the will. but if he dies and has made no will, or a will in which he has appointed no guardians, then the next of kin, two on the father's and two on the mother's side, and one of the friends of the deceased, shall have the authority of guardians, whom the guardians of the law shall appoint when the orphans require guardians. and the fifteen eldest guardians of the law shall have the whole care and charge of the orphans, divided into threes according to seniority--a body of three for one year, and then another body of three for the next year, until the cycle of the five periods is complete; and this, as far as possible, is to continue always. if a man dies, having made no will at all, and leaves sons who require the care of guardians, they shall share in the protection which is afforded by these laws. and if a man dying by some unexpected fate leaves daughters behind him, let him pardon the legislator if when he gives them in marriage, he have a regard only to two out of three conditions--nearness of kin and the preservation of the lot, and omits the third condition, which a father would naturally consider, for he would choose out of all the citizens a son for himself, and a husband for his daughter, with a view to his character and disposition--the father, i say, shall forgive the legislator if he disregards this, which to him is an impossible consideration. let the law about these matters where practicable be as follows: if a man dies without making a will, and leaves behind him daughters, let his brother, being the son of the same father or of the same mother, having no lot, marry the daughter and have the lot of the dead man. and if he have no brother, but only a brother's son, in like manner let them marry, if they be of a suitable age; and if there be not even a brother's son, but only the son of a sister, let them do likewise, and so in the fourth degree, if there be only the testator's father's brother, or in the fifth degree, his father's brother's son, or in the sixth degree, the child of his father's sister. let kindred be always reckoned in this way: if a person leaves daughters the relationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters, and brothers' and sisters' children, and first the males shall come, and after them the females in the same family. the judge shall consider and determine the suitableness or unsuitableness of age in marriage; he shall make an inspection of the males naked, and of the women naked down to the navel. and if there be a lack of kinsmen in a family extending to grandchildren of a brother, or to the grandchildren of a grandfather's children, the maiden may choose with the consent of her guardians any one of the citizens who is willing and whom she wills, and he shall be the heir of the dead man, and the husband of his daughter. circumstances vary, and there may sometimes be a still greater lack of relations within the limits of the state; and if any maiden has no kindred living in the city, and there is some one who has been sent out to a colony, and she is disposed to make him the heir of her father's possessions, if he be indeed of her kindred, let him proceed to take the lot according to the regulation of the law; but if he be not of her kindred, she having no kinsmen within the city, and he be chosen by the daughter of the dead man, and empowered to marry by the guardians, let him return home and take the lot of him who died intestate. and if a man has no children, either male or female, and dies without making a will, let the previous law in general hold; and let a man and a woman go forth from the family and share the deserted house, and let the lot belong absolutely to them; and let the heiress in the first degree be a sister, and in a second degree a daughter of a brother, and in the third, a daughter of a sister, in the fourth degree the sister of a father, and in the fifth degree the daughter of a father's brother, and in a sixth degree of a father's sister; and these shall dwell with their male kinsmen, according to the degree of relationship and right, as we enacted before. now we must not conceal from ourselves that such laws are apt to be oppressive and that there may sometimes be a hardship in the lawgiver commanding the kinsman of the dead man to marry his relation; he may be thought not to have considered the innumerable hindrances which may arise among men in the execution of such ordinances; for there may be cases in which the parties refuse to obey, and are ready to do anything rather than marry, when there is some bodily or mental malady or defect among those who are bidden to marry or be married. persons may fancy that the legislator never thought of this, but they are mistaken; wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects, the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator, in that he, having to take care of the common weal, cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals, and begging him to pardon them if naturally they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them. cleinias: and how, stranger, can we act most fairly under the circumstances? athenian: there must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the subjects of them. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: i mean to say, that a case may occur in which the nephew, having a rich father, will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his uncle; he will have a feeling of pride, and he will wish to look higher. and there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity, and he will be compelled to disobey the law, if he is required, for example, to take a wife who is mad, or has some other terrible malady of soul or body, such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer. then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law: if any one finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments, both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage, and asserts that the legislator, if he were alive and present, would not compel him to obey--that is to say, would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage, to do either--and some kinsman or guardian dispute this, the reply is that the legislator left fifteen of the guardians of the law to be arbiters and fathers of orphans, male or female, and to them let the disputants have recourse, and by their aid determine any matters of the kind, admitting their decision to be final. but if any one thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law, let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges, and there have the points in dispute determined. and he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator, which, by a man of sense, is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money. thus will orphan children have a second birth. after their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education, and after their second birth, when they have lost their parents, we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad to them as possible. in the first place, we say that the guardians of the law are lawgivers and fathers to them, not inferior to their natural fathers. moreover, they shall take charge of them year by year as of their own kindred; and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians as suitable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans. and we seem to have spoken opportunely in our former discourse, when we said that the souls of the dead have the power after death of taking an interest in human affairs, about which there are many tales and traditions, long indeed, but true; and seeing that they are so many and so ancient, we must believe them, and we must also believe the lawgivers, who tell us that these things are true, if they are not to be regarded as utter fools. but if these things are really so, in the first place men should have a fear of the gods above, who regard the loneliness of the orphans; and in the second place of the souls of the departed, who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children, and are friendly to those who honour, and unfriendly to those who dishonour them. men should also fear the souls of the living who are aged and high in honour; wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them, and so live happily; old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them, and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of such duties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate, considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of trusts. to all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind, if he has any, and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans, seeking in every possible way to do them good, for he is making a contribution to his own good and that of his children. he who obeys the tale which precedes the law, and does no wrong to an orphan, will never experience the wrath of the legislator. but he who is disobedient, and wrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother, shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive. as touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans, or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians, if they did not possess examples of the manner in which children of freemen would be brought up in the bringing up of their own children, and of the care of their property in the care of their own, or if they had not just laws fairly stated about these very things--there would have been reason in making laws for them, under the idea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make separate rules for the life of those who are orphans and of those who are not orphans. but as the case stands, the condition of orphans with us is not different from the case of those who have a father, though in regard to honour and dishonour, and the attention given to them, the two are not usually placed upon a level. wherefore, touching the legislation about orphans, the law speaks in serious accents, both of persuasion and threatening, and such a threat as the following will be by no means out of place: he who is the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and he among the guardians of the law to whom the superintendence of this guardian has been assigned, shall love the unfortunate orphan as though he were his own child, and he shall be as careful and diligent in the management of his possessions as he would be if they were his own, or even more careful and diligent. let every one who has the care of an orphan observe this law. but any one who acts contrary to the law on these matters, if he be a guardian of the child, may be fined by a magistrate, or, if he be himself a magistrate, the guardian may bring him before the court of select judges, and punish him, if convicted, by exacting a fine of double the amount of that inflicted by the court. and if a guardian appears to the relations of the orphan, or to any other citizen, to act negligently or dishonestly, let them bring him before the same court, and whatever damages are given against him, let him pay fourfold, and let half belong to the orphan and half to him who procured the conviction. if any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and thinks that he has been ill-used by his guardians, let him within five years of the expiration of the guardianship be allowed to bring them to trial; and if any of them be convicted, the court shall determine what he shall pay or suffer. and if a magistrate shall appear to have wronged the orphan by neglect, and he be convicted, let the court determine what he shall suffer or pay to the orphan, and if there be dishonesty in addition to neglect, besides paying the fine, let him be deposed from his office of guardian of the law, and let the state appoint another guardian of the law for the city and for the country in his room. greater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise between fathers and sons, on the part either of fathers who will be of opinion that the legislator should enact that they may, if they wish, lawfully renounce their son by the proclamation of a herald in the face of the world, or of sons who think that they should be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of imbecility when they are disabled by disease or old age. these things only happen, as a matter of fact, where the natures of men are utterly bad; for where only half is bad, as, for example, if the father be not bad, but the son be bad, or conversely, no great calamity is the result of such an amount of hatred as this. in another state, a son disowned by his father would not of necessity cease to be a citizen, but in our state, of which these are to be the laws, the disinherited must necessarily emigrate into another country, for no addition can be made even of a single family to the 5040 households; and, therefore, he who deserves to suffer these things must be renounced not only by his father, who is a single person, but by the whole family, and what is done in these cases must be regulated by some such law as the following: he who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly or unjustly, to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and brought up, shall not lightly or at once execute his purpose; but first of all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to cousins, and in like manner his son's kinsmen by the mother's side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the hands of them all to be dismissed from the family; and the son shall be allowed to address them in a similar manner, and show that he does not deserve to suffer any of these things. and if the father persuades them, and obtains the suffrages of more than half of his kindred, exclusive of the father and mother and the offender himself--i say, if he obtains more than half the suffrages of all the other grown-up members of the family, of both sexes, the father shall be permitted to put away his son, but not otherwise. and if any other citizen is willing to adopt the son who is put away, no law shall hinder him; for the characters of young men are subject to many changes in the course of their lives. and if he has been put away, and in a period of ten years no one is willing to adopt him, let those who have the care of the superabundant population which is sent out into colonies, see to him, in order that he may be suitably provided for in the colony. and if disease or age or harshness of temper, or all these together, makes a man to be more out of his mind than the rest of the world are--but this is not observable, except to those who live with him--and he, being master of his property, is the ruin of the house, and his son doubts and hesitates about indicting his father for insanity, let the law in that case ordain that he shall first of all go to the eldest guardians of the law and tell them of his father's misfortune, and they shall duly look into the matter, and take counsel as to whether he shall indict him or not. and if they advise him to proceed, they shall be both his witnesses and his advocates; and if the father is cast, he shall henceforth be incapable of ordering the least particular of his life; let him be as a child dwelling in the house for the remainder of his days. and if a man and his wife have an unfortunate incompatibility of temper, ten of the guardians of the law, who are impartial, and ten of the women who regulate marriages, shall look to the matter, and if they are able to reconcile them they shall be formally reconciled; but if their souls are too much tossed with passion, they shall endeavour to find other partners. now they are not likely to have very gentle tempers; and, therefore, we must endeavour to associate with them deeper and softer natures. those who have no children, or only a few, at the time of their separation, should choose their new partners with a view to the procreation of children; but those who have a sufficient number of children should separate and marry again in order that they may have some one to grow old with and that the pair may take care of one another in age. if a woman dies, leaving children, male or female, the law will advise rather than compel the husband to bring up the children without introducing into the house a stepmother. but if he have no children, then he shall be compelled to marry until he has begotten a sufficient number of sons to his family and to the state. and if a man dies leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up. but if she appears to be too young to live virtuously without a husband, let her relations communicate with the women who superintend marriage, and let both together do what they think best in these matters; if there is a lack of children, let the choice be made with a view to having them; two children, one of either sex, shall be deemed sufficient in the eye of the law. when a child is admitted to be the offspring of certain parents and is acknowledged by them, but there is need of a decision as to which parent the child is to follow--in case a female slave have intercourse with a male slave, or with a freeman or freedman, the offspring shall always belong to the master of the female slave. again, if a free woman have intercourse with a male slave, the offspring shall belong to the master of the slave; but if a child be born either of a slave by her master, or of his mistress by a slave--and this be proven--the offspring of the woman and its father shall be sent away by the women who superintend marriage into another country, and the guardians of the law shall send away the offspring of the man and its mother. neither god, nor a man who has understanding, will ever advise any one to neglect his parents. to a discourse concerning the honour and dishonour of parents, a prelude such as the following, about the service of the gods, will be a suitable introduction: there are ancient customs about the gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds: some of the gods we see with our eyes and we honour them, of others we honour the images, raising statues of them which we adore; and though they are lifeless, yet we imagine that the living gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. now, if a man has a father or mother, or their fathers or mothers treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how to show true service to them. cleinias: and what do you call the true mode of service? athenian: i will tell you, o my friend, for such things are worth listening to. cleinias: proceed. athenian: oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonoured by his sons, invoked on them curses which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by the gods, and amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son phoenix, and theseus upon hippolytus, and innumerable others have also called down wrath upon their children, whence it is clear that the gods listen to the imprecations of parents; for the curses of parents are, as they ought to be, mighty against their children as no others are. and shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonoured by his or her children, are heard by the gods in accordance with nature; and that if a parent is honoured by them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not minister to his request? if not, they would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to be contrary to their nature. cleinias: certainly. athenian: may we not think, as i was saying just now, that we can possess no image which is more honoured by the gods, than that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? whom when a man honours, the heart of the god rejoices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. and, truly, the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than that of a lifeless image. for the living, when they are honoured by us, join in our prayers, and when they are dishonoured, they utter imprecations against us; but lifeless objects do neither. and therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and grandfather and other aged relations, he will have images which above all others will win him the favour of the gods. cleinias: excellent. athenian: every man of any understanding fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have been accomplished. now these things being thus ordered by nature, good men think it a blessing from heaven if their parents live to old age and reach the utmost limit of human life, or if taken away before their time they are deeply regretted by them; but to bad men parents are always a cause of terror. wherefore let every man honour with every sort of lawful honour his own parents, agreeably to what has now been said. but if this prelude be an unmeaning sound in the ears of any one, let the law follow, which may be rightly imposed in these terms: if any one in this city be not sufficiently careful of his parents, and do not regard and gratify in every respect their wishes more than those of his sons and of his other offspring or of himself--let him who experiences this sort of treatment either come himself, or send some one to inform the three eldest guardians of the law, and three of the women who have the care of marriages; and let them look to the matter and punish youthful evil-doers with stripes and bonds if they are under thirty years of age, that is to say, if they be men, or if they be women, let them undergo the same punishment up to forty years of age. but if, when they are still more advanced in years, they continue the same neglect of their parents, and do any hurt to any of them, let them be brought before a court in which every single one of the eldest citizens shall be the judges, and if the offender be convicted, let the court determine what he ought to pay or suffer, and any penalty may be imposed on him which a man can pay or suffer. if the person who has been wronged be unable to inform the magistrates, let any freeman who hears of his case inform, and if he do not, he shall be deemed base, and shall be liable to have a suit for damage brought against him by any one who likes. and if a slave inform, he shall receive freedom; and if he be the slave of the injurer or injured party, he shall be set free by the magistrates, or if he belong to any other citizen, the public shall pay a price on his behalf to the owner; and let the magistrates take heed that no one wrongs him out of revenge, because he has given information. cases in which one man injures another by poisons, and which prove fatal, have been already discussed; but about other cases in which a person intentionally and of malice harms another with meats, or drinks, or ointments, nothing has as yet been determined. for there are two kinds of poisons used among men, which cannot clearly be distinguished. there is the kind just now explicitly mentioned, which injures bodies by the use of other bodies according to a natural law; there is also another kind which persuades the more daring class that they can do injury by sorceries, and incantations, and magic knots, as they are termed, and makes others believe that they above all persons are injured by the powers of the magician. now it is not easy to know the nature of all these things; nor if a man do know can he readily persuade others to believe him. and when men are disturbed in their minds at the sight of waxen images fixed either at their doors, or in a place where three ways meet, or on the sepulchres of parents, there is no use in trying to persuade them that they should despise all such things because they have no certain knowledge about them. but we must have a law in two parts, concerning poisoning, in whichever of the two ways the attempt is made, and we must entreat, and exhort, and advise men not to have recourse to such practises, by which they scare the multitude out of their wits, as if they were children, compelling the legislator and the judge to heal the fears which the sorcerer arouses, and to tell them in the first place, that he who attempts to poison or enchant others knows not what he is doing, either as regards the body (unless he has a knowledge of medicine), or as regards his enchantments (unless he happens to be a prophet or diviner). let the law, then, run as follows about poisoning or witchcraft: he who employs poison to do any injury, not fatal, to a man himself, or to his servants, or any injury, whether fatal or not, to his cattle or his bees, if he be a physician, and be convicted of poisoning, shall be punished with death; or if he be a private person, the court shall determine what he is to pay or suffer. but he who seems to be the sort of man who injures others by magic knots, or enchantments, or incantations, or any of the like practices, if he be a prophet or diviner, let him die; and if, not being a prophet, he be convicted of witchcraft, as in the previous case, let the court fix what he ought to pay or suffer. when a man does another any injury by theft or violence, for the greater injury let him pay greater damages to the injured man, and less for the smaller injury; but in all cases, whatever the injury may have been, as much as will compensate the loss. and besides the compensation of the wrong, let a man pay a further penalty for the chastisement of his offence: he who has done the wrong instigated by the folly of another, through the lightheartedness of youth or the like, shall pay a lighter penalty; but he who has injured another through his own folly, when overcome by pleasure or pain, in cowardly fear, or lust, or envy, or implacable anger, shall endure a heavier punishment. not that he is punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be undone, but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him corrected, may utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing. having an eye to all these things, the law, like a good archer, should aim at the right measure of punishment, and in all cases at the deserved punishment. in the attainment of this the judge shall be a fellow-worker with the legislator, whenever the law leaves to him to determine what the offender shall suffer or pay; and the legislator, like a painter, shall give a rough sketch of the cases in which the law is to be applied. this is what we must do, megillus and cleinias, in the best and fairest manner that we can, saying what the punishments are to be of all actions of theft and violence, and giving laws of such a kind as the gods and sons of gods would have us give. if a man is mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his relations shall keep him at home in any way which they can; or if not, let them pay a penalty--he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one hundred drachmas, whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects; and he of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina; and he of the third class three-fifths; and he of the fourth class two-fifths. now there are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we have already mentioned; and there are other kinds, which originate in an evil and passionate temperament, and are increased by bad education; out of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of abuse against one another, and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed to occur in a well-ordered state. let this, then, be the law about abuse, which shall relate to all cases: no one shall speak evil of another; and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and learn of the disputant and the company, but he shall abstain from evil-speaking; for out of the imprecations which men utter against one another, and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another, and using foul names, out of words light as air, in very deed the greatest enmities and hatreds spring up. for the speaker gratifies his anger, which is an ungracious element of his nature; and nursing up his wrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts, and exacerbating that part of his soul which was formerly civilised by education, he lives in a state of savageness and moroseness, and pays a bitter penalty for his anger. and in such cases almost all men take to saying something ridiculous about their opponent, and there is no man who is in the habit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness altogether, or lose the better half of greatness. wherefore let no one utter any taunting word at a temple, or at the public sacrifices, or at the games, or in the agora, or in a court of justice, or in any public assembly. and let the magistrate who presides on these occasions chastise an offender, and he shall be blameless; but if he fails in doing so, he shall not claim the prize of virtue; for he is one who heeds not the laws, and does not do what the legislator commands. and if in any other place any one indulges in these sort of revilings, whether he has begun the quarrel or is only retaliating, let any elder who is present support the law, and control with blows those who indulge in passion, which is another great evil; and if he do not, let him be liable to pay the appointed penalty. and we say now, that he who deals in reproaches against others cannot reproach them without attempting to ridicule them; and this, when done in a moment of anger, is what we make matter of reproach against him. but then, do we admit into our state the comic writers who are so fond of making mankind ridiculous, if they attempt in a good-natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens? or do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man to make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about any thing or person; though as we were saying, not if he be angry and have a set purpose? we forbid earnest--that is unalterably fixed; but we have still to say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in the employment of innocent humour. a comic poet, or maker of iambic or satirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the citizens, either by word or likeness, either in anger or without anger. and if any one is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him from the country, or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be dedicated to the god who presides over the contests. those only who have received permission shall be allowed to write verses at one another, but they shall be without anger and in jest; in anger and in serious earnest they shall not be allowed. the decision of this matter shall be left to the superintendent of the general education of the young, and whatever he may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he rejects let not the poet himself exhibit, or ever teach anybody else, slave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonoured, and held disobedient to the laws. now he is not to be pitied who is hungry, or who suffers any bodily pain, but he who is temperate, or has some other virtue, or part of a virtue, and at the same time suffers from misfortune; it would be an extraordinary thing if such an one, whether slave or freeman, were utterly forsaken and fell into the extremes of poverty in any tolerably well-ordered city or government. wherefore the legislator may safely make a law applicable to such cases in the following terms: let there be no beggars in our state; and if anybody begs, seeking to pick up a livelihood by unavailing prayers, let the wardens of the agora turn him out of the agora, and the wardens of the city out of the city, and the wardens of the country send him out of any other parts of the land across the border, in order that the land may be cleared of this sort of animal. if a slave of either sex injure anything, which is not his or her own, through inexperience, or some improper practice, and the person who suffers damage be not himself in part to blame, the master of the slave who has done the harm shall either make full satisfaction, or give up the slave who has done the injury. but if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion between the injured party and the injurer, with the view of obtaining the slave, let him sue the person, who says that he has been injured, for malpractices. and if he gain a conviction, let him receive double the value which the court fixes as the price of the slave; and if he lose his suit, let him make amends for the injury, and give up the slave. and if a beast of burden, or horse, or dog, or any other animal, injure the property of a neighbour, the owner shall in like manner pay for the injury. if any man refuses to be a witness, he who wants him shall summon him, and he who is summoned shall come to the trial; and if he knows and is willing to bear witness, let him bear witness, but if he says he does not know let him swear by the three divinities zeus, and apollo, and themis, that he does not, and have no more to do with the cause. and he who is summoned to give witness and does not answer to his summoner, shall be liable for the harm which ensues according to law. and if a person calls up as a witness any one who is acting as a judge, let him give his witness, but he shall not afterwards vote in the cause. a free woman may give her witness and plead, if she be more than forty years of age, and may bring an action if she have no husband; but if her husband be alive she shall only be allowed to bear witness. a slave of either sex and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and to plead, but only in cases of murder; and they must produce sufficient sureties that they will certainly remain until the trial, in case they should be charged with false witness. and either of the parties in a cause may bring an accusation of perjury against witnesses, touching their evidence in whole or in part, if he asserts that such evidence has been given; but the accusation must be brought previous to the final decision of the cause. the magistrates shall preserve the accusations of false witness, and have them kept under the seal of both parties, and produce them on the day when the trial for false witness takes place. if a man be twice convicted of false witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he has been convicted three times, let any one who pleases inform against him to the magistrates, and let the magistrates hand him over to the court, and if he be convicted he shall be punished with death. and in any case in which the evidence is rightly found to be false, and yet to have given the victory to him who wins the suit, and more than half the witnesses are condemned, the decision which was gained by these means shall be rescinded, and there shall be a discussion and a decision as to whether the suit was determined by that false evidence or not; and in whichever way the decision may be given, the previous suit shall be determined accordingly. there are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. is not justice noble, which has been the civiliser of humanity? how then can the advocate of justice be other than noble? and yet upon this profession which is presented to us under the fair name of art has come an evil reputation. in the first place, we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just or unjust; and that both the art, and the power of speech which is thereby imparted, are at the service of him who is willing to pay for them. now in our state this so-called art, whether really an art or only an experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never to come into existence, or if existing among us should listen to the request of the legislator and go away into another land, and not speak contrary to justice. if the offenders obey we say no more; but for those who disobey, the voice of the law is as follows: if any one thinks that he will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the judges, and unseasonably litigate or advocate, let any one who likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advocacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges; and if he be convicted, let the court determine whether he may be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentiousness. and if he is supposed to act from contentiousness, the court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute or plead a cause; and if he is supposed to act as he does from love of money, in case he be a stranger, he shall leave the country, and never return under penalty of death; but if he be a citizen, he shall die, because he is a lover of money, in whatever manner gained; and equally, if he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die. book xii. if a herald or an ambassador carry a false message from our city to any other, or bring back a false message from the city to which he is sent, or be proved to have brought back, whether from friends or enemies, in his capacity of herald or ambassador, what they have never said, let him be indicted for having violated, contrary to the law, the commands and duties imposed upon him by hermes and zeus, and let there be a penalty fixed, which he shall suffer or pay if he be convicted. theft is a mean, and robbery a shameless thing; and none of the sons of zeus delight in fraud and violence, or ever practised either. wherefore let no one be deluded by poets or mythologers into a mistaken belief of such things, nor let him suppose, when he thieves or is guilty of violence, that he is doing nothing base, but only what the gods themselves do. for such tales are untrue and improbable; and he who steals or robs contrary to the law, is never either a god or the son of a god; of this the legislator ought to be better informed than all the poets put together. happy is he and may he be for ever happy, who is persuaded and listens to our words; but he who disobeys shall have to contend against the following law: if a man steal anything belonging to the public, whether that which he steals be much or little, he shall have the same punishment. for he who steals a little steals with the same wish as he who steals much, but with less power, and he who takes up a greater amount, not having deposited it, is wholly unjust. wherefore the law is not disposed to inflict a less penalty on the one than on the other because his theft is less, but on the ground that the thief may possibly be in one case still curable, and may in another case be incurable. if any one convict in a court of law a stranger or a slave of a theft of public property, let the court determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay, bearing in mind that he is probably not incurable. but the citizen who has been brought up as our citizens will have been, if he be found guilty of robbing his country by fraud or violence, whether he be caught in the act or not, shall be punished with death; for he is incurable. now for expeditions of war much consideration and many laws are required; the great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander; nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to do anything, either in jest or earnest, of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader, even in the least things being under his guidance; for example, he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden; and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior; and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. of all soldiers the life should be always and in all things as far as possible in common and together; there neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. and we ought in time of peace from youth upwards to practise this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by others; anarchy should have no place in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to man. i may add that all dances ought to be performed with a view to military excellence; and agility and ease should be cultivated for the same object, and also endurance of the want of meats and drinks, and of winter cold and summer heat, and of hard couches; and, above all, care should be taken not to destroy the peculiar qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding them with extraneous coverings, and so hindering their natural growth of hair and soles. for these are the extremities, and of all the parts of the body, whether they are preserved or not is of the greatest consequence; the one is the servant of the whole body, and the other the master, in whom all the ruling senses are by nature set. let the young men imagine that he hears in what has preceded the praises of the military life; the law shall be as follows: he shall serve in war who is on the roll or appointed to some special service, and if any one is absent from cowardice, and without the leave of the generals, he shall be indicted before the military commanders for failure of service when the army comes home; and the soldiers shall be his judges; the heavy-armed, and the cavalry, and the other arms of the service shall form separate courts; and they shall bring the heavy-armed before the heavy-armed, and the horsemen before the horsemen, and the others in like manner before their peers; and he who is found guilty shall never be allowed to compete for any prize of valour, or indict another for not serving on an expedition, or be an accuser at all in any military matters. moreover, the court shall further determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay. when the suits for failure of service are completed, the leaders of the several kinds of troops shall again hold an assembly, and they shall adjudge the prizes of valour; and he who likes searching for judgment in his own branch of the service, saying nothing about any former expedition, nor producing any proof or witnesses to confirm his statement, but speaking only of the present occasion. the crown of victory shall be an olive wreath which the victor shall offer up at the temple of any war-god whom he likes, adding an inscription for a testimony to last during life, that such an one has received the first, the second, or the third prize. if any one goes on an expedition, and returns home before the appointed time, when the generals have not withdrawn the army, he shall be indicted for desertion before the same persons who took cognizance of failure of service, and if he be found guilty, the same punishment shall be inflicted on him. now every man who is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false witness against any one, either intentionally or unintentionally, if he can help; for justice is truly said to be an honourable maiden, and falsehood is naturally repugnant to honour and justice. a witness ought to be very careful not to sin against justice, as for example in what relates to the throwing away of arms--he must distinguish the throwing them away when necessary, and not make that a reproach, or bring an action against some innocent person on that account. to make the distinction may be difficult; but still the law must attempt to define the different kinds in some way. let me endeavour to explain my meaning by an ancient tale: if patroclus had been brought to the tent still alive but without his arms (and this has happened to innumerable persons), the original arms, which the poet says were presented to peleus by the gods as a nuptial gift when he married thetis, remaining in the hands of hector, then the base spirits of that day might have reproached the son of menoetius with having cast away his arms. again, there is the case of those who have been thrown down precipices and lost their arms; and of those who at sea, and in stormy places, have been suddenly overwhelmed by floods of water; and there are numberless things of this kind which one might adduce by way of extenuation, and with the view of justifying a misfortune which is easily misrepresented. we must, therefore, endeavour to divide to the best of our power the greater and more serious evil from the lesser. and a distinction may be drawn in the use of terms of reproach. a man does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his shield; he may be only the loser of his arms. for there is a great or rather absolute difference between him who is deprived of his arms by a sufficient force, and him who voluntarily lets his shield go. let the law then be as follows: if a person having arms is overtaken by the enemy and does not turn round and defend himself, but lets them go voluntarily or throws them away, choosing a base life and a swift escape rather than a courageous and noble and blessed death--in such a case of the throwing away of arms let justice be done, but the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned; for the bad men ought always to be punished, in the hope that he may be improved, but not the unfortunate, for there is no advantage in that. and what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his weapons of defence? tradition says that caeneus, the thessalian, was changed by a god from a woman into a man; but the converse miracle cannot now be wrought, or no punishment would be more proper than that the man who throws away his shield should be changed into a woman. this however is impossible, and therefore let us make a law as nearly like this as we can--that he who loves his life too well shall be in no danger for the remainder of his days, but shall live for ever under the stigma of cowardice. and let the law be in the following terms: when a man is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war, no general or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or give him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers; and the officer who gives the coward any place, shall suffer a penalty which the public examiner shall exact of him; and if he be of the highest class, he shall pay a thousand drachmae; or if he be of the second class, five minae; or if he be of the third, three minae; or if he be of the fourth class, one mina. and he who is found guilty of cowardice, shall not only be dismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his nature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae, if he be of the highest class, and five minae if he be of the second class, and three if he be of the third class, and a mina, like the preceding, if he be of the fourth class. what regulations will be proper about examiners, seeing that some of our magistrates are elected by lot, and for a year, and some for a longer time and from selected persons? of such magistrates, who will be a sufficient censor or examiner, if any of them, weighed down by the pressure of office or his own inability to support the dignity of his office, be guilty of any crooked practice? it is by no means easy to find a magistrate who excels other magistrates in virtue, but still we must endeavour to discover some censor or examiner who is more than man. for the truth is, that there are many elements of dissolution in a state, as there are also in a ship, or in an animal; they all have their cords, and girders, and sinews--one nature diffused in many places, and called by many names; and the office of examiner is a most important element in the preservation and dissolution of states. for if the examiners are better than the magistrates, and their duty is fulfilled justly and without blame, then the whole state and country flourishes and is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on in a wrong way, then, by the relaxation of that justice which is the uniting principle of all constitutions, every power in the state is rent asunder from every other; they no longer incline in the same direction, but fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one, and soon bring all to destruction. wherefore the examiners ought to be admirable in every sort of virtue. let us invent a mode of creating them, which shall be as follows: every year, after the summer solstice, the whole city shall meet in the common precincts of helios and apollo, and shall present to the god three men out of their own number in the manner following: each citizen shall select, not himself, but some other citizen whom he deems in every way the best, and who is not less than fifty years of age. and out of the selected persons who have the greatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they reduce them to one-half, if they are an even number; but if they are not an even number, they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number of votes, and make them an even number, and then leave the half which have the greater number of votes. and if two persons have an equal number of votes, and thus increase the number beyond one-half, they shall withdraw the younger of the two and do away the excess; and then including all the rest they shall again vote, until there are left three having an unequal number of votes. but if all the three, or two out of the three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate and fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the third; these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the prize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world that the city of the magnetes, by the providence of the gods, is again preserved, and presents to the sun and to apollo her three best men as first-fruits, to be a common offering to them, according to the ancient law, as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. and these shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue until each has completed seventy-five years, to whom three shall afterwards be added yearly; and let these divide all the magistracies into twelve parts, and prove the holders of them by every sort of test to which a freeman may be subjected; and let them live while they hold office in the precinct of helios and apollo, in which they were chosen, and let each one form a judgment of some things individually, and of others in company with his colleagues; and let him place a writing in the agora about each magistracy, and what the magistrate ought to suffer or pay, according to the decision of the examiners. and if a magistrate does not admit that he has been justly judged, let him bring the examiners before the select judges, and if he be acquitted by their decision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves; if, however, he be convicted, and have been condemned to death by the examiners, let him die (and of course he can only die once): but any other penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over. and now let us pass under review the examiners themselves; what will their examination be, and how conducted? during the life of these men, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue, they shall have the first seat at all public assemblies, and at all hellenic sacrifices and sacred missions, and other public and holy ceremonies in which they share. the chiefs of each sacred mission shall be selected from them, and they only of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel; they shall all be priests of apollo and helios; and one of them, who is judged first of the priests created in that year, shall be high priest; and they shall write up his name in each year to be a measure of time as long as the city lasts; and after their death they shall be laid out and carried to the grave and entombed in a manner different from the other citizens. they shall be decked in a robe all of white, and there shall be no crying or lamentation over them; but a chorus of fifteen maidens, and another of boys, shall stand around the bier on either side, hymning the praises of the departed priests in alternate responses, declaring their blessedness in song all day long; and at dawn a hundred of the youths who practise gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the departed shall choose, shall carry the bier to the sepulchre, the young men marching first, dressed in the garb of warriors--the cavalry with their horses, the heavy-armed with their arms, and the others in like manner. and boys near the bier and in front of it shall sing their national hymn, and maidens shall follow behind, and with them the women who have passed the age of child-bearing; next, although they are interdicted from other burials, let priests and priestesses follow, unless the pythian oracle forbid them; for this burial is free from pollution. the place of burial shall be an oblong vaulted chamber underground, constructed of tufa, which will last for ever, having stone couches placed side by side. and here they will lay the blessed person, and cover the sepulchre with a circular mound of earth and plant a grove of trees around on every side but one; and on that side the sepulchre shall be allowed to extend for ever, and a new mound will not be required. every year they shall have contests in music and gymnastics, and in horsemanship, in honour of the dead. these are the honours which shall be given to those who at the examination are found blameless; but if any of them, trusting to the scrutiny being over, should, after the judgment has been given, manifest the wickedness of human nature, let the law ordain that he who pleases shall indict him, and let the cause be tried in the following manner. in the first place, the court shall be composed of the guardians of the law, and to them the surviving examiners shall be added, as well as the court of select judges; and let the pursuer lay his indictment in this form--he shall say that so-and-so is unworthy of the prize of virtue and of his office; and if the defendant be convicted let him be deprived of his office, and of the burial, and of the other honours given him. but if the prosecutor do not obtain the fifth part of the votes, let him, if he be of the first-class, pay twelve minae, and eight if he be of the second class, and six if he be of the third class, and two minae if he be of the fourth class. the so-called decision of rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. he knew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt that there were gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days, because most men were the sons of gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. he appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but to the gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. for he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. but now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the opinion of most men, and of the worst men, is that in return for a small sacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in purloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments, the way of rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice; for as the opinions of men about the gods are changed, the laws should also be changed--in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side--he who obtains leave to bring an action should write down the charges, but should not add an oath; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing, and not swear; for it is a dreadful thing to know, when many lawsuits are going on in a state, that almost half the people who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. let the law, then, be as follows: a judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath, and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall either vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from a temple; so too the judge of dances and of all music, and the superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and any matters in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath, shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the sake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor to use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. but they shall ever be teaching and learning what is just in auspicious words; and he who does otherwise shall be supposed to speak beside the point, and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at issue. on the other hand, strangers in their dealings with strangers shall as at present have power to give and receive oaths, for they will not often grow old in the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons and heirs of the land. as to the initiation of private suits, let the manner of deciding causes between all citizens be the same as in cases in which any freeman is disobedient to the state in minor matters, of which the penalty is not stripes, imprisonment, or death. but as regards attendance at choruses or processions or other shows, and as regards public services, whether the celebration of sacrifice in peace, or the payment of contributions in war--in all these cases, first comes the necessity of providing a remedy for the loss; and by those who will not obey, there shall be security given to the officers whom the city and the law empower to exact the sum due; and if they forfeit their security, let the goods which they have pledged be sold and the money given to the city; but if they ought to pay a larger sum, the several magistrates shall impose upon the disobedient a suitable penalty, and bring them before the court, until they are willing to do what they are ordered. now a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only, and has no foreign trade, must consider what it will do about the emigration of its own people to other countries, and the reception of strangers from elsewhere. about these matters the legislator has to consider, and he will begin by trying to persuade men as far as he can. the intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of manners; strangers are always suggesting novelties to strangers. when states are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury; but seeing that most cities are the reverse of well-ordered, the confusion which arises in them from the reception of strangers, and from the citizens themselves rushing off into other cities, when any one either young or old desires to travel anywhere abroad at whatever time, is of no consequence. on the other hand, the refusal of states to receive others, and for their own citizens never to go to other places, is an utter impossibility, and to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilised; it is a practice adopted by people who use harsh words, such as xenelasia or banishment of strangers, and who have harsh and morose ways, as men think. and to be thought or not to be thought well of by the rest of the world is no light matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments of the differences between the good and bad. and the generality of cities are quite right in exhorting us to value a good reputation in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this--that he who is really good (i am speaking of the men who would be perfect) seeks for reputation with, but not without, the reality of goodness. and our cretan colony ought also to acquire the fairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men; and there is every reason to expect that, if the reality answers to the idea, she will be one of the few well-ordered cities which the sun and the other gods behold. wherefore, in the matter of journeys to other countries and the reception of strangers, we enact as follows: in the first place, let no one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is less than forty years of age; and no one shall go in a private capacity, but only in some public one, as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a sacred mission. going abroad on an expedition or in war is not to be included among travels of the class authorised by the state. to apollo at delphi and to zeus at olympia and to nemea and to the isthmus, citizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games there dedicated to the gods; and they should send as many as possible, and the best and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned at holy meetings in time of peace, procuring a glory which shall be the converse of that which is gained in war; and when they come home they shall teach the young that the institutions of other states are inferior to their own. and they shall send spectators of another sort, if they have the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look a little more at leisure at the doings of other men; and these no law shall hinder. for a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilised, nor, again, can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them. and there always are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities. these are they whom the citizens of a well-ordered city should be ever seeking out, going forth over sea and over land to find him who is incorruptible--that he may establish more firmly institutions in his own state which are good already, and amend what is deficient; for without this examination and enquiry a city will never continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted. cleinias: how can we have an examination and also a good one? athenian: in this way: in the first place, our spectator shall be of not less than fifty years of age; he must be a man of reputation, especially in war, if he is to exhibit to other cities a model of the guardians of the law, but when he is more than sixty years of age he shall no longer continue in his office of spectator. and when he has carried on his inspection during as many out of the ten years of his office as he pleases, on his return home let him go to the assembly of those who review the laws. this shall be a mixed body of young and old men, who shall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising of the sun. they shall consist, in the first place, of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue; and, in the second place, of guardians of the law, the ten eldest being chosen; the general superintendent of education shall also be a member, as well as the last appointed as those who have been released from the office; and each of them shall take with him as his companion a young man, whomsoever he chooses, between the ages of thirty and forty. these shall be always holding conversation and discourse about the laws of their own city or about any specially good ones which they may hear to be existing elsewhere; also about kinds of knowledge which may appear to be of use and will throw light upon the examination, or of which the want will make the subject of laws dark and uncertain to them. any knowledge of this sort which the elders approve, the younger men shall learn with all diligence; and if any one of those who have been invited appear to be unworthy, the whole assembly shall blame him who invited him. the rest of the city shall watch over those among the young men who distinguish themselves, having an eye upon them, and especially honouring them if they succeed, but dishonouring them above the rest if they turn out to be inferior. this is the assembly to which he who has visited the institutions of other men, on his return home shall straightway go, and if he have discovered any one who has anything to say about the enactment of laws or education or nurture, or if he have himself made any observations, let him communicate his discoveries to the whole assembly. and if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse, let him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm; and if he be much better, let him be praised so much the more; and not only while he lives but after his death let the assembly honour him with fitting honours. but if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted, pretending to be wise when he is not, let him hold no communication with any one, whether young or old; and if he will hearken to the rulers, then he shall be permitted to live as a private individual; but if he will not, let him die, if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about education and the laws. and if he deserve to be indicted, and none of the magistrates indict him, let that be counted as a disgrace to them when the rewards of virtue are decided. let such be the character of the person who goes abroad, and let him go abroad under these conditions. in the next place, the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. now there are four kinds of strangers, of whom we must make some mention--the first is he who comes and stays throughout the summer; this class are like birds of passage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea to other cities, while the season lasts; he shall be received in market-places and harbours and public buildings, near the city but outside, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever he be, duly receives justice; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation. they shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this shall be as little as possible. the second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festivals of the muses; such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons, and the priests and ministers of the temples should see and attend to them. but they should not remain more than a reasonable time; let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came, and then go away, neither having suffered nor done any harm. the priests shall be their judges, if any of them receive or do any wrong up to the sum of fifty drachmae, but if any greater charge be brought, in such cases the suit shall come before the wardens of the agora. the third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land, and is to be received with public honours. he is to be received only by the generals and commanders of horse and foot, and the host by whom he is entertained, in conjunction with the prytanes, shall have the sole charge of what concerns him. there is a fourth class of persons answering to our spectators, who come from another land to look at ours. in the first place, such visits will be rare, and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age; he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city. let such an one, then, go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, being one of them himself: let him go, for example, to the house of the superintendent of education, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host, or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them, both learning from them, and also teaching them; and when he has seen and heard all, he shall depart, as a friend taking leave of friends, and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect. these are the customs, according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come from other countries, and should send forth her own citizens, showing respect to zeus, the god of hospitality, not forbidding strangers at meals and sacrifices, as is the manner which prevails among the children of the nile, nor driving them away by savage proclamations. when a man becomes surety, let him give the security in a distinct form, acknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand drachmae, and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a thousand drachmae. the agent of a dishonest or untrustworthy seller shall himself be responsible; both the agent and the principal shall be equally liable. if a person wishes to find anything in the house of another, he shall enter naked, or wearing only a short tunic and without a girdle, having first taken an oath by the customary gods that he expects to find it there; he shall then make his search, and the other shall throw open his house and allow him to search things both sealed and unsealed. and if a person will not allow the searcher to make his search, he who is prevented shall go to law with him, estimating the value of the goods after which he is searching, and if the other be convicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. if the master be absent from home, the dwellers in the house shall let him search the unsealed property, and on the sealed property the searcher shall set another seal, and shall appoint any one whom he likes to guard them during five days; and if the master of the house be absent during a longer time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city, and so make his search, opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed, and then, together with the members of the family and the wardens of the city, he shall seal them up again as they were before. there shall be a limit of time in the case of disputed things, and he who has had possession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be disturbed. as to houses and lands there can be no dispute in this state of ours; but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and openly shown in the city and in the agora and in the temples, and no one has put in a claim to them, and some one says that he was looking for them during this time, and the possessor is proved to have made no concealment, if they have continued for a year, the one having the goods and the other looking for them, the claim of the seeker shall not be allowed after the expiration of the year; or if he does not use or show the lost property in the market or in the city, but only in the country, and no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the expiration of the five years the claim shall be barred for ever after; or if he uses them in the city but within the house, then the appointed time of claiming the goods shall be three years, or ten years if he has them in the country in private. and if he has them in another land, there shall be no limit of time or prescription, but whenever the owner finds them he may claim them. if any one prevents another by force from being present at a trial, whether a principal party or his witnesses; if the person prevented be a slave, whether his own or belonging to another, the suit shall be incomplete and invalid; but if he who is prevented be a freeman, besides the suit being incomplete, the other who has prevented him shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall be prosecuted for kidnapping by any one who pleases. and if any one hinders by force a rival competitor in gymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present at the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judges, and they shall liberate him who is desirous of competing; and if they are not able, and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize, then they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented, and inscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases; and he who hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or inscription having reference to that contest, and in any case he shall be liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer. if any one knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall undergo the same punishment as the thief, and if a man receives an exile he shall be punished with death. every man should regard the friend and enemy of the state as his own friend and enemy; and if any one makes peace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority of the state, he, like the receiver of the exile, shall undergo the penalty of death. and if any fraction of the city declare war or peace against any, the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding, and if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts, and there ought to be no excusing or approving the saying, 'men should receive gifts as the reward of good, but not of evil deeds'; for to know which we are doing, and to stand fast by our knowledge, is no easy matter. the safest course is to obey the law which says, 'do no service for a bribe,' and let him who disobeys, if he be convicted, simply die. with a view to taxation, for various reasons, every man ought to have had his property valued: and the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly produce to the wardens of the country, that in this way there may be two valuations; and the public officers may use annually whichever on consideration they deem the best, whether they prefer to take a certain portion of the whole value, or of the annual revenue, after subtracting what is paid to the common tables. touching offerings to the gods, a moderate man should observe moderation in what he offers. now the land and the hearth of the house of all men is sacred to all gods; wherefore let no man dedicate them a second time to the gods. gold and silver, whether possessed by private persons or in temples, are in other cities provocative of envy, and ivory, the product of a dead body, is not a proper offering; brass and iron, again, are instruments of war; but of wood let a man bring what offering he likes, provided it be a single block, and in like manner of stone, to the public temples; of woven work let him not offer more than one woman can execute in a month. white is a colour suitable to the gods, especially in woven works, but dyes should only be used for the adornments of war. the most divine of gifts are birds and images, and they should be such as one painter can execute in a single day. and let all other offerings follow a similar rule. now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described, and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing will be to have justice done. the first of the courts shall consist of elected judges, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant in common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. and in the second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes corresponding to the twelvefold division of the land, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment; and if he find fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. and the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall if he wins receive in addition to the damages a fifth part more, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as i said before, half as much again, and the plaintiff, if he lose, shall pay half of the damages claimed. now the assignment by lot of judges to courts and the completion of the number of them, and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates, and the times at which the several causes should be heard, and the votings and delays, and all the things that necessarily concern suits, and the order of causes, and the time in which answers have to be put in and parties are to appear--of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken, but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice: all lesser and easier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger one. private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way, and the public and state courts, and those which the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many other states. many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of experience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined; and then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible, they shall use them for ever afterwards. as to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse, and the different notions of the just and good and honourable which exist in our own as compared with other states, they have been partly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned hereafter as we draw near the end. to all these matters he who would be an equal judge shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. for of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner; otherwise there would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (nous, nomos). and of all other words, such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them, as is often the case--of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator, which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright, procuring for the good the continuance and increase of justice, and for the bad, on the other hand, a conversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all unrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those whose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the only remedy for souls in their condition, as i may say truly again and again. and such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise from the whole city. when the suits of the year are completed the following laws shall regulate their execution: in the first place, the judge shall assign to the party who wins the suit the whole property of him who loses, with the exception of mere necessaries, and the assignment shall be made through the herald immediately after each decision in the hearing of the judges; and when the month arrives following the month in which the courts are sitting, (unless the gainer of the suit has been previously satisfied) the court shall follow up the case, and hand over to the winner the goods of the loser; but if they find that he has not the means of paying, and the sum deficient is not less than a drachma, the insolvent person shall not have any right of going to law with any other man until he have satisfied the debt of the winning party; but other persons shall still have the right of bringing suits against him. and if any one after he is condemned refuses to acknowledge the authority which condemned him, let the magistrates who are thus deprived of their authority bring him before the court of the guardians of the law, and if he be cast, let him be punished with death, as a subverter of the whole state and of the laws. thus a man is born and brought up, and after this manner he begets and brings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with other men, and suffers if he has done wrong to any one, and receives satisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at length in due time he grows old under the protection of the laws, and his end comes in the order of nature. concerning the dead of either sex, the religious ceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the gods of the under-world or of this, shall be decided by the interpreters with absolute authority. their sepulchres are not to be in places which are fit for cultivation, and there shall be no monuments in such spots, either large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country which is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. no man, living or dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth, their foster-parent, is naturally inclined to provide for them. and let not the mound be piled higher than would be the work of five men completed in five days; nor shall the stone which is placed over the spot be larger than would be sufficient to receive the praises of the dead included in four heroic lines. nor shall the laying out of the dead in the house continue for a longer time than is sufficient to distinguish between him who is in a trance only and him who is really dead, and speaking generally, the third day after death will be a fair time for carrying out the body to the sepulchre. now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly said to be our shades or images; for the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other gods, before them to give an account--which is an inspiring hope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us; and they also say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man after he is dead. but the living--he should be helped by all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the world below. if this be true, a man ought not to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him; he should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfil his own destiny, and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moderately on the lifeless altar of the gods below. but the legislator does not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of meanness. let the law, then, be as follows: the expenditure on the entire funeral of him who is of the highest class, shall not exceed five minae; and for him who is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third class, two minae, and for him who is of the fourth class, one mina, will be a fair limit of expense. the guardians of the law ought to take especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood, or manhood, or any other age. and at the end of all, let there be some one guardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of the deceased to superintend, and let it be glory to him to manage with fairness and moderation what relates to the dead, and a discredit to him if they are not well managed. let the laying out and other ceremonies be in accordance with custom, but to the statesman who adopts custom as his law we must give way in certain particulars. it would be monstrous for example that he should command any man to weep or abstain from weeping over the dead; but he may forbid cries of lamentation, and not allow the voice of the mourner to be heard outside the house; also, he may forbid the bringing of the dead body into the open streets, or the processions of mourners in the streets, and may require that before daybreak they should be outside the city. let these, then, be our laws relating to such matters, and let him who obeys be free from penalty; but he who disobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all with a fitting penalty. other modes of burial, or again the denial of burial, which is to be refused in the case of robbers of temples and parricides and the like, have been devised and are embodied in the preceding laws, so that now our work of legislation is pretty nearly at an end; but in all cases the end does not consist in doing something or acquiring something or establishing something--the end will be attained and finally accomplished, when we have provided for the perfect and lasting continuance of our institutions; until then our creation is incomplete. cleinias: that is very good, stranger; but i wish you would tell me more clearly what you mean. athenian: o cleinias, many things of old time were well said and sung; and the saying about the fates was one of them. cleinias: what is it? athenian: the saying that lachesis or the giver of the lots is the first of them, and that clotho or the spinster is the second of them, and that atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them; and that she is the preserver of the things which we have spoken, and which have been compared in a figure to things woven by fire, they both (i.e. atropos and the fire) producing the quality of unchangeableness. i am speaking of the things which in a state and government give not only health and salvation to the body, but law, or rather preservation of the law, in the soul; and, if i am not mistaken, this seems to be still wanting in our laws: we have still to see how we can implant in them this irreversible nature. cleinias: it will be no small matter if we can only discover how such a nature can be implanted in anything. athenian: but it certainly can be; so much i clearly see. cleinias: then let us not think of desisting until we have imparted this quality to our laws; for it is ridiculous, after a great deal of labour has been spent, to place a thing at last on an insecure foundation. athenian: i approve of your suggestion, and am quite of the same mind with you. cleinias: very good: and now what, according to you, is to be the salvation of our government and of our laws, and how is it to be effected? athenian: were we not saying that there must be in our city a council which was to be of this sort: the ten oldest guardians of the law, and all those who have obtained prizes of virtue, were to meet in the same assembly, and the council was also to include those who had visited foreign countries in the hope of hearing something that might be of use in the preservation of the laws, and who, having come safely home, and having been tested in these same matters, had proved themselves to be worthy to take part in the assembly--each of the members was to select some young man of not less than thirty years of age, he himself judging in the first instance whether the young man was worthy by nature and education, and then suggesting him to the others, and if he seemed to them also to be worthy they were to adopt him; but if not, the decision at which they arrived was to be kept a secret from the citizens at large, and, more especially, from the rejected candidate. the meeting of the council was to be held early in the morning, when everybody was most at leisure from all other business, whether public or private--was not something of this sort said by us before? cleinias: true. athenian: then, returning to the council, i would say further, that if we let it down to be the anchor of the state, our city, having everything which is suitable to her, will preserve all that we wish to preserve. cleinias: what do you mean? athenian: now is the time for me to speak the truth in all earnestness. cleinias: well said, and i hope that you will fulfil your intention. athenian: know, cleinias, that everything, in all that it does, has a natural saviour, as of an animal the soul and the head are the chief saviours. cleinias: once more, what do you mean? athenian: the well-being of those two is obviously the preservation of every living thing. cleinias: how is that? athenian: the soul, besides other things, contains mind, and the head, besides other things, contains sight and hearing; and the mind, mingling with the noblest of the senses, and becoming one with them, may be truly called the salvation of all. cleinias: yes, quite so. athenian: yes, indeed; but with what is that intellect concerned which, mingling with the senses, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as in fair weather? in a ship, when the pilot and the sailors unite their perceptions with the piloting mind, do they not save both themselves and their craft? cleinias: very true. athenian: we do not want many illustrations about such matters: what aim would the general of an army, or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain salvation? cleinias: very good. athenian: does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war, and do not the physician and his assistants aim at producing health in the body? cleinias: certainly. athenian: and a physician who is ignorant about the body, that is to say, who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general who knows not victory, or any others who are ignorant of the particulars of the arts which we mentioned, cannot be said to have understanding about any of these matters. cleinias: they cannot. athenian: and what would you say of the state? if a person proves to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look, ought he, in the first place, to be called a ruler at all; and further, will he ever be able to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim? cleinias: impossible. athenian: and therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as i was saying, will tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or what man will advise us to that end. any state which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance. cleinias: very true. athenian: in which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? can we say? cleinias: i am not quite certain, stranger; but i have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night. athenian: you understand me perfectly, cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims. cleinias: quite true. athenian: then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray--the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. the tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with a view to two things at once--they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look. cleinias: then, stranger, our former assertion will hold; for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue. athenian: yes. cleinias: and we said that virtue was of four kinds? athenian: quite true. cleinias: and that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard? athenian: you follow me capitally, cleinias, and i would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that one thing to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mind political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: o wonderful being, and to what are you looking? the physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not able to tell. can you, megillus, and you, cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which i have given you? cleinias: we cannot, stranger. athenian: well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found? cleinias: for example, where? athenian: for example, we were saying that there are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and further, all four of them we call one; for we say that courage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue. cleinias: quite so. athenian: there is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. but there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue. cleinias: how do you mean? athenian: i have no difficulty in explaining what i mean. let us distribute the subject into questions and answers. cleinias: once more, what do you mean? athenian: ask me what is that one thing which i call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. i will tell you how that occurs: one of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate, and quite young children--i mean courage; for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. but without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and understanding soul; it is of a different nature. cleinias: that is true. athenian: i have now told you in what way the two are different, and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. suppose that i ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition. can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and glorious truths are concerned? cleinias: i suppose not. athenian: and is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, than these very qualities of which we are now speaking--courage, temperance, wisdom, justice? cleinias: how can there be anything greater? athenian: and ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, the guardians of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil actions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature of virtue and vice? or shall some poet who has found his way into the city, or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth, show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue? and can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day? cleinias: wonder! no. athenian: well, then, must we do as we said? or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power? cleinias: what, stranger, is the drift of your comparison? athenian: do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? they keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in the city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many wise thoughts--that is to say, the old men--take counsel, and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them--in this way both together truly preserve the whole state: shall this or some other be the order of our state? are all our citizens to be equal in acquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who have received a more careful training and education? cleinias: that they should be equal, my good sir, is impossible. athenian: then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any which has preceded. cleinias: certainly. athenian: and must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding? cleinias: very true. athenian: did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he should press onward to the one? this he should know, and knowing, order all things with a view to it. cleinias: true. athenian: and can any one have a more exact way of considering or contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered from many different things? cleinias: perhaps not. athenian: not 'perhaps not,' but 'certainly not,' my good sir, is the right answer. there never has been a truer method than this discovered by any man. cleinias: i bow to your authority, stranger; let us proceed in the way which you propose. athenian: then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four--the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. to this, my friends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one? certainly, if we take counsel among ourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will. cleinias: we must not, stranger, by the god of strangers i swear that we must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose. athenian: wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished. cleinias: certainly, it ought to be, if it can be. athenian: well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view? are our guardians only to know that each of them is many, or also how and in what way they are one? cleinias: they must consider also in what sense they are one. athenian: and are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth what they think? cleinias: certainly not; that would be the state of a slave. athenian: and may not the same be said of all good things--that the true guardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature? cleinias: certainly. athenian: is not the knowledge of the gods which we have set forth with so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge--to know that they are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? we do indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the gods; our city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not laboured at these things. cleinias: it is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things honourable should be put away from him. athenian: are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the gods, as we have already stated? cleinias: what are they? athenian: one is the argument about the soul, which has been already mentioned--that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. if a man look upon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never any one so godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many imagine. for they think that those who handle these matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become godless, because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good. cleinias: but what is the fact? athenian: just the opposite, as i said, of the opinion which once prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. even in those days men wondered about them, and that which is now ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of them--that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they could never have moved with numerical exactness so wonderful; and even at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. but these same persons again mistaking the nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, i should say, themselves; for the bodies which they saw moving in heaven all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless substances, and to these they assigned the causes of all things. such studies gave rise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be abusive--comparing the philosophers to she-dogs uttering vain howlings, and talking other nonsense of the same sort. but now, as i said, the case is reversed. cleinias: how so? athenian: no man can be a true worshipper of the gods who does not know these two principles--that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover, as i have now said several times, he who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous training, and seen the connexion of music with these things, and harmonized them all with laws and institutions, is not able to give a reason of such things as have a reason. and he who is unable to acquire this in addition to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can hardly be a good ruler of a whole state; but he should be the subordinate of other rulers. wherefore, cleinias and megillus, let us consider whether we may not add to all the other laws which we have discussed this further one--that the nocturnal assembly of the magistrates, which has also shared in the whole scheme of education proposed by us, shall be a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state. shall we propose this? cleinias: certainly, my good friend, we will if the thing is in any degree possible. athenian: let us make a common effort to gain such an object; for i too will gladly share in the attempt. of these matters i have had much experience, and have often considered them, and i dare say that i shall be able to find others who will also help. cleinias: i agree, stranger, that we should proceed along the road in which god is guiding us; and how we can proceed rightly has now to be investigated and explained. athenian: o megillus and cleinias, about these matters we cannot legislate further until the council is constituted; when that is done, then we will determine what authority they shall have of their own; but the explanation of how this is all to be ordered would only be given rightly in a long discourse. cleinias: what do you mean, and what new thing is this? athenian: in the first place, a list would have to be made out of those who by their ages and studies and dispositions and habits are well fitted for the duty of a guardian. in the next place, it will not be easy for them to discover themselves what they ought to learn, or become the disciple of one who has already made the discovery. furthermore, to write down the times at which, and during which, they ought to receive the several kinds of instruction, would be a vain thing; for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the knowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul of each. and so these details, although they could not be truly said to be secret, might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand, because when stated they would have no meaning. cleinias: what then are we to do, stranger, under these circumstances? athenian: as the proverb says, the answer is no secret, but open to all of us: we must risk the whole on the chance of throwing, as they say, thrice six or thrice ace, and i am willing to share with you the danger by stating and explaining to you my views about education and nurture, which is the question coming to the surface again. the danger is not a slight or ordinary one, and i would advise you, cleinias, in particular, to see to the matter; for if you order rightly the city of the magnetes, or whatever name god may give it, you will obtain the greatest glory; or at any rate you will be thought the most courageous of men in the estimation of posterity. dear companions, if this our divine assembly can only be established, to them we will hand over the city; none of the present company of legislators, as i may call them, would hesitate about that. and the state will be perfected and become a waking reality, which a little while ago we attempted to create as a dream and in idea only, mingling together reason and mind in one image, in the hope that our citizens might be duly mingled and rightly educated; and being educated, and dwelling in the citadel of the land, might become perfect guardians, such as we have never seen in all our previous life, by reason of the saving virtue which is in them. megillus: dear cleinias, after all that has been said, either we must detain the stranger, and by supplications and in all manner of ways make him share in the foundation of the city, or we must give up the undertaking. cleinias: very true, megillus; and you must join with me in detaining him. megillus: i will. 