A treatise of taxes and contributions shewing the nature and measures of [brace] crown-lands, assessments, customs, poll-moneys, lotteries, benevolence, penalties, monopolies, offices, tythes, raising of coins, harth-money, excize, &c. : with several intersperst discourses and digressions concerning [brace] warres, the church, universities, rents and purchases, usury and exchange, banks and lombards, registries for conveyances, beggars, ensurance, exportation of money/wool, free-ports, coins, housing, liberty of conscience, &c. : the same being frequently applied to the present state and affairs of Ireland.
Petty, William, Sir, 1623-1687.
1662
Approx. 190 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 47 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images.
Text Creation Partnership,
Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) :
2003-01 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).
A54625
Wing P1938
ESTC R33399
13292188
ocm 13292188
98850
This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of
Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal
. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.
Early English books online.
(EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A54625)
Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 98850)
Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 1039:25)
A treatise of taxes and contributions shewing the nature and measures of [brace] crown-lands, assessments, customs, poll-moneys, lotteries, benevolence, penalties, monopolies, offices, tythes, raising of coins, harth-money, excize, &c. : with several intersperst discourses and digressions concerning [brace] warres, the church, universities, rents and purchases, usury and exchange, banks and lombards, registries for conveyances, beggars, ensurance, exportation of money/wool, free-ports, coins, housing, liberty of conscience, &c. : the same being frequently applied to the present state and affairs of Ireland.
Petty, William, Sir, 1623-1687.
[16], 75, [3] p.
Printed for N. Brooke ...,
London :
1662.
Attributed to William Petty by Wing.
Includes index.
Errata: p. [2]-[3] (at end)
Reproduction of original in the Cambridge University Library.
Created by converting TCP files to TEI P5 using tcp2tei.xsl, TEI @ Oxford.
Re-processed by University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. Gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors.
EEBO-TCP is a partnership between the Universities of Michigan and Oxford and the publisher ProQuest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by ProQuest via their Early English Books Online (EEBO) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). The general aim of EEBO-TCP is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic English-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in EEBO.
EEBO-TCP aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the Text Encoding Initiative (http://www.tei-c.org).
The EEBO-TCP project was divided into two phases. The 25,363 texts created during Phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 January 2015. Anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source.
Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data.
Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so.
Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor.
The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines.
Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements).
Keying and markup guidelines are available at the
Text Creation Partnership web site
.
eng
Taxation -- Ireland.
Finance -- Ireland.
Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1660-1688.
2000-00 TCP
Assigned for keying and markup
2001-08 Apex CoVantage
Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images
2001-09 TCP Staff (Michigan)
Sampled and proofread
2001-09 TCP Staff (Michigan)
Text and markup reviewed and edited
2001-11 pfs
Batch review (QC) and XML conversion
A
TREATISE
OF
Taxes
&
Contributions
.
Shewing
the
Nature
and
Measures
of
Crown-Lands
.
Assessements
.
Customs
.
Poll-Moneys
.
Lotteries
.
Benevolence
.
Penalties
.
Monopolies
.
Offices
.
Tythes
.
Raising
of
Coins
.
Harth-Money
.
Excize
,
&c.
With
several
intersperst
Discourses
and
Digressions
concerning
Warres
.
The
Church
.
Universities
.
Rents
&
Purchases
.
Usury
&
Exchange
.
Banks
&
Lombards
.
Registries
for
Conveyances
.
Beggars
.
Ensurance
.
Exportation
of
Money
.
Exportation
of
Wool.
Free-Ports
.
Coins
.
Housing
.
Liberty
of
Conscience
,
&c.
The
same
being
frequently
applied
to
the
present
State
and
Affairs
of
IRELAND
.
London
,
Printed
for
N.
Brooke
,
at
the
Angel
in
Cornhill
.
1662.
The
Preface
.
YOung
and
vain
persons
,
though
perhaps
they
marry
not
primarily
and
onely
on
purpose
to
get
Children
,
much
less
to
get
such
as
may
be
fit
for
some
one
particular
vocation
;
yet
having
Children
,
they
dispose
of
them
as
well
as
they
can
according
to
their
respective
inclinations
:
Even
so
,
although
I
wrote
these
sheets
but
to
rid
my
head
of
so
many
troublesome
conceits
,
and
not
to
apply
them
to
the
use
of
any
one
particular
People
or
Concernment
;
yet
now
they
are
born
,
and
that
their
Birth
happened
to
be
about
the
time
of
the
Duke
of
Ormond's
going
Lord
Lieutenant
into
Ireland
,
I
thought
they
might
be
as
proper
for
the
consideration
of
that
place
,
as
of
any
other
,
though
perhaps
of
effect
little
enough
in
any
.
Ireland
is
a
place
which
must
have
so
great
an
Army
kept
up
in
it
,
as
may
make
the
Irish
desist
from
doing
themselves
or
the
English
harm
by
their
future
Rebellions
.
And
this
great
Army
well
,
as
well
in
times
and
matters
of
Peace
as
War
,
and
understands
the
Interests
as
well
of
particular
persons
,
as
of
all
and
every
factions
and
parties
struggling
with
each
other
in
that
Kingdom
;
understanding
withall
the
state
of
England
,
and
also
of
several
Forreign
Nations
,
with
reference
to
Ireland
.
2.
His
Grace
hath
given
fresh
demonstration
of
his
care
of
an
English
Interest
in
Ireland
,
and
of
his
wisdom
in
reconciling
the
several
cross
concernments
there
so
far
as
the
same
is
possible
.
3.
His
Graces
Estate
in
Lands
there
is
the
greatest
that
ever
was
in
Ireland
,
and
consequently
he
is
out
of
the
danger
incident
to
those
Proreges
,
against
whom
Cambden
sayes
,
Hibernia
est
semper
querula
;
there
being
no
reason
for
ones
getting
more
Land
,
who
hath
already
the
most
of
any
.
4.
Whereas
some
chief
Governours
who
have
gone
into
Ireland
,
chiefly
to
repair
or
raise
fortunes
,
have
withdrawn
themselves
again
when
their
work
hath
been
done
,
not
abiding
the
clamors
and
complaints
of
the
people
afterwards
:
But
his
Grace
hath
given
Hostages
to
that
Nation
for
his
good
Government
,
and
yet
hath
taken
away
aforehand
all
fears
of
the
contrary
.
5.
His
Grace
dares
do
whatever
he
understands
to
be
fitting
,
even
to
the
doing
of
a
single
Subject
Justice
against
a
Confederate
multitude
;
being
above
the
sinister
interpretations
of
the
jealous
and
querulous
;
for
his
known
Liberality
and
Magnificence
shall
ever
keep
him
free
from
the
clamor
of
the
people
,
and
his
through-tried
fidelity
shall
frustrate
the
force
of
any
subdolous
whisperings
in
the
Ears
of
His
Majesty
.
6.
His
good
acceptance
of
all
ingenious
endeavours
,
shall
make
the
wise
men
of
this
Eastern
England
be
led
by
his
Star
into
Ireland
,
and
there
present
him
with
their
choicest
advices
,
who
can
most
judiciously
select
and
apply
them
.
Lastly
,
this
great
Person
takes
the
great
Settlement
in
hand
,
when
Ireland
is
as
a
white
paper
,
when
there
sits
a
Parliament
most
affectionate
to
his
Person
,
and
capable
of
his
Counsel
,
under
a
King
curious
as
well
as
careful
of
Reformation
;
and
when
there
is
opportunity
,
to
pass
into
Positive
Laws
whatsoever
is
right
reason
and
the
Law
of
Nature
.
Wherefore
by
applying
those
Notions
unto
Ireland
,
I
think
I
have
harped
upon
the
right
string
,
and
have
struck
whilest
the
Iron
is
hot
;
by
publishing
them
now
,
when
,
if
ever
at
all
,
they
be
useful
.
I
would
now
advertise
the
world
,
that
I
do
not
think
I
can
mend
it
,
and
that
I
hold
it
best
for
every
mans
particular
quiet
,
to
let
it
vadere
sicut
vult
;
I
know
well
,
that
res
nolunt
male
administrari
,
and
that
(
say
I
what
I
will
or
can
)
things
will
have
their
course
,
nor
will
nature
be
couzened
:
Wherefore
what
I
have
written
(
as
I
said
before
)
was
done
but
to
ease
and
deliver
my self
,
my
head
having
been
impregnated
with
these
things
by
the
daily
talk
I
hear
about
advancing
and
regulating
Trade
,
and
by
the
murmurs
about
Taxes
,
&c.
Now
whether
what
I
have
said
be
contemned
or
cavilled
at
,
I
care
not
,
being
of
the
same
minde
about
this
,
as
some
thriving
men
are
concerning
the
profuseness
of
their
Children
;
for
as
they
take
pleasure
to
get
even
what
they
believe
will
be
afterwards
pissed
against
the
wall
,
so
do
I
to
write
,
what
I
suspect
will
signifie
nothing
:
Wherefore
the
race
being
not
to
the
swift
,
&c.
but
time
and
chance
happening
to
all
men
,
I
leave
the
Judgement
of
the
whole
to
the
Candid
,
of
whose
correction
I
shall
never
be
impatient
.
The
Index
.
AN
Enumeration
and
description
of
the
several
Branches
of
the
Publick
Charge
.
Page
1
The
Maintenance
of
Governours
ought
to
be
in
greater
splendour
then
private
Callings
can
reach
to
.
Ibidem
The
honour
of
being
trusted
,
and
the
pleasure
of
being
feared
,
is
reward
enough
for
some
Offices
.
p.
2
The
Pastorage
of
Souls
ought
to
be
a
Publick
Charge
even
upon
a
Civil
Account
.
Ibid.
The
use
of
Schools
and
Universities
,
as
they
are
a
publick
charge
.
3
The
common
and
general
Causes
,
which
encrease
and
aggravate
the
burthen
of
paying
Taxes
.
4
The
Causes
that
excite
Forreign
and
Offensive
Wars
.
Ibid.
The
Causes
of
Defensive
and
Civil
Wars
.
5
A
Cause
of
unnecessary
Ecclesiastical
Charge
,
is
the
not
sizing
of
Parishes
according
to
the
Alterations
which
have
been
in
Religion
and
Trade
.
6
That
five
thousand
Parishes
are
enough
for
England
and
Wales
,
so
as
to
give
unto
each
but
a
thousand
Parishioners
,
and
so
as
that
none
need
go
two
miles
to
Church
.
7
Antiquated
Offices
and
overgrown
Fees
a
Cause
of
unnecessary
Charge
in
the
Government
,
and
administration
of
Justice
.
8
Registers
for
Conveyances
of
Lands
and
Depositories
for
moveable
Pawns
,
as
also
Banks
of
Money
will
lessen
the
Charge
of
Law-suits
and
Writings
.
9
How
the
number
of
such
as
relate
to
the
Faculty
of
Medicine
may
be
adjusted
.
10
How
the
number
of
Students
in
the
Universities
intending
to
make
Learning
the
way
of
their
livelihood
may
be
adjusted
.
Ibid.
An
Use
propounded
sor
the
choice
Parish-Children
and
Foundlings
,
to
force
on
an
useful
Work
,
which
hath
hitherto
been
but
perfunctorily
pursued
.
Ibid.
That
the
number
of
unnecessary
Merchants
and
Retailers
be
retrenched
.
11
The
careful
Maintenance
and
Education
of
exposed
Children
,
and
concealing
their
names
and
Families
,
is
a
matter
of
great
consequence
.
Ibid.
A
Proposal
of
several
Employments
,
for
Beggars
and
such
as
have
now
no
Work.
12
Great
Works
of
Labour
though
in
themselves
unnecessary
,
are
nevertheless
of
advantage
to
the
Publick
.
13
The
mending
of
Highwayes
,
building
Bridges
and
Causeys
,
and
the
making
of
Rivers
Navigable
in
England
,
would
make
English
Horses
an
exportable
Commodity
,
and
help
to
vend
the
Commodities
of
Ireland
.
Ibid.
The
Causes
of
unquiet
bearing
of
Taxes
,
viz.
14
First
,
That
the
Sovereign
exacts
too
much
.
15
Secondly
,
That
Assessments
are
unequally
laid
.
Ibid.
Thirdly
,
That
the
Moneys
levied
are
vainly
expended
.
Ibid.
Fourthly
,
Or
given
to
Favourites
.
Ibid.
Fifthly
,
Ignorance
of
the
Number
,
Trade
,
and
Wealth
of
the
People
.
16
Sixthly
,
Obscurity
about
the
right
of
imposing
.
Ibid.
Seventhly
,
Fewness
of
People
.
Ibid.
Eighthly
,
Scarcity
of
Money
,
and
confusion
of
Coins
.
17
Ninthly
,
That
scarce
an
hundredth
part
of
the
Riches
of
this
Nation
is
Coined
Bullion
.
Ibid.
Tenthly
,
The
non-acceptance
of
Some
Commodities
in
specie
in
discharge
of
Taxes
.
Ibid.
The
Consequences
of
a
Tax
too
heavy
if
there
be
too
much
Money
in
a
Nation
,
which
may
be
;
or
is
there
be
too
little
,
and
that
either
in
a
State
well
or
ill
governed
.
17
,
18
,
19
The
first
way
of
providing
for
the
Publick
Charge
,
is
the
excinding
or
setting
apart
of
a
proportion
of
the
Territory
,
in
the
nature
of
Crown-Lands
.
20
The
second
is
taking
away
the
same
proportion
of
the
Rents
of
all
Lands
.
21
The
Nation
is
happy
where
either
of
the
said
two
wayes
is
practised
ab
antiquo
,
and
upon
original
agreement
,
and
not
exacted
as
a
sudden
contingent
Surcharge
upon
the
People
.
21
The
Owners
of
settled
Rents
bear
the
burthen
of
a
Land-Tax
,
or
Assessment
,
others
probably
gaining
thereby
.
Ibid.
A
Land-Tax
upon
free
Estates
resolves
into
an
Excize
upon
Consumptions
.
22
Assessment
upon
Housing
more
uncertain
then
that
of
Land
,
Housing
being
of
a
double
nature
,
viz.
either
an
instrument
of
gain
,
or
way
of
expence
.
Ibid.
The
heavy
taxing
of
Housing
no
discouragement
to
new
Buildings
;
nor
is
the
discouragement
of
new
Buildings
any
means
to
prevent
the
populousness
of
a
City
Ibid.
Prohibition
to
build
upon
new
Foundations
serves
onely
to
fix
the
Ground-plot
of
a
City
.
23
The
reason
why
the
City
of
London
removes
its
Ground-plot
Westward
.
Ibid.
That
't
is
probable
the
King
of
Englands
Palace
will
in
process
of
time
be
towards
Chelsey
.
Ibid.
That
the
present
Seat
of
London
will
be
the
greatest
Cohabitation
of
People
ever
whilst
this
Island
is
inhabited
.
24
The
nature
and
natural
Measures
of
the
Rent
of
Land
,
computed
in
Commodities
of
the
growth
of
the
said
Land.
Ibid.
The
Par
between
food
or
other
proceed
of
Land
,
and
Bullion
or
Coin.
25
The
Par
between
Gold
and
Silver
.
Ibid.
Gold
and
Silver
are
not
natural
Standards
of
the
Values
of
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
26
The
prime
Denominations
of
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
are
but
two
,
viz.
Land
and
Labour
,
as
the
Denominations
of
Money
in
England
are
Pounds
,
Shillings
,
Pence
.
Ibid.
Of
the
Par
between
Land
and
Labour
.
Ibid.
The
reason
of
the
number
of
years
Purchase
that
Land
is
worth
in
several
Countreys
.
27
Why
Land
in
Ireland
is
worth
fewer
years
Purchase
then
in
England
.
27
,
28.
The
Description
and
Ratio
formalis
of
Usury
.
29
The
same
of
Exchange
.
Ibid.
The
Measures
of
both
.
29
,
30
Why
Usury
hath
been
limited
more
then
Exchange
.
30
A
Parallel
between
the
Changes
of
the
Prince
of
Money
,
and
that
of
Land.
Ibid.
How
to
compute
and
compare
the
Rents
of
Lands
,
in
order
to
a
just
Land-Tax
or
Assessment
.
31
The
intrinsick
value
of
Land
is
found
by
Surveys
of
the
Quantity
,
Figure
,
and
Scituation
.
Ibid.
And
by
the
Survey
of
the
Quality
,
viz.
its
aptitude
to
bear
;
first
,
precious
Commodities
;
secondly
,
the
best
of
the
kinde
;
thirdly
,
most
in
quantity
.
Ibid.
The
extrinsick
or
accidental
value
depends
upon
the
plenty
of
Money
,
luxurious
or
frugal
living
;
the
Opinions
Civil
,
Natural
,
and
Religious
of
the
People
.
Ibid.
It
is
necessary
to
these
Enquiries
to
know
how
to
tell
the
Gold
and
Silver
Coins
of
this
present
Age
,
and
compare
the
same
with
that
of
former
times
.
32
How
to
compare
not
onely
the
Money
of
this
present
Age
with
that
of
the
former
,
but
the
entire
Riches
of
the
present
with
the
former
People
.
Ibid.
By
the
numbers
of
People
,
and
the
proportion
of
Money
amongst
them
,
the
accidental
values
of
Lands
are
to
be
computed
.
33
How
to
proportion
the
Rates
of
a
Commodity
in
one
place
,
unto
the
Rates
of
the
same
in
another
place
.
Ibid.
That
the
Day-wages
of
Labourers
and
several
other
of
the
most
vulgar
Tradesmen
ought
to
be
ascertain'd
,
and
well
adapted
to
the
changes
of
time
.
Ibid.
That
though
the
difficulty
of
computing
the
contingent
values
of
Land
be
great
,
yet
there
be
greater
reasons
for
undergoing
it
.
34
The
nature
of
Credit
,
as
the
said
word
is
commonly
used
among
Tradesmen
,
and
otherwise
.
Ibid.
That
the
Sovereigns
exact
knowledge
of
the
Subjects
Estates
would
do
them
no
harm
.
Ibid.
A
descriptiou
of
the
Duty
of
Customs
.
35
A
Conjecture
that
Customs
at
first
were
a
kinde
of
praemium
for
ensurance
against
Pyrates
.
Ibid.
The
measures
of
the
said
Duty
upon
exported
Goods
.
36
The
inconvenience
of
too
heavy
Customs
.
Ibid.
What
Commodities
may
be
forced
to
pay
Customs
.
37
The
measures
of
Customs
upon
imported
Goods
.
Ibid.
The
inconveniences
of
raising
money
,
by
the
way
of
Customs
.
Ibid.
A
Proposal
,
that
instead
of
Tunnage
and
Poundage
upon
shipped
Goods
,
a
Tunnage
were
paid
out
of
the
ships
Fraight
.
38
Or
that
the
Customs
were
taken
as
an
Ensurance
-
praemium
.
Ibid.
Of
prohibited
Commodities
in
general
.
Ibid.
Of
prohibiting
the
exportation
of
Money
and
Bullion
.
39
The
said
prohibition
of
Money
serves
as
a
sumptuary
Law.
Ibid.
About
the
exportation
of
Wool.
Ibid.
The
lessening
of
our
Sheep-trade
,
and
encrease
of
Corn-tillage
is
an
expedient
in
this
case
for
many
reasons
.
40
Other
considerations
tending
to
shew
,
that
the
too
vehement
prohibitions
of
Wool
may
be
ineffectual
;
or
to
do
more
harm
then
good
41
Of
prohibiting
Importations
.
Ibid.
It
were
better
to
make
and
raise
Commodities
,
though
to
burn
them
,
then
not
to
make
them
,
or
let
the
makers
lose
their
Faculty
,
and
be
idle
.
Ibid.
Of
Free
Ports
,
and
in
what
cases
they
may
do
good
or
harm
.
42
Of
Poll-money
,
and
the
sorts
of
it
.
Ibid.
The
faults
of
the
late
Poll-moneys
.
43
Of
the
most
simple
Poll-money
,
where
all
pay
alike
,
its
conveniencies
and
inconveniencies
.
Ibid.
Of
Poll-money
upon
Titles
,
Offices
,
and
Faculties
.
44
Harth-money
is
of
the
same
nature
with
simple
Poll-money
,
but
both
are
rather
Accumulative
Excizes
.
45
Grants
for
publick
Lotteries
are
Taxes
upon
the
people
.
Ibid.
Why
Lotteries
ought
not
to
be
allowed
but
by
good
authority
.
Ibid.
Raising
of
Money
by
Benevolence
is
a
real
Tax
.
46
Three
cases
where
the
way
of
a
Benevolence
may
be
made
good
.
Ibid
Several
reasons
against
it
.
46
,
47
The
several
species
of
Penalties
.
47
A
doubt
whether
the
Penalties
set
down
in
Moses
Law
ought
to
be
inflicted
now
.
47
The
proper
use
and
reason
of
every
sort
of
Penalty
.
48
Perpetual
Imprisonment
is
a
kinde
of
slow
death
.
49
In
what
case
death
,
mutilation
,
imprisonment
,
disgrace
,
&c.
ought
to
be
commuted
for
pecuniary
mulcts
.
Ibid.
The
meaning
of
the
double
and
multiple
Restitutions
mentioned
in
the
Law
of
Moses
.
Ibid.
Of
the
wayes
for
punishing
or
permitting
Heterodox
Believers
in
Religion
.
50
That
the
Sovereign
may
do
either
.
51
That
all
Pseudodoxies
whatsoever
may
be
safely
muzzled
from
doing
harm
by
pecuniary
mulcts
.
51
,
52
That
the
Sovereign
by
punishing
them
with
death
,
mutilations
,
or
imprisonments
,
doth
therein
punish
himself
,
and
that
too
re
infecta
,
very
often
.
51
That
the
Pastours
ought
in
some
measure
to
be
punished
for
the
errours
and
defections
of
their
Flocks
.
52
The
true
use
of
the
Clergy
is
rather
to
be
patterns
of
Holiness
,
then
to
teach
men
variety
of
Opinions
de
rebus
divinis
.
53
The
substance
of
all
that
hath
been
said
in
this
whole
discourse
about
the
Church
.
Ibid.
The
abuse
of
Penal
Laws
.
54
Of
Monopolies
.
Ibid.
The
use
and
reason
of
instituting
Monopolies
.
55
A
Digression
about
new
Inventions
,
and
the
vexations
incident
to
the
Projectors
of
new
practices
.
Ibid.
Offices
instituted
by
the
State
,
with
Fees
of
their
own
appointment
,
are
of
a
parallel
nature
to
Monopolies
.
56
Why
the
Fees
of
Offices
were
great
heretofore
.
Ibid.
How
Offices
are
become
as
a
saleable
Commodity
.
57
Why
many
superfluous
Offices
are
not
abolished
.
Ibid.
A
description
of
Tythes
in
several
particulars
.
58
The
causes
why
Tythes
encrease
.
Ibid.
The
Rent
of
the
Lands
of
England
is
but
a
quarter
of
the
Expence
of
the
people
.
59
The
Tythes
in
England
are
six
times
as
much
as
they
were
four
hundred
years
ago
.
Ibid.
The
Clergy
are
far
richer
now
then
they
were
in
ancient
times
,
and
yet
have
less
work
to
do
.
Ibid.
The
danger
of
too
many
Church
men
.
60
How
to
adjust
the
number
of
Church-men
and
Students
in
Divinity
.
Ibid.
Tythes
is
now
no
Tax
or
burthen
upon
the
people
.
61
The
way
of
Tythes
is
a
good
pattern
for
a
Tax
.
Ibid
,
The
way
of
paying
Tythes
in
the
City
and
Countrey
is
very
disproportionable
.
61
The
inconveniences
of
contributing
to
the
Publick
Charge
after
the
manner
of
Tythes
.
Ibid.
A
reason
why
the
wayes
of
Taxing
the
people
are
often
shifted
.
62
The
State
gains
in
several
Countreys
by
being
the
common
Cashier
,
Usurer
,
Ensurer
,
Monopolist
,
&c.
63
The
case
of
the
Jews
(
every
where
subject
to
great
Taxes
)
briefly
stated
.
64
The
way
of
leavying
an
aliquot
part
of
mens
Estates
very
dangerous
.
Ibid.
Alterations
in
the
values
of
Coins
is
a
Tax
upon
such
as
live
by
determined
Rents
,
Pensions
,
Fees
,
&c.
65
What
is
embasing
of
Moneys
,
and
what
is
not
.
Ibid.
Of
Tin
and
Copper
money
,
as
well
curiously
as
coursly
wrought
.
Ibid.
Of
the
Tokens
coined
by
retailing
Shop-keepers
.
Ibid.
What
is
Gold
and
Silver
embased
.
66
The
reasons
for
embasing
of
money
.
Ibid.
Reasons
against
the
same
.
Ibid.
What
is
properly
raising
of
Money
.
67
The
effect
of
raising
both
domestick
and
forreign
Coins
.
Ibid.
Raising
of
money
changes
the
species
of
moneys
,
but
lessens
the
Bullion
.
Ibid.
Why
many
wise
States
have
raised
their
Moneys
.
68
Raising
of
Forreign
money
to
a
double
value
,
or
abating
the
price
of
our
Native
commodities
to
half
,
is
not
all
one
,
but
the
former
is
better
.
69
The
way
of
computing
and
comparing
the
prices
of
Commodities
upon
natural
grounds
.
69
,
70
Men
are
really
and
actually
rich
according
to
what
they
spend
and
enjoy
in
their
own
persons
.
71
Excize
being
a
Tax
upon
such
riches
,
is
a
just
way
by
which
to
defray
the
Publick
Charge
.
Ibid.
That
a
proportion
ought
to
be
pitched
between
the
Expence
or
Consumption
of
the
whole
Nation
,
and
the
Publick
Charge
thereof
.
ib.
Commodities
ought
not
to
be
taxed
until
they
be
just
ripe
for
Consumption
.
72
Commodities
of
equal
value
may
be
unequally
excized
with
justice
.
ibidem
.
Of
accumulating
the
Excize
of
many
things
upon
some
one
thing
.
Ibid.
Whether
Native
Commodities
exported
ought
to
pay
Excize
.
Ibid.
The
explication
of
Accumulative
Excize
.
73
Reason
for
accumulating
the
Excize
of
all
things
upon
some
one
thing
.
Ibid.
Why
Beer
ought
not
to
be
that
one
thing
74
Harth
or
Smoak-money
is
an
Accumulative
Excize
,
with
the
reasons
for
and
against
it
.
Ibid.
Reasons
in
behalf
of
the
Excize
.
75
Of
framing
persons
to
be
fit
for
great
Trusts
,
as
to
be
Cashiers
,
Store-keepers
,
Checques
,
&c.
Ibid.
CHAP.
I.
Of
the
several
sorts
of
Publick
Charges
.
THe
Publick
Charges
of
a
State
,
are
,
That
of
its
Defence
by
Land
and
Sea
,
of
its
Peace
at
home
and
abroad
,
as
also
of
its
honourable
vindication
from
the
injuries
of
other
States
;
all
which
we
may
call
the
Charge
of
the
Militia
,
which
commonly
is
in
ordinary
as
great
as
any
other
Branch
of
the
whole
;
but
extraordinary
,
(
that
is
,
in
time
of
War
,
or
fear
of
War
)
is
much
the
greatest
.
2.
Another
branch
of
the
Publick
Charge
is
,
the
Maintenance
of
the
Governours
,
Chief
and
Subordinate
;
I
mean
,
such
not
onely
as
spend
their
whole
time
in
the
Execution
of
their
respective
Offices
,
but
also
who
spent
much
in
fitting
themselves
as
well
with
abilities
to
that
end
,
as
in
begetting
an
opinion
in
their
Superiours
of
such
their
ability
and
trustworthiness
.
3.
Which
Maintenance
of
the
Governours
is
to
be
in
such
a
degree
of
plenty
and
splendour
,
as
private
Endeavours
and
Callings
seldom
reach
unto
:
To
the
end
,
that
such
Governours
may
have
the
natural
as
well
as
the
artificial
Causes
of
Power
to
act
with
.
4
For
if
a
great
multitude
of
men
should
call
one
of
their
number
King
,
unless
this
instituted
Prince
,
appear
in
greater
visible
splendour
then
others
,
can
reward
those
that
obey
and
please
him
,
and
do
the
contrary
to
others
;
his
Institution
signifies
little
,
even
although
he
chance
to
have
g●●●ter
corporal
or
mental
faculties
,
then
any
other
of
the
number
.
5.
There
be
Offices
which
are
but
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
Sheriffs
,
Justices
of
the
Peace
,
Constables
,
Churchwardens
,
&c.
which
men
may
attend
without
much
prejudice
to
their
ordinary
wayes
of
livelihood
,
and
for
which
the
honour
of
being
trusted
,
and
the
pleasure
of
being
feared
,
hath
been
thought
a
competent
Reward
.
6.
Unto
this
head
,
the
Charge
of
the
administring
Justice
may
be
referred
,
as
well
between
man
and
man
,
as
between
the
whole
State
or
Commonalty
and
particular
members
of
it
;
as
well
that
of
righting
and
punishing
past
injuries
and
crimes
,
as
of
preventing
the
same
in
time
to
come
.
7.
A
third
branch
of
the
Publick
Charge
is
,
that
of
the
Pastorage
of
mens
Souls
,
and
the
guidance
of
their
Consciences
;
which
,
one
would
think
(
because
it
respects
another
world
,
and
but
the
particular
interest
of
each
man
there
)
should
not
be
a
publick
Charge
in
this
:
Nevertheless
if
we
consider
how
easie
it
is
to
elude
the
Laws
of
man
,
to
commit
unproveable
crimes
,
to
corrupt
and
divert
Testimonies
,
to
wrest
the
sense
and
meaning
of
the
Laws
,
&c.
there
follows
a
necessity
of
contributing
towards
a
publick
Charge
,
wherewith
to
have
men
instructed
in
the
Laws
of
God
,
that
take
notice
of
evil
thoughts
and
designs
,
and
much
more
of
secret
deeds
,
and
that
punisheth
eternally
in
another
world
,
what
man
can
but
slightly
chastise
in
this
.
8.
Now
those
who
labour
in
this
publick
Service
,
must
also
be
maintained
in
a
proportionable
splendour
;
and
must
withall
have
the
means
to
allure
men
with
some
kinde
of
reward
,
even
in
this
life
;
forasmuch
,
as
many
heretofore
followed
even
Christ
himself
but
for
the
Loaves
he
gave
them
.
9.
Another
Branch
is
,
the
Charge
of
Schools
and
Universities
,
especially
for
so
much
as
they
teach
above
Reading
,
Writing
,
and
Arithmetick
;
these
being
of
particular
use
to
every
man
,
as
being
helps
and
substitutes
of
Memory
and
Reason
,
Reckoning
being
of
the
latter
,
as
Writing
and
Reading
are
of
the
former
;
for
whether
Divinity
,
&c.
ought
to
be
made
a
private
Trade
,
is
to
me
a
question
.
10.
'T
is
true
,
that
Schools
and
Colledges
are
now
for
the
most
part
but
the
Donations
of
particular
men
,
or
places
where
particular
men
spend
their
money
and
time
upon
their
own
private
accounts
;
but
no
doubt
it
were
not
amiss
,
if
the
end
of
them
were
to
furnish
all
imaginable
helps
unto
the
highest
and
finest
Natural
Wits
,
towards
the
discovery
of
Nature
in
all
its
operations
;
in
which
sense
they
ought
to
be
a
publick
Charge
:
The
which
Wits
should
not
be
selected
for
that
work
,
according
to
the
fond
conceits
of
their
own
Parents
and
Friends
,
(
Crows
that
think
their
own
Birds
ever
fairest
)
but
rather
by
the
approbation
of
others
more
impartial
;
such
as
they
are
,
who
pick
from
out
of
the
Christians
Children
the
ablest
Instruments
and
Support
of
the
Turkish
Government
.
Of
which
Selections
more
hereafter
.
11.
Another
Branch
is
,
that
of
the
Maintenance
of
Orphans
,
found
and
exposed
Children
,
which
also
are
Orphans
;
as
also
of
Impotents
of
all
sorts
,
and
moreover
such
as
want
employment
.
12.
For
the
permitting
of
any
to
beg
is
a
more
chargeable
way
of
maintaining
them
whom
the
law
of
Nature
will
not
suffer
to
starve
,
where
food
may
possibly
be
had
:
Besides
,
it
is
unjust
to
let
any
starve
,
when
we
think
it
just
to
limit
the
wages
of
the
poor
,
so
as
they
can
lay
up
nothing
against
the
time
of
their
impotency
and
want
of
work
.
13.
A
last
Branch
may
be
,
the
Charge
of
High-wayes
,
Navigable
Rivers
,
Aquaeducts
,
Bridges
,
Havens
,
and
other
things
of
universal
good
and
concernment
.
14.
Other
Branches
may
be
thought
on
,
which
let
other
men
either
refer
unto
these
,
or
adde
over
and
above
.
For
it
suffices
for
my
purpose
to
have
for
the
present
set
down
these
the
chief
and
most
obvious
of
all
the
rest
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
Causes
which
encrease
and
aggravate
the
several
sorts
of
Publick
Charges
.
HAving
thus
spoken
of
the
several
sorts
of
Publick
Charges
,
we
shall
next
consider
the
Causes
which
encrease
them
both
in
general
and
in
particular
.
Among
the
general
Causes
is
,
First
,
the
unwillingness
of
the
people
to
pay
them
;
arising
from
an
opinion
,
that
by
delay
and
reluctancy
they
may
wholly
avoid
them
,
with
a
suspition
that
what
is
imposed
is
too
much
,
or
that
what
is
collected
is
embezelled
or
ill
expended
,
or
that
it
is
unequally
leavied
and
assessed
.
All
these
resolving
into
an
unnecessary
Charge
to
collect
them
,
and
of
forcing
their
Prince
to
hardships
towards
the
people
.
2.
Another
Cause
which
aggravates
Taxes
is
,
the
force
of
paying
them
in
money
at
a
certain
time
,
and
not
in
commodities
,
at
the
most
convenient
seasons
.
3.
Thirdly
,
Obscurities
and
doubts
concerning
the
right
of
imposing
.
4.
Fourthly
,
Scarcity
of
Money
,
and
Confusion
of
Coins
.
5.
Fifthly
,
Fewness
of
people
,
especially
of
Labourers
and
Artificers
.
6.
Sixthly
,
Ignorance
of
the
numbers
,
Wealth
and
Trade
of
the
people
,
causing
a
needless
repetition
of
the
charge
and
trouble
of
new
additional
Levies
,
in
order
to
amend
mistakes
.
7.
As
to
particulars
.
The
Causes
of
encreasing
the
Military
Charge
are
the
same
with
those
that
enrease
Wars
,
or
fear
of
Wars
,
which
are
Forreign
or
Civil
.
8.
An
Offensive
Forreign
War
is
caused
by
many
,
and
those
very
various
,
secret
,
personal
distastes
coloured
—
with
publick
pretences
;
of
which
we
can
say
nothing
,
but
that
the
common
encouragement
unto
them
particularly
here
in
England
is
a
false
opinion
,
that
our
Countrey
is
full
peopled
,
o●
that
if
we
wanted
more
Territory
,
we
could
take
it
with
less
charge
from
our
neighbours
,
then
purchase
it
from
the
Americans
;
and
a
mistake
,
that
the
greatness
and
glory
of
a
Prince
lyeth
rather
in
the
extent
of
his
Territory
,
then
in
the
number
,
art
,
and
industry
of
his
people
,
well
united
and
governed
.
And
moreover
,
that
it
is
more
glorious
to
take
from
others
by
fraud
or
rapine
,
then
to
gain
ones
self
out
of
the
bowels
of
the
Earth
and
Sea.
9.
Now
those
States
are
free
from
Forreign
Offensive
Wars
(
arising
as
abovesaid
out
of
Personal
and
Private
Causes
)
where
the
chief
Governours
Revenue
is
but
small
,
and
not
sufficient
to
carry
on
such
Wars
,
the
which
if
they
happen
to
be
begun
,
and
so
far
carryed
on
,
as
to
want
more
Contributions
,
then
those
who
have
the
power
to
impose
them
,
do
commonly
enquire
what
private
persons
and
Ends
occasioned
the
War
,
and
so
fall
upon
the
Authors
,
rather
then
contribute
to
the
Effect
;
otherwise
then
to
quench
it
.
10.
Defensive
Wars
are
caused
from
unpreparedness
of
the
offended
State
for
War
,
as
when
defective
Stores
are
served
into
the
Magazines
by
corrupt
Officers
at
the
rate
of
good
;
when
Armies
are
fasly
Mustered
;
when
Souldiers
are
either
Tenants
or
Servants
to
their
Commanders
,
or
else
persons
,
who
for
their
Crimes
or
Debts
,
want
protection
from
Justice
;
when
the
Officers
are
ignorant
of
their
business
,
and
absent
from
their
Commands
;
and
withal
afraid
to
punish
,
because
unwilling
to
pay
.
Wherefore
to
be
alwayes
in
a
posture
of
War
at
home
,
is
the
cheapest
way
to
keep
off
War
from
abroad
.
11.
The
causes
of
Civil
Wars
here
in
Europe
proceed
very
much
from
Religion
,
viz.
the
punishing
of
Believers
heterodox
from
the
Authorized
way
,
in
publike
and
open
places
,
before
great
multitudes
of
ignorant
people
,
with
loss
of
life
,
liberty
,
and
limbs
,
rather
then
by
well
proportioned
tolerable
pecuniary
mulcts
,
such
as
every
conscientious
Non-Conformist
would
gladly
pay
,
and
Hypocrites
by
refusing
,
discover
themselves
to
be
such
.
12.
Civil
Wars
are
likewise
caused
by
peoples
fansying
,
that
their
own
uneasie
condition
may
be
best
remedied
by
an
universal
confusion
;
although
indeed
upon
the
upshot
of
such
disorders
they
shall
probably
be
in
a
worse
,
even
although
they
survive
and
succeed
,
but
more
probably
perish
in
the
contest
.
13.
Moreover
,
the
peoples
believing
that
Forms
of
Government
shall
in
a
few
years
produce
any
considerable
alteration
as
to
the
wealth
of
the
Subject
;
that
the
Form
which
is
most
ancient
and
present
is
not
the
best
for
the
place
;
that
any
established
family
or
person
is
not
better
then
any
new
pretender
,
or
even
then
the
best
Election
that
can
be
made
;
that
Sovereignty
is
invisible
,
and
that
it
is
not
certainly
annexed
unto
some
certain
person
or
persons
.
14.
Causes
of
Civil
War
are
also
,
that
the
Wealth
of
the
Nation
is
in
too
few
mens
hands
,
and
that
no
certain
means
are
provided
to
keep
all
men
from
a
necessity
either
to
beg
,
or
steal
,
or
be
Souldiers
.
Moreover
,
the
allowing
Luxury
in
some
,
whilst
others
starve
.
The
dispensing
of
benefits
upon
casual
and
uncertain
Motives
,
the
giving
vaste
Emoluments
to
persons
and
parties
of
no
certain
visible
merit
.
These
are
the
things
which
cause
animofities
among
the
totter-headed
multitude
,
who
are
the
tinder
that
the
sparks
of
a
few
Designers
may
easily
inflame
.
15.
The
Cause
of
Publick
Charge
in
matters
of
Religion
,
are
the
not
having
changed
the
limits
of
Parishes
and
Cures
with
the
Change
of
Religion
from
Popery
,
and
with
the
Changes
in
Plantation
and
Trade
.
For
now
when
the
Ministers
of
the
Gospel
preach
unto
multitudes
assembled
in
one
place
,
may
not
Parishes
be
bigger
?
that
is
,
may
not
Flocks
be
more
numerous
,
then
when
every
particular
sheep
was
,
as
heretofore
,
drest
and
shorn
three
or
four
times
per
annum
by
Shrift
.
If
there
be
in
England
and
Wales
but
about
five
millions
of
people
,
what
needs
more
then
5000.
Parishes
?
that
is
1000.
Sheep
under
every
Shepheard
.
Whereas
in
the
middling
Parishes
of
London
there
are
about
5000.
souls
in
each
.
Upon
which
account
there
needs
be
in
England
and
Wales
but
a
1000.
Parishes
,
whereas
there
are
near
10000.
16.
Now
the
saving
of
half
the
Parishes
,
would
(
reckoning
the
Benefices
one
with
another
,
but
at
100l
.
per
Annum
a
piece
)
save
500000l
.
Besides
,
when
the
number
of
Parochial
Parsons
were
halved
,
then
there
would
need
but
half
the
present
number
of
Byshops
,
Deans
and
Chapters
,
Colledges
and
Cathedralls
,
which
perhaps
would
amount
to
two
or
three
hundred
thousand
pounds
more
:
And
yet
the
Church
of
God
would
be
more
regularly
served
then
now
,
and
that
without
prejudice
to
that
sacred
,
ancient
Order
of
Episcopacy
,
and
the
way
of
their
Maintenance
by
Tythes
;
and
all
this
in
a
method
of
greater
Reformation
and
suitableness
thereunto
.
18.
But
suppose
it
be
said
,
that
in
some
wild
Countreys
,
a
thousand
people
do
not
live
in
a
less
scope
of
ground
then
of
eight
miles
square
.
To
which
I
answer
,
that
there
are
few
or
no
such
places
,
the
largest
Parishes
I
know
,
being
not
more
capacious
then
of
three
or
four
miles
square
,
in
which
is
no
difficulty
,
for
the
people
to
meet
once
a
week
at
some
central
place
within
that
scope
.
19.
Moreover
I
say
,
that
a
Curate
of
small
Learning
,
if
of
good
life
,
and
duly
Ordained
,
may
officiate
in
four
Chappels
of
Ease
every
Sunday
;
and
the
Preacher
,
who
indeed
should
be
a
person
of
Learning
and
Eloquence
,
may
preach
every
other
Sunday
in
every
of
the
said
Chappels
,
by
preaching
in
two
of
them
one
day
,
and
in
the
other
two
,
the
other
day
:
And
this
with
Catechizing
,
and
Extra-Lectures
upon
the
Week-dayes
,
would
perform
as
much
as
now
is
performed
,
and
as
much
as
by
the
blessing
of
God
is
necessary
to
salvation
;
for
the
yoak
of
Christ
is
easie
,
and
his
burthen
light
.
20.
But
to
put
an
end
to
this
doubt
;
I
affirm
,
that
if
England
and
Wales
were
cut
out
in
parcels
of
three
miles
square
,
there
would
be
found
few
above
four
thousand
such
,
of
which
to
make
Parishes
.
21.
Now
if
it
be
said
,
that
the
Alienation
of
these
Tythes
is
Sacriledge
;
I
answer
,
that
if
the
same
be
employed
to
defend
the
Church
of
God
against
the
Turke
and
Pope
,
and
the
Nations
who
adhere
to
them
,
it
is
not
at
all
;
or
less
,
then
to
give
¾
.
of
the
same
to
the
Wives
and
Children
of
the
Priests
which
were
not
in
being
when
those
allowances
were
set
forth
?
21.
If
I
had
not
an
abhorrence
from
propounding
the
lessening
of
the
Church
Means
,
I
could
say
,
that
the
retrenching
part
of
each
remaining
Parsons
Tythes
and
Emoluments
,
and
leaving
him
for
part
,
to
the
free
Contributions
of
his
Flocks
,
were
a
way
to
promote
the
Gospel
,
and
to
give
less
offence
to
such
as
think
that
their
whole
maintenance
should
be
made
in
that
manner
.
22.
I
might
also
say
,
that
forasmuch
as
there
be
more
Males
then
Females
in
England
,
(
the
said
disproportion
pro
tanto
hindering
procreation
)
that
it
were
good
for
the
Ministers
to
return
to
their
Caelibat
;
or
that
none
should
be
Ministers
,
whilst
they
were
married
,
it
being
easie
among
five
millions
of
people
to
finde
out
5000.
that
could
and
would
live
single
,
that
is
,
one
in
a
thousand
:
And
then
our
unmarried
Parson
might
live
as
well
with
half
,
as
now
with
the
whole
of
his
Benefice
.
23.
Alwayes
provided
,
that
though
the
number
of
Parishes
,
and
the
measure
of
Benefices
were
lessened
,
yet
that
the
same
ought
to
be
done
without
dammage
to
the
present
Incumbents
.
24.
As
for
lessening
the
Charge
of
Offices
relating
to
the
Government
and
the
Law
,
the
same
will
consist
in
abolishing
the
superfluous
,
supernumerary
,
and
antiquated
;
and
withall
,
in
retrenching
the
Fees
of
others
,
to
what
the
labour
,
art
,
and
trust
of
their
respective
employments
do
require
.
For
there
be
many
Offices
wholly
executed
by
Deputies
for
small
wages
,
whereas
the
Masters
of
them
have
ten
times
as
much
,
although
they
know
nothing
either
of
what
is
done
,
or
ought
to
be
done
in
the
business
.
25.
Now
such
Surplusages
as
these
should
be
either
restored
unto
the
people
who
gave
them
unto
the
King
,
at
a
time
when
those
Fees
made
up
but
a
just
reward
for
the
Officer
;
or
else
the
King
keeping
them
still
might
take
them
for
so
much
toward
the
Publick
Charge
,
but
not
give
them
away
to
stop
the
importunate
suits
of
any
particular
person
,
in
whom
and
in
all
his
dependants
,
such
benefits
do
but
cause
a
laziness
as
to
the
true
original
gain
of
the
Nation
,
and
themselves
in
particular
,
together
with
a
total
negligence
and
ignorance
of
the
publick
good
.
26.
Many
are
the
particulars
that
might
be
instanced
of
this
kinde
;
but
my
aim
not
being
to
prejudice
any
man
in
particular
,
I
descend
no
lower
,
wishing
onely
that
there
might
be
an
universal
Reformation
of
what
length
of
time
hath
warped
awry
,
in
which
case
no
particular
men
are
to
be
troubled
;
for
if
all
suffer
,
none
suffers
,
and
all
men
would
be
no
poorer
then
now
they
are
if
they
should
lose
half
their
Estates
;
nor
would
they
be
a
whit
the
richer
if
the
same
were
doubled
,
the
Ratio
formalis
of
Riches
lying
rather
in
proportion
then
quantity
.
27.
To
lessen
the
charge
of
Universities
,
unto
which
I
adde
the
Inns
of
Court
,
which
is
not
much
,
were
to
lessen
the
number
of
the
Students
in
Divinity
,
Law
and
Medicine
,
by
lessening
the
use
of
those
Professions
.
Now
having
spoken
already
of
Divinity
,
I
come
next
to
the
Law
,
and
say
;
that
if
Registers
were
kept
of
all
mens
Estates
in
Lands
,
and
of
all
the
Conveyances
of
,
and
Engagements
upon
them
;
and
withal
if
publick
Loan-Banks
,
Lombards
,
or
Banks
of
Credit
upon
deposited
money
,
Plate
,
Jewels
,
Cloth
,
Wooll
,
Silke
,
Leather
,
Linnen
,
Mettals
,
and
other
durable
Commodities
,
were
erected
,
I
cannot
apprehend
how
there
could
be
above
one
tenth
part
of
the
Law-suits
and
Writings
,
as
now
there
are
.
28.
And
moreover
,
if
by
accompt
of
the
people
,
of
their
Land
and
other
wealth
,
the
number
of
Lawyers
and
Scriveners
were
adjusted
,
I
cannot
conceive
how
their
should
remain
above
one
hundredth
part
of
what
now
are
;
forasmuch
as
I
have
heard
some
affirm
,
that
there
be
now
ten
times
as
many
as
are
even
now
necessary
;
and
that
there
are
now
ten
times
as
many
Law-suits
,
as
upon
the
abovementioned
Reformation
,
there
would
be
.
It
follows
therefore
,
that
upon
the
whole
there
would
not
need
one
in
a
hundred
of
the
present
number
of
Retainers
to
the
Law
,
and
Offices
of
Justice
;
the
occasions
as
well
of
crimes
as
injuries
being
so
much
retrenched
.
29.
As
for
Physicians
,
it
is
not
hard
by
the
help
of
the
observations
which
have
been
lately
made
upon
the
Bills
of
Mortality
,
to
know
how
many
are
sick
in
London
by
the
number
of
them
that
dye
,
and
by
the
proportions
of
the
City
to
finde
out
the
same
of
the
Countrey
;
and
by
both
,
by
the
advice
of
the
learned
Colledge
of
that
Faculty
to
calculate
how
many
Physicians
were
requisite
for
the
whole
Nation
,
and
consequently
,
how
many
Students
in
that
art
to
permit
and
encourage
;
and
lastly
,
having
calculated
these
numbers
,
to
adoptate
a
proportion
of
Chyrurgeons
,
Apothecaries
,
and
Nurses
to
them
,
and
so
by
the
whole
to
cut
off
and
extinguish
that
infinite
swarm
of
vain
pretenders
unto
,
and
abusers
of
that
God-like
Faculty
,
which
of
all
Secular
Employments
our
Saviour
himself
after
he
began
to
preach
engaged
himself
upon
.
30.
Moreover
,
if
it
were
agreed
,
what
number
of
Divines
,
Physicians
,
and
Civilians
(
that
is
,
of
men
bred
in
Universities
)
were
requisite
to
the
publick
service
?
As
suppose
13000.
in
the
present
way
,
and
perhaps
not
above
6000.
in
that
way
of
Retrenchment
which
we
propound
;
then
supposing
that
but
one
in
forty
dyes
per
annum
,
it
follows
that
less
then
350.
might
suffice
to
be
sent
yearly
out
of
the
Universities
:
Where
supposing
they
stay
five
years
one
with
another
,
it
followeth
also
that
about
1800.
is
the
number
of
Students
fit
to
be
allowed
in
the
Universities
at
a
time
;
I
mean
,
of
such
as
intend
to
make
Learning
their
Trade
and
way
of
Livelihood
.
31.
I
might
intimate
,
that
if
1800.
Students
were
enough
,
and
that
if
there
were
40000.
Parish
Children
and
Foundlings
in
England
,
it
were
probable
that
one
in
twenty
of
them
might
be
of
excellent
wit
and
towardness
.
Now
since
the
Publick
may
dispose
of
these
Children
as
they
please
,
and
since
there
is
Maintenance
in
both
Universities
for
above
1800.
what
if
our
Professors
of
Art
were
in
this
manner
selected
and
educated
?
But
of
this
but
in
transitu
.
32.
Hereunto
may
be
added
,
that
by
reason
of
Loan
Banks
aforementioned
,
whereby
the
Credits
and
Estates
of
all
Dealers
may
be
known
,
and
all
the
mysterious
dangers
of
money
prevented
,
and
that
by
good
Accompts
of
our
growth
,
Manufacture
,
Consumption
,
and
Importation
,
it
might
be
known
how
many
Merchants
were
able
to
mannage
the
Exchange
of
our
superfluous
Commodities
with
the
same
of
other
Countreys
:
And
also
how
many
Retailers
are
needful
to
make
the
subdistributions
into
every
Village
of
this
Nation
,
and
to
receive
back
their
superfluities
.
Upon
these
grounds
I
presume
a
large
proportion
of
these
also
might
be
retrenched
,
who
properly
and
originally
earn
nothing
from
the
Publick
,
being
onely
a
kinde
of
Gamesters
,
that
play
with
one
another
for
the
labours
of
the
poor
;
yielding
of
themselves
no
fruit
at
all
,
otherwise
then
as
veins
and
arteries
,
to
distribute
forth
and
back
the
blood
and
nutritive
juyces
of
the
Body
Politick
,
namely
the
product
of
Husbandry
and
Manufacture
.
33.
Now
if
the
numerous
Offices
and
Fees
relating
to
the
Government
,
Law
,
and
Church
,
and
if
the
number
of
Divines
,
Lawyers
,
Physicians
,
Merchants
,
and
Retailers
were
also
lessened
,
all
which
do
receive
great
wages
for
little
work
done
to
the
Publick
,
with
how
much
greater
ease
would
common
expences
be
defrayed
?
and
with
how
much
more
equality
would
the
same
be
assessed
?
34.
We
enumerated
six
Branches
of
the
Publick
Charge
,
and
have
slightly
spoken
how
four
of
them
might
be
lessened
;
we
come
next
to
the
other
two
Branches
,
whereof
we
shall
rather
recommend
the
augmentation
.
The
first
of
these
two
Branches
I
call
,
generally
speaking
,
Care
of
the
Poor
,
consisting
of
Receptacles
for
the
aged
,
blinde
,
lame
,
&c.
in
health
;
Hospitals
for
noysome
,
chronical
,
curable
and
uncurable
,
inward
and
outward
Diseases
,
With
others
for
acute
and
contagious
.
Others
for
Orphans
,
found
and
exposed
Children
;
of
which
latter
sort
none
should
be
refused
,
let
the
number
be
never
so
great
,
provided
their
names
,
families
,
and
relations
were
well
concealed
:
The
choice
of
which
Children
being
made
at
their
being
about
eight
or
ten
years
old
,
might
afford
the
King
the
fittest
Instruments
for
all
kinde
of
his
Affairs
,
and
be
as
firmly
obliged
to
be
his
faithful
servants
as
his
own
natural
Children
.
35.
This
is
no
new
nor
rare
thing
,
onely
the
neglect
of
it
in
these
Countreys
,
is
rather
to
be
esteemed
a
rare
and
new
project
:
Nor
is
it
unknown
what
excellent
fruits
there
have
been
of
this
Institution
,
of
which
we
shall
say
much
more
,
upon
another
occasion
hereafter
.
36.
When
all
helpless
and
impotent
Persons
were
thus
provided
for
,
and
the
lazy
and
thievish
restrained
and
punished
by
the
Minister
of
Justice
,
it
follows
now
,
that
we
finde
out
certain
constant
Employments
for
all
other
indigent
people
,
who
labouring
according
to
the
Rules
upon
them
,
may
require
a
sufficiency
of
food
and
raiment
.
Their
Children
also
,
(
if
small
and
impotent
)
as
aforesaid
,
being
provided
for
elsewhere
.
37.
But
what
shall
these
Employments
be
?
I
answer
,
such
as
were
reckoned
as
the
sixth
Branch
of
the
Publick
Expence
,
viz.
making
all
High-wayes
so
broad
,
firm
,
and
eaven
,
as
whereby
the
charge
and
tedium
of
travelling
and
Carriages
may
be
greatly
lessened
.
The
cutting
and
scowring
of
Rivers
into
Navigable
;
the
planting
of
usefull
Trees
for
timber
,
delight
,
and
fruit
in
convenient
places
:
The
making
of
Bridges
and
Cawseys
.
The
working
in
Mines
,
Quarries
,
and
Colleries
.
The
Manufactures
of
Iron
,
&c.
38.
I
pitch
upon
all
these
particulars
,
first
,
as
works
wanting
in
this
Nation
;
secondly
,
as
works
of
much
labour
,
and
little
art
;
and
thirdly
,
as
introductive
of
new
Trades
into
England
,
to
supply
that
of
Cloth
,
which
we
have
almost
totally
lost
.
In
the
next
place
it
will
be
asked
,
who
shall
pay
these
men
?
I
answer
,
every
body
;
for
if
there
be
1000.
men
in
a
Territory
,
and
if
100.
of
these
can
raise
necessary
food
and
raiment
for
the
whole
1000.
If
200.
more
make
as
much
commodities
,
as
other
Nations
will
give
either
their
commodities
or
money
for
,
and
if
400.
more
be
employed
in
the
ornaments
,
pleasure
,
and
magnificence
of
the
whole
;
if
there
be
200.
Governours
,
Divines
,
Lawyers
,
Physicians
,
Merchants
,
and
Retailers
,
making
in
all
900.
the
question
is
,
since
there
is
food
enough
for
this-supernumerary
100.
also
,
how
they
should
come
by
it
?
whether
by
begging
,
or
by
stealing
;
or
whether
they
shall
suffer
themselves
to
starve
,
finding
no
fruit
of
their
begging
,
or
being
taken
in
their
stealing
be
put
to
death
another
way
?
Or
whether
they
shall
be
given
away
to
another
Nation
that
will
take
them
?
I
think
't
is
plain
,
they
ought
neither
to
be
starved
,
nor
hanged
,
nor
given
away
;
now
if
they
beg
,
they
may
pine
for
hunger
to
day
,
and
be
gorged
and
glutted
to
morrow
,
which
will
occasion
Diseases
and
evil
habits
,
the
same
may
be
said
of
stealing
;
moreover
,
perhaps
they
may
get
either
by
begging
or
stealing
more
then
will
suffice
them
,
which
will
for
ever
after
indispose
them
to
labour
,
even
upon
the
greatest
occasion
which
may
suddenly
and
unexpectedly
happen
.
39.
For
all
these
Reasons
,
it
will
be
certainly
the
safer
way
to
afford
them
the
superfluity
which
would
otherwise
be
lost
and
wasted
,
or
wantonly
spent
:
Or
in
case
there
be
no
overplus
,
then
't
is
fit
to
retrench
a
little
from
the
delicacy
of
others
feeding
in
quantity
or
quality
;
few
men
spending
less
then
double
of
what
might
suffice
them
as
to
the
bare
necessities
of
nature
.
40.
Now
as
to
the
work
of
these
supernumeraries
,
let
it
be
without
expence
of
Foreign
Commodities
,
and
then
't
is
no
matter
if
it
be
employed
to
build
a
useless
Pyramid
upon
Salisbury
Plain
,
bring
the
Stones
at
Stonehenge
to
Tower-Hill
,
or
the
like
;
for
at
worst
this
would
keep
their
mindes
to
discipline
and
obedience
,
and
their
bodies
to
a
patience
of
more
profitable
labours
when
need
shall
require
it
.
41.
In
the
next
place
,
as
an
instance
of
the
usefulness
of
what
hath
been
propounded
,
I
ask
what
benefit
will
the
mending
of
High-wayes
,
the
building
of
Bridges
and
Cawseys
,
with
making
of
Rivers
navigable
produce
,
besides
the
pleasure
and
beauty
of
them
?
To
which
I
also
answer
,
as
an
instance
of
the
premises
,
that
the
same
,
together
with
the
numerous
missions
of
Cattle
and
Sheep
out
of
Ireland
,
shall
produce
a
vaste
superfluity
of
English
Horses
,
the
which
because
they
have
the
many
excellent
qualities
of
beauty
,
strength
,
courage
,
swiftness
,
and
patience
concentrated
in
them
,
beyond
the
Horses
of
other
places
,
would
be
a
very
vendible
Commodity
all
over
Europe
;
and
such
as
depending
upon
the
intrinsick
nature
of
the
English
Soyle
could
not
be
counterfeited
,
nor
taken
away
by
others
.
Moreover
,
an
Horse
is
such
a
Commodity
as
will
carry
both
himself
and
his
Merchant
to
the
Market
,
be
the
same
never
so
distant
.
CHAP.
III.
How
the
Causes
of
the
unquiet
bearing
of
Taxes
may
be
lessened
.
WE
have
slighty
gone
through
all
the
six
Branches
of
the
Publick
Charge
,
and
have
(
though
imperfectly
and
in
haste
)
shewn
what
would
encrease
,
and
what
would
abate
them
.
We
come
next
to
take
away
some
of
the
general
Causes
of
the
unquiet
bearing
of
Taxes
,
and
yielding
to
Contributions
,
viz.
2.
1.
That
the
people
think
,
the
Sovereign
askes
more
then
he
needs
.
To
which
we
answer
,
1.
That
if
the
Sovereign
were
sure
to
have
what
he
wanted
in
due
time
,
it
were
his
own
great
dammage
to
draw
away
the
money
out
of
his
Subjects
hands
,
who
by
trade
increase
it
,
and
to
hoard
it
up
in
his
own
Coffers
,
where
't
is
of
no
use
even
to
himself
,
but
lyable
to
be
begged
or
vainly
expended
.
3.
2.
Let
the
Tax
be
never
so
great
,
if
it
be
proportionable
unto
all
,
then
no
man
suffers
the
loss
of
any
Riches
by
it
.
For
men
(
as
we
said
but
now
)
if
the
Estates
of
them
all
were
either
halfed
or
doubled
,
would
in
both
cases
remain
equally
rich
.
For
they
would
each
man
have
his
former
state
,
dignity
,
and
degree
;
and
moreover
,
the
Money
leavied
not
going
out
of
the
Nation
,
the
same
also
would
remain
as
rich
in
comparison
of
any
other
Nation
;
onely
the
Riches
of
the
Prince
and
People
would
differ
for
a
little
while
,
namely
,
until
the
money
leavied
from
some
,
were
again
refunded
upon
the
same
,
or
other
persons
that
paid
it
:
In
which
case
every
man
also
should
have
his
chance
and
opportunity
to
be
made
the
better
or
worse
by
the
new
distribution
;
or
if
he
lost
by
one
,
yet
to
gain
by
another
.
4.
3.
Now
that
which
angers
men
most
,
is
to
be
taxed
above
their
Neighbours
.
To
which
I
answer
,
that
many
times
these
surmizes
are
mistakes
,
many
times
they
are
chances
,
which
in
the
next
Tax
may
run
more
favourable
;
and
if
they
be
by
design
,
yet
it
cannot
be
imagined
,
that
it
was
by
design
of
the
Sovereign
,
but
of
some
temporary
Assessor
,
whose
turn
it
may
be
to
receive
the
Talio
upon
the
next
occasion
from
the
very
man
he
has
wronged
.
5.
4.
Men
repine
much
,
if
they
think
the
money
leavyed
will
be
expended
on
Entertainments
,
mangnificent
Shews
,
triumphal
Arches
,
&c.
To
which
I
answer
,
that
the
same
is
a
refunding
the
said
moneys
to
the
Tradesmen
who
work
upon
those
things
;
which
Trades
though
they
seem
vain
and
onely
of
ornament
,
yet
they
refund
presently
to
the
most
useful
;
namely
,
to
Brewers
,
Bakers
,
Taylours
,
Shoemakers
,
&c.
Moreover
,
the
Prince
hath
no
more
pleasure
in
these
Shews
and
Entertainments
then
100000.
others
of
his
meanest
Subjects
have
,
whom
,
for
all
their
grumbling
,
we
see
to
travel
many
miles
to
be
spectators
of
these
mistaken
and
distasted
vanities
.
6.
5.
The
people
often
complain
,
that
the
King
bestows
the
money
he
raises
from
the
people
upon
his
Favourites
:
To
which
we
answer
;
that
what
is
given
to
Favourites
,
may
at
the
next
step
or
transmigration
,
come
into
our
own
hands
,
or
theirs
unto
whom
we
wish
well
,
and
think
do
deserve
it
.
7.
Secondly
,
as
this
man
is
a
Favourite
to
day
,
so
another
,
or
our selves
,
may
be
hereafter
;
favour
being
of
a
very
slippery
and
moveable
nature
,
and
not
such
a
thing
as
we
need
much
to
envy
;
for
the
same
way
that
—
leads
up
an
hill
,
leads
also
down
the
same
.
Besides
,
there
is
nothing
in
the
Lawes
or
Customes
of
England
,
which
excludes
any
the
meanest
mans
Childe
,
from
arriving
to
the
highest
Offices
in
this
Kingdom
,
much
less
debars
him
from
the
Personall
kindness
of
his
Prince
.
8.
All
these
imaginations
(
whereunto
the
vulgar
heads
are
subject
)
do
cause
a
backwardness
to
pay
,
and
that
necessitates
the
Prince
to
severity
.
Now
this
lighting
upon
some
poor
,
though
stubborn
,
stiff-necked
Refuser
,
charged
with
Wife
and
Children
,
gives
the
credulous
great
occasion
to
complain
of
Oppression
,
and
breeds
ill
blood
as
to
all
other
matters
;
feeding
the
ill
humours
already
in
being
.
9.
6.
Ignorance
of
the
Number
,
Trade
,
and
Wealth
of
the
people
,
is
often
the
reason
why
the
said
people
are
needlesly
troubled
,
viz.
with
the
double
charge
and
vexation
of
two
,
or
many
Levies
,
when
one
might
have
served
:
Examples
whereof
have
been
seen
in
late
Poll-moneys
;
in
which
(
by
reason
of
not
knowing
the
state
of
the
people
,
viz.
how
many
there
were
of
each
Taxable
sort
,
and
the
want
of
sensible
markes
whereby
to
rate
men
,
and
the
confounding
of
Estates
with
Titles
and
Offices
)
great
mistakes
were
committed
.
10.
Besides
,
for
not
knowing
the
Wealth
of
the
people
,
the
Prince
knows
not
what
they
can
bear
;
and
for
not
knowing
the
Trade
,
he
can
make
no
Judgment
of
the
proper
season
when
to
demand
his
Exhibitions
.
11.
7.
Obscurities
and
doubts
,
about
the
right
of
imposing
,
hath
been
the
cause
of
great
and
ugly
Reluctancies
in
the
people
,
and
of
Involuntary
Severities
in
the
Prince
;
an
eminent
Example
whereof
was
the
Ship-money
,
no
small
cause
of
twenty
years
calamity
to
the
whole
Kingdom
.
12.
8.
Fewness
of
people
,
is
real
poverty
;
and
a
Nation
wherein
are
Eight
Millions
of
people
,
are
more
then
twice
as
rich
as
the
same
scope
of
Land
wherein
are
but
Four
;
For
the
same
Governours
which
are
the
great
charge
,
may
serve
near
as
well
,
for
the
greater
,
as
the
lesser
number
.
13.
Secondly
,
If
the
people
be
so
few
,
as
that
they
can
live
,
Exsponte
Creatis
,
or
with
little
labour
,
such
as
is
Grazing
,
&c.
they
become
wholly
without
Art.
No
man
that
will
not
exercise
his
hands
,
being
able
to
endure
the
tortures
of
the
mind
,
which
much
thoughtfulness
doth
occasion
.
14.
9.
Scarcity
of
money
,
is
another
cause
of
the
bad
payment
of
Taxes
;
for
if
we
consider
,
that
of
all
the
wealth
of
this
Nation
,
viz.
Lands
,
Housing
,
Shipping
,
Commodities
,
Furniture
,
Plate
,
and
Money
,
that
scarce
one
part
of
an
hundred
is
Coin
;
and
that
perhaps
there
is
scarce
six
millions
of
Pounds
now
in
England
,
that
is
but
twenty
shillings
a
head
for
every
head
in
the
Nation
.
We
may
easily
judge
,
how
difficult
it
is
for
men
of
competent
estates
,
to
pay
a
Summe
of
money
on
a
sudden
;
which
if
they
cannot
compass
,
Severities
,
and
Charges
ensue
;
and
that
with
reason
,
though
unluckie
enough
,
it
being
more
tolerable
to
undoe
one
particular
Member
,
then
to
endanger
the
whole
,
notwithstanding
indeed
it
be
more
tolerable
for
one
particular
Member
to
be
undone
with
the
whole
,
then
alone
.
15.
10.
It
seems
somewhat
hard
,
that
all
Taxes
should
be
paid
in
money
,
that
is
,
(
when
the
King
hath
occasion
to
Victual
his
Ships
at
Portsmouth
)
that
Fat
Oxen
,
and
Corn
should
not
be
received
in
kind
,
but
that
Farmers
must
first
carry
their
Corn
perhaps
ten
Miles
to
sell
,
and
turn
into
money
;
which
being
paid
to
the
King
,
is
again
reconverted
into
Corn
,
fetcht
many
miles
further
.
16.
Moreover
,
the
Farmer
for
haste
is
forced
to
under-sell
his
Corn
,
and
the
King
for
haste
likewise
,
is
forced
to
over-buy
his
provisions
.
Whereas
the
paying
in
kinde
,
Pro
Hic
&
Nunc
,
would
lessen
a
considerable
grievance
to
the
poor
people
.
17.
The
next
consideration
shall
be
of
the
consequences
,
and
effects
of
too
great
a
Tax
,
not
in
respect
of
particular
men
,
of
which
we
have
spoken
before
,
but
to
the
whole
people
in
general
:
To
which
I
say
,
that
there
is
a
certain
measure
,
and
proportion
of
money
requisite
to
drive
the
trade
of
a
Nation
,
more
or
less
then
which
would
prejudice
the
same
.
Just
as
there
is
a
certain
proportion
of
Farthings
necessary
in
a
small
retail
Trade
,
to
change
silver
money
,
and
to
even
such
reckonings
,
as
cannot
be
adjusted
with
the
smallest
silver
pieces
.
For
money
,
(
made
of
Gold
and
silver
)
is
to
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
(
that
is
to
the
matter
of
our
Food
and
Covering
)
but
as
Farthings
,
and
other
local
extrinsick
money
,
is
to
the
Gold
and
Silver
species
.
18.
Now
as
the
proportion
of
the
number
of
Farthings
requisite
in
comerse
is
to
be
taken
from
the
number
of
people
,
the
frequency
of
their
exchanges
;
as
also
,
and
principally
from
the
value
of
the
smallest
silver
pieces
of
money
;
so
in
like
maner
,
the
proportion
of
money
requisite
to
our
Trade
,
is
to
be
likewise
taken
from
the
frequency
of
commutations
,
and
from
the
bigness
of
the
payments
,
that
are
by
Law
or
Custome
usually
made
otherwise
.
From
whence
it
follows
,
that
where
there
are
Registers
of
Lands
,
whereby
the
just
value
of
each
mans
interest
in
them
,
may
be
well
known
;
and
where
there
are
Depositories
of
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
of
Metals
,
Cloth
,
Linnen
,
Leather
,
and
other
Usefuls
;
and
where
there
are
Banks
of
money
also
,
there
less
money
is
necessary
to
drive
the
Trade
.
For
if
all
the
greatest
payments
be
made
in
Lands
,
and
the
other
perhaps
down
to
ten
pound
,
or
twenty
pound
be
made
by
credit
in
Lombars
or
Money-Banks
:
It
follows
,
that
there
needs
onely
money
to
pay
sums
less
then
those
aforementioned
;
just
as
fewer
Farthings
are
requisite
for
change
,
where
there
be
plenty
of
silver
two
Pences
,
then
where
the
least
silver
piece
is
six
Pence
.
19.
To
apply
all
this
,
I
say
,
that
if
there
be
too
much
money
in
a
Nation
,
it
were
good
for
the
Commonalty
,
as
well
as
the
King
,
and
no
harm
even
to
particular
men
,
if
the
King
had
in
his
Coffers
,
all
that
is
superflous
,
no
more
then
if
men
were
permitted
to
pay
their
Taxes
in
any
thing
they
could
best
spare
.
20.
On
the
other
side
,
if
the
largeness
of
a
publick
Exhibition
should
leave
less
money
then
is
necessary
to
drive
the
Nations
Trade
,
then
the
mischief
thereof
would
be
the
doing
of
less
work
,
which
is
the
same
as
lessening
the
people
,
or
their
Art
and
Industry
;
for
a
hundred
pound
passing
a
hundred
hands
for
Wages
,
causes
a
10000l
.
worth
of
Commodities
to
be
produced
,
which
hands
would
have
been
idle
and
useless
,
had
there
not
been
this
continual
motive
to
their
employment
,
21.
Taxes
if
they
be
presently
expended
upon
our
own
Domestick
Commodities
,
seem
to
me
,
to
do
little
harm
to
the
whole
Body
of
the
people
,
onely
they
work
a
change
in
the
Riches
and
Fortunes
of
particular
men
;
and
particularly
by
transferring
the
same
from
the
Landed
and
Lazy
,
to
the
Crafty
and
Industrious
.
As
for
example
,
if
a
Gentleman
have
let
his
Lands
to
Farm
for
a
hundred
pound
per
annum
,
for
several
years
or
lives
,
and
he
be
taxed
twenty
pound
per
annum
,
to
maintain
a
Navy
;
then
the
effect
hereof
will
be
,
that
this
Gentlemans
twenty
pound
per
annum
,
will
be
distributed
amongst
Seamen
,
Ship-Carpenters
,
and
other
Trades
relating
to
Naval
matters
;
but
if
the
Gentleman
had
his
Land
in
his
own
hands
,
then
being
taxed
a
Fifth
part
,
he
would
raise
his
Rents
near
the
same
proportion
upon
his
under
Tenants
,
or
would
sell
his
Cattle
,
Corn
,
and
Wooll
a
Fifth
part
dearer
;
the
like
also
would
all
other
subdependents
on
him
do
;
and
thereby
recover
in
some
measure
,
what
he
paid
.
Lastly
,
but
if
all
the
money
levied
were
thrown
into
the
Sea
,
then
the
ultimate
effect
would
onely
be
,
that
every
man
must
work
a
fifth
part
the
harder
,
or
retrench
a
fifth
part
of
his
consumptions
,
viz.
the
former
,
if
forreign
Trade
be
improveable
,
and
the
latter
,
if
it
be
not
.
22.
This
,
I
conceive
,
were
the
worst
of
Taxes
in
a
well
policyed
State
;
but
in
other
States
,
where
is
not
a
certain
prevention
of
Beggary
and
Theevery
,
that
is
a
sure
livelihood
for
men
wanting
imployment
;
there
,
I
confess
,
an
excessive
Taxe
,
causes
excessive
and
insuperable
want
,
even
of
natural
necessities
,
and
that
on
a
sudden
,
so
as
ignorant
particular
persons
,
cannot
finde
out
what
way
to
subsist
by
;
and
this
,
by
the
law
of
Nature
,
must
cause
sudden
effects
to
relieve
it self
,
that
is
,
Rapines
,
Frauds
;
and
this
again
must
bring
Death
,
Mutilations
,
and
Impisonments
,
according
to
the
present
Laws
which
are
Mischiefs
,
and
Punishments
,
as
well
unto
the
State
,
as
to
the
particular
sufferers
of
them
.
CHAP.
IV.
Of
the
several
wayes
of
Taxe
,
and
first
,
of
setting
a
part
,
a
proportion
of
the
whole
Territory
for
Publick
uses
,
in
the
nature
of
Crown
Lands
;
and
secondly
,
by
way
of
Assessement
,
or
Land-taxe
.
BUt
supposing
,
that
the
several
causes
of
Publick
Charge
are
lessened
as
much
as
may
be
,
and
that
the
people
be
well
satisfied
,
and
contented
to
pay
their
just
shares
of
what
is
needfull
for
their
Government
and
Protection
,
as
also
for
the
Honour
of
their
Prince
and
Countrey
:
It
follows
now
to
propose
the
several
wayes
,
and
expedients
,
how
the
same
may
be
most
easily
,
speedily
,
and
insensibly
collected
.
The
which
I
shall
do
,
by
exposing
the
conveniencies
and
inconveniences
of
some
of
the
principal
wayes
of
Levyings
,
used
of
later
years
within
the
several
States
of
Europe
:
unto
which
others
of
smaller
and
more
rare
use
may
be
referred
.
2.
Imagine
then
,
a
number
of
people
,
planted
in
a
Territory
,
who
had
upon
Computation
concluded
,
that
two
Millions
of
pounds
per
annum
,
is
necessary
to
the
publick
charges
.
Or
rather
,
who
going
more
wisely
to
work
,
had
computed
a
twenty
fifth
part
of
the
proceed
of
all
their
Lands
and
Labours
,
were
to
be
the
Excisium
,
or
the
part
to
be
cut
out
,
and
laid
aside
for
publick
uses
.
Which
proportions
perhaps
are
fit
enough
to
the
affairs
of
England
,
but
of
that
hereafter
.
3.
Now
the
question
is
,
how
the
one
or
the
other
shall
be
raised
.
The
first
way
we
propose
,
is
,
to
Excize
the
very
Land
it self
in
kinde
;
that
is
,
to
cut
out
of
the
whole
twenty
five
Millions
,
which
are
said
to
be
in
England
and
Wales
,
as
much
Land
in
specie
,
as
whereof
the
Rack-rent
would
be
two
Millions
,
viz.
about
four
Millions
of
Acres
,
which
is
about
a
sixth
part
of
the
whole
;
making
the
said
four
Millions
to
be
Crown
Lands
,
and
as
the
four
Counties
intended
to
be
reserved
in
Ireland
upon
the
forfeitures
were
.
Or
else
to
excize
a
sixth
part
of
the
rent
of
the
whole
,
which
is
about
the
proportion
,
that
the
Adventurers
and
Souldiers
in
Ireland
retribute
to
the
King
,
as
Quit
Rents
.
Of
which
two
wayes
,
the
latter
is
manifestly
the
better
,
the
King
having
more
security
,
and
more
obliges
;
provided
the
trouble
and
charge
of
this
universal
Collection
,
exceed
not
that
of
the
other
advantage
considerably
.
4.
This
way
in
a
new
State
would
be
good
,
being
agreed
upon
,
as
it
was
in
Ireland
,
before
men
had
even
the
possession
of
any
Land
at
all
;
wherefore
whosoever
buyes
Land
in
Ireland
hereafter
,
is
no
more
concerned
with
the
Quit
Rents
wherewith
they
are
charged
,
then
if
the
Acres
were
so
much
the
fewer
;
or
then
men
are
,
who
buy
Land
,
out
of
which
they
know
Tythes
are
to
be
paid
.
And
truly
that
Countrey
is
happy
,
in
which
by
Original
Accord
,
such
a
Rent
is
reserved
,
as
whereby
the
Publick
charge
may
be
born
,
without
contingent
,
sudden
,
superadditions
,
in
which
lies
the
very
Ratio
of
the
burthen
of
all
Contributions
and
Exactions
.
For
in
such
cases
,
as
was
said
before
,
it
is
not
onely
the
Landlord
payes
,
but
every
man
who
eats
but
an
Egg
,
or
an
Onion
of
the
growth
of
his
Lands
;
or
who
useth
the
help
of
any
Artisan
,
which
feedeth
on
the
same
.
5.
But
if
the
same
were
propounded
in
England
,
viz.
if
an
aliquot
part
of
every
Landlords
Rent
were
excinded
or
retrenched
,
then
those
whose
Rents
were
settled
,
and
determined
for
long
times
to
come
,
would
chiefly
bear
the
burthen
of
such
an
Imposition
,
and
others
have
a
benefit
thereby
.
For
suppose
A.
and
B.
have
each
of
them
a
parcel
of
Land
,
of
equal
goodness
and
value
;
suppose
also
that
A.
hath
let
his
parcel
for
twenty
one
years
at
twenty
pound
per
annum
,
but
that
B.
is
free
;
now
there
comes
out
a
Taxe
of
a
fifth
part
;
hereupon
B.
will
not
let
under
25
l.
that
his
remainder
may
be
twenty
,
whereas
A.
must
be
contented
with
sixteen
neat
;
nevertheless
the
Tenants
of
A.
will
sell
the
proceed
of
their
bargain
at
the
same
rate
,
that
the
Tenants
of
B.
shall
do
.
The
effect
of
all
this
is
;
First
,
that
the
Kings
fifth
part
of
B.
his
Farm
,
shall
be
greater
then
before
.
Secondly
,
that
the
Farmer
to
B.
shall
gain
more
then
before
the
Taxe
.
Thirdly
,
that
the
Tenant
or
Farmer
of
A.
shall
gain
as
much
as
the
King
and
Tenant
to
B.
both
.
Fourthly
,
the
Tax
doth
ultimately
light
upon
the
Landlord
A.
and
the
Consumptioners
.
From
whence
it
follows
,
that
a
Land-taxe
resolves
into
an
irregular
Excize
upon
consumptions
,
that
those
bear
it
most
,
who
least
complain
.
And
lastly
,
that
some
Landlords
may
gain
,
and
onely
such
whose
Rents
are
predetermined
shall
loose
;
and
that
doubly
,
viz.
one
way
by
the
raising
of
their
revenues
,
and
the
other
by
exhausting
the
prices
of
provisions
upon
them
.
6.
Another
way
is
an
Excisium
out
of
the
Rent
of
Houseing
,
which
is
much
more
uncertain
then
that
of
Land.
For
an
House
is
of
a
double
nature
,
viz.
one
,
wherein
it
is
a
way
and
means
of
expence
;
the
other
,
as
't
is
an
Instrument
and
Tool
of
gain
:
for
a
Shop
in
London
of
less
capacity
and
less
charge
in
building
then
a
fair
Dining-Room
in
the
same
House
,
unto
which
both
do
belong
,
shall
nevertheless
be
of
the
greater
value
;
so
also
shall
a
Dungeon
,
Sellar
,
then
a
pleasant
Chamber
;
because
the
one
is
expence
,
the
other
profit
.
Now
the
way
Land-taxe
rates
housing
,
as
of
the
latter
nature
,
but
the
Excize
,
as
of
the
former
.
7.
We
might
sometimes
adde
hereunto
,
that
housing
is
sometimes
disproportionally
taxed
to
discourage
Building
,
especially
upon
new
Foundations
,
thereby
to
prevent
the
growth
of
a
City
;
suppose
London
,
such
excessive
and
overgrown
Cities
being
dangerous
to
Monarchy
,
though
the
more
secure
when
the
Supremacy
is
in
Citizens
of
such
places
themselves
,
as
in
Venice
.
8.
But
we
say
,
that
such
checking
of
new
Buildings
signifies
nothing
to
this
purpose
;
forasmuch
as
Buildings
do
not
encrease
,
until
the
People
already
have
increased
:
but
the
remedy
of
the
abovementioned
dangers
is
to
be
sought
in
the
causes
of
the
encrease
of
People
,
the
which
if
they
can
be
nipt
,
the
other
work
will
necessarily
be
done
.
But
what
then
is
the
true
effect
of
forbidding
to
build
upon
new
foundations
?
I
answer
to
keep
and
fasten
the
City
to
its
old
seat
and
ground-plot
,
the
which
encouragement
for
new
Buildings
will
remove
,
as
it
comes
to
pass
almost
in
all
great
Cities
,
though
insensibly
,
and
not
under
many
years
progression
.
9.
The
reason
whereof
is
,
because
men
are
unwilling
to
build
new
houses
at
the
charge
of
pulling
down
their
old
,
where
both
the
old
house
it self
,
and
the
ground
it
stands
upon
do
make
a
much
dearer
ground-plot
for
a
new
house
,
and
yet
far
less
free
and
convenient
;
wherefore
men
build
upon
new
free
foundations
,
and
cobble
up
old
houses
,
until
they
become
fundamentally
irreparable
,
at
which
time
they
become
either
the
dwelling
of
the
Rascality
,
or
in
process
of
time
return
to
waste
and
Gardens
again
,
examples
whereof
are
many
even
about
London
.
Now
if
great
Cities
are
naturally
apt
to
remove
their
Seats
,
I
ask
which
way
?
I
say
,
in
the
case
of
London
,
it
must
be
Westward
,
because
the
Windes
blowing
near
¾
.
of
the
year
from
the
West
,
,
the
dwellings
of
the
West
end
are
so
much
the
more
free
from
the
fumes
,
steams
,
and
stinks
of
the
whole
Easterly
Pyle
;
which
where
Seacoal
is
burnt
is
a
great
matter
.
Now
if
it
follow
from
hence
,
that
the
Pallaces
of
the
greatest
men
will
remove
Westward
,
it
will
also
naturally
follow
,
that
the
dwellings
of
others
who
depend
upon
them
will
creep
after
them
.
This
we
see
in
London
,
where
the
Noblemens
ancient
houses
are
now
become
Halls
for
Companies
,
or
turned
into
Tenements
,
and
all
the
Pallaces
are
gotten
Westward
;
Insomuch
,
as
I
do
not
doubt
but
that
five
hundred
years
hence
,
the
Kings
Pallace
will
be
near
Chelsey
,
and
the
old
building
of
Whitehall
converted
to
uses
more
answerable
to
their
quality
.
For
to
build
a
new
Royal
Pallace
upon
the
same
ground
will
be
too
great
a
confinement
,
in
respect
of
Gardens
and
other
magnificencies
,
and
withall
a
disaccommodation
in
the
time
of
the
work
;
but
it
rather
seems
to
me
,
that
the
next
Palace
will
be
built
from
the
whole
present
contignation
of
houses
at
such
a
distance
as
the
old
Pallace
of
Westminster
was
from
the
City
of
London
,
when
the
Archers
began
to
bend
their
bowes
just
without
Ludgate
,
and
when
all
the
space
between
the
Thames
,
Fleet-street
,
and
Holborn
was
as
Finsbury-Fields
are
now
.
10.
This
digression
I
confess
to
be
both
impertinent
to
the
business
of
Taxes
,
and
in
it self
almost
needless
;
for
why
should
we
trouble
our selves
what
shall
be
five
hundred
years
hence
,
not
knowing
what
a
day
may
bring
forth
;
and
since
't
is
not
unlikely
,
but
that
before
that
time
we
may
be
all
transplanted
from
hence
into
America
,
these
Countreys
being
over-run
with
Turks
,
and
made
waste
,
as
the
Seats
of
the
famous
Eastern
Empires
at
this
day
are
.
11.
Onely
I
think
't
is
certain
,
that
while
ever
there
are
people
in
England
,
the
greatest
cohabitation
of
them
will
be
about
the
place
which
is
now
London
,
the
Thames
being
the
most
commodious
River
of
this
Island
,
and
the
seat
of
London
the
most
commodious
part
of
the
Thames
;
so
much
doth
the
means
of
facilitating
Carriage
greaten
a
City
,
which
may
put
us
in
minde
of
employing
our
idle
hands
about
mending
the
High-wayes
,
making
Bridges
,
Cawseys
,
and
Rivers
navigable
:
Which
considerations
brings
me
back
round
into
my
way
of
Taxes
,
from
whence
I
digrest
.
12.
But
before
we
talk
too
much
of
Rents
,
we
should
endeavour
to
explain
the
mysterious
nature
of
them
,
with
reference
as
well
to
Money
,
the
rent
of
which
we
call
usury
;
as
to
that
of
Lands
and
Houses
,
aforementioned
.
13.
Suppose
a
man
could
with
his
own
hands
plant
a
certain
scope
of
Land
with
Corn
,
that
is
,
could
Digg
,
or
Plough
,
Harrow
,
Weed
,
Reap
,
Carry
home
,
Thresh
,
and
Winnow
so
much
as
the
Husbandry
of
this
Land
requires
;
and
had
withal
Seed
wherewith
to
sowe
the
same
.
I
say
,
that
when
this
man
hath
subducted
his
seed
out
of
the
proceed
of
his
Harvest
,
and
also
,
what
himself
hath
both
eaten
and
given
to
others
in
exchange
for
Clothes
,
and
other
Natural
necessaries
;
that
the
remainder
of
Corn
,
is
the
natural
and
true
Rent
of
the
Land
for
that
year
;
and
the
medium
of
seven
years
,
or
rather
of
so
many
years
as
makes
up
the
Cycle
,
within
which
Dearths
and
Plenties
make
their
revolution
,
doth
give
the
ordinary
Rent
of
the
Land
in
Corn.
14.
But
a
further
,
though
collaterall
question
may
be
,
how
much
English
money
this
Corn
or
Rent
is
worth
?
I
answer
,
so
much
as
the
money
,
which
another
single
man
can
save
,
within
the
same
time
,
over
and
above
his
expence
,
if
he
imployed
himself
wholly
to
produce
and
make
it
;
viz.
Let
another
man
go
travel
into
a
Countrey
where
is
Silver
,
there
Dig
it
,
Refine
it
,
bring
it
to
the
same
place
where
the
other
man
planted
his
Corn
;
Coyne
it
,
&c.
the
same
person
,
all
the
while
of
his
working
for
Silver
,
gathering
also
food
for
his
necessary
livelihood
,
and
procuring
himself
covering
,
&c.
I
say
,
the
Silver
of
the
one
,
must
be
esteemed
of
equal
value
with
the
Corn
of
the
other
:
the
one
being
perhaps
twenty
Ounces
,
and
the
other
twenty
Bushels
.
From
whence
it
follows
,
that
the
price
of
a
Bushel
of
this
Corn
to
be
an
Ounce
of
Silver
.
15.
And
forasmuch
as
possibly
there
may
be
more
Art
and
Hazzard
in
working
about
the
Silver
,
then
about
the
Corn
,
yet
all
comes
to
the
same
pass
;
for
let
a
hundred
men
work
ten
years
upon
Corn
,
and
the
same
number
of
men
,
the
same
time
,
upon
Silver
;
I
say
,
that
the
neat
proceed
of
the
Silver
is
the
price
of
the
whole
neat
proceed
of
the
Corn
,
and
like
parts
of
the
one
,
the
price
of
like
parts
of
the
other
.
Although
not
so
many
of
those
who
wrought
in
Silver
,
learned
the
Art
of
refining
and
coining
,
or
out-lived
the
dangers
and
diseases
of
working
in
the
Mines
.
And
this
also
is
the
way
of
pitching
the
true
proportion
,
between
the
values
of
Gold
and
Silver
,
which
many
times
is
set
but
by
popular
errour
,
sometimes
more
,
sometimes
less
,
diffused
in
the
world
;
which
errour
(
by
the
way
)
is
the
cause
of
our
having
been
pestred
with
too
much
Gold
heretofore
,
and
wanting
it
now
.
16.
This
,
I
say
,
to
be
the
foundation
of
equallizing
and
ballancing
of
values
;
yet
in
the
superstructures
and
practices
hereupon
,
I
confess
there
is
much
variety
,
and
intricacy
;
of
which
hereafter
.
17.
The
world
measures
things
by
Gold
and
Silver
,
but
principally
the
latter
;
for
there
may
not
be
two
measures
,
and
consequently
the
better
of
many
must
be
the
onely
of
all
;
that
is
,
by
fine
silver
of
a
certain
weight
:
but
now
if
it
be
hard
to
measure
the
weight
and
fineness
of
silver
,
as
by
the
different
reports
of
the
ablest
Saymasters
I
have
known
it
to
be
;
and
if
silver
granted
to
be
of
the
same
fineness
and
weight
,
rise
and
fall
in
its
price
,
and
be
more
worth
at
one
place
then
another
,
not
onely
for
being
farther
from
the
Mines
,
but
for
other
accidents
,
and
may
be
more
worth
at
present
,
then
a
moneth
or
other
small
time
hence
;
and
if
it
differ
in
its
proportion
unto
the
several
things
valued
by
it
,
in
several
ages
upon
the
increase
and
diminution
thereof
,
we
shall
endeavour
to
examine
some
other
natural
Standards
and
Measures
,
without
derogating
from
the
excellent
use
of
these
.
18.
Our
Silver
and
Gold
we
call
by
severall
names
,
as
in
England
by
pounds
,
shillings
,
and
pence
,
all
which
may
be
called
and
understood
by
either
of
the
three
.
But
that
which
I
would
say
upon
this
matter
is
,
that
all
things
ought
to
be
valued
by
two
natural
Denominations
,
which
is
Land
and
Labour
;
that
is
,
we
ought
to
say
,
a
Ship
or
garment
is
worth
such
a
measure
of
Land
,
with
such
another
measure
of
Labour
;
forasmuch
as
both
Ships
and
Garments
were
the
creatures
of
Lands
and
mens
Labours
thereupon
:
This
being
true
,
we
should
be
glad
to
finde
out
a
natural
Par
between
Land
and
Labour
,
so
as
we
might
express
the
value
by
either
of
them
alone
as
well
or
better
then
by
both
,
and
reduce
one
into
the
other
as
easily
and
certainly
as
we
reduce
pence
into
pounds
.
Wherefore
we
would
be
glad
to
finde
the
natural
values
of
the
Fee
simple
of
Land
,
though
but
no
better
then
we
have
done
that
of
the
usus
fructus
abovementioned
,
which
we
attempt
as
followeth
.
19.
Having
found
the
Rent
or
value
of
the
usus
fructus
per
annum
,
the
question
is
,
how
many
years
purchase
(
as
we
usually
say
)
is
the
Fee
simple
naturally
worth
?
If
we
say
an
infinite
number
,
then
an
Acre
of
Land
would
be
equal
in
value
to
a
thousand
Acres
of
the
same
Land
;
which
is
absurd
,
an
infinity
of
unites
being
equal
to
an
infinity
of
thousands
.
Wherefore
we
must
pitch
upon
some
limited
number
,
and
that
I
apprehend
to
be
the
number
of
years
,
which
I
conceive
one
man
of
fifty
years
old
,
another
of
twenty
eight
,
and
another
of
seven
years
old
,
all
being
alive
together
may
be
thought
to
live
;
that
is
to
say
,
of
a
Grandfather
,
Father
,
and
Childe
;
few
men
having
reason
to
take
care
of
more
remote
Posterity
:
for
if
a
man
be
a
great
Grandfather
,
he
himself
is
so
much
the
nearer
his
end
,
so
as
there
are
but
three
in
a
continual
line
of
descent
usually
co-existing
together
;
and
as
some
are
Grandfathers
at
forty
years
,
yet
as
many
are
not
till
above
sixty
,
and
sic
de
caeteris
.
20.
Wherefore
I
pitch
the
number
of
years
purchase
,
that
any
Land
is
naturally
worth
,
to
be
the
ordinary
extent
of
three
such
persons
their
lives
.
Now
in
England
we
esteem
three
lives
equal
to
one
and
twenty
years
,
and
consequently
the
value
of
Land
,
to
be
about
the
same
number
of
years
purchase
.
Possibly
if
they
thought
themselves
mistaken
in
the
one
,
(
as
the
observator
on
the
Bills
of
Mortality
thinks
they
are
)
they
would
alter
in
the
other
,
unless
the
consideration
of
the
force
of
popular
errour
and
dependance
of
things
already
concatenated
,
did
hinder
them
.
21.
This
I
esteem
to
be
the
number
of
years
purchase
where
Titles
are
good
,
and
where
there
is
a
moral
certainty
of
enjoying
the
purchase
.
But
in
other
Countreys
Lands
are
worth
nearer
thirty
years
purchase
,
by
reason
of
the
better
Titles
,
more
people
,
and
perhaps
truer
opinion
of
the
value
and
duration
of
three
lives
.
22.
And
in
some
places
,
Lands
are
worth
yet
more
years
purchase
by
reason
of
some
special
honour
,
pleasures
,
priviledge
or
jurisdiction
annexed
unto
them
.
23.
On
the
other
hand
,
Lands
are
worth
fewer
years
purchase
(
as
in
Ireland
)
for
the
following
reasons
,
which
I
have
here
set
down
,
as
unto
the
like
whereof
the
cause
of
the
like
cheapness
in
any
other
place
may
be
imputed
.
First
,
In
Ireland
by
reason
of
the
frequent
Rebellions
,
(
in
which
if
you
are
conquered
,
all
is
lost
;
or
if
you
conquer
,
yet
you
are
subject
to
swarms
of
thieves
and
robbers
)
and
the
envy
which
precedent
missions
of
English
have
against
the
subsequent
,
perpetuity
it self
is
but
forty
years
long
,
as
within
which
time
some
ugly
disturbance
hath
hitherto
happened
almost
ever
since
the
first
coming
of
the
English
thither
.
24.
2.
The
Claims
upon
Claims
which
each
hath
to
the
others
Estates
,
and
the
facility
of
making
good
any
pretence
whatsoever
by
the
favour
of
some
one
or
other
of
the
many
Governours
and
Ministers
which
within
forty
years
shall
be
in
power
there
;
as
also
by
the
frequency
of
false
testimonies
,
and
abuse
of
solemn
Oaths
.
25.
3.
The
paucity
of
Inhabitants
,
there
being
not
above
the
⅕
.
th
.
part
so
many
as
the
Territory
would
maintain
,
and
of
those
but
a
small
part
do
work
at
all
,
and
yet
a
smaller
work
so
much
as
in
other
Countreys
.
26.
4.
That
a
great
part
of
the
Estates
both
real
and
personal
in
Ireland
are
owned
by
Absentees
,
and
such
as
draw
over
the
profits
raised
out
of
Ireland
refunding
nothing
;
so
as
Ireland
exporting
more
then
it
imports
doth
yet
grow
poorer
to
a
paradox
.
27.
5.
The
difficulty
of
executing
justice
,
so
many
of
those
in
power
being
themselves
protected
by
Offices
,
and
protecting
others
.
Moreover
,
the
number
of
criminous
and
indebted
persons
being
great
,
they
favour
their
like
in
Juries
,
Offices
,
and
wheresoever
they
can
:
Besides
the
Countrey
is
seldom
enough
to
give
due
encouragement
to
profound
Judges
and
Lawyers
,
which
makes
judgements
very
casual
;
ignorant
men
being
more
apt
to
be
bold
and
arbitrary
,
then
such
as
understand
the
dangers
of
it
.
But
all
this
with
a
little
care
in
due
season
might
remedy
,
so
as
to
bring
Ireland
in
a
few
years
to
the
same
level
of
values
with
other
places
;
but
of
this
also
elsewhere
more
at
large
,
for
in
the
next
place
we
shall
come
to
Usury
.
CHAP.
V.
Of
Usury
.
WHat
reason
there
is
for
taking
or
giving
Interest
or
Usury
for
any
thing
which
we
may
certainly
have
again
whensoever
we
call
for
it
,
I
see
not
;
nor
why
Usury
should
be
scrupled
,
where
money
or
other
necessaries
valued
by
it
,
is
lent
to
be
paid
at
such
a
time
and
place
as
the
Borrower
chuseth
,
so
as
the
Lender
cannot
have
his
money
paid
him
back
where
and
when
himself
pleaseth
,
I
also
see
not
.
Wherefore
when
a
man
giveth
out
his
money
upon
condition
that
he
may
not
demand
it
back
until
a
certain
time
to
come
,
whatsoever
his
own
necessities
shall
be
in
the
mean
time
,
he
certainly
may
take
a
compensation
for
this
inconvenience
which
he
admits
against
himself
:
And
this
allowance
is
that
we
commonly
call
Usury
.
2.
And
when
one
man
furnisheth
another
with
money
at
some
distant
place
,
and
engages
under
great
Penalties
to
pay
him
there
,
and
at
a
certain
day
besides
;
the
consideration
for
this
,
is
that
we
call
Exchange
or
local
Usury
.
As
for
example
,
if
a
man
wanting
:
money
at
Carlisle
in
the
heat
of
the
late
Civil
Wars
,
when
the
way
was
full
of
Souldiers
and
Robbers
,
and
the
passage
by
Sea
very
long
,
troublesome
,
and
dangerous
,
and
seldom
passed
;
why
might
not
another
take
much
more
then
an
100l
.
at
London
for
warranting
the
like
summe
to
be
paid
at
Carlisle
on
a
certain
day
?
3.
Now
the
Questions
arising
hence
are
;
what
are
the
natural
Standards
of
Usury
and
Exchange
?
As
for
Usury
,
the
least
that
can
be
,
is
the
Rent
of
so
much
Land
as
the
money
lent
will
buy
,
where
the
security
is
undoubted
;
but
where
the
security
is
casual
,
then
a
kinde
of
ensurance
must
be
enterwoven
with
the
simple
natural
Interest
,
which
may
advance
the
Usury
very
conscionably
unto
any
height
below
the
Principal
itself
.
Now
if
things
are
so
in
England
,
that
really
there
is
no
such
security
as
abovementioned
,
but
that
all
are
more
or
less
hazardous
,
troublesome
,
or
chargeable
to
make
,
I
see
no
reason
for
endeavoring
to
limit
Usury
upon
time
,
any
more
then
that
upon
place
,
which
the
practice
of
the
world
doth
not
,
unless
it
be
that
those
who
make
such
Laws
were
rather
Borrowers
then
Lenders
:
But
of
the
vanity
and
fruitlessness
of
making
Civil
Positive
Laws
against
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
I
have
spoken
elsewhere
,
and
instanced
in
several
particulars
.
4.
As
for
the
natural
measures
of
Exchange
,
I
say
,
that
in
times
of
Peace
,
the
greatest
Exchange
can
be
but
the
labour
of
carrying
the
money
in
specie
,
but
where
are
hazards
emergent
uses
for
money
more
in
one
place
then
another
,
&c.
or
opinions
of
these
true
or
false
,
the
Exchange
will
be
governed
by
them
.
5.
Parallel
unto
this
,
is
something
which
we
omit
concerning
the
price
of
Land
;
for
as
great
need
of
money
heightens
Exchange
,
so
doth
great
need
of
Corn
raise
the
price
of
that
likewise
,
and
consequently
of
the
Rent
of
the
Land
that
bears
Corn
,
and
lastly
of
the
Land
itself
;
as
for
example
,
if
the
Corn
which
feedeth
London
,
or
an
Army
,
be
brought
forty
miles
thither
,
then
the
Corn
growing
within
a
mile
of
London
,
or
the
quarters
of
such
Army
,
shall
have
added
unto
its
natural
price
,
so
much
as
the
charge
of
bringing
it
thirty
nine
miles
doth
amount
unto
:
And
unto
perishable
Commodities
as
fresh
fish
,
fruits
,
&c.
the
ensurance
upon
the
hazard
of
corrupting
,
&c.
shall
be
added
also
;
and
finally
unto
him
that
eats
these
things
there
(
suppose
in
Taverns
)
shall
be
added
the
charge
of
all
the
circumstancial
appurtenances
of
House-rent
,
Furniture
,
Attendance
,
and
the
Cooks
skill
as
well
as
his
labour
to
accompany
the
same
.
6.
Hence
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
Lands
intrinsically
alike
near
populous
places
,
such
as
where
the
perimeter
of
the
Area
that
feeds
them
is
great
,
will
not
onely
yield
more
Rent
for
these
Reasons
,
but
also
more
years
purchase
then
in
remote
places
,
by
reason
of
the
pleasure
and
honour
extraordinary
of
having
Lands
there
;
for
—
Omne
tulit
punctum
qui
miscuit
utile
dulci.
7.
Having
finished
our
digression
upon
the
measures
of
the
Rents
and
Values
of
Lands
and
Moneys
,
we
now
return
to
our
second
way
of
leavying
Publick
Charges
,
which
was
the
taking
of
a
proportion
of
the
Rent
,
(
commonly
called
Assessment
)
it
follows
next
to
speak
of
the
way
of
computing
the
said
Rents
,
otherwise
then
according
to
the
bargains
which
a
few
men
make
one
with
another
,
through
ignorance
,
haste
,
false
suggestion
,
or
else
in
their
passion
or
drink
:
Although
I
acknowledge
,
that
the
medium
or
common
result
of
all
the
bargains
made
within
three
years
(
or
other
such
Cycle
of
time
,
as
within
which
all
contingencies
of
Land
revolve
)
may
be
very
sufficient
to
this
purpose
,
being
but
the
summe
synthetically
computed
by
casual
opinions
,
as
I
would
endeavour
to
cast
up
analytically
by
a
distinct
particularizing
of
the
Causes
.
8.
1.
Therefore
I
propound
a
Survey
of
the
Figures
,
Quantities
,
and
Scituations
of
all
the
Lands
both
according
to
the
civil
bounds
of
Parishes
,
Farms
,
&c.
and
the
natural
distinctions
thereof
by
the
Sea
,
Rivers
,
ridges
of
Rocks
,
or
Mountains
,
&c.
9.
2.
I
propound
that
the
quality
of
each
denomination
were
described
by
the
Commodities
it
had
usually
born
,
in
some
Land
,
some
sort
of
Timber
,
Grain
,
pulse
or
root
growing
more
happily
then
in
others
:
Also
by
the
encrease
of
things
sown
or
planted
,
which
it
hath
yielded
communibus
annis
;
and
withall
,
the
comparative
goodness
of
the
said
Commodities
not
unto
the
common
Standard
money
,
but
to
one
another
.
As
for
example
;
if
there
be
ten
acres
of
Land
,
I
would
have
it
judged
whether
they
be
better
for
Hay
or
Corn
;
if
for
Hay
,
whether
the
said
ten
Acres
will
bear
more
or
less
of
Hay
then
ten
other
Acres
;
and
whether
an
hundred
weight
of
the
said
Hay
will
feed
or
fatten
more
or
less
,
then
the
same
weight
of
other
Hay
,
and
not
as
yet
comparing
it
to
money
,
in
which
the
value
of
the
said
Hay
will
be
more
or
less
,
according
to
the
plenty
of
money
,
which
hath
changed
strangely
since
the
discovery
of
the
West
Indies
,
and
according
to
the
multitudes
of
people
living
near
this
Land
,
together
with
the
luxurious
or
frugal
living
of
them
;
and
besides
all
,
according
to
the
Civil
,
Natural
,
and
Religious
Opinions
of
the
said
people
:
As
for
example
,
Eggs
in
the
fore-part
of
Lent
(
because
their
goodness
and
delicacy
decayes
before
Lent
be
done
)
being
worth
little
in
some
Popish
Countreys
;
nor
Swines
flesh
among
the
Jews
,
nor
Hedgehogs
,
Frogs
,
Snails
,
Mushrooms
,
&c.
to
those
that
fear
to
eat
them
,
as
poisonous
or
unwholesome
;
nor
Currans
and
Spanish
Wines
,
if
they
were
all
to
be
destroyed
as
the
great
thieves
of
this
Nation
,
by
an
Edict
of
the
State.
10.
This
I
call
a
Survey
or
Inquisition
into
the
intrinsick
Values
of
Land
,
that
of
extrinsick
or
accidentall
follows
.
We
said
,
that
the
change
of
the
store
of
money
would
change
the
rates
of
commodities
according
to
our
reckoning
in
names
and
words
,
(
pounds
,
shillings
,
and
pence
being
nothing
else
)
as
for
example
:
If
a
man
can
bring
to
London
an
ounce
of
Silver
out
of
the
Earth
in
Peru
,
in
the
same
time
that
he
can
produce
a
bushel
of
Corn
,
then
one
is
the
natural
price
of
the
other
;
now
if
by
reason
of
new
and
more
easie
Mines
a
man
can
get
two
ounces
of
Silver
as
easily
as
formerly
he
did
one
,
then
Corn
will
be
as
cheap
at
ten
shillings
the
bushel
,
as
it
was
before
at
five
shillings
caeteris
paribus
.
11.
It
behoves
us
therefore
to
have
a
way
,
whereby
to
tell
the
money
of
our
Countrey
(
which
I
think
I
have
,
and
that
in
a
short
time
,
and
without
cost
,
and
(
which
is
more
)
without
looking
into
particular
mens
pockets
;
of
which
hereafter
.
)
Now
if
we
know
what
Gold
and
Silver
we
had
in
England
two
hundred
years
ago
,
and
could
tell
it
again
now
;
and
though
we
also
knew
the
difference
of
our
denominations
then
,
when
thirty
seven
shillings
were
made
out
the
same
quantity
of
Silver
as
sixty
two
are
now
;
also
that
of
the
alloy
,
labour
in
Coinage
,
remedies
for
weight
and
fineness
,
and
duties
to
the
King
;
nay
,
if
we
also
knew
the
Labourers
wages
then
and
now
,
yet
all
this
would
not
shew
the
difference
of
the
Riches
of
our
Nation
even
in
money
alone
.
12.
Wherefore
we
must
adde
to
the
premises
,
the
knowledge
of
the
difference
of
the
numbers
of
the
people
,
and
conclude
,
that
if
all
the
money
in
the
Nation
were
equally
divided
amongst
all
the
people
both
then
and
now
,
that
that
time
wherein
each
Devisee
had
wherewith
to
hire
most
labourers
,
was
the
richer
.
So
that
we
want
the
knowledge
of
the
People
and
Bullion
which
is
now
in
this
Land
,
and
which
was
heretofore
;
all
which
I
think
may
be
found
out
even
for
the
time
past
,
but
more
probably
for
the
time
present
and
to
come
.
13.
But
to
proceed
;
suppose
we
had
them
,
then
we
would
pitch
the
accidental
values
upon
our
Lands
about
London
;
as
thus
,
viz.
We
would
first
at
hazzard
compute
the
materials
for
food
and
covering
,
which
the
Shires
of
Essex
,
Kent
,
Surrey
,
Middlesex
and
Hertford
,
next
circumjacent
to
London
,
did
communibus
annis
produce
;
and
would
withal
compute
the
Consumptioners
of
them
living
in
the
said
five
Shires
and
London
.
The
which
if
I
found
to
be
more
then
were
the
Consumptioners
living
upon
the
like
scope
of
other
Land
,
or
rather
upon
as
much
other
Land
as
bore
the
like
quantity
of
Provisions
.
Then
I
say
,
that
Provisions
must
be
dearer
in
the
said
five
Shires
then
in
the
other
;
and
within
the
said
Shires
cheaper
or
dearer
as
the
way
to
London
was
more
or
less
long
,
or
rather
more
or
less
chargeable
.
14.
For
if
the
said
five
Shires
did
already
produce
as
much
Commodity
,
as
by
all
endeavour
was
possible
:
then
what
is
wanting
must
be
brought
from
a
far
,
and
that
which
is
near
,
advanced
in
price
accordingly
;
or
if
by
the
said
Shires
by
greater
labour
then
now
is
used
,
(
as
by
digging
instead
of
Ploughing
,
setting
instead
of
sowing
,
picking
of
choice
seed
instead
of
taking
it
promiscuously
,
steeping
it
instead
of
using
it
wholly
unprepared
,
and
manuring
the
ground
with
salt
instead
of
rotten
straw
,
&c.
)
then
will
the
Rent
be
as
much
more
advanced
,
as
the
excess
of
encrease
exceeds
that
of
the
labour
.
15.
Now
the
price
of
labour
must
be
certain
,
(
as
we
see
it
made
by
the
Statutes
which
limit
the
day
wages
of
several
workmen
,
(
the
non-observance
of
which
Laws
,
and
the
not
adapting
them
to
the
change
of
times
,
is
by
the
way
very
dangerous
,
and
confusive
to
all
endeavours
of
bettering
the
Trade
of
the
Nation
.
16.
Moreover
,
the
touchstone
to
try
whether
it
be
better
to
use
those
improvements
or
not
,
is
to
examine
whether
the
labour
of
fetching
these
things
even
from
the
places
where
they
grow
wilde
,
or
with
less
Culture
,
be
not
less
then
that
of
the
said
improvements
.
17.
Against
all
this
will
be
objected
,
that
these
computations
are
very
hard
if
not
impossible
to
make
;
to
which
I
answer
onely
this
,
that
they
are
so
,
especially
if
none
will
trouble
their
hands
or
heads
to
make
them
,
or
give
authority
for
so
doing
:
But
withall
,
I
say
,
that
until
this
be
done
,
Trade
will
be
too
conjectural
a
work
for
any
man
to
employ
his
thoughts
about
;
for
it
will
be
the
same
wisdom
in
order
to
win
with
fair
Dice
,
to
spend
much
time
in
considering
how
to
hold
them
,
how
much
to
shake
them
,
and
how
hard
to
throw
them
,
and
on
what
angles
they
should
hit
the
side
of
the
Tables
,
as
to
consider
how
to
advance
the
Trade
of
this
Nation
;
where
at
present
particular
men
get
from
their
neighbours
(
not
from
the
earth
and
sea
)
rather
by
hit
then
wit
,
and
by
the
false
opinions
of
others
;
rather
then
their
own
judgements
;
Credit
every
where
,
but
chiefly
in
London
,
being
become
a
meer
conceit
,
that
a
man
is
responsible
or
not
,
without
any
certain
knowledge
of
his
Wealth
or
true
Estate
.
Whereas
I
think
the
nature
of
credit
should
be
limited
onely
to
an
opinion
of
a
mans
faculties
to
get
by
his
art
and
industry
.
The
way
of
knowing
his
Estate
being
to
be
made
certain
,
and
the
way
of
making
him
pay
what
he
owes
to
the
utmost
of
his
ability
,
being
to
be
expected
from
the
good
execution
of
our
Laws
.
18.
I
should
here
enlarge
upon
a
Paradox
,
to
prove
that
if
every
mans
Estate
could
be
alwayes
read
in
his
forehead
,
our
Trade
would
much
be
advanced
thereby
,
although
the
poorer
ambitious
man
be
commonly
the
more
industrious
.
But
of
this
elsewhere
.
19.
The
next
objection
against
this
so
exact
computation
of
the
Rents
and
works
of
Lands
,
&c.
is
,
that
the
Sovereign
would
know
too
exactly
every
mans
Estate
;
to
which
I
answer
,
that
if
the
Charge
of
the
Nation
be
brought
as
low
as
it
may
be
,
(
which
depends
much
upon
the
people
in
Parliament
to
do
)
and
if
the
people
be
willing
and
ready
to
pay
,
and
if
care
be
taken
,
that
although
they
have
not
ready
money
,
the
credit
of
their
Lands
and
Goods
shall
be
as
good
;
and
lastly
,
that
it
would
be
a
great
discommodity
to
the
Prince
to
take
more
then
he
needs
,
as
was
proved
before
;
where
is
the
evil
of
this
so
exact
knowledge
?
And
as
for
the
proportion
of
every
Contributor
,
why
should
any
man
hope
or
accept
to
ease
himself
by
his
craft
and
interest
in
a
confusion
?
or
why
should
he
not
fear
,
though
he
may
be
advantaged
this
time
,
to
suffer
in
the
next
.
CHAP.
VI.
Of
Customs
and
Free
Ports
.
CUstom
is
a
Contribution
or
Excisium
out
of
Goods
sent
out
or
imported
into
the
Princes
Dominions
:
In
these
Countreys
of
a
twentieth
part
not
according
to
the
Prices
currant
among
Merchants
of
each
respective
Commodity
,
but
according
to
other
standing
Rates
set
by
the
State
,
though
advised
for
the
most
part
by
concerned
Persons
.
2.
I
cannot
well
imagine
what
should
be
the
natural
Reasons
,
why
a
Prince
should
be
paid
this
duty
inward
and
outward
both
;
there
seems
indeed
to
be
some
,
why
he
should
be
paid
for
indulging
the
Exportation
of
some
such
things
as
other
Countreys
do
really
want
.
3.
Wherefore
I
think
,
that
Customs
at
the
first
were
a
praemium
allowed
the
Prince
for
protecting
the
Carriage
of
Goods
both
inward
and
outward
from
the
Pyrats
;
and
this
I
should
verily
believe
,
if
the
Prince
were
bound
to
make
good
losses
of
that
kinde
.
And
I
thought
that
the
proportion
of
five
pound
per
cent
.
was
pitched
upon
computation
,
that
the
Merchants
before
the
said
undertaking
and
composition
,
had
usually
lost
more
by
Pyracy
:
And
finally
,
that
the
Customs
had
been
an
ensurance
upon
losses
by
enemies
,
as
the
ensurance
now
usual
,
is
of
the
casualties
of
sea
,
winde
,
weather
,
and
Vessel
,
or
altogether
;
or
like
the
ensurance
in
some
Countreys
of
Houses
from
Fires
for
a
certain
small
part
of
their
yearly
Rent
.
But
be
it
what
it
will
,
it
is
anciently
established
by
Law
,
and
ought
to
be
paid
until
it
shall
be
abolished
.
Onely
I
take
leave
as
an
idle
Philosopher
to
discourse
upon
the
Nature
and
Measures
of
it
.
4.
The
Measures
of
Customs
outwards
may
be
such
,
as
after
reasonable
profit
to
the
Exporter
will
leave
such
of
our
own
Commodities
as
are
necessary
to
Forreigners
somewhat
cheaper
unto
them
then
they
can
be
had
from
elsewhere
.
As
for
example
,
Tin
is
a
Native
Commodity
,
which
governs
the
Market
,
that
is
,
there
is
none
so
good
and
so
easie
to
be
had
and
exported
.
Now
suppose
Tin
might
be
made
in
Cornwall
for
four
pence
the
pound
,
and
that
the
same
would
yield
twelve
pence
at
the
nearest
part
in
France
,
I
say
,
that
this
extraordinary
profit
ought
to
be
esteemed
as
a
Mine
Royal
,
or
Tresor
Trovè
,
and
the
Sovereign
ought
to
have
his
share
in
it
:
Which
he
will
have
,
by
imposing
so
great
a
duty
upon
Tin
Exported
,
as
on
one
side
may
leave
a
subsistence
to
the
Workmen
,
(
and
no
more
)
with
a
competent
profit
to
the
owners
of
the
ground
;
and
on
the
other
side
,
may
leave
the
price
abroad
less
then
that
for
which
Tin
may
be
had
from
any
other
place
.
5.
The
same
Imposition
might
also
be
made
on
the
Tin
spent
at
home
,
unless
it
be
as
impossible
so
to
do
,
as
for
the
King
of
France
to
impose
the
Gabel
upon
Salt
in
the
very
places
where
it
is
made
.
6.
But
it
is
observed
,
that
such
high
duties
make
men
endeavour
not
to
enter
any
such
Goods
at
all
,
or
pay
for
them
,
provided
the
charge
of
smuckling
and
bribing
,
with
the
hazzard
of
being
seized
do
not
communibus
vi●ibus
exceed
the
Duty
.
7.
Wherefore
the
Measures
of
this
Nature
are
,
that
it
be
more
easie
,
safe
,
and
profitable
for
men
to
keep
the
Law
,
then
to
break
it
,
unless
it
be
in
such
cases
,
where
the
Magistrate
can
with
certainty
execute
the
Law.
As
for
example
,
it
would
be
hard
to
save
the
Duties
upon
Horses
shipped
at
a
small
Port
,
without
adjacent
Creeks
,
and
that
but
some
certain
two
hours
every
Tide
,
forasmuch
as
Horses
cannot
be
disguised
,
put
up
in
bags
or
cask
,
nor
shipped
without
noise
and
the
help
of
many
hands
.
8.
The
Measures
of
Customs
upon
imported
Commodities
are
;
1.
That
all
things
ready
and
ripe
for
Consumption
may
be
made
somewhat
dearer
then
the
same
things
grown
or
made
at
home
;
if
the
same
be
feasible
caeteris
talibus
.
2.
That
all
Superfluities
tending
to
Luxury
and
sin
,
might
be
loaded
with
so
much
Impost
,
as
to
serve
instead
of
a
sumptuary
Law
to
restrain
the
use
of
them
.
But
here
also
care
is
to
be
had
that
it
be
not
better
to
smuckle
then
to
pay
.
9.
On
the
contrary
,
all
things
not
fully
wrought
and
Manufactured
,
as
raw
Hides
,
Wool
,
Beaver
,
Raw-silk
,
Cotton
;
as
also
all
Tools
and
Materials
for
Manufacture
,
as
also
Dying-stuff
,
&c.
ought
to
be
gently
dealt
with
.
10.
If
to
leavy
the
payment
of
these
Duties
could
be
most
exactly
performed
,
Princes
might
strangely
practice
one
upon
another
;
wherefore
since
they
cannot
,
the
people
pay
no
more
then
they
cannot
with
greater
safety
upon
the
whole
matter
save
,
nor
observe
any
more
of
these
Laws
,
then
they
cannot
elude
.
11.
The
Inconveniences
of
the
way
of
Customs
,
are
,
viz.
1.
That
Duties
are
laid
upon
things
not
yet
ripe
for
use
,
upon
Commodities
in
fieri
,
and
but
in
the
way
of
their
full
improvements
,
which
seems
the
same
ill-husbandry
,
as
to
make
fuel
of
young
Saplings
,
instead
of
Dotards
and
Pollards
.
2.
The
great
number
of
Officers
requisite
to
Collect
the
said
Duies
,
especially
in
a
Countrey
where
the
Harbours
are
many
,
and
the
Tides
convenient
for
shipping
of
Goods
at
any
time
.
3.
The
great
facility
of
smuckling
by
Briberies
,
Collusions
.
hiding
and
disguising
of
Commodities
,
&c.
and
all
this
notwithstanding
Oaths
and
Penalties
,
and
withall
by
the
several
wayes
of
mitigating
and
taking
off
the
said
Penalties
even
after
discovery
.
4.
The
Customs
or
Duties
upon
the
few
Commodities
of
the
growth
of
England
exchanged
with
Forreigners
,
make
too
small
a
part
of
the
whole
Expence
of
the
people
of
this
Kingdom
,
which
(
perhaps
is
not
less
then
fifty
millions
of
pounds
per
annum
)
out
of
which
to
bear
the
common
Charges
thereof
,
so
as
some
other
way
of
Leavy
must
be
practised
together
with
it
;
whereas
by
some
one
way
,
if
the
best
,
the
whole
work
may
be
absolved
:
wherefore
't
is
an
inconvenience
in
the
way
of
Customs
,
that
it
necessitates
other
wayes
then
it self
.
12.
Now
as
a
small
attempt
of
a
Remedy
or
Expedient
herein
,
I
offer
rather
,
that
instead
of
the
Customs
upon
Goods
shipped
,
every
Ship
that
goes
in
or
out
,
may
pay
a
Tonnage
,
the
same
being
collectible
by
a
very
few
hands
,
as
a
matter
visible
to
all
the
world
;
and
that
the
said
Duty
be
but
such
a
part
of
the
Fraight
,
as
the
like
whereof
being
excinded
out
of
the
whole
Consumption
,
would
defray
all
the
Publique
Charge
;
which
part
perhaps
is
4.
per
Cent.
or
thereabouts
,
viz.
two
millions
per
annum
out
of
fifty
.
13.
The
other
is
,
that
the
Customs
be
reduced
into
the
nature
of
an
Ensurance
-
praemium
,
and
that
the
same
be
augmented
and
fitted
,
as
whereby
the
King
may
afford
to
ensure
the
goods
as
well
against
the
Sea
as
Enemies
;
by
which
means
the
whole
Nation
would
be
concerned
in
all
such
losses
,
and
then
the
Merchant
for
his
own
sake
would
more
willingly
enter
and
pay
for
whatsoever
he
would
have
ensured
.
14.
But
it
will
be
here
objected
,
that
although
the
duty
of
Customs
be
abrogated
,
yet
that
there
must
be
almost
the
same
number
of
Officers
maintained
as
now
to
prevent
the
bringing
in
and
carrying
out
of
prohibited
Commodities
.
Wherefore
we
shall
here
state
the
nature
of
such
Prohibitions
by
two
or
three
grand
instances
.
15.
To
prohibit
the
Exportation
of
Money
,
in
that
it
is
a
thing
almost
impracticable
,
it
is
almost
nugatory
and
vain
;
And
the
danger
of
it
resolves
either
into
a
kinde
of
Ensurance
answerable
to
the
danger
of
being
seized
,
or
unto
a
Surcharge
of
a
Composition
by
bribing
the
Searchers
.
As
for
example
,
If
but
one
in
fifty
Exportations
are
seized
,
or
if
twenty
shillings
be
usually
taken
for
coining
at
fifty
pounds
,
then
the
Commodities
bought
with
this
Money
must
be
sold
two
at
least
per
cent
.
the
dearer
to
the
Consumptioner
.
Now
if
the
Trade
will
not
bear
this
Surcharge
,
then
Money
will
not
be
exported
with
discretion
.
Now
the
use
of
this
Prohibition
,
supposing
it
practicable
,
is
to
serve
as
a
sumptuary
Law
,
and
to
binde
the
Nation
in
general
not
to
spend
more
then
they
get
;
for
if
we
could
export
no
Commodity
of
our
own
growth
or
manufacture
then
by
prohibiting
the
going
out
of
Money
,
it
is
also
ipso
facto
commanded
that
nothing
forreign
should
be
brought
in
.
Again
supposing
,
that
ordinarily
we
export
enough
to
furnish
us
with
all
Forreign
Commodities
,
but
upon
some
extraordinary
decay
of
our
Land
or
hands
,
we
are
able
to
export
but
half
as
much
as
would
procure
our
ordinary
proportion
of
Forreign
Goods
,
then
the
Prohibition
of
Money
performs
indeed
the
part
of
a
sumptuary
Law
,
in
hindring
us
to
bring
n
any
more
then
half
as
much
Forreign
Commodities
as
we
formerly
used
,
onely
it
leaves
it
to
the
discretion
of
the
Merchant
,
to
chose
which
he
will
neglect
or
forbear
to
bring
in
,
and
w●ich
not
;
whereas
in
sumptuary
Laws
the
State
taketh
this
care
upon
themselves
.
As
for
example
,
If
we
wanted
Exportations
to
ballance
our
Importations
by
forty
thousand
pounds
,
and
suppose
for
examples
sake
,
that
the
Importation
of
forty
thousand
pounds
worth
of
Coffee-Berries
,
or
the
like
of
Spanish
Wine
must
be
retrenched
;
in
this
case
,
the
said
Prohibition
of
Money
will
do
one
,
or
some
of
one
,
and
some
of
the
other
as
much
harm
as
the
Merchant
himself
pleases
:
But
the
sumptuary
Law
determines
,
whether
we
shall
encourage
and
keep
fair
with
the
Nation
that
sends
us
Wine
rather
then
that
which
sends
us
Coffee
,
whether
the
Expence
of
Wine
or
Coffee
be
most
prejudicial
to
our
people
,
&c.
16.
The
benefits
alledged
for
the
free
Exportation
of
Money
is
m●●●rrily
this
,
viz.
That
if
a
Ship
carrying
out
of
England
forty
thousand
pounds
worth
of
Cloth
,
might
also
carry
with
it
forty
thousand
pounds
in
Money
,
then
could
the
Merchant
stand
the
stiffer
upon
his
terms
,
and
in
fine
would
buy
cheaper
,
and
sell
dearer
;
but
by
the
way
,
the
Merchant
buyes
this
power
with
the
Intrest
and
of
the
Money
he
carries
,
which
if
it
amount
to
five
pound
per
Cent.
then
he
had
better
sold
his
Goods
at
four
pound
per
Cent.
under
rate
,
then
to
have
fortified
himself
with
Money
as
aforesaid
.
But
of
this
more
may
be
said
,
we
hasten
to
the
great
point
of
Wool.
17.
The
Hollanders
having
gotten
away
our
Manufacture
of
Cloth
,
by
becoming
able
to
work
with
more
art
,
to
labour
and
fare
harder
,
to
take
less
fraight
,
Duties
and
Ensurance
,
hath
so
madded
us
here
in
England
,
that
we
have
been
apt
to
think
of
such
exorbitantly
fierce
wayes
of
prohibiting
Wool
and
Earth
to
be
exported
,
as
perhaps
would
do
us
twice
as
much
harm
as
the
losse
of
our
said
Trade
.
Wherefore
to
return
to
our
Wits
and
Trade
again
,
before
we
can
tell
what
to
do
in
this
case
,
we
must
consider
;
1.
That
we
are
often
forced
to
buy
Corn
from
abroad
,
and
as
often
complain
that
we
are
pestered
with
abundance
of
idle
hands
at
home
,
and
withall
that
we
cannot
vend
the
Woollen
Manufactures
even
which
our
few
working
hands
do
produce
.
In
this
case
were
it
not
better
to
lessen
our
sheep-trade
,
and
convert
our
hands
to
more
Tillage
?
Because
1.
Flesh
becomming
dearer
,
there
would
be
encouragement
for
Fish
,
which
will
never
be
till
then
.
2.
Our
Money
would
not
run
so
fast
away
for
Corn.
3.
We
should
have
no
such
Gluts
of
Wool
upon
our
hands
.
4.
Our
idle
hands
would
be
employed
in
Tillage
and
Fishing
,
one
man
by
the
way
of
grazing
,
tilling
as
it
were
many
thousand
Acres
of
Land
by
himself
and
his
Dog.
2.
Suppose
we
wanted
no
Corn
,
nor
had
any
idle
hands
,
and
yet
that
we
abounded
with
more
Wool
then
we
can
work
up
;
in
this
certainly
Wool
might
be
exported
,
because
't
is
supposed
,
that
the
hands
which
work
are
already
employed
upon
a
better
Trade
.
3.
Suppose
the
Hollander
outdo
us
by
more
art
,
were
it
not
better
to
draw
over
a
number
of
their
choice
Workmen
,
or
send
our
most
ingenious
men
thither
to
learn
;
which
if
they
succeed
;
it
is
most
manifest
,
that
this
were
the
more
natural
way
,
then
to
keep
that
infinite
clutter
about
resisting
of
Nature
,
stopping
up
the
windes
and
seas
,
&c.
4.
If
we
can
make
Victual
much
cheaper
here
then
in
Holland
,
take
away
burthensome
,
frivolous
,
and
antiquated
Impositions
and
Offices
.
I
conceive
even
this
were
better
then
to
perswade
Water
to
rise
out
of
it self
above
its
natural
Spring
.
5.
We
must
consider
in
general
,
that
as
wiser
Physicians
tamper
not
excessively
with
their
Patients
,
rather
observing
and
complying
with
the
motions
of
nature
,
then
contradicting
it
with
vehement
Administrations
of
their
own
;
so
in
Politicks
and
Oconomicks
the
same
must
be
used
;
for
Naturam
expellas
furcâ
licet
usque
recurrit
.
18.
Nevertheless
,
if
the
Hollanders
advantages
in
making
Cloth
be
but
small
and
few
in
comparison
of
ours
,
that
is
,
if
they
have
but
a
little
the
better
of
us
,
then
I
conceive
that
Prohibitions
to
export
Wool
may
sufficiently
turn
the
scales
.
But
whether
this
be
〈◊〉
,
I
leave
to
others
,
being
my self
neither
Merchant
nor
Statseman
.
19.
As
for
Prohibition
of
Importations
,
I
say
that
it
needs
not
be
,
until
they
much
exceed
our
Exportations
.
For
if
we
should
think
it
hard
to
give
good
necessary
Cloth
for
debauching
Wines
,
yet
if
we
cannot
dispose
of
our
Cloth
to
others
,
't
were
better
to
give
it
for
Wine
or
worse
,
then
to
cease
making
it
;
nay
,
better
to
burn
a
thousand
mens
labours
for
a
time
,
then
to
let
those
thousand
men
by
non-employment
lose
their
faculty
of
labouring
.
In
brief
,
what
may
be
further
said
hereupon
,
resolves
into
the
Doctrine
and
Ingenium
of
making
sumptuary
Laws
,
and
judicious
use
of
them
pro
hic
&
nunc
.
20.
Unto
this
Discourse
of
Customs
appertains
that
of
Free
Ports
,
which
(
in
a
Nation
that
onely
trades
for
it self
,
viz.
vents
its
own
superfluities
,
and
imports
onely
Necessaries
for
it self
)
are
of
no
use
,
but
rather
harm
;
for
suppose
Wines
be
brought
into
a
Free
Port
,
be
there
housed
and
privately
sold
,
but
the
Cask
filled
up
with
stained
water
,
and
put
on
ship-board
again
to
be
staved
as
soon
as
the
ship
is
out
at
sea
:
In
this
case
,
the
Duties
of
those
Wines
are
defrauded
,
as
it
also
may
be
many
other
wayes
.
21.
Now
if
it
be
said
,
that
although
we
should
trade
but
for
our selves
,
yet
that
our
Ports
(
being
more
commodious
then
those
of
other
Nations
)
would
be
the
more
frequented
;
for
being
free
,
and
consequently
the
more
enriched
,
by
the
expence
of
Sea-men
and
Passengers
,
hire
of
Labourers
,
and
Ware-houses
,
&c.
even
without
any
Custom
at
all
upon
the
Goods
.
Nevertheless
't
is
reason
that
a
small
duty
should
be
paid
upon
the
ship
as
aforesaid
for
such
use
of
our
Ports
,
and
that
eo
nomine
;
not
expecting
all
our
Benefit
from
the
said
hire
of
Cellaridge
,
Porters
,
and
Carmen
,
which
also
might
be
had
over
and
above
for
their
proper
reasons
.
22.
But
if
we
could
attain
to
be
the
Merchants
between
other
Nations
,
there
is
then
no
reason
for
exacting
Duties
(
as
was
said
before
)
upon
things
in
fieri
,
and
which
are
but
in
the
way
of
their
improvement
:
And
as
for
the
fraud
that
may
be
committed
,
as
in
the
case
of
Wines
abovementioned
,
I
affirm
that
our
Excize
upon
the
Consumption
,
would
overcome
and
elude
them
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
Poll-money
.
POll-money
is
a
Tax
upon
the
Persons
of
men
,
either
upon
all
simply
and
indifferently
,
or
else
according
to
some
known
Title
or
mark
of
distinction
upon
each
;
and
that
either
of
bare
honour
,
or
else
of
some
Office
sought
or
imposed
,
or
of
some
Faculty
and
Calling
without
respect
to
Riches
or
Poverty
,
Incomes
or
Expence
,
Gain
or
Loss
accrewing
by
the
said
Title
,
Office
,
or
Faculty
.
2.
The
Poll-moneys
which
have
been
leavied
of
late
have
been
wonderfully
confused
;
as
taxing
some
rich
single
persons
at
the
lowest
rate
;
some
Knights
,
though
wanting
necessaries
,
at
twenty
pounds
,
encouraging
some
vain
fellows
to
pay
as
Esquires
,
on
purpose
to
have
themselves
written
Esquires
in
the
Receipts
;
making
some
pay
ten
pounds
as
Doctours
of
Physick
or
Law
,
who
get
nothing
by
the
Faculty
,
nor
minde
the
practice
;
making
some
poor
Tradesmen
forced
to
be
of
the
Liveries
of
their
Companies
to
pay
beyond
their
strength
;
and
lastly
,
some
to
pay
according
to
their
Estates
,
the
same
to
be
valued
by
those
that
know
them
not
;
thereby
also
giving
opportunity
to
some
Bankrupts
to
make
the
world
credit
them
as
men
of
such
Estates
,
at
which
the
Assessors
did
rate
them
by
Collusion
.
3.
So
as
by
this
Confusion
,
Arbitraries
,
Irregularities
,
and
hotch-pot
of
Qualifications
,
no
estimate
could
be
made
of
the
fitness
of
this
Plaister
to
the
Sore
,
nor
no
Checque
or
way
to
examine
whether
the
respective
Receipts
were
duly
accompted
for
,
&c.
4.
Wherefore
wholly
rejecting
the
said
complicated
way
of
Tax
,
I
shall
speak
of
Poll-money
more
distinctly
,
and
first
of
the
simple
Poll-money
upon
every
head
of
all
mankiude
alike
;
the
Parish
paying
for
those
that
receive
alms
,
Parents
for
their
Children
under
age
,
and
Masters
for
their
Apprentices
,
and
others
who
receive
no
wages
.
5.
The
evil
of
this
way
is
,
that
it
is
very
unequal
;
men
of
unequal
abilities
,
all
paying
alike
,
and
those
who
have
greatest
charges
of
Children
paying
most
;
that
is
,
that
by
how
much
the
poorer
they
are
,
by
so
much
the
harder
are
they
taxed
.
6.
The
Conveniencies
are
;
first
,
that
it
may
be
suddenly
collected
,
and
with
small
charge
:
Secondly
,
that
the
number
of
the
people
being
alwayes
known
,
it
may
be
sufficiently
computed
what
the
same
will
amount
unto
.
Thirdly
,
It
seems
to
be
a
spur
unto
all
men
,
to
set
their
Children
to
some
profitable
employment
upon
their
very
first
capacity
,
out
of
the
proceed
whereof
,
to
pay
each
childe
his
own
Poll-money
.
7.
The
next
Poll-money
is
upon
every
head
,
but
distinguished
by
Titles
of
meer
Honour
,
without
any
kinde
of
Office
or
Faculty
;
as
,
Dukes
,
Marquesses
,
Earls
,
Viscounts
,
Barons
,
Baronets
,
Knights
,
and
Esquires
,
viz.
the
eldest
Sons
of
Knights
in
perpetuum
,
and
Gentlemen
if
they
write
themselves
so
.
This
way
is
much
more
equal
then
the
other
;
forasmuch
as
those
who
are
Titled
,
are
for
the
most
part
rich
proportionably
;
or
if
they
were
not
,
yet
men
so
dignified
shall
command
a
preheminence
and
place
,
even
although
they
do
not
or
cannot
buy
it
of
the
vulgar
by
their
Expence
:
my
meaning
hereby
is
,
that
a
Title
may
possibly
save
a
man
as
much
as
his
Poll-money
may
exceed
the
Plebeian
Level
by
reason
of
such
title
.
8.
Moreover
,
good
and
multiform
Accompts
being
kept
of
the
People
,
this
Tax
may
be
also
easily
speedily
and
inexpensively
collected
;
and
also
being
capable
of
being
computed
aforehand
,
may
be
fitted
and
seized
according
to
the
needs
of
the
Prince
.
9.
As
for
Offices
,
they
are
indeed
Dignities
for
the
most
part
,
but
paid
for
by
the
trouble
of
administring
them
;
as
for
example
,
to
be
an
Alderman
suppose
of
London
,
is
indeed
an
honour
,
yet
many
pay
five
hundred
pounds
to
be
excused
from
receiving
it
.
Nevertheless
it
may
not
be
improper
to
tax
Offices
sought
,
or
such
as
are
accepted
although
they
might
be
refused
:
And
on
the
other
side
no
Titulado
should
be
forced
to
pay
Poll-money
according
to
his
Title
,
if
he
be
contented
to
lay
it
down
,
and
never
resume
it
more
.
10.
The
Titles
of
Faculties
and
Callings
ought
to
be
no
Qualification
in
a
Poll-money
,
because
they
do
not
necessarily
nor
probably
inferr
ability
to
pay
,
but
carry
with
them
vaste
inequalities
.
But
therefore
if
a
man
by
his
Licence
to
practise
get
much
,
it
may
be
presumed
he
will
spend
accordingly
;
in
which
net
the
way
of
Excize
will
certainly
take
him
,
as
it
will
all
the
Officers
aforementioned
.
11.
Harth-money
seems
to
be
a
Poll-money
,
but
is
not
,
be-being
rather
a
way
of
Accumulative
Excize
;
of
which
hereafter
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
Of
Lotteries
.
MEn
that
accept
Titles
may
foresee
,
that
they
may
be
taxed
by
them
as
aforesaid
,
(
although
it
be
unlikely
(
one
House
of
Parliament
being
all
Tituladoes
,
and
the
greatest
part
of
the
other
being
such
also
)
that
any
such
way
of
Leavy
should
pass
)
and
therefore
they
do
as
it
were
à
priori
consent
unto
the
Tax
in
their
own
Individuals
.
2.
Now
in
the
way
of
Lottery
men
do
also
tax
themselves
in
the
general
,
though
out
of
hopes
of
Advantage
in
particular
:
A
Lottery
therefore
is
properly
a
Tax
upon
unfortunate
self-conceited
fools
;
men
that
have
good
opinion
of
their
own
luckiness
,
or
that
have
believed
some
Fortune-teller
or
Astrologer
,
who
had
promised
them
great
success
about
the
time
and
place
of
the
Lottery
,
lying
Southwest
perhaps
from
the
place
where
the
destiny
was
read
.
3.
Now
because
the
world
abounds
with
this
kinde
of
fools
,
it
is
not
fit
that
every
man
that
will
,
may
cheat
every
man
that
would
be
cheated
;
but
it
is
rather
ordained
,
that
the
Sovereign
should
have
the
Guardianship
of
these
fools
,
or
that
some
Favourite
should
beg
the
Sovereigns
right
of
taking
advantage
of
such
mens
folly
,
even
as
in
the
case
of
Lunaticks
and
Idiots
.
4.
Wherefore
a
Lottery
is
not
tollerated
without
authority
,
assigning
the
proportion
in
which
the
people
shall
pay
for
their
errours
,
and
taking
care
that
they
be
not
so
much
and
so
often
couzened
,
as
they
themselves
would
be
.
5.
This
way
of
Lottery
is
used
but
for
small
Leavies
,
and
rather
upon
privato-publick
accompts
,
(
then
for
maintaining
Armies
or
Equipping
Fleets
,
)
such
as
are
Aque-Ducts
,
Bridges
,
and
perhaps
Highwayes
,
&c.
Wherefore
we
shall
say
no
more
of
it
upon
this
occasion
.
CHAP.
IX
.
Of
Benevolence
.
THe
raising
of
Money
by
Benevolence
,
seems
to
be
no
force
upon
any
man
,
nor
to
take
from
any
man
but
what
himself
knows
he
can
spare
,
nevertheless
there
is
more
in
it
;
for
to
be
but
brow-beaten
by
a
Prince
or
Grandee
,
proves
often
as
heavy
as
to
be
distrained
upon
for
an
Assessement
or
Subsidy
;
and
the
danger
of
being
misrepresented
by
linsy
Pick-thanks
and
Informers
as
disaffected
to
the
Cause
for
which
the
Leavy
is
made
,
is
more
frequent
then
the
payment
of
any
summe
in
a
due
proportion
with
all
other
men
(
which
I
have
said
is
no
impoverishment
)
can
possibly
be
hurtful
.
The
benefits
of
this
way
are
these
,
viz.
That
forasmuch
as
it
sometimes
falls
out
(
as
in
the
late
Differences
with
the
Scots
,
annis
1638.
and
1639.
when
the
Church
Dignitaries
were
most
concerned
)
that
the
cause
of
the
Expence
concerns
some
men
more
then
others
,
that
then
an
Imposition
should
not
pass
upon
all
for
the
sakes
of
a
part
:
Sometimes
it
happens
,
that
one
sort
of
men
have
received
greater
and
fresher
favours
then
another
;
as
upon
the
late
Restoration
of
his
Majesty
Anno
1660.
those
who
needed
an
Act
of
Indempnity
did
:
And
sometimes
it
is
visible
,
that
some
men
have
had
better
times
of
gain
and
advantages
then
others
,
as
the
Clergy
most
eminently
have
had
since
his
Majesties
said
Restoration
.
In
all
these
Cases
,
the
proposal
of
a
Benevolence
may
be
offered
,
although
in
no
cases
it
be
without
its
inconveniencies
;
the
which
are
principally
these
.
1.
The
abovementioned
Brow-beating
and
distaste
given
,
if
a
man
have
not
contributed
as
largely
as
envious
observers
think
he
should
have
done
.
2.
A
Benevolence
in
many
cases
may
divide
a
whole
Nation
into
parties
,
or
at
least
make
the
strength
of
Parties
too
well
known
to
such
as
need
not
know
it
:
and
withall
it
may
(
on
the
contrary
and
upon
design
)
disguize
the
same
,
and
elude
the
measures
which
the
Governours
thought
to
have
taken
by
such
an
exploratory
artifice
.
3.
Some
men
may
have
particular
reasons
to
contribute
large
,
viz.
complacency
with
,
and
hopes
of
being
repaired
by
the
favour
of
some
Grandee
,
who
favours
the
business
,
and
the
very
same
may
make
to
the
prejudice
of
others
.
4.
Men
of
sinking
Estates
,
(
who
nevertheless
love
to
live
high
,
and
appear
splendid
,
and
such
who
make
themselves
friends
,
(
by
their
hospitality
paid
for
,
in
effect
by
others
)
enough
to
be
protected
,
even
from
Justice
)
do
often
upon
this
occasion
of
Benevolence
set
extravagant
Examples
unto
others
,
who
have
laboured
hardly
for
what
they
have
;
those
not
caring
what
they
pay
,
because
it
encreaseth
their
credit
,
to
borrow
the
more
,
so
as
at
length
the
whole
burthen
of
such
Bankrupts
Benevolence
,
lights
upon
the
frugal
Patriots
,
by
whom
the
Publique
Weal
subsists
.
CHAP.
X.
Of
Penalties
.
THe
usual
Penalties
are
Death
,
Mutilations
,
Imprisonment
,
Publick
disgrace
,
Corporal
transient
pains
,
and
great
Tortures
,
besides
Pecuniary
Mulcts
.
Of
which
last
we
shall
most
insist
,
speaking
of
the
others
but
in
order
to
examine
whether
they
may
not
be
commuted
for
these
.
2.
There
be
some
certain
Crimes
,
for
which
the
Law
of
God
appoints
death
;
and
these
must
be
punished
with
it
,
unless
we
say
that
those
were
but
the
Civil
Laws
of
the
Jewish
Commonwealth
,
although
given
by
God
himself
;
of
which
opinion
certainly
most
modern
States
are
,
in
as
much
as
they
punish
not
Adulteries
,
&c.
with
death
,
as
among
the
Jewes
,
and
yet
punish
small
Thefts
with
Death
instead
of
multiple
reparation
.
3.
Upon
this
supposition
we
shall
venture
to
offer
;
whether
the
reason
of
simple
Death
be
not
to
punish
incorrigible
Committers
of
great
faults
?
4.
Of
publick
Death
with
Torments
,
to
affright
men
from
Treasons
,
which
cause
the
deaths
and
miseries
of
many
thousand
innocent
and
useful
people
?
5.
Of
Death
secretly
executed
,
to
punish
secret
and
unknown
Crimes
,
such
as
Publick
Executions
would
teach
to
the
World
?
Or
else
to
suffocate
betimes
some
dangerous
Novelties
in
Religion
,
which
the
patient
suffering
of
the
worst
man
would
much
spread
and
encourage
.
6.
Mutilations
suppose
of
Ears
,
Nose
,
&c.
are
used
for
perpetual
disgrace
,
as
standing
in
the
Pillory
is
for
temporary
and
transient
;
which
and
such
other
punishments
have
(
by
the
way
)
made
some
corrigible
offenders
,
to
become
desperate
and
incurable
.
7.
Mutilations
of
parts
as
of
Fingers
,
are
proper
to
disable
such
as
have
abused
their
dextrous
use
of
them
,
by
Pocket-picking
,
Counterfeiting
of
Seals
and
Writings
,
&c.
Mutilations
of
other
parts
,
may
serve
to
punish
and
prevent
Adulteries
,
Rapes
,
Incests
,
&c.
And
the
smaller
Corporal
pains
,
serve
to
punish
those
,
who
can
pay
no
pecuniary
mulcts
.
8.
Imprisonment
seems
rather
to
be
the
punishments
of
suspected
then
guilty
persons
,
and
such
as
by
their
carriage
give
the
Magistrate
occasion
to
think
,
either
they
have
done
some
smaller
particular
Crime
,
as
Thefts
,
&c.
or
that
they
would
commit
greater
,
as
Treasons
and
Seditions
.
But
where
Imprisonment
is
not
a
securing
men
untill
their
Trialls
,
but
a
sentence
after
Triall
,
it
seems
to
me
proper
onely
to
seclude
such
men
from
conversation
,
whose
Discourses
are
bewitching
,
and
Practices
infectious
,
and
in
whom
neverthelesse
remains
some
hopes
of
their
future
Amendments
,
or
usefulnesse
for
some
service
not
yet
appearing
.
9.
As
for
perpetual
Imprisonment
by
sentence
,
it
seems
but
the
same
with
death
it self
,
to
be
executed
by
nature
it self
,
quickened
with
such
Diseases
,
as
close
living
,
sadness
,
solitude
,
and
reflections
upon
a
past
and
better
condition
,
doth
commonly
beget
:
Nor
do
men
sentenced
hereunto
live
longer
,
though
they
be
longer
in
dying
.
10.
Here
we
are
to
remember
in
consequence
of
our
opinion
,
[
That
Labour
is
the
Father
and
active
principle
of
Wealth
,
as
Lands
are
the
Mother
]
that
the
State
by
killing
,
mutilating
,
or
imprisoning
their
members
,
do
withall
punish
themselves
;
wherefore
such
punishments
ought
(
as
much
as
possible
)
to
be
avoided
and
commuted
for
pecuniary
mulcts
,
which
will
encrease
labour
and
publick
wealth
.
11.
Upon
which
account
,
why
should
not
a
man
of
Estate
,
found
guilty
of
man-slaughter
,
rather
pay
a
certain
proportion
of
his
whole
Estate
,
then
be
burnt
in
the
hand
?
12.
Why
should
not
insolvent
Thieves
be
rather
punished
with
slavery
then
death
?
so
as
being
slaves
they
may
be
forced
to
as
much
labour
,
and
as
cheap
fare
,
as
nature
will
endure
,
and
thereby
become
as
two
men
added
to
the
Commonwealth
,
and
not
as
one
taken
away
from
it
;
for
if
England
be
under-peopled
,
(
suppose
by
half
)
I
say
that
next
to
the
bringing
in
of
as
many
more
as
now
are
,
is
the
making
these
that
are
,
to
do
double
the
work
which
now
they
do
;
that
is
,
to
make
some
slaves
;
but
of
this
elsewhere
.
13.
And
why
should
not
the
solvent
Thieves
and
Cheats
be
rather
punished
with
multiple
Restitutions
then
Death
,
Pillory
,
Whipping
?
&c.
But
it
will
be
asked
,
with
how
manifold
Restitutions
should
picking
a
pocket
(
for
example
)
be
punished
?
I
say
,
't
were
good
in
order
to
the
solution
hereof
,
to
enquire
of
some
candid
Artists
in
that
Trade
,
how
often
they
are
taken
one
time
with
another
practising
in
this
work
?
If
but
once
in
ten
times
,
then
to
restore
even
but
seven-fold
,
would
be
a
fair
profit
;
and
to
restore
but
ten-fold
,
were
but
an
even
lay
;
wherefore
to
restore
twenty-fold
,
that
is
,
double
to
the
hazard
,
is
rather
the
true
ratio
and
measure
of
punishment
by
double
reparation
.
14.
And
surely
the
restoring
two
,
three
,
four
,
and
seven-fold
mentioned
in
Moses
Law
must
be
thus
understood
,
or
else
a
man
might
make
thieving
a
very
fair
and
lawful
profession
.
15.
The
next
question
is
,
in
such
multiple
Restitutions
how
many
parts
should
be
given
to
the
sufferer
.
To
which
I
answer
,
never
above
one
,
and
scarce
that
,
to
oblige
him
to
more
care
,
and
self-preservation
,
with
three
parts
to
discoveers
,
and
the
rest
to
publick
uses
.
16.
Thirdly
,
In
the
case
of
Fornications
,
most
of
the
punishments
not
made
by
pecuniary
mulcts
and
commuted
,
are
but
shame
,
and
that
too
but
towards
some
few
persons
,
which
shame
for
ever
after
obdurates
the
Offender
,
what
ever
it
work
upon
such
whose
fames
are
yet
intire
:
Of
all
which
men
take
little
consideration
,
standing
upon
the
brink
of
such
precipices
as
makes
them
giddy
;
and
when
they
are
in
danger
of
such
faults
as
are
rather
madnesses
,
distempers
,
and
alienations
of
the
minde
and
reason
,
as
also
infurrections
of
the
passions
,
then
deliberate
acts
of
the
understanding
.
17.
Moreover
,
according
to
that
Axiom
of
,
In
quo
quis
peccat
,
in
eodem
puniatur
;
if
the
Ratio
formalis
of
the
sin
of
Concubitus
Vagi
,
be
the
hindering
of
procreation
,
let
those
who
by
their
miscarriages
of
this
kinde
are
guilty
thereof
,
repair
unto
the
State
the
misse
of
another
pair
of
hands
with
the
double
labour
of
their
own
,
or
which
is
all
one
,
by
a
pecuniary
mulct
;
and
this
is
the
practice
of
some
wise
States
in
punishing
what
they
will
never
be
able
to
prevent
:
Nor
doth
the
Gospel
specifie
any
punishment
in
this
world
,
onely
declaring
they
shall
not
be
received
into
the
joyes
of
the
next
.
18.
I
could
instance
in
more
particulars
,
but
if
what
I
have
already
said
be
reasonable
,
this
little
is
enough
;
if
not
,
then
all
the
rest
would
be
too
little
also
:
wherefore
I
shall
adde
but
one
instance
more
,
as
most
suitable
to
our
present
times
and
occasions
,
which
is
the
way
of
punishing
Heterodox
Professors
of
Religion
.
19.
That
the
Magistrate
may
punish
false
Believers
,
if
he
believe
he
shall
offend
God
in
forbearing
it
,
is
true
;
for
the
same
reasons
that
men
give
for
Liberty
of
Conseience
,
and
universal
tolleration
;
and
on
the
other
side
,
that
he
may
permit
false
Worships
,
seems
clearly
at
least
by
the
practice
of
all
States
,
who
allow
Ambassadours
their
freedom
(
be
the
Worship
never
so
abominable
)
even
when
they
come
to
negociate
but
upon
temporal
and
small
matters
.
20.
Wherefore
,
since
the
Magistrate
may
allow
or
connive
at
such
Worships
as
himself
thinks
fit
,
and
yet
may
also
punish
;
and
since
by
Death
,
Mutilations
,
and
imprisonments
of
the
Subjects
,
the
State
not
onely
punisheth
it self
,
but
spreadeth
the
Pseudodoxies
;
it
follows
,
that
pecuniary
Mulcts
are
the
fittest
wayes
of
checking
the
wantonness
of
men
in
this
particular
:
forasmuch
as
that
course
savours
of
no
bitterness
at
all
,
but
rather
argues
a
desire
to
indulge
,
provided
such
indulgence
may
consist
with
the
indempnity
of
the
State
;
for
no
Heterodox
will
desire
to
be
tollerated
longer
then
he
keeps
the
Publick
Peace
;
the
which
if
he
means
to
do
,
he
cannot
take
it
ill
of
the
Magistrate
,
to
keep
him
steddy
unto
that
his
duty
,
nor
grudge
to
contribute
towards
so
much
charge
for
that
purpose
as
himself
occasions
.
21.
Moreover
,
as
there
seems
a
reason
for
indulging
some
conscientious
misbelievers
,
so
there
is
as
much
for
being
severe
towards
Hypocrites
,
especially
such
as
abuse
holy
Religion
to
cloak
and
vizzard
worldly
ends
:
Now
what
more
easie
and
yet
effectual
way
is
there
to
discern
between
these
two
,
then
well
proportioned
pecuniary
mulcts
?
for
who
desiring
to
serve
God
without
fear
,
and
labouring
ten
hours
per
diem
at
his
Calling
,
would
not
labour
one
hour
more
for
such
a
freedon
?
even
as
religious
men
spend
an
hour
per
diem
more
then
the
looser
sort
do
at
their
Devotions
;
or
who
weaving
Cloth
of
one
and
twenty
shillings
the
yard
,
would
not
be
contented
with
that
of
twenty
shillings
,
for
the
same
advantage
of
his
liberty
in
Worship
?
Those
that
kick
at
this
,
being
unwilling
either
to
do
or
suffer
for
God
,
for
whose
sake
they
pretend
so
much
.
22.
It
may
be
here
objected
,
that
although
some
bad
Religions
might
be
tollerated
,
yet
that
all
may
not
,
viz.
such
as
consist
not
with
the
Civil
Peace
.
To
which
I
answer
.
First
,
that
there
is
no
Schisme
or
Separation
be
it
never
so
small
,
consistent
with
that
unity
and
peace
as
could
be
wisht
;
nor
none
so
perfectly
conscientious
,
but
may
also
be
civilly
most
pernicious
:
For
that
Venner
and
his
Complices
acted
upon
internal
motives
,
the
most
free
exposing
of
themselves
to
death
may
evince
;
and
yet
their
holding
the
King
to
be
an
Usurper
upon
the
Throne
and
Right
of
Jesus
Christ
was
a
Civil
mischief
neither
to
be
pardoned
or
parallel'd
.
23.
And
yet
on
the
other
hand
there
is
no
Pseudodoxy
so
great
,
but
may
be
muzzled
from
doing
much
harm
in
the
State
,
without
either
Death
,
Imprisonment
,
or
Mutilation
:
To
make
short
,
no
opinion
can
be
more
dangerous
,
then
to
disbelieve
the
immortality
of
the
Soul
,
as
rendring
man
a
beast
,
and
without
conscience
,
or
fear
of
committing
any
evil
,
if
he
can
but
elude
the
penalties
of
humane
Laws
made
against
it
,
and
letting
men
loose
to
all
evil
thoughts
and
designs
whereof
man
can
take
no
notice
:
Now
I
say
,
that
even
this
Misbeliever
may
be
adaequately
punished
if
he
be
kept
as
a
beast
,
be
proprietor
of
nothing
,
as
making
no
conscience
how
he
gets
;
be
never
admitted
in
Evidence
or
Testimony
,
as
under
no
Obligation
to
speak
truth
;
be
excluded
all
Honours
and
Offices
,
as
caring
onely
for
himself
,
not
the
protecting
of
others
;
and
be
withall
kept
to
extream
bodily
labour
,
the
profit
whereof
to
the
State
is
the
pecuniary
Mulct
we
speak
of
,
though
the
greatest
.
24.
As
for
opinions
less
horrible
then
this
,
the
Mulct
may
be
fitted
to
each
of
them
respectively
,
according
to
the
measure
of
danger
which
the
Magistrate
apprehends
from
their
allowance
,
and
the
charge
necessary
to
prevent
it
.
25.
And
now
we
are
speaking
of
the
wayes
how
to
prevent
and
correct
Heterodoxies
in
Religion
,
which
we
have
hitherto
done
by
designing
punishments
for
the
erring
sheep
,
I
think
it
not
amiss
to
adde
,
That
in
all
these
cases
the
Shepherds
themselves
should
not
wholly
scape
free
:
For
if
in
this
Nation
there
be
such
abundance
of
Free-Schools
,
and
of
liberall
Maintenance
provided
in
our
Universities
and
elsewhere
for
instructing
more
then
enough
in
all
such
learning
as
is
fit
to
defend
the
established
Religion
,
together
with
superabundant
Libraries
for
that
purpose
.
Moreover
,
if
the
Church-preferments
be
so
numerous
and
ample
both
for
Wealth
,
Honour
,
and
Power
,
as
scarce
any
where
more
;
it
seems
strange
that
when
by
the
laziness
,
formality
,
ignorance
,
and
loose
lives
of
our
Pastours
,
the
sheep
have
gone
astray
,
grown
scabbed
,
or
have
been
devoured
by
Wolves
and
Foxes
,
that
the
Remedy
of
all
this
should
be
onely
sought
by
frighting
those
that
have
strayed
from
ever
returning
again
,
and
by
tearing
off
as
well
the
skins
as
the
wool
of
those
that
are
scabbed
;
whereas
Almighty
God
will
rather
require
the
blood
even
of
them
that
have
been
devoured
,
from
the
shepheards
themselves
.
26.
Wherefore
if
the
Minister
should
lose
part
of
the
Tythes
of
those
whom
he
suffers
to
dissent
from
the
Church
,
(
the
defector
not
saving
,
but
the
State
wholly
gaining
them
)
and
the
defector
paying
some
pecuniary
Mulct
for
his
Schisme
,
and
withall
himself
defraying
the
charge
of
his
new
particular
Church
and
Pastorage
,
me
thinks
the
burthen
would
be
thus
more
equally
born
.
27.
Besides
,
the
judicious
world
do
not
believe
our
Clergy
can
deserve
the
vaste
preferments
they
have
,
onely
because
they
preach
,
give
a
better
accompt
of
Opinions
concerning
Religion
then
others
,
or
can
express
their
conceptions
in
the
words
of
the
Fathers
,
or
the
Scriptures
,
&c.
Whereas
certainly
the
great
honour
we
give
them
,
is
for
being
patterns
of
holiness
,
for
shewing
by
their
own
self-denials
,
mortifications
,
and
austerities
,
that
't
is
possible
for
us
to
imitate
them
in
the
precepts
of
God
;
for
if
it
were
but
for
their
bare
Pulpit-discourses
,
some
men
might
think
there
is
ten
thousand
times
as
much
already
printed
as
can
be
necessary
,
and
as
good
as
any
that
ever
hereafter
may
be
expected
.
And
it
is
much
suspected
,
that
the
Discipline
of
the
Cloisters
hath
kept
up
the
Roman
Religion
,
which
the
Luxury
of
the
Cardinals
and
Prelates
might
have
destroyed
.
28.
The
substance
therefore
of
all
we
have
said
in
this
discourse
concerning
the
Church
is
,
that
it
would
make
much
for
its
peace
,
if
the
Nursery
of
Ministers
be
not
too
big
,
that
Austerities
in
the
Priests
lives
would
reconcile
them
to
the
people
;
and
that
it
is
not
unreasonable
,
that
when
the
whole
Church
suffers
by
the
defection
of
her
Members
,
that
the
Pastours
of
it
by
bearing
a
small
part
should
be
made
sensible
of
the
loss
;
the
manner
and
measures
of
all
which
I
leave
unto
those
unto
whom
it
belongs
.
29.
Concerning
Penalties
and
Penal
Laws
I
shall
adde
but
this
,
that
the
abuse
of
them
is
,
when
they
are
made
not
to
keep
men
from
sin
,
but
to
draw
them
into
punishment
;
and
when
the
Executers
of
them
keep
them
hid
until
a
fault
be
done
,
and
then
shew
them
terrible
to
the
poor
immalicious
offender
:
Just
like
Centinels
,
who
never
shew
men
the
advertisements
against
pissing
near
their
Guards
,
till
they
have
catcht
them
by
the
coats
for
the
forfeiture
they
claim
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Of
Monopolies
and
Offices
.
MOnopoly
(
as
the
word
signifies
)
is
the
sole
selling
power
,
which
whosoever
hath
can
vend
the
commodity
whereupon
he
hath
this
power
,
either
qualified
as
himself
pleases
,
or
at
what
price
he
pleaseth
,
or
both
,
within
the
limits
of
his
Commission
.
2.
The
great
example
of
a
Monopoly
is
the
King
of
France
his
Gabel
upon
Salt
,
whereby
he
sells
that
for
sixty
which
costs
him
but
one
;
now
Salt
being
a
thing
of
universal
use
to
all
degrees
of
men
,
and
scarce
more
to
the
poor
then
the
rich
,
it
seems
to
be
of
the
same
effect
with
the
simplest
Poll-money
abovementioned
,
in
case
all
men
spent
equally
of
it
,
or
if
men
be
forced
to
take
it
whether
they
spend
it
or
not
,
as
in
some
places
they
are
.
But
if
men
spend
or
eat
Salt
unequally
,
as
they
commonly
do
,
nor
are
bound
to
take
or
pay
for
more
then
they
spend
,
then
is
no
other
then
an
accumulative
Excize
,
especially
if
the
salt
be
all
of
one
uniform
goodness
,
otherwise
it
is
a
distinct
species
of
Leavy
,
viz.
a
Monopoly
.
3.
The
use
or
pretence
of
instituting
a
Monopoly
is
,
First
,
Right
of
Invention
;
forasmuch
as
the
Laws
do
reward
Inventions
,
by
granting
them
a
Monopoly
of
them
for
a
certain
time
;
(
as
here
in
England
for
fourteen
years
)
for
thereby
the
Inventor
is
rewarded
more
or
less
according
to
the
acceptance
which
his
Invention
findes
amongst
men
.
Where
note
by
the
way
,
that
few
new
Inventions
were
ever
rewarded
by
a
Monopoly
;
for
although
the
Inventor
oftentimes
drunk
with
the
opinion
of
his
own
merit
,
thinks
all
the
world
will
invade
and
incroach
upon
him
,
yet
I
have
observed
,
that
the
generality
of
men
will
scarce
be
hired
to
make
use
of
new
practices
,
which
themselves
have
not
throughly
tried
,
and
which
length
of
time
hath
not
vindicated
from
latent
inconveniences
;
so
as
when
a
new
Invention
is
first
propounded
,
in
the
beginning
every
man
objects
,
and
the
poor
Inventor
runs
the
Gantloop
of
all
petulent
wits
;
every
man
finding
his
several
flaw
,
no
man
approving
it
,
unless
mended
according
to
his
own
advice
:
Now
not
one
of
an
hundred
out-lives
this
torture
,
and
those
that
do
,
are
at
length
so
changed
by
the
various
contrivanees
of
others
,
that
not
any
one
man
can
pretend
to
the
Invention
of
the
whole
,
nor
well
agree
about
their
respective
shares
in
the
parts
.
And
moreover
,
this
commonly
is
so
long
a
doing
,
that
the
poor
Inventor
is
either
dead
,
or
disabled
by
the
debts
contracted
to
pursue
his
design
;
and
withall
railed
upon
as
a
Projector
,
or
worse
,
by
those
who
joyned
their
money
in
partnership
with
his
wit
;
so
as
the
said
Inventor
and
his
pretences
are
wholly
lost
and
vanisht
.
Secondly
,
a
Monopoly
may
be
of
real
use
for
a
time
,
viz.
at
the
first
introducing
of
a
new
Manufacture
,
wherein
is
much
nicety
to
make
it
well
,
and
which
the
generality
of
men
cannot
judge
of
as
to
the
performance
.
As
for
example
;
suppose
there
were
some
most
approved
Medicament
which
one
certain
man
could
make
most
exactly
well
,
although
several
others
could
also
make
the
same
less
perfectly
:
in
this
case
this
same
chief
Artist
may
be
allowed
a
Monopoly
for
a
time
,
viz.
until
others
have
had
experience
enough
under
him
,
how
to
make
the
Medicament
as
well
as
himself
.
First
,
because
the
world
may
not
have
the
Medicament
variously
made
,
when
as
they
can
neither
discern
the
difference
by
their
senses
,
nor
judge
of
the
effects
thereof
à
posteriori
,
by
their
reasons
.
Secondly
,
because
others
may
be
fully
instructed
by
him
that
can
best
do
it
;
and
thirdly
,
because
he
may
have
a
reward
for
such
his
communications
:
But
forasmuch
as
by
Monopolies
of
this
kinde
,
great
Leavies
are
seldom
made
,
they
are
scarce
pertinent
to
our
design
.
Offices
instituted
by
the
State
with
Fees
of
their
own
appointment
,
are
of
parallel
nature
to
Monopolies
;
the
one
relating
to
actions
and
employments
as
the
other
to
things
,
and
have
the
same
to
be
said
for
and
against
them
as
Monopolies
have
.
As
a
Kingdom
encreaseth
and
flourisheth
,
so
doth
variety
of
things
,
of
actions
,
and
even
of
words
encrease
also
;
for
we
see
that
the
language
of
the
most
flourishing
Empires
was
ever
the
most
copious
and
elegant
,
and
that
of
mountainous
Cantons
the
contrary
:
Now
as
the
actions
of
this
Kingdom
encreased
,
so
did
the
Offices
(
that
is
,
the
power
and
faculty
of
solely
executing
and
performing
the
said
actions
)
encrease
likewise
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
as
the
business
of
Offices
encreased
,
so
did
the
difficulty
and
danger
of
discharging
them
amiss
decrease
proportionably
:
from
whence
't
is
come
to
pass
,
that
the
Offices
which
at
their
first
erecting
were
not
performed
but
by
the
ablest
,
most
inventive
,
and
versatile
Instruments
,
(
such
as
could
wrestle
with
all
emergent
difficulties
,
and
collect
Rules
and
Axioms
out
of
the
Series
of
their
own
Observations
,
(
with
reference
to
the
various
casualties
of
their
employments
)
whereby
to
direct
Posterity
)
are
now
performed
by
the
most
ordinary
,
formal
,
pack-horse
Deputies
and
Sub-Deputies
.
And
whereas
at
first
such
large
Fees
were
allowed
as
(
considering
even
the
paucity
of
them
which
might
then
be
received
)
should
compensate
the
Art
,
Trust
,
and
Industry
of
the
Administratour
;
yet
the
large
said
Fees
are
still
continued
,
although
the
skill
and
trust
be
lessened
,
and
the
number
of
the
said
Fees
so
extreamly
multiplyed
:
so
as
now
the
profits
of
such
Officers
(
being
become
cleer
,
and
the
work
so
easie
as
any
man
is
capable
of
it
,
even
those
that
never
saw
it
,
)
are
bought
and
sold
for
Years
or
Lives
,
as
any
other
Annuity
may
be
;
and
withal
,
the
splendor
arising
from
the
easie
gaines
of
those
places
in
Courts
of
Justice
,
is
called
the
Flourishing
of
the
Law
,
which
certainly
flourisheth
best
,
when
the
Professors
and
Ministers
of
it
have
least
to
do
.
And
moreover
,
when
the
burthen
and
uselesness
of
such
an
Office
is
taken
notice
of
,
't
is
nevertheless
spared
as
a
Subjects
Freehold
in
favour
of
him
that
bought
it
.
Of
these
Offices
are
many
in
this
Nation
,
and
such
as
might
be
a
Revenue
to
the
King
,
either
by
their
Annual
profits
,
or
the
Sale
of
them
for
many
years
together
.
And
these
are
the
Offices
that
are
properly
Saleable
,
viz.
where
the
Fees
are
large
,
as
appointed
when
the
number
of
them
was
few
,
and
also
numerous
,
as
multiplying
upon
the
increase
of
business
,
and
where
the
business
is
onely
the
labour
of
the
meanest
men
:
length
of
time
having
made
all
the
work
so
easie
,
and
found
out
security
against
all
the
frauds
,
breaches
of
trust
,
and
male-administrations
,
whereunto
the
infancies
of
those
places
were
obnoxious
.
These
Offices
are
thererore
Taxes
upon
such
as
can
or
will
not
avoid
the
passing
through
them
,
and
are
born
as
men
endure
and
run
themselves
into
the
mischiefs
of
Duelling
,
the
which
are
very
great
,
which
side
soever
prevails
;
for
certainly
men
do
not
alwayes
go
to
Law
to
obtain
right
,
or
prevent
wrong
,
which
judicious
neighbours
might
perform
as
well
as
a
Jury
of
no
abler
men
;
and
men
might
tell
the
Judge
himself
the
merits
of
their
Cause
,
as
well
as
now
they
instruct
their
Councel
.
This
therefore
of
Offices
is
a
voluntary
Tax
upon
contentious
men
,
as
Excize
upon
Drink
is
,
to
good
Fellows
to
love
it
.
CHAP.
XII
.
Of
Tythes
.
THe
Word
Tythes
being
the
same
with
Tenths
,
signifie
of
it self
no
more
then
the
proportion
of
the
Excisium
,
or
part
retrenched
,
as
if
Customs
upon
imported
and
exported
Commodities
should
be
called
by
the
name
of
Twentieths
,
as
it
is
sometimes
called
Tunnage
and
Poundage
;
wherefore
it
remains
to
say
,
that
Tythes
in
this
place
,
do
together
with
the
said
proportion
,
consignifie
the
use
of
it
,
viz.
the
maintenance
of
the
Clergy
,
as
also
the
matter
or
substance
out
of
which
this
Maintenance
is
cut
,
viz.
the
immediate
fruit
of
the
Land
and
Waters
,
or
the
proceed
of
mens
Labour
,
Art
,
and
Stock
laid
out
upon
them
.
It
signifies
also
the
manner
of
paying
it
,
viz.
in
specie
,
and
not
(
but
upon
special
and
voluntary
causes
)
in
money
.
2.
We
said
the
matter
of
Tythes
,
was
the
immediate
Fruits
of
the
Earth
,
viz.
of
Grain
as
soon
as
'c
is
ready
to
be
removed
from
the
ground
that
bare
it
;
and
not
of
Bread
which
is
Corn
thresht
,
winnowed
,
ground
,
tempered
with
liquor
and
baked
.
3.
'T
is
also
the
second
choice
out
of
the
young
of
multipa●ous
Cattle
taken
in
specie
,
so
soon
as
the
said
Younglings
can
subsist
without
their
Dams
,
or
else
a
Composition
in
Money
for
the
Uniparons
.
4.
'T
is
Wool
,
so
soon
as
it
is
shorn
;
't
is
Fowl
and
Fish
,
where
Fowling
and
Fishing
is
rather
a
Trade
then
a
meer
Recreation
,
&
sic
de
caeteris
.
5.
Moreover
,
in
great
Cities
Tythes
are
a
kinde
of
composition
in
Money
for
the
labour
and
profit
of
the
Artisans
who
work
upon
the
materials
which
have
paid
Tythes
before
.
6.
Tythes
therefore
encrease
within
any
Territory
,
as
the
labour
of
that
Countrey
increases
;
and
labour
doth
or
ought
to
increase
as
the
people
do
;
now
within
four
hundred
years
the
people
of
England
are
about
quadrupled
,
as
doubling
every
two
hundred
years
,
and
the
proportion
of
the
Rent
of
all
the
Lands
in
England
is
about
the
fourth
part
of
the
Expence
of
the
people
in
it
,
so
as
the
other
three
parts
is
labour
and
stock
.
7.
Wherefore
the
Tythes
now
should
be
twelve
times
as
good
as
they
were
four
hundred
years
ago
;
which
the
rates
of
Benefices
in
the
Kings
books
do
pretty
well
shew
,
by
comparing
of
times
;
something
of
this
should
be
abated
because
the
proportion
between
the
proceed
of
Lands
and
Labour
do
vary
as
the
hands
of
Labourers
vary
:
Wherefore
we
shall
rather
say
,
that
the
Tythes
are
but
six
times
as
good
now
as
four
hundred
years
ago
,
that
is
,
that
the
Tythes
now
would
pay
six
times
as
many
Labourers
,
or
feed
six
times
as
many
mouthes
,
as
the
Tythes
four
hundred
years
ago
would
have
done
.
8.
Now
if
there
were
not
onely
as
many
Parishes
then
as
now
,
more
Priests
in
every
Parish
,
and
also
more
Religious
Men
who
were
also
Priests
,
and
the
Religion
of
those
times
being
more
operose
,
and
fuller
of
work
then
now
,
by
reason
of
Confessions
,
Holydayes
,
Offices
,
&c.
more
in
those
dayes
then
now
,
(
the
great
work
in
these
dayes
being
a
compendious
teaching
above
a
thousand
at
once
without
much
particular
Confession
and
Catechising
,
or
trouble
about
the
Dead
;
it
seems
clear
,
that
the
Clergy
now
is
far
richer
then
heretofore
;
and
that
to
be
a
Clergy-man
then
was
a
kinde
of
a
Mortification
,
whereas
now
(
praised
be
God
)
't
is
matter
of
splendour
and
magnificence
;
unless
any
will
say
,
that
there
were
golden
Priests
when
the
Chalices
were
wood
,
and
but
wooden
Priests
when
the
Chalices
were
gold
;
or
that
Religion
best
flourisheth
when
the
Priests
are
most
mortified
,
as
was
before
said
of
the
Law
,
which
best
flourisheth
when
Lawyers
have
least
to
do
.
9.
But
what
ever
the
increase
of
the
Churches
Goods
are
,
I
grudge
it
them
not
;
onely
wish
,
that
they
would
take
a
course
to
enjoy
it
with
safety
and
peace
to
themselves
;
whereof
one
is
,
not
to
breed
more
Churchmen
then
the
Benefices
as
they
now
stand
shred
out
,
will
receive
;
that
is
to
say
,
if
there
be
places
but
for
about
twelve
thousand
in
England
and
Wales
,
it
will
not
be
safe
to
breed
up
24000.
Ministers
,
upon
a
view
or
conceipt
that
the
Church
means
otherwise
distributed
might
suffice
them
all
;
for
then
the
twelve
thousand
which
are
unprovided
for
,
will
seek
wayes
how
to
get
themselves
a
livelihood
;
which
they
cannot
do
more
easily
then
by
perswading
the
people
,
that
the
twelve
thousand
Incumbents
do
poison
or
starve
their
souls
,
and
misguide
them
in
their
way
to
Heaven
:
Which
needy
men
upon
a
strong
temptation
will
do
effectually
;
we
having
observed
,
that
Lecturers
being
such
a
sort
of
Supernumeraries
,
have
preached
more
times
in
a
week
,
more
hours
in
the
day
,
and
with
greater
vehemence
every
time
then
the
Incumbents
could
afford
to
do
;
for
Graeculus
esuriens
in
Coelum
,
jusseris
,
ibit
.
Now
this
vehemence
,
this
pains
,
this
zeal
,
and
this
living
upon
particular
donations
,
makes
the
people
think
,
that
those
who
act
them
are
withall
more
Orthodox
,
nay
better
assisted
from
God
then
the
others
.
Now
let
any
man
judge
,
whether
men
reputed
to
be
inspired
will
not
get
help
to
lift
themselves
into
Church-livings
,
&c.
But
these
things
are
too
plain
from
the
latest
experiences
.
10.
Now
you
will
ask
,
how
shall
that
be
done
,
or
how
may
we
know
how
to
adjust
our
Nursery
to
our
Orchard
?
To
which
I
answer
,
that
if
there
be
twelve
thousand
Church-livings
in
England
,
Dignitaries
included
,
then
that
about
four
hundred
being
sent
forth
per
ann
.
into
the
Vineyard
,
may
keep
it
well
served
,
without
luxuriency
;
for
according
to
the
Mortality-Bill-observation
,
about
that
number
will
dye
yearly
out
of
twelve
thousand
Adult-persons
,
such
as
Ministers
are
as
to
age
,
and
ought
to
be
as
well
as
to
speculative
knowledge
,
as
practical
experience
,
both
of
themselves
and
others
.
11.
But
I
have
digressed
,
my
main
scope
being
to
explain
the
nature
of
the
Tax
of
Tythes
;
nevertheless
since
the
end
of
such
explanation
is
but
to
perswade
men
to
bear
quietly
so
much
Tax
as
is
necessary
,
and
not
to
kick
against
the
pricks
;
and
since
the
end
of
that
again
,
and
the
end
of
all
else
we
are
to
do
,
is
but
to
preserve
the
publick
Peace
,
I
think
I
have
not
been
impertinent
in
inserting
this
little
Advertisement
,
making
so
much
for
the
Peace
of
our
Jerusalem
.
12.
But
to
return
to
Tythes
as
a
Tax
or
Levy
,
I
say
that
in
England
it
is
none
,
whatsoever
it
might
be
or
seem
to
be
in
the
first
Age
of
its
Institution
;
nor
will
the
Kings
Quit-rents
in
Ireland
as
they
are
properly
none
now
,
seem
any
in
the
next
Age
,
when
every
man
will
proportion
his
Expence
to
the
remainder
of
his
own
Rent
after
the
King
is
paid
his
;
for
't
is
surprize
and
the
suddenness
of
the
Charge
,
which
a
Tax
supervenient
to
a
mans
other
expences
and
issues
makes
,
that
renders
it
a
burthen
,
and
that
intollerable
to
such
as
will
not
understand
it
,
making
men
even
to
take
up
Arms
to
withstand
it
;
that
is
,
leap
out
of
the
Frying-pan
upon
earth
into
the
fire
even
of
hell
,
which
is
War
and
the
calamities
thereof
.
13.
Now
Tythes
being
no
Tax
,
I
speak
of
it
but
as
the
modus
or
pattern
of
a
Tax
,
affirming
it
to
be
next
to
one
,
the
most
equal
and
indifferent
which
can
be
appointed
in
order
to
defray
the
publick
Charge
of
the
whole
Nation
as
well
as
that
of
the
Church
;
for
hereby
is
collected
a
proportion
of
all
the
Corn
,
Cattle
,
Fish
,
Fowl
,
Fruit
,
Wool
,
Honey
,
Wax
,
Oyl
,
Hemp
,
and
Flax
of
the
Nation
,
as
a
result
of
the
Lands
,
Art
,
Labour
,
and
Stock
which
produced
them
;
onely
it
is
scarce
regular
in
respect
of
Housing
,
Cloth
,
Drinks
,
Leather
,
Feathers
,
and
the
several
Manufactures
of
them
;
insomuch
,
as
if
the
difference
of
Tythes
which
the
Countrey
payes
in
proportion
to
the
City
,
were
now
de
novo
to
be
established
,
I
do
not
see
what
in
likelihood
would
sooner
cause
a
grand
sedition
about
it
.
14.
The
payment
of
an
aliquot
part
to
the
King
out
of
the
same
things
as
now
pay
Tythes
,
in
specie
,
would
have
no
inconvenience
,
because
the
Kings
Rents
would
be
like
the
Dividend
in
Colledges
,
viz.
higher
or
lower
according
to
the
prices
of
those
Commodities
,
unless
the
said
inequality
in
Colledges
happen
by
reason
of
the
fewness
of
particulars
,
according
to
the
market
rates
whereof
,
their
Rents
are
paid
in
money
;
whereas
the
whole
of
all
the
particulars
might
well
enough
ballance
each
other
,
a
dear
or
plentiful
being
but
an
appellation
secundum
quid
,
viz.
with
reference
as
to
Corn
onely
,
as
the
chief
food
of
the
multitude
;
whereas
't
is
likely
,
that
the
same
causes
which
makes
Corn
scarce
may
make
other
things
in
plenty
of
no
less
use
to
the
King
;
as
repairing
in
one
thing
what
he
wants
in
another
.
15.
Another
inconvenience
would
be
that
which
was
observed
in
Ireland
,
when
the
Ministery
were
paid
by
Sallary
,
and
the
Tythes
in
kinde
paid
to
the
State
;
who
because
they
could
not
actually
receive
them
in
specie
,
let
them
at
farm
to
the
most
bidder
;
in
the
Transaction
whereof
was
much
juggling
,
combination
,
and
collusion
,
which
perhaps
might
have
been
remedied
,
had
not
that
course
been
used
but
as
a
sudden
temporary
shift
,
without
intention
of
continuing
it
.
16.
The
third
inconvenience
is
,
that
abovementioned
,
viz.
the
necessity
of
another
way
of
Tax
,
to
take
in
the
Manufactures
of
those
Commodities
which
pay
the
Tax
of
Tythes
;
whereas
possibly
there
is
a
way
of
Tax
equal
in
its
own
nature
,
and
which
needs
not
to
be
pieced
up
by
any
other
;
so
as
the
Officers
about
that
may
have
a
full
employment
,
and
none
others
wanted
,
whose
wide
intervals
of
leasure
shall
make
them
seem
Drones
,
as
they
are
also
the
Caterpillers
of
any
State.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Of
several
smaller
wayes
of
levying
Money
.
WHen
the
people
are
weary
of
any
one
sort
of
Tax
,
presently
some
Projector
propounds
another
,
and
gets
himself
audience
,
by
affirming
he
can
propound
a
way
how
all
the
publick
charge
may
be
born
without
the
way
that
is
.
As
for
example
,
if
a
Land-tax
be
the
present
distasted
way
,
and
the
people
weary
of
it
,
then
he
offers
to
do
the
business
without
such
a
Land-tax
,
and
propound
either
a
Poll-money
,
Excize
,
or
the
institution
of
some
new
Office
or
Monopoly
;
and
hereby
draws
some
or
other
to
hearken
to
him
;
which
is
readily
enough
done
by
those
who
are
not
in
the
places
of
profit
relating
to
the
way
of
Levies
in
use
,
but
hope
to
make
themselves
Offices
in
the
new
Institution
.
2.
I
shall
enumerate
a
few
of
the
smaller
wayes
which
I
have
observed
in
several
places
of
Europe
,
viz.
First
,
in
some
places
the
State
is
common
Cashier
for
all
or
most
moneys
,
as
where
Banks
are
,
thereby
gaining
the
interest
of
as
much
money
as
is
deposited
in
their
hands
.
Secondly
,
Sometimes
the
State
is
the
common
Usurer
,
as
where
Loan
Banks
,
and
montes
pietatis
are
in
use
,
and
might
be
more
copiously
and
effectually
where
Registers
of
Lands
are
kept
.
Thirdly
,
Sometimes
the
State
is
or
may
be
Common
Ensurer
,
either
upon
the
danger
onely
of
Enemies
at
sea
,
according
to
the
supposed
primitive
end
of
our
Customs
in
England
,
or
else
of
the
casualties
of
the
Enemy
,
Weather
,
Sea
,
and
Vessel
taken
together
.
Fourthly
,
Sometimes
the
State
hath
the
whole
sale
and
benefit
of
certain
Commodities
,
as
of
Amber
in
the
Duke
of
Brandenburghs
Countrey
,
Tobacco
formerly
in
Ireland
,
Salt
in
France
,
&c.
Fifthly
,
Sometimes
the
State
is
common
Beggar
,
as
't
is
almost
in
Holland
,
where
particular
Charity
seems
only
to
serve
for
the
relief
of
concealed
wants
,
and
to
save
these
wanting
from
the
shame
of
discovering
their
poverty
,
and
not
so
much
to
relieve
any
wants
that
are
declared
,
and
already
publickly
known
.
Sixthly
,
In
some
places
the
State
is
the
sole
Guardian
of
Minors
,
Lunaticks
,
and
Idiots
.
Seventhly
,
In
some
other
Countreys
the
State
sets
up
and
maintains
Play-houses
,
and
publick
Entertainments
,
giving
Sallaries
to
the
Actors
,
but
receiving
the
bulk
of
the
profit
to
themselves
.
Eighthly
,
In
some
places
,
Houses
are
ensured
from
fire
by
the
State
at
a
small
Rent
per
annum
upon
each
.
Ninthly
,
In
some
places
Tolls
are
taken
upon
passage
over
Bridges
,
Causeys
,
and
Ferries
built
and
maintained
at
the
Publick
Charge
.
Tenthly
,
In
some
places
men
that
dye
are
obliged
to
leave
a
certain
pittance
to
the
publick
,
the
same
is
practised
in
other
places
upon
Marriages
,
and
may
be
in
others
upon
Births
.
Eleventhly
,
In
some
places
strangers
especially
Jews
,
are
particularly
taxed
;
which
may
be
good
in
over-peopled
Countreys
,
though
bad
in
the
contrary
case
.
3.
As
for
Jews
,
they
may
well
bear
somewhat
extraordinary
,
because
they
seldom
eat
and
drink
with
Christians
,
hold
it
no
disparagement
to
live
frugally
,
and
even
sordidly
among
themselves
,
by
which
way
alone
they
become
able
to
under-sell
any
other
Traders
,
to
elude
the
Excize
,
which
bears
but
according
to
mens
Expences
;
as
also
other
Duties
,
by
dealing
so
much
in
Bills
of
Exchange
,
Jewels
,
and
Money
,
and
by
practising
of
several
frauds
with
more
impunity
then
others
;
for
by
their
being
at
home
every
where
,
and
yet
no
where
they
become
responsible
almost
for
nothing
.
4.
Twelfthly
,
There
have
been
in
our
times
,
wayes
of
levying
an
aliquot
part
of
mens
Estates
,
as
a
Fifth
,
and
Twentieth
,
viz.
of
their
Estates
real
and
personal
,
yea
of
their
Offices
,
Faculties
,
and
imaginary
Estates
also
,
in
and
about
which
way
may
be
so
much
fraud
,
collusion
,
oppression
,
and
trouble
,
some
purposely
getting
themselves
taxed
to
gain
more
trust
:
Others
bribing
to
be
taxed
low
,
and
it
being
impossible
to
check
or
examine
,
or
trace
these
Collections
by
the
print
of
any
footsteps
they
leave
,
(
such
as
the
Harths
of
Chimneys
are
)
that
I
have
not
patience
to
speak
more
against
it
;
daring
rather
conclude
without
more
ado
,
in
the
words
of
our
Comick
to
be
naught
,
yea
exceeding
naught
,
very
abominable
,
and
not
good
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
Of
raising
,
depressing
,
or
embasing
of
Money
.
SOmetimes
it
hath
hapned
,
that
States
(
I
know
not
by
what
raw
advice
)
have
raised
or
embased
their
money
,
hoping
thereby
,
as
it
were
,
to
multiply
it
,
and
make
it
pass
for
more
then
it
did
before
;
that
is
,
to
purchase
more
commodity
or
labour
with
it
:
All
which
indeed
and
in
truth
,
amounts
to
no
more
then
a
Tax
,
upon
such
People
unto
whom
the
State
is
indebted
,
or
a
defalkation
of
what
is
due
;
as
also
the
like
burthen
upon
all
that
live
upon
Pensions
,
established
Rents
,
Annuities
,
Fees
,
Gratuities
,
&c.
2.
To
explain
this
fully
,
one
might
lanch
out
into
the
deep
Ocean
of
all
the
Mysteries
concerning
Money
,
which
is
done
for
other
ends
elsewhere
;
nevertheless
I
shall
do
it
the
best
I
can
,
by
expounding
the
reasons
pro
&
contrà
for
embasing
and
raising
of
Money
:
and
first
of
embasing
.
3.
Copper
or
Tin
Money
made
ad
valorem
in
its
matter
,
is
no
embasing
;
the
same
being
onely
cumbersom
and
baser
then
silver
money
,
onely
because
less
convenient
and
portable
.
And
Copper
money
ad
valorem
in
workmanship
and
matter
both
together
;
(
such
as
on
which
the
Effigies
and
Scutcheon
are
so
curiously
graven
and
impressed
,
as
the
moneys
seem
rather
a
Medal
)
is
not
embasing
,
unless
the
numbers
of
such
pieces
be
excessive
,
(
the
measures
whereof
I
shall
not
set
down
,
until
I
shall
hereafter
propound
the
fittest
Sections
of
the
abstracted
pound
into
which
I
would
have
money
coyned
,
and
determine
how
many
pieces
of
each
Section
should
be
in
an
hundred
pound
)
for
in
case
of
such
excess
,
the
workmanship
being
of
no
other
use
but
to
look
upon
,
becomes
base
by
its
being
too
common
.
4.
Nor
are
such
Tokens
base
as
are
coyned
for
Exchange
in
retailing
by
particular
men
,
(
if
such
men
be
responsible
and
able
to
take
them
back
,
and
give
Silver
for
them
.
)
5.
But
that
Gold
I
count
to
be
embased
,
which
hath
more
allay
either
of
Copper
or
Silver
in
it
,
then
serves
to
correct
its
too
great
natural
softness
and
flexibility
,
whereby
it
wears
too
fast
in
Money
:
And
that
Silver
I
reckon
also
embased
,
wherein
is
commixed
more
Copper
then
will
sufficiently
toughen
it
,
and
save
it
from
cracking
under
the
Hammer
,
Press
,
or
Mill
that
must
coin
it
,
or
the
like
.
6.
Base
Money
is
therefore
such
as
Dutch
Shillings
,
Stivers
,
French
Soulz
,
Irish
Bon-galls
,
&c.
and
for
the
most
part
consisting
great
pieces
,
though
of
small
value
.
To
answer
the
first
reason
or
pretence
of
making
them
,
which
is
,
that
the
said
Pieces
might
be
more
bulky
,
handleable
,
and
the
silver
in
them
less
apt
to
be
lost
or
worn
away
.
7.
The
other
reason
(
besides
that
of
allay
which
we
must
allow
in
the
Measures
abovementioned
)
is
to
save
it
from
being
melted
down
by
Goldsmiths
and
Bullioners
,
or
exported
by
strangers
;
neither
of
which
can
happen
but
to
their
loss
:
for
suppose
a
Stiver
of
two
pence
,
had
a
penny
of
pure
silver
,
if
the
Bullioner
melts
it
for
the
sake
of
the
silver
onely
,
in
the
separation
he
shall
lose
the
Copper
and
charge
of
refining
the
Silver
;
nor
will
strangers
export
it
into
places
where
the
local
value
of
the
Piece
perisheth
,
the
intrinsick
leaving
him
to
loss
.
7.
Now
the
reasons
against
this
kinde
of
Money
are
,
first
the
greater
danger
of
falsification
,
because
the
colour
,
sound
,
and
weight
by
which
men
(
without
the
test
)
guess
at
the
goodness
of
the
material
of
Money
is
too
much
confounded
,
for
the
vulgar
(
whom
it
concerns
)
to
make
use
of
them
for
their
marks
and
guides
in
the
business
.
8.
Secondly
,
In
case
small
pieces
of
this
Money
,
viz.
pieces
of
two
pence
should
happen
to
be
raised
or
depressed
twelve
,
fifteen
,
or
sixteen
per
cent
.
then
there
will
be
a
certain
loss
by
reason
of
the
fractions
,
which
the
vulgar
cannot
reckon
:
As
for
example
,
if
such
Money
were
depressed
but
ten
,
eleven
,
or
twelve
per
cent
.
then
the
two
pence
piece
would
be
worth
but
three
half
pence
,
which
is
twenty
five
per
cent
.
and
so
of
other
proportions
.
9.
Thirdly
,
In
case
the
Inconvenience
of
this
Money
should
be
so
great
as
to
necessitate
a
new
Coinage
of
it
,
then
will
happen
all
the
losses
we
mentioned
before
in
melting
it
down
by
Bullioners
.
10.
Fourthly
,
If
the
two
pence
piece
contained
but
⅙
.
th
.
part
of
the
Silver
usually
in
a
shilling
,
then
Dealers
would
have
fifteen
pence
paid
in
this
money
for
the
same
Commodity
,
for
which
they
would
take
a
shilling
in
Standard
Silver
.
11.
Raising
of
Money
is
either
the
cutting
the
pound
Troy
of
Standard
Silver
into
more
pieces
then
formerly
,
as
into
above
sixty
,
whereas
heretofore
the
same
was
made
but
into
twenty
,
and
yet
both
sorts
called
shillings
,
or
else
calling
the
money
already
made
by
higher
names
:
The
reasons
or
pretences
given
for
such
raising
are
these
,
viz.
That
the
raising
of
Money
will
bring
it
in
,
and
the
material
thereof
more
plentifully
;
for
trial
whereof
suppose
one
shilling
were
proclaimed
to
be
worth
two
,
what
other
effect
could
this
have
,
then
the
raising
of
all
Commodities
unto
a
double
price
?
Now
if
it
were
proclaimed
,
That
Labourers
Wages
,
&c.
should
not
rise
at
all
upon
this
raising
of
Money
,
then
would
this
Act
be
as
onely
a
Tax
upon
the
said
Labourers
,
as
forcing
them
to
lose
half
their
wages
,
which
would
not
be
onely
unjust
but
impossible
,
unless
they
could
live
with
the
said
half
,
(
which
is
not
to
be
supposed
)
for
then
the
Law
that
appoints
such
Wages
were
ill
made
,
which
should
allow
the
Labourer
but
just
wherewithall
to
live
;
for
if
you
allow
double
,
then
he
works
but
half
so
much
as
he
could
have
done
,
and
otherwise
would
;
which
is
a
loss
to
the
Publick
of
the
fruit
of
so
much
labour
.
12.
But
suppose
the
Quart
d'Es●●
of
France
commonly
esteemed
worth
eighteen
pence
were
raised
to
three
shillings
,
then
't
is
true
,
that
all
the
Moneys
of
England
would
be
indeed
Quart
d'Esens
pieces
;
but
as
true
,
that
all
the
English
Money
would
be
carried
away
,
and
that
our
Quart
d'Esens
would
contain
but
half
so
much
Bullion
as
our
own
money
did
;
so
that
raising
of
Money
may
indeed
change
the
species
,
but
with
so
much
loss
as
the
Forreign
Pieces
were
raised
unto
,
above
their
intrinsick
value
.
13.
But
for
remedy
of
this
,
suppose
we
raised
the
Quart
d'Esen
double
,
and
prohibited
the
Exportation
of
our
own
money
in
Exchange
thereof
.
I
answer
,
that
such
a
Prohibition
is
nugatory
,
and
impossible
to
be
executed
;
and
if
it
were
not
,
yet
the
raising
of
the
said
species
would
but
make
us
sell
the
Commodities
bought
with
raised
Quart
d'Esens
,
in
effect
but
at
half
the
usual
rate
,
which
unto
them
that
want
such
commodities
will
as
well
yield
the
full
;
so
that
abating
our
prices
,
will
as
well
allure
strangers
to
buy
extraordinary
proportions
of
our
Commodities
,
as
raising
their
money
will
do
:
But
neither
that
,
nor
abating
the
price
will
make
strangers
use
more
of
our
Commodities
then
they
want
;
for
although
the
first
year
they
should
carry
away
an
unuseful
and
superfluous
proportion
,
yet
afterwards
they
would
take
so
much
the
less
.
14.
If
this
be
true
,
as
in
substance
it
is
,
why
then
have
so
many
wise
States
in
several
ancient
,
as
well
as
modern
times
frequently
practised
this
Artifice
,
as
a
means
to
draw
in
money
into
their
respective
Dominions
?
I
answer
,
that
something
is
to
be
attributed
to
the
stupidity
and
ignorance
of
the
people
,
who
cannot
of
a
sudden
understand
this
matter
:
for
I
finde
many
men
wise
enough
,
who
though
they
be
well
informed
that
raising
of
money
signifies
little
,
yet
cannot
suddenly
digest
it
.
As
for
example
,
an
unengaged
person
who
had
money
in
his
purse
in
England
,
and
should
hear
that
a
shilling
was
made
fourteen
pence
in
Ireland
,
would
more
readily
run
thither
to
buy
Land
then
before
;
not
suddenly
apprehending
,
that
for
the
same
Land
which
he
might
have
bought
before
for
six
years
Purchase
,
he
shall
now
pay
seven
.
Nor
will
Sellers
in
Ireland
of
a
sudden
apprehend
cause
to
raise
their
Land
proportionally
,
but
will
at
least
be
contented
to
compound
the
business
,
viz.
to
sell
at
six
and
an
half
;
and
if
the
difference
be
a
more
ragged
fraction
,
men
under
a
long
time
will
not
apprehend
it
,
nor
ever
be
able
exactly
to
govern
their
practice
according
to
it
.
15.
Secondly
,
Although
I
apprehend
little
real
difference
between
raising
Forreign
Money
to
double
,
and
abasing
half
in
the
price
of
our
own
Commodities
,
yet
to
sell
them
on
on
a
tacite
condition
to
be
paid
in
Forreign
present
Money
,
shall
increase
our
money
;
forasmuch
as
between
raising
the
money
,
and
abasing
the
price
,
is
the
same
difference
as
between
selling
for
money
and
in
barter
,
which
latter
is
the
dearer
;
or
between
selling
for
present
money
,
and
for
time
;
barter
resolving
into
the
nature
of
uncertain
time
.
16.
I
say
,
suppose
English
Cloth
were
sold
at
six
shillings
a
Yard
,
and
French
Canvas
at
eighteen
pence
the
Ell
,
the
question
is
,
whether
it
were
all
one
in
order
to
increase
Money
in
England
to
raise
the
French
Money
double
,
or
to
abate
half
of
the
price
of
our
Cloth
?
I
think
the
former
,
because
that
former
way
or
proposition
carries
with
it
a
condition
of
having
Forreign
Money
in
specie
,
and
not
Canvas
in
barter
,
between
which
two
wayes
the
world
generally
agrees
there
is
a
difference
.
Wherefore
if
we
can
afford
to
abate
half
our
price
,
but
will
not
do
it
but
for
our
neighbours
money
,
then
we
gain
so
much
as
the
said
difference
between
Money
and
Barter
amounts
unto
,
by
such
raising
of
our
Neighbours
Money
.
17.
But
the
fundamental
solution
of
this
Question
depends
upon
a
real
and
not
an
imaginary
way
of
computing
the
prices
of
Commodities
;
in
order
to
which
real
way
I
premise
these
suppositions
:
First
then
,
suppose
there
be
in
a
Territory
a
thousand
people
,
let
these
people
be
supposed
sufficient
to
Till
this
whole
Territory
as
to
the
Husbandry
of
Corn
,
which
we
will
suppose
to
contain
all
necessaries
for
life
,
as
in
the
Lords
Prayer
we
suppose
the
word
Bread
doth
;
and
let
the
production
of
a
Bushel
of
this
Corn
be
supposed
of
equal
labour
to
that
of
producing
an
ounce
of
Silver
.
Suppose
again
that
a
tenth
part
of
this
Land
,
and
tenth
of
the
people
,
viz.
an
hundred
of
them
,
can
produce
Corn
enough
for
the
whole
;
suppose
that
the
Rent
of
Land
(
found
out
as
above-mentioned
)
be
a
fourth
part
of
the
whole
product
,
(
about
which
proportion
it
really
is
,
as
we
may
perceive
by
paying
a
fourth
Sheaf
instead
of
Rent
in
some
places
)
suppose
also
that
whereas
but
an
hundred
are
necessary
for
this
Husbandry
,
yet
that
two
hundred
have
taken
up
the
Trade
;
and
suppose
that
where
a
Bushel
of
Corn
would
suffice
,
yet
men
out
of
delicacy
will
use
two
,
making
use
of
the
Flower
onely
of
both
.
Now
the
Inferences
from
hence
are
;
First
,
That
the
goodness
or
badness
,
or
the
value
of
Land
depends
upon
the
greater
or
lesser
share
of
the
product
given
for
it
in
proportion
to
the
simple
labour
bestowed
to
raise
the
said
Product
.
Secondly
,
That
the
proportions
between
Corn
and
Silver
signific
onely
an
artificial
value
,
not
a
natural
;
because
the
comparison
is
between
a
thing
naturally
useful
,
and
a
thing
in
it self
unnecessary
,
which
(
by
the
way
)
is
part
of
the
reason
why
there
are
not
so
great
changes
and
leaps
in
the
pro●●ed
of
Silver
as
of
other
Commodities
.
Thirdly
,
That
natural
dearness
and
cheapness
depends
upon
the
few
or
more
hands
requisite
to
necessaries
of
Nature
:
As
Corn
is
cheaper
where
one
man
produces
Corn
for
ten
,
then
where
he
can
do
the
like
but
for
six
;
and
withall
,
according
as
the
Climate
disposes
men
to
a
necessity
of
spending
more
or
less
.
But
Political
Cheapness
depends
upon
the
paucity
of
Supernumerary
Interlopers
into
any
Trade
over
and
above
all
that
are
necessary
,
viz.
Corn
will
be
twice
as
dear
where
are
two
hundred
Husbandmen
to
do
the
same
work
which
an
hundred
could
perform
:
the
proportion
thereof
being
compounded
with
the
proportion
of
superfluous
Expence
,
(
viz.
if
to
the
cause
of
dearness
abovementioned
be
added
to
the
double
Expence
to
what
is
necessary
)
then
the
natural
price
will
appear
quadrupled
;
and
this
quadruple
Price
is
the
true
Political
Price
computed
upon
naturall
grounds
.
And
this
again
proportioned
to
the
common
artificiall
Standard
Silver
gives
what
was
sought
;
that
is
,
the
true
Price
Currant
.
18.
But
forasmuch
as
almost
all
Commodities
have
their
Substitutes
or
Succedanea
,
and
that
almost
all
uses
may
be
answered
several
wayes
;
and
for
that
novelty
,
surprize
,
example
of
Superiours
,
and
opinion
of
unexaminable
effects
do
adde
or
take
away
from
the
price
of
things
,
we
must
adde
these
contingent
Causes
to
the
permanent
Causes
abovementioned
,
in
the
judicious
foresight
and
computation
whereof
lies
the
excellency
of
a
Merchant
.
Now
to
apply
this
Digression
,
I
say
,
that
to
encrease
Money
,
it
is
as
well
necessary
to
know
how
to
abate
the
raise
,
the
price
of
Commodities
,
and
that
of
Money
,
which
was
the
scope
of
the
said
Digression
.
19.
To
conclude
this
whole
Chapter
,
we
say
,
that
raising
or
embasing
of
Moneys
is
a
very
pittiful
and
unequal
way
of
Taxing
the
people
;
and
't
is
a
sign
that
the
State
sinketh
,
which
catcheth
hold
on
such
Weeds
as
are
accompanied
with
the
dishonour
of
impressing
a
Princes
Effigies
to
justifie
Adulterate
Commodities
,
and
the
breach
of
Publick
Faith
,
such
as
is
the
calling
a
thing
what
it
really
is
not
.
CHAP.
XV.
Of
Excize
.
IT
is
generally
allowed
by
all
,
that
men
should
contribute
to
the
Publick
Charge
but
according
to
the
share
and
interest
they
have
in
the
Publick
Peace
;
that
is
,
according
to
their
Estates
or
Riches
:
now
there
are
two
sorts
of
Riches
,
one
actual
,
and
the
other
potential
.
A
man
is
actually
and
truly
rich
according
to
what
he
eateth
,
drinketh
,
weareth
,
or
any
other
way
really
and
actually
enjoyeth
;
others
are
but
potentially
or
imaginatively
rich
,
who
though
they
have
power
overmuch
,
make
little
use
of
it
;
these
being
rather
Stewards
and
Exchangers
for
the
other
sort
,
then
owners
for
themselves
.
2.
Concluding
therefore
that
every
man
ought
to
contribute
according
to
what
he
taketh
to
himself
,
and
actually
enjoyeth
.
The
first
thing
to
be
done
is
,
to
compute
what
the
Total
of
the
Expence
of
this
Nation
is
by
particular
men
upon
themselves
,
and
then
what
part
thereof
is
necessary
for
the
Publick
;
both
which
(
no
not
the
former
)
are
so
difficult
as
most
men
imagine
.
3.
In
the
next
place
we
must
conceive
,
that
the
very
perfect
Idea
of
making
a
Leavy
upon
Consumptions
,
is
to
rate
every
particular
Necessary
,
just
when
it
is
ripe
for
Consumption
;
that
is
to
say
,
not
to
rate
Corn
until
it
be
Bread
,
nor
Wool
until
it
be
Cloth
,
or
rather
until
it
be
a
very
Garment
;
so
as
the
value
of
Wool
,
Cloathing
,
and
Tayloring
,
even
to
the
Thread
and
Needles
might
be
comprehended
:
But
this
being
perhaps
too
laborious
to
be
performed
,
we
ought
to
enumerate
a
Catalogue
of
Commodities
both
native
and
artificial
,
such
whereof
accompts
may
be
most
easily
taken
,
and
can
bear
the
Office
marks
either
on
themselves
,
or
on
what
contains
them
;
being
withall
such
,
as
are
to
be
as
near
Consumption
as
possible
:
And
then
we
are
to
compute
what
further
labour
or
charge
is
to
be
bestowed
on
each
of
them
,
before
consumption
,
that
so
an
allowance
be
given
accordingly
.
As
for
example
,
suppose
there
be
an
hundred
pounds
worth
of
Stript
Stuff
for
Hangings
,
and
an
hundred
pounds
worth
of
Cloth
or
Stuff
for
the
best
mens
Cloathes
;
I
conceive
,
that
the
Cloth
should
bear
a
greater
Excize
then
the
said
stript
stuff
,
the
one
wanting
nothing
but
tacking
up
,
to
be
at
its
wayes
end
;
and
the
other
Tayloring
,
Thread
,
Silk
,
Needles
,
Thimbles
,
Buttons
,
and
several
other
particulars
:
The
Excise
of
all
which
must
be
accumulated
upon
the
Excize
of
the
Cloth
,
unless
they
be
so
great
(
as
perhaps
Buttons
,
Lace
,
or
Ribbons
may
be
)
to
be
taxed
apart
,
and
inserted
into
the
Catalogue
abovementioned
.
4.
Now
the
things
to
be
accumulated
upon
Cloth
are
,
as
near
as
possible
,
to
be
such
particulars
as
are
used
onely
to
Cloth
,
or
very
rarely
to
any
other
particular
,
as
the
several
sorts
of
peculiar
trimmings
;
so
on
Corn
should
be
accumulated
the
charge
of
grinding
,
bolting
,
yeast
,
&c.
for
the
baking
of
it
into
Bread
,
unless
,
as
was
said
before
,
any
of
these
particulars
'
can
be
better
rated
apart
.
5.
A
Question
ariseth
hence
,
whether
any
Native
Commodities
exported
ought
to
pay
the
Excize
,
or
that
what
is
imported
in
lieu
of
it
should
pay
none
?
I
answer
no
,
because
they
are
not
spent
here
in
specie
;
but
I
conceive
that
the
Goods
returned
from
abroad
for
them
and
spent
here
should
pay
,
if
the
exported
have
not
already
,
for
so
shall
what
we
spend
pay
once
,
but
not
ostner
.
Now
if
Bullion
be
returned
,
then
if
it
be
coyned
into
Money
it
ought
not
to
pay
,
because
Money
will
beget
other
commodities
which
shall
pay
;
but
if
the
said
Bullion
be
wrought
into
Plate
and
Utensils
,
or
disgrost
into
Wire
or
Lace
,
or
beaten
into
Fucilles
,
then
it
also
ought
to
pay
,
because
it
is
consumed
and
absolutely
spent
,
as
in
Lace
and
Gilding
is
too
notorious
;
and
this
is
the
reason
why
I
think
the
Leavy
we
commonly
call
Customs
to
be
unseasonable
and
preposterous
,
the
same
being
a
payment
before
consumption
.
6.
We
have
several
times
spoken
of
Accumulative
Excize
,
by
which
we
mean
Taxing
many
things
together
as
one
:
As
for
example
,
suppose
the
many
Drugs
used
in
Treacle
or
Mithridate
were
used
onely
in
those
Compositions
,
in
such
case
by
taxing
any
one
of
them
,
the
whole
number
will
be
taxed
as
certainly
as
that
one
,
because
they
all
bear
a
certain
proportion
one
to
another
:
In
Cloth
,
the
Workmanship
and
Tools
as
well
as
the
Wool
may
be
well
enough
taxed
,
&c.
7.
But
some
have
strained
this
Accumulation
so
,
as
they
would
have
all
things
together
taxed
upon
some
one
single
particular
,
such
as
they
think
to
be
nearest
the
Common
Standard
of
all
Expence
,
the
principal
ends
of
their
proposition
being
these
,
viz.
First
,
To
disguise
the
name
of
Excize
,
as
odious
to
them
,
that
do
neither
know
the
payment
of
Taxes
to
be
as
indispensable
as
eating
,
and
as
have
not
considered
the
natural
justice
of
this
way
of
Excizing
or
proportionating
.
Secondly
,
To
avoid
the
trouble
and
charge
of
Collecting
.
Thirdly
,
To
bring
the
business
ad
firmum
,
and
to
a
certainty
of
all
which
we
shall
speak
hereafter
,
when
we
examine
the
several
reasons
for
and
against
the
way
of
Excize
,
proceeding
now
to
the
several
species
of
Accumulative
Excizes
propounded
in
the
world
.
8.
Some
propound
Beer
to
be
the
only
Excizable
Commodity
,
supposing
that
in
the
proportion
that
men
drink
,
they
make
all
other
Expences
;
which
certainly
will
not
hold
,
especially
if
Strong
Beer
pay
quintuple
unto
,
(
as
now
)
or
any
more
Excize
then
the
small
:
For
poor
Carpenters
,
Smiths
,
Felt-makers
,
&c.
drinking
twice
as
much
Strong
Beer
as
Gentlemen
do
of
Small
,
must
consequently
pay
ten
times
as
much
Excize
.
Moreover
,
upon
the
Artizans
Beer
is
accumulated
,
onely
a
little
Bread
and
Cheese
,
leathern
Clothes
,
Neck-Beef
,
and
Inwards
twice
a
week
,
stale
Fish
,
old
Pease
without
Butter
,
&c.
Whereas
on
the
other
,
beside
Drink
,
is
accumulated
as
many
more
things
as
Nature
and
Art
can
produce
;
besides
this
way
of
Excizing
,
though
it
be
never
so
well
administred
,
is
neither
so
equal
nor
so
easie
,
nor
so
examinable
as
the
simple
Poll-money
before
spoken
of
,
which
is
also
but
an
Accumulative
Excize
.
9.
What
hath
been
propounded
for
Beer
may
be
of
Salt
,
Fuel
,
Bread
,
&c.
and
the
Propositions
would
all
labour
under
the
same
Inconveniences
;
for
some
spend
more
,
some
less
of
these
Commodities
;
and
sometimes
Families
(
each
whereof
are
propounded
to
be
farmed
,
without
descending
to
individual
heads
)
are
more
numerous
at
some
times
then
at
others
,
according
as
their
Estates
or
other
Interests
shall
wax
or
wane
.
10.
Of
all
the
Accumulative
Excizes
,
that
of
Harth-money
or
Smoak-money
seems
the
best
;
and
that
onely
because
the
easiest
,
and
clearest
,
and
fittest
to
ground
a
certain
Revenue
upon
;
it
being
easie
to
tell
the
number
of
Harths
,
which
remove
not
as
Heads
or
Polls
do
:
Moreover
,
't
is
more
easie
to
pay
a
small
Tax
,
then
to
alter
or
abrogate
Harths
,
even
though
they
are
useless
and
supernumerary
;
nor
is
it
possible
to
cover
them
,
because
most
of
the
neighbours
know
them
;
nor
in
new
Building
will
any
man
who
gives
forty
shillings
for
making
a
Chimney
be
without
it
for
two
.
11.
Here
is
to
be
noted
,
that
a
Harth-money
must
be
but
small
,
or
else
't
will
be
intollerable
;
it
being
more
easie
for
a
Gentleman
of
a
thousand
pound
per
annum
to
pay
for
an
hundred
Chimneys
(
few
of
their
Mansion-Houses
having
more
)
then
for
Labourers
to
pay
for
two
.
Moreover
,
if
the
Land-Lord
onely
pay
this
Tax
,
then
is
it
not
an
Accumulative
Excize
for
all
,
but
a
particular
Excize
upon
but
one
onely
Commodity
,
namely
Housing
.
12.
Now
the
Reasons
for
Excize
are
these
,
viz.
First
,
The
Natural
Justice
that
every
man
should
pay
according
to
what
he
actually
enjoyeth
;
upon
which
account
this
Tax
is
scarce
forced
upon
any
,
and
is
very
light
to
those
,
who
please
to
be
content
with
natural
Necessaries
.
Seondly
,
This
Tax
if
it
be
not
farmed
,
but
regularly
collected
,
engages
to
thrift
,
the
onely
way
to
enrich
a
Nation
,
as
by
the
Dutch
and
Jews
,
and
by
all
other
men
,
who
have
come
to
vaste
Estates
by
Trade
,
doth
appear
.
Thirdly
,
No
man
payes
double
or
twice
for
the
same
thing
,
forasmuch
as
nothing
can
be
spent
but
once
;
whereas
it
is
frequently
seen
,
that
otherwise
men
pay
both
by
the
Rent
of
their
Lands
,
by
their
Smoaks
,
by
their
Titles
,
and
by
Customs
,
(
which
all
men
do
,
though
Merchants
chiefly
talk
of
it
)
they
also
pay
by
Benevolence
and
by
Tythes
;
whereas
in
this
way
of
Excize
no
man
need
pay
but
one
way
,
nor
but
once
,
properly
speaking
.
Fifthly
,
By
this
way
an
excellent
account
may
be
taken
of
the
Wealth
,
Growth
,
Trade
,
and
strength
of
the
Nation
at
all
times
.
All
which
Reasons
do
make
not
for
particular
compoundings
with
〈◊〉
,
nor
for
letting
the
whole
to
farm
,
but
for
collecting
it
by
special
Officers
,
who
having
a
full
employment
,
will
not
be
a
fourth
of
the
charge
of
our
present
many
multiform
Levies
;
for
to
put
extraordinary
trouble
and
hazzard
upon
the
Countrey
Officers
,
is
a
sorer
Taxing
of
them
,
then
to
make
them
pay
a
small
Reward
unto
practised
Persons
to
be
their
Substitutes
.
All
which
are
the
common
Objections
against
Excize
.
13.
I
should
here
adde
the
manner
of
Collecting
it
,
but
I
refer
this
to
the
practice
of
Holland
;
and
I
might
also
offer
how
men
may
be
framed
to
be
fit
for
this
and
other
Publick
Trusts
,
as
to
be
Cashiers
,
Store-keepers
,
Collectors
,
&c.
but
I
refer
this
Enquiry
unto
a
more
ample
and
fit
occasion
.
Errata
.
Pag.
line
.
1
14
between
[
who
and
spent
]
interline
[
have
]
5
13
after
[
want
]
read
[
general
]
instead
of
[
more
]
6
19
before
[
starve
]
interline
[
needlesly
]
6
29
before
[
cause
]
read
[
one
]
instead
of
[
the
]
6
30
read
[
is
]
instead
of
[
are
]
8
7
read
[
them
]
for
[
him
]
8
8
read
[
their
]
for
[
his
]
17
19
read
[
viz.
]
for
[
that
is
]
18
3
read
[
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
]
instead
of
[
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
]
20
17
read
[
Excisum
]
not
[
Excisium
]
21
7
read
[
obligees
]
not
[
obliges
]
22
12
read
[
enhansing
]
not
[
exhausting
]
22
23
between
[
way
and
Land-Tax
]
interline
[
of
a
]
22
25
deleatur
[
sometimes
]
24
25
between
[
Rents
and
we
]
interline
[
in
order
to
Taxes
]
28
24
between
[
seldom
and
enough
]
interline
[
rich
]
28
28
deleatur
[
with
]
30
11
after
[
hazards
]
interline
[
and
]
14
read
[
omitted
]
27
read
[
apparatus
]
instead
of
[
appurtenances
]
32
10
after
[
the
]
interline
[
former
]
11
after
[
Land
]
read
[
this
latter
]
instead
[
of
the
]
33
26
deleatur
[
by
]
31
between
[
&c.
and
then
]
interline
[
could
be
fertilized
]
34
36
read
[
worth
]
not
[
work
]
36
16
after
[
market
]
interline
[
abroad
]
37
12
read
[
paribus
]
not
[
talibus
]
39
6
read
[
conniving
]
not
[
coyning
]
Pag.
line
.
39
32
deleatur
[
as
much
harm
]
ibid.
between
[
of
and
one
]
interline
[
the
]
penult
.
after
[
Coffee
]
inter
[
and
]
40
2
read
[
meerly
]
for
[
merrily
]
ult
.
before
[
certainly
]
interline
[
case
]
41
13
dele
[
out
]
24
read
[
so
or
not
]
instead
of
[
use
]
47
26
read
[
on
]
for
[
of
]
51
3
read
[
their
]
for
[
the
]
15
after
[
Heterodox
]
interline
[
Believer
]
29
read
[
wearing
]
for
[
weaving
]
53
14
read
[
defect
]
for
[
dissent
]
54
36
between
[
then
and
is
]
interline
[
it
]
56.
ult
.
after
[
yet
the
]
interline
[
said
]
57
3
read
[
offices
]
for
[
officers
]
60
2
read
[
shared
]
for
[
shred
]
61
15
read
[
consequences
]
for
[
calamities
]
32
read
[
an
]
for
[
no
]
62
1
after
[
plentiful
]
interline
[
year
]
65
21
read
[
medalls
]
instead
of
[
a
medall
]
66
10
between
[
consisting
and
great
]
interline
[
of
]
67
29
read
[
d'Escu
]
instead
of
[
d'Esens
]
68
36
read
[
abating
]
for
[
abasing
]
69
11
after
[
former
]
interline
[
better
]
70
12
read
[
prices
]
for
[
proceed
]
71
5
read
[
as
]
for
[
the
]
75
25
read
[
families
]
for
[
faculties
.
]
FINIS
.