transcriber's note: underscores are used as delimiters for _italics_] an unsinkable titanic [illustration: photo by brown bros., new york stoke-hole of a transatlantic liner] an unsinkable titanic every ship its own lifeboat by j. bernard walker editor of the scientific american [illustration] new york dodd, mead and company 1912 copyright, 1912, by dodd, mead and company published, july, 1912 the quinn & boden co. press rahway, n. j. to the memory of the chief engineer of the _titanic_, john bell, and his staff of thirty-three assistants, who stood at their posts in the engine and boiler-rooms to the very last, and went down with the ship, this work is dedicated preface it is the object of this work to show that, in our eagerness to make the ocean liner fast and luxurious, we have forgotten to make her safe. the safest ocean liner was the _great eastern_; and she was built over fifty years ago. her designer aimed to make the ship practically unsinkable--and he succeeded; for she passed through a more severe ordeal than the _titanic_, survived it, and came into port under her own steam. since her day, the shipbuilder has eliminated all but one of the safety devices which made the _great eastern_ a ship so difficult to sink. nobody, not even the shipbuilders themselves, seemed to realise what was being done, until, suddenly, the world's finest vessel, in all the pride of her maiden voyage, struck an iceberg and went to the bottom in something over two and a half hours' time! if we learn the lesson of this tragedy, we shall lose no time in getting back to first principles. we shall reintroduce in all future passenger ships those simple and effective elements of safety--the double skin, the longitudinal bulkhead, and the watertight deck--which were conspicuous in the _great eastern_, and which alone can render such a ship as the _titanic_ unsinkable. * * * * * the author's acknowledgments are due to the "scientific american" for many of the photographs and line drawings reproduced in this volume; to an article by professor j. h. biles, published in "engineering," for material relating to the board of trade stipulations as to bulkheads; to sir george c. v. holmes and the victoria and albert museum for data regarding the _great eastern_, published in "ancient and modern ships"; to naval constructor r. h. m. robinson, u.s.n., for permission to reproduce certain drawings from his work, "naval construction," and to naval constructor henry williams, u.s.n., who courteously read the proofs of this work and offered many valuable suggestions. the original wash and line drawings are by mr. c. mcknight smith. j. b. w. new york, _june_, 1912. contents chapter page i. introductory 1 ii. the ever-present dangers of the sea 19 iii. every ship its own lifeboat 35 iv. safety lies in subdivision 51 v. the unsinkable _great eastern_ of 1858 69 vi. the sinkable _titanic_ 91 vii. how the great ship went down 116 viii. warship protection against ram, mine, and torpedo 136 ix. warship protection as applied to some ocean liners 161 x. conclusions 179 illustrations stoke-hole of a transatlantic liner _frontispiece_ page riveting the outer skin on the frames of a 65,000-ton ocean liner 3 growth of the transatlantic steamer from 1840 to 1912 7 receiving submarine signals on the bridge 13 taking the temperature of the water 17 fire-drill on a german liner: stewards are closing door in fire-protection bulkhead 21 fire-drill on a german liner: hose from bellows supplies fresh air to man with smoke helmet 25 fire-drill on a german liner: test of fire-mains is made every time the ship is in port 29 the 44,000-ton, 25½-knot _lusitania_ 37 provisioning the boats during a boat drill 43 loading and lowering boats, stowed athwartships 43 the elaborate installation of telegraphs, telephones, voice-tubes, etc., on the bridge of an ocean liner 47 hydraulically-operated, watertight door in an engine-room bulkhead 53 diagram showing protective value of transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, watertight decks, and inner skin 57 closing, from the bridge, all watertight doors throughout the ship by pulling a lever 63 _great eastern_, 1858; most completely protected passenger ship ever built 71 longitudinal section and plan of the _great eastern_, 1858 77 two extremes in protection, and a compromise 83 _great eastern_, lying at foot of canal street, north river, new york 87 fifty years' decline in safety construction 93 _olympic_, sister to _titanic_, reaching new york on maiden voyage 97 the framing and some of the deck beams of the _imperator_, as seen from inside the bow, before the outside plating is riveted on 103 how the plating of the inner bottom of such a ship as the _titanic_ may be carried up the side frames to form an inner skin 107 twenty of the twenty-nine boilers of the _titanic_ assembled ready for placing in the ship 111 the last photograph of the _titanic_, taken as she was leaving southampton on her maiden voyage 117 swimming pool on the _titanic_ 121 the _titanic_ struck a glancing blow against an under-water shelf of the iceberg, opening up five compartments 125 comparison of subdivision in two famous ships 129 the vast dining-room of the _titanic_ 133 the united states battleship _kansas_ 137 plan and longitudinal section of the battleship _connecticut_ 143 midship section of a battleship 149 safety lies in subdivision 155 the 65,000-ton, 23-knot _imperator_, largest ship afloat 159 longitudinal section and plan of the _imperator_ 163 the rotor, or rotating element, of one of the low-pressure turbines of the _imperator_ 167 the 26,000-ton, 23½-knot _kronprinzessin cecilie_, a thoroughly protected ship 171 chapter i introductory among the many questions which have arisen out of the loss of the _titanic_ there is one, which, in its importance as affecting the safety of ocean travel, stands out preëminent: "why did this ship, the latest, the largest, and supposedly the safest of ocean liners, go to the bottom so soon after collision with an iceberg?" the question is one to which, as yet, no answer that is perfectly clear to the lay mind has been made. we know that the collision was the result of daring navigation; that the wholesale loss of life was due to the lack of lifeboats and the failure to fill completely the few that were available; and that, had it not been for the amazing indifference or stupidity of the captain of a nearby steamer, who failed to answer the distress signals of the sinking vessel, the whole of the ship's complement might have been saved. but the ship itself--why did she so quickly go to the bottom after meeting with an accident, which, in spite of its stupendous results, must be reckoned as merely one among the many risks of transatlantic travel? so far as the loss of the ship itself was concerned, it is certain that the stupefaction with which the news of her sinking was received was due to the belief that her vast size was a guarantee against disaster--that the ever-increasing dimensions of length, breadth, and tonnage had conferred upon the modern ocean liner a certain immunity against the dangers of travel by sea. the fetish of mere size seems, indeed, to have affected even the officers in command of these modern leviathans. surely it must have thrown its spell over the captain of the ill-fated _titanic_, who, in spite of an oft-repeated warning that there was a large field of ice ahead, followed the usual practice, if the night is clear, and ran his ship at full speed into the zone of danger, as though, forsooth, he expected the _titanic_ to brush the ice floes aside, and split asunder any iceberg that might stand in her way. [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_ rivetting the outer skin on the frames of a 65,000-ton ocean liner] confidence in the indestructibility of the _titanic_, moreover, was stimulated by the fact that she was supposed to be the "last word" in first-class steamship construction, the culmination of three-quarters of a century of experience in building safe and stanch vessels. in the official descriptions of the ship, widely distributed at the time of her launching, the safety elements of her construction were freely dwelt upon. this literature rang the changes on stout bulkheads, watertight compartments, automatic, self-closing bulkhead doors, etc.,--and honestly so. there is every reason to believe that the celebrated firm who built the ship, renowned the world over for the high character of their work; the powerful company whose flag she carried; aye, and even her talented designer, who was the first to pronounce the _titanic_ a doomed vessel and went down with the ship, were united in the belief that the size of the _titanic_ and her construction were such that she was unsinkable by any of the ordinary accidents to which the transatlantic liner is liable. how comes it, then, that this noble vessel lies to-day at the bottom of the atlantic in two thousand fathoms of water? a review of the progress of those constructive arts which affect the safety of human life seems to show that it needs the spur of great disasters, such as this, to concentrate the attention of the engineer and the architect upon the all-important question of safety. more important than considerations of convenience, economy, speed of construction, or even revenue-earning capacity, are those of the value and sanctity of human life. too frequently these considerations are the last to receive attention. this is due less to indifference than to inadvertence--a failure to remember that an accident which may be insignificant in its effect on steel and stone, may be fatal to frail flesh and blood. furthermore, the monumental disasters, and particularly those occurring in this age of great constructive works, are frequently traceable to hidden or unsuspected causes, the existence and potentialities of which are revealed only when the mischief has been done. a faulty method of construction, containing in itself huge possibilities of disaster, may be persisted in for years without revealing its lurking menace. here and there, now and then, some minor mischance will direct the attention of the few to the peril; but the excitement will be local and passing. it takes a "horror"--a "holocaust" of human life, with all its attendant exploitation in the press and the monthly magazine, to awaken a busy and preoccupied world to the danger and beget those stringent laws and improved constructions which are the earmarks of progress towards an ideal civilisation. [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_. note how far the _great eastern_ was ahead of her time. she was not exceeded until the advent of the _oceanic_ in 1899. growth of the transatlantic steamer from 1840 to 1912] not many years ago, there was being erected across the st. lawrence river a huge bridge, with the largest single span in the world, which it was believed would be not only the largest but the strongest and most enduring structure of its kind in existence. it was being built under the supervision of one of the leading bridge engineers of the world; its design was of an approved type, which had long been standard in the western hemisphere; and the steelwork was being fabricated in one of the best equipped bridge works in the country. nevertheless, when one great cantilever was about completed, and before any live load had been placed on it, the structure collapsed under its own weight. one of the principal members--a massive steel column, five feet square and sixty feet long--crumpled up as though it had been a boy's tin whistle, and allowed the whole bridge to fall into the st. lawrence, carrying eighty men to their death! the disaster was traced to a very insignificant cause--the failure of some small angle-bars, 3½ inches in width, by which the parts of the massive member were held in place. no engineer had suspected that danger lurked in these little angle-bars. had the accident happened to a bridge of moderate size, the lessons of the failure would have been noted by the engineers and contractors; it would have formed the subject, possibly, of a paper before some engineering society, and the warning would have had results merely local and temporary. but the failure of this monumental structure, with a loss of life so appalling, gave to the disaster a world-wide notoriety. it became the subject of a searching enquiry by a highly expert board; the unsuspected danger which lurked in the existing and generally approved methods of building up massive steel columns was acknowledged; and safer rules of construction were adopted. it took the baltimore conflagration to teach us the strong and weak points of our much-vaunted systems of fireproof construction. only when san francisco, after repeated warnings, had seen the whole of its business section shaken down and ravaged by fire, did she set about the construction of a city that would be proof against fire and earthquake. it was the spectacle of maimed and dying passengers being slowly burned to death in the wreckage of colliding wooden cars, that led to the abolition of the heating stove and the oil lamp; and it was the risk of fire, coupled with the shocking injuries due to splintering of wooden cars, that brought in the era of the electrically lighted, strong, and incombustible steel car. the conditions attending the loss of the _titanic_ were so heartrending, and its appeal has been so world-wide, as to lead us to expect that the tragedy will be preëminently fruitful in those reforms which, as we have shown, usually follow a disaster of this magnitude. had the ship been less notable and the toll of human life less terrible, the disaster might have failed to awaken that sense of distrust in present methods which is at the root of all thorough-going reform. the measure of the one compensation which can be recovered from this awful loss of life and treasure, will depend upon the care with which its lessons are learned and the fidelity with which they are carried out. unquestionably, public faith in the security of ocean travel has been rudely shaken. the defects, however, which are directly answerable for the sinking of this ship are fortunately of such a character that they can be easily corrected; and if certain necessary and really very simple changes in construction are made (and they can be made without any burdensome increase in the cost) we do not hesitate to say that future passenger travel on a first-class ocean-going steamship will be rendered absolutely safe. [illustration: small dial indicates whether signals come from port or starboard. receiving submarine signals on the bridge] the duty of a passenger steamer, such as the _titanic_, may be regarded as threefold: she must stay afloat; she must provide a comfortable home for a small townful of people; and she must carry them to their destination with as much speed as is compatible with safety and comfort. evidently the first condition, as to safety, should be paramount. when it has been determined to build a ship of a certain size and weight (in the case of the _titanic_ the weight was 60,000 tons, loaded) the designer should be permitted to appropriate to the safety elements of her construction every pound of steel that he may wish to employ. in a vessel like the _titanic_, which is to be entrusted with the care of three or four thousand souls, he should be permitted to double-skin the ship, and divide and subdivide the hull with bulkheads, until he is satisfied that the vessel is unsinkable by any of the ordinary accidents of the sea. when these demands have been met, he may pile deck upon deck and crowd as big a boilerand engine-plant into this unsinkable hull as the balance of the weights at his disposal will allow. unfortunately the board of trade requirements under which the _titanic_ was built--and very conscientiously built--proceed along no such common-sense lines. instead, the board many years ago framed a set of rules in which the safety requirements were cut down to such a low limit, that the question of a ship's surviving a serious collision was reduced to a mere gamble with fate. the board of trade ship may fill _two_ adjoining compartments, and then _with the top of her bulkheads practically level with the sea_, in the opinion of the board, she will have a fighting chance to live _in smooth water_! the _titanic_ filled at least five adjoining compartments, and hence,--thanks to these altogether inadequate and obsolete requirements, she is now at the bottom of the atlantic; and, thanks again to the requirements of the board as to lifeboat accommodations, over fifteen hundred of her passengers and crew went down with the ship! [illustration: water is hauled up in the canvas bucket and its temperature taken by thermometer. taking the temperature of the water] chapter ii the ever-present dangers of the sea boswell, that faithful, if over-appreciative chronicler, tells us that dr. johnson once described an ocean voyage as "going to jail with a chance of being drowned." had some one quoted the grim witticism of the doctor in the spacious dining-room of the _titanic_ on the night of april the fourteenth, it would have provoked a smile of derisive incredulity. going to sea in the cramped quarters of the frail sailing packet of johnson's day was one thing; crossing the atlantic at railroad speed in the spacious luxury of a 60,000-ton liner was quite another. yet, five hours later, when the vast bulk of that noble ship was slanting to its final plunge, the pitiless truth was brought home to that awe-stricken crowd that, even to-day, travel by sea involves the "chance of being drowned." the remarkable immunity of the high-speed atlantic liners from such accidents as befell the _titanic_ has been due in part to careful seamanship and in part to an amazing run of good luck. of this there can be no doubt whatever. on a recent occasion the subject was brought up for discussion in the officers' quarters of one of the fastest liners. in answer to the writer's question as to whether the dangers of running at high speed through fog or ice-infested regions were not enormous, one of the officers frankly admitted that, not only were the risks most serious, but the immunity from such disasters as that which befell the _titanic_ was to be explained on the ground of sheer good fortune. "i well remember," said he, "that the first time i found myself in charge of the bridge on a ship that was running through fog at a speed of over 20 knots, i fairly shivered with a sense of the possibilities of disaster that were involved. to-day--well--familiarity, you know----" [illustration: stewards are closing door in fire-protection bulkhead. fire-drill on a german liner] let it not be supposed, from the heading of this chapter, that it is the writer's purpose to draw any lurid picture of the dangers of ocean travel. these are no greater to-day than they were before the _titanic_ went down. icebergs have swept down from the arctic seas from time immemorial, and year by year they will continue to throw the shadow of their awful menace across the lines of steamship travel. fog, with its ever-present dangers of collision, will continue to infest the ocean highways; and always, the half-submerged derelict, a peril scarcely less than that of the iceberg, will continue to sail its uncharted course over the high seas. the strength of the impulse to build unsinkable ships will be exactly in proportion to our realisation of the dangers which beset ocean travel. the toll of human life exacted in the recent disaster will lose its one possible compensation, if it fails to impress deeply the very serious lesson that since the sea is not man's natural element, he can hold his way safely across its surface only at the cost of most careful preparation and eternal vigilance. protracted and amazing immunity from disasters of portentous magnitude has bred in us something of that very contempt for the dangers of the sea above referred to. we have piled deck upon deck until the "floating palace" of the sea towers twice as far above the water-line as it extends below it. so rapidly have we added weight to weight and horsepower to horsepower, that both the mass and the power have been quadrupled. the giant steamship of to-day, as she rushes through the black night and the all-obscuring fog, represents a potential engine of destruction, for which no parallel can be found in the whole field of human activity. do you doubt it? then learn that on that fatal night when the _titanic_ bore headlong into the icefield, she embodied in her onrushing mass an energy equal to that of the combined broadsides of our two most powerful battleships, the _florida_ and the _utah_. which is to say that, if the two dreadnoughts had discharged their twenty twelve-inch guns, at point-blank range, against the iceberg which sank this ship, they would have struck a combined blow of less energy than that delivered by the _titanic_. and every one of these guns, be it remembered, delivers its shell with an energy of 50,000 foot-tons--sufficient to lift either of these battleships nearly two and a half feet into the air. [illustration: hose from bellows supplies fresh air to man with smoke helmet. fire-drill on a german liner] of the serious risk to a ship of collision with an iceberg, it is superfluous to say anything here. the swift sinking of the world's greatest steamship has driven that lesson home, surely, for all time to come. but there are two other forms of accident on the high seas--collision with another ship and the running down of a derelict--whose possibilities of disaster are scarcely less. for if the huge steamships of our day, moving at high speed, are such potential engines of destruction, it follows that the damaging effects of collisions are proportionately increased. if a 60,000-ton ship, such as the _titanic_, while running at high speed, were struck on the beam by a vessel of large size, it is quite conceivable that the outside plating of three of her compartments (not merely the "two adjoining" of standard shipbuilding practice) might be broken in, or the seams and butts started, before the energy of the colliding ship was absorbed and the two vessels swung clear of each other. the average length of the compartments of the _titanic_ was about 53 feet. at 21 knots she would move forward about 35 feet in one second. hence, in a few seconds' time (even allowing for her slowing down due to the drag of the other ship), her enormous energy of over 1,000,000 foot-tons would cause her to grind along past the broken bow, surely more than the 100 feet or so which would suffice to involve three compartments. if three compartments amidships were opened to the sea, it would mean the admission of some 12,000 to 15,000 tons of water. even more insidious is the menace of the abandoned and water-logged ship--the justly dreaded derelict--which, floating low in the water, and without a light to reveal its position, may lie directly in the path of the high-speed ocean liner. so slightly does the derelict project above the surface, that it is almost impossible of detection by night from the lofty position of the lookout on a modern steamship. [illustration: test of fire mains is made every time the ship is in port. fire-drill on a german liner] another risk of the sea, which, because of long immunity from disaster, is in danger of being overlooked or underrated, is that of fire. the structural portions of a ship and its engineand boiler-plant, being of metal, are proof against fire; but the stateroom partitions, the wooden floors and ceilings, the wainscoting, and the hundreds of tons of material used in decoration and general embellishment, to say nothing of the highly inflammable paint-work and varnish, constitute a mass of material, which, in the event of a serious fire, might turn the whole interior of a large passenger ship into one vast cauldron of flame. fortunately, the bulkhead is as effective in confining a fire as it is in localising an inflow of water in the event of collision. therefore, some of the bulkheads of the under-water portion of all passenger ships should be continued (of lighter construction) right through the decks reserved for passenger accommodations, to the topmost deck of the ship. but, perhaps, after all said and done, the greatest perils of high-speed ocean travel are to be found in that spirit of nautical _sangfroid_, or indifference to danger, which, as this disaster has proved, may in time begin to characterise the attitude even of so experienced a navigator as the late captain of the _titanic_. protection against the dangers of the sea may be sought in two directions: first, the enforcement of rules for more careful navigation; second, the embodiment of non-sinkable construction in the ship. the protection afforded by the one is limited by the fallibility of human nature. the protection afforded by the other is exact, absolutely sure, and will last as long as the ship itself. if we would make ocean travel safe we must make the ship, as far as possible, unsinkable. in other words, the naval architect must adopt that principle of construction, common in other lines of mechanical work, which has been aptly designated as "fool-proof." in the building of folly-proof ships, then (the term is here used in a modified sense and with not the least reflection upon that fine body of professional men whose duties lie on the bridge of our ocean liners), is to be found the one sure protection against the perils of the sea. we are well aware that the merchant ship, like the warship, is a compromise, and that the ingenuity of the naval architect is sorely taxed to meet the many demands for speed, coal capacity, freight capacity, and luxurious accommodations for passengers. all this is admitted. but the object of these chapters is to show that in designing the ship, the architect has given too little attention to the elements of safety--that, in the compromise, luxurious accommodations, let us say, have been favoured at the expense of certain protective structural arrangements, which might readily be introduced without any great addition to the cost of the ship, or any serious sacrifice of comfort or speed. under the sobering effect of this calamity, caution and moderation are the watchwords of the hour. steamships are leaving port crowded with lifeboats of every size and shape. steamship routes have been moved far to the south of the accustomed lines of travel. the time occupied in passage is longer, distances are greater, and the coal bill runs into larger figures. but competition is keen, dividends must be earned, and amid all the fret and fever of our modern life, memories, even of stupendous happenings, have but a brief life. steamship routes, under the strong pressure of competition, will tend to edge northward on to the older and shorter sailing lines. immunity from disaster will beget the old _sangfroid_; and with the near approach of the age of motor-driven ships, we may look for an increase in speed such as the old atlantic has never witnessed, even in the years of fiercest contest for the blue ribbon of the seas. let it be so--provided, always provided that, made wise by the lessons of the hour, we write it in our laws and grave it deep in the hearts of our shipbuilders, that the one sure safeguard against the eternal hazards of the sea is the fireproof and unsinkable ship! chapter iii every ship its own lifeboat say what we will, it cannot be denied that the lifeboat is a makeshift. the long white line of boats, conspicuous on each side of the upper deck of a large passenger ship, is, in a certain sense, a confession of failure--an admission on the part of the shipbuilder that, in spite of all that he has done in making travel by sea fast and comfortable, he has not yet succeeded in making it safe. progress in shipbuilding and especially in the construction of fast and luxuriously appointed ships has been simply phenomenal, particularly during the past two decades. there is no art in the whole field of engineering that has made such rapid and astonishing strides; and it is not stretching the point too far to assert that man's mastery of the ocean is the greatest engineering triumph of all time. the fury of the elements, as shown in a heavy storm at sea, has always been regarded as one of the most majestic and terrifying exhibitions of the forces of nature. when the sailing packet was struck by the full fury of a gale, the skipper lay to, thankful if he could survive the racket, without carrying away boats, bulwarks, and deck gear. frequently, with canvas blown out of the bolt ropes, he was obliged to run under bare poles, at the imminent risk of being swamped under the weight of some following sea. for many a decade, even in the era of the steamship, it was necessary, when heading into a heavy sea, to slow down the engines, maintaining only sufficient speed to give steerage way. to-day, so great are the weight and engine power that the giant steamship, if the captain is willing to risk some minor mishaps to her upper works, may be driven resistlessly along the appointed lines of travel regardless of wind and sea. so far as the loss of the ship from heavy weather is concerned, man has obtained complete mastery of the ocean. [illustration: this ship, with 34 compartments below a water-tight steel deck, would serve as its own lifeboat in the event of collision. the 44,000-ton, 25½-knot lusitania] the writer well remembers a trip to the westward on one of the subsidised mail steamers, built to naval requirements, which was made at a time when the ship was striving to accomplish the average speed of 24½ knots for the round trip from england to america, which was necessary before she could claim the government subsidy. in the run to the eastward, the ship had averaged for the whole passage 25 knots; therefore to win the coveted prize, it was necessary, on the return passage to new york, to maintain an average of 24 knots. as it happened, two hours out from queenstown it began to blow hard from the southwest, and for the next four days the wind, veering from southwest to northwest, never fell below the strength of half a gale. on the fourth day out the wind rose to full cyclonic force, and against the most tempestuous weather that the north atlantic can show, the ship was driven for twenty-four hours into what the captain's log-book designated as "enormous head seas." she averaged a speed of 23 knots for the whole four days of heavy weather, and came through the ordeal without starting a single rivet, or showing any signs of undue strain in her roughly-handled hull. the large and powerful passenger steamer of to-day is proof against fatal damage due to wind and sea. true it is that these ships occasionally reach new york after a stormy passage, with porthole glasses broken, windows smashed, and rails and other light fittings carried away; but these are minor damages which in no way affect the integrity of the ship as a whole. if, then, the shipbuilder has made such wonderful strides in the strength of his construction and in the development of engine power, is it not a strange anomaly that he should have so far failed in his attempt to provide against sinking through collision, as to be under the necessity of advertising the fact, by crowding the topmost deck with appliances for saving the lives of the passengers when the ship goes down? but it will be objected that, even if the ship were made so far unsinkable that she might act as her own lifeboat, there would yet remain the risk of her destruction by fire, and that, if a fierce conflagration occurred, the passengers would have to abandon ship and take to the boats. the objection is well made, and if it be possible to introduce structural features which will render ships both fireproof and unsinkable, the thing should be done. it is sincerely to be hoped that one outcome of the present world-wide interest in the subject of safety at sea, will be a searching investigation of the whole question of fire protection. in some of the first-class passenger ships, notably those of the leading german companies, the subject has been given the attention which it merits; but there is no doubt that a large majority of the vessels engaged in the passenger-carrying trade contain no fire protection of a structural nature; that is to say, the spaces reserved for passenger accommodations are not laid out with any view to limiting the ravages of fire. on most of these ships a fire which once obtained strong headway might sweep through the decks devoted to passenger accommodations, without meeting with any fireproof wall to stay its progress. now the most effective protection against a conflagration on board ship is to apply the same method of localisation which is used to such good effect in limiting the inflow of water resulting from collision. the steel bulkhead and the steel deck, acting as fire screens, may be made as effective in limiting the area of a fire as they are in limiting the area of flooding. the passenger decks should be intersected at frequent intervals by steel bulkheads, extending from side to side of the ship and carried up to include the topmost tier of staterooms. where the alleyways intersect the bulkheads, fireproof doors would afford all the necessary means of communication. the provision of many such bulkheads, coupled with the installation of an ample fire-main service and the faithful practice of fire-drills, would render the loss of a ship by fire practically impossible. the pathetic reluctance of her passengers to leave the _titanic_ for the lifeboats was justified, surely, by the seeming security of the one and frailty of the other. perfectly natural was their belief that the mighty ship would survive, at least until the rescuing steamers should reach her vicinity and render the transfer of passengers a safe operation. did not the _republic_ remain afloat for many hours after a collision scarcely less terrible than this, and was not the _titanic_ twice her size and, therefore, good as a lifeboat for many an hour to come? [illustration: provisioning the boats during a boat drill] [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_ loading and lowering boats, stowed athwartships] in considering the excellent service rendered by the lifeboats of the _republic_ and the _titanic_, it should be borne in mind that the weather conditions happened to be very favourable. the launching of lifeboats in rough weather is a difficult and perilous operation. frequently the sinking ship will have a heavy list; if she lists to starboard, the boats on that side can be launched well clear of the ship, but the boats on the port or higher side cannot be so launched. as they are lowered, they will come in contact with the side of the ship and be damaged or capsized. furthermore, should the ship be rolling, the boats are liable to be swung violently against the vessel and their sides may be crushed in or heavily strained, rendering them unseaworthy. had a heavy sea, nay, even a moderate sea, been running at the time of the _titanic_ disaster, how long would her heavily loaded boats have survived in water that was infested with ice floes? their helplessness will be more evident when we remember that they weighed between one and two tons, and that when they were loaded down with sixty-five people, the total weight must have been about six tons. now a craft of six tons' displacement requires considerable handling, and the two or three sailors allotted to each boat, jammed in, as they were, among crowded passengers, would have been powerless in heavy weather to keep the boat from broaching broadside to the sea and capsizing. the demand, then, for unsinkable ships is justified by the fact that the lifeboat is at best but a poor makeshift--that to put several thousand people adrift in mid-ocean is to expose them to the risk of ultimate death by starvation or drowning. [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_ boat deck of titanic, showing, in black, plan for stowing extra boats, to bring total accommodations up to 3,100 persons] however, in view of the fact that ninety-five passenger ships out of every hundred are built with the single skin, low bulkheads, and non-watertight decks, which characterised the _titanic_, it is certain that the cry: "a lifeboat seat for every passenger" is fully justified. the problem of housing the large number that would be required presents no insuperable difficulties, and there are several alternative plans on which the boats might be disposed. on page 45 will be found a proposed arrangement, reproduced by the courtesy of the "scientific american," which shows in white the twenty boats actually carried by the _titanic_, and in black the additional boats which would be necessary to increase the total accommodation to about 3,100 people. this plan would necessitate the sacrifice of some of the deck-house structures. between each pair of smoke-stacks two lines of four boats each are stowed athwartships. the boat chocks are provided with gunmetal wheels, which run in transverse tracks sunk in the deck. along each side of the boat-deck there is a continuous line of boats. [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_ the elaborate installation of telegraphs, telephones, voice-tubes, etc., on the bridge of an ocean liner] another plan would be to take advantage of the full capacity of the welin davit with which the _titanic_ was equipped, which is capable of handling two or even three boats stowed abreast. three lines of boats carried on each side of the long boat-deck of a modern liner would provide ample accommodation for every person on board. but we repeat--and the point cannot be too strongly urged--that however complete the lifeboat accommodation may be, it is at the best a makeshift. the demand that every ship that is launched in the future shall be so far unsinkable as to serve as its own lifeboat in case of serious disaster is perfectly reasonable; for there are certain first-class transatlantic liners in service to-day--notably in certain leading english and german lines--which fulfil this condition. considerations both of humanity and self-interest should lead to the adoption of similar principles of construction by every passenger steamship company. it is possible that the time will come, and it may indeed be very close at hand, when the most attractive page in the illustrated steamship pamphlet will be one containing plans of the ships, in which the safeguards against sinking--such as side bunkers, high bulkheads, and watertight decks--are clearly delineated. chapter iv safety lies in subdivision other things being equal, the protection of a ship against sinking is exactly proportionate to the number of separate watertight compartments into which the interior of her hull is subdivided. if she contains no watertight partitions whatsoever, her sinking, due to damage below the water-line, is a mere matter of time. if the inflow exceeds the capacity of the pumps, water will flow into the ship until all buoyancy is lost. protection against sinking is obtained by dividing the interior of the hull into a number of compartments by means of strong, watertight partitions, or bulkheads. usually, these are placed transversely to the ship, extending from side to side and from the bottom to a height of one or two decks above the water-line. they are built of steel plates, stiffened by vertical i-beams, angle-bars, or other suitable members. the bulkheads are strongly riveted to the bottom, sides, and decks of the ship, and the joints are carefully caulked, so as to secure a perfectly tight connection. in the standard construction for merchant ships, as used in the _titanic_, the bulkheads are placed transversely to the length of the ship, and the number of separate compartments is just one more than the number of bulkheads, ten such bulkheads giving eleven compartments, fifteen, as in the _titanic_, giving sixteen compartments, and so on. in the case of a few high-class merchant steamers, built to meet special requirements as to safety, bulkheads are run lengthwise through the ship. these longitudinal bulkheads, intersecting the transverse bulkheads, greatly increase the factor of safety due to subdivision; for it is evident that one such, running the full length of the ship, would double, two would treble, and three would quadruple the number of separate compartments. [illustration: hydraulically-operated, watertight door in an engine-room bulkhead] the bulkhead subdivision above described is all done in vertical planes. its object is to restrict the water to such compartments as (through collision or grounding) may have been opened to the sea. as the water enters, the ship, because of the loss of buoyancy, will sink until the buoyancy of the undamaged compartments restores equilibrium and the ship assumes a new position, with the water in the damaged compartments at the same level as the sea outside. this position is shown in fig. 2, page 57. it must be carefully noted, however, that this condition can exist only if the bulkheads are carried high enough to prevent the water in the damaged compartments from rising above them and flowing over the tops of the bulkheads into adjoining compartments. in addition to lateral and longitudinal subdivision by means of vertical bulkheads, the hull may be further subdivided by means of horizontal partitions in the form of watertight decks--a system which is universally adopted in the navies of the world. for it is evident that if the ship shown in fig. 2, page 57, were provided with a watertight deck, say at the level of the water-line, as shown in fig. 1, page 57, the water could rise only to the height of that deck, where it would be arrested. the amount of water entering the vessel would be, say, only one-half to two-thirds of that received in the case of the vessel shown in fig. 2. if ships that are damaged below the water-line always settled in the water on an even keel, that is to say without any change of trim, the loss through collisions would be greatly reduced. but for obvious reasons, the damage usually occurs in the forward part of the ship, and the flooding of compartments leads to a change of trim, setting the ship down by the head, as shown in figs. 3 and 4. if the transverse bulkheads are of limited height, and extend only to about 10 feet above the normal water-line, the settling of the bow may soon bring the bulkhead deck (the deck against which the bulkheads terminate) below the water. if, as is too often the case, this deck is not watertight--that is to say, if it is pierced by hatch openings, stair or ladder-ways, ventilator shafts, etc., which are not provided with watertight casings or hatch covers, the water will flow aft along the deck, and find its way through these openings into successive compartments, gradually destroying the reserve buoyancy of the ship until she goes down. the vessels shown in figs. 3 and 4 are similar as to their subdivision, each containing thirteen compartments; but in fig. 3 the bulkheads are shown carried only to the upper deck, say 10 feet above the water, whereas in fig. 4 they extend to the saloon deck, one deck higher, or, say, 19 feet above the same point. now, if both ships received the same injury, involving, say, the three forward compartments, a loss of buoyancy which would bring the tops of bulkheads in fig. 3 below the surface, would leave the bulkheads in fig. 4, which end at a watertight deck, with a safe margin, and any further settling of the ship would be arrested. [illustration: fig. 1 watertight deck at waterline limits inflow of water fig. 2 high bulkheads, without watertight deck would save the ship but permit deep submersion fig. 3 sinking by the head; water flowing along low bulkhead deck and entering compartments through doors or hatchways fig. 4 down by the head, but saved by higher bulkheads and watertight bulkhead deck fig. 5 relative area of flooding from same damage in ships, "a" with double skin; "b" with side bunkers; "c" with a single skin. transverse bulkheads on each ship diagrams showing protective value of transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, watertight decks, and inner skin] ordinarily, it would suffice to carry the first two bulkheads at the bow and the last two at the stern to the shelter deck, terminating the intermediate bulkheads one deck lower. but whatever the deck to which the bulkheads are carried, care should be taken to make it absolutely watertight. otherwise, as already made clear, the so-called watertight subdivision of the ship may, in time of stress, prove to be a delusion and a snare. although the longitudinal bulkhead, which is employed below the water-line, and chiefly in the holds and machinery spaces, is the least used, it is one of the most effective means of subdivision that can be employed. a certain amount of prejudice exists against it, on the ground that it confines the inflowing water to one side of the ship, causing it to list, if not ultimately to capsize. but this objection merely points the moral that all things must be used with discretion. a single longitudinal bulkhead, built through the exact centre of a ship, would invite a speedy capsize in the event of extensive injury below the water-line. the loss of the british battleship _victoria_ emphasised that truth many years ago. but longitudinal bulkheads, carried through the engine and boiler spaces, at the sides of the ship, are a most effective protection. not only is each of the large compartments in the wider central body of the ship divided into three, but along each side is provided a row of comparatively small compartments, several of which could be flooded without causing a serious loss of buoyancy. these bulkheads, built some 15 to 18 feet in from the side of the ship, not only form an inner skin for the ship, but they serve as the inner wall of the coal bunkers. they extend from the inner bottom to the under side of the lower deck, to both of which they are securely riveted, the joints being carefully caulked, to render them watertight. the space between the ship's side and the bulkhead is subdivided by transverse watertight partitions (see plan of _mauretania_, fig. 3, page 129), placed centrally between the main transverse bulkheads of the ship. a further and most effective means for protecting the buoyancy is to construct the ship with a double skin up to and preferably a few feet above the water-line. the inner skin should extend from the first bulkhead abaft the engine-room to the first or collision bulkhead, forward. this construction merely involves carrying the inner floor plating of the double bottom up the sides of the ship to the under side of the lower deck. as all merchant ships are built with a double bottom (see page 107), the cost of thus providing a double skin below the water-line is small in proportion to the security against flooding which it affords. the description of the _titanic_, published at the time of her launch, stated that any two of her adjoining compartments could be flooded without endangering the safety of the ship, and the question must frequently have occurred to the lay mind as to why the ability of the ship to sustain flooding of her interior was confined to two, and not extended to include three or even more compartments. the ability to stand the flooding of two compartments only is not peculiar to the _titanic_. it represents the standard practice which is followed in all passenger ships, the spacing and height of whose bulkheads is determined in accordance with certain stipulations of the british board of trade. these stipulations, as given by prof. j. h. biles of glasgow university, in his book "design and construction of ships," are as follows: "a vessel is considered to be safe, even in the event of serious damage, if she is able to keep afloat with two adjoining compartments in free communication with the sea. the vessel must therefore have efficient transverse watertight bulkheads so spaced that when any two adjoining compartments are open to the sea, the uppermost deck to which all the bulkheads extend is not brought nearer to the surface of the water than a certain prescribed margin. "the watertight deck referred to is called the bulkhead deck. the line past which the vessel may not sink is called the margin of safety line. "the margin of safety line, as defined in the above report, is a line drawn round the side at a distance amidships of three-one-hundredths of the depth at side at that place below the bulkhead deck, and gradually approaching it toward the aft end, where it may be three-two-hundredths of the same depth below it." by referring to the diagrams on page 66 showing the disposition of bulkheads on certain notable ships, it will be seen that, in the case of the _titanic_, the application of the board of trade rule called for the extension of the bulkheads amidships only to the upper deck, which, at the loaded draft of 34 feet, was only 10 feet above the water-line! compare this with the safe construction adopted by brunel and scott russell over fifty-four years ago, who, in constructing the _great eastern_, extended all the bulkheads (see page 83) to the topmost deck, fully 30 feet above the water-line. [illustration: closing, from the bridge, all watertight doors throughout the ship by pulling a lever] before leaving the question of bulkheads, the writer would enter a strong protest against the present practice of placing watertight doors in the main bulkheads below the water-line. they are put there generally for the convenience of the engineand boiler-room forces, whose duties render it necessary for them to pass from compartment to compartment. as at present constructed, these doors are of the sliding type, and they can be closed simultaneously from the bridge, or separately, by hand. the safer plan is to permit no bulkhead doors below the water-line, and provide in their place elevators or ladders, enclosed in watertight trunks. access from compartment to compartment must then be had by way of the bulkhead deck. the advantage of lofty bulkheads was admirably illustrated in the case of the _city of paris_ and the _city of new york_, designed by mr. biles in 1888. although these were small ships compared with the _titanic_, their fourteen bulkheads were carried one deck higher. biles laid down the rule that no doors were to be cut through the bulkheads, and in spite of strenuous objections on the grounds of passenger accommodation and general convenience in the operation of the ship, he carried his point. [illustration: courtesy of engineering olympic and titanic 1912 lusitania 1906 great eastern 1858 campania 1893 paris 1868 a comparison of bulkhead protection in some notable ships] the wisdom of this construction was demonstrated years later, when, as a result of an accident to her engines, the two largest adjoining compartments of the _city of paris_ were flooded, at a time when the ship was 150 miles off the coast of ireland. there was no wireless in those days to send out its call for help, and for three days the ship drifted in a helpless condition. thanks to her lofty bulkheads, the good ship stood the ordeal and was finally brought into port without the loss of a single passenger. bulkhead spacing on notable ships ====================================================================== |date of |registered| no. of | average | per name |building| length, |main w. t.| length of |cent. of | | feet [1] |bulkheads |compartments| length -----------------+--------+----------+----------+------------+------- titanic | 1911 | 852.5 | 15 | 53 | 6.2 lusitania | 1907 | 762.0 | 16 | 45 | 5.9 george washington| 1908 | 699.0 | 13 | 50 | 7.1 great eastern | 1854-59| 680.0 | 9 | 68 | 10.0 carmania | 1905 | 650.0 | 15 | 50 | 7.8 campania | 1893 | 601.0 | 8 | 67 | 11.1 new york | 1888 | 517.0 | 14 | 37 | 6.7 alma | 1894 | 270.7 | 11 | 23 | 8.3 -----------------+--------+----------+----------+------------+------- [1] figures in this column represent the length between perpendiculars. an interesting study of bulkhead practice in some notable ships is afforded by the table and diagrams which are herewith reproduced by the courtesy of "engineering." in the matter of height of bulkheads above the water-line, the _great eastern_ stands first, followed by the _paris_, the _lusitania_, the _campania_, and the _titanic_. chapter v the unsinkable _great eastern_ of 1858 the term "unsinkable," as applied to ships, is used throughout the present work in an accommodated sense. there never was but one unsinkable craft, and for that we must go back to the age of primitive man, who doubtless paddled himself across the rivers and lakes upon a roughly fashioned log of wood. in the modern sense, an unsinkable ship is one which cannot be sunk by any of the ordinary accidents of the open sea, such as those due to stress of weather, or to collision with icebergs, derelicts, or some other ship. can such a ship be built? not only is it feasible to construct vessels of this type to-day; but, as far back as the year 1858, there was launched a magnificent ship, the _great eastern_, in which the provisions against foundering were so admirably worked out that probably she would have survived even the terrific collision which proved the undoing of the _titanic_. the _great eastern_ represented the joint labours of the two most distinguished engineers of the middle period of the nineteenth century, i. k. brunel and john scott russell. the former was responsible for the original idea of the ship, and it was he who suggested that it should be built upon the principles adopted in the rectangular, tubular bridge that had recently been built across the menai straits. to scott russell, as naval architect, were due the lines and dimensions of the ship and the elaborate system of transverse and longitudinal bulkheads. those were the days when the engineer was supreme. he worked with a free hand; and these two men set out to build a ship which should be not only the largest and strongest, but also the safest and most unsinkable vessel afloat. how they succeeded is shown by the fact, that on one of her voyages to new york, the _great eastern_ ran over some submerged rocks off montauk point, long island, and tore two great rents in her outer skin, whose aggregate area was equivalent to a rupture 10 feet wide and 80 feet long. in spite of this damage, which was probably greater in total area than that suffered by the _titanic_, the ship came safely to new york under her own steam. [illustration: courtesy of holmes' "ancient and modern ships" great eastern, 1858; the most completely protected passenger ship ever built] there can be no doubt that in undertaking to build a ship of the then unprecedented length of 692 feet, the designers were as much concerned with the question of her strength as with that of her ability to keep afloat in case of under-water damage. but it so happens that the very forms of construction which conduce to strength are favourable also to flotation--a fact which renders all the more reasonable the demand that, in all future passenger-carrying steamships, a return shall be made to the non-sinkable construction of this remarkable ship of over fifty years ago. let it not be supposed, however, that brunel and russell were insensible to the risks of foundering through under-water damage, or that the fully protected buoyancy of this vessel was accidental rather than the result of careful planning. for in the technical descriptions of the ship, it is stated that the inner skin was carried forward right up to the bow, as a protection against "collision with an iceberg," and it is further stated that the combination of longitudinal and transverse bulkheads afforded such complete subdivision, that "several compartments might be opened to the sea without endangering the ship." so remarkable in every respect was the _great eastern_, so admirable a model is she of safe construction, even for the naval architect of to-day, that a somewhat extended description of the construction of the vessel will doubtless be welcome. it was at the close of the year 1851 that brunel made a study of the problem of building a vessel of sufficient size to carry enough coal to make a round voyage to australia and back, and at the same time afford comfortable accommodations for an unusually large number of passengers and carry a large amount of freight. with the thoroughness and frank open-mindedness which distinguished the man, he sought for information and advice from every promising quarter. sir william white is of the opinion that all the leading features of the design, such as the structure, the arrangement of the propelling machinery, and the determination of dimensions, originated with brunel, who said at the time: "i never embarked on any one thing to which i have so entirely devoted myself and to which i have devoted so much time, thought, and labour; on the success of which i have staked so much reputation, and to which i have so largely committed myself and those who were supposed to place faith in me." sir william states that, after going carefully through brunel's notes and reports, his admiration for the remarkable grasp and foresight therein displayed has been greatly increased. "in regard to the provision of ample structural strength with a minimum of weight, the increase of safety by watertight subdivision and cellular double-bottom, the design of propelling machinery and boilers, with a view to economy of coal and great endurance for long-distance steaming; the selection of forms and dimensions likely to minimise resistance and favour good behaviour at sea, brunel displayed a knowledge of principles such as no other ship designer of that time seems to have possessed." the value of this tribute will be understood when it is borne in mind that sir william white is the most widely known architect of the day. the principal dimensions of the _great eastern_ were as follows: particulars of the _great eastern_ length between perpendiculars 680 feet length on upper deck 692 " extreme breadth of hull 83 " width over paddle-boxes 120 " depth from upper deck to keel 58 " draught of water (laden) 28 " weight of iron used in construction 10,000 tons the ship was propelled by two separate engines, driving respectively paddle-wheels and a single propeller. the engines for the paddle-wheels were of the oscillating type. the cylinders were four in number, 74 inches in diameter, by 14-feet stroke, and each one in the finished condition weighed 28 tons. the paddle-wheels were 56 feet in diameter. steam for these engines was supplied by four, double-ended, tubular boilers, each 17 feet 9 inches long, 17 feet 6 inches wide, and 13 feet 9 inches high, and weighing, with water, 95 tons. each boiler contained 10 furnaces. the screw engines, which were placed in the aftermost compartment of the machinery spaces, were of the horizontal, opposed type; there were four cylinders, 84 inches in diameter, by 4-feet stroke, and each one, in the finished condition, weighed 39 tons. the propeller shafting, 150 feet in length, weighed 60 tons. the four-bladed propeller was 24 feet in diameter. steam was supplied to these engines by six tubular boilers of about the same dimensions as those for the paddle-wheel engines. the working pressure was 25 pounds per square inch. [illustration: length, 692 feet; beam, 83 feet; depth, 58 feet. subdivision: double hull; nine main bulkheads, 53 feet high, extending to upper deck, and six sub-bulkheads 35 feet high, extending to lower deck. two longitudinal bulkheads through machinery spaces. longitudinal section and plan of the great eastern, 1858] the estimated speed of the _great eastern_ was 15 knots; her best actual performance on an extended voyage was an average speed of 14 knots, which was realised on one of her trips to new york. she was designed to carry 4,000 passengers, namely 800 first, 2,000 second, and 1,200 third class, besides a crew of 400. she had a capacity of 5,000 tons of cargo, and 12,000 tons of coal. when fitted up for the accommodation of troops she could carry 10,000. fully laden with passengers, cargo, and coal, she displaced, on a draft of 30 feet, about 27,000 tons;--her actual draft was from 26 to 28 feet. the accommodations for passengers would have done credit to one of our modern liners. there were five saloons on the upper, and another five on the lower deck. the uppermost deck afforded two unbroken and spacious promenades, one on each side of the ship, each of which was 20 feet wide and over 600 feet in length. because of the great length of the ship it was decided to launch her sideways,--a disastrous experiment which cost the company dear. the launching ways yielded under the great weight, the ship jammed on the ways, and she had to be laboriously forced into the river thames, inch by inch, by the aid of powerful hydraulic jacks. the great cost of the launching, which occupied two and a half months' time, caused the failure of the original company, and the ship was sold for $900,000 to a new company, who completed her in 1859. she made several voyages to america; and although in this service she was unprofitable, the great ship proved that she was staunch, eminently seaworthy, and fast for a passenger ship of that period. although the _great eastern_ was never employed on the australian service, for which she was designed, she was usefully employed in 1865 in laying two of the atlantic telegraph cables, and, subsequently, in similar service in other parts of the world--a work for which her great strength and size rendered her peculiarly adapted. after serving an inglorious career in the hands of the showman, the _great eastern_ was sold for the value of her metal and was broken up in the autumn of 1888. the financial failure of this ship was not due to any excessive first cost, resulting from the very thorough character of her construction, but rather to certain economic conditions of her time. traffic across the atlantic, both freight and passenger, was as yet in its infancy; and even if full cargoes had been available, the loading facilities of those days were so inadequate, that the ship would have been delayed in port for an unconscionable length of time. furthermore, fuel consumption, in that early stage of development of the steam engine, was excessive, the coal consumed per horsepower per hour being about three and one-half to four pounds, as compared with a modern consumption of from one and a quarter to one and a half pounds per horsepower. a careful study of the construction of this remarkable vessel establishes the fact that over fifty years ago brunel and scott russell produced in the _great eastern_ a ship which stands as a model for all time. realising, in the first place, how vulnerable is an iron vessel which carries only a single skin, they decided to provide a double skin and construct the ship with two separate hulls, placed one within the other and firmly tied together by a system of continuous longitudinal and lateral web-plates or frames. by reference to the cross-section, published on page 83, it will be seen that the double-skin construction extended entirely around the hull, and was carried up to a continuous plate-iron lower deck, which was from 8 to 10 feet above the water-line, the distance varying with the draft of the ship. the two skins were placed 2 feet 10 inches apart and they were tied together by 34 longitudinal web-members, which ran the entire length of the double hull, and divided the space between the two skins into separate watertight compartments. these were themselves further subdivided by a series of transverse webs which intersected the longitudinal webs. the cellular construction thus provided extended from the aftermost bulkhead right through to the bow, to which it was carried for the purpose of protecting the forward part of the ship against the effect of collision with icebergs, which at that early day were recognised as constituting a serious menace to navigation. the inner skin was not continued aft of the aftermost bulkhead, for the reason that at the stern it would have been unnecessary and somewhat inconvenient. [illustration: titanic built 1912 mauretania built 1906 great eastern built 1858 two extremes in protection, and a compromise] the double hull was closed in by a watertight iron deck (the lower deck), which served to entirely separate the boilerand engine-rooms and the holds from the passenger quarters. above the lower deck the hull was built with a single skin, which terminated at a flush, continuous, cellular steel deck, corresponding to the shelter deck of modern steamships, which extended unbroken from stem to stern. this deck was an unusually rigid structure. its upper and lower surfaces were each one inch in thickness, and each consisted of two layers of half-inch plating riveted together. the double deck thus formed was two feet in depth, and the intervening space was intersected by longitudinal girders, the whole construction forming an unusually stiff and strong watertight deck, which was admirably suited to meet the heavy tensional and compressive stresses, to which a ship of the length of the _great eastern_ is subjected when driving through head seas. the watertight subdivision of the _great eastern_ was more complete than that of any ship that was ever constructed for the merchant service, more thorough even than that of recent passenger ships which have been designed for use as auxiliary cruisers in time of war. in addition to the great protection afforded by her double hull, she was subdivided by nine transverse bulkheads, which extended from the bottom clear through to the upper deck, or to a height of 30 feet above the water-line. compare this with the practice followed in the _titanic_ and in all but a very few of the merchant ships of the present day, whose bulkheads are carried up only from one-third to one-half of that height, and too often terminate at a deck which is not, in the proper sense of the term, watertight. in addition to these main bulkheads, the _great eastern_ contained six additional transverse bulkheads, which extended to the iron lower deck. five of these were contained in the machinery spaces and one was placed aft of the aftermost main bulkhead. the submerged portion of the hull, or rather all that portion of it lying below the lower deck, was thus divided by 15 transverse bulkheads into 16 separate watertight compartments. [illustration: from an old photograph, taken in 1860 great eastern, lying at foot of canal street, north river, new york] not content with this, however, brunel ran throughout the whole of the machinery and engine spaces two longitudinal bulkheads, which extended from the bottom of the ship to the top deck. a further subdivision consisted of a curved steel roof which separated the boiler-rooms from the coal-bunkers above them. altogether the hull of the _great eastern_ was divided up into between 40 and 50 separate watertight compartments. an excellent structural feature, from which later practice has made a wide departure, was the fact that no doors were cut through the bulkheads below the lower deck. such was the _great eastern_, a marvel in her time and an object lesson, even to-day, in safe and unsinkable construction. that her valuable qualities were not obtained at the cost of extravagance in the use of material is one of the most meritorious features of her design and construction. on this point we cannot do better than quote from the address of sir william white, delivered when he was president of the institution of civil engineers: "i have most thoroughly investigated the question of the weight absorbed in the structure of the _great eastern_, and my conclusion is that it is considerably less than that of steel-built ships of approximately the same dimensions and of the most recent construction. of course these vessels are much faster, have more powerful engines, and have superstructures for passenger accommodation towering above the upper deck. these and other features involve additional weight; and the _great eastern_ has the advantage of being deeper in relation to her length than the modern ships. after making full allowance for these differences, my conclusion is that the _great eastern_ was a relatively lighter structure, although at the time she was built only iron plates of very moderate size were available." chapter vi the sinkable _titanic_ in all the long record of disasters involving the loss of human life there is none which appeals so strongly to the imagination as those which have occurred upon the high seas, and among these the loss of the _titanic_ stands out preëminent as the most stupendous and heartrending tragedy of them all. the ship itself was not only the latest and largest of those magnificent ocean liners which, because of their size and speed and luxurious appointments, have taken such a strong hold upon the public imagination, but it was popularly believed that because of her huge proportions, and the special precautions which had been taken to render her unsinkable, the _titanic_ was so far proof against the ordinary accidents of the sea as to survive the severest disaster and bring her passengers safely into port. the belief that the _titanic_ stood for the "last word" in naval architecture certainly seemed to be justified by the facts. she was not a contract-built ship in the commonly accepted sense of that term. on the contrary, she was built under a system which conduces to high-class workmanship and eliminates the temptations to cheap work, which must always exist when a contract is secured in the face of keen competition. the famous white star company have pointed with pride to the fact that the excellence of their ships was due largely to the fact that they had been built in the same shipbuilding yard and under an arrangement which encouraged the builders to embody in the ships the most careful design and workmanship. under this arrangement, messrs. harland & wolff, of belfast, build the white star vessels without entering into any hard and fast agreement as to the price: the only stipulation of this character being that, when the ship is accepted, they shall be paid for the cost of the ship, plus a certain profit, which is commonly believed to be ten per cent. [illustration: great eastern 1858 four watertight compartments titanic 1912 one watertight compartment _titanic_ shows omission of inner skin, longitudinal bulkheads, and watertight decks. transverse bulkheads are lower by 20 feet. fifty years' decline in safety construction] of the strength of the _titanic_ and the general high character of her construction there can be no doubt whatever. not only was she built to the requirements of the board of trade and the insurance companies, but, as we have noted, she was constructed by the leading shipbuilding company of the world, under conditions which would inspire them to put into the world's greatest steamship the very best that the long experience and ample facilities of the yard could produce. the principal dimensions of the _titanic_, as furnished by her owners, were as follows: particulars of the _titanic_ ft. ins. length over all 882 9 length between perpendiculars 850 0 breadth extreme 92 6 depth moulded to shelter deck 64 3 depth moulded to bridge deck 73 3 total height from keel to navigating bridge 104 0 load draft 34 6 gross tonnage 45,000 displacement in tons 60,000 indicated horsepower of reciprocating engines 38,000 shaft horsepower of turbine engine 22,000 in this connection the following table, giving the dimensions of the most notable steamships, from the _great eastern_ of 1858 to the _imperator_ of 1913, will be of interest. how rapidly the weight (displacement) increases with the length of these large ships, is shown by the fact that, although in length the _titanic_ is only about 27 per cent. greater than the _great eastern_, in displacement she exceeds her by considerably over 100 per cent. particulars of noted transatlantic liners ==============+======+========+======+=======+========+========+====== | |length | | | | | name | date |between | beam | plated| dis | horse| speed | |perpen| | depth | place| power | | |diculars| | | ment | | --------------+------+--------+------+-------+--------+--------+----- | | feet |feet |feet | tons | | knots | | | ins.| ins.| | | --------------+------+--------+------+-------+--------+--------+----- great eastern | 1858 | 680 | 83.0 | 58.0 | 27,000 | 7,650 | 14.0 city of paris | 1888 | 528 | 63.0 | 41.9 | 13,000 | 20,700 | 21.8 teutonic | 1890 | 565 | 57.6 | 42.2 | 12,000 | 19,500 | 21.0 campania | 1893 | 600 | 65.0 | 41.6 | 18,000 | 30,000 | 22.01 st. paul | 1895 | 536 | 63.0 | 42.0 | 16,000 | 18,000 | 21.08 k. wilhelm | | | | | | | der grosse | 1897 | 625 | 66.0 | 43.0 | 20,890 | 30,000 | 22.5 oceanic | 1899 | 685 | 68.5 | 49.0 | 28,500 | 27,000 | 20.7 deutschland | 1900 | 663 | 67.0 | 44.0 | 23,600 | 36,000 | 23.5 kaiser | | | | | | | wilhelm ii | 1903 | 678 | 72.0 | 52.6 | 26,000 | 38,000 | 23.5 adriatic | 1907 | 709 | 75.6 | 56.9 | 40,800 | 16,000 | 17.0 mauretania | 1907 | 760 | 88.0 | 60.6 | 44,640 | 70,000 | 26.01 la france | 1912 | 685 | 75.5 | 52.10 | 27,000 | 45,000 | 23.5 titanic | 1912 | 850 | 92.6 | 64.3 | 60,000 | 60,000 | 22.5 imperator | 1913 | 880 | 96.0 | 62.0 | 65,000 | 70,000 | 23.0 --------------+------+--------+------+-------+--------+--------+-----the general structure of the _titanic_ is shown by the midship section, page 83, and the side elevation, page 129. for about 550 feet amidships she contained 8 steel decks, the boat deck, promenade deck, bridge deck, shelter deck, saloon deck, upper deck, middle deck, and lower deck. the highest steel deck that extended continuously throughout the full length of the ship was the shelter deck. for 550 feet amidships the sideplating of the ship was carried up one deck higher to the bridge deck. the moulded or plated depth of the ship to the shelter deck was 64 feet 3 inches and to the bridge deck 73 feet 3 inches. this great depth of over 73 feet, in conjunction with specially heavy steel decks on the bridge and shelter decks, and the doubling of the plating at the bilges, (where the bottom rounds up into the side,) conjoined with the deep and heavy double bottom, served to give the _titanic_ the necessary strength to resist the bending stresses to which her long hull was subjected, when steaming across the heavy seas of the atlantic. the doubling of the plating on the bridge and shelter decks served the same purpose as the cellular steel construction which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was adopted for the upper deck of the _great eastern_. [illustration: courtesy of the _scientific american_ olympic, sister to titanic, reaching new york on maiden voyage] the dimensions of the frames and plating of the hull were determined by the builder's long experience in the construction of large vessels. the cellular double bottom, which extended the full width of the ship, was of unusual depth and strength. throughout the ship, its depth was 5 feet 3 inches; but in the reciprocating engine-room, it was increased to 6 feet 3 inches. the keel consisted of a single thickness of plating, 1½ inches thick, and a heavy, flat bar, 3 inches in thickness and 19½ inches wide. generally speaking, the shell plates were 6 feet wide, 30 feet long, and 2½ to 3 tons in weight. the largest of these plates was 36 feet long and weighed 4¼ tons. amidships, the framing, which consisted of channel sections 10 inches in depth, was spaced 3 feet apart. throughout the boiler-room spaces, additional frames, 2½ feet deep, were fitted 9 feet apart, and in the engineand turbine-rooms, similar deep frames were fitted on every second frame, 6 feet apart. these heavy web-frames extended up to the middle deck, a few feet above the water-line, and added greatly to the strength and stiffness of the hull. had the inside plating of the double bottom been carried up the sides and riveted on the inner flanges of these frames, as shown in the sketch on page 107, it would have served the purpose of an inner skin; and when the outer skin of her forward boiler-rooms was ruptured by the iceberg, it would have served to prevent the inflow of water to these two large compartments. mr. ismay, the president of the international mercantile marine company, in his testimony at the senate investigation, stated that among the improvements, which would be made in the _gigantic_, now under construction for the company, would be the addition of an inner skin. doubtless he had in mind the construction above suggested. the 10-inch channel frames extended from the double bottom to the bridge deck, and some of these bars were 66 feet in length and weighed nearly 1 ton apiece. the frames were tied together along the full length of each deck by the deck beams of channel section, which, throughout the middle portion of the ship, were 10 inches deep and weighed as high as 1¼ tons apiece. the transverse stiffness of the framing was assured by stout bracket knees, riveted to the frames and deck beams at each point of connection, and by the 15 watertight bulkheads, which were riveted strongly to the bottom and sides of the ship, and also by 11 non-watertight bulkheads, which formed the inner walls of the coal bunkers on each side of the main bulkheads. the bridge, shelter, saloon, and upper decks were supported and stiffened by four lines of heavy longitudinal girders, worked in between the beams, which were themselves carried by solid round pillars placed at every third deck beam. in the boiler-rooms, below the middle deck, the load of the superincumbent decks was carried down to the double bottom by means of heavy round pillars. such was the construction of the _titanic_; and it will be agreed that, so far as the strength and integrity of the hull were concerned, it was admirably adapted to meet the heavy stresses which are involved in driving so great and heavy a ship through the tempestuous weather of the north atlantic. the first sight of such a gigantic vessel as the _titanic_ produces an impression of solidity and invulnerability, which is not altogether justified by the facts. for, to tell the truth, the modern steamship is a curious compound of strength and fragility. her strength, as must be evident from the foregoing description of the framing of the _titanic_, is enormous, and ample for safety. her fragility and vulnerability lie in the fact that her framework is overlaid with a relatively thin skin of plating, an inch or so in thickness, which, while amply strong to resist the inward pressure of the water, the impact of the seas, and the tensile and compressive stresses due to the motion of the ship in a seaway, etc., is readily fractured by the blow of a collision. [illustration: the framing and some of the deck beams of the imperator, as seen from inside the bow, before the outside plating was rivetted on] in a previous chapter it was shown that when the _titanic_ is being driven at a speed of 21 knots, she represents an energy of over 1,000,000 foot-tons. if this enormous energy is arrested, or sought to be arrested, by some rigid obstruction, whether another ship, a rock, or an iceberg, the delicate outside skin will be torn like a sheet of paper. it was shown in chapter iv that protection against flooding of a ship through damage below the water-line is obtained by subdividing the hull into separate watertight compartments, and that, roughly speaking, the degree of protection is proportionate to the extent to which this subdivision is carried. applying this to the _titanic_, we find that she was divided by 15 transverse bulkheads into 16 separate compartments. but, in this connection it must be noted that these bulkheads did not extend through the whole height of the ship to the shelter deck, as they did in the case of the _great eastern_, and therefore it cannot be said that the whole of the interior space of the hull received the benefit of subdivision. as a matter of fact, only about two-thirds of the total cubical space contained below the shelter deck was protected by subdivision. water, finding its way into the ship above the level of the decks to which the bulkheads were carried, was free to flow the whole length of her from stem to stern. furthermore, the value of the subdivision below the bulkhead deck depends largely upon the degree to which this deck is made watertight. if the deck is pierced by hatchways, stairways, and other openings, which are not provided with watertight casings and hatch covers, the integrity of the deck is destroyed, and the bulkhead subdivision below loses its value. it was largely this most serious defect--the existence of many unprotected openings in the bulkhead deck of the _titanic_--that caused her to go down so soon after the collision. [illustration: this drawing shows how the plating of the inner bottom of such a ship as the titanic may be carried up the side frames to form an inner skin] referring now to the side elevation of the titanic on page 129, it will be noted that the only bulkhead which was carried up to the shelter deck was the first, or collision bulkhead. the second bulkhead extended to the saloon deck, and on the after side of this and immediately against it was a spiral stairway for the accommodation of the crew, which led from their quarters down to the floor of the ship. here the stairway terminated in a fireman's passage, which led aft through the third and fourth bulkheads, and gave access through a watertight door to the foremost boiler-room. the seven bulkheads, from no. 3 to no. 9, extended only to the upper deck, which, at load draft, was only about 10 feet above the water-line. bulkhead no. 10 was carried up one deck higher to the saloon deck, as were also bulkheads 11, 12, 13, and 14. bulkhead no. 15 terminated at the upper deck. now, it will be asked: what was the factor in the calculations which determined the height of these bulkheads? the answer is to be found in the board of trade stipulations, to which reference was made in chapter iv, page 62. these stipulations establish an imaginary safety line, below which a ship may not sink without danger of foundering. the safety line represents the depth to which a ship will sink when any two adjoining compartments are opened to the sea and therefore flooded. if the two forward compartments are flooded, for instance, the bow may sink with safety, until the water is only three one-hundredths of the depth of the ship, at the side, from the bulkhead deck. if two central compartments are flooded, the ship is supposed to settle with safety until the bulkhead deck at that point is only three one-hundredths of the depth of the side, at that place, above the water. the raising of the height of the bulkheads, by one deck, at the engine-room, is due to the operation of this rule; for here the two adjoining compartments, those containing the reciprocating engines and the turbine, are the largest in the ship, and their flooding would sink the ship proportionately lower in the water. now it takes but a glance at the diagrams on page 66 to show that the application of the board of trade rule brought the bulkhead line of the _titanic_ down to a lower level than that of any of the other notable ships shown in comparison with her. it was the low bulkheads, acting in connection with the non-watertight construction of the bulkhead deck, that was largely answerable for the loss of this otherwise very fine ship. [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_ twenty of the twenty-nine boilers of the titanic assembled, ready for placing in the ship] another grave defect in the _titanic_ was the great size of the individual compartments, coupled with the fact that the only protection against their being flooded was the one-inch plating of the outside skin. if this plating were ruptured or the rivets started along the seams, there was nothing to prevent the flooding of the whole compartment and the entry, at least throughout the middle portion of the ship, of from 4,000 to 6,000 tons of water--this last being the approximate capacity of the huge compartment which contained the two reciprocating engines. now, if safety lies in minute subdivision, it is evident that in this ship safety was sacrificed to some other considerations. the motive for the plan adopted was the desire to place the coal-bunkers in the most convenient position with regard to the boilers. by reference to the hold plan of the _titanic_, page 129, it will be seen that her 29 boilers were arranged transversely to the ship. with the exception of the five in the aftermost compartment, they were "double-ended," with the furnaces facing fore and aft. to facilitate shovelling the coal into the furnaces, the coal-bunkers were placed one on each side of each transverse watertight bulkhead. the coal supply was thus placed immediately back of the firemen, and the work of getting the coal from the bunkers to the furnaces was greatly facilitated. now, while this was an admirable arrangement for convenience of firing, it was the worst possible plan as far as the safety of the _titanic_ was concerned; since any damage to the hull admitted water across the whole width of the ship. the alternative plan, which should be made compulsory on all large ocean-going passenger steamers, is the one adopted for the _mauretania_, _kaiser wilhelm ii_, _imperator_, and a few other first-class ships, in which the coal-bunkers are placed at the sides of the ship, where they serve to prevent the flooding of the main boiler-room compartments. it is probable that any one of the ships named would have survived even the terrific collision which sank the _titanic_. the objection has been raised against longitudinal coal-bunkers, that they are not so conveniently placed for the firemen. a large force of "coal passers" has to be employed in wheeling the coal from the bunkers to the front of the furnaces. this, of course, entails an increased expense of operation. the use of transverse coal-bunkers must be regarded as one among many instances, in which the safety of passenger ships is sacrificed to considerations of economy and convenience of operation. chapter vii how the great ship went down the _titanic_, fresh from the builder's hands, sailed from southampton, wednesday, april 10, 1912. she reached cherbourg on the afternoon of the same day, and queenstown, ireland, at noon on thursday. after embarking the mails and passengers, she left for new york, having on board 1,324 passengers and a ship's complement of officers and crew of 899 persons. the passenger list showed that there were 329 first-class, 285 second-class, and 710 third-class passengers. the weather throughout the voyage was clear and the sea calm. at noon on the third day out, a wireless message was received from the _baltic_, dated sunday, april 14, which read: "greek steamship _athinai_ reports passing icebergs and large quantity of field ice to-day in latitude 41.51 north, longitude 49.52 west." at about 7 p.m. a second warning was received by the _titanic_, this time from the _californian_, which reported ice about 19 miles to the northward of the track on which the _titanic_ was steaming. the message read: "latitude 42.3 north, longitude 49.9 west. three large bergs five miles to southward of us." later there was a third message: "_amerika_ passed two large icebergs in 41.27 north, 50.8 west on the 14th of april." a fourth message, sent by the _californian_, reached the ship about an hour before the accident occurred, or about 10.40 o'clock, which said: "we are stopped and surrounded by ice." [illustration: copyright by underwood & underwood, n. y. the last photograph of the titanic, taken as she was leaving southampton on her maiden voyage] these wireless warnings prove that the captain of the _titanic_ knew there was ice to the north, to the south, and immediately ahead of the southerly steamship route on which he was steaming. the evidence shows that captain smith remarked to the officer doing duty on the bridge, "if it is in a slight degree hazy we shall have to go very slowly." the officer of the watch instructed the lookouts to "keep a sharp lookout for ice." the night was starlit and the weather exceptionally clear. after leaving queenstown the speed of the _titanic_ had been gradually increased. the run for the first day was 464 miles, for the second 519 miles, and for the third day, ending at noon sunday, it was 546 miles. testimony given before the court of inquiry under lord mersey, showed that the chief engineer had arranged to drive the vessel at full speed for a few hours either on monday or tuesday. twenty-one of the twenty-nine boilers were in use until sunday night, when three more were "lighted." it is evident that the engines were being gradually speeded up to their maximum revolutions. both on the bridge and in the engine-room there was a manifest reluctance to allow anything to interfere with the full-speed run of the following day. this is the only possible explanation of the amazing fact that, in spite of successive warnings that a large icefield with bergs of great size was drifting right across the course of the _titanic_, fire was put under additional boilers and the speed of the ship increased. it was shown in a previous chapter on "the dangers of the sea," that one of the greatest risks of high-speed travel across the north atlantic is a certain spirit of _sangfroid_ which is liable to be begotten of constant familiarity with danger and a continual run of good luck. if familiarity ever bred contempt, surely it must have done so among the captain and officers of the _titanic_ on that fatal night. one looks in vain for evidence that the situation was regarded as highly critical and calling for the most careful navigation;--calling, surely, for something more than the mere keeping of a good lookout--an imperative duty at all times, whether by day or night. yet the fate of that ship and her precious freight of human life hung upon the mere chance of sighting an obstruction in time to avoid collision by a quick turn of the helm. the question of hitting or missing was one not of minutes but of seconds. a ship like this, nigh upon a thousand feet in length, makes a wide sweep in turning, even with the helm hard over. at 21 knots the _titanic_ covered over a third of a mile in a minute's time. even with her engines reversed she would have surged ahead for a half mile or so before coming to a stop. should she strike an obstruction at full speed, the blow delivered would equal that of the combined broadsides of two modern dreadnoughts. [illustration: photograph by underwood & underwood, n. y. the elimination of swimming pools, squash courts and summer gardens would cover the cost of additional bulkheads and inner skins. swimming pool on the titanic] and so the majestic ship swept swiftly to her doom--a concrete expression of man's age-long struggle to subdue the resistless forces of nature--a pathetic picture both of his power and his impotence. as she sped on under the dim light of the stars, not a soul on board dreamed to what a death-grapple she was coming with the relentless powers of the sea. latest product of the shipbuilder's art, she was about to brush elbows with another giant of the sea, launched by nature from the frozen shipyards of the north, and she was to reel from the contact stricken to the death like the fragile thing she was! at 11.46 p.m. the sharp warning came from the lookout: "iceberg right ahead." instantly the engines were reversed and the helm was put hard a-starboard. a few seconds earlier and she might have cleared. as it was, she struck an underwater, projecting shelf of the iceberg, and ripped open 200 feet of her plating, from forward of the collision bulkhead to a few feet aft of the bulkhead separating boiler-rooms numbers 5 and 6. it was a death wound! how deeply the iceberg cut into the fabric of the ship will never be known. probably the first incision was deep and wide, the damage, as the shelf of ice was ground down by contact with the framing and plating of the ship becoming less in area as successive compartments were ruptured. [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_ the titanic struck a glancing blow against an under-water shelf of the iceberg, opening up five compartments. had she been provided with a watertight deck at or near the water line, the water which entered the ship would have been confined below that deck, and the buoyancy of that portion of the ship above water would have kept her afloat. as it was, the water rose through openings in the decks and destroyed the reserve buoyancy] whatever may have been the depth of the injury, it is certain from the evidence that the six forward compartments were opened to the sea. immediately after the collision the whistling of air, as it issued from the escape pipe of the forepeak tank, indicated that the tank was being filled by an inrush of water. the three following compartments, in which were located the baggage-room and mail-room, were quickly flooded. leading fireman barrett, who was in the forward boiler-room, felt the shock of the collision. immediately afterwards he saw the outer skin of the ship ripped open about two feet above the floor, and a large volume of water came rushing into the ship. he was quick enough to jump through the open door in the bulkhead separating boiler-rooms 6 and 5, before it was released from the bridge. the damage just abaft of this bulkhead admitted water to the forward coal-bunker of room no. 5, which held for a while, but being of non-watertight and rather light construction, must have soon given way; for the same witness testified to a sudden rush of water coming across the floor-plates between the boilers. in spite of the frightful extent of the damage, the _titanic_, because of the great height to which her plated structure extended above the water-line, and the consequent large amount of reserve buoyancy which she possessed, would probably have remained afloat a great many hours longer than she did, had the deck to which her bulkheads extended been thoroughly watertight. as it was, this deck (upper deck e) was pierced by hatchways and stairways which, as the bow settled deeper and deeper, permitted the water to flow up over the deck and pass aft over the tops of the after bulkheads and so-called watertight compartments. see page 129. now, it so happened that for the full length of the boiler-rooms there had been constructed on upper deck e what was known as the "working-crew alleyway." on the inboard side of this passage six non-watertight doors opened on to as many iron ladders leading down to the boiler-rooms. not only were these doors non-watertight, but they consisted of a mere open frame or grating, this construction having been adopted, doubtless, for purposes of ventilation. unfortunately, although there was a watertight door at the after end of this alleyway, there was none at its forward end. the water which boiled up from the forward flooded compartments, as it flowed aft, poured successively through the open grating of the alleyway doors, flooding the compartments below, one after the other. [illustration: titanic 1912 mauretania 1906 _titanic_: single skin, 16 compartments; _mauretania_: double skin, 34 compartments. comparison of subdivision in two famous ships] it does not take a technically instructed mind to understand from this that the safety elements of the construction of the _titanic_ were as faulty above the water-line as they were below it. the absence of an inner skin and the presence of these many openings in her bulkhead deck combined to sink this huge ship, whose reserve buoyancy must have amounted to at least 80,000 tons, in the brief space of two and one-half hours. not until the designer, mr. andrews, had made known to the captain that the ship was doomed was the order given to man the lifeboats. the lifeboats, forsooth! twenty of them in all with a maximum accommodation, if every one were loaded to its full capacity, of something over one thousand, for a ship's company that numbered 2,223 in all. just here, in this very fatal discrepancy, is to be found proof of the widespread belief that a great ship like the _titanic_ was practically unsinkable, and therefore in times of dire stress such as this, was well able to act as its own lifeboat until rescuing ships, summoned by wireless, should come to her aid. the manner of the stricken ship's final plunge to the bottom may be readily gathered from the stories told by the survivors. as compartment after compartment was filled by overflow from the decks above, her bow sank deeper and her stern lifted high in the air, until the ship, buoyed up by her after compartments, swung almost vertically in the water like a gigantic spar buoy. in this unaccustomed position, her engines and boilers, standing out from the floor like brackets from a wall, tore loose from their foundations and crashed down into the forward part of the ship. probably it was the muffled roar of this falling machinery that caused some of the survivors to imagine that they witnessed the bursting of boilers and the breaking apart of the hull. as a matter of fact, the shell of the _titanic_ went to the bottom practically intact. one by one the after compartments gave way, until the ship, weighted at her forward end with the wreckage of engineand boiler-rooms, sank, straight as an arrow, to bury herself deep in the ooze of the atlantic bottom two miles below. there, for aught we know, with several hundred feet of her hull rising sheer above the ocean floor, she may now be standing, a sublime memorial shaft to the fifteen hundred souls who perished in this unspeakable tragedy! [illustration: photograph by underwood & underwood, n. y. smaller rooms would admit of higher bulkheads and better fire-protection. the vast dining-room of the titanic] chapter viii warship protection against ram, mine, and torpedo the most perfect example of protection by subdivision of the hull into separate compartments is to be found in the warship. it is safe to say that there is no feature of the design to which more careful thought is given by the naval constructor than this. loss of stability in a naval engagement means the end of the fight so far as the damaged ship is concerned. nay, even a partial loss of stability, causing the ship to take a heavy list, may throw a ship's batteries entirely out of action, the guns on the high side being so greatly elevated and those on the low side so much depressed, that neither can be effectively trained upon the enemy. furthermore, deep submergence following the entrance of large quantities of water, will cut down the ship's speed; with the result, either that she must fall out of line or the speed of the whole fleet must be reduced. in the battle of the sea of japan it was the bursting of heavy 12-inch shells at or just below the water-line of the leading ship of the russian line that sent her to the bottom before she had received any serious damage to her main batteries. later in the fight, several other russian battleships capsized from the same cause, assisted by the weight of extra supplies of coal which the russians had stowed on the upper decks above the water-line. [illustration: courtesy of _u. s. navy department_ below the water line this ship is divided into 500 water-tight compartments. the united states battleship kansas] in the matter of subdivision as a protection against sinking, there is this important difference between the merchant ship and the warship, that, whereas the merchant ship is sunk through accident, the warship is sunk by deliberate intention. the amount of damage done to the former ship will be great or small according to the accidental conditions of the time; but the damage to the warship is the result of a deliberately planned attack, and is wrought by powerful agencies, designed to execute the maximum amount of destruction with every blow delivered. a large proportion of the time and money which have been expended in the development of the instruments of naval warfare has been devoted to the design and construction of weapons, whose object is to sink the enemy by destroying the integrity of the submerged portion of the hull. chief among these weapons are the ram, the torpedo, and the mine. there can be no question that the damage inflicted by the ram of a warship would be far greater, other things being equal, than that inflicted by the bow of a merchant ship. the ram is built especially for its purpose. not only is it an exceedingly stiff and strong construction; but it is so framed and tied into the bow of the warship, that it will tear open a long, gaping wound in the hull of the enemy before it is broken off or twisted out of place. the bow of the merchant vessel is a relatively frail structure, and many a ship that has been rammed has owed its salvation to the fact that immediately upon contact, the bow of the ramming ship is crumpled up or bent aside, and the depth of penetration into the vessel that is rammed is greatly limited. furthermore, because of its underwater projection, the ram develops the whole force of the blow beneath the water-line, where the injury will be most fatal. even more potent than the ram is the torpedo, which of late years has been developed to a point of efficiency in range, speed, and destructive power which has rendered it perhaps the most dreaded of all the weapons of naval warfare. the modern torpedo carries in its head a charge of over 200 pounds of guncotton and has a range of 10,000 yards. ordinarily, it is set to run at a depth of 10 to 12 feet below the water; and should it get home against the side of a ship, it will strike her well below the armour belt and upon the relatively thin plating of the hull. most destructive of all weapons for underwater attack, however, is the mine, which sent to the bottom many a good ship during the russo-japanese war. the more deadly effects of the mine, as compared with the torpedo, are due to its heavy charge of high explosive, which sometimes reaches as high as 500 pounds. contact, even with a mine, is not necessarily fatal; indeed the notable instances in which warships have gone to the bottom immediately upon striking a mine have been due to the fact that the mine exploded immediately under, or in close proximity to the ship's magazines, which, being set off by the shock, tore the ship apart and caused her to go down within a few minutes' time. this was what happened to our own battleship _maine_ in havana harbour, and to the russian battleship _petropavlovsk_ and the japanese battleship _hatsuse_ at port arthur. enough has been said to prove that when the naval architect undertakes to build a hull that will be proof against the blow, not merely of one but of several of these terrific weapons, he has set himself a task that may well try his ingenuity to the utmost. protection by heavy armour is out of the question. the weight would be prohibitive and, indeed, all the side armour that he can put upon the ship is needed at the water-line and above it, as a protection against the armour-piercing, high-explosive shells of the enemy. heavy armour, then, being out of the question, he has to fall back upon the one method of defense left at his disposal,--minute subdivision into watertight compartments. associated with this is the placing at the water-line of a heavy steel deck, known as the protective deck, which extends over the whole length and breadth of the hull and is made thoroughly watertight. [illustration: courtesy of robinson's "naval construction" hold plan. inboard profile. these drawings show the minute subdivision of a battleship. below the protective deck (shown by heavy line) the hull contains 500 water-tight compartments. plan and longitudinal section of the battleship connecticut] the double-skin construction, which was used to such good effect in the _great eastern_, is found in every large warship; and in a battleship of the first class, the two skins are spaced widely apart, a spacing of three or more feet being not unusual. the double-hull construction, with its exceedingly strong framing, is carried up to about water-line level, where it is covered in by the protective deck above referred to. below the protective deck the interior is subdivided into a number of small compartments by transverse bulkheads, which extend from the inner bottom to the protective deck, and from side to side of the ship. the transverse compartments thus formed are made as small as possible, the largest being those which contain the boilers and engines. forward and aft of the boilerand engine-room compartments the transverse bulkheads are spaced much closer together, the uses to which these portions of the ship are put admitting of more minute subdivision. by the courtesy of naval constructor r. h. m. robinson, u.s.n., we reproduce on page 143 from his work "naval construction" a hold plan and an inboard profile of a typical battleship,--the _connecticut_,--which give a clear impression of the completeness with which the interior is bulkheaded. although the ship shown is less than one-half as long as the _titanic_, she has 27 transverse bulkheads as against the 15 on the larger ship; and all but nine of these are carried clear across the ship from side to side. equally complete is the system of longitudinal bulkheads. most important of these is a central bulkhead, placed on the line of the keel, and running from stem to stern. on each side of this and extending the full length of the machinery spaces, is another bulkhead, which forms the inner wall of the coal-bunkers. forward and aft of the machinery spaces are other longitudinal bulkheads, which form the fore-and-aft walls of the handling-rooms and ammunition-rooms. to appreciate the completeness of the subdivision, we must look at the inboard profile and note that the spaces forward and aft of the engineand boiler-rooms are further subdivided, in horizontal planes, by several steel, watertight decks or "flats," as they are called. including the compartments enclosed between the walls of the double hull, the whole interior of the battleship _connecticut_, below the protective deck, is divided up into as many as 500 separate and perfectly watertight compartments. moreover, in some of the latest battleships of the dreadnought type the practice has been followed of permitting no doors of any description to be cut through the bulkheads below the water-line. access from one compartment to another can be had only by way of the decks above. furthermore, all the openings through the protective deck are provided with strong watertight hatches or, as in the case of the openings for the smoke stacks, ammunition-hoists, and ventilators, they are enclosed by watertight steel casings, extending to the upper decks, far above the water-line. in the later warships, further protection is afforded by constructing the first deck above the protective deck of heavy steel plating and making it thoroughly watertight, every opening in this deck, such as those for stairways, being provided with watertight steel hatches. this deck, also, is thoroughly subdivided by bulkheads and provided with watertight doors. it sounds like a truism to say that a watertight bulkhead must be watertight; yet it is a fact that only in the navy are the proper precautions taken to test the bulkheads and make sure that they will not leak when they are subjected to heavy water pressure. before a ship is accepted by the government, every compartment is tested by filling it with water and placing it under the maximum pressure to which it would be subjected if the ship were deeply submerged. if any leaks are observed in the bulkheads, decks, etc., they are carefully caulked up, and the test is repeated until the bulkhead is absolutely tight. now, here is a practice which should be made compulsory in the construction of all passenger-carrying steamships. only by filling a compartment with water is it possible to determine whether that compartment is watertight. to send an important ship to sea without testing her bulkheads is an invitation to disaster. the amount of water that may find its way through a newly-constructed bulkhead is something astonishing; for although the leakage along any particular joint or seam of the plating may be relatively small, the aggregate amount will be surprisingly large. [illustration: between the boiler rooms and the sea are four, separate, watertight walls of steel. the whole is covered in by a 3-inch watertight steel deck. midship section of a battleship] let us now pass on to consider the actual efficiency of the watertight subdivision as thus so carefully worked out in the modern warship. thanks to the russo-japanese war, which afforded a supreme test of the underwater protection of ships, the value of the present methods of construction has been proved to an absolute demonstration. the following facts, which, were given to the writer by captain (now admiral) von essen of the russian navy, at the close of the russo-japanese war, and were published in the "scientific american," serve to show what great powers of resistance are conferred on a warship by the system of subdivision above described. the story of the repeated damage inflicted and the method of extemporised repairs adopted, is so full of interest that it is given in full: "immediately after the disaster of the night of february 8th," when the japanese, in a surprise attack, torpedoed several of the russian ships, "the cruiser _pallada_ was floated into drydock, and the battleships _czarevitch_ and _retvizan_ were taken into the inner harbour, and repairs executed by means of caissons of timber, built around the gaping holes which had been blown into their hulls by torpedoes. the repairs to the _pallada_ were completed early in april, and about the 20th of june the _czarevitch_ and _retvizan_ were also in condition to take the sea. on the 13th of april, during the sortie in which the _petropavlovsk_ was sunk with admiral makaroff on board, the battleship _pobieda_, in returning to the harbour, struck a contact mine, and was heavily damaged. similar repairs were executed, and this ship was able to take her station in the line in the great sortie of august 10. "on june 23 captain von essen's ship, the _sevastopol_, was sent outside the harbour to drive off several japanese cruisers that were shelling the line of fortifications to the east of port arthur. this she accomplished; but in returning she struck a japanese mine, which blew in about 400 square feet on the starboard side, abaft the foremast, at a depth of about 7 feet below the water-line. the rent was from 7 to 10 feet in depth and 35 to 40 feet in length. the frames, ten in all, were bent inward, or torn entirely apart, and the plating was blown bodily into the ship. she was taken into the inner harbour, where the injured portion of the hull was enclosed by a timber caisson in the manner shown in the engravings on page 155. the caisson--a rectangular, three-sided chamber--was built of 9-in. by 9-in. timbers, tongued and grooved and carefully dovetailed. the floor of the caisson abutted against the bilge keel. the outer wall, which was at a distance of about 10 feet from the hull, had a total depth of about 34 feet, the total length of the caisson being about 75 feet. knee-bracing of heavy timbers was worked in between the floor and the walls, and the construction was stiffened by heavy, diagonal bolts, which passed through from floor to outside wall, as shown in the drawing. watertight contact between the edge of the caisson and the hull of the ship was secured by the use of hemp packing covered with canvas. the whole of the outside of the caisson was covered with canvas, and upon this was laid a heavy coating of hot tar. the caisson was then floated into position and drawn up snugly against the side of the ship by means of cables, some of which passed underneath the ship and were drawn tight on the port side, while others were attached to the top edge of the caisson and led across to steam winches on deck. after the water had been pumped out, the hydraulic pressure served to hold the caisson snugly against the hull. the damaged plating and broken frames were then cut away; new frames were built into the ship, the plating was riveted on, and the vessel was restored to first-class condition without entering drydock. [illustration: the battleship _sevastopol_ was twice struck by a mine; but she remained afloat and was repaired by the use of caissons without entering dry dock. safety lies in subdivision] "on september the 20th, during operations outside the harbour, the _sevastopol_ again struck a mine, and by a curious coincidence she was damaged in the exact spot where she received her first injury. this time, however, the mine was much larger and it was estimated to have contained fully 400 pounds of high explosive. the shock was terrific and the area of the injury was fully 700 square feet. the ship immediately took a heavy list to starboard, which was corrected by admitting water to compartments on the port side. she was brought back into the harbour, and a repair caisson was again applied. the repairing of this damage was, of course, a longer job. moreover, it was done at a time when the japanese 11-inch mortar batteries were getting the range and making frequent hits. one 11-inch shell struck the bridge just above the caisson and, when it burst, a shower of heavy fragments tore through the outer wall of the caisson, letting in the water and necessitating extensive repairs. nevertheless, the _sevastopol_ was again put in seaworthy condition, this time the repairs taking about two and one-half months' time. during the eleven months of the siege of port arthur five big repair jobs of the magnitude above described were completed, and over one dozen perforations of the hull below water, due to heavy projectiles, were repaired, either in drydock or by the caisson method." now, when it is remembered that the _sevastopol_ was not a new ship, and that her internal subdivision was not nearly so complete as that which is found in the most modern battleships, it will be realised how effective are properly built bulkheads and thoroughly watertight compartments against even the most extensive injury to the outer shell of a ship. it is claimed for the latest battleships of the dreadnought type, built for the united states navy, that they would remain afloat, even after having been struck by three or four torpedoes. now, it is inexpedient to build merchant ships with such an elaborate system of watertight compartments as that described in this chapter. considerations of cost and convenience of operation render this impossible; but it is entirely possible to incorporate in the large passenger steamers a sufficient degree of protection of this character to render them proof against sinking by the accidents of collision, whether with another ship, a derelict, or even with the dreaded iceberg. the manner in which the problem has been worked out in several of the most noted passenger steamers of the present day is reserved for discussion in the following chapter. [illustration: this ship has twenty-four compartments below the water line. fire-bulkheads protect passenger decks. the 65,000-ton, 23-knot imperator--largest ship afloat] chapter ix warship protection as applied to some ocean liners it was shown in the previous chapter that the most completely protected vessel, so far as its flotation is concerned, is the warship, and plans were given of a battleship whose hull below the water-line was subdivided into no less than five hundred separate watertight compartments. facts were cited from the naval operations in and around the harbour of port arthur, which prove that the battleship is capable of sustaining an enormous amount of injury below the water-line without going to the bottom. now, if it were possible to apply subdivision to the large ocean liners on the liberal scale on which it is worked out in ships of war, it would not be going too far to say that they would be absolutely unsinkable by any of the usual accidents of collision. the 60,000-ton _titanic_, were she subdivided as minutely as the warship shown on page 143, would contain at least 1,500 separate compartments below her lower deck, and under these conditions even the long rent which was torn in her plating would have done no more than set her down slightly by the head. her pumps would have taken care of the leakage of water through the bulkheads, and the ship would have come into new york harbour under her own steam. but a warship and a passenger ship are two very different propositions. the one, being designed to resist the attack of an implacable enemy, who is using every weapon that the ingenuity of man can devise to effect its destruction, is built with little if any regard to the cost. the other, built as a commercial proposition for the purpose of earning reasonable dividends for its owners, and exposed only to such risks of damage as are incidental to ocean transportation, is constructed as economically as reasonable considerations of strength and safety may permit. another important limitation which renders it impossible to give a passenger ship the elaborate subdivision of a warship, is the necessity of providing large cargo spaces and wide hatchways for the convenient handling and stowage of the freight, upon which a large proportion of the passenger-carrying vessels chiefly depend for their revenue. [illustration: courtesy of _scientific american_ longitudinal bulkheads form an inner skin through machinery spaces. transverse bulkheads extend two decks (20 feet) above water line, the height increasing towards the ends. longitudinal section and plan of the imperator] on the other hand, the main features of warship protection may be so applied to the large merchant ship as to render her as proof against collision with icebergs, derelicts, or with other vessels, as the warship is against the blow of the ram, the mine, or the torpedo. and the merchant ship of the size of our largest ocean liners has the great advantage over the warship (provided that the average size of her compartments be not too greatly increased) that her great size is in itself a safeguard against sinking. by way of showing what can be done in applying warship principles of subdivision to merchant vessels, we shall consider in some detail three notable ships, the _mauretania_, the _kronprinzessin cecilie_, and the recently launched _imperator_. the _mauretania_ and her sister, the _lusitania_, were built under an agreement with the british government, who stipulated that they would provide a sum sufficient to pay for the new vessels not to exceed $13,000,000, secured on debentures at 2¾ per cent. interest. the two ships were to be of large size and capable of maintaining a minimum average ocean speed of 24½ knots in moderate weather. the government also agreed that if the ships fulfilled these conditions, the cunard company was to be paid annually $750,000.00. in return for this extremely liberal assistance, the cunard company agreed to employ them in the british mail-carrying service; to so construct them that they would be available for use as auxiliary cruisers; and to hold them at the instant service of the government in case of war. in addition to holding the ships at the service of the government, it was agreed that all the officers and three-fourths of the crew should be british subjects, and that a large proportion should belong to the royal naval reserve. the ships were thus to be utilised as a training school for officers and seamen, and with this point in view a record of the personnel was to be made each month. the particulars of these two ships as finally constructed are as follows: length over all 790 feet; beam, 88 feet; displacement, 46,000 tons; and horsepower, 70,000. both vessels greatly exceeded the contract speed of 24½ knots, the _lusitania_ having maintained over 25½ knots and the _mauretania_ 26 knots for the whole run across the atlantic. [illustration: the rotor, or rotating element, of one of the low-pressure turbines of the imperator. diameter over tips of blades is 18 feet] the purpose of the present chapter is to show how successfully the methods of underwater protection employed in naval ships may be applied to passenger ships of the first class; and the _mauretania_ is given first consideration, for the reason that she is the best example afloat to-day of a merchant ship fully protected against sinking by collision. the protective elements may be summed up as consisting of multiple subdivision, associated with a complete inner skin and a watertight steel deck, answering to the heavy protective deck at the water-line of the warship. by reference to the hold plan on page 129 it will be noticed that she is subdivided by 22 transverse bulkheads, 12 of which extend entirely across the ship and 10 from the side inboard to the longitudinal bulkheads. the space devoted to the turbine engines is subdivided by two lines of longitudinal bulkheading, and the compartment aft of the engine-room spaces is divided by a longitudinal bulkhead placed upon the axis of the ship. altogether there are 34 separate watertight compartments below the water-line. the most important feature of the subdivision is the two lines of longitudinal bulkheads, which extend each side of the boiler-rooms and serve the double purpose of providing watertight bunker compartments and protecting the large boiler-room compartments from being flooded, in the event of damage to the outer skin of the ship. the main engine-room, containing the low-pressure turbines, is similarly protected against flooding. now, all of these bulkheads are carried up to a watertight connection with the upper deck, which, amidships, is over two decks, or say about 20 feet above the water-line, the exception being the first or collision bulkhead, which extends to the shelter deck. a most important feature of the protection, borrowed from warship practice, is that the lower deck, which, amidships, is located at about the water-line, is built of extra heavy plating, and is furnished with strong watertight hatches. it thus serves the purpose of a protective deck, and water, which flooded any compartment lying below the water-line, would be restrained by this deck from finding its way through to the decks above. the _mauretania_, therefore, could sustain an enormous amount of damage below the water-line without foundering. it is our belief that she would have survived the disaster which sank the _titanic_. the first three compartments would have been flooded, it is true, but the water would have been restrained from her large forward boiler-compartment by the "inner skin" of the starboard bunkers. furthermore, the watertight hatches of her lower, or protective, deck would have prevented that upward flow of water on to the decks above, which proved so fatal to the _titanic_. [illustration: in addition to transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, this ship has fire bulkheads in the passenger spaces. the 26,000-ton, 23½-knot kronprinzessin cecilie, a thoroughly protected ship] in dealing with the question of safety, the german shipbuilders have shown that thorough study of the problem which characterises the german people in all their industrial work. although german ships of the first class, such as the _kronprinzessin cecilie_ and the _imperator_ are not built to naval requirements, they embody many of the same protective features as are to be found in the _mauretania_ and _lusitania_, and, indeed, in some safety features, and particularly in those built in the ship as a protection against fire, they excel them. the existence of side bunkers, small compartments, and bulkheads carried well up above the water-line, is due to the close supervision and strict requirements of the german lloyd and the immigration authorities, and it takes but a glance at the hold plan of the _kronprinzessin cecilie_ to show how admirably this ship and her sister are protected against collision. there are 21 transverse bulkheads, 18 of which are shown in the hold plan, the other three being sub-bulkheads, worked in the after part of the ship abaft of the machinery spaces. the four engines are contained in four separate compartments, and the boiler-rooms are entirely surrounded by coal-bunkers. these, the largest compartments, are protected throughout their entire length by the inner skin of the coal-bunker bulkheads. the engine-rooms are further protected by extending the inner floor of the double bottom up the sides as shown on page 176. altogether, the hold plan shows 33 separate, watertight compartments. the collision bulkhead is carried up to the shelter deck, and the other bulkheads terminate at the main deck, which is about 19 feet above the normal water-line. [illustration: this well-protected ship has side coal bunkers, and inner skin in engine-rooms. there are thirty-three compartments below the water-line. hold plan of kronprinzessin cecilie] it is greatly to the credit of the germans that they have given such careful attention to the question of fire protection. we have shown in a previous chapter that the long stretch of staterooms, with alleyways several hundred feet in length running through them, offer dangerous facilities for the rapid spread of a fire, should it once obtain a strong hold on the inflammable material of which the stateroom partitions and furnishings are composed. on the _kaiser wilhelm ii_ and _cecilie_ the passenger accommodations on the main deck are protected against the spread of fire by four steel bulkheads, which extend from side to side of the ship. where the alleyways intersect these bulkheads, fire-doors are provided which are closed by hand and secured by strong clamps. [illustration: courtesy of _engineering_ section through engine-room of the kaiser wilhelm ii, showing inner bottom carried up sides of ship, to form double skin] the fire protection also includes both an outside and an inside line of fire-mains. fire-drill, with full pressure on the mains, is carried on every time the ship is in port, the outside lines of fire-mains being used. once every three months there is a fire-drill with the inside line of mains. every time the ship reaches her home port, both fire-drills and lifeboat drills are carried out under the close inspection of german government officials. now, the provision of fire bulkheads is such an excellent protection that it should be made compulsory upon every steamship of large carrying capacity. moreover, they should be extended throughout the full tier of decks reserved for passenger accommodation. the bulkheads need not be of heavy construction, and they can be placed in the natural line of division of the staterooms, where they will cause no inconvenience. special interest attaches to the _imperator_ of the hamburg-american line, just now, because she is the latest and largest of those huge ocean liners, of which the _olympic_ and _titanic_ were the forerunners. this truly enormous vessel, 900 feet long and 96 feet broad, will displace, when fully loaded, 65,000 tons, or 5,000 tons more than the _titanic_. a study of her hold plan and inboard profile, shown on page 163, proves that it is possible to provide for an even larger boiler and machinery plant than that of the _titanic_, without making any of that sacrifice of safety, which is so evident in the arrangement of compartments and bulkheads on the _titanic_. not only are the bulkheads throughout the machinery and boiler compartments carried to the second deck above the water-line, but the same spaces, throughout their whole length, are protected by an inner skin in the form of the longitudinal bulkheads of the side bunkers. the large forward engine-room is also protected by two longitudinal bulkheads at the sides of the ship and the after engine-room is divided by a central longitudinal bulkhead. protection against the spread of fire is assured by several bulkheads worked across the decks which are devoted to passenger accommodation. chapter x conclusions i. the fact that the _titanic_ sank in two hours and thirty minutes after a collision demonstrates that the margin of safety against foundering in this ship was dangerously narrow. ii. it is not to the point to say that the collision was of an unusual character and may never occur again. collision with an iceberg is one of the permanent risks of ocean travel, and this stupendous calamity has shown how disastrous its results may be. we cannot afford to gamble with chance in a hazard whose issue involves the life or death of a whole townful of people. iii. if it be structurally possible, and the cost is not prohibitive, passenger ships should be so designed, that they cannot be sunk by any of the accidents of the sea,--not even by such a disaster as befell the _titanic_. iv. that such design and construction are possible is proved by the fact that the first of the large ocean liners, the _great eastern_, built over half a century ago, so far fulfilled these conditions, that, after receiving injuries to her hull more extensive than those which sank the _titanic_, she came safely to port. v. it is not to the point to attribute the financial failure of the _great eastern_ to the costly character of her construction. she failed because, commercially, she was ahead of her time, passenger and freight traffic being yet in their infancy when the ship was launched. cheap steel and modern shipyard facilities have made it possible to build a ship of the size and unsinkable characteristics of the _great eastern_, with a reduction in the cost of twenty to thirty per cent. vi. the principles of unsinkable construction, as formulated by brunel and worked out in this remarkable ship, have been adopted in their entirety by naval constructors, and are to be found embodied in every modern warship. these elements--the double skin, transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, and watertight decks--are the _sine qua non_ of warship construction; and in the designing of warships, they receive the first consideration, all other questions of speed, armour-protection, and gun-power being made subordinate. vii. in the building of merchant ships, unsinkable construction has been sacrificed to considerations of speed, convenience of operation, and the provision of luxurious accommodations for the travelling public. the inner skin, the longitudinal bulkhead, and the watertight deck have been abandoned. although the transverse bulkhead has been retained, its efficiency has been greatly impaired; for, whereas these bulkheads in the _great eastern_ extended thirty feet above the water-line; in the _titanic_, they were carried only ten feet above the same point. viii. the portentous significance of this decline in the art of unsinkable construction will be realised, when it is borne in mind that the _titanic_ was built to the highest requirements of the board of trade and the insurance companies. she was the latest example of current and approved practice in the construction of high-class passenger ships of the first magnitude; and, judged on the score of safety against sinking, she was as safe a ship as ninety-five out of every hundred merchant vessels afloat to-day. ix. that the narrowing of the margin of safety in merchant ships during the past fifty years has not been due to urgent considerations of economy, is proved by the fact that shipowners have not hesitated to incur the enormous expense involved in providing the costly machinery to secure high speed, or the equally heavy outlay involved in providing the sumptuous accommodations which characterise the modern liner. x. if, then, by making moderate concessions in the direction of speed and luxury, it would be possible, without adding to the cost, to reintroduce those structural features which are necessary to render a ship unsinkable, considerations of humanity demand that it should be done. xi. should the stupendous disaster of april the 14th lead us back to the sane construction of fifty years ago, and teach us so to construct the future passenger ship that she shall be not merely fast and comfortable, but practically unsinkable, the hapless multitude who went down to their death in that unspeakable calamity will not have died in vain. xii. in conclusion, let us note what changes would render such a ship as the _titanic_ unsinkable: (a) the inner floor of the double bottom should be extended up the sides to a watertight connection with the middle deck. this inner skin should extend from bulkhead no. 1 at the bow to bulkhead no. 14, the second bulkhead from the stern. (b) the lower deck should be made absolutely watertight from stem to stern, so as to form practically a second inner bottom; and it should be strengthened to withstand a water pressure equal to that to which the outer bottom of the ship is subjected at normal draft. (c) all openings through this deck, such as those for hatches and ladders and for the boiler uptakes, should be enclosed by strong watertight casings, carried up to the shelter deck, and free from any doors or openings leading to the intervening decks,--the construction being such that the water, rising within these casings from the flooded spaces below the lower deck, could not find its way out to the decks above. (d) the second bulkhead from the bow and the second from the stern should be carried up to the shelter deck. all the intermediate bulkheads should be extended one deck higher to the saloon deck, d. (e) the cargo spaces in compartments 3 and 4, lying below the middle deck, should be divided by a central longitudinal bulkhead, and the hatches, leading up from these holds, should be enclosed in watertight casings extending, without any openings, to the shelter deck, where they should be closed by watertight hatch covers. the huge reciprocating-engine-room should be divided by a similar, central, longitudinal bulkhead. (f) finally, the passenger spaces on decks a, b, c, and d, should be protected against fire by the construction, at suitable intervals, of transverse bulkheads of light construction, provided with fire-doors where they intersect the alleyways. * * * * * a _titanic_, as thus modified, might reasonably be pronounced unsinkable. to such a ship we could confidently apply the verdict of brunel, as recorded in his notes on the strength and safety of the _great eastern_: "no combination of circumstances, within the ordinary range of probability, can cause such damage as to sink her." [transcriber's note all words printed in small capitals have been converted to uppercase characters. some illustrations contain explanatory text; the keywords have been added to the captions. the following modifications have been made, page 10: "3 1-2 inches" changed to "3½ inches" (some small angle-bars, 3½ inches in width) page 36: "24 1-2 knots" changed to "24½ knots" (to accomplish the average speed of 24½ knots) page 96: "translantic" changed to "transatlantic" (particulars of noted transatlantic liners) page 145: "u. s. n." changed to "u.s.n." (courtesy of naval constructor r. h. m. robinson, u.s.n.) not modified but retained as printed: inconsistent spelling of "underwater" / "under-water" inconsistent spelling of "watertight" / "water-tight"] images generously made available by the cwru preservation department digital library. html version by al haines. the loss of the s. s. titanic its story and its lessons by lawrence beesley b. a. (_cantab_.) scholar of gonville and caius college one of the survivors preface the circumstances in which this book came to be written are as follows. some five weeks after the survivors from the titanic landed in new york, i was the guest at luncheon of hon. samuel j. elder and hon. charles t. gallagher, both well-known lawyers in boston. after luncheon i was asked to relate to those present the experiences of the survivors in leaving the titanic and reaching the carpathia. when i had done so, mr. robert lincoln o'brien, the editor of the _boston herald_, urged me as a matter of public interest to write a correct history of the titanic disaster, his reason being that he knew several publications were in preparation by people who had not been present at the disaster, but from newspaper accounts were piecing together a description of it. he said that these publications would probably be erroneous, full of highly coloured details, and generally calculated to disturb public thought on the matter. he was supported in his request by all present, and under this general pressure i accompanied him to messrs. houghton mifflin company, where we discussed the question of publication. messrs. houghton mifflin company took at that time exactly the same view that i did, that it was probably not advisable to put on record the incidents connected with the titanic's sinking: it seemed better to forget details as rapidly as possible. however, we decided to take a few days to think about it. at our next meeting we found ourselves in agreement again,--but this time on the common ground that it would probably be a wise thing to write a history of the titanic disaster as correctly as possible. i was supported in this decision by the fact that a short account, which i wrote at intervals on board the carpathia, in the hope that it would calm public opinion by stating the truth of what happened as nearly as i could recollect it, appeared in all the american, english, and colonial papers and had exactly the effect it was intended to have. this encourages me to hope that the effect of this work will be the same. another matter aided me in coming to a decision,--the duty that we, as survivors of the disaster, owe to those who went down with the ship, to see that the reforms so urgently needed are not allowed to be forgotten. whoever reads the account of the cries that came to us afloat on the sea from those sinking in the ice-cold water must remember that they were addressed to him just as much as to those who heard them, and that the duty, of seeing that reforms are carried out devolves on every one who knows that such cries were heard in utter helplessness the night the titanic sank. contents i. construction and preparations for the first voyage ii. from southampton to the night of the collision iii. the collision and embarkation in lifeboats iv. the sinking of the titanic, seen from a lifeboat v. the rescue vi. the sinking of the titanic, seen from her deck vii. the carpathia's return to new york viii. the lessons taught by the loss of the titanic ix. some impressions illustrations the titanic from a photograph taken in belfast harbour. copyrighted by underwood and underwood, new york. view of four decks of the olympic, sister ship of the titanic from a photograph published in the "sphere," may 4,1918 transverse (amidship) section through the titanic after a drawing furnished by the white star line. longitudinal sections and deck plan of the titanic after plans published in the "shipbuilder." the carpathia from a photograph furnished by the cunard steamship co. chapter i construction and preparations for the first voyage the history of the r.m.s. titanic, of the white star line, is one of the most tragically short it is possible to conceive. the world had waited expectantly for its launching and again for its sailing; had read accounts of its tremendous size and its unexampled completeness and luxury; had felt it a matter of the greatest satisfaction that such a comfortable, and above all such a safe boat had been designed and built--the "unsinkable lifeboat";--and then in a moment to hear that it had gone to the bottom as if it had been the veriest tramp steamer of a few hundred tons; and with it fifteen hundred passengers, some of them known the world over! the improbability of such a thing ever happening was what staggered humanity. if its history had to be written in a single paragraph it would be somewhat as follows:-"the r.m.s. titanic was built by messrs. harland & wolff at their well-known ship-building works at queen's island, belfast, side by side with her sister ship the olympic. the twin vessels marked such an increase in size that specially laid-out joiner and boiler shops were prepared to aid in their construction, and the space usually taken up by three building slips was given up to them. the keel of the titanic was laid on march 31, 1909, and she was launched on may 31, 1911; she passed her trials before the board of trade officials on march 31, 1912, at belfast, arrived at southampton on april 4, and sailed the following wednesday, april 10, with 2208 passengers and crew, on her maiden voyage to new york. she called at cherbourg the same day, queenstown thursday, and left for new york in the afternoon, expecting to arrive the following wednesday morning. but the voyage was never completed. she collided with an iceberg on sunday at 11.45 p.m. in lat. 41° 46' n. and long. 50° 14' w., and sank two hours and a half later; 815 of her passengers and 688 of her crew were drowned and 705 rescued by the carpathia." such is the record of the titanic, the largest ship the world had ever seen--she was three inches longer than the olympic and one thousand tons more in gross tonnage--and her end was the greatest maritime disaster known. the whole civilized world was stirred to its depths when the full extent of loss of life was learned, and it has not yet recovered from the shock. and that is without doubt a good thing. it should not recover from it until the possibility of such a disaster occurring again has been utterly removed from human society, whether by separate legislation in different countries or by international agreement. no living person should seek to dwell in thought for one moment on such a disaster except in the endeavour to glean from it knowledge that will be of profit to the whole world in the future. when such knowledge is practically applied in the construction, equipment, and navigation of passenger steamers--and not until then--will be the time to cease to think of the titanic disaster and of the hundreds of men and women so needlessly sacrificed. a few words on the ship's construction and equipment will be necessary in order to make clear many points that arise in the course of this book. a few figures have been added which it is hoped will help the reader to follow events more closely than he otherwise could. the considerations that inspired the builders to design the titanic on the lines on which she was constructed were those of speed, weight of displacement, passenger and cargo accommodation. high speed is very expensive, because the initial cost of the necessary powerful machinery is enormous, the running expenses entailed very heavy, and passenger and cargo accommodation have to be fined down to make the resistance through the water as little as possible and to keep the weight down. an increase in size brings a builder at once into conflict with the question of dock and harbour accommodation at the ports she will touch: if her total displacement is very great while the lines are kept slender for speed, the draught limit may be exceeded. the titanic, therefore, was built on broader lines than the ocean racers, increasing the total displacement; but because of the broader build, she was able to keep within the draught limit at each port she visited. at the same time she was able to accommodate more passengers and cargo, and thereby increase largely her earning capacity. a comparison between the mauretania and the titanic illustrates the difference in these respects:- displacement horse power speed in knots mauretania 44,640 70,000 26 titanic 60,000 46,000 21 the vessel when completed was 883 feet long, 92 1/2 feet broad; her height from keel to bridge was 104 feet. she had 8 steel decks, a cellular double bottom, 5 1/4 feet through (the inner and outer "skins" so-called), and with bilge keels projecting 2 feet for 300 feet of her length amidships. these latter were intended to lessen the tendency to roll in a sea; they no doubt did so very well, but, as it happened, they proved to be a weakness, for this was the first portion of the ship touched by the iceberg and it has been suggested that the keels were forced inwards by the collision and made the work of smashing in the two "skins" a more simple matter. not that the final result would have been any different. her machinery was an expression of the latest progress in marine engineering, being a combination of reciprocating engines with parsons's low-pressure turbine engine,--a combination which gives increased power with the same steam consumption, an advance on the use of reciprocating engines alone. the reciprocating engines drove the wing-propellers and the turbine a mid-propeller, making her a triple-screw vessel. to drive these engines she had 29 enormous boilers and 159 furnaces. three elliptical funnels, 24 feet 6 inches in the widest diameter, took away smoke and water gases; the fourth one was a dummy for ventilation. she was fitted with 16 lifeboats 30 feet long, swung on davits of the welin double-acting type. these davits are specially designed for dealing with two, and, where necessary, three, sets of lifeboats,--i.e., 48 altogether; more than enough to have saved every soul on board on the night of the collision. she was divided into 16 compartments by 15 transverse watertight bulkheads reaching from the double bottom to the upper deck in the forward end and to the saloon deck in the after end (fig. 2), in both cases well above the water line. communication between the engine rooms and boiler rooms was through watertight doors, which could all be closed instantly from the captain's bridge: a single switch, controlling powerful electro-magnets, operated them. they could also be closed by hand with a lever, and in case the floor below them was flooded by accident, a float underneath the flooring shut them automatically. these compartments were so designed that if the two largest were flooded with water--a most unlikely contingency in the ordinary way--the ship would still be quite safe. of course, more than two were flooded the night of the collision, but exactly how many is not yet thoroughly established. her crew had a complement of 860, made up of 475 stewards, cooks, etc., 320 engineers, and 65 engaged in her navigation. the machinery and equipment of the titanic was the finest obtainable and represented the last word in marine construction. all her structure was of steel, of a weight, size, and thickness greater than that of any ship yet known: the girders, beams, bulkheads, and floors all of exceptional strength. it would hardly seem necessary to mention this, were it not that there is an impression among a portion of the general public that the provision of turkish baths, gymnasiums, and other so-called luxuries involved a sacrifice of some more essential things, the absence of which was responsible for the loss of so many lives. but this is quite an erroneous impression. all these things were an additional provision for the comfort and convenience of passengers, and there is no more reason why they should not be provided on these ships than in a large hotel. there were places on the titanic's deck where more boats and rafts could have been stored without sacrificing these things. the fault lay in not providing them, not in designing the ship without places to put them. on whom the responsibility must rest for their not being provided is another matter and must be left until later. when arranging a tour round the united states, i had decided to cross in the titanic for several reasons--one, that it was rather a novelty to be on board the largest ship yet launched, and another that friends who had crossed in the olympic described her as a most comfortable boat in a seaway, and it was reported that the titanic had been still further improved in this respect by having a thousand tons more built in to steady her. i went on board at southampton at 10 a.m. wednesday, april 10, after staying the night in the town. it is pathetic to recall that as i sat that morning in the breakfast room of an hotel, from the windows of which could be seen the four huge funnels of the titanic towering over the roofs of the various shipping offices opposite, and the procession of stokers and stewards wending their way to the ship, there sat behind me three of the titanic's passengers discussing the coming voyage and estimating, among other things, the probabilities of an accident at sea to the ship. as i rose from breakfast, i glanced at the group and recognized them later on board, but they were not among the number who answered to the roll-call on the carpathia on the following monday morning. between the time of going on board and sailing, i inspected, in the company of two friends who had come from exeter to see me off, the various decks, dining-saloons and libraries; and so extensive were they that it is no exaggeration to say that it was quite easy to lose one's way on such a ship. we wandered casually into the gymnasium on the boatdeck, and were engaged in bicycle exercise when the instructor came in with two photographers and insisted on our remaining there while his friends--as we thought at the time--made a record for him of his apparatus in use. it was only later that we discovered that they were the photographers of one of the illustrated london papers. more passengers came in, and the instructor ran here and there, looking the very picture of robust, rosy-cheeked health and "fitness" in his white flannels, placing one passenger on the electric "horse," another on the "camel," while the laughing group of onlookers watched the inexperienced riders vigorously shaken up and down as he controlled the little motor which made the machines imitate so realistically horse and camel exercise. it is related that on the night of the disaster, right up to the time of the titanic's sinking, while the band grouped outside the gymnasium doors played with such supreme courage in face of the water which rose foot by foot before their eyes, the instructor was on duty inside, with passengers on the bicycles and the rowing-machines, still assisting and encouraging to the last. along with the bandsmen it is fitting that his name, which i do not think has yet been put on record--it is mccawley--should have a place in the honourable list of those who did their duty faithfully to the ship and the line they served. chapter ii from southampton to the night of the collision soon after noon the whistles blew for friends to go ashore, the gangways were withdrawn, and the titanic moved slowly down the dock, to the accompaniment of last messages and shouted farewells of those on the quay. there was no cheering or hooting of steamers' whistles from the fleet of ships that lined the dock, as might seem probable on the occasion of the largest vessel in the world putting to sea on her maiden voyage; the whole scene was quiet and rather ordinary, with little of the picturesque and interesting ceremonial which imagination paints as usual in such circumstances. but if this was lacking, two unexpected dramatic incidents supplied a thrill of excitement and interest to the departure from dock. the first of these occurred just before the last gangway was withdrawn:--a knot of stokers ran along the quay, with their kit slung over their shoulders in bundles, and made for the gangway with the evident intention of joining the ship. but a petty officer guarding the shore end of the gangway firmly refused to allow them on board; they argued, gesticulated, apparently attempting to explain the reasons why they were late, but he remained obdurate and waved them back with a determined hand, the gangway was dragged back amid their protests, putting a summary ending to their determined efforts to join the titanic. those stokers must be thankful men to-day that some circumstance, whether their own lack of punctuality or some unforeseen delay over which they had no control, prevented their being in time to run up that last gangway! they will have told--and will no doubt tell for years--the story of how their lives were probably saved by being too late to join the titanic. the second incident occurred soon afterwards, and while it has no doubt been thoroughly described at the time by those on shore, perhaps a view of the occurrence from the deck of the titanic will not be without interest. as the titanic moved majestically down the dock, the crowd of friends keeping pace with us along the quay, we came together level with the steamer new york lying moored to the side of the dock along with the oceanic, the crowd waving "good-byes" to those on board as well as they could for the intervening bulk of the two ships. but as the bows of our ship came about level with those of the new york, there came a series of reports like those of a revolver, and on the quay side of the new york snaky coils of thick rope flung themselves high in the air and fell backwards among the crowd, which retreated in alarm to escape the flying ropes. we hoped that no one was struck by the ropes, but a sailor next to me was certain he saw a woman carried away to receive attention. and then, to our amazement the new york crept towards us, slowly and stealthily, as if drawn by some invisible force which she was powerless to withstand. it reminded me instantly of an experiment i had shown many times to a form of boys learning the elements of physics in a laboratory, in which a small magnet is made to float on a cork in a bowl of water and small steel objects placed on neighbouring pieces of cork are drawn up to the floating magnet by magnetic force. it reminded me, too, of seeing in my little boy's bath how a large celluloid floating duck would draw towards itself, by what is called capillary attraction, smaller ducks, frogs, beetles, and other animal folk, until the menagerie floated about as a unit, oblivious of their natural antipathies and reminding us of the "happy families" one sees in cages on the seashore. on the new york there was shouting of orders, sailors running to and fro, paying out ropes and putting mats over the side where it seemed likely we should collide; the tug which had a few moments before cast off from the bows of the titanic came up around our stern and passed to the quay side of the new york's stern, made fast to her and started to haul her back with all the force her engines were capable of; but it did not seem that the tug made much impression on the new york. apart from the serious nature of the accident, it made an irresistibly comic picture to see the huge vessel drifting down the dock with a snorting tug at its heels, for all the world like a small boy dragging a diminutive puppy down the road with its teeth locked on a piece of rope, its feet splayed out, its head and body shaking from side to side in the effort to get every ounce of its weight used to the best advantage. at first all appearance showed that the sterns of the two vessels would collide; but from the stern bridge of the titanic an officer directing operations stopped us dead, the suction ceased, and the new york with her tug trailing behind moved obliquely down the dock, her stern gliding along the side of the titanic some few yards away. it gave an extraordinary impression of the absolute helplessness of a big liner in the absence of any motive power to guide her. but all excitement was not yet over: the new york turned her bows inward towards the quay, her stern swinging just clear of and passing in front of our bows, and moved slowly head on for the teutonic lying moored to the side; mats were quickly got out and so deadened the force of the collision, which from where we were seemed to be too slight to cause any damage. another tug came up and took hold of the new york by the bows; and between the two of them they dragged her round the corner of the quay which just here came to an end on the side of the river. we now moved slowly ahead and passed the teutonic at a creeping pace, but notwithstanding this, the latter strained at her ropes so much that she heeled over several degrees in her efforts to follow the titanic: the crowd were shouted back, a group of gold-braided officials, probably the harbour-master and his staff, standing on the sea side of the moored ropes, jumped back over them as they drew up taut to a rigid line, and urged the crowd back still farther. but we were just clear, and as we slowly turned the corner into the river i saw the teutonic swing slowly back into her normal station, relieving the tension alike of the ropes and of the minds of all who witnessed the incident. [illustration: four decks of olympic, sister ship of titanic] unpleasant as this incident was, it was interesting to all the passengers leaning over the rails to see the means adopted by the officers and crew of the various vessels to avoid collision, to see on the titanic's docking-bridge (at the stern) an officer and seamen telephoning and ringing bells, hauling up and down little red and white flags, as danger of collision alternately threatened and diminished. no one was more interested than a young american kinematograph photographer, who, with his wife, followed the whole scene with eager eyes, turning the handle of his camera with the most evident pleasure as he recorded the unexpected incident on his films. it was obviously quite a windfall for him to have been on board at such a time. but neither the film nor those who exposed it reached the other side, and the record of the accident from the titanic's deck has never been thrown on the screen. as we steamed down the river, the scene we had just witnessed was the topic of every conversation: the comparison with the olympic-hawke collision was drawn in every little group of passengers, and it seemed to be generally agreed that this would confirm the suction theory which was so successfully advanced by the cruiser hawke in the law courts, but which many people scoffed at when the british admiralty first suggested it as the explanation of the cruiser ramming the olympic. and since this is an attempt to chronicle facts as they happened on board the titanic, it must be recorded that there were among the passengers and such of the crew as were heard to speak on the matter, the direst misgivings at the incident we had just witnessed. sailors are proverbially superstitious; far too many people are prone to follow their lead, or, indeed, the lead of any one who asserts a statement with an air of conviction and the opportunity of constant repetition; the sense of mystery that shrouds a prophetic utterance, particularly if it be an ominous one (for so constituted apparently is the human mind that it will receive the impress of an evil prophecy far more readily than it will that of a beneficent one, possibly through subservient fear to the thing it dreads, possibly through the degraded, morbid attraction which the sense of evil has for the innate evil in the human mind), leads many people to pay a certain respect to superstitious theories. not that they wholly believe in them or would wish their dearest friends to know they ever gave them a second thought; but the feeling that other people do so and the half conviction that there "may be something in it, after all," sways them into tacit obedience to the most absurd and childish theories. i wish in a later chapter to discuss the subject of superstition in its reference to our life on board the titanic, but will anticipate events here a little by relating a second so-called "bad omen" which was hatched at queenstown. as one of the tenders containing passengers and mails neared the titanic, some of those on board gazed up at the liner towering above them, and saw a stoker's head, black from his work in the stokehold below, peering out at them from the top of one of the enormous funnels--a dummy one for ventilation--that rose many feet above the highest deck. he had climbed up inside for a joke, but to some of those who saw him there the sight was seed for the growth of an "omen," which bore fruit in an unknown dread of dangers to come. an american lady--may she forgive me if she reads these lines!--has related to me with the deepest conviction and earnestness of manner that she saw the man and attributes the sinking of the titanic largely to that. arrant foolishness, you may say! yes, indeed, but not to those who believe in it; and it is well not to have such prophetic thoughts of danger passed round among passengers and crew: it would seem to have an unhealthy influence. we dropped down spithead, past the shores of the isle of wight looking superbly beautiful in new spring foliage, exchanged salutes with a white star tug lying-to in wait for one of their liners inward bound, and saw in the distance several warships with attendant black destroyers guarding the entrance from the sea. in the calmest weather we made cherbourg just as it grew dusk and left again about 8.30, after taking on board passengers and mails. we reached queenstown about 12 noon on thursday, after a most enjoyable passage across the channel, although the wind was almost too cold to allow of sitting out on deck on thursday morning. the coast of ireland looked very beautiful as we approached queenstown harbour, the brilliant morning sun showing up the green hillsides and picking out groups of dwellings dotted here and there above the rugged grey cliffs that fringed the coast. we took on board our pilot, ran slowly towards the harbour with the sounding-line dropping all the time, and came to a stop well out to sea, with our screws churning up the bottom and turning the sea all brown with sand from below. it had seemed to me that the ship stopped rather suddenly, and in my ignorance of the depth of the harbour entrance, that perhaps the sounding-line had revealed a smaller depth than was thought safe for the great size of the titanic: this seemed to be confirmed by the sight of sand churned up from the bottom--but this is mere supposition. passengers and mails were put on board from two tenders, and nothing could have given us a better idea of the enormous length and bulk of the titanic than to stand as far astern as possible and look over the side from the top deck, forwards and downwards to where the tenders rolled at her bows, the merest cockleshells beside the majestic vessel that rose deck after deck above them. truly she was a magnificent boat! there was something so graceful in her movement as she rode up and down on the slight swell in the harbour, a slow, stately dip and recover, only noticeable by watching her bows in comparison with some landmark on the coast in the near distance; the two little tenders tossing up and down like corks beside her illustrated vividly the advance made in comfort of motion from the time of the small steamer. presently the work of transfer was ended, the tenders cast off, and at 1.30 p.m., with the screws churning up the sea bottom again, the titanic turned slowly through a quarter-circle until her nose pointed down along the irish coast, and then steamed rapidly away from queenstown, the little house on the left of the town gleaming white on the hillside for many miles astern. in our wake soared and screamed hundreds of gulls, which had quarrelled and fought over the remnants of lunch pouring out of the waste pipes as we lay-to in the harbour entrance; and now they followed us in the expectation of further spoil. i watched them for a long time and was astonished at the ease with which they soared and kept up with the ship with hardly a motion of their wings: picking out a particular gull, i would keep him under observation for minutes at a time and see no motion of his wings downwards or upwards to aid his flight. he would tilt all of a piece to one side or another as the gusts of wind caught him: rigidly unbendable, as an aeroplane tilts sideways in a puff of wind. and yet with graceful ease he kept pace with the titanic forging through the water at twenty knots: as the wind met him he would rise upwards and obliquely forwards, and come down slantingly again, his wings curved in a beautiful arch and his tail feathers outspread as a fan. it was plain that he was possessed of a secret we are only just beginning to learn--that of utilizing air-currents as escalators up and down which he can glide at will with the expenditure of the minimum amount of energy, or of using them as a ship does when it sails within one or two points of a head wind. aviators, of course, are imitating the gull, and soon perhaps we may see an aeroplane or a glider dipping gracefully up and down in the face of an opposing wind and all the time forging ahead across the atlantic ocean. the gulls were still behind us when night fell, and still they screamed and dipped down into the broad wake of foam which we left behind; but in the morning they were gone: perhaps they had seen in the night a steamer bound for their queenstown home and had escorted her back. all afternoon we steamed along the coast of ireland, with grey cliffs guarding the shores, and hills rising behind gaunt and barren; as dusk fell, the coast rounded away from us to the northwest, and the last we saw of europe was the irish mountains dim and faint in the dropping darkness. with the thought that we had seen the last of land until we set foot on the shores of america, i retired to the library to write letters, little knowing that many things would happen to us all--many experiences, sudden, vivid and impressive to be encountered, many perils to be faced, many good and true people for whom we should have to mourn--before we saw land again. there is very little to relate from the time of leaving queenstown on thursday to sunday morning. the sea was calm,--so calm, indeed, that very few were absent from meals: the wind westerly and southwesterly,--"fresh" as the daily chart described it,--but often rather cold, generally too cold to sit out on deck to read or write, so that many of us spent a good part of the time in the library, reading and writing. i wrote a large number of letters and posted them day by day in the box outside the library door: possibly they are there yet. each morning the sun rose behind us in a sky of circular clouds, stretching round the horizon in long, narrow streaks and rising tier upon tier above the sky-line, red and pink and fading from pink to white, as the sun rose higher in the sky. it was a beautiful sight to one who had not crossed the ocean before (or indeed been out of sight of the shores of england) to stand on the top deck and watch the swell of the sea extending outwards from the ship in an unbroken circle until it met the sky-line with its hint of infinity: behind, the wake of the vessel white with foam where, fancy suggested, the propeller blades had cut up the long atlantic rollers and with them made a level white road bounded on either side by banks of green, blue, and blue-green waves that would presently sweep away the white road, though as yet it stretched back to the horizon and dipped over the edge of the world back to ireland and the gulls, while along it the morning sun glittered and sparkled. and each night the sun sank right in our eyes along the sea, making an undulating glittering path way, a golden track charted on the surface of the ocean which our ship followed unswervingly until the sun dipped below the edge of the horizon, and the pathway ran ahead of us faster than we could steam and slipped over the edge of the skyline,--as if the sun had been a golden ball and had wound up its thread of gold too quickly for us to follow. from 12 noon thursday to 12 noon friday we ran 386 miles, friday to saturday 519 miles, saturday to sunday 546 miles. the second day's run of 519 miles was, the purser told us, a disappointment, and we should not dock until wednesday morning instead of tuesday night, as we had expected; however, on sunday we were glad to see a longer run had been made, and it was thought we should make new york, after all, on tuesday night. the purser remarked: "they are not pushing her this trip and don't intend to make any fast running: i don't suppose we shall do more than 546 now; it is not a bad day's run for the first trip." this was at lunch, and i remember the conversation then turned to the speed and build of atlantic liners as factors in their comfort of motion: all those who had crossed many times were unanimous in saying the titanic was the most comfortable boat they had been on, and they preferred the speed we were making to that of the faster boats, from the point of view of lessened vibration as well as because the faster boats would bore through the waves with a twisted, screw-like motion instead of the straight up-and-down swing of the titanic. i then called the attention of our table to the way the titanic listed to port (i had noticed this before), and we all watched the sky-line through the portholes as we sat at the purser's table in the saloon: it was plain she did so, for the sky-line and sea on the port side were visible most of the time and on the starboard only sky. the purser remarked that probably coal had been used mostly from the starboard side. it is no doubt a common occurrence for all vessels to list to some degree; but in view of the fact that the titanic was cut open on the starboard side and before she sank listed so much to port that there was quite a chasm between her and the swinging lifeboats, across which ladies had to be thrown or to cross on chairs laid flat, the previous listing to port may be of interest. returning for a moment to the motion of the titanic, it was interesting to stand on the boat-deck, as i frequently did, in the angle between lifeboats 13 and 15 on the starboard side (two boats i have every reason to remember, for the first carried me in safety to the carpathia, and it seemed likely at one time that the other would come down on our heads as we sat in 13 trying to get away from the ship's side), and watch the general motion of the ship through the waves resolve itself into two motions--one to be observed by contrasting the docking-bridge, from which the log-line trailed away behind in the foaming wake, with the horizon, and observing the long, slow heave as we rode up and down. i timed the average period occupied in one up-and-down vibration, but do not now remember the figures. the second motion was a side-to-side roll, and could be calculated by watching the port rail and contrasting it with the horizon as before. it seems likely that this double motion is due to the angle at which our direction to new york cuts the general set of the gulf stream sweeping from the gulf of mexico across to europe; but the almost clock-like regularity of the two vibratory movements was what attracted my attention: it was while watching the side roll that i first became aware of the list to port. looking down astern from the boat-deck or from b deck to the steerage quarters, i often noticed how the third-class passengers were enjoying every minute of the time: a most uproarious skipping game of the mixed-double type was the great favourite, while "in and out and roundabout" went a scotchman with his bagpipes playing something that gilbert says "faintly resembled an air." standing aloof from all of them, generally on the raised stern deck above the "playing field," was a man of about twenty to twenty-four years of age, well-dressed, always gloved and nicely groomed, and obviously quite out of place among his fellow-passengers: he never looked happy all the time. i watched him, and classified him at hazard as the man who had been a failure in some way at home and had received the proverbial shilling plus third-class fare to america: he did not look resolute enough or happy enough to be working out his own problem. another interesting man was travelling steerage, but had placed his wife in the second cabin: he would climb the stairs leading from the steerage to the second deck and talk affectionately with his wife across the low gate which separated them. i never saw him after the collision, but i think his wife was on the carpathia. whether they ever saw each other on the sunday night is very doubtful: he would not at first be allowed on the second-class deck, and if he were, the chances of seeing his wife in the darkness and the crowd would be very small, indeed. of all those playing so happily on the steerage deck i did not recognize many afterwards on the carpathia. coming now to sunday, the day on which the titanic struck the iceberg, it will be interesting, perhaps, to give the day's events in some detail, to appreciate the general attitude of passengers to their surroundings just before the collision. service was held in the saloon by the purser in the morning, and going on deck after lunch we found such a change in temperature that not many cared to remain to face the bitter wind--an artificial wind created mainly, if not entirely, by the ship's rapid motion through the chilly atmosphere. i should judge there was no wind blowing at the time, for i had noticed about the same force of wind approaching queenstown, to find that it died away as soon as we stopped, only to rise again as we steamed away from the harbour. returning to the library, i stopped for a moment to read again the day's run and observe our position on the chart; the rev. mr. carter, a clergyman of the church of england, was similarly engaged, and we renewed a conversation we had enjoyed for some days: it had commenced with a discussion of the relative merits of his university--oxford--with mine--cambridge--as world-wide educational agencies, the opportunities at each for the formation of character apart from mere education as such, and had led on to the lack of sufficiently qualified men to take up the work of the church of england (a matter apparently on which he felt very deeply) and from that to his own work in england as a priest. he told me some of his parish problems and spoke of the impossibility of doing half his work in his church without the help his wife gave. i knew her only slightly at that time, but meeting her later in the day, i realized something of what he meant in attributing a large part of what success he had as a vicar to her. my only excuse for mentioning these details about the carters--now and later in the day--is that, while they have perhaps not much interest for the average reader, they will no doubt be some comfort to the parish over which he presided and where i am sure he was loved. he next mentioned the absence of a service in the evening and asked if i knew the purser well enough to request the use of the saloon in the evening where he would like to have a "hymn sing-song"; the purser gave his consent at once, and mr. carter made preparations during the afternoon by asking all he knew--and many he did not--to come to the saloon at 8.30 p.m. the library was crowded that afternoon, owing to the cold on deck: but through the windows we could see the clear sky with brilliant sunlight that seemed to augur a fine night and a clear day to-morrow, and the prospect of landing in two days, with calm weather all the way to new york, was a matter of general satisfaction among us all. i can look back and see every detail of the library that afternoon--the beautifully furnished room, with lounges, armchairs, and small writing or card-tables scattered about, writing-bureaus round the walls of the room, and the library in glass-cased shelves flanking one side,--the whole finished in mahogany relieved with white fluted wooden columns that supported the deck above. through the windows there is the covered corridor, reserved by general consent as the children's playground, and here are playing the two navatril children with their father,--devoted to them, never absent from them. who would have thought of the dramatic history of the happy group at play in the corridor that afternoon!--the abduction of the children in nice, the assumed name, the separation of father and children in a few hours, his death and their subsequent union with their mother after a period of doubt as to their parentage! how many more similar secrets the titanic revealed in the privacy of family life, or carried down with her untold, we shall never know. in the same corridor is a man and his wife with two children, and one of them he is generally carrying: they are all young and happy: he is dressed always in a grey knickerbocker suit--with a camera slung over his shoulder. i have not seen any of them since that afternoon. close beside me--so near that i cannot avoid hearing scraps of their conversation--are two american ladies, both dressed in white, young, probably friends only: one has been to india and is returning by way of england, the other is a school-teacher in america, a graceful girl with a distinguished air heightened by a pair of _pince-nez_. engaged in conversation with them is a gentleman whom i subsequently identified from a photograph as a well-known resident of cambridge, massachusetts, genial, polished, and with a courtly air towards the two ladies, whom he has known but a few hours; from time to time as they talk, a child acquaintance breaks in on their conversation and insists on their taking notice of a large doll clasped in her arms; i have seen none of this group since then. in the opposite corner are the young american kinematograph photographer and his young wife, evidently french, very fond of playing patience, which she is doing now, while he sits back in his chair watching the game and interposing from time to time with suggestions. i did not see them again. in the middle of the room are two catholic priests, one quietly reading,--either english or irish, and probably the latter,--the other, dark, bearded, with broad-brimmed hat, talking earnestly to a friend in german and evidently explaining some verse in the open bible before him; near them a young fire engineer on his way to mexico, and of the same religion as the rest of the group. none of them were saved. it may be noted here that the percentage of men saved in the second-class is the lowest of any other division--only eight per cent. many other faces recur to thought, but it is impossible to describe them all in the space of a short book: of all those in the library that sunday afternoon, i can remember only two or three persons who found their way to the carpathia. looking over this room, with his back to the library shelves, is the library steward, thin, stooping, sad-faced, and generally with nothing to do but serve out books; but this afternoon he is busier than i have ever seen him, serving out baggage declaration-forms for passengers to fill in. mine is before me as i write: "form for nonresidents in the united states. steamship titanic: no. 31444, d," etc. i had filled it in that afternoon and slipped it in my pocket-book instead of returning it to the steward. before me, too, is a small cardboard square: "white star line. r.m.s. titanic. 208. this label must be given up when the article is returned. the property will be deposited in the purser's safe. the company will not be liable to passengers for the loss of money, jewels, or ornaments, by theft or otherwise, not so deposited." the "property deposited" in my case was money, placed in an envelope, sealed, with my name written across the flap, and handed to the purser; the "label" is my receipt. along with other similar envelopes it may be still intact in the safe at the bottom of the sea, but in all probability it is not, as will be seen presently. after dinner, mr. carter invited all who wished to the saloon, and with the assistance at the piano of a gentleman who sat at the purser's table opposite me (a young scotch engineer going out to join his brother fruit-farming at the foot of the rockies), he started some hundred passengers singing hymns. they were asked to choose whichever hymn they wished, and with so many to choose, it was impossible for him to do more than have the greatest favourites sung. as he announced each hymn, it was evident that he was thoroughly versed in their history: no hymn was sung but that he gave a short sketch of its author and in some cases a description of the circumstances in which it was composed. i think all were impressed with his knowledge of hymns and with his eagerness to tell us all he knew of them. it was curious to see how many chose hymns dealing with dangers at sea. i noticed the hushed tone with which all sang the hymn, "for those in peril on the sea." the singing must have gone on until after ten o'clock, when, seeing the stewards standing about waiting to serve biscuits and coffee before going off duty, mr. carter brought the evening to a close by a few words of thanks to the purser for the use of the saloon, a short sketch of the happiness and safety of the voyage hitherto, the great confidence all felt on board this great liner with her steadiness and her size, and the happy outlook of landing in a few hours in new york at the close of a delightful voyage; and all the time he spoke, a few miles ahead of us lay the "peril on the sea" that was to sink this same great liner with many of those on board who listened with gratitude to his simple, heartfelt words. so much for the frailty of human hopes and for the confidence reposed in material human designs. think of the shame of it, that a mass of ice of no use to any one or anything should have the power fatally to injure the beautiful titanic! that an insensible block should be able to threaten, even in the smallest degree, the lives of many good men and women who think and plan and hope and love--and not only to threaten, but to end their lives. it is unbearable! are we never to educate ourselves to foresee such dangers and to prevent them before they happen? all the evidence of history shows that laws unknown and unsuspected are being discovered day by day: as this knowledge accumulates for the use of man, is it not certain that the ability to see and destroy beforehand the threat of danger will be one of the privileges the whole world will utilize? may that day come soon. until it does, no precaution too rigorous can be taken, no safety appliance, however costly, must be omitted from a ship's equipment. after the meeting had broken up, i talked with the carters over a cup of coffee, said good-night to them, and retired to my cabin at about quarter to eleven. they were good people and this world is much poorer by their loss. it may be a matter of pleasure to many people to know that their friends were perhaps among that gathering of people in the saloon, and that at the last the sound of the hymns still echoed in their ears as they stood on the deck so quietly and courageously. who can tell how much it had to do with the demeanour of some of them and the example this would set to others? chapter iii the collision and embarkation in lifeboats i had been fortunate enough to secure a two-berth cabin to myself,--d 56,--quite close to the saloon and most convenient in every way for getting about the ship; and on a big ship like the titanic it was quite a consideration to be on d deck, only three decks below the top or boat-deck. below d again were cabins on e and f decks, and to walk from a cabin on f up to the top deck, climbing five flights of stairs on the way, was certainly a considerable task for those not able to take much exercise. the titanic management has been criticised, among other things, for supplying the boat with lifts: it has been said they were an expensive luxury and the room they took up might have been utilized in some way for more life-saving appliances. whatever else may have been superfluous, lifts certainly were not: old ladies, for example, in cabins on f deck, would hardly have got to the top deck during the whole voyage had they not been able to ring for the lift-boy. perhaps nothing gave one a greater impression of the size of the ship than to take the lift from the top and drop slowly down past the different floors, discharging and taking in passengers just as in a large hotel. i wonder where the lift-boy was that night. i would have been glad to find him in our boat, or on the carpathia when we took count of the saved. he was quite young,--not more than sixteen, i think,--a bright-eyed, handsome boy, with a love for the sea and the games on deck and the view over the ocean--and he did not get any of them. one day, as he put me out of his lift and saw through the vestibule windows a game of deck quoits in progress, he said, in a wistful tone, "my! i wish i could go out there sometimes!" i wished he could, too, and made a jesting offer to take charge of his lift for an hour while he went out to watch the game; but he smilingly shook his head and dropped down in answer to an imperative ring from below. i think he was not on duty with his lift after the collision, but if he were, he would smile at his passengers all the time as he took them up to the boats waiting to leave the sinking ship. after undressing and climbing into the top berth, i read from about quarter-past eleven to the time we struck, about quarter to twelve. during this time i noticed particularly the increased vibration of the ship, and i assumed that we were going at a higher speed than at any other time since we sailed from queenstown. now i am aware that this is an important point, and bears strongly on the question of responsibility for the effects of the collision; but the impression of increased vibration is fixed in my memory so strongly that it seems important to record it. two things led me to this conclusion--first, that as i sat on the sofa undressing, with bare feet on the floor, the jar of the vibration came up from the engines below very noticeably; and second, that as i sat up in the berth reading, the spring mattress supporting me was vibrating more rapidly than usual: this cradle-like motion was always noticeable as one lay in bed, but that night there was certainly a marked increase in the motion. referring to the plan, [footnote: see figure 2, page 116.] it will be seen that the vibration must have come almost directly up from below, when it is mentioned that the saloon was immediately above the engines as shown in the plan, and my cabin next to the saloon. from these two data, on the assumption that greater vibration is an indication of higher speed,--and i suppose it must be,--then i am sure we were going faster that night at the time we struck the iceberg than we had done before, i.e., during the hours i was awake and able to take note of anything. and then, as i read in the quietness of the night, broken only by the muffled sound that came to me through the ventilators of stewards talking and moving along the corridors, when nearly all the passengers were in their cabins, some asleep in bed, others undressing, and others only just down from the smoking-room and still discussing many things, there came what seemed to me nothing more than an extra heave of the engines and a more than usually obvious dancing motion of the mattress on which i sat. nothing more than that--no sound of a crash or of anything else: no sense of shock, no jar that felt like one heavy body meeting another. and presently the same thing repeated with about the same intensity. the thought came to me that they must have still further increased the speed. and all this time the titanic was being cut open by the iceberg and water was pouring in her side, and yet no evidence that would indicate such a disaster had been presented to us. it fills me with astonishment now to think of it. consider the question of list alone. here was this enormous vessel running starboard-side on to an iceberg, and a passenger sitting quietly in bed, reading, felt no motion or list to the opposite or port side, and this must have been felt had it been more than the usual roll of the ship--never very much in the calm weather we had all the way. again, my bunk was fixed to the wall on the starboard side, and any list to port would have tended to fling me out on the floor: i am sure i should have noted it had there been any. and yet the explanation is simple enough: the titanic struck the berg with a force of impact of over a million foot-tons; her plates were less than an inch thick, and they must have been cut through as a knife cuts paper: there would be no need to list; it would have been better if she had listed and thrown us out on the floor, for it would have been an indication that our plates were strong enough to offer, at any rate, some resistance to the blow, and we might all have been safe to-day. and so, with no thought of anything serious having happened to the ship, i continued my reading; and still the murmur from the stewards and from adjoining cabins, and no other sound: no cry in the night; no alarm given; no one afraid--there was then nothing which could cause fear to the most timid person. but in a few moments i felt the engines slow and stop; the dancing motion and the vibration ceased suddenly after being part of our very existence for four days, and that was the first hint that anything out of the ordinary had happened. we have all "heard" a loud-ticking clock stop suddenly in a quiet room, and then have noticed the clock and the ticking noise, of which we seemed until then quite unconscious. so in the same way the fact was suddenly brought home to all in the ship that the engines--that part of the ship that drove us through the sea--had stopped dead. but the stopping of the engines gave us no information: we had to make our own calculations as to why we had stopped. like a flash it came to me: "we have dropped a propeller blade: when this happens the engines always race away until they are controlled, and this accounts for the extra heave they gave"; not a very logical conclusion when considered now, for the engines should have continued to heave all the time until we stopped, but it was at the time a sufficiently tenable hypothesis to hold. acting on it, i jumped out of bed, slipped on a dressing-gown over pyjamas, put on shoes, and went out of my cabin into the hall near the saloon. here was a steward leaning against the staircase, probably waiting until those in the smoke-room above had gone to bed and he could put out the lights. i said, "why have we stopped?" "i don't know, sir," he replied, "but i don't suppose it is anything much." "well," i said, "i am going on deck to see what it is," and started towards the stairs. he smiled indulgently at me as i passed him, and said, "all right, sir, but it is mighty cold up there." i am sure at that time he thought i was rather foolish to go up with so little reason, and i must confess i felt rather absurd for not remaining in the cabin: it seemed like making a needless fuss to walk about the ship in a dressing-gown. but it was my first trip across the sea; i had enjoyed every minute of it and was keenly alive to note every new experience; and certainly to stop in the middle of the sea with a propeller dropped seemed sufficient reason for going on deck. and yet the steward, with his fatherly smile, and the fact that no one else was about the passages or going upstairs to reconnoitre, made me feel guilty in an undefined way of breaking some code of a ship's régime--an englishman's fear of being thought "unusual," perhaps! i climbed the three flights of stairs, opened the vestibule door leading to the top deck, and stepped out into an atmosphere that cut me, clad as i was, like a knife. walking to the starboard side, i peered over and saw the sea many feet below, calm and black; forward, the deserted deck stretching away to the first-class quarters and the captain's bridge; and behind, the steerage quarters and the stern bridge; nothing more: no iceberg on either side or astern as far as we could see in the darkness. there were two or three men on deck, and with one--the scotch engineer who played hymns in the saloon--i compared notes of our experiences. he had just begun to undress when the engines stopped and had come up at once, so that he was fairly well-clad; none of us could see anything, and all being quiet and still, the scotchman and i went down to the next deck. through the windows of the smoking-room we saw a game of cards going on, with several onlookers, and went in to enquire if they knew more than we did. they had apparently felt rather more of the heaving motion, but so far as i remember, none of them had gone out on deck to make any enquiries, even when one of them had seen through the windows an iceberg go by towering above the decks. he had called their attention to it, and they all watched it disappear, but had then at once resumed the game. we asked them the height of the berg and some said one hundred feet, others, sixty feet; one of the onlookers--a motor engineer travelling to america with a model carburetter (he had filled in his declaration form near me in the afternoon and had questioned the library steward how he should declare his patent)--said, "well, i am accustomed to estimating distances and i put it at between eighty and ninety feet." we accepted his estimate and made guesses as to what had happened to the titanic: the general impression was that we had just scraped the iceberg with a glancing blow on the starboard side, and they had stopped as a wise precaution, to examine her thoroughly all over. "i expect the iceberg has scratched off some of her new paint," said one, "and the captain doesn't like to go on until she is painted up again." we laughed at his estimate of the captain's care for the ship. poor captain smith!--he knew by this time only too well what had happened. one of the players, pointing to his glass of whiskey standing at his elbow, and turning to an onlooker, said, "just run along the deck and see if any ice has come aboard: i would like some for this." amid the general laughter at what we thought was his imagination,--only too realistic, alas! for when he spoke the forward deck was covered with ice that had tumbled over,--and seeing that no more information was forthcoming, i left the smoking-room and went down to my cabin, where i sat for some time reading again. i am filled with sorrow to think i never saw any of the occupants of that smoking-room again: nearly all young men full of hope for their prospects in a new world; mostly unmarried; keen, alert, with the makings of good citizens. presently, hearing people walking about the corridors, i looked out and saw several standing in the hall talking to a steward--most of them ladies in dressing-gowns; other people were going upstairs, and i decided to go on deck again, but as it was too cold to do so in a dressing-gown, i dressed in a norfolk jacket and trousers and walked up. there were now more people looking over the side and walking about, questioning each other as to why we had stopped, but without obtaining any definite information. i stayed on deck some minutes, walking about vigorously to keep warm and occasionally looking downwards to the sea as if something there would indicate the reason for delay. the ship had now resumed her course, moving very slowly through the water with a little white line of foam on each side. i think we were all glad to see this: it seemed better than standing still. i soon decided to go down again, and as i crossed from the starboard to the port side to go down by the vestibule door, i saw an officer climb on the last lifeboat on the port side--number 16--and begin to throw off the cover, but i do not remember that any one paid any particular attention to him. certainly no one thought they were preparing to man the lifeboats and embark from the ship. all this time there was no apprehension of any danger in the minds of passengers, and no one was in any condition of panic or hysteria; after all, it would have been strange if they had been, without any definite evidence of danger. as i passed to the door to go down, i looked forward again and saw to my surprise an undoubted tilt downwards from the stern to the bows: only a slight slope, which i don't think any one had noticed,--at any rate, they had not remarked on it. as i went downstairs a confirmation of this tilting forward came in something unusual about the stairs, a curious sense of something out of balance and of not being able to put one's feet down in the right place: naturally, being tilted forward, the stairs would slope downwards at an angle and tend to throw one forward. i could not see any visible slope of the stairway: it was perceptible only by the sense of balance at this time. on d deck were three ladies--i think they were all saved, and it is a good thing at least to be able to chronicle meeting some one who was saved after so much record of those who were not--standing in the passage near the cabin. "oh! why have we stopped?" they said. "we did stop," i replied, "but we are now going on again.". "oh, no," one replied; "i cannot feel the engines as i usually do, or hear them. listen!" we listened, and there was no throb audible. having noticed that the vibration of the engines is most noticeable lying in a bath, where the throb comes straight from the floor through its metal sides--too much so ordinarily for one to put one's head back with comfort on the bath,--i took them along the corridor to a bathroom and made them put their hands on the side of the bath: they were much reassured to feel the engines throbbing down below and to know we were making some headway. i left them and on the way to my cabin passed some stewards standing unconcernedly against the walls of the saloon: one of them, the library steward again, was leaning over a table, writing. it is no exaggeration to say that they had neither any knowledge of the accident nor any feeling of alarm that we had stopped and had not yet gone on again full speed: their whole attitude expressed perfect confidence in the ship and officers. turning into my gangway (my cabin being the first in the gangway), i saw a man standing at the other end of it fastening his tie. "anything fresh?" he said. "not much," i replied; "we are going ahead slowly and she is down a little at the bows, but i don't think it is anything serious." "come in and look at this man," he laughed; "he won't get up." i looked in, and in the top bunk lay a man with his back to me, closely wrapped in his bed-clothes and only the back of his head visible. "why won't he get up? is he asleep?" i said. "no," laughed the man dressing, "he says--" but before he could finish the sentence the man above grunted: "you don't catch me leaving a warm bed to go up on that cold deck at midnight. i know better than that." we both told him laughingly why he had better get up, but he was certain he was just as safe there and all this dressing was quite unnecessary; so i left them and went again to my cabin. i put on some underclothing, sat on the sofa, and read for some ten minutes, when i heard through the open door, above, the noise of people passing up and down, and a loud shout from above: "all passengers on deck with lifebelts on." i placed the two books i was reading in the side pockets of my norfolk jacket, picked up my lifebelt (curiously enough, i had taken it down for the first time that night from the wardrobe when i first retired to my cabin) and my dressing-gown, and walked upstairs tying on the lifebelt. as i came out of my cabin, i remember seeing the purser's assistant, with his foot on the stairs about to climb them, whisper to a steward and jerk his head significantly behind him; not that i thought anything of it at the time, but i have no doubt he was telling him what had happened up in the bows, and was giving him orders to call all passengers. going upstairs with other passengers,--no one ran a step or seemed alarmed,--we met two ladies coming down: one seized me by the arm and said, "oh! i have no lifebelt; will you come down to my cabin and help me to find it?" i returned with them to f deck,--the lady who had addressed me holding my arm all the time in a vise-like grip, much to my amusement,--and we found a steward in her gangway who took them in and found their lifebelts. coming upstairs again, i passed the purser's window on f deck, and noticed a light inside; when halfway up to e deck, i heard the heavy metallic clang of the safe door, followed by a hasty step retreating along the corridor towards the first-class quarters. i have little doubt it was the purser, who had taken all valuables from his safe and was transferring them to the charge of the first-class purser, in the hope they might all be saved in one package. that is why i said above that perhaps the envelope containing my money was not in the safe at the bottom of the sea: it is probably in a bundle, with many others like it, waterlogged at the bottom. reaching the top deck, we found many people assembled there,--some fully dressed, with coats and wraps, well-prepared for anything that might happen; others who had thrown wraps hastily round them when they were called or heard the summons to equip themselves with lifebelts--not in much condition to face the cold of that night. fortunately there was no wind to beat the cold air through our clothing: even the breeze caused by the ship's motion had died entirely away, for the engines had stopped again and the titanic lay peacefully on the surface of the sea--motionless, quiet, not even rocking to the roll of the sea; indeed, as we were to discover presently, the sea was as calm as an inland lake save for the gentle swell which could impart no motion to a ship the size of the titanic. to stand on the deck many feet above the water lapping idly against her sides, and looking much farther off than it really was because of the darkness, gave one a sense of wonderful security: to feel her so steady and still was like standing on a large rock in the middle of the ocean. but there were now more evidences of the coming catastrophe to the observer than had been apparent when on deck last: one was the roar and hiss of escaping steam from the boilers, issuing out of a large steam pipe reaching high up one of the funnels: a harsh, deafening boom that made conversation difficult and no doubt increased the apprehension of some people merely because of the volume of noise: if one imagines twenty locomotives blowing off steam in a low key it would give some idea of the unpleasant sound that met us as we climbed out on the top deck. but after all it was the kind of phenomenon we ought to expect: engines blow off steam when standing in a station, and why should not a ship's boilers do the same when the ship is not moving? i never heard any one connect this noise with the danger of boiler explosion, in the event of the ship sinking with her boilers under a high pressure of steam, which was no doubt the true explanation of this precaution. but this is perhaps speculation; some people may have known it quite well, for from the time we came on deck until boat 13 got away, i heard very little conversation of any kind among the passengers. it is not the slightest exaggeration to say that no signs of alarm were exhibited by any one: there was no indication of panic or hysteria; no cries of fear, and no running to and fro to discover what was the matter, why we had been summoned on deck with lifebelts, and what was to be done with us now we were there. we stood there quietly looking on at the work of the crew as they manned the lifeboats, and no one ventured to interfere with them or offered to help them. it was plain we should be of no use; and the crowd of men and women stood quietly on the deck or paced slowly up and down waiting for orders from the officers. now, before we consider any further the events that followed, the state of mind of passengers at this juncture, and the motives which led each one to act as he or she did in the circumstances, it is important to keep in thought the amount of information at our disposal. men and women act according to judgment based on knowledge of the conditions around them, and the best way to understand some apparently inconceivable things that happened is for any one to imagine himself or herself standing on deck that night. it seems a mystery to some people that women refused to leave the ship, that some persons retired to their cabins, and so on; but it is a matter of judgment, after all. so that if the reader will come and stand with the crowd on deck, he must first rid himself entirely of the knowledge that the titanic has sunk--an important necessity, for he cannot see conditions as they existed there through the mental haze arising from knowledge of the greatest maritime tragedy the world has known: he must get rid of any foreknowledge of disaster to appreciate why people acted as they did. secondly, he had better get rid of any picture in thought painted either by his own imagination or by some artist, whether pictorial or verbal, "from information supplied." some are most inaccurate (these, mostly word-pictures), and where they err, they err on the highly dramatic side. they need not have done so: the whole conditions were dramatic enough in all their bare simplicity, without the addition of any high colouring. having made these mental erasures, he will find himself as one of the crowd faced with the following conditions: a perfectly still atmosphere; a brilliantly beautiful starlight night, but no moon, and so with little light that was of any use; a ship that had come quietly to rest without any indication of disaster--no iceberg visible, no hole in the ship's side through which water was pouring in, nothing broken or out of place, no sound of alarm, no panic, no movement of any one except at a walking pace; the absence of any knowledge of the nature of the accident, of the extent of damage, of the danger of the ship sinking in a few hours, of the numbers of boats, rafts, and other lifesaving appliances available, their capacity, what other ships were near or coming to help--in fact, an almost complete absence of any positive knowledge on any point. i think this was the result of deliberate judgment on the part of the officers, and perhaps, it was the best thing that could be done. in particular, he must remember that the ship was a sixth of a mile long, with passengers on three decks open to the sea, and port and starboard sides to each deck: he will then get some idea of the difficulty presented to the officers of keeping control over such a large area, and the impossibility of any one knowing what was happening except in his own immediate vicinity. perhaps the whole thing can be summed up best by saying that, after we had embarked in the lifeboats and rowed away from the titanic, it would not have surprised us to hear that all passengers would be saved: the cries of drowning people after the titanic gave the final plunge were a thunderbolt to us. i am aware that the experiences of many of those saved differed in some respects from the above: some had knowledge of certain things, some were experienced travellers and sailors, and therefore deduced more rapidly what was likely to happen; but i think the above gives a fairly accurate representation of the state of mind of most of those on deck that night. all this time people were pouring up from the stairs and adding to the crowd: i remember at that moment thinking it would be well to return to my cabin and rescue some money and warmer clothing if we were to embark in boats, but looking through the vestibule windows and seeing people still coming upstairs, i decided it would only cause confusion passing them on the stairs, and so remained on deck. i was now on the starboard side of the top boat deck; the time about 12.20. we watched the crew at work on the lifeboats, numbers 9, 11, 13, 15, some inside arranging the oars, some coiling ropes on the deck,--the ropes which ran through the pulleys to lower to the sea,--others with cranks fitted to the rocking arms of the davits. as we watched, the cranks were turned, the davits swung outwards until the boats hung clear of the edge of the deck. just then an officer came along from the first-class deck and shouted above the noise of escaping steam, "all women and children get down to deck below and all men stand back from the boats." he had apparently been off duty when the ship struck, and was lightly dressed, with a white muffler twisted hastily round his neck. the men fell back and the women retired below to get into the boats from the next deck. two women refused at first to leave their husbands, but partly by persuasion and partly by force they were separated from them and sent down to the next deck. i think that by this time the work on the lifeboats and the separation of men and women impressed on us slowly the presence of imminent danger, but it made no difference in the attitude of the crowd: they were just as prepared to obey orders and to do what came next as when they first came on deck. i do not mean that they actually reasoned it out: they were the average teutonic crowd, with an inborn respect for law and order and for traditions bequeathed to them by generations of ancestors: the reasons that made them act as they did were impersonal, instinctive, hereditary. but if there were any one who had not by now realized that the ship was in danger, all doubt on this point was to be set at rest in a dramatic manner. suddenly a rush of light from the forward deck, a hissing roar that made us all turn from watching the boats, and a rocket leapt upwards to where the stars blinked and twinkled above us. up it went, higher and higher, with a sea of faces upturned to watch it, and then an explosion that seemed to split the silent night in two, and a shower of stars sank slowly down and went out one by one. and with a gasping sigh one word escaped the lips of the crowd: "rockets!" anybody knows what rockets at sea mean. and presently another, and then a third. it is no use denying the dramatic intensity of the scene: separate it if you can from all the terrible events that followed, and picture the calmness of the night, the sudden light on the decks crowded with people in different stages of dress and undress, the background of huge funnels and tapering masts revealed by the soaring rocket, whose flash illumined at the same time the faces and minds of the obedient crowd, the one with mere physical light, the other with a sudden revelation of what its message was. every one knew without being told that we were calling for help from any one who was near enough to see. the crew were now in the boats, the sailors standing by the pulley ropes let them slip through the cleats in jerks, and down the boats went till level with b deck; women and children climbed over the rail into the boats and filled them; when full, they were lowered one by one, beginning with number 9, the first on the second-class deck, and working backwards towards 15. all this we could see by peering over the edge of the boat-deck, which was now quite open to the sea, the four boats which formed a natural barrier being lowered from the deck and leaving it exposed. about this time, while walking the deck, i saw two ladies come over from the port side and walk towards the rail separating the second-class from the first-class deck. there stood an officer barring the way. "may we pass to the boats?" they said. "no, madam," he replied politely, "your boats are down on your own deck," pointing to where they swung below. the ladies turned and went towards the stairway, and no doubt were able to enter one of the boats: they had ample time. i mention this to show that there was, at any rate, some arrangement--whether official or not--for separating the classes in embarking in boats; how far it was carried out, i do not know, but if the second-class ladies were not expected to enter a boat from the first-class deck, while steerage passengers were allowed access to the second-class deck, it would seem to press rather hardly on the second-class men, and this is rather supported by the low percentage saved. almost immediately after this incident, a report went round among men on the top deck--the starboard side--that men were to be taken off on the port side; how it originated, i am quite unable to say, but can only suppose that as the port boats, numbers 10 to 16, were not lowered from the top deck quite so soon as the starboard boats (they could still be seen on deck), it might be assumed that women were being taken off on one side and men on the other; but in whatever way the report started, it was acted on at once by almost all the men, who crowded across to the port side and watched the preparation for lowering the boats, leaving the starboard side almost deserted. two or three men remained, however: not for any reason that we were consciously aware of; i can personally think of no decision arising from reasoned thought that induced me to remain rather than to cross over. but while there was no process of conscious reason at work, i am convinced that what was my salvation was a recognition of the necessity of being quiet and waiting in patience for some opportunity of safety to present itself. soon after the men had left the starboard side, i saw a bandsman--the 'cellist--come round the vestibule corner from the staircase entrance and run down the now deserted starboard deck, his 'cello trailing behind him, the spike dragging along the floor. this must have been about 12.40 a.m. i suppose the band must have begun to play soon after this and gone on until after 2 a.m. many brave things were done that night, but none more brave than by those few men playing minute after minute as the ship settled quietly lower and lower in the sea and the sea rose higher and higher to where they stood; the music they played serving alike as their own immortal requiem and their right to be recorded on the rolls of undying fame. looking forward and downward, we could see several of the boats now in the water, moving slowly one by one from the side, without confusion or noise, and stealing away in the darkness which swallowed them in turn as the crew bent to the oars. an officer--i think first officer murdock--came striding along the deck, clad in a long coat, from his manner and face evidently in great agitation, but determined and resolute; he looked over the side and shouted to the boats being lowered: "lower away, and when afloat, row around to the gangway and wait for orders." "aye, aye, sir," was the reply; and the officer passed by and went across the ship to the port side. almost immediately after this, i heard a cry from below of, "any more ladies?" and looking over the edge of the deck, saw boat 13 swinging level with the rail of b deck, with the crew, some stokers, a few men passengers and the rest ladies,--the latter being about half the total number; the boat was almost full and just about to be lowered. the call for ladies was repeated twice again, but apparently there were none to be found. just then one of the crew looked up and saw me looking over. "any ladies on your deck?" he said. "no," i replied. "then you had better jump." i sat on the edge of the deck with my feet over, threw the dressing-gown (which i had carried on my arm all of the time) into the boat, dropped, and fell in the boat near the stern. as i picked myself up, i heard a shout: "wait a moment, here are two more ladies," and they were pushed hurriedly over the side and tumbled into the boat, one into the middle and one next to me in the stern. they told me afterwards that they had been assembled on a lower deck with other ladies, and had come up to b deck not by the usual stairway inside, but by one of the vertically upright iron ladders that connect each deck with the one below it, meant for the use of sailors passing about the ship. other ladies had been in front of them and got up quickly, but these two were delayed a long time by the fact that one of them--the one that was helped first over the side into boat 13 near the middle--was not at all active: it seemed almost impossible for her to climb up a vertical ladder. we saw her trying to climb the swinging rope ladder up the carpathia's side a few hours later, and she had the same difficulty. as they tumbled in, the crew shouted, "lower away"; but before the order was obeyed, a man with his wife and a baby came quickly to the side: the baby was handed to the lady in the stern, the mother got in near the middle and the father at the last moment dropped in as the boat began its journey down to the sea many feet below. chapter iv the sinking of the titanic seen from a lifeboat looking back now on the descent of our boat down the ship's side, it is a matter of surprise, i think, to all the occupants to remember how little they thought of it at the time. it was a great adventure, certainly: it was exciting to feel the boat sink by jerks, foot by foot, as the ropes were paid out from above and shrieked as they passed through the pulley blocks, the new ropes and gear creaking under the strain of a boat laden with people, and the crew calling to the sailors above as the boat tilted slightly, now at one end, now at the other, "lower aft!" "lower stern!" and "lower together!" as she came level again--but i do not think we felt much apprehension about reaching the water safely. it certainly was thrilling to see the black hull of the ship on one side and the sea, seventy feet below, on the other, or to pass down by cabins and saloons brilliantly lighted; but we knew nothing of the apprehension felt in the minds of some of the officers whether the boats and lowering-gear would stand the strain of the weight of our sixty people. the ropes, however, were new and strong, and the boat did not buckle in the middle as an older boat might have done. whether it was right or not to lower boats full of people to the water,--and it seems likely it was not,--i think there can be nothing but the highest praise given to the officers and crew above for the way in which they lowered the boats one after the other safely to the water; it may seem a simple matter, to read about such a thing, but any sailor knows, apparently, that it is not so. an experienced officer has told me that he has seen a boat lowered in practice from a ship's deck, with a trained crew and no passengers in the boat, with practised sailors paying out the ropes, in daylight, in calm weather, with the ship lying in dock--and has seen the boat tilt over and pitch the crew headlong into the sea. contrast these conditions with those obtaining that monday morning at 12.45 a.m., and it is impossible not to feel that, whether the lowering crew were trained or not, whether they had or had not drilled since coming on board, they did their duty in a way that argues the greatest efficiency. i cannot help feeling the deepest gratitude to the two sailors who stood at the ropes above and lowered us to the sea: i do not suppose they were saved. perhaps one explanation of our feeling little sense of the unusual in leaving the titanic in this way was that it seemed the climax to a series of extraordinary occurrences: the magnitude of the whole thing dwarfed events that in the ordinary way would seem to be full of imminent peril. it is easy to imagine it,--a voyage of four days on a calm sea, without a single untoward incident; the presumption, perhaps already mentally half realized, that we should be ashore in forty-eight hours and so complete a splendid voyage,--and then to feel the engine stop, to be summoned on deck with little time to dress, to tie on a lifebelt, to see rockets shooting aloft in call for help, to be told to get into a lifeboat,--after all these things, it did not seem much to feel the boat sinking down to the sea: it was the natural sequence of previous events, and we had learned in the last hour to take things just as they came. at the same time, if any one should wonder what the sensation is like, it is quite easy to measure seventy-five feet from the windows of a tall house or a block of flats, look down to the ground and fancy himself with some sixty other people crowded into a boat so tightly that he could not sit down or move about, and then picture the boat sinking down in a continuous series of jerks, as the sailors pay out the ropes through cleats above. there are more pleasant sensations than this! how thankful we were that the sea was calm and the titanic lay so steadily and quietly as we dropped down her side. we were spared the bumping and grinding against the side which so often accompanies the launching of boats: i do not remember that we even had to fend off our boat while we were trying to get free. as we went down, one of the crew shouted, "we are just over the condenser exhaust: we don't want to stay in that long or we shall be swamped; feel down on the floor and be ready to pull up the pin which lets the ropes free as soon as we are afloat." i had often looked over the side and noticed this stream of water coming out of the side of the titanic just above the water-line: in fact so large was the volume of water that as we ploughed along and met the waves coming towards us, this stream would cause a splash that sent spray flying. we felt, as well as we could in the crowd of people, on the floor, along the sides, with no idea where the pin could be found,--and none of the crew knew where it was, only of its existence somewhere,--but we never found it. and all the time we got closer to the sea and the exhaust roared nearer and nearer--until finally we floated with the ropes still holding us from above, the exhaust washing us away and the force of the tide driving us back against the side,--the latter not of much account in influencing the direction, however. thinking over what followed, i imagine we must have touched the water with the condenser stream at our bows, and not in the middle as i thought at one time: at any rate, the resultant of these three forces was that we were carried parallel to the ship, directly under the place where boat 15 would drop from her davits into the sea. looking up we saw her already coming down rapidly from b deck: she must have filled almost immediately after ours. we shouted up, "stop lowering 14," [footnote: in an account which appeared in the newspapers of april 19 i have described this boat as 14, not knowing they were numbered alternately.] and the crew and passengers in the boat above, hearing us shout and seeing our position immediately below them, shouted the same to the sailors on the boat deck; but apparently they did not hear, for she dropped down foot by foot,--twenty feet, fifteen, ten,--and a stoker and i in the bows reached up and touched her bottom swinging above our heads, trying to push away our boat from under her. it seemed now as if nothing could prevent her dropping on us, but at this moment another stoker sprang with his knife to the ropes that still held us and i heard him shout, "one! two!" as he cut them through. the next moment we had swung away from underneath 15, and were clear of her as she dropped into the water in the space we had just before occupied. i do not know how the bow ropes were freed, but imagine that they were cut in the same way, for we were washed clear of the titanic at once by the force of the stream and floated away as the oars were got out. i think we all felt that that was quite the most exciting thing we had yet been through, and a great sigh of relief and gratitude went up as we swung away from the boat above our heads; but i heard no one cry aloud during the experience--not a woman's voice was raised in fear or hysteria. i think we all learnt many things that night about the bogey called "fear," and how the facing of it is much less than the dread of it. the crew was made up of cooks and stewards, mostly the former, i think; their white jackets showing up in the darkness as they pulled away, two to an oar: i do not think they can have had any practice in rowing, for all night long their oars crossed and clashed; if our safety had depended on speed or accuracy in keeping time it would have gone hard with us. shouting began from one end of the boat to the other as to what we should do, where we should go, and no one seemed to have any knowledge how to act. at last we asked, "who is in charge of this boat?" but there was no reply. we then agreed by general consent that the stoker who stood in the stern with the tiller should act as captain, and from that time he directed the course, shouting to other boats and keeping in touch with them. not that there was anywhere to go or anything we could do. our plan of action was simple: to keep all the boats together as far as possible and wait until we were picked up by other liners. the crew had apparently heard of the wireless communications before they left the titanic, but i never heard them say that we were in touch with any boat but the olympic: it was always the olympic that was coming to our rescue. they thought they knew even her distance, and making a calculation, we came to the conclusion that we ought to be picked up by her about two o'clock in the afternoon. but this was not our only hope of rescue: we watched all the time the darkness lasted for steamers' lights, thinking there might be a chance of other steamers coming near enough to see the lights which some of our boats carried. i am sure there was no feeling in the minds of any one that we should not be picked up next day: we knew that wireless messages would go out from ship to ship, and as one of the stokers said: "the sea will be covered with ships to-morrow afternoon: they will race up from all over the sea to find us." some even thought that fast torpedo boats might run up ahead of the olympic. and yet the olympic was, after all, the farthest away of them all; eight other ships lay within three hundred miles of us. how thankful we should have been to know how near help was, and how many ships had heard our message and were rushing to the titanic's aid. i think nothing has surprised us more than to learn so many ships were near enough to rescue us in a few hours. almost immediately after leaving the titanic we saw what we all said was a ship's lights down on the horizon on the titanic's port side: two lights, one above the other, and plainly not one of our boats; we even rowed in that direction for some time, but the lights drew away and disappeared below the horizon. but this is rather anticipating: we did none of these things first. we had no eyes for anything but the ship we had just left. as the oarsmen pulled slowly away we all turned and took a long look at the mighty vessel towering high above our midget boat, and i know it must have been the most extraordinary sight i shall ever be called upon to witness; i realize now how totally inadequate language is to convey to some other person who was not there any real impression of what we saw. but the task must be attempted: the whole picture is so intensely dramatic that, while it is not possible to place on paper for eyes to see the actual likeness of the ship as she lay there, some sketch of the scene will be possible. first of all, the climatic conditions were extraordinary. the night was one of the most beautiful i have ever seen: the sky without a single cloud to mar the perfect brilliance of the stars, clustered so thickly together that in places there seemed almost more dazzling points of light set in the black sky than background of sky itself; and each star seemed, in the keen atmosphere, free from any haze, to have increased its brilliance tenfold and to twinkle and glitter with a staccato flash that made the sky seem nothing but a setting made for them in which to display their wonder. they seemed so near, and their light so much more intense than ever before, that fancy suggested they saw this beautiful ship in dire distress below and all their energies had awakened to flash messages across the black dome of the sky to each other; telling and warning of the calamity happening in the world beneath. later, when the titanic had gone down and we lay still on the sea waiting for the day to dawn or a ship to come, i remember looking up at the perfect sky and realizing why shakespeare wrote the beautiful words he puts in the mouth of lorenzo:- "jessica, look how the floor of heaven is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold. there's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st but in his motion like an angel sings, still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims; such harmony is in immortal souls; but whilst this muddy vesture of decay doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it." but it seemed almost as if we could--that night: the stars seemed really to be alive and to talk. the complete absence of haze produced a phenomenon i had never seen before: where the sky met the sea the line was as clear and definite as the edge of a knife, so that the water and the air never merged gradually into each other and blended to a softened rounded horizon, but each element was so exclusively separate that where a star came low down in the sky near the clear-cut edge of the waterline, it still lost none of its brilliance. as the earth revolved and the water edge came up and covered partially the star, as it were, it simply cut the star in two, the upper half continuing to sparkle as long as it was not entirely hidden, and throwing a long beam of light along the sea to us. in the evidence before the united states senate committee the captain of one of the ships near us that night said the stars were so extraordinarily bright near the horizon that he was deceived into thinking that they were ships' lights: he did not remember seeing such a night before. those who were afloat will all agree with that statement: _we_ were often deceived into thinking they were lights of a ship. and next the cold air! here again was something quite new to us: there was not a breath of wind to blow keenly round us as we stood in the boat, and because of its continued persistence to make us feel cold; it was just a keen, bitter, icy, motionless cold that came from nowhere and yet was there all the time; the stillness of it--if one can imagine "cold" being motionless and still--was what seemed new and strange. and these--the sky and the air--were overhead; and below was the sea. here again something uncommon: the surface was like a lake of oil, heaving gently up and down with a quiet motion that rocked our boat dreamily to and fro. we did not need to keep her head to the swell: often i watched her lying broadside on to the tide, and with a boat loaded as we were, this would have been impossible with anything like a swell. the sea slipped away smoothly under the boat, and i think we never heard it lapping on the sides, so oily in appearance was the water. so when one of the stokers said he had been to sea for twenty-six years and never yet seen such a calm night, we accepted it as true without comment. just as expressive was the remark of another--"it reminds me of a bloomin' picnic!" it was quite true; it did: a picnic on a lake, or a quiet inland river like the cam, or a backwater on the thames. and so in these conditions of sky and air and sea, we gazed broadside on the titanic from a short distance. she was absolutely still--indeed from the first it seemed as if the blow from the iceberg had taken all the courage out of her and she had just come quietly to rest and was settling down without an effort to save herself, without a murmur of protest against such a foul blow. for the sea could not rock her: the wind was not there to howl noisily round the decks, and make the ropes hum; from the first what must have impressed all as they watched was the sense of stillness about her and the slow, insensible way she sank lower and lower in the sea, like a stricken animal. the mere bulk alone of the ship viewed from the sea below was an awe-inspiring sight. imagine a ship nearly a sixth of a mile long, 75 feet high to the top decks, with four enormous funnels above the decks, and masts again high above the funnels; with her hundreds of portholes, all her saloons and other rooms brilliant with light, and all round her, little boats filled with those who until a few hours before had trod her decks and read in her libraries and listened to the music of her band in happy content; and who were now looking up in amazement at the enormous mass above them and rowing away from her because she was sinking. i had often wanted to see her from some distance away, and only a few hours before, in conversation at lunch with a fellow-passenger, had registered a vow to get a proper view of her lines and dimensions when we landed at new york: to stand some distance away to take in a full view of her beautiful proportions, which the narrow approach to the dock at southampton made impossible. little did i think that the opportunity was to be found so quickly and so dramatically. the background, too, was a different one from what i had planned for her: the black outline of her profile against the sky was bordered all round by stars studded in the sky, and all her funnels and masts were picked out in the same way: her bulk was seen where the stars were blotted out. and one other thing was different from expectation: the thing that ripped away from us instantly, as we saw it, all sense of the beauty of the night, the beauty of the ship's lines, and the beauty of her lights,--and all these taken in themselves were intensely beautiful,--that thing was the awful angle made by the level of the sea with the rows of porthole lights along her side in dotted lines, row above row. the sea level and the rows of lights should have been parallel--should never have met--and now they met at an angle inside the black hull of the ship. there was nothing else to indicate she was injured; nothing but this apparent violation of a simple geometrical law--that parallel lines should "never meet even if produced ever so far both ways"; but it meant the titanic had sunk by the head until the lowest portholes in the bows were under the sea, and the portholes in the stern were lifted above the normal height. we rowed away from her in the quietness of the night, hoping and praying with all our hearts that she would sink no more and the day would find her still in the same position as she was then. the crew, however, did not think so. it has been said frequently that the officers and crew felt assured that she would remain afloat even after they knew the extent of the damage. some of them may have done so--and perhaps, from their scientific knowledge of her construction, with more reason at the time than those who said she would sink--but at any rate the stokers in our boat had no such illusion. one of them--i think he was the same man that cut us free from the pulley ropes--told us how he was at work in the stoke-hole, and in anticipation of going off duty in quarter of an hour,--thus confirming the time of the collision as 11.45,--had near him a pan of soup keeping hot on some part of the machinery; suddenly the whole side of the compartment came in, and the water rushed him off his feet. picking himself up, he sprang for the compartment doorway and was just through the aperture when the watertight door came down behind him, "like a knife," as he said; "they work them from the bridge." he had gone up on deck but was ordered down again at once and with others was told to draw the fires from under the boiler, which they did, and were then at liberty to come on deck again. it seems that this particular knot of stokers must have known almost as soon as any one of the extent of injury. he added mournfully, "i could do with that hot soup now"--and indeed he could: he was clad at the time of the collision, he said, in trousers and singlet, both very thin on account of the intense heat in the stoke-hole; and although he had added a short jacket later, his teeth were chattering with the cold. he found a place to lie down underneath the tiller on the little platform where our captain stood, and there he lay all night with a coat belonging to another stoker thrown over him and i think he must have been almost unconscious. a lady next to him, who was warmly clad with several coats, tried to insist on his having one of hers--a fur-lined one--thrown over him, but he absolutely refused while some of the women were insufficiently clad; and so the coat was given to an irish girl with pretty auburn hair standing near, leaning against the gunwale--with an "outside berth" and so more exposed to the cold air. this same lady was able to distribute more of her wraps to the passengers, a rug to one, a fur boa to another; and she has related with amusement that at the moment of climbing up the carpathia's side, those to whom these articles had been lent offered them all back to her; but as, like the rest of us, she was encumbered with a lifebelt, she had to say she would receive them back at the end of the climb, i had not seen my dressing-gown since i dropped into the boat, but some time in the night a steerage passenger found it on the floor and put it on. it is not easy at this time to call to mind who were in the boat, because in the night it was not possible to see more than a few feet away, and when dawn came we had eyes only for the rescue ship and the icebergs; but so far as my memory serves the list was as follows: no first-class passengers; three women, one baby, two men from the second cabin; and the other passengers steerage--mostly women; a total of about 35 passengers. the rest, about 25 (and possibly more), were crew and stokers. near to me all night was a group of three swedish girls, warmly clad, standing close together to keep warm, and very silent; indeed there was very little talking at any time. one conversation took place that is, i think, worth repeating: one more proof that the world after all is a small place. the ten months' old baby which was handed down at the last moment was received by a lady next to me--the same who shared her wraps and coats. the mother had found a place in the middle and was too tightly packed to come through to the child, and so it slept contentedly for about an hour in a stranger's arms; it then began to cry and the temporary nurse said: "will you feel down and see if the baby's feet are out of the blanket! i don't know much about babies but i think their feet must be kept warm." wriggling down as well as i could, i found its toes exposed to the air and wrapped them well up, when it ceased crying at once: it was evidently a successful diagnosis! having recognized the lady by her voice,--it was much too dark to see faces,--as one of my vis-à-vis at the purser's table, i said,--"surely you are miss ----?" "yes," she replied, "and you must be mr. beesley; how curious we should find ourselves in the same boat!" remembering that she had joined the boat at queenstown, i said, "do you know clonmel? a letter from a great friend of mine who is staying there at ---[giving the address] came aboard at queenstown." "yes, it is my home: and i was dining at ---just before i came away." it seemed that she knew my friend, too; and we agreed that of all places in the world to recognize mutual friends, a crowded lifeboat afloat in mid-ocean at 2 a.m. twelve hundred miles from our destination was one of the most unexpected. and all the time, as we watched, the titanic sank lower and lower by the head and the angle became wider and wider as the stern porthole lights lifted and the bow lights sank, and it was evident she was not to stay afloat much longer. the captain-stoker now told the oarsmen to row away as hard as they could. two reasons seemed to make this a wise decision: one that as she sank she would create such a wave of suction that boats, if not sucked under by being too near, would be in danger of being swamped by the wave her sinking would create--and we all knew our boat was in no condition to ride big waves, crowded as it was and manned with untrained oarsmen. the second was that an explosion might result from the water getting to the boilers, and dèbris might fall within a wide radius. and yet, as it turned out, neither of these things happened. at about 2.15 a.m. i think we were any distance from a mile to two miles away. it is difficult for a landsman to calculate distance at sea but we had been afloat an hour and a half, the boat was heavily loaded, the oarsmen unskilled, and our course erratic: following now one light and now another, sometimes a star and sometimes a light from a port lifeboat which had turned away from the titanic in the opposite direction and lay almost on our horizon; and so we could not have gone very far away. about this time, the water had crept up almost to her sidelight and the captain's bridge, and it seemed a question only of minutes before she sank. the oarsmen lay on their oars, and all in the lifeboat were motionless as we watched her in absolute silence--save some who would not look and buried their heads on each others' shoulders. the lights still shone with the same brilliance, but not so many of them: many were now below the surface. i have often wondered since whether they continued to light up the cabins when the portholes were under water; they may have done so. and then, as we gazed awe-struck, she tilted slowly up, revolving apparently about a centre of gravity just astern of amidships, until she attained a vertically upright position; and there she remained--motionless! as she swung up, her lights, which had shone without a flicker all night, went out suddenly, came on again for a single flash, then went out altogether. and as they did so, there came a noise which many people, wrongly i think, have described as an explosion; it has always seemed to me that it was nothing but the engines and machinery coming loose from their bolts and bearings, and falling through the compartments, smashing everything in their way. it was partly a roar, partly a groan, partly a rattle, and partly a smash, and it was not a sudden roar as an explosion would be: it went on successively for some seconds, possibly fifteen to twenty, as the heavy machinery dropped down to the bottom (now the bows) of the ship: i suppose it fell through the end and sank first, before the ship. but it was a noise no one had heard before, and no one wishes to hear again: it was stupefying, stupendous, as it came to us along the water. it was as if all the heavy things one could think of had been thrown downstairs from the top of a house, smashing each other and the stairs and everything in the way. several apparently authentic accounts have been given, in which definite stories of explosions have been related--in some cases even with wreckage blown up and the ship broken in two; but i think such accounts will not stand close analysis. in the first place the fires had been withdrawn and the steam allowed to escape some time before she sank, and the possibility of explosion from this cause seems very remote. then, as just related, the noise was not sudden and definite, but prolonged--more like the roll and crash of thunder. the probability of the noise being caused by engines falling down will be seen by referring to figure 2, page 116, where the engines are placed in compartments 3, 4, and 5. as the titanic tilted up they would almost certainly fall loose from their bed and plunge down through the other compartments. no phenomenon like that pictured in some american and english papers occurred--that of the ship breaking in two, and the two ends being raised above the surface. i saw these drawings in preparation on board the carpathia, and said at the time that they bore no resemblance to what actually happened. when the noise was over the titanic was still upright like a column: we could see her now only as the stern and some 150 feet of her stood outlined against the star-specked sky, looming black in the darkness, and in this position she continued for some minutes--i think as much as five minutes, but it may have been less. then, first sinking back a little at the stern, i thought, she slid slowly forwards through the water and dived slantingly down; the sea closed over her and we had seen the last of the beautiful ship on which we had embarked four days before at southampton. and in place of the ship on which all our interest had been concentrated for so long and towards which we looked most of the time because it was still the only object on the sea which was a fixed point to us--in place of the titanic, we had the level sea now stretching in an unbroken expanse to the horizon: heaving gently just as before, with no indication on the surface that the waves had just closed over the most wonderful vessel ever built by man's hand; the stars looked down just the same and the air was just as bitterly cold. there seemed a great sense of loneliness when we were left on the sea in a small boat without the titanic: not that we were uncomfortable (except for the cold) nor in danger: we did not think we were either, but the titanic was no longer there. we waited head on for the wave which we thought might come--the wave we had heard so much of from the crew and which they said had been known to travel for miles--and it never came. but although the titanic left us no such legacy of a wave as she went to the bottom, she left us something we would willingly forget forever, something which it is well not to let the imagination dwell on--the cries of many hundreds of our fellow-passengers struggling in the ice-cold water. i would willingly omit any further mention of this part of the disaster from this book, but for two reasons it is not possible--first, that as a matter of history it should be put on record; and secondly, that these cries were not only an appeal for help in the awful conditions of danger in which the drowning found themselves,--an appeal that could never be answered,--but an appeal to the whole world to make such conditions of danger and hopelessness impossible ever again; a cry that called to the heavens for the very injustice of its own existence; a cry that clamoured for its own destruction. we were utterly surprised to hear this cry go up as the waves closed over the titanic: we had heard no sound of any kind from her since we left her side; and, as mentioned before, we did not know how many boats she had or how many rafts. the crew may have known, but they probably did not, and if they did, they never told the passengers; we should not have been surprised to know all were safe on some life-saving device. so that unprepared as we were for such a thing, the cries of the drowning floating across the quiet sea filled us with stupefaction: we longed to return and rescue at least some of the drowning, but we knew it was impossible. the boat was filled to standing-room, and to return would mean the swamping of us all, and so the captain-stoker told his crew to row away from the cries. we tried to sing to keep all from thinking of them; but there was no heart for singing in the boat at that time. the cries, which were loud and numerous at first, died away gradually one by one, but the night was clear, frosty and still, the water smooth, and the sounds must have carried on its level surface free from any obstruction for miles, certainly much farther from the ship than we were situated. i think the last of them must have been heard nearly forty minutes after the titanic sank. lifebelts would keep the survivors afloat for hours; but the cold water was what stopped the cries. there must have come to all those safe in the lifeboats, scattered round the drowning at various distances, a deep resolve that, if anything could be done by them in the future to prevent the repetition of such sounds, they would do it--at whatever cost of time or other things. and not only to them are those cries an imperative call, but to every man and woman who has known of them. it is not possible that ever again can such conditions exist; but it is a duty imperative on one and all to see that they do not. think of it! a few more boats, a few more planks of wood nailed together in a particular way at a trifling cost, and all those men and women whom the world can so ill afford to lose would be with us to-day, there would be no mourning in thousands of homes which now are desolate, and these words need not have been written. chapter v the rescue all accounts agree that the titanic sunk about 2:20 a.m.: a watch in our boat gave the time as 2:30 a.m. shortly afterwards. we were then in touch with three other boats: one was 15, on our starboard quarter, and the others i have always supposed were 9 and 11, but i do not know definitely. we never got into close touch with each other, but called occasionally across the darkness and saw them looming near and then drawing away again; we called to ask if any officer were aboard the other three, but did not find one. so in the absence of any plan of action, we rowed slowly forward--or what we thought was forward, for it was in the direction the titanic's bows were pointing before she sank. i see now that we must have been pointing northwest, for we presently saw the northern lights on the starboard, and again, when the carpathia came up from the south, we saw her from behind us on the southeast, and turned our boat around to get to her. i imagine the boats must have spread themselves over the ocean fanwise as they escaped from the titanic: those on the starboard and port sides forward being almost dead ahead of her and the stern boats being broadside from her; this explains why the port boats were so much longer in reaching the carpathia--as late as 8.30 a.m.--while some of the starboard boats came up as early as 4.10 a.m. some of the port boats had to row across the place where the titanic sank to get to the carpathia, through the debris of chairs and wreckage of all kinds. none of the other three boats near us had a light--and we missed lights badly: we could not see each other in the darkness; we could not signal to ships which might be rushing up full speed from any quarter to the titanic's rescue; and now we had been through so much it would seem hard to have to encounter the additional danger of being in the line of a rescuing ship. we felt again for the lantern beneath our feet, along the sides, and i managed this time to get down to the locker below the tiller platform and open it in front by removing a board, to find nothing but the zinc airtank which renders the boat unsinkable when upset. i do not think there was a light in the boat. we felt also for food and water, and found none, and came to the conclusion that none had been put in; but here we were mistaken. i have a letter from second officer lightoller in which he assures me that he and fourth officer pitman examined every lifeboat from the titanic as they lay on the carpathia's deck afterwards and found biscuits and water in each. not that we wanted any food or water then: we thought of the time that might elapse before the olympic picked us up in the afternoon. towards 3 a.m. we saw a faint glow in the sky ahead on the starboard quarter, the first gleams, we thought, of the coming dawn. we were not certain of the time and were eager perhaps to accept too readily any relief from darkness--only too glad to be able to look each other in the face and see who were our companions in good fortune; to be free from the hazard of lying in a steamer's track, invisible in the darkness. but we were doomed to disappointment: the soft light increased for a time, and died away a little; glowed again, and then remained stationary for some minutes! "the northern lights"! it suddenly came to me, and so it was: presently the light arched fanwise across the northern sky, with faint streamers reaching towards the pole-star. i had seen them of about the same intensity in england some years ago and knew them again. a sigh of disappointment went through the boat as we realized that the day was not yet; but had we known it, something more comforting even than the day was in store for us. all night long we had watched the horizon with eager eyes for signs of a steamer's lights; we heard from the captain-stoker that the first appearance would be a single light on the horizon, the masthead light, followed shortly by a second one, lower down, on the deck; if these two remained in vertical alignment and the distance between them increased as the lights drew nearer, we might be certain it was a steamer. but what a night to see that first light on the horizon! we saw it many times as the earth revolved, and some stars rose on the clear horizon and others sank down to it: there were "lights" on every quarter. some we watched and followed until we saw the deception and grew wiser; some were lights from those of our boats that were fortunate enough to have lanterns, but these were generally easily detected, as they rose and fell in the near distance. once they raised our hopes, only to sink them to zero again. near what seemed to be the horizon on the port quarter we saw two lights close together, and thought this must be our double light; but as we gazed across the miles that separated us, the lights slowly drew apart and we realized that they were two boats' lanterns at different distances from us, in line, one behind the other. they were probably the forward port boats that had to return so many miles next morning across the titanic's graveyard. but notwithstanding these hopes and disappointments, the absence of lights, food and water (as we thought), and the bitter cold, it would not be correct to say we were unhappy in those early morning hours: the cold that settled down on us like a garment that wraps close around was the only real discomfort, and that we could keep at bay by not thinking too much about it as well as by vigorous friction and gentle stamping on the floor (it made too much noise to stamp hard!). i never heard that any one in boat b had any after effects from the cold--even the stoker who was so thinly clad came through without harm. after all, there were many things to be thankful for: so many that they made insignificant the temporary inconvenience of the cold, the crowded boat, the darkness and the hundred and one things that in the ordinary way we might regard as unpleasant. the quiet sea, the beautiful night (how different from two nights later when flashes of lightning and peals of thunder broke the sleep of many on board the carpathia!), and above all the fact of being in a boat at all when so many of our fellow-passengers and crew--whose cries no longer moaned across the water to us--were silent in the water. gratitude was the dominant note in our feelings then. but grateful as we were, our gratitude was soon to be increased a hundred fold. about 3:30 a.m., as nearly as i can judge, some one in the bow called our attention to a faint far-away gleam in the southeast. we all turned quickly to look and there it was certainly: streaming up from behind the horizon like a distant flash of a warship's searchlight; then a faint boom like guns afar off, and the light died away again. the stoker who had lain all night under the tiller sat up suddenly as if from a dream, the overcoat hanging from his shoulders. i can see him now, staring out across the sea, to where the sound had come from, and hear him shout, "that was a cannon!" but it was not: it was the carpathia's rocket, though we did not know it until later. but we did know now that something was not far away, racing up to our help and signalling to us a preliminary message to cheer our hearts until she arrived. with every sense alert, eyes gazing intently at the horizon and ears open for the least sound, we waited in absolute silence in the quiet night. and then, creeping over the edge of the sea where the flash had been, we saw a single light, and presently a second below it, and in a few minutes they were well above the horizon and they remained in line! but we had been deceived before, and we waited a little longer before we allowed ourselves to say we were safe. the lights came up rapidly: so rapidly it seemed only a few minutes (though it must have been longer) between first seeing them and finding them well above the horizon and bearing down rapidly on us. we did not know what sort of a vessel was coming, but we knew she was coming quickly, and we searched for paper, rags,--anything that would burn (we were quite prepared to burn our coats if necessary). a hasty paper torch was twisted out of letters found in some one's pocket, lighted, and held aloft by the stoker standing on the tiller platform. the little light shone in flickers on the faces of the occupants of the boat, ran in broken lines for a few yards along the black oily sea (where for the first time i saw the presence of that awful thing which had caused the whole terrible disaster--ice--in little chunks the size of one's fist, bobbing harmlessly up and down), and spluttered away to blackness again as the stoker threw the burning remnants of paper overboard. but had we known it, the danger of being run down was already over, one reason being that the carpathia had already seen the lifeboat which all night long had shown a green light, the first indication the carpathia had of our position. but the real reason is to be found in the carpathia's log:--"went full speed ahead during the night; stopped at 4 a.m. with an iceberg dead ahead." it was a good reason. with our torch burnt and in darkness again we saw the headlights stop, and realized that the rescuer had hove to. a sigh of relief went up when we thought no hurried scramble had to be made to get out of her way, with a chance of just being missed by her, and having to meet the wash of her screws as she tore by us. we waited and she slowly swung round and revealed herself to us as a large steamer with all her portholes alight. i think the way those lights came slowly into view was one of the most wonderful things we shall ever see. it meant deliverance at once: that was the amazing thing to us all. we had thought of the afternoon as our time of rescue, and here only a few hours after the titanic sank, before it was yet light, we were to be taken aboard. it seemed almost too good to be true, and i think everyone's eyes filled with tears, men's as well as women's, as they saw again the rows of lights one above the other shining kindly to them across the water, and "thank god!" was murmured in heartfelt tones round the boat. the boat swung round and the crew began their long row to the steamer; the captain called for a song and led off with "pull for the shore, boys." the crew took it up quaveringly and the passengers joined in, but i think one verse was all they sang. it was too early yet, gratitude was too deep and sudden in its overwhelming intensity, for us to sing very steadily. presently, finding the song had not gone very well, we tried a cheer, and that went better. it was more easy to relieve our feelings with a noise, and time and tune were not necessary ingredients in a cheer. in the midst of our thankfulness for deliverance, one name was mentioned with the deepest feeling of gratitude: that of marconi. i wish that he had been there to hear the chorus of gratitude that went out to him for the wonderful invention that spared us many hours, and perhaps many days, of wandering about the sea in hunger and storm and cold. perhaps our gratitude was sufficiently intense and vivid to "marconi" some of it to him that night. all around we saw boats making for the carpathia and heard their shouts and cheers. our crew rowed hard in friendly rivalry with other boats to be among the first home, but we must have been eighth or ninth at the side. we had a heavy load aboard, and had to row round a huge iceberg on the way. and then, as if to make everything complete for our happiness, came the dawn. first a beautiful, quiet shimmer away in the east, then a soft golden glow that crept up stealthily from behind the sky-line as if it were trying not to be noticed as it stole over the sea and spread itself quietly in every direction--so quietly, as if to make us believe it had been there all the time and we had not observed it. then the sky turned faintly pink and in the distance the thinnest, fleeciest clouds stretched in thin bands across the horizon and close down to it, becoming every moment more and more pink. and next the stars died, slowly,--save one which remained long after the others just above the horizon; and near by, with the crescent turned to the north, and the lower horn just touching the horizon, the thinnest, palest of moons. and with the dawn came a faint breeze from the west, the first breath of wind we had felt since the titanic stopped her engines. anticipating a few hours,--as the day drew on to 8 a.m., the time the last boats came up,--this breeze increased to a fresh wind which whipped up the sea, so that the last boat laden with people had an anxious time in the choppy waves before they reached the carpathia. an officer remarked that one of the boats could not have stayed afloat another hour: the wind had held off just long enough. the captain shouted along our boat to the crew, as they strained at the oars,--two pulling and an extra one facing them and pushing to try to keep pace with the other boats,--"a new moon! turn your money over, boys! that is, if you have any!" we laughed at him for the quaint superstition at such a time, and it was good to laugh again, but he showed his disbelief in another superstition when he added, "well, i shall never say again that 13 is an unlucky number. boat 13 is the best friend we ever had." if there had been among us--and it is almost certain that there were, so fast does superstition cling--those who feared events connected with the number thirteen, i am certain they agreed with him, and never again will they attach any importance to such a foolish belief. perhaps the belief itself will receive a shock when it is remembered that boat 13 of the titanic brought away a full load from the sinking vessel, carried them in such comfort all night that they had not even a drop of water on them, and landed them safely at the carpathia's side, where they climbed aboard without a single mishap. it almost tempts one to be the thirteenth at table, or to choose a house numbered 13 fearless of any croaking about flying in the face of what is humorously called "providence." looking towards the carpathia in the faint light, we saw what seemed to be two large fully rigged sailing ships near the horizon, with all sails set, standing up near her, and we decided that they must be fishing vessels off the banks of newfoundland which had seen the carpathia stop and were waiting to see if she wanted help of any kind. but in a few minutes more the light shone on them and they stood revealed as huge icebergs, peaked in a way that readily suggested a ship. when the sun rose higher, it turned them pink, and sinister as they looked towering like rugged white peaks of rock out of the sea, and terrible as was the disaster one of them had caused, there was an awful beauty about them which could not be overlooked. later, when the sun came above the horizon, they sparkled and glittered in its rays; deadly white, like frozen snow rather than translucent ice. as the dawn crept towards us there lay another almost directly in the line between our boat and the carpathia, and a few minutes later, another on her port quarter, and more again on the southern and western horizons, as far as the eye could reach: all differing in shape and size and tones of colour according as the sun shone through them or was reflected directly or obliquely from them. [illustration: the carpathia] we drew near our rescuer and presently could discern the bands on her funnel, by which the crew could tell she was a cunarder; and already some boats were at her side and passengers climbing up her ladders. we had to give the iceberg a wide berth and make a détour to the south: we knew it was sunk a long way below the surface with such things as projecting ledges--not that it was very likely there was one so near the surface as to endanger our small boat, but we were not inclined to take any risks for the sake of a few more minutes when safety lay so near. once clear of the berg, we could read the cunarder's name--c a r p a t h i a--a name we are not likely ever to forget. we shall see her sometimes, perhaps, in the shipping lists,--as i have done already once when she left genoa on her return voyage,--and the way her lights climbed up over the horizon in the darkness, the way she swung and showed her lighted portholes, and the moment when we read her name on her side will all come back in a flash; we shall live again the scene of rescue, and feel the same thrill of gratitude for all she brought us that night. we rowed up to her about 4.30, and sheltering on the port side from the swell, held on by two ropes at the stern and bow. women went up the side first, climbing rope ladders with a noose round their shoulders to help their ascent; men passengers scrambled next, and the crew last of all. the baby went up in a bag with the opening tied up: it had been quite well all the time, and never suffered any ill effects from its cold journey in the night. we set foot on deck with very thankful hearts, grateful beyond the possibility of adequate expression to feel a solid ship beneath us once more. chapter vi the sinking of the titanic seen from her deck the two preceding chapters have been to a large extent the narrative of a single eyewitness and an account of the escape of one boat only from the titanic's side. it will be well now to return to the titanic and reconstruct a more general and complete account from the experiences of many people in different parts of the ship. a considerable part of these experiences was related to the writer first hand by survivors, both on board the carpathia and at other times, but some are derived from other sources which are probably as accurate as first-hand information. other reports, which seemed at first sight to have been founded on the testimony of eyewitnesses, have been found on examination to have passed through several hands, and have therefore been rejected. the testimony even of eye-witnesses has in some cases been excluded when it seemed not to agree with direct evidence of a number of other witnesses or with what reasoned judgment considered probable in the circumstances. in this category are the reports of explosions before the titanic sank, the breaking of the ship in two parts, the suicide of officers. it would be well to notice here that the titanic was in her correct course, the southerly one, and in the position which prudence dictates as a safe one under the ordinary conditions at that time of the year: to be strictly accurate she was sixteen miles south of the regular summer route which all companies follow from january to august. perhaps the real history of the disaster should commence with the afternoon of sunday, when marconigrams were received by the titanic from the ships ahead of her, warning her of the existence of icebergs. in connection with this must be taken the marked fall of temperature observed by everyone in the afternoon and evening of this day as well as the very low temperature of the water. these have generally been taken to indicate that without any possibility of doubt we were near an iceberg region, and the severest condemnation has been poured on the heads of the officers and captain for not having regard to these climatic conditions; but here caution is necessary. there can be little doubt now that the low temperature observed can be traced to the icebergs and ice-field subsequently encountered, but experienced sailors are aware that it might have been observed without any icebergs being near. the cold labrador current sweeps down by newfoundland across the track of atlantic liners, but does not necessarily carry icebergs with it; cold winds blow from greenland and labrador and not always from icebergs and ice-fields. so that falls in temperature of sea and air are not prima facie evidence of the close proximity of icebergs. on the other hand, a single iceberg separated by many miles from its fellows might sink a ship, but certainly would not cause a drop in temperature either of the air or water. then, as the labrador current meets the warm gulf stream flowing from the gulf of mexico across to europe, they do not necessarily intermingle, nor do they always run side by side or one on top of the other, but often interlaced, like the fingers of two hands. as a ship sails across this region the thermometer will record within a few miles temperatures of 34°, 58°, 35°, 59°, and so on. it is little wonder then that sailors become accustomed to place little reliance on temperature conditions as a means of estimating the probabilities of encountering ice in their track. an experienced sailor has told me that nothing is more difficult to diagnose than the presence of icebergs, and a strong confirmation of this is found in the official sailing directions issued by the hydrographic department of the british admiralty. "no reliance can be placed on any warning being conveyed to the mariner, by a fall in temperature, either of sea or air, of approaching ice. some decrease in temperature has occasionally been recorded, but more often none has been observed." but notification by marconigram of the exact location of icebergs is a vastly different matter. i remember with deep feeling the effect this information had on us when it first became generally known on board the carpathia. rumours of it went round on wednesday morning, grew to definite statements in the afternoon, and were confirmed when one of the titanic officers admitted the truth of it in reply to a direct question. i shall never forget the overwhelming sense of hopelessness that came over some of us as we obtained definite knowledge of the warning messages. it was not then the unavoidable accident we had hitherto supposed: the sudden plunging into a region crowded with icebergs which no seaman, however skilled a navigator he might be, could have avoided! the beautiful titanic wounded too deeply to recover, the cries of the drowning still ringing in our ears and the thousands of homes that mourned all these calamities--none of all these things need ever have been! it is no exaggeration to say that men who went through all the experiences of the collision and the rescue and the subsequent scenes on the quay at new york with hardly a tremor, were quite overcome by this knowledge and turned away, unable to speak; i for one, did so, and i know others who told me they were similarly affected. i think we all came to modify our opinions on this matter, however, when we learnt more of the general conditions attending trans-atlantic steamship services. the discussion as to who was responsible for these warnings being disregarded had perhaps better be postponed to a later chapter. one of these warnings was handed to mr. ismay by captain smith at 5 p.m. and returned at the latter's request at 7 p.m., that it might be posted for the information of officers; as a result of the messages they were instructed to keep a special lookout for ice. this, second officer lightoller did until he was relieved at 10 p.m. by first officer murdock, to whom he handed on the instructions. during mr. lightoller's watch, about 9 p.m., the captain had joined him on the bridge and discussed "the time we should be getting up towards the vicinity of the ice, and how we should recognize it if we should see it, and refreshing our minds on the indications that ice gives when it is in the vicinity." apparently, too, the officers had discussed among themselves the proximity of ice and mr. lightoller had remarked that they would be approaching the position where ice had been reported during his watch. the lookouts were cautioned similarly, but no ice was sighted until a few minutes before the collision, when the lookout man saw the iceberg and rang the bell three times, the usual signal from the crow's nest when anything is seen dead-ahead. by telephone he reported to the bridge the presence of an iceberg, but mr. murdock had already ordered quartermaster hichens at the wheel to starboard the helm, and the vessel began to swing away from the berg. but it was far too late at the speed she was going to hope to steer the huge titanic, over a sixth of a mile long, out of reach of danger. even if the iceberg had been visible half a mile away it is doubtful whether some portion of her tremendous length would not have been touched, and it is in the highest degree unlikely that the lookout could have seen the berg half a mile away in the conditions that existed that night, even with glasses. the very smoothness of the water made the presence of ice a more difficult matter to detect. in ordinary conditions the dash of the waves against the foot of an iceberg surrounds it with a circle of white foam visible for some distance, long before the iceberg itself; but here was an oily sea sweeping smoothly round the deadly monster and causing no indication of its presence. there is little doubt, moreover, that the crow's nest is not a good place from which to detect icebergs. it is proverbial that they adopt to a large extent the colour of their surroundings; and seen from above at a high angle, with the black, foam-free sea behind, the iceberg must have been almost invisible until the titanic was close upon it. i was much struck by a remark of sir ernest shackleton on his method of detecting icebergs--to place a lookout man as low down near the water-line as he could get him. remembering how we had watched the titanic with all her lights out, standing upright like "an enormous black finger," as one observer stated, and had only seen her thus because she loomed black against the sky behind her, i saw at once how much better the sky was than the black sea to show up an iceberg's bulk. and so in a few moments the titanic had run obliquely on the berg, and with a shock that was astonishingly slight--so slight that many passengers never noticed it--the submerged portion of the berg had cut her open on the starboard side in the most vulnerable portion of her anatomy--the bilge. [footnote: see figure 4, page 50.] the most authentic accounts say that the wound began at about the location of the foremast and extended far back to the stern, the brunt of the blow being taken by the forward plates, which were either punctured through both bottoms directly by the blow, or through one skin only, and as this was torn away it ripped out some of the inner plates. the fact that she went down by the head shows that probably only the forward plates were doubly punctured, the stern ones being cut open through the outer skin only. after the collision, murdock had at once reversed the engines and brought the ship to a standstill, but the iceberg had floated away astern. the shock, though little felt by the enormous mass of the ship, was sufficient to dislodge a large quantity of ice from the berg: the forecastle deck was found to be covered with pieces of ice. feeling the shock, captain smith rushed out of his cabin to the bridge, and in reply to his anxious enquiry was told by murdock that ice had been struck and the emergency doors instantly closed. the officers roused by the collision went on deck: some to the bridge; others, while hearing nothing of the extent of the damage, saw no necessity for doing so. captain smith at once sent the carpenter below to sound the ship, and fourth officer boxhall to the steerage to report damage. the latter found there a very dangerous condition of things and reported to captain smith, who then sent him to the mail-room; and here again, it was easy to see, matters looked very serious. mail-bags were floating about and the water rising rapidly. all this was reported to the captain, who ordered the lifeboats to be got ready at once. mr. boxhall went to the chartroom to work out the ship's position, which he then handed to the marconi operators for transmission to any ship near enough to help in the work of rescue. reports of the damage done were by this time coming to the captain from many quarters, from the chief engineer, from the designer,--mr. andrews,--and in a dramatic way from the sudden appearance on deck of a swarm of stokers who had rushed up from below as the water poured into the boiler-rooms and coal-bunkers: they were immediately ordered down below to duty again. realizing the urgent heed of help, he went personally to the marconi room and gave orders to the operators to get into touch with all the ships they could and to tell them to come quickly. the assistant operator bride had been asleep, and knew of the damage only when phillips, in charge of the marconi room, told him ice had been encountered. they started to send out the well-known "c.q.d." message,--which interpreted means: c.q. "all stations attend," and d, "distress," the position of the vessel in latitude and longitude following. later, they sent out "s.o.s.," an arbitrary message agreed upon as an international code-signal. soon after the vessel struck, mr. ismay had learnt of the nature of the accident from the captain and chief engineer, and after dressing and going on deck had spoken to some of the officers not yet thoroughly acquainted with the grave injury done to the vessel. by this time all those in any way connected with the management and navigation must have known the importance of making use of all the ways of safety known to them--and that without any delay. that they thought at first that the titanic would sink as soon as she did is doubtful; but probably as the reports came in they knew that her ultimate loss in a few hours was a likely contingency. on the other hand, there is evidence that some of the officers in charge of boats quite expected the embarkation was a precautionary measure and they would all return after daylight. certainly the first information that ice had been struck conveyed to those in charge no sense of the gravity of the circumstances: one officer even retired to his cabin and another advised a steward to go back to his berth as there was no danger. and so the order was sent round, "all passengers on deck with lifebelts on"; and in obedience to this a crowd of hastily dressed or partially dressed people began to assemble on the decks belonging to their respective classes (except the steerage passengers who were allowed access to other decks), tying on lifebelts over their clothing. in some parts of the ship women were separated from the men and assembled together near the boats, in others men and women mingled freely together, husbands helping their own wives and families and then other women and children into the boats. the officers spread themselves about the decks, superintending the work of lowering and loading the boats, and in three cases were ordered by their superior officers to take charge of them. at this stage great difficulty was experienced in getting women to leave the ship, especially where the order was so rigorously enforced, "women and children only." women in many cases refused to leave their husbands, and were actually forcibly lifted up and dropped in the boats. they argued with the officers, demanding reasons, and in some cases even when induced to get in were disposed to think the whole thing a joke, or a precaution which it seemed to them rather foolish to take. in this they were encouraged by the men left behind, who, in the same condition of ignorance, said good-bye to their friends as they went down, adding that they would see them again at breakfast-time. to illustrate further how little danger was apprehended--when it was discovered on the first-class deck that the forward lower deck was covered with small ice, snowballing matches were arranged for the following morning, and some passengers even went down to the deck and brought back small pieces of ice which were handed round. below decks too was additional evidence that no one thought of immediate danger. two ladies walking along one of the corridors came across a group of people gathered round a door which they were trying vainly to open, and on the other side of which a man was demanding in loud terms to be let out. either his door was locked and the key not to be found, or the collision had jammed the lock and prevented the key from turning. the ladies thought he must be afflicted in some way to make such a noise, but one of the men was assuring him that in no circumstances should he be left, and that his (the bystander's) son would be along soon and would smash down his door if it was not opened in the mean time. "he has a stronger arm than i have," he added. the son arrived presently and proceeded to make short work of the door: it was smashed in and the inmate released, to his great satisfaction and with many expressions of gratitude to his rescuer. but one of the head stewards who came up at this juncture was so incensed at the damage done to the property of his company, and so little aware of the infinitely greater damage done the ship, that he warned the man who had released the prisoner that he would be arrested on arrival in new york. it must be borne in mind that no general warning had been issued to passengers: here and there were experienced travellers to whom collision with an iceberg was sufficient to cause them to make every preparation for leaving the ship, but the great majority were never enlightened as to the amount of damage done, or even as to what had happened. we knew in a vague way that we had collided with an iceberg, but there our knowledge ended, and most of us drew no deductions from that fact alone. another factor that prevented some from taking to the boats was the drop to the water below and the journey into the unknown sea: certainly it looked a tremendous way down in the darkness, the sea and the night both seemed very cold and lonely; and here was the ship, so firm and well lighted and warm. but perhaps what made so many people declare their decision to remain was their strong belief in the theory of the titanic's unsinkable construction. again and again was it repeated, "this ship cannot sink; it is only a question of waiting until another ship comes up and takes us off." husbands expected to follow their wives and join them either in new york or by transfer in mid-ocean from steamer to steamer. many passengers relate that they were told by officers that the ship was a lifeboat and could not go down; one lady affirms that the captain told her the titanic could not sink for two or three days; no doubt this was immediately after the collision. it is not any wonder, then, that many elected to remain, deliberately choosing the deck of the titanic to a place in a lifeboat. and yet the boats had to go down, and so at first they went half-full: this is the real explanation of why they were not as fully loaded as the later ones. it is important then to consider the question how far the captain was justified in withholding all the knowledge he had from every passenger. from one point of view he should have said to them, "this ship will sink in a few hours: there are the boats, and only women and children can go to them." but had he the authority to enforce such an order? there are such things as panics and rushes which get beyond the control of a handful of officers, even if armed, and where even the bravest of men get swept off their feet--mentally as well as physically. on the other hand, if he decided to withhold all definite knowledge of danger from all passengers and at the same time persuade--and if it was not sufficient, compel--women and children to take to the boats, it might result in their all being saved. he could not foresee the tenacity of their faith in the boat: there is ample evidence that he left the bridge when the ship had come to rest and went among passengers urging them to get into the boat and rigorously excluding all but women and children. some would not go. officer lowe testified that he shouted, "who's next for the boat?" and could get no replies. the boats even were sent away half-loaded,--although the fear of their buckling in the middle was responsible as well for this,--but the captain with the few boats at his disposal could hardly do more than persuade and advise in the terrible circumstances in which he was placed. how appalling to think that with a few more boats--and the ship was provided with that particular kind of davit that would launch more boats--there would have been no decision of that kind to make! it could have been stated plainly: "this ship will sink in a few hours: there is room in the boats for all passengers, beginning with women and children." poor captain smith! i care not whether the responsibility for such speed in iceberg regions will rest on his shoulders or not: no man ever had to make such a choice as he had that night, and it seems difficult to see how he can be blamed for withholding from passengers such information as he had of the danger that was imminent. when one reads in the press that lifeboats arrived at the carpathia half full, it seems at first sight a dreadful thing that this should have been allowed to happen; but it is so easy to make these criticisms afterwards, so easy to say that captain smith should have told everyone of the condition of the vessel. he was faced with many conditions that night which such criticism overlooks. let any fair-minded person consider some few of the problems presented to him--the ship was bound to sink in a few hours; there was lifeboat accommodation for all women and children and some men; there was no way of getting some women to go except by telling them the ship was doomed, a course he deemed it best not to take; and he knew the danger of boats buckling when loaded full. his solution of these problems was apparently the following:--to send the boats down half full, with such women as would go, and to tell the boats to stand by to pick up more passengers passed down from the cargo ports. there is good evidence that this was part of the plan: i heard an officer give the order to four boats and a lady in number 4 boat on the port side tells me the sailors were so long looking for the port where the captain personally had told them to wait, that they were in danger of being sucked under by the vessel. how far any systematic attempt was made to stand by the ports, i do not know: i never saw one open or any boat standing near on the starboard side; but then, boats 9 to 15 went down full, and on reaching the sea rowed away at once. there is good evidence, then, that captain smith fully intended to load the boats full in this way. the failure to carry out the intention is one of the things the whole world regrets, but consider again the great size of the ship and the short time to make decisions, and the omission is more easily understood. the fact is that such a contingency as lowering away boats was not even considered beforehand, and there is much cause for gratitude that as many as seven hundred and five people were rescued. the whole question of a captain's duties seems to require revision. it was totally impossible for any one man to attempt to control the ship that night, and the weather conditions could not well have been more favourable for doing so. one of the reforms that seem inevitable is that one man shall be responsible for the boats, their manning, loading and lowering, leaving the captain free to be on the bridge to the last moment. but to return for a time to the means taken to attract the notice of other ships. the wireless operators were now in touch with several ships, and calling to them to come quickly for the water was pouring in and the titanic beginning to go down by the head. bride testified that the first reply received was from a german boat, the frankfurt, which was: "all right: stand by," but not giving her position. from comparison of the strength of signals received from the frankfurt and from other boats, the operators estimated the frankfurt was the nearest; but subsequent events proved that this was not so. she was, in fact, one hundred and forty miles away and arrived at 10.50 a.m. next morning, when the carpathia had left with the rescued. the next reply was from the carpathia, fifty-eight miles away on the outbound route to the mediterranean, and it was a prompt and welcome one--"coming hard," followed by the position. then followed the olympic, and with her they talked for some time, but she was five hundred and sixty miles away on the southern route, too far to be of any immediate help. at the speed of 23 knots she would expect to be up about 1 p.m. next day, and this was about the time that those in boat 13 had calculated. we had always assumed in the boat that the stokers who gave this information had it from one of the officers before they left; but in the absence of any knowledge of the much nearer ship, the carpathia, it is more probable that they knew in a general way where the sister ship, the olympic, should be, and had made a rough calculation. other ships in touch by wireless were the mount temple, fifty miles; the birma, one hundred miles; the parisian, one hundred and fifty miles; the virginian, one hundred and fifty miles; and the baltic, three hundred miles. but closer than any of these--closer even than the carpathia--were two ships: the californian, less than twenty miles away, with the wireless operator off duty and unable to catch the "c.q.d." signal which was now making the air for many miles around quiver in its appeal for help--immediate, urgent help--for the hundreds of people who stood on the titanic's deck. the second vessel was a small steamer some few miles ahead on the port side, without any wireless apparatus, her name and destination still unknown; and yet the evidence for her presence that night seems too strong to be disregarded. mr. boxhall states that he and captain smith saw her quite plainly some five miles away, and could distinguish the mast-head lights and a red port light. they at once hailed her with rockets and morse electric signals, to which boxhall saw no reply, but captain smith and stewards affirmed they did. the second and third officers saw the signals sent and her lights, the latter from the lifeboat of which he was in charge. seaman hopkins testified that he was told by the captain to row for the light; and we in boat 13 certainly saw it in the same position and rowed towards it for some time. but notwithstanding all the efforts made to attract its attention, it drew slowly away and the lights sank below the horizon. the pity of it! so near, and so many people waiting for the shelter its decks could have given so easily. it seems impossible to think that this ship ever replied to the signals: those who said so must have been mistaken. the united state senate committee in its report does not hesitate to say that this unknown steamer and the californian are identical, and that the failure on the part of the latter to come to the help of the titanic is culpable negligence. there is undoubted evidence that some of the crew on the californian saw our rockets; but it seems impossible to believe that the captain and officers knew of our distress and deliberately ignored it. judgment on the matter had better be suspended until further information is forthcoming. an engineer who has served in the trans-atlantic service tells me that it is a common practice for small boats to leave the fishing smacks to which they belong and row away for miles; sometimes even being lost and wandering about among icebergs, and even not being found again. in these circumstances, rockets are part of a fishing smack's equipment, and are sent up to indicate to the small boats how to return. is it conceivable that the californian thought our rockets were such signals, and therefore paid no attention to them? incidentally, this engineer did not hesitate to add that it is doubtful if a big liner would stop to help a small fishing-boat sending off distress signals, or even would turn about to help one which she herself had cut down as it lay in her path without a light. he was strong in his affirmation that such things were commonly known to all officers in the trans-atlantic service. with regard to the other vessels in wireless communication, the mount temple was the only one near enough from the point of distance to have arrived in time to be of help, but between her and the titanic lay the enormous ice-floe, and icebergs were near her in addition. the seven ships which caught the message started at once to her help but were all stopped on the way (except the birma) by the carpathia's wireless announcing the fate of the titanic and the people aboard her. the message must have affected the captains of these ships very deeply: they would understand far better than the travelling public what it meant to lose such a beautiful ship on her first voyage. the only thing now left to be done was to get the lifeboats away as quickly as possible, and to this task the other officers were in the meantime devoting all their endeavours. mr. lightoller sent away boat after boat: in one he had put twenty-four women and children, in another thirty, in another thirty-five; and then, running short of seamen to man the boats he sent major peuchen, an expert yachtsman, in the next, to help with its navigation. by the time these had been filled, he had difficulty in finding women for the fifth and sixth boats for the reasons already stated. all this time the passengers remained--to use his own expression--"as quiet as if in church." to man and supervise the loading of six boats must have taken him nearly up to the time of the titanic's sinking, taking an average of some twenty minutes to a boat. still at work to the end, he remained on the ship till she sank and went down with her. his evidence before the united states committee was as follows: "did you leave the ship?" "no, sir." "did the ship leave you?" "yes, sir." it was a piece of work well and cleanly done, and his escape from the ship, one of the most wonderful of all, seems almost a reward for his devotion to duty. captain smith, officers wilde and murdock were similarly engaged in other parts of the ship, urging women to get in the boats, in some cases directing junior officers to go down in some of them,--officers pitman, boxhall, and lowe were sent in this way,--in others placing members of the crew in charge. as the boats were lowered, orders were shouted to them where to make for: some were told to stand by and wait for further instructions, others to row for the light of the disappearing steamer. it is a pitiful thing to recall the effects of sending down the first boats half full. in some cases men in the company of their wives had actually taken seats in the boats--young men, married only a few weeks and on their wedding trip--and had done so only because no more women could then be found; but the strict interpretation by the particular officer in charge there of the rule of "women and children only," compelled them to get out again. some of these boats were lowered and reached the carpathia with many vacant seats. the anguish of the young wives in such circumstances can only be imagined. in other parts of the ship, however, a different interpretation was placed on the rule, and men were allowed and even invited by officers to get in--not only to form part of the crew, but even as passengers. this, of course, in the first boats and when no more women could be found. the varied understanding of this rule was a frequent subject of discussion on the carpathia--in fact, the rule itself was debated with much heart-searching. there were not wanting many who doubted the justice of its rigid enforcement, who could not think it well that a husband should be separated from his wife and family, leaving them penniless, or a young bridegroom from his wife of a few short weeks, while ladies with few relatives, with no one dependent upon them, and few responsibilities of any kind, were saved. it was mostly these ladies who pressed this view, and even men seemed to think there was a good deal to be said for it. perhaps there is, theoretically, but it would be impossible, i think, in practice. to quote mr. lightoller again in his evidence before the united states senate committee,--when asked if it was a rule of the sea that women and children be saved first, he replied, "no, it is a rule of human nature." that is no doubt the real reason for its existence. but the selective process of circumstances brought about results that were very bitter to some. it was heartrending for ladies who had lost all they held dearest in the world to hear that in one boat was a stoker picked up out of the sea so drunk that he stood up and brandished his arms about, and had to be thrown down by ladies and sat upon to keep him quiet. if comparisons can be drawn, it did seem better that an educated, refined man should be saved than one who had flown to drink as his refuge in time of danger. these discussions turned sometimes to the old enquiry--"what is the purpose of all this? why the disaster? why this man saved and that man lost? who has arranged that my husband should live a few short happy years in the world, and the happiest days in those years with me these last few weeks, and then be taken from me?" i heard no one attribute all this to a divine power who ordains and arranges the lives of men, and as part of a definite scheme sends such calamity and misery in order to purify, to teach, to spiritualize. i do not say there were not people who thought and said they saw divine wisdom in it all,--so inscrutable that we in our ignorance saw it not; but i did not hear it expressed, and this book is intended to be no more than a partial chronicle of the many different experiences and convictions. there were those, on the other hand, who did not fail to say emphatically that indifference to the rights and feelings of others, blindness to duty towards our fellow men and women, was in the last analysis the cause of most of the human misery in the world. and it should undoubtedly appeal more to our sense of justice to attribute these things to our own lack of consideration for others than to shift the responsibility on to a power whom we first postulate as being all-wise and all-loving. all the boats were lowered and sent away by about 2 a.m., and by this time the ship was very low in the water, the forecastle deck completely submerged, and the sea creeping steadily up to the bridge and probably only a few yards away. no one on the ship can have had any doubt now as to her ultimate fate, and yet the fifteen hundred passengers and crew on board made no demonstration, and not a sound came from them as they stood quietly on the decks or went about their duties below. it seems incredible, and yet if it was a continuation of the same feeling that existed on deck before the boats left,--and i have no doubt it was,--the explanation is straightforward and reasonable in its simplicity. an attempt is made in the last chapter to show why the attitude of the crowd was so quietly courageous. there are accounts which picture excited crowds running about the deck in terror, fighting and struggling, but two of the most accurate observers, colonel gracie and mr. lightoller, affirm that this was not so, that absolute order and quietness prevailed. the band still played to cheer the hearts of all near; the engineers and their crew--i have never heard any one speak of a single engineer being seen on deck--still worked at the electric light engines, far away below, keeping them going until no human being could do so a second longer, right until the ship tilted on end and the engines broke loose and fell down. the light failed then only because the engines were no longer there to produce light, not because the men who worked them were not standing by them to do their duty. to be down in the bowels of the ship, far away from the deck where at any rate there was a chance of a dive and a swim and a possible rescue; to know that when the ship went--as they knew it must soon--there could be no possible hope of climbing up in time to reach the sea; to know all these things and yet to keep the engines going that the decks might be lighted to the last moment, required sublime courage. but this courage is required of every engineer and it is not called by that name: it is called "duty." to stand by his engines to the last possible moment is his duty. there could be no better example of the supremest courage being but duty well done than to remember the engineers of the titanic still at work as she heeled over and flung them with their engines down the length of the ship. the simple statement that the lights kept on to the last is really their epitaph, but lowell's words would seem to apply to them with peculiar force- "the longer on this earth we live and weigh the various qualities of men- the more we feel the high, stern-featured beauty of plain devotedness to duty. steadfast and still, nor paid with mortal praise, but finding amplest recompense for life's ungarlanded expense in work done squarely and unwasted days." for some time before she sank, the titanic had a considerable list to port, so much so that one boat at any rate swung so far away from the side that difficulty was experienced in getting passengers in. this list was increased towards the end, and colonel gracie relates that mr. lightoller, who has a deep, powerful voice, ordered all passengers to the starboard side. this was close before the end. they crossed over, and as they did so a crowd of steerage passengers rushed up and filled the decks so full that there was barely room to move. soon afterwards the great vessel swung slowly, stern in the air, the lights went out, and while some were flung into the water and others dived off, the great majority still clung to the rails, to the sides and roofs of deck-structures, lying prone on the deck. and in this position they were when, a few minutes later, the enormous vessel dived obliquely downwards. as she went, no doubt many still clung to the rails, but most would do their best to get away from her and jump as she slid forwards and downwards. whatever they did, there can be little question that most of them would be taken down by suction, to come up again a few moments later and to fill the air with those heartrending cries which fell on the ears of those in the lifeboats with such amazement. another survivor, on the other hand, relates that he had dived from the stern before she heeled over, and swam round under her enormous triple screws lifted by now high out of the water as she stood on end. fascinated by the extraordinary sight, he watched them up above his head, but presently realizing the necessity of getting away as quickly as possible, he started to swim from the ship, but as he did she dived forward, the screws passing near his head. his experience is that not only was no suction present, but even a wave was created which washed him away from the place where she had gone down. of all those fifteen hundred people, flung into the sea as the titanic went down, innocent victims of thoughtlessness and apathy of those responsible for their safety, only a very few found their way to the carpathia. it will serve no good purpose to dwell any longer on the scene of helpless men and women struggling in the water. the heart of everyone who has read of their helplessness has gone out to them in deepest love and sympathy; and the knowledge that their struggle in the water was in most cases short and not physically painful because of the low temperature--the evidence seems to show that few lost their lives by drowning--is some consolation. if everyone sees to it that his sympathy with them is so practical as to force him to follow up the question of reforms personally, not leaving it to experts alone, then he will have at any rate done something to atone for the loss of so many valuable lives. we had now better follow the adventures of those who were rescued from the final event in the disaster. two accounts--those of colonel gracie and mr. lightoller--agree very closely. the former went down clinging to a rail, the latter dived before the ship went right under, but was sucked down and held against one of the blowers. they were both carried down for what seemed a long distance, but mr. lightoller was finally blown up again by a "terrific gust" that came up the blower and forced him clear. colonel gracie came to the surface after holding his breath for what seemed an eternity, and they both swam about holding on to any wreckage they could find. finally they saw an upturned collapsible boat and climbed on it in company with twenty other men, among them bride the marconi operator. after remaining thus for some hours, with the sea washing them to the waist, they stood up as day broke, in two rows, back to back, balancing themselves as well as they could, and afraid to turn lest the boat should roll over. finally a lifeboat saw them and took them off, an operation attended with the greatest difficulty, and they reached the carpathia in the early dawn. not many people have gone through such an experience as those men did, lying all night on an overturned, ill-balanced boat, and praying together, as they did all the time, for the day and a ship to take them off. some account must now be attempted of the journey of the fleet of boats to the carpathia, but it must necessarily be very brief. experiences differed considerably: some had no encounters at all with icebergs, no lack of men to row, discovered lights and food and water, were picked up after only a few hours' exposure, and suffered very little discomfort; others seemed to see icebergs round them all night long and to be always rowing round them; others had so few men aboard--in some cases only two or three--that ladies had to row and in one case to steer, found no lights, food or water, and were adrift many hours, in some cases nearly eight. the first boat to be picked up by the carpathia was one in charge of mr. boxhall. there was only one other man rowing and ladies worked at the oars. a green light burning in this boat all night was the greatest comfort to the rest of us who had nothing to steer by: although it meant little in the way of safety in itself, it was a point to which we could look. the green light was the first intimation captain rostron had of our position, and he steered for it and picked up its passengers first. mr. pitman was sent by first officer murdock in charge of boat 5, with forty passengers and five of the crew. it would have held more, but no women could be found at the time it was lowered. mr. pitman says that after leaving the ship he felt confident she would float and they would all return. a passenger in this boat relates that men could not be induced to embark when she went down, and made appointments for the next morning with him. tied to boat 5 was boat 7, one of those that contained few people: a few were transferred from number 5, but it would have held many more. fifth officer lowe was in charge of boat 14, with fifty-five women and children, and some of the crew. so full was the boat that as she went down mr. lowe had to fire his revolver along the ship's side to prevent any more climbing in and causing her to buckle. this boat, like boat 13, was difficult to release from the lowering tackle, and had to be cut away after reaching the sea. mr. lowe took in charge four other boats, tied them together with lines, found some of them not full, and transferred all his passengers to these, distributing them in the darkness as well as he could. then returning to the place where the titanic had sunk, he picked up some of those swimming in the water and went back to the four boats. on the way to the carpathia he encountered one of the collapsible boats, and took aboard all those in her, as she seemed to be sinking. boat 12 was one of the four tied together, and the seaman in charge testified that he tried to row to the drowning, but with forty women and children and only one other man to row, it was not possible to pull such a heavy boat to the scene of the wreck. boat 2 was a small ship's boat and had four or five passengers and seven of the crew. boat 4 was one of the last to leave on the port side, and by this time there was such a list that deck chairs had to bridge the gap between the boat and the deck. when lowered, it remained for some time still attached to the ropes, and as the titanic was rapidly sinking it seemed she would be pulled under. the boat was full of women, who besought the sailors to leave the ship, but in obedience to orders from the captain to stand by the cargo port, they remained near; so near, in fact, that they heard china falling and smashing as the ship went down by the head, and were nearly hit by wreckage thrown overboard by some of the officers and crew and intended to serve as rafts. they got clear finally, and were only a short distance away when the ship sank, so that they were able to pull some men aboard as they came to the surface. this boat had an unpleasant experience in the night with icebergs; many were seen and avoided with difficulty. quartermaster hickens was in charge of boat 6, and in the absence of sailors major peuchen was sent to help to man her. they were told to make for the light of the steamer seen on the port side, and followed it until it disappeared. there were forty women and children here. boat 8 had only one seaman, and as captain smith had enforced the rule of "women and children only," ladies had to row. later in the night, when little progress had been made, the seaman took an oar and put a lady in charge of the tiller. this boat again was in the midst of icebergs. of the four collapsible boats--although collapsible is not really the correct term, for only a small portion collapses, the canvas edge; "surf boats" is really their name--one was launched at the last moment by being pushed over as the sea rose to the edge of the deck, and was never righted. this is the one twenty men climbed on. another was caught up by mr. lowe and the passengers transferred, with the exception of three men who had perished from the effects of immersion. the boat was allowed to drift away and was found more than a month later by the celtic in just the same condition. it is interesting to note how long this boat had remained afloat after she was supposed to be no longer seaworthy. a curious coincidence arose from the fact that one of my brothers happened to be travelling on the celtic, and looking over the side, saw adrift on the sea a boat belonging to the titanic in which i had been wrecked. the two other collapsible boats came to the carpathia carrying full loads of passengers: in one, the forward starboard boat and one of the last to leave, was mr. ismay. here four chinamen were concealed under the feet of the passengers. how they got there no one knew--or indeed how they happened to be on the titanic, for by the immigration laws of the united states they are not allowed to enter her ports. it must be said, in conclusion, that there is the greatest cause for gratitude that all the boats launched carried their passengers safely to the rescue ship. it would not be right to accept this fact without calling attention to it: it would be easy to enumerate many things which might have been present as elements of danger. chapter vii the carpathia's return to new york the journey of the carpathia from the time she caught the "c.q.d." from the titanic at about 12.30 a.m. on monday morning and turned swiftly about to her rescue, until she arrived at new york on the following thursday at 8.30 p.m. was one that demanded of the captain, officers and crew of the vessel the most exact knowledge of navigation, the utmost vigilance in every department both before and after the rescue, and a capacity for organization that must sometimes have been taxed to the breaking point. the extent to which all these qualities were found present and the manner in which they were exercised stands to the everlasting credit of the cunard line and those of its servants who were in charge of the carpathia. captain rostron's part in all this is a great one, and wrapped up though his action is in a modesty that is conspicuous in its nobility, it stands out even in his own account as a piece of work well and courageously done. as soon as the titanic called for help and gave her position, the carpathia was turned and headed north: all hands were called on duty, a new watch of stokers was put on, and the highest speed of which she was capable was demanded of the engineers, with the result that the distance of fifty-eight miles between the two ships was covered in three and a half hours, a speed well beyond her normal capacity. the three doctors on board each took charge of a saloon, in readiness to render help to any who needed their services, the stewards and catering staff were hard at work preparing hot drinks and meals, and the purser's staff ready with blankets and berths for the shipwrecked passengers as soon as they got on board. on deck the sailors got ready lifeboats, swung them out on the davits, and stood by, prepared to lower away their crews if necessary; fixed rope-ladders, cradle-chairs, nooses, and bags for the children at the hatches, to haul the rescued up the side. on the bridge was the captain with his officers, peering into the darkness eagerly to catch the first signs of the crippled titanic, hoping, in spite of her last despairing message of "sinking by the head," to find her still afloat when her position was reached. a double watch of lookout men was set, for there were other things as well as the titanic to look for that night, and soon they found them. as captain rostron said in his evidence, they saw icebergs on either side of them between 2.45 and 4 a.m., passing twenty large ones, one hundred to two hundred feet high, and many smaller ones, and "frequently had to manoeuvre the ship to avoid them." it was a time when every faculty was called upon for the highest use of which it was capable. with the knowledge before them that the enormous titanic, the supposedly unsinkable ship, had struck ice and was sinking rapidly; with the lookout constantly calling to the bridge, as he must have done, "icebergs on the starboard," "icebergs on the port," it required courage and judgment beyond the ordinary to drive the ship ahead through that lane of icebergs and "manoeuvre round them." as he himself said, he "took the risk of full speed in his desire to save life, and probably some people might blame him for taking such a risk." but the senate committee assured him that they, at any rate, would not, and we of the lifeboats have certainly no desire to do so. the ship was finally stopped at 4 a.m., with an iceberg reported dead ahead (the same no doubt we had to row around in boat 13 as we approached the carpathia), and about the same time the first lifeboat was sighted. again she had to be manoeuvred round the iceberg to pick up the boat, which was the one in charge of mr. boxhall. from him the captain learned that the titanic had gone down, and that he was too late to save any one but those in lifeboats, which he could now see drawing up from every part of the horizon. meanwhile, the passengers of the carpathia, some of them aroused by the unusual vibration of the screw, some by sailors tramping overhead as they swung away the lifeboats and got ropes and lowering tackle ready, were beginning to come on deck just as day broke; and here an extraordinary sight met their eyes. as far as the eye could reach to the north and west lay an unbroken stretch of field ice, with icebergs still attached to the floe and rearing aloft their mass as a hill might suddenly rise from a level plain. ahead and to the south and east huge floating monsters were showing up through the waning darkness, their number added to moment by moment as the dawn broke and flushed the horizon pink. it is remarkable how "busy" all those icebergs made the sea look: to have gone to bed with nothing but sea and sky and to come on deck to find so many objects in sight made quite a change in the character of the sea: it looked quite crowded; and a lifeboat alongside and people clambering aboard, mostly women, in nightdresses and dressing-gowns, in cloaks and shawls, in anything but ordinary clothes! out ahead and on all sides little torches glittered faintly for a few moments and then guttered out--and shouts and cheers floated across the quiet sea. it would be difficult to imagine a more unexpected sight than this that lay before the carpathia's passengers as they lined the sides that morning in the early dawn. no novelist would dare to picture such an array of beautiful climatic conditions,--the rosy dawn, the morning star, the moon on the horizon, the sea stretching in level beauty to the sky-line,--and on this sea to place an ice-field like the arctic regions and icebergs in numbers everywhere,--white and turning pink and deadly cold,--and near them, rowing round the icebergs to avoid them, little boats coming suddenly out of mid-ocean, with passengers rescued from the most wonderful ship the world has known. no artist would have conceived such a picture: it would have seemed so highly dramatic as to border on the impossible, and would not have been attempted. such a combination of events would pass the limit permitted the imagination of both author and artist. the passengers crowded the rails and looked down at us as we rowed up in the early morning; stood quietly aside while the crew at the gangways below took us aboard, and watched us as if the ship had been in dock and we had rowed up to join her in a somewhat unusual way. some of them have related that we were very quiet as we came aboard: it is quite true, we were; but so were they. there was very little excitement on either side: just the quiet demeanour of people who are in the presence of something too big as yet to lie within their mental grasp, and which they cannot yet discuss. and so they asked us politely to have hot coffee, which we did; and food, which we generally declined,--we were not hungry,--and they said very little at first about the lost titanic and our adventures in the night. much that is exaggerated and false has been written about the mental condition of passengers as they came aboard: we have been described as being too dazed to understand what was happening, as being too overwhelmed to speak, and as looking before us with "set, staring gaze," "dazed with the shadow of the dread event." that is, no doubt, what most people would expect in the circumstances, but i know it does not give a faithful record of how we did arrive: in fact it is simply not true. as remarked before, the one thing that matters in describing an event of this kind is the exact truth, as near as the fallible human mind can state it; and my own impression of our mental condition is that of supreme gratitude and relief at treading the firm decks of a ship again. i am aware that experiences differed considerably according to the boats occupied; that those who were uncertain of the fate of their relatives and friends had much to make them anxious and troubled; and that it is not possible to look into another person's consciousness and say what is written there; but dealing with mental conditions as far as they are delineated by facial and bodily expressions, i think joy, relief, gratitude were the dominant emotions written on the faces of those who climbed the rope-ladders and were hauled up in cradles. it must not be forgotten that no one in any one boat knew who were saved in other boats: few knew even how many boats there were and how many passengers could be saved. it was at the time probable that friends would follow them to the carpathia, or be found on other steamers, or even on the pier at which we landed. the hysterical scenes that have been described are imaginative; true, one woman did fill the saloon with hysterical cries immediately after coming aboard, but she could not have known for a certainty that any of her friends were lost: probably the sense of relief after some hours of journeying about the sea was too much for her for a time. one of the first things we did was to crowd round a steward with a bundle of telegraph forms. he was the bearer of the welcome news that passengers might send marconigrams to their relatives free of charge, and soon he bore away the first sheaf of hastily scribbled messages to the operator; by the time the last boatload was aboard, the pile must have risen high in the marconi cabin. we learned afterwards that many of these never reached their destination; and this is not a matter for surprise. there was only one operator--cottam--on board, and although he was assisted to some extent later, when bride from the titanic had recovered from his injuries sufficiently to work the apparatus, he had so much to do that he fell asleep over this work on tuesday night after three days' continuous duty without rest. but we did not know the messages were held back, and imagined our friends were aware of our safety; then, too, a roll-call of the rescued was held in the carpathia's saloon on the monday, and this was marconied to land in advance of all messages. it seemed certain, then, that friends at home would have all anxiety removed, but there were mistakes in the official list first telegraphed. the experience of my own friends illustrates this: the marconigram i wrote never got through to england; nor was my name ever mentioned in any list of the saved (even a week after landing in new york, i saw it in a black-edged "final" list of the missing), and it seemed certain that i had never reached the carpathia; so much so that, as i write, there are before me obituary notices from the english papers giving a short sketch of my life in england. after landing in new york and realizing from the lists of the saved which a reporter showed me that my friends had no news since the titanic sank on monday morning until that night (thursday 9 p.m.), i cabled to england at once (as i had but two shillings rescued from the titanic, the white star line paid for the cables), but the messages were not delivered until 8.20 a.m. next morning. at 9 a.m. my friends read in the papers a short account of the disaster which i had supplied to the press, so that they knew of my safety and experiences in the wreck almost at the same time. i am grateful to remember that many of my friends in london refused to count me among the missing during the three days when i was so reported. there is another side to this record of how the news came through, and a sad one, indeed. again i wish it were not necessary to tell such things, but since they all bear on the equipment of the trans-atlantic lines--powerful marconi apparatus, relays of operators, etc.,--it is best they should be told. the name of an american gentleman--the same who sat near me in the library on sunday afternoon and whom i identified later from a photograph--was consistently reported in the lists as saved and aboard the carpathia: his son journeyed to new york to meet him, rejoicing at his deliverance, and never found him there. when i met his family some days later and was able to give them some details of his life aboard ship, it seemed almost cruel to tell them of the opposite experience that had befallen my friends at home. returning to the journey of the carpathia--the last boatload of passengers was taken aboard at 8.30 a.m., the lifeboats were hauled on deck while the collapsibles were abandoned, and the carpathia proceeded to steam round the scene of the wreck in the hope of picking up anyone floating on wreckage. before doing so the captain arranged in the saloon a service over the spot where the titanic sank, as nearly as could be calculated,--a service, as he said, of respect to those who were lost and of gratitude for those who were saved. she cruised round and round the scene, but found nothing to indicate there was any hope of picking up more passengers; and as the californian had now arrived, followed shortly afterwards by the birma, a russian tramp steamer, captain rostron decided to leave any further search to them and to make all speed with the rescued to land. as we moved round, there was surprisingly little wreckage to be seen: wooden deck-chairs and small pieces of other wood, but nothing of any size. but covering the sea in huge patches was a mass of reddish-yellow "seaweed," as we called it for want of a name. it was said to be cork, but i never heard definitely its correct description. the problem of where to land us had next to be decided. the carpathia was bound for gibraltar, and the captain might continue his journey there, landing us at the azores on the way; but he would require more linen and provisions, the passengers were mostly women and children, ill-clad, dishevelled, and in need of many attentions he could not give them. then, too, he would soon be out of the range of wireless communication, with the weak apparatus his ship had, and he soon decided against that course. halifax was the nearest in point of distance, but this meant steaming north through the ice, and he thought his passengers did not want to see more ice. he headed back therefore to new york, which he had left the previous thursday, working all afternoon along the edge of the ice-field which stretched away north as far as the unaided eye could reach. i have wondered since if we could possibly have landed our passengers on this ice-floe from the lifeboats and gone back to pick up those swimming, had we known it was there; i should think it quite feasible to have done so. it was certainly an extraordinary sight to stand on deck and see the sea covered with solid ice, white and dazzling in the sun and dotted here and there with icebergs. we ran close up, only two or three hundred yards away, and steamed parallel to the floe, until it ended towards night and we saw to our infinite satisfaction the last of the icebergs and the field fading away astern. many of the rescued have no wish ever to see an iceberg again. we learnt afterwards the field was nearly seventy miles long and twelve miles wide, and had lain between us and the birma on her way to the rescue. mr. boxhall testified that he had crossed the grand banks many times, but had never seen field-ice before. the testimony of the captains and officers of other steamers in the neighbourhood is of the same kind: they had "never seen so many icebergs this time of the year," or "never seen such dangerous ice floes and threatening bergs." undoubtedly the titanic was faced that night with unusual and unexpected conditions of ice: the captain knew not the extent of these conditions, but he knew somewhat of their existence. alas, that he heeded not their warning! during the day, the bodies of eight of the crew were committed to the deep: four of them had been taken out of the boats dead and four died during the day. the engines were stopped and all passengers on deck bared their heads while a short service was read; when it was over the ship steamed on again to carry the living back to land. the passengers on the carpathia were by now hard at work finding clothing for the survivors: the barber's shop was raided for ties, collars, hair-pins, combs, etc., of which it happened there was a large stock in hand; one good samaritan went round the ship with a box of tooth-brushes offering them indiscriminately to all. in some cases, clothing could not be found for the ladies and they spent the rest of the time on board in their dressing-gowns and cloaks in which they came away from the titanic. they even slept in them, for, in the absence of berths, women had to sleep on the floor of the saloons and in the library each night on straw _paillasses_, and here it was not possible to undress properly. the men were given the smoking-room floor and a supply of blankets, but the room was small, and some elected to sleep out on deck. i found a pile of towels on the bathroom floor ready for next morning's baths, and made up a very comfortable bed on these. later i was waked in the middle of the night by a man offering me a berth in his four-berth cabin: another occupant was unable to leave his berth for physical reasons, and so the cabin could not be given up to ladies. on tuesday the survivors met in the saloon and formed a committee among themselves to collect subscriptions for a general fund, out of which it was resolved by vote to provide as far as possible for the destitute among the steerage passengers, to present a loving cup to captain rostron and medals to the officers and crew of the carpathia, and to divide any surplus among the crew of the titanic. the work of this committee is not yet (june 1st) at an end, but all the resolutions except the last one have been acted upon, and that is now receiving the attention of the committee. the presentations to the captain and crew were made the day the carpathia returned to new york from her mediterranean trip, and it is a pleasure to all the survivors to know that the united states senate has recognized the service rendered to humanity by the carpathia and has voted captain rostron a gold medal commemorative of the rescue. on the afternoon of tuesday, i visited the steerage in company with a fellow-passenger, to take down the names of all who were saved. we grouped them into nationalities,--english irish, and swedish mostly,--and learnt from them their names and homes, the amount of money they possessed, and whether they had friends in america. the irish girls almost universally had no money rescued from the wreck, and were going to friends in new york or places near, while the swedish passengers, among whom were a considerable number of men, had saved the greater part of their money and in addition had railway tickets through to their destinations inland. the saving of their money marked a curious racial difference, for which i can offer no explanation: no doubt the irish girls never had very much but they must have had the necessary amount fixed by the immigration laws. there were some pitiful cases of women with children and the husband lost; some with one or two children saved and the others lost; in one case, a whole family was missing, and only a friend left to tell of them. among the irish group was one girl of really remarkable beauty, black hair and deep violet eyes with long lashes, and perfectly shaped features, and quite young, not more than eighteen or twenty; i think she lost no relatives on the titanic. the following letter to the london "times" is reproduced here to show something of what our feeling was on board the carpathia towards the loss of the titanic. it was written soon after we had the definite information on the wednesday that ice warnings had been sent to the titanic, and when we all felt that something must be done to awaken public opinion to safeguard ocean travel in the future. we were not aware, of course, how much the outside world knew, and it seemed well to do something to inform the english public of what had happened at as early an opportunity as possible. i have not had occasion to change any of the opinions expressed in this letter. sir:-as one of few surviving englishmen from the steamship titanic, which sank in mid-atlantic on monday morning last, i am asking you to lay before your readers a few facts concerning the disaster, in the hope that something may be done in the near future to ensure the safety of that portion of the travelling public who use the atlantic highway for business or pleasure. i wish to dissociate myself entirely from any report that would seek to fix the responsibility on any person or persons or body of people, and by simply calling attention to matters of fact the authenticity of which is, i think, beyond question and can be established in any court of inquiry, to allow your readers to draw their own conclusions as to the responsibility for the collision. first, that it was known to those in charge of the titanic that we were in the iceberg region; that the atmospheric and temperature conditions suggested the near presence of icebergs; that a wireless message was received from a ship ahead of us warning us that they had been seen in the locality of which latitude and longitude were given. second, that at the time of the collision the titanic was running at a high rate of speed. third, that the accommodation for saving passengers and crew was totally inadequate, being sufficient only for a total of about 950. this gave, with the highest possible complement of 3400, a less than one in three chance of being saved in the case of accident. fourth, that the number landed in the carpathia, approximately 700, is a high percentage of the possible 950, and bears excellent testimony to the courage, resource, and devotion to duty of the officers and crew of the vessel; many instances of their nobility and personal self-sacrifice are within our possession, and we know that they did all they could do with the means at their disposal. fifth, that the practice of running mail and passenger vessels through fog and iceberg regions at a high speed is a common one; they are timed to run almost as an express train is run, and they cannot, therefore, slow down more than a few knots in time of possible danger. i have neither knowledge nor experience to say what remedies i consider should be applied; but, perhaps, the following suggestions may serve as a help:-first, that no vessel should be allowed to leave a british port without sufficient boat and other accommodation to allow each passenger and member of the crew a seat; and that at the time of booking this fact should be pointed out to a passenger, and the number of the seat in the particular boat allotted to him then. second, that as soon as is practicable after sailing each passenger should go through boat drill in company with the crew assigned to his boat. third, that each passenger boat engaged in the transatlantic service should be instructed to slow down to a few knots when in the iceberg region, and should be fitted with an efficient searchlight. yours faithfully, lawrence beesley. it seemed well, too, while on the carpathia to prepare as accurate an account as possible of the disaster and to have this ready for the press, in order to calm public opinion and to forestall the incorrect and hysterical accounts which some american reporters are in the habit of preparing on occasions of this kind. the first impression is often the most permanent, and in a disaster of this magnitude, where exact and accurate information is so necessary, preparation of a report was essential. it was written in odd corners of the deck and saloon of the carpathia, and fell, it seemed very happily, into the hands of the one reporter who could best deal with it, the associated press. i understand it was the first report that came through and had a good deal of the effect intended. the carpathia returned to new york in almost every kind of climatic conditions: icebergs, ice-fields and bitter cold to commence with; brilliant warm sun, thunder and lightning in the middle of one night (and so closely did the peal follow the flash that women in the saloon leaped up in alarm saying rockets were being sent up again); cold winds most of the time; fogs every morning and during a good part of one day, with the foghorn blowing constantly; rain; choppy sea with the spray blowing overboard and coming in through the saloon windows; we said we had almost everything but hot weather and stormy seas. so that when we were told that nantucket lightship had been sighted on thursday morning from the bridge, a great sigh of relief went round to think new york and land would be reached before next morning. there is no doubt that a good many felt the waiting period of those four days very trying: the ship crowded far beyond its limits of comfort, the want of necessities of clothing and toilet, and above all the anticipation of meeting with relatives on the pier, with, in many cases, the knowledge that other friends were left behind and would not return home again. a few looked forward to meeting on the pier their friends to whom they had said au revoir on the titanic's deck, brought there by a faster boat, they said, or at any rate to hear that they were following behind us in another boat: a very few, indeed, for the thought of the icy water and the many hours' immersion seemed to weigh against such a possibility; but we encouraged them to hope the californian and the birma had picked some up; stranger things have happened, and we had all been through strange experiences. but in the midst of this rather tense feeling, one fact stands out as remarkable--no one was ill. captain rostron testified that on tuesday the doctor reported a clean bill of health, except for frost-bites and shaken nerves. there were none of the illnesses supposed to follow from exposure for hours in the cold night--and, it must be remembered, a considerable number swam about for some time when the titanic sank, and then either sat for hours in their wet things or lay flat on an upturned boat with the sea water washing partly over them until they were taken off in a lifeboat; no scenes of women weeping and brooding over their losses hour by hour until they were driven mad with grief--yet all this has been reported to the press by people on board the carpathia. these women met their sorrow with the sublimest courage, came on deck and talked with their fellow-men and women face to face, and in the midst of their loss did not forget to rejoice with those who had joined their friends on the carpathia's deck or come with them in a boat. there was no need for those ashore to call the carpathia a "death-ship," or to send coroners and coffins to the pier to meet her: her passengers were generally in good health and they did not pretend they were not. presently land came in sight, and very good it was to see it again: it was eight days since we left southampton, but the time seemed to have "stretched out to the crack of doom," and to have become eight weeks instead. so many dramatic incidents had been crowded into the last few days that the first four peaceful, uneventful days, marked by nothing that seared the memory, had faded almost out of recollection. it needed an effort to return to southampton, cherbourg and queenstown, as though returning to some event of last year. i think we all realized that time may be measured more by events than by seconds and minutes: what the astronomer would call "2.20 a.m. april 15th, 1912," the survivors called "the sinking of the titanic"; the "hours" that followed were designated "being adrift in an open sea," and "4.30 a.m." was "being rescued by the carpathia." the clock was a mental one, and the hours, minutes and seconds marked deeply on its face were emotions, strong and silent. surrounded by tugs of every kind, from which (as well as from every available building near the river) magnesium bombs were shot off by photographers, while reporters shouted for news of the disaster and photographs of passengers, the carpathia drew slowly to her station at the cunard pier, the gangways were pushed across, and we set foot at last on american soil, very thankful, grateful people. the mental and physical condition of the rescued as they came ashore has, here again, been greatly exaggerated--one description says we were "half-fainting, half-hysterical, bordering on hallucination, only now beginning to realize the horror." it is unfortunate such pictures should be presented to the world. there were some painful scenes of meeting between relatives of those who were lost, but once again women showed their self-control and went through the ordeal in most cases with extraordinary calm. it is well to record that the same account added: "a few, strangely enough, are calm and lucid"; if for "few" we read "a large majority," it will be much nearer the true description of the landing on the cunard pier in new york. there seems to be no adequate reason why a report of such a scene should depict mainly the sorrow and grief, should seek for every detail to satisfy the horrible and the morbid in the human mind. the first questions the excited crowds of reporters asked as they crowded round were whether it was true that officers shot passengers, and then themselves; whether passengers shot each other; whether any scenes of horror had been noticed, and what they were. it would have been well to have noticed the wonderful state of health of most of the rescued, their gratitude for their deliverance, the thousand and one things that gave cause for rejoicing. in the midst of so much description of the hysterical side of the scene, place should be found for the normal--and i venture to think the normal was the dominant feature in the landing that night. in the last chapter i shall try to record the persistence of the normal all through the disaster. nothing has been a greater surprise than to find people that do not act in conditions of danger and grief as they would be generally supposed to act--and, i must add, as they are generally described as acting. and so, with her work of rescue well done, the good ship carpathia returned to new york. everyone who came in her, everyone on the dock, and everyone who heard of her journey will agree with captain rostron when he says: "i thank god that i was within wireless hailing distance, and that i got there in time to pick up the survivors of the wreck." chapter viii the lessons taught by the loss of the titanic one of the most pitiful things in the relations of human beings to each other--the action and reaction of events that is called concretely "human life"--is that every now and then some of them should be called upon to lay down their lives from no sense of imperative, calculated duty such as inspires the soldier or the sailor, but suddenly, without any previous knowledge or warning of danger, without any opportunity of escape, and without any desire to risk such conditions of danger of their own free will. it is a blot on our civilization that these things are necessary from time to time, to arouse those responsible for the safety of human life from the lethargic selfishness which has governed them. the titanic's two thousand odd passengers went aboard thinking they were on an absolutely safe ship, and all the time there were many people--designers, builders, experts, government officials--who knew there were insufficient boats on board, that the titanic had no right to go fast in iceberg regions,--who knew these things and took no steps and enacted no laws to prevent their happening. not that they omitted to do these things deliberately, but were lulled into a state of selfish inaction from which it needed such a tragedy as this to arouse them. it was a cruel necessity which demanded that a few should die to arouse many millions to a sense of their own insecurity, to the fact that for years the possibility of such a disaster has been imminent. passengers have known none of these things, and while no good end would have been served by relating to them needless tales of danger on the high seas, one thing is certain--that, had they known them, many would not have travelled in such conditions and thereby safeguards would soon have been forced on the builders, the companies, and the government. but there were people who knew and did not fail to call attention to the dangers: in the house of commons the matter has been frequently brought up privately, and an american naval officer, captain e. k. boden, in an article that has since been widely reproduced, called attention to the defects of this very ship, the titanic--taking her as an example of all other liners--and pointed out that she was not unsinkable and had not proper boat accommodation. the question, then, of responsibility for the loss of the titanic must be considered: not from any idea that blame should be laid here or there and a scapegoat provided--that is a waste of time. but if a fixing of responsibility leads to quick and efficient remedy, then it should be done relentlessly: our simple duty to those whom the titanic carried down with her demands no less. dealing first with the precautions for the safety of the ship as apart from safety appliances, there can be no question, i suppose, that the direct responsibility for the loss of the titanic and so many lives must be laid on her captain. he was responsible for setting the course, day by day and hour by hour, for the speed she was travelling; and he alone would have the power to decide whether or not speed must be slackened with icebergs ahead. no officer would have any right to interfere in the navigation, although they would no doubt be consulted. nor would any official connected with the management of the line--mr. ismay, for example--be allowed to direct the captain in these matters, and there is no evidence that he ever tried to do so. the very fact that the captain of a ship has such absolute authority increases his responsibility enormously. even supposing the white star line and mr. ismay had urged him before sailing to make a record,--again an assumption,--they cannot be held directly responsible for the collision: he was in charge of the lives of everyone on board and no one but he was supposed to estimate the risk of travelling at the speed he did, when ice was reported ahead of him. his action cannot be justified on the ground of prudent seamanship. but the question of indirect responsibility raises at once many issues and, i think, removes from captain smith a good deal of personal responsibility for the loss of his ship. some of these issues it will be well to consider. in the first place, disabusing our minds again of the knowledge that the titanic struck an iceberg and sank, let us estimate the probabilities of such a thing happening. an iceberg is small and occupies little room by comparison with the broad ocean on which it floats; and the chances of another small object like a ship colliding with it and being sunk are very small: the chances are, as a matter of fact, one in a million. this is not a figure of speech: that is the actual risk for total loss by collision with an iceberg as accepted by insurance companies. the one-in-a-million accident was what sunk the titanic. even so, had captain smith been alone in taking that risk, he would have had to bear all the blame for the resulting disaster. but it seems he is not alone: the same risk has been taken over and over again by fast mail-passenger liners, in fog and in iceberg regions. their captains have taken the long--very long--chance many times and won every time; he took it as he had done many times before, and lost. of course, the chances that night of striking an iceberg were much greater than one in a million: they had been enormously increased by the extreme southerly position of icebergs and field ice and by the unusual number of the former. thinking over the scene that met our eyes from the deck of the carpathia after we boarded her,--the great number of icebergs wherever the eye could reach,--the chances of _not_ hitting one in the darkness of the night seemed small. indeed, the more one thinks about the carpathia coming at full speed through all those icebergs in the darkness, the more inexplicable does it seem. true, the captain had an extra lookout watch and every sense of every man on the bridge alert to detect the least sign of danger, and again he was not going so fast as the titanic and would have his ship under more control; but granted all that, he appears to have taken a great risk as he dogged and twisted round the awful two-hundred-foot monsters in the dark night. does it mean that the risk is not so great as we who have seen the abnormal and not the normal side of taking risks with icebergs might suppose? he had his own ship and passengers to consider, and he had no right to take too great a risk. but captain smith could not know icebergs were there in such numbers: what warnings he had of them is not yet thoroughly established,--there were probably three,--but it is in the highest degree unlikely that he knew that any vessel had seen them in such quantities as we saw them monday morning; in fact, it is unthinkable. he thought, no doubt, he was taking an ordinary risk, and it turned out to be an extraordinary one. to read some criticisms it would seem as if he deliberately ran his ship in defiance of all custom through a region infested with icebergs, and did a thing which no one has ever done before; that he outraged all precedent by not slowing down. but it is plain that he did not. every captain who has run full speed through fog and iceberg regions is to blame for the disaster as much as he is: they got through and he did not. other liners can go faster than the titanic could possibly do; had they struck ice they would have been injured even more deeply than she was, for it must not be forgotten that the force of impact varies as the _square_ of the velocity--i.e., it is four times as much at sixteen knots as at eight knots, nine times as much at twenty-four, and so on. and with not much margin of time left for these fast boats, they must go full speed ahead nearly all the time. remember how they advertise to "leave new york wednesday, dine in london the following monday,"--and it is done regularly, much as an express train is run to time. their officers, too, would have been less able to avoid a collision than murdock of the titanic was, for at the greater speed, they would be on the iceberg in shorter time. many passengers can tell of crossing with fog a good deal of the way, sometimes almost all the way, and they have been only a few hours late at the end of the journey. so that it is the custom that is at fault, not one particular captain. custom is established largely by demand, and supply too is the answer to demand. what the public demanded the white star line supplied, and so both the public and the line are concerned with the question of indirect responsibility. the public has demanded, more and more every year, greater speed as well as greater comfort, and by ceasing to patronize the low-speed boats has gradually forced the pace to what it is at present. not that speed in itself is a dangerous thing,--it is sometimes much safer to go quickly than slowly,--but that, given the facilities for speed and the stimulus exerted by the constant public demand for it, occasions arise when the judgment of those in command of a ship becomes swayed--largely unconsciously, no doubt--in favour of taking risks which the smaller liners would never take. the demand on the skipper of a boat like the californian, for example, which lay hove-to nineteen miles away with her engines stopped, is infinitesimal compared with that on captain smith. an old traveller told me on the carpathia that he has often grumbled to the officers for what he called absurd precautions in lying to and wasting his time, which he regarded as very valuable; but after hearing of the titanic's loss he recognized that he was to some extent responsible for the speed at which she had travelled, and would never be so again. he had been one of the travelling public who had constantly demanded to be taken to his journey's end in the shortest possible time, and had "made a row" about it if he was likely to be late. there are some business men to whom the five or six days on board are exceedingly irksome and represent a waste of time; even an hour saved at the journey's end is a consideration to them. and if the demand is not always a conscious one, it is there as an unconscious factor always urging the highest speed of which the ship is capable. the man who demands fast travel unreasonably must undoubtedly take his share in the responsibility. he asks to be taken over at a speed which will land him in something over four days; he forgets perhaps that columbus took ninety days in a forty-ton boat, and that only fifty years ago paddle steamers took six weeks, and all the time the demand is greater and the strain is more: the public demand speed and luxury; the lines supply it, until presently the safety limit is reached, the undue risk is taken--and the titanic goes down. all of us who have cried for greater speed must take our share in the responsibility. the expression of such a desire and the discontent with so-called slow travel are the seed sown in the minds of men, to bear fruit presently in an insistence on greater speed. we may not have done so directly, but we may perhaps have talked about it and thought about it, and we know no action begins without thought. the white star line has received very rough handling from some of the press, but the greater part of this criticism seems to be unwarranted and to arise from the desire to find a scapegoat. after all they had made better provision for the passengers the titanic carried than any other line has done, for they had built what they believed to be a huge lifeboat, unsinkable in all ordinary conditions. those who embarked in her were almost certainly in the safest ship (along with the olympic) afloat: she was probably quite immune from the ordinary effects of wind, waves and collisions at sea, and needed to fear nothing but running on a rock or, what was worse, a floating iceberg; for the effects of collision were, so far as damage was concerned, the same as if it had been a rock, and the danger greater, for one is charted and the other is not. then, too, while the theory of the unsinkable boat has been destroyed at the same time as the boat itself, we should not forget that it served a useful purpose on deck that night--it eliminated largely the possibility of panic, and those rushes for the boats which might have swamped some of them. i do not wish for a moment to suggest that such things would have happened, because the more information that comes to hand of the conduct of the people on board, the more wonderful seems the complete self-control of all, even when the last boats had gone and nothing but the rising waters met their eyes--only that the generally entertained theory rendered such things less probable. the theory, indeed, was really a safeguard, though built on a false premise. there is no evidence that the white star line instructed the captain to push the boat or to make any records: the probabilities are that no such attempt would be made on the first trip. the general instructions to their commanders bear quite the other interpretation: it will be well to quote them in full as issued to the press during the sittings of the united states senate committee. _instructions to commanders_ commanders must distinctly understand that the issue of regulations does not in any way relieve them from responsibility for the safe and efficient navigation of their respective vessels, and they are also enjoined to remember that they must run no risks which might by any possibility result in accident to their ships. it is to be hoped that they will ever bear in mind that the safety of the lives and property entrusted to their care is the ruling principle that should govern them in the navigation of their vessels, and that no supposed gain in expedition or saving of time on the voyage is to be purchased at the risk of accident. commanders are reminded that the steamers are to a great extent uninsured, and that their own livelihood, as well as the company's success, depends upon immunity from accident; no precaution which ensures safe navigation is to be considered excessive. nothing could be plainer than these instructions, and had they been obeyed, the disaster would never have happened: they warn commanders against the only thing left as a menace to their unsinkable boat--the lack of "precaution which ensures safe navigation." in addition, the white star line had complied to the full extent with the requirements of the british government: their ship had been subjected to an inspection so rigid that, as one officer remarked in evidence, it became a nuisance. the board of trade employs the best experts, and knows the dangers that attend ocean travel and the precautions that should be taken by every commander. if these precautions are not taken, it will be necessary to legislate until they are. no motorist is allowed to career at full speed along a public highway in dangerous conditions, and it should be an offence for a captain to do the same on the high seas with a ship full of unsuspecting passengers. they have entrusted their lives to the government of their country--through its regulations--and they are entitled to the same protection in mid-atlantic as they are in oxford street or broadway. the open sea should no longer be regarded as a neutral zone where no country's police laws are operative. of course there are difficulties in the way of drafting international regulations: many governments would have to be consulted and many difficulties that seem insuperable overcome; but that is the purpose for which governments are employed, that is why experts and ministers of governments are appointed and paid--to overcome difficulties for the people who appoint them and who expect them, among other things, to protect their lives. the american government must share the same responsibility: it is useless to attempt to fix it on the british board of trade for the reason that the boats were built in england and inspected there by british officials. they carried american citizens largely, and entered american ports. it would have been the simplest matter for the united states government to veto the entry of any ship which did not conform to its laws of regulating speed in conditions of fog and icebergs--had they provided such laws. the fact is that the american nation has practically no mercantile marine, and in time of a disaster such as this it forgets, perhaps, that it has exactly the same right--and therefore the same responsibility--as the british government to inspect, and to legislate: the right that is easily enforced by refusal to allow entry. the regulation of speed in dangerous regions could well be undertaken by some fleet of international police patrol vessels, with power to stop if necessary any boat found guilty of reckless racing. the additional duty of warning ships of the exact locality of icebergs could be performed by these boats. it would not of course be possible or advisable to fix a "speed limit," because the region of icebergs varies in position as the icebergs float south, varies in point of danger as they melt and disappear, and the whole question has to be left largely to the judgment of the captain on the spot; but it would be possible to make it an offence against the law to go beyond a certain speed in known conditions of danger. so much for the question of regulating speed on the high seas. the secondary question of safety appliances is governed by the same principle--that, in the last analysis, it is not the captain, not the passenger, not the builders and owners, but the governments through their experts, who are to be held responsible for the provision of lifesaving devices. morally, of course, the owners and builders are responsible, but at present moral responsibility is too weak an incentive in human affairs--that is the miserable part of the whole wretched business--to induce owners generally to make every possible provision for the lives of those in their charge; to place human safety so far above every other consideration that no plan shall be left unconsidered, no device left untested, by which passengers can escape from a sinking ship. but it is not correct to say, as has been said frequently, that it is greed and dividend-hunting that have characterized the policy of the steamship companies in their failure to provide safety appliances: these things in themselves are not expensive. they have vied with each other in making their lines attractive in point of speed, size and comfort, and they have been quite justified in doing so: such things are the product of ordinary competition between commercial houses. where they have all failed morally is to extend to their passengers the consideration that places their lives as of more interest to them than any other conceivable thing. they are not alone in this: thousands of other people have done the same thing and would do it to-day--in factories, in workshops, in mines, did not the government intervene and insist on safety precautions. the thing is a defect in human life of to-day--thoughtlessness for the well-being of our fellow-men; and we are all guilty of it in some degree. it is folly for the public to rise up now and condemn the steamship companies: their failing is the common failing of the immorality of indifference. the remedy is the law, and it is the only remedy at present that will really accomplish anything. the british law on the subject dates from 1894, and requires only twenty boats for a ship the size of the titanic: the owners and builders have obeyed this law and fulfilled their legal responsibility. increase this responsibility and they will fulfil it again--and the matter is ended so far as appliances are concerned. it should perhaps be mentioned that in a period of ten years only nine passengers were lost on british ships: the law seemed to be sufficient in fact. the position of the american government, however, is worse than that of the british government. its regulations require more than double the boat accommodation which the british regulations do, and yet it has allowed hundreds of thousands of its subjects to enter its ports on boats that defied its own laws. had their government not been guilty of the same indifference, passengers would not have been allowed aboard any british ship lacking in boat-accommodation--the simple expedient again of refusing entry. the reply of the british government to the senate committee, accusing the board of trade of "insufficient requirements and lax inspection," might well be--"ye have a law: see to it yourselves!" it will be well now to consider briefly the various appliances that have been suggested to ensure the safety of passengers and crew, and in doing so it may be remembered that the average man and woman has the same right as the expert to consider and discuss these things: they are not so technical as to prevent anyone of ordinary intelligence from understanding their construction. using the term in its widest sense, we come first to:-_bulkheads and water-tight compartments_ it is impossible to attempt a discussion here of the exact constructional details of these parts of a ship; but in order to illustrate briefly what is the purpose of having bulkheads, we may take the titanic as an example. she was divided into sixteen compartments by fifteen transverse steel walls called bulkheads. [footnote: see figures 1 and 2 page 116.] if a hole is made in the side of the ship in any one compartment, steel water-tight doors seal off the only openings in that compartment and separate it as a damaged unit from the rest of the ship and the vessel is brought to land in safety. ships have even put into the nearest port for inspection after collision, and finding only one compartment full of water and no other damage, have left again, for their home port without troubling to disembark passengers and effect repairs. the design of the titanic's bulkheads calls for some attention. the "scientific american," in an excellent article on the comparative safety of the titanic's and other types of water-tight compartments, draws attention to the following weaknesses in the former--from the point of view of possible collision with an iceberg. she had no longitudinal bulkheads, which would subdivide her into smaller compartments and prevent the water filling the whole of a large compartment. probably, too, the length of a large compartment was in any case too great--fifty-three feet. the mauretania, on the other hand, in addition to transverse bulkheads, is fitted with longitudinal torpedo bulkheads, and the space between them and the side of the ship is utilised as a coal bunker. then, too, in the mauretania all bulkheads are carried up to the top deck, whereas in the case of the titanic they reached in some parts only to the saloon deck and in others to a lower deck still,--the weakness of this being that, when the water reached to the top of a bulkhead as the ship sank by the head, it flowed over and filled the next compartment. the british admiralty, which subsidizes the mauretania and lusitania as fast cruisers in time of war, insisted on this type of construction, and it is considered vastly better than that used in the titanic. the writer of the article thinks it possible that these ships might not have sunk as the result of a similar collision. but the ideal ship from the point of bulkhead construction, he considers to have been the great eastern, constructed many years ago by the famous engineer brunel. so thorough was her system of compartments divided and subdivided by many transverse and longitudinal bulkheads that when she tore a hole eighty feet long in her side by striking a rock, she reached port in safety. unfortunately the weight and cost of this method was so great that his plan was subsequently abandoned. but it would not be just to say that the construction of the titanic was a serious mistake on the part of the white star line or her builders, on the ground that her bulkheads were not so well constructed as those of the lusitania and mauretania, which were built to fulfil british admiralty regulations for time of war--an extraordinary risk which no builder of a passenger steamer--as such--would be expected to take into consideration when designing the vessel. it should be constantly borne in mind that the titanic met extraordinary conditions on the night of the collision: she was probably the safest ship afloat in all ordinary conditions. collision with an iceberg is not an ordinary risk; but this disaster will probably result in altering the whole construction of bulkheads and compartments to the great eastern type, in order to include the one-in-a-million risk of iceberg collision and loss. here comes in the question of increased cost of construction, and in addition the great loss of cargo-carrying space with decreased earning capacity, both of which will mean an increase in the passenger rates. this the travelling public will have to face and undoubtedly will be willing to face for the satisfaction of knowing that what was so confidently affirmed by passengers on the titanic's deck that night of the collision will then be really true,--that "we are on an unsinkable boat,"--so far as human forethought can devise. after all, this _must_ be the solution to the problem how best to ensure safety at sea. other safety appliances are useful and necessary, but not useable in certain conditions of weather. the ship itself must always be the "safety appliance" that is really trustworthy, and nothing must be left undone to ensure this. _wireless apparatus and operators_ the range of the apparatus might well be extended, but the principal defect is the lack of an operator for night duty on some ships. the awful fact that the californian lay a few miles away, able to save every soul on board, and could not catch the message because the operator was asleep, seems too cruel to dwell upon. even on the carpathia, the operator was on the point of retiring when the message arrived, and we should have been much longer afloat--and some boats possibly swamped--had he not caught the message when he did. it has been suggested that officers should have a working knowledge of wireless telegraphy, and this is no doubt a wise provision. it would enable them to supervise the work of the operators more closely and from all the evidence, this seems a necessity. the exchange of vitally important messages between a sinking ship and those rushing to her rescue should be under the control of an experienced officer. to take but one example--bride testified that after giving the birma the "c.q.d." message and the position (incidentally signer marconi has stated that this has been abandoned in favour of "s.o.s.") and getting a reply, they got into touch with the carpathia, and while talking with her were interrupted by the birma asking what was the matter. no doubt it was the duty of the birma to come at once without asking any questions, but the reply from the titanic, telling the birma's operator not to be a "fool" by interrupting, seems to have been a needless waste of precious moments: to reply, "we are sinking" would have taken no longer, especially when in their own estimation of the strength of the signals they thought the birma was the nearer ship. it is well to notice that some large liners have already a staff of three operators. _submarine signalling apparatus_ there are occasions when wireless apparatus is useless as a means of saving life at sea promptly. one of its weaknesses is that when the ships' engines are stopped, messages can no longer be sent out, that is, with the system at present adopted. it will be remembered that the titanic's messages got gradually fainter and then ceased altogether as she came to rest with her engines shut down. again, in fogs,--and most accidents occur in fogs,--while wireless informs of the accident, it does not enable one ship to locate another closely enough to take off her passengers at once. there is as yet no method known by which wireless telegraphy will fix the direction of a message; and after a ship has been in fog for any considerable length of time it is more difficult to give the exact position to another vessel bringing help. nothing could illustrate these two points better than the story of how the baltic found the republic in the year 1909, in a dense fog off nantucket lightship, when the latter was drifting helplessly after collision with the florida. the baltic received a wireless message stating the republic's condition and the information that she was in touch with nantucket through a submarine bell which she could hear ringing. the baltic turned and went towards the position in the fog, picked up the submarine bell-signal from nantucket, and then began searching near this position for the republic. it took her twelve hours to find the damaged ship, zigzagging across a circle within which she thought the republic might lie. in a rough sea it is doubtful whether the republic would have remained afloat long enough for the baltic to find her and take off all her passengers. now on these two occasions when wireless telegraphy was found to be unreliable, the usefulness of the submarine bell at once becomes apparent. the baltic could have gone unerringly to the republic in the dense fog had the latter been fitted with a submarine emergency bell. it will perhaps be well to spend a little time describing the submarine signalling apparatus to see how this result could have been obtained: twelve anxious hours in a dense fog on a ship which was injured so badly that she subsequently foundered, is an experience which every appliance known to human invention should be enlisted to prevent. submarine signalling has never received that public notice which wireless telegraphy has, for the reason that it does not appeal so readily to the popular mind. that it is an absolute necessity to every ship carrying passengers--or carrying anything, for that matter--is beyond question. it is an additional safeguard that no ship can afford to be without. there are many occasions when the atmosphere fails lamentably as a medium for carrying messages. when fog falls down, as it does sometimes in a moment, on the hundreds of ships coasting down the traffic ways round our shores--ways which are defined so easily in clear weather and with such difficulty in fogs--the hundreds of lighthouses and lightships which serve as warning beacons, and on which many millions of money have been spent, are for all practical purposes as useless to the navigator as if they had never been built: he is just as helpless as if he were back in the years before 1514, when trinity house was granted a charter by henry viii "for the relief...of the shipping of this realm of england," and began a system of lights on the shores, of which the present chain of lighthouses and lightships is the outcome. nor is the foghorn much better: the presence of different layers of fog and air, and their varying densities, which cause both reflection and refraction of sound, prevent the air from being a reliable medium for carrying it. now, submarine signalling has none of these defects, for the medium is water, subject to no such variable conditions as the air. its density is practically non variable, and sound travels through it at the rate of 4400 feet per second, without deviation or reflection. the apparatus consists of a bell designed to ring either pneumatically from a lightship, electrically from the shore (the bell itself being a tripod at the bottom of the sea), automatically from a floating bell-buoy, or by hand from a ship or boat. the sound travels from the bell in every direction, like waves in a pond, and falls, it may be, on the side of a ship. the receiving apparatus is fixed inside the skin of the ship and consists of a small iron tank, 16 inches square and 18 inches deep. the front of the tank facing the ship's iron skin is missing and the tank, being filled with water, is bolted to the framework and sealed firmly to the ship's side by rubber facing. in this way a portion of the ship's iron hull is washed by the sea on one side and water in the tank on the other. vibrations from a bell ringing at a distance fall on the iron side, travel through, and strike on two microphones hanging in the tank. these microphones transmit the sound along wires to the chart room, where telephones convey the message to the officer on duty. there are two of these tanks or "receivers" fitted against the ship's side, one on the port and one on the starboard side, near the bows, and as far down below the water level as is possible. the direction of sounds coming to the microphones hanging in these tanks can be estimated by switching alternately to the port and starboard tanks. if the sound is of greater intensity on the port side, then the bell signalling is off the port bows; and similarly on the starboard side. the ship is turned towards the sound until the same volume of sound is heard from both receivers, when the bell is known to be dead ahead. so accurate is this in practice that a trained operator can steer his ship in the densest fog directly to a lightship or any other point where a submarine bell is sending its warning beneath the sea. it must be repeated that the medium in which these signals are transmitted is a constant one, not subject to any of the limitations and variations imposed on the atmosphere and the ether as media for the transmission of light, blasts of a foghorn, and wireless vibrations. at present the chief use of submarine signalling is from the shore or a lightship to ships at sea, and not from ship to ship or from ship to the shore: in other words ships carry only receiving apparatus, and lighthouses and lightships use only signalling apparatus. some of the lighthouses and lightships on our coasts already have these submarine bells in addition to their lights, and in bad weather the bells send out their messages to warn ships of their proximity to a danger point. this invention enables ships to pick up the sound of bell after bell on a coast and run along it in the densest fog almost as well as in daylight; passenger steamers coming into port do not have to wander about in the fog, groping their way blindly into harbour. by having a code of rings, and judging by the intensity of the sound, it is possible to tell almost exactly where a ship is in relation to the coast or to some lightship. the british admiralty report in 1906 said: "if the lightships round the coast were fitted with submarine bells, it would be possible for ships fitted with receiving apparatus to navigate in fog with almost as great certainty as in clear weather." and the following remark of a captain engaged in coast service is instructive. he had been asked to cut down expenses by omitting the submarine signalling apparatus, but replied: "i would rather take out the wireless. that only enables me to tell other people where i am. the submarine signal enables me to find out where i am myself." the range of the apparatus is not so wide as that of wireless telegraphy, varying from 10 to 15 miles for a large ship (although instances of 20 to 30 are on record), and from 3 to 8 miles for a small ship. at present the receiving apparatus is fixed on only some 650 steamers of the merchant marine, these being mostly the first-class passenger liners. there is no question that it should be installed, along with wireless apparatus, on every ship of over 1000 tons gross tonnage. equally important is the provision of signalling apparatus on board ships: it is obviously just as necessary to transmit a signal as to receive one; but at present the sending of signals from ships has not been perfected. the invention of signal-transmitting apparatus to be used while the ship is under way is as yet in the experimental stage; but while she is at rest a bell similar to those used by lighthouses can be sunk over her side and rung by hand with exactly the same effect. but liners are not provided with them (they cost only 60 pounds!). as mentioned before, with another 60 pounds spent on the republic's equipment, the baltic could have picked up her bell and steered direct to her--just as they both heard the bell of nantucket lightship. again, if the titanic had been provided with a bell and the californian with receiving apparatus,--neither of them was,--the officer on the bridge could have heard the signals from the telephones near. a smaller size for use in lifeboats is provided, and would be heard by receiving apparatus for approximately five miles. if we had hung one of these bells over the side of the lifeboats afloat that night we should have been free from the anxiety of being run down as we lay across the carpathia's path, without a light. or if we had gone adrift in a dense fog and wandered miles apart from each other on the sea (as we inevitably should have done), the carpathia could still have picked up each boat individually by means of the bell signal. in those ships fitted with receiving apparatus, at least one officer is obliged to understand the working of the apparatus: a very wise precaution, and, as suggested above, one that should be taken with respect to wireless apparatus also. it was a very great pleasure to me to see all this apparatus in manufacture and in use at one of the principal submarine signalling works in america and to hear some of the remarkable stories of its value in actual practice. i was struck by the aptness of the motto adopted by them--"de profundis clamavi"--in relation to the titanic's end and the calls of our passengers from the sea when she sank. "out of the deep have i called unto thee" is indeed a suitable motto for those who are doing all they can to prevent such calls arising from their fellow men and women "out of the deep." _fixing of steamship routes_ the "lanes" along which the liners travel are fixed by agreement among the steamship companies in consultation with the hydrographic departments of the different countries. these routes are arranged so that east-bound steamers are always a number of miles away from those going west, and thus the danger of collision between east and west-bound vessels is entirely eliminated. the "lanes" can be moved farther south if icebergs threaten, and north again when the danger is removed. of course the farther south they are placed, the longer the journey to be made, and the longer the time spent on board, with consequent grumbling by some passengers. for example, the lanes since the disaster to the titanic have been moved one hundred miles farther south, which means one hundred and eighty miles longer journey, taking eight hours. the only real precaution against colliding with icebergs is to go south of the place where they are likely to be: there is no other way. _lifeboats_ the provision was of course woefully inadequate. the only humane plan is to have a numbered seat in a boat assigned to each passenger and member of the crew. it would seem well to have this number pointed out at the time of booking a berth, and to have a plan in each cabin showing where the boat is and how to get to it the most direct way--a most important consideration with a ship like the titanic with over two miles of deck space. boat-drills of the passengers and crew of each boat should be held, under compulsion, as soon as possible after leaving port. i asked an officer as to the possibility of having such a drill immediately after the gangways are withdrawn and before the tugs are allowed to haul the ship out of dock, but he says the difficulties are almost insuperable at such a time. if so, the drill should be conducted in sections as soon as possible after sailing, and should be conducted in a thorough manner. children in school are called upon suddenly to go through fire-drill, and there is no reason why passengers on board ship should not be similarly trained. so much depends on order and readiness in time of danger. undoubtedly, the whole subject of manning, provisioning, loading and lowering of lifeboats should be in the hands of an expert officer, who should have no other duties. the modern liner has become far too big to permit the captain to exercise control over the whole ship, and all vitally important subdivisions should be controlled by a separate authority. it seems a piece of bitter irony to remember that on the titanic a special chef was engaged at a large salary,--larger perhaps than that of any officer,--and no boatmaster (or some such officer) was considered necessary. the general system again--not criminal neglect, as some hasty criticisms would say, but lack of consideration for our fellow-man, the placing of luxurious attractions above that kindly forethought that allows no precaution to be neglected for even the humblest passenger. but it must not be overlooked that the provision of sufficient lifeboats on deck is not evidence they will all be launched easily or all the passengers taken off safely. it must be remembered that ideal conditions prevailed that night for launching boats from the decks of the titanic: there was no list that prevented the boats getting away, they could be launched on both sides, and when they were lowered the sea was so calm that they pulled away without any of the smashing against the side that is possible in rough seas. sometimes it would mean that only those boats on the side sheltered from a heavy sea could ever get away, and this would at once halve the boat accommodation. and when launched, there would be the danger of swamping in such a heavy sea. all things considered, lifeboats might be the poorest sort of safeguard in certain conditions. life-rafts are said to be much inferior to lifeboats in a rough sea, and collapsible boats made of canvas and thin wood soon decay under exposure to weather and are danger-traps at a critical moment. some of the lifeboats should be provided with motors, to keep the boats together and to tow if necessary. the launching is an important matter: the titanic's davits worked excellently and no doubt were largely responsible for all the boats getting away safely: they were far superior to those on most liners. _pontoons_ after the sinking of the bourgogne, when two americans lost their lives, a prize of 4000 pounds was offered by their heirs for the best life-saving device applicable to ships at sea. a board sat to consider the various appliances sent in by competitors, and finally awarded the prize to an englishman, whose design provided for a flat structure the width of the ship, which could be floated off when required and would accommodate several hundred passengers. it has never been adopted by any steamship line. other similar designs are known, by which the whole of the after deck can be pushed over from the stern by a ratchet arrangement, with air-tanks below to buoy it up: it seems to be a practical suggestion. one point where the titanic management failed lamentably was to provide a properly trained crew to each lifeboat. the rowing was in most cases execrable. there is no more reason why a steward should be able to row than a passenger--less so than some of the passengers who were lost; men of leisure accustomed to all kinds of sport (including rowing), and in addition probably more fit physically than a steward to row for hours on the open sea. and if a steward cannot row, he has no right to be at an oar; so that, under the unwritten rule that passengers take precedence of the crew when there is not sufficient accommodation for all (a situation that should never be allowed to arise again, for a member of the crew should have an equal opportunity with a passenger to save his life), the majority of stewards and cooks should have stayed behind and passengers have come instead: they could not have been of less use, and they might have been of more. it will be remembered that the proportion of crew saved to passengers was 210 to 495, a high proportion. another point arises out of these figures--deduct 21 members of the crew who were stewardesses, and 189 men of the crew are left as against the 495 passengers. of these some got on the overturned collapsible boat after the titanic sank, and a few were picked up by the lifeboats, but these were not many in all. now with the 17 boats brought to the carpathia and an average of six of the crew to man each boat,--probably a higher average than was realized,--we get a total of 102 who should have been saved as against 189 who actually were. there were, as is known, stokers and stewards in the boats who were not members of the lifeboats' crews. it may seem heartless to analyze figures in this way, and suggest that some of the crew who got to the carpathia never should have done so; but, after all, passengers took their passage under certain rules,--written and unwritten,--and one is that in times of danger the servants of the company in whose boats they sail shall first of all see to the safety of the passengers before thinking of their own. there were only 126 men passengers saved as against 189 of the crew, and 661 men lost as against 686 of the crew, so that actually the crew had a greater percentage saved than the men passengers--22 per cent against 16. but steamship companies are faced with real difficulties in this matter. the crews are never the same for two voyages together: they sign on for the one trip, then perhaps take a berth on shore as waiters, stokers in hotel furnace-rooms, etc.,--to resume life on board any other ship that is handy when the desire comes to go to sea again. they can in no sense be regarded as part of a homogeneous crew, subject to regular discipline and educated to appreciate the morale of a particular liner, as a man of war's crew is. _searchlights_ these seem an absolute necessity, and the wonder is that they have not been fitted before to all ocean liners. not only are they of use in lighting up the sea a long distance ahead, but as flashlight signals they permit of communication with other ships. as i write, through the window can be seen the flashes from river steamers plying up the hudson in new york, each with its searchlight, examining the river, lighting up the bank for hundreds of yards ahead, and bringing every object within its reach into prominence. they are regularly used too in the suez canal. i suppose there is no question that the collision would have been avoided had a searchlight been fitted to the titanic's masthead: the climatic conditions for its use must have been ideal that night. there are other things besides icebergs: derelicts are reported from time to time, and fishermen lie in the lanes without lights. they would not always be of practical use, however. they would be of no service in heavy rain, in fog, in snow, or in flying spray, and the effect is sometimes to dazzle the eyes of the lookout. while writing of the lookout, much has been made of the omission to provide the lookout on the titanic with glasses. the general opinion of officers seems to be that it is better not to provide them, but to rely on good eyesight and wide-awake men. after all, in a question of actual practice, the opinion of officers should be accepted as final, even if it seems to the landsman the better thing to provide glasses. _cruising lightships_ one or two internationally owned and controlled lightships, fitted with every known device for signalling and communication, would rob those regions of most of their terrors. they could watch and chart the icebergs, report their exact position, the amount and direction of daily drift in the changing currents that are found there. to them, too, might be entrusted the duty of police patrol. chapter ix some impressions no one can pass through an event like the wreck of the titanic without recording mentally many impressions, deep and vivid, of what has been seen and felt. in so far as such impressions are of benefit to mankind they should not be allowed to pass unnoticed, and this chapter is an attempt to picture how people thought and felt from the time they first heard of the disaster to the landing in new york, when there was opportunity to judge of events somewhat from a distance. while it is to some extent a personal record, the mental impressions of other survivors have been compared and found to be in many cases closely in agreement. naturally it is very imperfect, and pretends to be no more than a sketch of the way people act under the influence of strong emotions produced by imminent danger. in the first place, the principal fact that stands out is the almost entire absence of any expressions of fear or alarm on the part of passengers, and the conformity to the normal on the part of almost everyone. i think it is no exaggeration to say that those who read of the disaster quietly at home, and pictured to themselves the scene as the titanic was sinking, had more of the sense of horror than those who stood on the deck and watched her go down inch by inch. the fact is that the sense of fear came to the passengers very slowly--a result of the absence of any signs of danger and the peaceful night--and as it became evident gradually that there was serious damage to the ship, the fear that came with the knowledge was largely destroyed as it came. there was no sudden overwhelming sense of danger that passed through thought so quickly that it was difficult to catch up and grapple with it--no need for the warning to "be not afraid of sudden fear," such as might have been present had we collided head-on with a crash and a shock that flung everyone out of his bunk to the floor. everyone had time to give each condition of danger attention as it came along, and the result of their judgment was as if they had said: "well, here is this thing to be faced, and we must see it through as quietly as we can." quietness and self-control were undoubtedly the two qualities most expressed. there were times when danger loomed more nearly and there was temporarily some excitement,--for example when the first rocket went up,--but after the first realization of what it meant, the crowd took hold of the situation and soon gained the same quiet control that was evident at first. as the sense of fear ebbed and flowed, it was so obviously a thing within one's own power to control, that, quite unconsciously realizing the absolute necessity of keeping cool, every one for his own safety put away the thought of danger as far as was possible. then, too, the curious sense of the whole thing being a dream was very prominent: that all were looking on at the scene from a near-by vantage point in a position of perfect safety, and that those who walked the decks or tied one another's lifebelts on were the actors in a scene of which we were but spectators: that the dream would end soon and we should wake up to find the scene had vanished. many people have had a similar experience in times of danger, but it was very noticeable standing on the titanic's deck. i remember observing it particularly while tying on a lifebelt for a man on the deck. it is fortunate that it should be so: to be able to survey such a scene dispassionately is a wonderful aid inn the destruction of the fear that go with it. one thing that helped considerably to establish this orderly condition of affairs was the quietness of the surroundings. it may seem weariness to refer again to this, but i am convinced it had much to do with keeping everyone calm. the ship was motionless; there was not a breath of wind; the sky was clear; the sea like a mill-pond--the general "atmosphere" was peaceful, and all on board responded unconsciously to it. but what controlled the situation principally was the quality of obedience and respect for authority which is a dominant characteristic of the teutonic race. passengers did as they were told by the officers in charge: women went to the decks below, men remained where they were told and waited in silence for the next order, knowing instinctively that this was the only way to bring about the best result for all on board. the officers, in their turn, carried out the work assigned to them by their superior officers as quickly and orderly as circumstances permitted, the senior ones being in control of the manning, filling and lowering of the lifeboats, while the junior officers were lowered in individual boats to take command of the fleet adrift on the sea. similarly, the engineers below, the band, the gymnasium instructor, were all performing their tasks as they came along: orderly, quietly, without question or stopping to consider what was their chance of safety. this correlation on the part of passengers, officers and crew was simply obedience to duty, and it was innate rather than the product of reasoned judgment. i hope it will not seem to detract in any way from the heroism of those who faced the last plunge of the titanic so courageously when all the boats had gone,--if it does, it is the difficulty of expressing an idea in adequate words,--to say that their quiet heroism was largely unconscious, temperamental, not a definite choice between two ways of acting. all that was visible on deck before the boats left tended to this conclusion and the testimony of those who went down with the ship and were afterwards rescued is of the same kind. certainly it seems to express much more general nobility of character in a race of people--consisting of different nationalities--to find heroism an unconscious quality of the race than to have it arising as an effort of will, to have to bring it out consciously. it is unfortunate that some sections of the press should seek to chronicle mainly the individual acts of heroism: the collective behaviour of a crowd is of so much more importance to the world and so much more a test--if a test be wanted--of how a race of people behaves. the attempt to record the acts of individuals leads apparently to such false reports as that of major butt holding at bay with a revolver a crowd of passengers and shooting them down as they tried to rush the boats, or of captain smith shouting, "be british," through a megaphone, and subsequently committing suicide along with first officer murdock. it is only a morbid sense of things that would describe such incidents as heroic. everyone knows that major butt was a brave man, but his record of heroism would not be enhanced if he, a trained army officer, were compelled under orders from the captain to shoot down unarmed passengers. it might in other conditions have been necessary, but it would not be heroic. similarly there could be nothing heroic in captain smith or murdock putting an end to their lives. it is conceivable men might be so overwhelmed by the sense of disaster that they knew not how they were acting; but to be really heroic would have been to stop with the ship--as of course they did--with the hope of being picked up along with passengers and crew and returning to face an enquiry and to give evidence that would be of supreme value to the whole world for the prevention of similar disasters. it was not possible; but if heroism consists in doing the greatest good to the greatest number, it would have been heroic for both officers to _expect_ to be saved. we do not know what they thought, but i, for one, like to imagine that they did so. second officer lightoller worked steadily at the boats until the last possible moment, went down with the ship, was saved in what seemed a miraculous manner, and returned to give valuable evidence before the commissions of two countries. the second thing that stands out prominently in the emotions produced by the disaster is that in moments of urgent need men and women turn for help to something entirely outside themselves. i remember reading some years ago a story of an atheist who was the guest at dinner of a regimental mess in india. the colonel listened to his remarks on atheism in silence, and invited him for a drive the following morning. he took his guest up a rough mountain road in a light carriage drawn by two ponies, and when some distance from the plain below, turned the carriage round and allowed the ponies to run away--as it seemed--downhill. in the terror of approaching disaster, the atheist was lifted out of his reasoned convictions and prayed aloud for help, when the colonel reined in his ponies, and with the remark that the whole drive had been planned with the intention of proving to his guest that there was a power outside his own reason, descended quietly to level ground. the story may or may not be true, and in any case is not introduced as an attack on atheism, but it illustrates in a striking way the frailty of dependence on a man's own power and resource in imminent danger. to those men standing on the top deck with the boats all lowered, and still more so when the boats had all left, there came the realization that human resources were exhausted and human avenues of escape closed. with it came the appeal to whatever consciousness each had of a power that had created the universe. after all, some power had made the brilliant stars above, countless millions of miles away, moving in definite order, formed on a definite plan and obeying a definite law: had made each one of the passengers with ability to think and act; with the best proof, after all, of being created--the knowledge of their own existence; and now, if at any time, was the time to appeal to that power. when the boats had left and it was seen the ship was going down rapidly, men stood in groups on the deck engaged in prayer, and later, as some of them lay on the overturned collapsible boat, they repeated together over and over again the lord's prayer--irrespective of religious beliefs, some, perhaps, without religious beliefs, united in a common appeal for deliverance from their surroundings. and this was not because it was a habit, because they had learned this prayer "at their mother's knee": men do not do such things through habit. it must have been because each one saw removed the thousand and one ways in which he had relied on human, material things to help him--including even dependence on the overturned boat with its bubble of air inside, which any moment a rising swell might remove as it tilted the boat too far sideways, and sink the boat below the surface--saw laid bare his utter dependence on something that had made him and given him power to think--whether he named it god or divine power or first cause or creator, or named it not at all but recognized it unconsciously--saw these things and expressed them in the form of words he was best acquainted with in common with his fellow-men. he did so, not through a sense of duty to his particular religion, not because he had learned the words, but because he recognized that it was the most practical thing to do--the thing best fitted to help him. men do practical things in times like that: they would not waste a moment on mere words if those words were not an expression of the most intensely real conviction of which they were capable. again, like the feeling of heroism, this appeal is innate and intuitive, and it certainly has its foundation on a knowledge--largely concealed, no doubt--of immortality. i think this must be obvious: there could be no other explanation of such a general sinking of all the emotions of the human mind expressed in a thousand different ways by a thousand different people in favour of this single appeal. the behaviour of people during the hours in the lifeboats, the landing on the carpathia, the life there and the landing in new york, can all be summarized by saying that people did not act at all as they were expected to act--or rather as most people expected they would act, and in some cases have erroneously said they did act. events were there to be faced, and not to crush people down. situations arose which demanded courage, resource, and in the cases of those who had lost friends most dear to them, enormous self-control; but very wonderfully they responded. there was the same quiet demeanour and poise, the same inborn dominion over circumstances, the same conformity to a normal standard which characterized the crowd of passengers on the deck of the titanic--and for the same reasons. the first two or three days ashore were undoubtedly rather trying to some of the survivors. it seemed as if coming into the world again--the four days shut off from any news seemed a long time--and finding what a shock the disaster had produced, the flags half-mast, the staring head-lines, the sense of gloom noticeable everywhere, made things worse than they had been on the carpathia. the difference in "atmosphere" was very marked, and people gave way to some extent under it and felt the reaction. gratitude for their deliverance and a desire to "make the best of things" must have helped soon, however, to restore them to normal conditions. it is not at all surprising that some survivors felt quieter on the carpathia with its lack of news from the outside world, if the following extract from a leading new york evening paper was some of the material of which the "atmosphere" on shore was composed:--"stunned by the terrific impact, the dazed passengers rushed from their staterooms into the main saloon amid the crash of splintering steel, rending of plates and shattering of girders, while the boom of falling pinnacles of ice upon the broken deck of the great vessel added to the horror.... in a wild ungovernable mob they poured out of the saloons to witness one of the most appalling scenes possible to conceive.... for a hundred feet the bow was a shapeless mass of bent, broken and splintered steel and iron." and so on, horror piled on horror, and not a word of it true, or remotely approaching the truth. this paper was selling in the streets of new york while the carpathia was coming into dock, while relatives of those on board were at the docks to meet them and anxiously buying any paper that might contain news. no one on the carpathia could have supplied such information; there was no one else in the world at that moment who knew any details of the titanic disaster, and the only possible conclusion is that the whole thing was a deliberate fabrication to sell the paper. this is a repetition of the same defect in human nature noticed in the provision of safety appliances on board ship--the lack of consideration for the other man. the remedy is the same--the law: it should be a criminal offence for anyone to disseminate deliberate falsehoods that cause fear and grief. the moral responsibility of the press is very great, and its duty of supplying the public with only clean, correct news is correspondingly heavy. if the general public is not yet prepared to go so far as to stop the publication of such news by refusing to buy those papers that publish it, then the law should be enlarged to include such cases. libel is an offence, and this is very much worse than any libel could ever be. it is only right to add that the majority of the new york papers were careful only to report such news as had been obtained legitimately from survivors or from carpathia passengers. it was sometimes exaggerated and sometimes not true at all, but from the point of reporting what was heard, most of it was quite correct. one more thing must be referred to--the prevalence of superstitious beliefs concerning the titanic. i suppose no ship ever left port with so much miserable nonsense showered on her. in the first place, there is no doubt many people refused to sail on her because it was her maiden voyage, and this apparently is a common superstition: even the clerk of the white star office where i purchased my ticket admitted it was a reason that prevented people from sailing. a number of people have written to the press to say they had thought of sailing on her, or had decided to sail on her, but because of "omens" cancelled the passage. many referred to the sister ship, the olympic, pointed to the "ill luck" that they say has dogged her--her collision with the hawke, and a second mishap necessitating repairs and a wait in harbour, where passengers deserted her; they prophesied even greater disaster for the titanic, saying they would not dream of travelling on the boat. even some aboard were very nervous, in an undefined way. one lady said she had never wished to take this boat, but her friends had insisted and bought her ticket and she had not had a happy moment since. a friend told me of the voyage of the olympic from southampton after the wait in harbour, and said there was a sense of gloom pervading the whole ship: the stewards and stewardesses even going so far as to say it was a "death-ship." this crew, by the way, was largely transferred to the titanic. the incident with the new york at southampton, the appearance of the stoker at queenstown in the funnel, combine with all this to make a mass of nonsense in which apparently sensible people believe, or which at any rate they discuss. correspondence is published with an official of the white star line from some one imploring them not to name the new ship "gigantic," because it seems like "tempting fate" when the titanic has been sunk. it would seem almost as if we were back in the middle ages when witches were burned because they kept black cats. there seems no more reason why a black stoker should be an ill omen for the titanic than a black cat should be for an old woman. the only reason for referring to these foolish details is that a surprisingly large number of people think there may be "something in it." the effect is this: that if a ship's company and a number of passengers get imbued with that undefined dread of the unknown--the relics no doubt of the savage's fear of what he does not understand--it has an unpleasant effect on the harmonious working of the ship: the officers and crew feel the depressing influence, and it may even spread so far as to prevent them being as alert and keen as they otherwise would; may even result in some duty not being as well done as usual. just as the unconscious demand for speed and haste to get across the atlantic may have tempted captains to take a risk they might otherwise not have done, so these gloomy forebodings may have more effect sometimes than we imagine. only a little thing is required sometimes to weigh down the balance for and against a certain course of action. at the end of this chapter of mental impressions it must be recorded that one impression remains constant with us all to-day--that of the deepest gratitude that we came safely through the wreck of the titanic; and its corollary--that our legacy from the wreck, our debt to those who were lost with her, is to see, as far as in us lies, that such things are impossible ever again. meanwhile we can say of them, as shelley, himself the victim of a similar disaster, says of his friend keats in "adonais":-"peace, peace! he is not dead, he doth not sleep--he hath awakened from the dream of life--he lives, he wakes--'tis death is dead, not he; mourn not for adonais." the end [illustration: fig 4. transverse view of the decks the titanic s sun deck a upper promenade deck b promenade deck, glass enclosed c upper deck d saloon deck e main deck f middle deck g lower deck: cargo, coal bunkers, boilers, engines (a) welin davits with lifeboats (b) bilge (c) double bottom] produced from scanned images of public domain material from the google print project.) price $6.00 62d congress senate {document _2d session_ {no. 933 loss of the steamship "titanic" report of a formal investigation into the circumstances attending the foundering on april 15, 1912, of the british steamship "titanic," of liverpool, after striking ice in or near latitude 41° 46´ n., longitude 50° 14´ w., north atlantic ocean, as conducted by the british government [illustration: colophon] presented by mr. smith of michigan august 20, 1912.--ordered to be printed with illustrations washington 1912 table of contents. page. introduction 7 i. description of the ship 10 the white star co. 10 the steamship titanic 11 detailed description 13 water-tight compartments 14 decks and accommodation 16 structure 23 life-saving appliances 25 pumping arrangements 26 electrical installation 27 machinery 29 general 31 crew and passengers 32 ii. account of the ship's journey across the atlantic, the messages she received, and the disaster 32 the sailing orders 32 the route followed 33 ice messages received 35 speed of the ship 39 the weather conditions 40 action that should have been taken 40 the collision 41 iii. description of the damage to the ship and of its gradual and final effect, with observations thereon 42 extent of the damage 42 time in which the damage was done 42 the flooding in the first 10 minutes 42 gradual effect of the damage 43 final effect of the damage 44 observations 45 effect of additional subdivision upon floatation 46 iv. account of the saving and rescue of those who survived 48 the boats 48 conduct of sir c. duff gordon and mr. ismay 53 the third-class passengers 53 means taken to procure assistance 54 the rescue by the steamship "carpathia" 54 numbers saved 55 v. the circumstances in connection with the steamship "californian" 56 vi. the board of trade's administration 60 vii. finding of the court 77 viii. recommendations 85 water-tight subdivision 85 lifeboats and rafts 86 manning the boats and boat drills 87 general 87 report on the loss of the steamship "titanic." the merchants shipping acts, 1894 to 1906. in the matter of the formal investigation held at the scottish hall, buckingham gate, westminster, on may 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, june 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29; at the caxton hall, caxton street, westminster, on july 1 and 3; and at the scottish hall, buckingham gate, westminster, on july 30, 1912, before the right hon. lord mersey, wreck commissioner, assisted by rear admiral the hon. s. a. gough-calthorpe, c. v. o., r. n.; capt. a. w. clarke; commander f. c. a. lyon, r. n. r.; prof. j. h. biles, d. sc., ll. d. and mr. e. c. chaston, r. n. r., as assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship _titanic_, of liverpool, and the loss of 1,490 lives in the north atlantic ocean, in lat. 41° 46´ n., long. 50° 14´ w. on april 15 last. report of the court. the court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons appearing in the annex hereto, that the loss of the said ship was due to collision with an iceberg, brought about by the excessive speed at which the ship was being navigated. dated this 30th day of july, 1912. mersey, _wreck commissioner_. we concur in the above report. arthur gough-calthorpe, a. w. clarke, f. c. a. lyon, j. h. biles, edward c. chaston, _assessors_. loss of the steamship "titanic." report of a formal investigation into the circumstances attending the foundering on april 15, 1912, of the british steamship titanic, of liverpool, after striking ice in or near latitude 41° 46´ n., longitude 50° 14´ w., north atlantic ocean, whereby loss of life ensued. annex to the report. introduction. on april 23, 1912, the lord chancellor appointed a wreck commissioner under the merchant shipping acts, and on april 26 the home secretary nominated five assessors. on april 30 the board of trade requested that a formal investigation of the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship _titanic_ should be held, and the court accordingly commenced to sit on may 2. since that date there have been 37 public sittings, at which 97 witnesses have been examined, while a large number of documents, charts, and plans have been produced. the 26 questions formulated by the board of trade, which are set out in detail below, appear to cover all the circumstances to be inquired into. briefly summarized, they deal with the history of the ship, her design, construction, size, speed, general equipment, life-saving apparatus, wireless installation, her orders and course, her passengers, her crew, their training, organization and discipline; they request an account of the casualty, its cause and effect, and of the means taken for saving those on board the ship; and they call for a report on the efficiency of the rules and regulations made by the board of trade under the merchant shipping acts and on their administration, and, finally, for any recommendations to obviate similar disasters which may appear to the court to be desirable. the 26 questions, as subsequently amended, are here attached: 1. when the _titanic_ left queenstown on or about april 11 last-(_a_) what was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board her, and what were their respective ratings? (_b_) what was the total number of her passengers, distinguishing sexes and classes, and discriminating between adults and children? 2. before leaving queenstown on or about april 11 last did the _titanic_ comply with the requirements of the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of "passenger steamers" and "emigrant ships"? 3. in the actual design and construction of the _titanic_ what special provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those on board in the event of collisions and other casualties? 4. was the _titanic_ sufficiently and efficiently officered and manned? were the watches of the officers and crew usual and proper? was the _titanic_ supplied with proper charts? 5. what was the number of the boats of any kind on board the _titanic_? were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the _titanic_ in case of emergency proper and sufficient? had a boat drill been held on board; and, if so, when? what was the carrying capacity of the respective boats? 6. what installations for receiving and transmitting messages by wireless telegraphy were on board the _titanic_? how many operators were employed on working such installations? were the installations in good and effective working order, and were the number of operators sufficient to enable messages to be received and transmitted continuously by day and night? 7. at or prior to the sailing of the _titanic_ what, if any, instructions as to navigation were given to the master or known by him to apply to her voyage? were such instructions, if any, safe, proper, and adequate, having regard to the time of year and dangers likely to be encountered during the voyage? 8. what was in fact the track taken by the _titanic_ in crossing the atlantic ocean? did she keep to the track usually followed by liners on voyages from the united kingdom to new york in the month of april? are such tracks safe tracks at that time of the year? had the master any, and, if so, what, discretion as regards the track to be taken? 9. after leaving queenstown on or about april 11 last did information reach the _titanic_ by wireless messages or otherwise by signals of the existence of ice in certain latitudes? if so, what were such messages or signals and when were they received, and in what position or positions was the ice reported to be, and was the ice reported in or near the track actually being followed by the _titanic_? was her course altered in consequence of receiving such information; and, if so, in what way? what replies to such messages or signals did the _titanic_ send, and at what times? 10. if at the times referred to in the last preceding question or later the _titanic_ was warned of or had reason to suppose she would encounter ice, at what time might she have reasonably expected to encounter it? was a good and proper lookout for ice kept on board? were any, and, if so, what, directions given to vary the speed; if so, were they carried out? 11. were binoculars provided for and used by the lookout men? is the use of them necessary or usual in such circumstances? had the _titanic_ the means of throwing searchlights around her? if so, did she make use of them to discover ice? should searchlights have been provided and used? 12. what other precautions were taken by the _titanic_ in anticipation of meeting ice? were they such as are usually adopted by vessels being navigated in waters where ice may be expected to be encountered? 13. was ice seen and reported by anybody on board the _titanic_ before the casualty occurred? if so, what measures were taken by the officer on watch to avoid it? were they proper measures and were they promptly taken? 14. what was the speed of the _titanic_ shortly before and at the moment of the casualty? was such speed excessive under the circumstances? 15. what was the nature of the casualty which happened to the _titanic_ at or about 11.45 p. m. on april 14 last? in what latitude and longitude did the casualty occur? 16. what steps were taken immediately on the happening of the casualty? how long after the casualty was its seriousness realized by those in charge of the vessel? what steps were then taken? what endeavors were made to save the lives of those on board and to prevent the vessel from sinking? 17. was proper discipline maintained on board after the casualty occurred? 18. what messages for assistance were sent by the _titanic_ after the casualty, and at what times, respectively? what messages were received by her in response, and at what times, respectively? by what vessels were the messages that were sent by the _titanic_ received, and from what vessels did she receive answers? what vessels other than the _titanic_ sent or received messages at or shortly after the casualty in connection with such casualty? what were the vessels that sent or received such messages? were any vessels prevented from going to the assistance of the _titanic_ or her boats owing to messages received from the _titanic_ or owing to any erroneous messages being sent or received? in regard to such erroneous messages, from what vessels were they sent and by what vessels were they received, and at what times, respectively? 19. was the apparatus for lowering the boats on the _titanic_ at the time of the casualty in good working order? were the boats swung out, filled, lowered, or otherwise put into the water and got away under proper superintendence? were the boats sent away in seaworthy condition and properly manned, equipped, and provisioned? did the boats, whether those under davits or otherwise, prove to be efficient and serviceable for the purpose of saving life? 20. what was the number of (_a_) passengers, (_b_) crew taken away in each boat on leaving the vessel? how was this number made up, having regard to (1) sex, (2) class, (3) rating? how many were children and how many adults? did each boat carry its full load; and if not, why not? 21. how many persons on board the _titanic_ at the time of the casualty were ultimately rescued and by what means? how many lost their lives prior to the arrival of the steamship _carpathia_ in new york? what was the number of passengers distinguishing between men and women and adults and children of the first, second, and third classes, respectively, who were saved? what was the number of the crew, discriminating their ratings and sex, that were saved? what is the proportion which each of these numbers bears to the corresponding total number on board immediately before the casualty? what reason is there for the disproportion, if any? 22. what happened to the vessel from the happening of the casualty until she foundered? 23. where and at what time did the _titanic_ founder? 24. what was the cause of the loss of the _titanic_, and of the loss of life which thereby ensued or occurred? what vessels had the opportunity of rendering assistance to the _titanic_; and if any, how was it that assistance did not reach the _titanic_ before the steamship _carpathia_ arrived? was the construction of the vessel and its arrangements such as to make it difficult for any class of passengers or any portion of the crew to take full advantage of any of the existing provisions for safety? 25. when the _titanic_ left queenstown, on or about april 11 last, was she properly constructed and adequately equipped as a passenger steamer and emigrant ship for the atlantic service? 26. the court is invited to report upon the rules and regulations made under the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of those acts and of such rules and regulations, so far as the consideration thereof is material to this casualty, and to make any recommendations or suggestions that it may think fit, having regard to the circumstances of the casualty with a view to promoting the safety of vessels and persons at sea. in framing this report it has seemed best to divide it into sections in the following manner: first. a description of the ship as she left southampton on april 10 and of her equipment, crew, and passengers. second. an account of her journey across the atlantic, of the messages she received and of the disaster. third. a description of the damage to the ship and of its gradual and final effect with observations thereon. fourth. an account of the saving and rescue of those who survived. fifth. the circumstances in connection with the steamship _californian_. sixth. an account of the board of trade's administration. seventh. the finding of the court on the questions submitted; and eighth. the recommendations held to be desirable. i.--description of the ship. the white star line. the _titanic_ was one of a fleet of 13 ships employed in the transport of passengers, mails, and cargo between great britain and the united states, the usual ports of call for the service in which she was engaged being southampton, cherbourg, plymouth, queenstown, and new york. the owners are the oceanic steam navigation co. (ltd.), usually known as the white star line, a british registered company, with a capital of £750,000, all paid up, the directors being mr. j. bruce ismay (chairman), the right hon. lord pirrie, and mr. h. a. sanderson. the company are owners of 29 steamers and tenders; they have a large interest in 13 other steamers, and also own a training sailing ship for officers. all the shares of the company, with the exception of eight held by messrs. e. c. grenfell, vivian h. smith, w. s. m. burns, james gray, j. bruce ismay, h. a. sanderson, a. kerr, and the right hon. lord pirrie, have, since the year 1902, been held by the international navigation co. (ltd.), of liverpool, a british registered company, with a capital of £700,000, of which all is paid up, the directors being mr. j. bruce ismay (chairman), and messrs. h. a. sanderson, charles f. torrey, and h. concannon. the debentures of the company, £1,250,000, are held mainly, if not entirely, in the united kingdom by the general public. the international navigation co. (ltd.), of liverpool, in addition to holding the above-mentioned shares of the oceanic steam navigation co. (ltd.), is also the owner of-1. practically the whole of the issued share capital of the british & north atlantic steam navigation co. (ltd.), and the mississippi & dominion steamship co. (ltd.), (the dominion line). 2. practically the whole of the issued share capital of the atlantic transport co. (ltd), (the atlantic transport line). 3. practically the whole of the issued ordinary share capital and about one-half of the preference share capital of frederick leyland & co. (ltd.), (the leyland line). as against the above-mentioned shares and other property, the international navigation co. (ltd.) have issued share lien certificates for £25,000,000. both the shares and share lien certificates of the international navigation co. (ltd.) are now held by the international mercantile marine co. of new jersey, or by trustees for the holders of its debenture bonds. the steamship "titanic." the _titanic_ was a three-screw vessel of 46,328 tons gross and 21,831 net register tons, built by messrs. harland & wolff for the white star line service between southampton and new york. she was registered as a british steamship at the port of liverpool, her official number being 131,428. her registered dimensions were- feet length 852.50 breadth 92.50 depth from top of keel to top of beam at lowest point of sheer of c deck, the highest deck which extends continuously from bow to stern 64.75 depth of hold 59.58 height from b to c deck 9.00 height from a to b deck 9.00 height from boat to a deck 9.50 height from boat deck to water line amidships at time of accident, about 60.50 ====== displacement at 34 feet 7 inches is tons 52,310 the propelling machinery consisted of two sets of four-cylinder reciprocating engines, each driving a wing propeller, and a turbine driving the center propeller. the registered horsepower of the propelling machinery was 50,000. the power which would probably have been developed was at least 55,000. _structural arrangements._--the structural arrangements of the _titanic_ consisted primarily of-(1) an outer shell of steel plating, giving form to the ship up to the top decks. (2) _steel decks._--these were enumerated as follows: ---------------------------------------+---------+------------------ | | distance | height | from 34 feet | to next | 7 inches water | deck | line amidships. | above. +---------+-------- | | above. | below. ---------------------------------------+---------+---------+-------- |_ft. in._|_ft. in._|_ft. in._ boat deck, length about 500 feet | | 58 0 | a deck, length about 500 feet | 9 6 | 48 6 | b deck, length about 550 feet, with | | | 125 feet forecastle and 105 feet poop| 9 0 | 39 6 | c deck, whole length of ship | 9 0 | 30 6 | d deck, whole length of ship | 10 6 | 20 0 | | |(tapered | | | down at | | | ends.) | e deck, whole length of ship | 9 0 | 11 0 | f deck, whole length of ship | 8 6 | 2 6 | g deck, 190 feet forward of boilers, | | | 210 feet aft of machinery | 8 0 | | 5 6 orlop deck, 190 feet forward of | | | boilers, 210 feet aft of machinery | 8 0 | | 13 6 ---------------------------------------+---------+--------------------c, d, e, and f were continuous from end to end of the ship. the decks above these were continuous for the greater part of the ship, extending from amidships both forward and aft. the boat deck and a deck each had two expansion joints, which broke the strength continuity. the decks below were continuous outside the boiler and engine rooms and extended to the ends of the ship. except in small patches none of these decks was water-tight in the steel parts, except the weather deck and the orlop deck aft. (3) _transverse vertical bulkheads._--there were 15 transverse water-tight bulkheads, by which the ship was divided in the direction of her length into 16 separate compartments. these bulkheads are referred to as "a" to "p," commencing forward. the water-tightness of the bulkheads extended up to one or other of the decks d or e; the bulkhead a extended to c, but was only water-tight to d deck. the position of the d, e, and f decks, which were the only ones to which the water-tight bulkheads extended, was in relation to the water line (34 feet 7 inches draft) approximately as follows: --------+------------------------------ | height above water line | (34 feet 7 inches). |---------+-------------------- | lowest | | | part | | | amid | at bow. | at stern. | ships. | | --------+---------+---------+---------- |_ft. in._|_ft. in._| _ft. in._ d | 20 0 | 33 0 | 25 0 e | 11 0 | 24 0 | 16 0 f | 2 6 | 15 6 | 7 6 --------+---------+--------------------these were the three of the four decks which, as already stated, were continuous all fore and aft. the other decks, g and orlop, which extended only along a part of the ship, were spaced about 8 feet apart. the g deck forward was about 7 feet 6 inches above the water line at the bow and about level with the water line at bulkhead d, which was at the fore end of boilers. the g deck aft and the orlop deck at both ends of the vessel were below the water line. the orlop deck abaft of the turbine engine room and forward of the collision bulkhead was water-tight. elsewhere, except in very small patches, the decks were not water-tight. all the decks had large openings or hatchways in them in each compartment, so that water could rise freely through them. there was also a water-tight inner bottom, or tank top, about 5 feet above the top of the keel, which extended for the full breadth of the vessel from bulkhead a to 20 feet before bulkhead p, i.e., for the whole length of the vessel except a small distance at each end. the transverse water-tight divisions of this double bottom practically coincided with the water-tight transverse bulkheads; there was an additional water-tight division under the middle of the reciprocating engine-room compartment (between bulkheads k and l). there were three longitudinal water-tight divisions in the double bottom, one at the center of the ship, extending for about 670 feet, and one on each side, extending for 447 feet. all the transverse bulkheads were carried up water-tight to at least the height of the e deck. bulkheads a and b, and all bulkheads from k (90 feet abaft amidships) to p, both inclusive, further extended water-tight up to the underside of d deck. a bulkhead further extended to c deck, but it was water-tight only to d deck. bulkheads a and b forward, and p aft, had no openings in them. all the other bulkheads had openings in them, which were fitted with water-tight doors. bulkheads d to o, both inclusive, had each a vertical sliding water-tight door at the level of the floor of the engine and boiler rooms for the use of the engineers and firemen. on the orlop deck there was one door, on bulkhead n, for access to the refrigerator rooms. on g deck there were no water-tight doors in the bulkheads. on both the f and e decks nearly all the bulkheads had water-tight doors, mainly for giving communication between the different blocks of passenger accommodation. all the doors, except those in the engine-rooms and boiler rooms, were horizontal sliding doors workable by hand, both at the door and at the deck above. there were 12 vertical sliding water-tight doors which completed the water-tightness of bulkheads d to o, inclusive, in the boiler and engine rooms. those were capable of being simultaneously closed from the bridge. the operation of closing was intended to be preceded by the ringing from the bridge of a warning bell. these doors were closed by the bringing into operation of an electric current and could not be opened until this current was cut off from the bridge. when this was done the doors could only be opened by a mechanical operation manually worked separately at each door. they could, however, be individually lowered again by operating a lever at the door. in addition, they would be automatically closed, if open, should water enter the compartment. this operation was done in each case by means of a float, actuated by the water, which was in either of the compartments which happened to be in the process of being flooded. there were no sluice valves or means of letting water from one compartment to another. detailed description. the following is a more detailed description of the vessel, her passenger and crew accommodation, and her machinery. water-tight compartments. the following table shows the decks to which the bulkheads extended, and the number of doors in them: +---------+---------+------------+---------+-------+-------+ | | | engine | | | | | | extends | and boiler | | | | |bulkhead | up to |spaces (all |orlop to |f to e |e to d | | letter. | under| controlled |g deck. | deck. | deck. | | | side of | from | | | | | | deck. | bridge). | | | | +---------+---------+------------+---------+-------+-------+ | a | c | ... | ... | ... | ... | | b | d | ... | ... | ... | ... | | c | e | ... | ... | 1 | ... | | d | e | [1]1 | ... | 1 | ... | | e | e | [2]1 | ... | ... | ... | | f | e | [2]1 | ... | 2 | ... | | g | e | [2]1 | ... | ... | ... | | h | e | [2]1 | ... | 2 | ... | | j | e | [2]1 | ... | 2 | ... | | k | d | 1 | ... | ... | 2 | | l | d | 1 | ... | ... | 2 | | m | d | 1 | ... | 1 | 2 | | n | d | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | o | d | 1 | ... | ... | 1 | | p | d | ... | ... | ... | ... | +---------+---------+------------+---------+-------+-------+ the following table shows the actual contents of each separate water-tight compartment. the compartments are shown in the left column, the contents of each compartment being read off horizontally. the contents of each water-tight compartment is separately given in the deck space in which it is: -------+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+-------- | length | | | | | |of each | | | | | | water | | orlop | | | | tight | | | | | water|compart| | to g | g to f | f to e | e to d tight | ment | | | | | compart-| in fore | hold. | deck. | deck. | deck. | deck. ment | and aft | | | | | | direc | | | | | | tion. | | | | | -------+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+-------- |_feet._ | | | | | bow to a| 46 |forepeak |forepeak |forepeak |forepeak |forepeak | |tank (not |storeroom.|storeroom. |storeroom. |storeroom. | |used | | | | | |excepting | | | | | |for | | | | | |trimming | | | | | |ship). | | | | a-b | 45 |cargo |cargo. |living |living |living | | | |spaces for |spaces for |spaces for | | | |firemen, |firemen. |firemen. | | | |etc. | | b-c | 51 | do | do |third-class|third-class|third-class | | | |passenger |passenger |passenger | | | |accommo |accommo |and seamen's | | | |dation. |dation. |spaces. c-d | 51 |alternati-|luggage |baggage, | do |third-class | |vely coal |and |squash | |passenger | |and cargo.|mails. |rackets, & | |accommo | | | |third-class| |dation. | | | |passengers.| | d-e | 54 |no. 6 |no. 6 |coal and | do |first-class | |boiler |boiler |boiler | |passenger | |room. |room. |casing. | |accommo | | | | | |dation. e-f | 57 |no. 5 |no. 5 |coal bunker|linen rooms| do. | |boiler |boiler |and boiler |and | | |room. |room. |casing and |swimming | | | | |swimming |bath. | | | | |bath. | | f-g | 57 |no. 4 |no. 4 |coal bunker|steward's, |first-class | |boiler |boiler | and boiler| turkish | and | |room. |room. | casing. | baths, | stewards. | | | | | etc. | g-h | 57 |no. 3 |no. 3 | do. | third |first and | |boiler |boiler | | class | second | |room. |room. | | saloon. | class and | | | | | | stewards. h-j | 60 |no. 2 |no. 2 | do. | do. |first class. | |boiler |boiler | | | | |room. |room. | | | j-k | 35 |no. 1 |no. 1 | do. |third-class|first class | |boiler |boiler | | galley, | and | |room. |room. | | stewards, | stewards. | | | | | etc. | k-l | 69 |recipro |recipro |reciprocat-|engineers' |first class | | cating | cating |ing-engine | and | and | | engine | engine |room | recipro | engineers' | |room. |room. |casing, | cating | mess, etc. | | | | workshop | engine | | | | | and | casing. | | | | | engineers'| | | | | | stores. | | l-m | 57 |turbine |turbine |turbine |second |second class | |engine |engine |engine room|class |and stewards | |room. |room. |casing and | turbine | etc. | | | | small |engine room| | | | | stewards' | casing. | | | | | stores. | | m-n | 63 |electric|provisions|provisions.|second |second and | |engine |and elect-| |class |third class. | |room. |ric engine| | | | | | casing. | | | n-o | 54 |tunnel |refrigera-|third class| do | do. | | |ted cargo.| | | o-p | 57 | do |cargo | do |third class|third class. p to | |afterpeak |afterpeak |stores |stores |stores. stern | | tank for | tank for | | | | | trimming | trimming | | | | | ship. | ship. | | | -------+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+-----------the vessel was constructed under survey of the british board of trade for a passenger certificate, and also to comply with the american immigration laws. steam was supplied from six entirely independent groups of boilers in six separate water-tight compartments. the after boiler room no. 1 contained five single-ended boilers. four other boiler rooms, nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, each contained five double-ended boilers. the forward boiler room, no. 6, contained four double-ended boilers. the reciprocating engines and most of the auxiliary machinery were in a seventh separate water-tight compartment aft of the boilers; the low-pressure turbine, the main condensers, and the thrust blocks of the reciprocating engine were in an eighth separate water-tight compartment. the main electrical machinery was in a ninth separate water-tight compartment immediately abaft the turbine engine room. two emergency steam-driven dynamos were placed on the d deck, 21 feet above the level of the load water line. these dynamos were arranged to take their supply of steam from any of the three of the boiler rooms nos. 2, 3, and 5, and were intended to be available in the event of the main dynamo room being flooded. the ship was equipped with the following: (1) wireless telegraphy. (2) submarine signaling. (3) electric lights and power systems. (4) telephones for communication between the different working positions in the vessel. in addition to the telephones, the means of communication included engine and docking telegraphs, and duplicate or emergency engine-room telegraph, to be used in the event of any accident to the ordinary telegraph. (5) three electric elevators for taking passengers in the first class up to a deck, immediately below the boat deck, and one in the second class for taking passengers up to the boat deck. (6) four electrically driven boat winches on the boat deck for hauling up the boats. (7) life-saving appliances to the requirements of the board of trade, including boats and life belts. (8) steam whistles on the two foremost funnels, worked on the willett-bruce system of automatic control. (9) navigation appliances, including kelvin's patent sounding machines for finding the depth of water under the ship without stopping; walker's taffrail log for determining the speed of the ship; and flash signal lamps fitted above the shelters at each of the navigating bridge for morse signaling with other ships. decks and accommodation. the boat deck was an uncovered deck, on which the boats were placed. at its lowest point it was about 92 feet 6 inches above the keel. the overall length of this deck was about 500 feet. the forward end of it was fitted to serve as the navigating bridge of the vessel and was 190 feet from the bow. on the after end of the bridge was a wheel house, containing the steering wheel and a steering compass. the chart room was immediately abaft this. on the starboard side of the wheel house and funnel casing were the navigating room, the captain's quarters, and some officers' quarters. on the port side were the remainder of the officers' quarters. at the middle line abaft the forward funnel casing were the wireless-telegraphy rooms and the operators' quarters. the top of the officers' house formed a short deck. the connections from the marconi aerials were made on this deck, and two of the collapsible boats were placed on it. aft of the officers' house were the first-class passengers' entrance and stairways and other adjuncts to the passengers' accommodation below. these stairways had a minimum effective width of 8 feet. they had assembling landings at the level of each deck, and three elevators communicating from e to a decks, but not to the boat deck, immediately on the fore side of the stairway. all the boats except two engelhardt life rafts were carried on this deck. there were seven lifeboats on each side, 30 feet long, 9 feet wide. there was an emergency cutter, 25 feet long, on each side at the fore end of the deck. abreast of each cutter was an engelhardt life raft. one similar raft was carried on the top of the officers' house on each side. in all there were 14 lifeboats, 2 cutters, and 4 engelhardt life rafts. the forward group of four boats and one engelhardt raft were placed on each side of the deck alongside the officers' quarters and the first-class entrance. further aft at the middle line on this deck was the special platform for the standard compass. at the after end of this deck was an entrance house for second-class passengers with a stairway and elevator leading directly down to f deck. there were two vertical iron ladders at the after end of this deck leading to a deck for the use of the crew. alongside and immediately forward of the second-class entrance was the after group of lifeboats, four on each side of the ship. in addition to the main stairways mentioned there was a ladder on each side amidships giving access from the a deck below. at the forward end of the boat deck there was on each side a ladder leading up from a deck with a landing there, from which by a ladder access to b deck could be obtained direct. between the reciprocating engine casing and the third funnel casing there was a stewards' stairway, which communicated with all the decks below as far as e deck. outside the deck houses was promenading space for first-class passengers. _a deck._--the next deck below the boat deck was a deck. it extended over a length of about 500 feet. on this deck was a long house extending nearly the whole length of the deck. it was of irregular shape, varying in width from 24 feet to 72 feet. at the forward end it contained 34 staterooms and abaft these a number of public rooms, etc., for first-class passengers, including two first-class entrances and stairway, reading room, lounge, and the smoke room. outside the deck house was a promenade for first-class passengers. the forward end of it on both sides of the ship, below the forward group of boats and for a short distance farther aft, was protected against the weather by a steel screen, 192 feet long, with large windows in it. in addition to the stairway described on the boat deck, there was near the after end of the a deck and immediately forward of the first-class smoke room another first-class entrance, giving access as far down as c deck. the second-class stairway at the after end of this deck (already described under the boat deck) had no exit on to the a deck. the stewards' staircase opened onto this deck. _b deck._--the next lowest deck was b deck, which constituted the top deck of the strong structure of the vessel, the decks above and the side plating between them being light plating. this deck extended continuously for 550 feet. there were breaks or wells both forward and aft of it, each about 50 feet long. it was terminated by a poop and forecastle. on this deck were placed the principal staterooms of the vessel, 97 in number, having berths for 198 passengers, and aft of these was the first-class stairway and reception room, as well as the restaurant for first-class passengers and its pantry and galley. immediately aft of this restaurant were the second-class stairway and smoke room. at the forward end of the deck outside the house was an assembling area, giving access by the ladders, previously mentioned, leading directly to the boat deck. from this same space a ladderway led to the forward third-class promenade on c deck. at the after end of it were two ladders giving access to the after third-class promenade on c deck. at the after end of this deck, at the middle line, was placed another second-class stairway, which gave access to c, d, e, f, and g decks. at the forward end of the vessel, on the level of the b deck, was situated the forecastle deck, which was 125 feet long. on it were placed the gear for working the anchors and cables and for warping (or moving) the ship in dock. at the after end, on the same level, was the poop deck, about 105 feet long, which carried the after-warping appliances and was a third-class promenading space. arranged above the poop was a light docking bridge, with telephone, telegraphs, etc., communicating to the main navigating bridge forward. _c deck._--the next lowest deck was c deck. this was the highest deck which extended continuously from bow to stern. at the forward end of it, under the forecastle, was placed the machinery required for working the anchors and cables and for the warping of the ship referred to on b deck above. there were also the crew's galley and the seamen's and firemen's mess-room accommodation, where their meals were taken. at the after end of the forecastle, at each side of the ship, were the entrances to the third-class spaces below. on the port side, at the extreme after end and opening onto the deck, was the lamp room. the break in b deck between the forecastle and the first-class passenger quarters formed a well about 50 feet in length, which enabled the space under it on c deck to be used as a third-class promenade. this space contained two hatchways, the no. 2 hatch, and the bunker hatch. the latter of these hatchways gave access to the space allotted to the first and second class baggage hold, the mails, specie and parcel room, and to the lower hold, which was used for cargo or coals. abaft of this well there was a house 450 feet long and extending for the full breadth of the ship. it contained 148 staterooms for first class, besides service rooms of various kinds. on this deck, at the forward first-class entrance, were the purser's office and the inquiry office, where passengers' telegrams were received for sending by the marconi apparatus. exit doors through the ship's side were fitted abreast of this entrance. abaft the after end of this long house was a promenade at the ship's side for second-class passengers, sheltered by bulwarks and bulkheads. in the middle of the promenade stood the second-class library. the two second-class stairways were at the ends of the library, so that from the promenade access was obtained at each end to a second-class main stairway. there was also access by a door from this space into each of the alleyways in the first-class accommodation on each side of the ship and by two doors at the after end into the after well. this after well was about 50 feet in length and contained two hatchways called no. 5 and no. 6 hatches. abaft this well, under the poop, was the main third-class entrance for the after end of the vessel leading directly down to g deck, with landings and access at each deck. the effective width of this stairway was 16 feet to e deck. from e to f it was 8 feet wide. aft of this entrance on b deck were the third-class smoke room and the general room. between these rooms and the stern was the steam steering gear and the machinery for working the after-capstan gear, which was used for warping the after end of the vessel. the steam steering gear had three cylinders. the engines were in duplicate to provide for the possibility of breakdown of one set. _d deck._--the general height from d deck to c deck was 10 feet 6 inches, this being reduced to 9 feet at the forward end, and 9 feet 6 inches at the after end, the taper being obtained gradually by increasing the sheer of the d deck. the forward end of this deck provided accommodation for 108 firemen, who were in two separate watches. there was the necessary lavatory accommodation, abaft the firemen's quarters at the sides of the ship. on each side of the middle line immediately abaft the firemen's quarters there was a vertical spiral staircase leading to the forward end of a tunnel, immediately above the tank top, which extended from the foot of the staircase to the forward stokehole, so that the firemen could pass direct to their work without going through any passenger accommodation or over any passenger decks. on d deck abaft of this staircase was the third class promenade space which was covered in by c deck. from this promenade space there were 4 separate ladderways with 2 ladders, 4 feet wide to each. one ladderway on each side forward led to c deck, and one, the starboard, led to e deck and continued to f deck as a double ladder and to g deck as a single ladder. the two ladderways at the after end led to e deck on both sides and to f deck on the port side. abaft this promenade space came a block of 50 first-class staterooms. this surrounded the forward funnel. the main first-class reception room and dining saloon were aft of these rooms and surrounded the no. 2 funnel. the reception room and staircase occupied 83 feet of the length of the ship. the dining saloon occupied 112 feet, and was between the second and third funnels. abaft this came the first-class pantry, which occupied 56 feet of the length of the ship. the reciprocating engine hatch came up through this pantry. aft of the first-class pantry, the galley, which provides for both first and second class passengers, occupied 45 feet of the length of the ship. aft of this were the turbine engine hatch and the emergency dynamos. abaft of and on the port side of this hatch were the second-class pantry and other spaces used for the saloon service of the passengers. on the starboard side abreast of these there was a series of rooms used for hospitals and their attendants. these spaces occupied about 54 feet of the length. aft of these was the second-class saloon occupying 70 feet of the length. in the next 88 feet of length there were 38 second-class rooms and the necessary baths and lavatories. from here to the stern was accommodation for third-class passengers and the main third-class lavatories for the passengers in the after end of the ship. the water-tight bulkheads come up to this deck throughout the length from the stern as far forward as the bulkhead dividing the after boiler room from the reciprocating engine room. the water-tight bulkhead of the two compartments abaft the stem was carried up to this deck. _e deck._--the water-tight bulkheads, other than those mentioned as extending to d deck, all stopped at this deck. at the forward end was provided accommodation for three watches of trimmers, in three separate compartments, each holding 24 trimmers. abaft this, on the port side, was accommodation for 44 seamen. aft of this, and also on the starboard side of it, were the lavatories for crew and third-class passengers; further aft again came the forward third-class lavatories. immediately aft of this was a passageway right across the ship communicating directly with the ladderways leading to the decks above and below and gangway doors in the ship's side. this passage was 9 feet wide at the sides and 15 feet at the center of the ship. from the after end of this cross passage main alleyways on each side of the ship ran right through to the after end of the vessel. that on the port side was about 8-1/2 feet wide. it was the general communication passage for the crew and third-class passengers and was known as the working passage. in this passage at the center line in the middle of the length of the ship direct access was obtained to the third-class dining rooms on the deck below by means of a ladderway 20 feet wide. between the working passage and the ship's side was the accommodation for the petty officers, most of the stewards, and the engineers' mess room. this accommodation extended for 475 feet. from this passage access was obtained to both engine rooms and the engineers' accommodation, some third-class lavatories and also some third-class accommodation at the after end. there was another cross passage at the end of this accommodation about 9 feet wide, terminating in gangway doors on each side of the ship. the port side of it was for third-class passengers and the starboard for second class. a door divided the parts, but it could be opened for any useful purpose, or for an emergency. the second-class stairway leading to the boat deck was in the cross passageway. the passage on the starboard side ran through the first and then the second-class accommodation, and the forward main first-class stairway and elevators extended to this deck, whilst both the second-class main stairways were also in communication with this starboard passage. there were 4 first-class, 8 first or second alternatively, and 19 second-class rooms leading off this starboard passage. the remainder of the deck was appropriated to third-class accommodation. this contained the bulk of the third-class accommodation. at the forward end of it was the accommodation for 53 firemen constituting the third watch. aft of this in three water-tight compartments there was third-class accommodation extending to 147 feet. in the next water-tight compartment were the swimming bath and linen rooms. in the next water-tight compartments were stewards' accommodation on the port side, and the turkish baths on the starboard side. the next two water-tight compartments each contained a third-class dining room. the third-class stewards' accommodation, together with the third-class galley and pantries, filled the water-tight compartment. the engineers' accommodation was in the next compartment directly alongside the casing of the reciprocating engine room. the next 3 compartments were allotted to 64 second-class staterooms. these communicated direct with the second-class main stairways. the after compartments contained third-class accommodation. all spaces on this deck had direct ladderway communication with the deck above, so that if it became necessary to close the water-tight doors in the bulkheads an escape was available in all cases. on this deck in the way of the boiler rooms were placed the electrically driven fans which provided ventilation to the stokeholes. _g deck._--the forward end of this deck had accommodation for 15 leading firemen and 30 greasers. the next water-tight compartment contained third-class accommodation in 26 rooms for 106 people. the next water-tight compartment contained the first-class baggage room, the post-office accommodation, a racquet court, and 7 third-class rooms for 34 passengers. from this point to the after end of the boiler room the space was used for the 'tween deck bunkers. alongside the reciprocating engine room were the engineers' stores and workshop. abreast of the turbine engine room were some of the ship's stores. in the next water-tight compartment abaft the turbine room were the main body of the stores. the next two compartments were appropriated to 186 third-class passengers in 60 rooms; this deck was the lowest on which any passengers or crew were carried. below g deck were two partial decks, the orlop and lower orlop decks, the latter extending only through the fore peak and no. 1 hold; on the former deck, abaft the turbine engine room, were some storerooms containing stores for ship's use. below these decks again came the inner bottom, extending fore-and-aft through about nine-tenths of the vessel's length, and on this were placed the boilers, main and auxiliary machinery, and the electric-light machines. in the remaining spaces below g deck were cargo holds or 'tween decks, seven in all, six forward and one aft. the firemen's passage, giving direct access from their accommodation to the forward boiler room by stairs at the forward end, contained the various pipes and valves connected with the pumping arrangements at the forward end of the ship, and also the steam pipes conveying steam to the windlass gear forward and exhaust steam pipes leading from winches and other deck machinery. it was made thoroughly water-tight throughout its length, and at its after end was closed by a water-tight vertical sliding door of the same character as other doors on the inner bottom. special arrangements were made for pumping this space out, if necessary. the pipes were placed in this tunnel to protect them from possible damage by coal or cargo, and also to facilitate access to them. on the decks was provided generally, in the manner above described, accommodation for a maximum number of 1,034 first-class passengers, and at the same time 510 second-class passengers and 1,022 third-class passengers. some of the accommodation was of an alternative character and could be used for either of two classes of passengers. in the statement of figures the higher alternative class has been reckoned. this makes a total accommodation for 2,566 passengers. accommodation was provided for the crew as follows: about 75 of the deck department, including officers and doctors, 326 of the engine-room department, including engineers, and 544 of the victualing department, including pursers and leading stewards. _access of passengers to the boat deck._--the following routes led directly from the various parts of the first-class passenger accommodation to the boat deck: from the forward ends of a, b, c, d, and e decks by the staircase in the forward first-class entrance direct to the boat deck. the elevators led from the same decks as far as a deck, where further access was obtained by going up the top flight of the main staircase. the same route was available for first-class passengers forward of midships on b, c, and e decks. first-class passengers abaft midships on b and c decks could use the staircase in the after main entrance to a deck, and then could pass out onto the deck and by the midships stairs beside the house ascend to the boat deck. they could also use the stewards' staircase between the reciprocating-engine casing and nos. 1 and 2 boiler casing, which led direct to the boat deck. this last route was also available for passengers on e deck in the same divisions who could use the forward first-class main stairway and elevators. second-class passengers on d deck could use their own after stairway to b deck and could then pass up their forward stairway to the boat deck, or else could cross their saloon and use the same stairway throughout. of the second-class passengers on e deck, those abreast of the reciprocating-engine casing, unless the water-tight door immediately abaft of them was closed, went aft and joined the other second-class passengers. if, however, the water-tight door at the end of their compartment was closed, they passed through an emergency door into the engine room and directly up to the boat deck by the ladders and gratings in the engine-room casing. the second-class passengers on e deck in the compartment abreast the turbine casing on the starboard side, and also those on f deck on both sides below could pass through m water-tight bulkhead to the forward second-class main stairway. if this door were closed, they could pass by the stairway up to the serving space at the forward end of the second-class saloon and go into the saloon and thence up the forward second-class stairway. passengers between m and n bulkheads on both e and f decks could pass directly up to the forward second-class stairway to the boat deck. passengers between n and o bulkheads on d, e, f, and g decks could pass by the after second-class stairway to b deck and then cross to the forward second-class stairway and go up to the boat deck. third-class passengers at the fore end of the vessel could pass by the staircases to c deck in the forward well and by ladders on the port and starboard sides at the forward end of the deck houses, thence direct to the boat deck outside the officers' accommodation. they might also pass along the working passage on e deck and through the emergency door to the forward first-class main stairway, or through the door on the same deck at the forward end of the first-class alleyway and up the first-class stairway direct to the boat deck. the third-class passengers at the after end of the ship passed up their stairway to e deck and into the working passage and through the emergency doors to the two second-class stairways and so to the boat deck, like second-class passengers. or, alternatively, they could continue up their own stairs and entrance to c deck, thence by the two ladders at the after end of the bridge onto the b deck and thence by the forward second-class stairway direct to the boat deck. _crew._--from each boiler room an escape or emergency ladder was provided direct to the boat deck by the fidleys, in the boiler casings, and also into the working passage on e deck, and thence by the stair immediately forward of the reciprocating-engine casing, direct to the boat deck. from both the engine rooms ladders and gratings gave direct access to the boat deck. from the electric engine room, the after tunnels, and the forward pipe tunnels escapes were provided direct to the working passage on e deck and thence by one of the several routes already detailed from that space. from the crew's quarters they could go forward by their own staircases into the forward well and thence, like the third-class passengers, to the boat deck. the stewards' accommodation being all connected to the working passage or the forward main first-class stairway, they could use one of the routes from thence. the engineers' accommodation also communicated with the working passage, but as it was possible for them to be shut between two water-tight bulkheads, they had also a direct route by the gratings in the engine-room casing to the boat deck. on all the principal accommodation decks the alleyways and stairways provided a ready means of access to the boat deck, and there were clear deck spaces in way of all first, second, and third class main entrances and stairways on boat deck and all decks below. structure. the vessel was built throughout of steel and had a cellular double bottom of the usual type, with a floor at every frame, its depth at the center line being 63 inches, except in way of the reciprocating machinery, where it was 78 inches. for about half of the length of the vessel this double bottom extended up the ship's side to a height of 7 feet above the keel. forward and aft of the machinery space the protection of the inner bottom extended to a less height above the keel. it was so divided that there were four separate water-tight compartments in the breadth of the vessel. before and abaft the machinery space there was a water-tight division at the center line only, except in the foremost and aftermost tanks. above the double bottom the vessel was constructed of the usual transverse frame system, reenforced by web frames, which extended to the highest decks. at the forward end the framing and plating was strengthened with a view to preventing panting and damage when meeting thin harbor ice. beams were fitted on every frame at all decks from the boat deck downward. an external bilge keel about 300 feet long and 25 inches deep was fitted along the bilge amidships. the heavy ship's plating was carried right up to the boat deck, and between the c and b decks was doubled. the stringer or edge plate of the b deck was also doubled. this double plating was hydraulic riveted. all decks were steel plated throughout. the transverse strength of the ship was in part dependent on the 15 transverse water-tight bulkheads, which were specially stiffened and strengthened to enable them to stand the necessary pressure in the event of accident, and they were connected by double angles to decks, inner bottom, and shell plating. the two decks above the b deck were of comparatively light scantling, but strong enough to insure their proving satisfactory in these positions in rough weather. _water-tight subdivision._--in the preparation of the design of this vessel it was arranged that the bulkheads and divisions should be so placed that the ship would remain afloat in the event of any two adjoining compartments being flooded and that they should be so built and strengthened that the ship would remain afloat under this condition. the minimum freeboard that the vessel would have in the event of any two compartments being flooded was between 2 feet 6 inches and 3 feet from the deck adjoining the top of the water-tight bulkheads. with this object in view, 15 water-tight bulkheads were arranged in the vessel. the lower part of c bulkhead was doubled and was in the form of a cofferdam. so far as possible the bulkheads were carried up in one plane to their upper sides, but in cases where they had for any reason to be stepped forward or aft, the deck, in way of the step, was made into a water-tight flat, thus completing the water-tightness of the compartment. in addition to this, g deck in the after peak was made a water-tight flat. the orlop deck between bulkheads which formed the top of the tunnel was also water-tight. the orlop deck in the forepeak tank was also a water-tight flat. the electric-machinery compartment was further protected by a structure some distance in from the ship's side, forming six separate water-tight compartments, which were used for the storage of fresh water. where openings were required for the working of the ship in these water-tight bulkheads they were closed by water-tight sliding doors which could be worked from a position above the top of the water-tight bulkhead, and those doors immediately above the inner bottom were of a special automatic closing pattern, as described below. by this subdivision there were in all 73 compartments, 29 of these being above the inner bottom. _water-tight doors._--the doors (12 in number) immediately above the inner bottom were in the engine and boiler room spaces. they were of messrs. harland & wolff's latest type, working vertically. the doorplate was of cast iron of heavy section, strongly ribbed. it closed by gravity, and was held in the open position by a clutch which could be released by means of a powerful electromagnet controlled from the captain's bridge. in the event of accident, or at any time when it might be considered desirable, the captain or officer on duty could, by simply moving an electric switch, immediately close all these doors. the time required for the doors to close was between 25 and 30 seconds. each door could also be closed from below by operating a hand lever fitted alongside the door. as a further precaution floats were provided beneath the floor level, which, in the event of water accidentally entering any of the compartments, automatically lifted and thus released the clutches, thereby permitting the doors in that particular compartment to close if they had not already been dropped by any other means. these doors were fitted with cataracts, which controlled the speed of closing. due notice of closing from the bridge was given by a warning bell. a ladder or escape was provided in each boiler room, engine room, and similar water-tight compartment, in order that the closing of the doors at any time should not imprison the men working therein. the water-tight doors on e deck were of horizontal pattern, with wrought-steel doorplates. those on f deck and the one aft on the orlop deck were of similar type, but had cast-iron doorplates of heavy section, strongly ribbed. each of the between-deck doors, and each of the vertical doors on the tank top level could be operated by the ordinary hand gear from the deck above the top of the water-tight bulkhead, and from a position on the next deck above, almost directly above the door. to facilitate the quick closing of the doors, plates were affixed in suitable positions on the sides of the alleyways, indicating the positions of the deck plates, and a box spanner was provided for each door, hanging in suitable clips alongside the deck plate. _ship's side doors._--large side doors were provided through the side plating, giving access to passengers' or crew's accommodation as follows: on the saloon (d) deck on the starboard side in the forward third-class open space, one baggage door. in way of the forward first-class entrance, two doors close together on each side. on the upper (e) deck, one door each side at the forward end of the working passage. on the port side abreast the engine room, one door leading into the working passage. one door each side on the port and starboard sides aft into the forward second-class entrance. all the doors on the upper deck were secured by lever handles, and were made water-tight by means of rubber strips. those on the saloon deck were closed by lever handles, but had no rubber. _accommodation ladder._--one teak accommodation ladder was provided, and could be worked on either side of the ship in the gangway door opposite the second-class entrance on the upper deck (e). it had a folding platform and portable stanchions, hand rope, etc. the ladder extended to within 3 feet 6 inches of the vessel's light draft, and was stowed overhead in the entrance abreast the forward second-class main staircase. its lower end was arranged so as to be raised and lowered from a davit immediately above. _masts and rigging._--the vessel was rigged with two masts and fore and aft sails. the two pole masts were constructed of steel, and stiffened with angle irons. the poles at the top of the mast were made of teak. a lookout cage, constructed of steel, was fitted on the foremast at a height of about 95 feet above the water line. access to the cage was obtained by an iron vertical ladder inside of the foremast, with an opening at c deck and one at the lookout cage. an iron ladder was fitted on the foremast from the hounds to the masthead light. life-saving appliances. _life buoys._--forty-eight, with beckets, were supplied, of pattern approved by the board of trade. they were placed about the ship. _life belts._--three thousand five hundred and sixty life belts, of the latest improved overhead pattern, approved by the board of trade, were supplied and placed on board the vessel and there inspected by the board of trade. these were distributed throughout all the sleeping accommodation. _lifeboats._--twenty boats in all were fitted on the vessel, and were of the following dimensions and capacities: fourteen wood lifeboats, each 30 feet long by 9 feet 1 inch broad by 4 feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 655.2 cubic feet, constructed to carry 65 persons each. emergency boats: one wood cutter, 25 feet 2 inches long by 7 feet 2 inches broad by 3 feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 326.6 cubic feet, constructed to carry 40 persons. one wood cutter, 25 feet 2 inches long by 7 feet 1 inch broad by 3 feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 322.1 cubic feet, constructed to carry 40 persons. four engelhardt collapsible boats, 27 feet 5 inches long by 8 feet broad by 3 feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 376.6 cubic feet, constructed to carry 47 persons each. or a total of 11,327.9 cubic feet for 1,178 persons. the lifeboats and cutters were constructed as follows: the keels were of elm. the stems and stern posts were of oak. they were all clinker built of yellow pine, double fastened with copper nails, clinched over rooves. the timbers were of elm, spaced about 9 inches apart, and the seats pitch pine, secured with galvanized-iron double knees. the buoyancy tanks in the lifeboats were of 18 ounce copper, and of capacity to meet the board of trade requirements. the lifeboats were fitted with murray's disengaging gear, with arrangements for simultaneously freeing both ends if required. the gear was fastened at a suitable distance from the forward and after ends of the boats, to suit the davits. life lines were fitted round the gunwales of the lifeboats. the davit blocks were treble for the lifeboats and double for the cutters. they were of elm, with lignum vitæ roller sheaves, and were bound inside with iron, and had swivel eyes. there were manila rope falls of sufficient length for lowering the boats to the vessel's light draft, and when the boats were lowered, to be able to reach the boat winches on the boat deck. the lifeboats were stowed on hinged wood chocks on the boat deck, by groups of three at the forward and four at the after ends. on each side of the boat deck the cutters were arranged forward of the group of three and fitted to lash outboard as emergency boats. they were immediately abaft the navigating bridge. the engelhardt collapsible lifeboats were stowed abreast of the cutters, one on each side of the ship, and the remaining two on top of the officers' house, immediately abaft the navigating bridge. the boat equipment was in accordance with the board of trade requirements. sails for each lifeboat and cutter were supplied and stowed in painted bags. covers were supplied for the lifeboats and cutters, and a sea anchor for each boat. every lifeboat was furnished with a special spirit boat compass and fitting for holding it; these compasses were carried in a locker on the boat deck. a provision tank and water beaker were supplied to each boat. _compasses._--compasses were supplied as follows: one kelvin standard compass, with azimuth mirror on compass platform. one kelvin steering compass inside of wheelhouse. one kelvin steering compass on captain's bridge. one light card compass for docking bridge. fourteen spirit compasses for lifeboats. all the ships' compasses were lighted with oil and electric lamps. they were adjusted by messrs. c. j. smith, of southampton, on the passage from belfast to southampton and southampton to queenstown. _charts._--all the necessary charts were supplied. _distress signals._--these were supplied of number and pattern approved by board of trade--i. e., 36 socket signals in lieu of guns, 12 ordinary rockets, 2 manwell holmes deck flares, 12 blue lights, and 6 lifebuoy lights. pumping arrangements. the general arrangement of piping was designed so that it was possible to pump from any flooded compartment by two independent systems of 10-inch mains having cross connections between them. these were controlled from above by rods and wheels led to the level of the bulkhead deck. by these it was possible to isolate any flooded space, together with any suctions in it. if any of these should happen accidentally to be left open, and consequently out of reach, it could be shut off from the main by the wheel on the bulkhead deck. this arrangement was specially submitted to the board of trade and approved by them. the double bottom of the vessel was divided by 17 transverse water-tight divisions, including those bounding the fore and aft peaks, and again subdivided by a center fore-and-aft bulkhead, and two longitudinal bulkheads, into 46 compartments. fourteen of these compartments had 8-inch suctions, 23 had 6-inch suctions, and 3 had 5-inch suctions connected to the 10-inch ballast main suction; 6 compartments were used exclusively for fresh water. the following bilge suctions were provided for dealing with water above the double bottom, viz, in no. 1 hold two 3-1/2-inch suctions, no. 2 hold two 3-1/2-inch and 2 3-inch suctions, bunker hold, two 3-1/2-inch and two 3-inch suctions. the valves in connection with the forward bilge and ballast suctions were placed in the firemen's passage, the water-tight pipe tunnel extending from no. 6 boiler room to the after end of no. 1 hold. in this tunnel, in addition to two 3-inch bilge suctions, one at each end, there was a special 3-1/2-inch suction with valve rod led up to the lower deck above the load line, so as always to have been accessible should the tunnel be flooded accidentally. in no. 6 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 4-1/2-inch, and two 3-inch suctions. in no. 5 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two 3-inch suctions. in no. 4 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 4-1/2-inch, and two 3-inch suctions. in no. 3 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two 3-inch suctions. in no. 2 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two 3-inch suctions. in no. 1 boiler room there were two 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two 3-inch suctions. in the reciprocating engine room there were two 3-1/2-inch, six 3-inch, two 18-inch, and two 5-inch suctions. in the turbine engine room there were two 3-1/2-inch, three 3-inch, two 18-inch, two 5-inch, and one 4-inch suctions. in the electric engine room there were four 3-1/2-inch suctions. in the storerooms above the electric engine room there was one 3-inch suction. in the forward tunnel compartment there were two 3-1/2-inch suctions. in the water-tight flat over the tunnel compartment there were two 3-inch suctions. in the tunnel after compartment there were two 3-1/2-inch suctions. in the water-tight flat over the tunnel after compartment there were two 3-inch suctions. electrical installation. _main generating sets._--there were four engines and dynamos, each having a capacity of 400 kilowatts at 100 volts and consisting of a vertical three-crank compound-forced lubrication inclosed engine of sufficient power to drive the electrical plant. the engines were direct-coupled to their respective dynamos. these four main sets were situated in a separate water-tight compartment about 63 feet long by 24 feet high, adjoining the after end of the turbine room at the level of the inner bottom. steam to the electric engines was supplied from two separate lengths of steam pipes, connecting on the port side to the five single-ended boilers in compartment no. 1 and two in compartment no. 2, and on the starboard side to the auxiliary steam pipe which derived steam from the five single-ended boilers in no. 1 compartment, two in no. 2, and two in no. 4. by connections at the engine room forward bulkhead steam could be taken from any boiler in the ship. _auxiliary generating sets._--in addition to the four main generating sets, there were two 30-kilowatt engines and dynamos situated on a platform in the turbine engine room casing on saloon deck level, 20 feet above the water line. they were the same general type as the main sets. these auxiliary emergency sets were connected to the boilers by means of a separate steam pipe running along the working passage above e deck, with branches from three boiler rooms, nos. 2, 3, and 5, so that should the main sets be temporarily out of action the auxiliary sets could provide current for such lights and power appliances as would be required in the event of emergency. _electric lighting._--the total number of incandescent lights was 10,000, ranging from 16 to 100 candlepower, the majority being of tantallum type, except in the cargo spaces and for the portable fittings, where carbon lamps were provided. special dimming lamps of small amount of light were provided in the first-class rooms. _electric heating and power and mechanical ventilation._--altogether 562 electric heaters and 153 electric motors were installed throughout the vessel, including six 50-hundredweight and two 30-hundredweight cranes, four 3-ton cargo winches, and four 15-hundredweight boat winches. there were also four electric passenger lifts, three forward of the first-class main entrance and one in the second-class forward entrance, each to carry 12 persons. _telephones._--loud speaking telephones of navy pattern were fitted for communication between the following: wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the forecastle. wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the lookout station on the crow's nest. wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the engine room. wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the poop. chief engineer's cabin and the engine room. engine room and nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 stokeholds. these were operated both from the ship's lighting circuit, through a motor generator, and alternatively by a stand-by battery, which by means of an automatic switch could be introduced in the circuit should the main supply fail. there was also a separate telephone system for intercommunication between a number of the chief officials and service rooms, through a 50-line exchange switchboard. a number of the pantries and galleys were also in direct telephonic communication. _wireless telegraphy._--the wireless telegraphy system was worked by a marconi 5-kilowatt motor generator. the house for the marconi instruments was situated on the boat deck close to the bridge. there were four parallel aerial wires extended between the masts, fastened to light booms; from the aerials the connecting wires were led to the instruments in the house. there were two complete sets of apparatus, one for the transmitting and one for receiving messages, the former being placed in a sound-proof chamber in one corner of the wireless house. there was also an independent storage battery and coil, in event of the failure of the current supply, which came from the ship's dynamos. _submarine signaling._--the submarine signal co.'s apparatus was provided for receiving signals from the submarine bells. small tanks containing the microphones were placed on the inside of the hull of the vessel on the port and starboard sides below the water level, and were connected by wires to receivers situated in the navigating room on the port side of the officer's deck house. _various._--the whistles were electrically actuated on the willett bruce system. the boiler-room telegraphs, stoking indicators, rudder indicators, clocks and thermostats were also electrical. the water-tight doors were released by electric magnets. _emergency circuit._--a separate and distinct installation was fitted in all parts of the vessel, deriving current from the two 30-kilowatt sets above mentioned, so that in the event of the current from the main dynamos being unavailable an independent supply was obtainable. connected to the emergency circuit were above 500 incandescent lamps fitted throughout all passenger, crew, and machinery compartments, at the end of passages, and near stairways, also on the boat deck, to enable anyone to find their way from one part of the ship to the other. the following were also connected to the emergency circuit by means of change-over switches: five arc lamps, seven cargo and gangway lanterns, marconi apparatus, mast, side, and stern lights, and all lights on bridge, including those for captain's, navigating, and chart rooms, wheelhouse, telegraphs and morse signaling lanterns, and four electrically-driven boat winches. these latter, situated on the boat deck, were each capable of lifting a load of 15 hundredweight at a speed of 100 feet per minute. _ventilating._--there were 12 electrically-driven fans for supplying air to the stokeholds, 6 electrically-driven fans for engine and turbine room ventilation. there were fans for engine and boiler rooms. machinery. _description._--the propelling machinery was of the combination type, having two sets of reciprocating engines driving the wing propellers and a low-pressure turbine working the center propeller. steam was supplied by 24 double-ended boilers and 5 single-ended boilers, arranged for a working pressure of 215 pounds per square inch. the turbine was placed in a separate compartment aft of the reciprocating-engine room and divided from it by a water-tight bulkhead. the main condensers, with their circulating pumps and air pumps, were placed in the turbine room. the boilers were arranged in six water-tight compartments, the single-ended boilers being placed in the one nearest the main engines, the whole being built under board of trade survey for passenger certificate. _reciprocating engines._--the reciprocating engines were of the four-crank triple-expansion type. each set had four inverted, direct-acting cylinders, the high-pressure having a diameter of 54 inches, the intermediate pressure of 84 inches, and each of the two low-pressure cylinders of 97 inches, all with a stroke of 6 feet 3 inches. the valves of the high-pressure and intermediate cylinders were of the piston type, and the low-pressure cylinder had double-ported slide valves, fitted with stephenson link motion. each engine was reversed by a brown type of direct-acting steam and hydraulic engine. there was also a separate steam-driven high-pressure pump fitted for operating either or both of the reversing engines. this alternative arrangement was a stand-by in case of breakdown of the steam pipes to these engines. _turbine._--the low-pressure turbine was of the parsons reaction type, direct coupled to the center line of shafting and arranged for driving in the ahead direction only. it exhausted to the two condensers, placed one on each side of it. a shut-off valve was fitted in each of the eduction pipes leading to the condensers. an emergency governor was fitted and arranged to shut off steam to the turbine and simultaneously change over the exhaust from the reciprocating engines to the condensers, should the speed of the turbine become excessive through the breaking of a shaft or other accident. _boilers._--all the boilers were 15 feet 9 inches in diameter, the 24 double-ended boilers being 20 feet long, and the single-ended 11 feet 9 inches long. each double-ended boiler had six and each single-ended boiler three furnaces, with a total heating surface of 144,142 square feet and a grate surface of 3,466 square feet. the boilers were constructed in accordance with the rules of the board of trade for a working pressure of 215 pounds per square inch. they were arranged for working under natural draft, assisted by fans, which blew air into the open stokehold. _auxiliary steam pipes._--the five single-ended boilers and those in boiler rooms nos. 2 and 4 had separate steam connections to the pipe supplying steam for working the auxiliary machinery, and the five single-ended boilers and the two port boilers in boiler room no. 2 had separate steam connections to the pipe supplying steam for working the electric-light engines. a cross connection was also made between the main and auxiliary pipes in the reciprocating-engine room, so that the auxiliaries could be worked from any boiler in the ship. steam pipes also were led separately from three of the boiler rooms (nos. 2, 3, 5) above the water-tight bulkheads and along the working passage to the emergency electric-light engines placed above the load line in the turbine room. pipes were also led from this steam supply to the pumps in the engine room, which were connected to the bilges throughout the ship. _main steam pipes._--there were two main lines of steam pipes led to the engine room, with shut-off valves at three of the bulkheads. besides the shut-off valves at the engine-room bulkhead, a quick-acting emergency valve was fitted on each main steam pipe, so that the steam could at once be shut off in case of rupture of the main pipe. _condensing plant and pumps._--there were two main condensers, having a combined cooling surface of 50,550 square feet, designed to work under a vacuum of 28 inches with cooling water at 60° f. the condensers were pear shaped in section, and built of mild steel plates. four gun-metal centrifugal pumps were fitted for circulating water through the condensers. each pump had suction and discharge pipes of 29-inch bore, and was driven by a compound engine. besides the main sea suctions, two of the pumps had direct bilge suctions from the turbine room and the other two from the reciprocating-engine room. the bilge suctions were 18 inches diameter. four of weir's "dual" air pumps were fitted, two to each condenser, and discharged to two feed tanks placed in the turbine engine room. _bilge and ballast pumps._--the ship was also fitted with the following pumps: five ballast and bilge pumps, each capable of discharging 250 tons of water per hour; three bilge pumps, each of 150 tons per hour capacity. one ash ejector was placed in each of the large boiler compartments to work the ash ejectors, and to circulate or feed the boilers as required. this pump was also connected to the bilges, except in the case of three of the boiler rooms, where three of the ballast and bilge pumps were placed. the pumps in each case had direct bilge suctions as well as a connection to the main bilge pipe, so that each boiler room might be independent. the remainder of the auxiliary pumps were placed in the reciprocating and turbine engine rooms. two ballast pumps were placed in the reciprocating-engine room, with large suctions from the bilges direct and from the bilge main. two bilge pumps were also arranged to draw from bilges. one bilge pump was placed in the turbine room and one of the hot salt-water pumps had a connection from the bilge main pipe for use in emergency. a 10-inch main ballast pipe was carried fore and aft through the ship with separate connections to each tank, and with filling pipes from the sea connected at intervals for trimming purposes. the five ballast pumps were arranged to draw from this pipe. a double line of bilge main pipe was fitted forward of no. 5 boiler room and aft of no. 1. general. there were four elliptical-shaped funnels; the three forward ones took the waste gases from the boiler furnaces, and the after one was placed over the turbine hatch and was used as a ventilator. the galley funnels were led up this funnel. the uptakes by which the waste gases were conveyed to the funnels were united immediately above the water-tight bulkhead which separated the boiler rooms. all overhead discharge from the circulating pumps, ballast pumps, bilge pumps, etc., were below the deep load line, but above the light line. the boilers were supported in built steel cradles, and were stayed to the ship's side and to each other athwart ships by strong steel stays. built steel chocks were also fitted to prevent movement fore and aft. silent blow-offs from the main steam pipes were connected direct to both condensers. crew and passengers. when the _titanic_ left queenstown on april 11 the total number of persons employed on board in any capacity was 885. the respective ratings of these persons were as follows: deck department 66 engine department 325 victualing department 494 --- 885 eight bandsmen were included in the second-class passenger list. in the deck department the master, edward charles smith, held an extra master's certificate; chief officer h. f. wilde held an ordinary master's certificate; first officer w. m. murdock held an ordinary master's certificate; second officer c. h. lightoller held an extra master's certificate; third officer h. j. pitman held an ordinary master's certificate; fourth officer j. g. boxall held an extra master's certificate; fifth officer h. g. lowe held an ordinary master's certificate; sixth officer j. p. moody held an ordinary master's certificate. in the engine department were included the chief engineer and 7 senior and 17 assistant engineers. in the victualing department there were 23 women employed. the total number of passengers on board was 1,316. ----------------------------------------------------- male. female. total. ----------------------------------------------------- of these- first class 180 145 325 second class 179 106 285 third class 510 196 706 ---- 1,316 -----------------------------------------------------of the above 6 children were in the first class; 24 children were in the second class; 79 children were in the third class; or 109 in all. about 410 of the third-class passengers were foreigners, and these, with the foreigners in the first and second class and in the victualing department, would make a total of nearly 500 persons on board who were presumably not english speaking, so far as it is possible to ascertain. the disposition of the different classes of passengers and of the crew in the ship has already been described (pp. 10-15). in all, 2,201 persons were on board. ii. account of the ship's journey across the atlantic, the messages she received, and the disaster. the sailing order. the masters of vessels belonging to the white star line are not given any special "sailing orders" before the commencement of any particular voyage. it is understood, however, that the "tracks" or "lane routes" proper to the particular time of the year, and agreed upon by the great steamship companies, are to be generally adhered to. should any master see fit during this passage to deviate from his route he has to report on and explain this deviation at the end of his voyage. when such deviation has been in the interests of safety, and not merely to shorten his passage, his action has always been approved of by the company. a book of general ship's rules and uniform regulations is also issued by the company as a guide; there are in this book no special instructions in regard to ice, but there is a general instruction that the safety of the lives of the passengers and ship are to be the first consideration. besides the book of ship's rules, every master when first appointed to command a ship is addressed by special letter from the company, of which the following passage is an extract: you are to dismiss all idea of competitive passages with other vessels and to concentrate your attention upon a cautious, prudent, and ever-watchful system of navigation, which shall lose time or suffer any other temporary inconvenience rather than incur the slightest risk which can be avoided. mr. sanderson, one of the directors, in his evidence says with reference to the above letter: we never fail to tell them in handing them these letters that we do not wish them to take it as a mere matter of form; that we wish them to read these letters, and to write an acknowledgment to us that they have read them, and that they will be influenced by what we have said in those letters. the route followed. the _titanic_ left southampton on wednesday, april 10, and after calling at cherbourg, proceeded to queenstown, from which port she sailed on the afternoon of thursday, april 11, following what was at that time the accepted outward-bound route for mail steamers from the fastnet light, off the southwest coast of ireland, to the nantucket shoal light vessel, off the coast of the united states. it is desirable here to explain that it has been, since 1899, the practice, by common agreement between the great north atlantic steamship companies, to follow lane routes, to be used by their ships at the different seasons of the year. speaking generally, it may be said that the selection of these routes has hitherto been based on the importance of avoiding as much as possible the areas where fog and ice are prevalent at certain seasons, without thereby unduly lengthening the passage across the atlantic, and also with the view of keeping the tracks of "outward" and "homeward" bound mail steamers well clear of one another. a further advantage is that, in case of a breakdown, vessels are likely to receive timely assistance from other vessels following the same route. the decisions arrived at by the steamship companies referred to above have, from time to time, been communicated to the hydrographic office, and the routes have there been marked on the north atlantic route charts printed and published by the admiralty; and they have also been embodied in the sailing directions. before the _titanic_ disaster the accepted mail steamers outward track between january 15 and august 14 followed the arc of a great circle between the fastnet light and a point in latitude 42° n. and 47° w. (sometimes termed the "turning point"), and from thence by rhumb line so as to pass just south of the nantucket shoal light vessel, and from this point on to new york. this track, usually called the outward southern track, was that followed by the _titanic_ on her journey. an examination of the north atlantic route chart shows that this track passes about 25 miles south (that is outside) of the edge of the area marked "field ice between march and july," but from 100 to 300 miles to the northward (that is inside) of the dotted line on the chart marked, "icebergs have been seen within this line in april, may, and june." that is to say, assuming the areas indicated to be based on the experience of many years, this track might be taken as passing clear of field ice under the usual conditions of that time of year, but well inside the area in which icebergs might be seen. it is instructive here to remark that had the "turning point" been in longitude 45° w. and latitude 38° n., that is some 240 miles to the south-eastward, the total distance of the passage would only have been increased by about 220 miles, or some 10 hours' steaming for a 22-knot ship. this is the route which was provisionally decided on by the great trans-atlantic companies subsequent to the _titanic_ disaster. it must not be supposed that the lane routes referred to had never been changed before. owing to the presence of ice in 1903, 1904, and 1905 from about early in april to mid-june or early in july, westward-bound vessels crossed the meridian of 47° w. in latitude 41° n., that is 60 miles further south than the then accepted track. the publications known as "sailing directions," compiled by the hydrographic office at the admiralty, indicate the caution which it is necessary to use in regions where ice is likely to be found. the following is an extract from one of these books, named "united states pilot (east coast)," part i (second edition, 1909, p. 34), referring to the ocean passages of the large trans-atlantic mail and passenger steamers: to these vessels one of the chief dangers in crossing the atlantic lies in the probability of encountering masses of ice, both in the form of bergs and of extensive fields of solid compact ice, released at the breaking up of winter in the arctic regions, and drifted down by the labrador current across their direct route. ice is more likely to be encountered in this route between april and august, both months inclusive, than at other times, although icebergs have been seen at all seasons northward of the parallel of 43° n., but not often so far south after august. these icebergs are sometimes over 200 feet in height and of considerable extent. they have been seen as far south as latitude 39° n., to obtain which position they must have crossed the gulf stream impelled by the cold arctic current underrunning the warm waters of the gulf stream. that this should happen is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the specific gravity of fresh-water ice, of which these bergs are composed, is about seven-eighths that of sea water; so that, however vast the berg may appear to the eye of the observer, he can in reality see one-eighth of its bulk, the remaining seven-eighths being submerged and subject to the deep-water currents of the ocean. the track of an iceberg is indeed directed mainly by current, so small a portion of its surface being exposed to the action of the winds that its course is but slightly retarded or deflected by moderate breezes. on the great bank of newfoundland bergs are often observed to be moving south or southeast; those that drift westward of cape race usually pass between green and st. pierre banks. the route chart of the north atlantic, no. 2058, shows the limits within which both field ice and icebergs may be met with, and where it should be carefully looked out for at all times, but especially during the spring and summer seasons. from this chart it would appear that whilst the southern and eastern limits of field ice are about latitude 42° n., and longitude 45° w., icebergs may be met with much farther from newfoundland; in april, may, and june they have been seen as far south as latitude 39° n. and as far east as longitude 38° 30´ w." and again, on page 35: it is, in fact, impossible to give, within the outer limits named, any distinct idea of where ice may be expected, and no rule can be laid down to insure safe navigation, as its position and the quantity met with differs so greatly in different seasons. everything must depend upon the vigilance, caution, and skill with which a vessel is navigated when crossing the dangerous ice-bearing regions of the atlantic ocean. similar warnings as to ice are also given in the "nova scotia (southeast coast) and bay of fundy pilot" (sixth edition, 1911), which is also published by the hydrographic office. both the above quoted books were supplied to the master of the _titanic_ (together with other necessary charts and books) before that ship left southampton. the above extracts show that it is quite incorrect to assume that icebergs had never been encountered or field ice observed so far south, at the particular time of year when the _titanic_ disaster occurred; but it is true to say that the field ice was certainly at that time farther south than it has been seen for many years. it may be useful here to give some definitions of the various forms of ice to be met with in these latitudes, although there is frequently some confusion in their use. an iceberg may be defined as a detached portion of a polar glacier carried out to sea. the ice of an iceberg formed from a glacier is of quite fresh water. only about an eighth of its mass floats above the surface of sea water. a "growler" is a colloquial term applied to icebergs of small mass, which therefore only show a small portion above the surface. it is not infrequently a berg which has turned over, and is therefore showing what has been termed "black ice" or, more correctly, dark-blue ice. pack ice is the floating ice which covers wide areas of the polar seas, broken into large pieces, which are driven ("packed") together by wind and current, so as to form a practically continuous sheet. such ice is generally frozen from sea water, and not derived from glaciers. field ice is a term usually applied to frozen sea water floating in much looser form than pack ice. an icefloe is the term generally applied to the same ice (i.e., field ice) in a smaller quantity. a floe berg is a stratified mass of floe ice (i.e., sea-water ice). ice messages received. the _titanic_ followed the outward southern track until sunday, april 14, in the usual way. at 11.40 p. m. on that day she struck an iceberg and at 2.20 a. m. on the next day she foundered. at 9 a. m. (_titanic_ time) on that day a wireless message from the steamship _caronia_ was received by capt. smith. it was as follows: * * * * * captain, _titanic_: west-bound steamers report bergs, growlers, and field ice in 42° n., from 49° to 51° w., april 12. compliments. barr. * * * * * it will be noticed that this message referred to bergs, growlers, and field ice sighted on april 12--at least 48 hours before the time of the collision. at the time this message was received the _titanic's_ position was about latitude 43° 35´ n. and longitude 43° 50´ w. capt. smith acknowledged the receipt of this message. at 1.42 p. m., a wireless message from the steamship _baltic_ was received by capt. smith. it was as follows: * * * * * capt. smith, _titanic_: have had moderate, variable winds and clear, fine weather since leaving. greek steamer _athenai_ reports passing icebergs and large quantities of field ice to-day in latitude 41° 51´ n., longitude 49° 52´ w. last night we spoke german oiltank steamer _deutschland_, stettin to philadelphia, not under control, short of coal, latitude 40° 42´ n., longitude 55° 11´ w. wishes to be reported to new york and other steamers. wish you and _titanic_ all success. commander. * * * * * at the time this message was received the _titanic_ position was about 42° 35´ n., 45° 50´ w. capt. smith acknowledged the receipt of this message also. mr. ismay, the managing director of the white star line, was on board the _titanic_, and it appears that the master handed the _baltic's_ message to mr. ismay almost immediately after it was received. this no doubt was in order that mr. ismay might know that ice was to be expected. mr. ismay states that he understood from the message that they would get up to the ice "that night." mr. ismay showed this message to two ladies, and it is therefore probable that many persons on board became aware of its contents. this message ought in my opinion to have been put on the board in the chart room as soon as it was received. it remained, however, in mr. ismay's possession until 7.15 p. m., when the master asked mr. ismay to return it. it was then that it was first posted in the chart room. this was considerably before the time at which the vessel reached the position recorded in the message. nevertheless, i think it was irregular for the master to part with the document, and improper for mr. ismay to retain it, but the incident had, in my opinion, no connection with or influence upon the manner in which the vessel was navigated by the master. it appears that about 1.45 p. m. (_titanic_ time) on the 14th a message was sent from the german steamer _amerika_ to the hydrographic office in washington, which was in the following terms: _amerika_ passed two large icebergs in 41° 27´ n., 50° 8´ w., on april 14. this was a position south of the point of the _titanic's_ disaster. the message does not mention at what hour the bergs had been observed. it was a private message for the hydrographer at washington, but it passed to the _titanic_ because she was nearest to cape race, to which station it had to be sent in order to reach washington. being a message affecting navigation, it should in the ordinary course have been taken to the bridge. so far as can be ascertained, it was never heard of by anyone on board the _titanic_ outside the marconi room. there were two marconi operators in the marconi room, namely, phillips, who perished, and bride, who survived and gave evidence. bride did not receive the _amerika_ message nor did phillips mention it to him, though the two had much conversation together after it had been received. i am of opinion that when this message reached the marconi room it was put aside by phillips to wait until the _titanic_ would be within call of cape race (at about 8 or 8.30 p. m.), and that it was never handed to any officer of the _titanic_. at 5.50 p. m. the _titanic's_ course (which had been s. 62° w.) was changed to bring her on a westerly course for new york. in ordinary circumstances this change in her course should have been made about half an hour earlier, but she seems on this occasion to have continued for about 10 miles longer on her southwesterly course before turning, with the result that she found herself, after altering course at 5.50 p. m., about 4 or 5 miles south of the customary route on a course s. 86° w. true. her course, as thus set, would bring her at the time of the collision to a point about 2 miles to the southward of the customary route and 4 miles south and considerably to the westward of the indicated position of the _baltic's_ ice. her position at the time of the collision would also be well to the southward of the indicated position of the ice mentioned in the _caronia_ message. this change of course was so insignificant that in my opinion it can not have been made in consequence of information as to ice. in this state of things, at 7.30 p.m. a fourth message was received, and is said by the marconi operator bride to have been delivered to the bridge. this message was from the steamship _californian_ to the steamship _antillian_, but was picked up by the _titanic_. it was as follows: * * * * * to captain, _antillian_: six-thirty p. m., apparent ship's time; latitude 42° 3´ n., longitude 49° 9´ w. three large bergs 5 miles to southward of us. regards. lord. * * * * * bride does not remember to what officer he delivered this message. by the time the _titanic_ reached the position of the collision (11.40 p. m.) she had gone about 50 miles to the westward of the indicated position of the ice mentioned in this fourth message. thus it would appear that before the collision she had gone clear of the indicated positions of ice contained in the messages from the _baltic_ and _californian_. as to the ice advised by the _caronia_ message, so far as it consisted of small bergs and field ice, it had before the time of the collision possibly drifted with the gulf stream to the eastward; and so far as it consisted of large bergs (which would be deep enough in the water to reach the labrador current) it had probably gone to the southward. it was urged by sir robert finlay, who appeared for the owners, that this is strong evidence that the _titanic_ had been carefully and successfully navigated so as to avoid the ice of which she had received warning. mr. ismay, however, stated that he understood from the _baltic_ message that "we would get up to the ice that night." there was a fifth message received in the marconi room of the _titanic_ at 9.40 p. m. this was from a steamer called the _mesaba_. it was in the following terms: _from "mesaba" to "titanic" and all east-bound ships_: ice report in latitude 42° n. to 41° 25´ n., longitude 49° to longitude 50° 30´ w. saw much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs. also field ice. weather good, clear. this message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate vicinity of the _titanic_, and if it had reached the bridge would perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. unfortunately, it does not appear to have been delivered to the master or to any of the officers. the marconi operator was very busy from 8 o'clock onward transmitting messages via cape race for passengers on board the _titanic_, and the probability is that he failed to grasp the significance and importance of the message, and put it aside until he should be less busy. it was never acknowledged by capt. smith, and i am satisfied that it was not received by him. but, assuming sir robert finlay's contentions to be well founded that the titanic had been navigated so as to avoid the _baltic_ and the _californian_ ice, and that the _caronia_ ice had drifted to the eastward and to the southward, still there can be no doubt, if the evidence of mr. lightoller, the second officer, is to be believed, that both he and the master knew that the danger of meeting ice still existed. mr. lightoller says that the master showed him the _caronia_ message about 12.45 p. m. on april 14, when he was on the bridge. he was about to go off watch, and he says he made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied him that the _titanic_ would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he came on watch again at 6 p. m. at 6 p. m. mr. lightoller came on the bridge again to take over the ship from mr. wilde, the chief officer (dead). he does not remember being told anything about the _baltic_ message, which had been received at 1.42 p. m. mr. lightoller then requested mr. moody, the sixth officer (dead), to let him know "at what time we should reach the vicinity of ice," and says that he thinks mr. moody reported "about 11 o'clock." mr. lightoller says that 11 o'clock did not agree with a mental calculation he himself had made and which showed 9.30 as the time. this mental calculation he at first said he had made before mr. moody gave him 11 o'clock as the time, but later on he corrected this, and said his mental calculation was made between 7 and 8 o'clock, and after mr. moody had mentioned 11. he did not point out the difference to him, and thought that perhaps mr. moody had made his calculations on the basis of some "other" message. mr. lightoller excuses himself for not pointing out the difference by saying that mr. moody was busy at the time, probably with stellar observations. it is, however, an odd circumstance that mr. lightoller, who believed that the vicinity of ice would be reached before his watch ended at 10 p.m., should not have mentioned the fact to mr. moody, and it is also odd that if he thought that mr. moody was working on the basis of some "other" message, he did not ask what the other message was or where it came from. the point, however, of mr. lightoller's evidence is that they both thought that the vicinity of ice would be reached before midnight. when he was examined as to whether he did not fear that on entering the indicated ice region he might run foul of a growler (a low-lying berg) he answers: "no, i judged i should see it with "sufficient distinctness" and at a distance of a "mile and a half, more probably 2 miles." he then adds: in the event of meeting ice there are many things we look for. in the first place, a slight breeze. of course, the stronger the breeze the more visible will the ice be, or, rather, the breakers on the ice. he is then asked whether there was any breeze on this night, and he answers: when i left the deck at 10 o'clock there was a slight breeze. oh, pardon me, no; i take that back. no, it was calm, perfectly calm-and almost immediately afterwards he describes the sea as "absolutely flat." it appeared, according to this witness, that about 9 o'clock the master came on the bridge and that mr. lightoller had a conversation with him which lasted half an hour. this conversation, so far as it is material, is described by mr. lightoller in the following words: we commenced to speak about the weather. he said, "there is not much wind." i said, "no, it is a flat calm," as a matter of fact. he repeated it, he said, "a flat calm." i said, "quite flat; there is no wind." i said something about it was rather a pity the breeze had not kept up whilst we were going through the ice region. of course, my reason was obvious: he knew i meant the water ripples breaking on the base of the berg * * * we then discussed the indications of ice. i remember saying, "in any case, there will be a certain amount of reflected light from the bergs." he said, "oh, yes, there will be a certain amount of reflected light." i said or he said--blue was said between us--that even though the blue side of the berg was towards us, probably the outline, the white outline, would give us sufficient warning, that we should be able to see it at a good distance, and as far as we could see, we should be able to see it. of course, it was just with regard to that possibility of the blue side being toward us, and that if it did happen to be turned with the purely blue side toward us, there would still be the white outline. further on mr. lightoller says that he told the master nothing about his own calculation as to coming up with the ice at 9.30 or about mr. moody's calculation as to coming up with it at 11. the conversation with the master ended with the master saying, "if it becomes at all doubtful let me know at once; i will be just inside." this remark mr. lightoller says undoubtedly referred to ice. at 9.30 the master went to his room, and the first thing that mr. lightoller did afterwards was to send a message to the crow's nest "to keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers," until daylight. there seems to be no doubt that this message was in fact sent, and that it was passed on to the next lookouts when they came on watch. hitchins, the quartermaster, says he heard mr. lightoller give the message to mr. moody, and both the men in the crow's nest at the time (jewell and symons) speak to having received it. from 9.30 to 10 o'clock, when his watch ended, mr. lightoller remained on the bridge "looking out for ice." he also said that the night order book for the 14th had a footnote about keeping a sharp lookout for ice, and that this note was "initialed by every officer." at 10 o'clock mr. lightoller handed over the watch to mr. murdoch, the first officer (dead), telling him that "we might be up around the ice any time now." that mr. murdoch knew of the danger of meeting ice appears from the evidence of hemming, a lamp trimmer, who says that about 7.15 p. m. mr. murdoch told him to go forward and see the forescuttle hatch closed- as we are in the vicinity of ice and there is a glow coming from that, and i want everything dark before the bridge. the foregoing evidence establishes quite clearly that capt. smith, the master; mr. murdoch, the first officer; mr. lightoller, the second officer; and mr. moody, the sixth officer, all knew on the sunday evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be expected; and this being so, it seems to me to be of little importance to consider whether the master had by design or otherwise succeeded in avoiding the particular ice indicated in the three messages received by him. speed of the ship. the entire passage had been made at high speed, though not at the ship's maximum, and this speed was never reduced until the collision was unavoidable. at 10 p. m. the ship was registering 45 knots every two hours by the cherub log. the quartermaster on watch aft when the _titanic_ struck states that the log, reset at noon, then registered 260 knots, and the fourth officer, when working up the position from 7.30 p. m. to the time of the collision, states he estimated the _titanic's_ speed as 22 knots, and this is also borne out by evidence that the engines were running continuously at 75 revolutions. the weather conditions. from 6 p. m. onward to the time of the collision the weather was perfectly clear and fine. there was no moon, the stars were out, and there was not a cloud in the sky. there was, however, a drop in temperature of 10° in slightly less than two hours, and by about 7.30 p. m. the temperature was 33° f., and it eventually fell to 32° f. that this was not necessarily an indication of ice is borne out by the sailing directions. the nova scotia (s. e. coast) and bay of fundy pilot (sixth edition, 1911, p. 16) says: no reliance can be placed on any warning being conveyed to a mariner by a fall of temperature, either of the air or sea, on approaching ice. some decrease in temperature has occasionally been recorded, but more often none has been observed. sir ernest shackleton was, however, of opinion that- if there was no wind and the temperature fell abnormally for the time of the year, i would consider that i was approaching an area which might have ice in it. action that should have been taken. the question is what ought the master to have done. i am advised that with the knowledge of the proximity of ice which the master had, two courses were open to him: the one was to stand well to the southward instead of turning up to a westerly course; the other was to reduce speed materially as night approached. he did neither. the alteration of the course at 5.50 p. m. was so insignificant that it can not be attributed to any intention to avoid ice. this deviation brought the vessel back to within about 2 miles of the customary route before 11.30 p. m. and there was certainly no reduction of speed. why, then, did the master persevere in his course and maintain his speed? the answer is to be found in the evidence. it was shown that for many years past, indeed, for a quarter of a century or more, the practice of liners using this track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp lookout to enable them to avoid the danger. this practice, it was said, had been justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it. i accept the evidence as to the practice and as to the immunity from casualties which is said to have accompanied it. but the event has proved the practice to be bad. its root is probably to be bound in competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the judgment of navigators. but unfortunately experience appeared to justify it. in these circumstances i am not able to blame capt. smith. he had not the experience which his own misfortune has afforded to those whom he has left behind, and he was doing only that which other skilled men would have done in the same position. it was suggested at the bar that he was yielding to influences which ought not to have affected him; that the presence of mr. ismay on board and the knowledge which he perhaps had of a conversation between mr. ismay and the chief engineer at queenstown about the speed of the ship and the consumption of coal probably induced him to neglect precautions which he would otherwise have taken. but i do not believe this. the evidence shows that he was not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick passage. he was not trying to please anybody, but was exercising his own discretion in the way he thought best. he made a mistake, a very grievous mistake, but one in which, in face of the practice and of past experience, negligence can not be said to have had any part; and in the absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix capt. smith with blame. it is, however, to be hoped that the last has been heard of the practice and that for the future it will be abandoned for what we now know to be more prudent and wiser measures. what was a mistake in the case of the _titanic_ would without doubt be negligence in any similar case in the future. the collision. mr. lightoller turned over the ship to mr. murdoch, the first officer, at 10 o'clock, telling him that the ship was within the region where ice had been reported. he also told him of the message he had sent to the crow's nest, and of his conversation with the master, and of the latter's orders. the ship appears to have run on, on the same course, until, at a little before 11.40, one of the lookouts in the crow's nest struck three blows on the gong, which was the accepted warning for something ahead, following this immediately afterward by a telephone message to the bridge "iceberg right ahead." almost simultaneously with the three-gong signal mr. murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order "hard-a-starboard," and immediately telegraphed down to the engine room "stop. full speed astern." the helm was already "hard over," and the ship's head had fallen off about two points to port, when she collided with an iceberg well forward on her starboard side. mr. murdoch at the same time pulled the lever over which closed the water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms. the master "rushed out" onto the bridge and asked mr. murdoch what the ship had struck. mr. murdoch replied: an iceberg, sir. i hard-a-starboarded and reversed the engines, and i was going to hard-a-port round it, but she was too close. i could not do any more. i have closed the water-tight doors. from the evidence given it appears that the _titanic_ had turned about two points to port before the collision occurred. from various experiments subsequently made with the steamship _olympic_, a sister ship to the _titanic_, it was found that traveling at the same rate as the _titanic_, about 37 seconds would be required for the ship to change her course to this extent after the helm had been put hard-a-starboard. in this time the ship would travel about 466 yards, and allowing for the few seconds that would be necessary for the order to be given, it may be assumed that 500 yards was about the distance at which the iceberg was sighted either from the bridge or crow's nest. that it was quite possible on this night, even with a sharp lookout at the stemhead, crow's nest, and on the bridge, not to see an iceberg at this distance is shown by the evidence of capt. rostron, of the _carpathia_. the injuries to the ship, which are described in the next section, were of such a kind that she foundered in 2 hours and 40 minutes. iii.--description of the damage to the ship and of its gradual and final effect, with observations thereon. the damage done to the ship was as follows: extent of the damage. the collision with the iceberg, which took place at 11.40 p. m., caused damage to the bottom of the starboard side of the vessel at about 10 feet above the level of the keel, but there was no damage above this height. there was damage in-the forepeak, no. 1 hold, no. 2 hold, no. 3 hold, no. 6 boiler room, no. 5 boiler room. the damage extended over a length of about 300 feet. time in which the damage was done. as the ship was moving at over 20 knots, she would have passed through 300 feet in less than 10 seconds, so that the damage was done in about this time. the flooding in first ten minutes. at first it is desirable to consider what happened in the first 10 minutes. the forepeak was not flooded above the orlop deck--i.e., the peak tank top, from the hole in the bottom of the peak tank. in no. 1 hold there was 7 feet of water. in no. 2 hold five minutes after the collision water was seen rushing in at the bottom of the firemen's passage on the starboard side, so that the ship's side was damaged abaft of bulkhead b sufficiently to open the side of the firemen's passage, which was 3-1/2 feet from the outer skin of the ship, thereby flooding both the hold and the passage. in no. 3 hold the mail room was filled soon after the collision. the floor of the mail room is 24 feet above the keel. in no. 6 boiler room, when the collision took place, water at once poured in at about 2 feet above the stokehold plates, on the starboard side, at the after end of the boiler room. some of the firemen immediately went through the water-tight door opening to no. 5 boiler room because the water was flooding the place. the water-tight doors in the engine rooms were shut from the bridge almost immediately after the collision. ten minutes later it was found that there was water to the height of 8 feet above the double bottom in no. 6 boiler room. no. 5 boiler room was damaged at the ship's side in the starboard forward bunker at a distance of 2 feet above the stokehold plates, at 2 feet from the water-tight bulkhead between nos. 5 and 6 boiler rooms. water poured in at that place as it would from an ordinary fire hose. at the time of the collision this bunker had no coal in it. the bunker door was closed when water was seen to be entering the ship. in no. 4 boiler room there was no indication of any damage at the early stages of the sinking. gradual effect of the damage. it will thus be seen that all the six compartments forward of no. 4 boiler room were open to the sea by damage which existed at about 10 feet above the keel. at 10 minutes after the collision the water seems to have risen to about 14 feet above the keel in all these compartments except no. 5 boiler room. after the first ten minutes the water rose steadily in all these six compartments. the forepeak above the peak tank was not filled until an hour after the collision, when the vessel's bow was submerged to above c deck. the water then flowed in from the top through the deck scuttle forward of the collision bulkhead. it was by this scuttle that access was obtained to all the decks below c down to the peak tank top on the orlop deck. at 12 o'clock water was coming up in no. 1 hatch. it was getting into the firemen's quarters and driving the firemen out. it was rushing round no. 1 hatch on g deck and coming mostly from the starboard side, so that in 20 minutes the water had risen above g deck in no. 1 hold. in no. 2 hold about 40 minutes after the collision the water was coming in to the seamen's quarters on e deck through a burst fore and aft wooden bulkhead of a third-class cabin opposite the seamen's wash place. thus, the water had risen in no. 2 hold to about 3 feet above e deck in 40 minutes. in no. 3 hold the mail room was afloat about 20 minutes after the collision. the bottom of the mail room which is on the orlop deck, is 24 feet above the keel. the water-tight doors on f deck at the fore and after ends of no. 3 compartment were not closed then. the mail room was filling and water was within 2 feet of g deck, rising fast when the order was given to clear the boats. there was then no water on f deck. there is a stairway on the port side on g deck which leads down to the first-class baggage room on the orlop deck immediately below. there was water in this baggage room 25 minutes after the collision. half an hour after the collision water was up to g deck in the mail room. thus the water had risen in this compartment to within 2 feet of g deck in 20 minutes, and above g deck in 25 to 30 minutes. no. 6 boiler room was abandoned by the men almost immediately after the collision. ten minutes later the water had risen to 8 feet above the top of the double bottom, and probably reached the top of the bulkhead at the after end of the compartment, at the level of e deck, in about one hour after the collision. in no. 5 boiler room there was no water above the stokehold plates, until a rush of water came through the pass between the boilers from the forward end, and drove the leading stoker out. it has already been shown in the description of what happened in the first 10 minutes, that water was coming into no. 5 boiler room in the forward starboard bunker at 2 feet above the plates in a stream about the size of a deck hose. the door in this bunker had been dropped probably when water was first discovered, which was a few minutes after the collision. this would cause the water to be retained in the bunker until it rose high enough to burst the door which was weaker than the bunker bulkhead. this happened about an hour after the collision. _no. 4 boiler room._--one hour and 40 minutes after the collision water was coming in forward, in no. 4 boiler room, from underneath the floor in the forward part, in small quantities. the men remained in that stokehold till ordered on deck. _nos. 3, 2, and 1 boiler rooms._--when the men left no. 4 some of them went through nos. 3, 2, and 1 boiler rooms into the reciprocating engine room, and from there on deck. there was no water in the boiler rooms abaft no. 4 one hour 40 minutes after the collision (1.20 a. m.), and there was then none in the reciprocating and turbine engine rooms. _electrical engine room and tunnels._--there was no damage to these compartments. from the foregoing it follows that there was no damage abaft no. 4 boiler room. all the water-tight doors aft of the main engine room were opened after the collision. half an hour after the collision the water-tight doors from the engine room to the stokehold were opened as far forward as they could be to no. 4 boiler room. final effect of the damage. the later stages of the sinking can not be stated with any precision, owing to a confusion of the times which was natural under the circumstances. the forecastle deck was not under water at 1.35 a. m. distress signals were fired until two hours after the collision (1.45 a. m.). at this time the fore deck was under water. the forecastle head was not then submerged though it was getting close down to the water, about half an hour before she disappeared (1.50 a. m.). when the last boat, lowered from davits (d), left the ship, a deck was under water, and water came up the stairway under the boat deck almost immediately afterwards. after this the other port collapsible (b), which had been stowed on the officers' house, was uncovered, the lashings cut adrift, and she was swung round over the edge of the coamings of the deckhouse on to the boat deck. very shortly afterwards the vessel, according to mr. lightoller's account, seemed to take a dive, and he just walked into the water. when he came to the surface all the funnels were above the water. her stern was gradually rising out of the water, and the propellers were clear of the water. the ship did not break in two, and she did, eventually, attain the perpendicular, when the second funnel from aft about reached the water. there were no lights burning then, though they kept alight practically until the last. before reaching the perpendicular, when at an angle of 50° or 60°, there was a rumbling sound which may be attributed to the boilers leaving their beds and crashing down on to or through the bulkheads. she became more perpendicular and finally absolutely perpendicular, when she went slowly down. after sinking as far as the after part of the boat deck she went down more quickly. the ship disappeared at 2.20 a. m. observations. i am advised that the _titanic_ as constructed could not have remained afloat long with such damage as she received. her bulkheads were spaced to enable her to remain afloat with any two compartments in communication with the sea. she had a sufficient margin of safety with any two of the compartments flooded which were actually damaged. in fact, any three of the four forward compartments could have been flooded by the damage received without sinking the ship to the top of her bulkheads. even if the four forward compartments had been flooded the water would not have got into any of the compartments abaft of them though it would have been above the top of some of the forward bulkheads. but the ship, even with these four compartments flooded, would have remained afloat. but she could not remain afloat with the four compartments and the forward boiler room (no. 6) also flooded. the flooding of these five compartments alone would have sunk the ship sufficiently deep to have caused the water to rise above the bulkhead at the after end of the forward boiler room (no. 6) and to flow over into the next boiler room (no. 5), and to fill it up until in turn its after bulkhead would be overwhelmed and the water would thereby flow over and fill no. 4 boiler room, and so on in succession to the other boiler rooms till the ship would ultimately fill and sink. it has been shown that water came into the five forward compartments to a height of about 14 feet above the keel in the first 10 minutes. this was at a rate of inflow with which the ship's pumps could not possibly have coped, so that the damage done to these five compartments alone inevitably sealed the doom of the ship. the damage done in the boiler rooms nos. 4 and 5 was too slight to have hastened appreciably the sinking of the ship, for it was given in evidence that no considerable amount of water was in either of these compartments for an hour after the collision. the rate at which water came into no. 6 boiler room makes it highly probable that the compartment was filled in not more than an hour, after which the flow over the top of the bulkhead between 5 and 6 began and continued till no. 5 was filled. it was shown that the leak in no. 5 boiler room was only about equal to the flow of a deck hose pipe about 3 inches in diameter. the leak in no. 4, supposing that there was one, was only enough to admit about 3 feet of water in that compartment in 1 hour 40 minutes. hence the leaks in nos. 4 and 5 boiler rooms did not appreciably hasten the sinking of the vessel. the evidence is very doubtful as to no. 4 being damaged. the pumps were being worked in no. 5 soon after the collision. the 10-inch leather special suction pipe which was carried from aft is more likely to have been carried for use in no. 5 than no. 4 because the doors were ordered to be opened probably soon after the collision when water was known to be coming into no. 5. there is no evidence that the pumps were being worked in no 4. the only evidence possibly favorable to the view that the pipe was required for no 4, and not for no. 5, is that scott, a greaser, says that he saw engineers dragging the suction pipe along one hour after the collision. but even as late as this it may have been wanted for no. 5 only. the importance of the question of the damage to no. 5 is small because the ship as actually constructed was doomed as soon as the water in no. 6 boiler room and all compartments forward of it entered in the quantities it actually did. it is only of importance in dealing with the question of what would have happened to the ship had she been more completely subdivided. it was stated in evidence that if no. 4 had not been damaged or had only been damaged to an extent within the powers of the pumps to keep under, then, if the bulkheads had been carried to c deck, the ship might have been saved. further methods of increased subdivision and their effect upon the fate of the ship are discussed later. evidence was given showing that after the water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms had been all closed, except those forward of no. 4 group of boilers, they were opened again, and there is no evidence to show that they were again closed. though it is probable that the engineers who remained below would have closed these doors as the water rose in the compartments, yet it was not necessary for them to do this, as each door had an automatic closing arrangement which would have come into operation immediately a small amount of water came through the door. it is probable, however, that the life of the ship would have been lengthened somewhat if these doors had been left open, for the water would have flowed through them to the after part of the ship, and the rate of flow of the water into the ship would have been for a time reduced as the bow might have been kept up a little by the water which flowed aft. it is thus seen that the efficiency of the automatic arrangements for the closing of the water-tight doors, which was questioned during the inquiry, had no important bearing on the question of hastening the sinking of the ship, except that, in the case of the doors not having been closed by the engineers, it might have retarded the sinking of the ship if they had not acted. the engineers would not have prevented the doors from closing unless they had been convinced that the ship was doomed. there is no evidence that they did prevent the doors from closing. the engineers were applying the pumps when barrett, leading stoker, left no. 5 boiler room, but even if they had succeeded in getting all the pumps in the ship to work they could not have saved the ship or prolonged her life to any appreciable extent. effect of suggested additional subdivision upon floatation. _water-tight decks._--it is in evidence that advantage might be obtained from the point of view of greater safety in having a water-tight deck. without entering into the general question of the advantage of water-tight decks for all ships, it is desirable to form an opinion in the case of the _titanic_ as to whether making the bulkhead deck water-tight would have been an advantage in the circumstances of the accident, or in case of accident to ships of this class. i am advised that it is found that with all the compartments certainly known to have been flooded, viz., those forward of no. 4 boiler room, the ship would have remained afloat if the bulkhead deck had been a water-tight deck. if, however, no. 4 boiler room had also been flooded the ship would not have remained afloat unless, in addition to making the bulkhead deck water-tight, the transverse bulkhead abaft of no. 4 boiler room had been carried up to d deck. to make the bulkhead deck effectively water-tight for this purpose it would have been necessary to carry water-tight trunks round all the openings in the bulkhead deck up to c deck. it has been shown that with the bulkhead abaft no. 5 boiler room carried to c deck the ship would have remained afloat if the compartments certainly known to have been damaged had been flooded. i do not desire to express an opinion upon the question whether it would have conduced to safety in the case of the _titanic_ if a water-tight deck had been fitted below the water line, as there may be some objections to such a deck. there are many considerations involved, and i think that the matter should be dealt with by the bulkhead committee for ships in general. _longitudinal subdivision._--the advantages and disadvantages of longitudinal subdivision by means of water-tight bunker bulkheads were pointed out in evidence. while not attempting to deal with this question generally for ships, i am advised that if the _titanic_ had been divided in the longitudinal method, instead of in the transverse method only, she would have been able, if damaged as supposed, to remain afloat, though with a list which could have been corrected by putting water ballast into suitable places. this subject is one, however, which again involves many considerations, and i think that for ships generally the matter should be referred to the bulkhead committee for their consideration and report. _extending double bottom up the sides._--it was shown in evidence that there would be increased protection in carrying the double bottom higher up the side than was done in the _titanic_, and that some of the boiler rooms would probably not then have been flooded, as water could not have entered the ship except in the double bottom. in the case of the _titanic_ i am advised that this would have been an advantage, but it was pointed out in evidence that there are certain disadvantages which in some ships may outweigh the advantages. in view of what has already been said about the possible advantages of longitudinal subdivision, it is unnecessary further to discuss the question of carrying up the double bottom in ships generally. this matter should also be dealt with by the bulkhead committee. _water-tight doors._--with reference to the question of the water-tight doors of the ship, there does not appear to have been any appreciable effect upon the sinking of the ship caused by either shutting or not shutting the doors. there does not appear to have been any difficulty in working the water-tight doors. they appear to have been shut in good time after the collision. but in other cases of damage in ships constructed like the _titanic_, it is probable that the efficiency of the closing arrangement of the water-tight doors may exert a vital influence on the safety of the ship. it has been represented that in future consideration should be given to the question- as to how far bulkhead should be solid bulkheads, and how far there should be water-tight doors, and, if there should be water-tight doors, how far they may or may not be automatically operated. this again is a question on which it is not necessary here to express any general opinion, for there are conflicting considerations which vary in individual cases. the matter, however, should come under the effective supervision of the board of trade much more than it seems to come at present, and should be referred to the bulkhead committee for their consideration with a view to their suggesting in detail where doors should or should not be allowed, and the type of door which should be adopted in the different parts of ships. [illustration: s.s. "titanic." note.--the vertical letters signify the different decks. the horizontal letters signify the water-tight bulkheads. the heavy line shows the top of the water-tight bulkheads. the crosshatched compartments are those opened to the sea at the time of the collision with the iceberg.] iv.--account of the saving and rescue of those who survived. the boats. the _titanic_ was provided with 20 boats. they were all on the boat deck. fourteen were life boats. these were hung inboard in davits, 7 on the starboard side and 7 on the port side, and were designed to carry 65 persons each. two were emergency boats. these were also in davits, but were hung outboard, one on the starboard side and one on the port side, and were designed to carry 40 persons each. the remaining 4 boats were engelhardt or collapsible boats. two of these were stowed on the boat deck and 2 on the roof of the officers' quarters, and were designed to carry 47 persons each. thus the total boat accommodation was for 1,178 persons. the boats in davits were numbered, the odd numbers being on the starboard side and the even numbers on the port side. the numbering began with the emergency boats, which were forward, and ran aft. thus the boats on the starboard side were numbered 1 (an emergency boat), 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 (lifeboats), and those on the port side 2 (an emergency boat), 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 (lifeboats). the collapsible boats were lettered, a and b being on the roof of the officers' quarters and c and d being on the boat deck; c was abreast of no. 1 (emergency boat) and d abreast of no. 2 (emergency boat). further particulars as to the boats will be found on page 18. in ordinary circumstances all these boats (with the exception of 1 and 2) were kept covered up, and contained only a portion of their equipment, such as oars, masts, and sails, and water; some of the remaining portion, such as lamps, compasses, and biscuits being stowed in the ship in some convenient place, ready for use when required. much examination was directed at the hearing to showing that some boats left the ship without a lamp and others without a compass, and so on, but in the circumstances of confusion and excitement which existed at the time of the disaster this seems to me to be excusable. each member of the crew had a boat assigned to him in printed lists, which were posted up in convenient places for the men to see; but it appeared that in some cases the men had not looked at these lists and did not know their respective boats. there had been no proper boat drill nor a boat muster. it was explained that great difficulty frequently exists in getting firemen to take part in a boat drill. they regard it as no part of their work. there seem to be no statutory requirements as to boat drills or musters, although there is a provision (sec. 9 of the merchant shipping act of 1906) that when a boat drill does take place the master of the vessel is, under a penalty, to record the fact in his log. i think it is desirable that the board of trade should make rules requiring boat drills and boat musters to be held of such a kind and at such times as may be suitable to the ship and to the voyage on which she is engaged. boat drill, regulated according to the opportunities of the service, should always be held. it is perhaps worth recording that there was an inspection of the boats themselves at southampton by mr. clarke, the emigration officer, and that, as a result, mr. clarke gave his certificate that the boats were satisfactory. for the purpose of this inspection two of the boats were lowered to the water and crews exercised in them. the collision took place at 11.40 p. m. (ship's time). about midnight it was realized that the vessel could not live, and at about 12.05 the order was given to uncover the 14 boats under davits. the work began on both sides of the ship under the superintendence of five officers. it did not proceed quickly at first; the crew arrived on the boat deck only gradually, and there was an average of not more than three deck hands to each boat. at 12.20 the order was given to swing out the boats, and this work was at once commenced. there were a few passengers on the deck at this time. mr. lightoller, who was one of the officers directing operations, says that the noise of the steam blowing off was so great that his voice could not be heard, and that he had to give directions with his hands. before this work had been begun, the stewards were rousing the passengers in their different quarters, helping them to put on life-belts and getting them up to the boat deck. at about 12.30 the order was given to place women and children in the boats. this was proceeded with at once and at about 12.45 mr. murdoch gave the order to lower no. 7 boat (on the starboard side) to the water. the work of uncovering, filling, and lowering the boats was done under the following supervision: mr. lowe, the fifth officer, saw to nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7; mr. murdoch (lost) saw also to 1 and 7 and to a and c. mr. moody (lost) looked after nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15. mr. murdoch also saw to 9 and 11. mr. lightoller saw to nos. 4, 6, 8, b, and d. mr. wilde (lost) also saw to 8 and d. mr. lightoller and mr. moody saw to 10 and 16 and mr. lowe to 12 and 14. mr. wilde also assisted at no. 14, mr. boxall helping generally. the evidence satisfies me that the officers did their work very well and without any thought of themselves. capt. smith, the master, mr. wilde, the chief officer, mr. murdoch, the first officer, and mr. moody, the sixth officer, all went down with the ship while performing their duties. the others, with the exception of mr. lightoller, took charge of boats and thus were saved. mr. lightoller was swept off the deck as the vessel went down and was subsequently picked up. so far as can be ascertained the boats left the ship at the following times, but i think it is necessary to say that these, and, indeed, all the times subsequent to the collision which are mentioned by the witnesses, are unreliable. -------------------------------------- | no. | starboard | no. | port side.| | | side. | | | -------------------|------------------| | | _a. m._ | | _a. m._ | | 7 | 12.46 | 6 | 12.55 | | 5 | 12.55 | 8 | 1.10 | | 3 | 1.0 | 10 | 1.20 | | 1 | 1.10 | 12 | 1.25 | | 9 | 1.20 | 14 | 1.30 | | 11 | 1.25 | 16 | 1.35 | | 13 | 1.35 | 2 | 1.45 | | 15 | 1.35 | 4 | 1.56 | | c | 1.40 | d | 2.05 | |[1]a | |[3]b | | --------------------------------------as regards the collapsible boats, c and d were properly lowered; as to a and b, which were on the roof of the officers' house, they were left until the last. there was difficulty in getting these boats down to the deck, and the ship had at this time a list. very few of the deck hands were left in the ship, as they had nearly all gone to man the lifeboats, and the stewards and firemen were unaccustomed to work the collapsible boats. work appears to have been going on in connection with these two boats at the time that the ship sank. the boats seem to have floated from the deck and to have served in the water as rafts. the following table shows the numbers of the male crew, male passengers, and women and children who, according to the evidence, left the ship in each boat. in three or four instances the numbers of women and children are only arrived at by subtracting the numbers of crew and male passengers from the total said to be in the boat (these are in italics). in each case the lowest figures given are taken: key a: starboard side boat. no. b: men of crew. c: men passengers. d: women and children. e: total. f: port side boat no. g: men of crew. h: men passengers. i: women and children. j: total +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+ | a | b | c | d | e || f | g | h | i | j | +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+ | 7 | 3 | 4 | _20_ | 27 || 6 | 2 | 2 | _24_ | 28 | | 5 | 5 | 6 | 30 | 41 || 8 | 4 | | 35 | 39 | | 3 | 15 | 10 | _25_ | 50 || 10 | 5 | | 50 | 55 | | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 12 || 2 | 4 | 1 | 21 | 26 | | 9 | 8 | 6 | 42 | 56 || 12 | 2 | | 40 | 42 | | 11 | 9 | 1 | 60 | 70 || 14 | 8 | | 53 | 63 | | 13 | 5 | | 59 | 64 || 16 | 6 | | 50 | 56 | | 15 | 13 | 4 | _53_ | 70 || 4 | 4 | | 36 | 40 | | c | 5 | 2 | 64 | 71 || d | 2 | 2 | 40 | 44 | | a[1] | | | | || b[1] | | | | | +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+ |total | 70 | 36 | 355 |461 || |37 | 7 | 349 |393 | +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+ general total: men of crew 107 men passengers 43 women and children 704 this shows in all 107 men of the crew, 43 male passengers, and 704 women and children, or a total of 854 in 18 boats. in addition, about 60 persons, two of whom were women, were said to have been transferred, subsequently, from a and b collapsible boats to other boats, or rescued from the water, making a total of 914 who escaped with their lives. it is obvious that these figures are quite unreliable, for only 712 were in fact saved by the _carpathia_, the steamer which came to the rescue at about 4 a. m., and all the boats were accounted for. another remarkable discrepancy is that, of the 712 saved, 189 were in fact men of the crew, 129 were male passengers, and 394 were women and children. in other words, the real proportion of women to men saved was much less than the proportion appearing in the evidence from the boats. allowing for those subsequently picked up, of the 712 persons saved only 652 could have left the _titanic_ in boats, or an average of about 36 per boat. there was a tendency in the evidence to exaggerate the numbers in each boat, to exaggerate the proportion of women to men, and to diminish the number of crew. i do not attribute this to any wish on the part of the witnesses to mislead the court, but to a natural desire to make the best case for themselves and their ship. the seamen who gave evidence were too frequently encouraged when under examination in the witness box to understate the number of crew in the boats. the number of crew actually saved was 189, giving an average of 10 per boat, and if from this figure the 58 men of the 60 persons above mentioned be deducted the average number of crew leaving the ship in the boats must still have been at least 7. the probability, however, is that many of the 60 picked up were passengers. the discipline both among passengers and crew during the lowering of the boats was good, but the organization should have been better, and if it had been it is possible that more lives would have been saved. the real difficulty in dealing with the question of the boats is to find the explanation of so many of them leaving the ship with comparatively few persons in them. no. 1 certainly left with only 12; this was an emergency boat with a carrying capacity of 40. no. 7 left with only 27, and no. 6 with only 28; these were lifeboats with a carrying capacity of 65 each; and several of the others, according to the evidence, and certainly according to the truth, must have left only partly filled. many explanations are forthcoming, one being that the passengers were unwilling to leave the ship. when the earlier boats left, and before the _titanic_ had begun materially to settle down, there was a drop of 65 feet from the boat deck to the water, and the women feared to get into the boats. many people thought that the risk in the ship was less than the risk in the boats. this explanation is supported by the evidence of capt. rostron, of the _carpathia_. he says that after those who were saved got on board his ship he was told by some of them that when the boats first left the _titanic_ the people "really would not be put in the boats; they did not want to go in." there was a large body of evidence from the _titanic_ to the same effect, and i have no doubt that many people, particularly women, refused to leave the deck for the boats. at one time the master appears to have had the intention of putting the people into the boats from the gangway doors in the side of the ship. this was possibly with a view to allay the fears of the passengers, for from these doors the water could be reached by means of ladders, and the lowering of some of the earlier boats when only partly filled may be accounted for in this way. there is no doubt that the master did order some of the partly filled boats to row to a position under one of the doors with the object of taking in passengers at that point. it appears, however, that these doors were never opened. another explanation is that some women refused to leave their husbands. it is said further that the officers engaged in putting the people into the boats feared that the boats might buckle if they were filled; but this proved to be an unfounded apprehension, for one or more boats were completely filled and then successfully lowered to the water. at 12.35 the message from the _carpathia_ was received announcing that she was making for the _titanic_. this probably became known and may have tended to make the passengers still more unwilling to leave the ship, and the lights of a ship (the _californian_) which were seen by many people may have encouraged the passengers to hope that assistance was at hand. these explanations are perhaps sufficient to account for so many of the lifeboats leaving without a full boat load; but i think, nevertheless, that if the boats had been kept a little longer before being lowered, or if the after gangway doors had been opened, more passengers might have been induced to enter the boats. and if women could not be induced to enter the boats, the boats ought then to have been filled up with men. it is difficult to account for so many of the lifeboats being sent from the sinking ship, in a smooth sea, far from full. these boats left behind them many hundreds of lives to perish. i do not, however, desire these observations to be read as casting any reflection on the officers of the ship or on the crew who were working on the boat deck. they all worked admirably, but i think that if there had been better organization the results would have been more satisfactory. i heard much evidence as to the conduct of the boats after the _titanic_ sank and when there must have been many struggling people in the water, and i regret to say that in my opinion some, at all events, of the boats failed to attempt to save lives when they might have done so, and might have done so successfully. this was particularly the case with boat no. 1. it may reasonably have been thought that the risk of making the attempt was too great; but it seems to me that if the attempt had been made by some of these boats it might have been the means of saving a few more lives. subject to these few adverse comments, i have nothing but praise for both passengers and crew. all the witnesses speak well of their behavior. it is to be remembered that the night was dark, the noise of the escaping steam was terrifying, the peril, though perhaps not generally recognized, was imminent and great, and many passengers who were unable to speak or to understand english were being collected together and hurried into the boats. conduct of sir c. duff gordon and mr. ismay. an attack was made in the course of the inquiry on the moral conduct of two of the passengers, namely, sir cosmo duff gordon and mr. bruce ismay. it is no part of the business of the court to inquire into such matters, and i should pass them by in silence if i did not fear that my silence might be misunderstood. the very gross charge against sir cosmo duff gordon that, having got into no. 1 boat, he bribed the men in it to row away from drowning people is unfounded. i have said that the members of the crew in that boat might have made some attempt to save the people in the water, and that such an attempt would probably have been successful; but i do not believe that the men were deterred from making the attempt by any act of sir cosmo duff gordon's. at the same time i think that if he had encouraged the men to return to the position where the _titanic_ had foundered they would probably have made an effort to do so and could have saved some lives. as to the attack on mr. bruce ismay, it resolved itself into the suggestion that, occupying the position of managing director of the steamship company, some moral duty was imposed upon him to wait on board until the vessel foundered. i do not agree. mr. ismay, after rendering assistance to many passengers, found c collapsible, the last boat on the starboard side, actually being lowered. no other people were there at the time. there was room for him and he jumped in. had he not jumped in he would merely have added one more life, namely, his own, to the number of those lost. the third-class passengers. it had been suggested before the inquiry that the third-class passengers had been unfairly treated; that their access to the boat deck had been impeded, and that when at last they reached that deck the first and second class passengers were given precedence in getting places in the boats. there appears to have been no truth in these suggestions. it is no doubt true that the proportion of third-class passengers saved falls far short of the proportion of the first and second class, but this is accounted for by the greater reluctance of the third-class passengers to leave the ship, by their unwillingness to part with their baggage, by the difficulty of getting them up from their quarters, which were at the extreme ends of the ship, and by other similar causes. the interests of the relatives of some of the third-class passengers who had perished were in the hands of mr. harbinson, who attended the inquiry on their behalf. he said at the end of his address to the court: i wish to say distinctly that no evidence has been given in the course of this case which would substantiate a charge that any attempt was made to keep back the third-class passengers. * * * i desire further to say that there is no evidence that when they did reach the boat deck there was any discrimination practiced either by the officers or the sailors in putting them into the boats. i am satisfied that the explanation of the excessive proportion of third-class passengers lost is not to be found in the suggestion that the third-class passengers were in any way unfairly treated. they were not unfairly treated. means taken to procure assistance. as soon as the dangerous condition of the ship was realized, messages were sent by the master's orders to all steamers within reach. at 12.15 a. m. the distress signal cqd was sent. this was heard by several steamships and by cape race. by 12.25 mr. boxall, the fourth officer, had worked out the correct position of the _titanic_, and then another message was sent: "come at once, we have struck a berg." this was heard by the cunard steamer _carpathia_, which was at this time bound from new york to liverpool and 58 miles away. the _carpathia_ answered, saying that she was coming to the assistance of the _titanic_. this was reported to capt. smith on the boat deck. at 12.26 a message was sent out, "sinking; can not hear for noise of steam." many other messages were also sent, but as they were only heard by steamers which were too far away to render help, it is not necessary to refer to them. at 1.45 a message was heard by the _carpathia_, "engine-room full up to boilers." the last message sent out was "cq" which was faintly heard by the steamer _virginian_. this message was sent at 2.17. it thus appears that the marconi apparatus was at work until within a few minutes of the foundering of the _titanic_. meanwhile mr. boxall was sending up distress signals from the deck. these signals (rockets) were sent off at intervals from a socket by no. 1 emergency boat on the boat deck. they were the ordinary distress signals, exploding in the air and throwing off white stars. the firing of these signals began about the time that no. 7 boat was lowered (12.45 a. m.), and it continued until mr. boxall left the ship at about 1.45. mr. boxall was also using a morse light from the bridge in the direction of a ship whose lights he saw about half a point on the port bow of the _titanic_ at a distance, as he thought, of about 5 or 6 miles. he got no answer. in all, mr. boxall fired about eight rockets. there appears to be no doubt that the vessel whose lights he saw was the _californian_. the evidence from the _californian_ speaks of eight rockets having been seen between 12.30 and 1.40. the _californian_ heard none of the _titanic's_ messages; she had only one marconi operator on board and he was asleep. the rescue by the steamship "carpathia." on the 15th of april the steamship _carpathia_, 13,600 tons gross, of the cunard line, mr. arthur henry rostron, master, was on her passage to liverpool from new york. she carried some 740 passengers and 325 crew. on receipt of the _titanic_'s first distress message the captain immediately ordered the ship to be turned around and driven at her highest speed (17-1/2 knots) in the direction of the _titanic_. he also informed the _titanic_ by wireless that he was coming to her assistance, and he subsequently received various messages from her. at about 2.40 a. m. he saw a green flare which, as the evidence shows, was being sent up by mr. boxall in no. 2 boat. from this time until 4 a. m. capt. rostron was altering his course continually in order to avoid icebergs. he fired rockets in answer to the signals he saw from boxall's boat. at 4 o'clock he considered he was practically up to the position given and he stopped his ship at 4.05. he sighted the first boat (no. 2) and picked her up at 4.10. there was then a large number of icebergs around him, and it was just daylight. eventually he picked up in all 13 lifeboats, two emergency boats, and two collapsible boats, all of which were taken on board the _carpathia_, the other boats being abandoned as damaged or useless. from these boats he took on board 712 persons, one of whom died shortly afterwards. the boats were scattered over an area of 4 or 5 miles, and it was 8 a. m. before they had all been picked up. he saw very little wreckage when he got near to the scene of the disaster, only a few deck chairs, cork life belts, etc., and only one body. the position was then 41° 46´ n., 50° 14´ w. the _carpathia_ subsequently returned to new york with the passengers and crew she had rescued. the court desires to record its great admiration of capt. rostron's conduct. he did the very best that could be done. numbers saved. the following were the numbers saved: first class: adult males 57 out of 175, or 32.57 per cent. adult females 140 out of 144, or 97.22 per cent. male children (all saved) 5 female children (all saved) 1 ---- 203 out of 325, or 62.46 per cent. second class: adult males 14 out of 168, or 8.33 per cent. adult females 80 out of 93, or 86.02 per cent. male children (all saved) 11 female children (all saved) 13 ---- 118 out of 285, or 41.40 per cent. third class: adult males 75 out of 462, or 16.23 per cent. adult females 76 out of 165, or 46.06 per cent. male children 13 out of 48, or 27.08 per cent. female children 14 out of 31, or 45.16 per cent. ---- 178 out of 706, or 25.21 per cent. total 499 out of 1,316, or 37.94 per cent. crew saved: deck department 43 out of 66, or 65.15 per cent. engine-room department 72 out of 325, or 22.15 per cent. victualing department (including 20 women out of 23) 97 out of 494, or 19.63 per cent. --- total 212 out of 885, or 23.95 per cent. total on board saved 711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent. passengers and crew: adult males 338 out of 1,667, or 20.27 per cent. adult females 316 out of 425, or 74.35 per cent. children 57 out of 109, or 52.29 per cent. --- total 711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent. v.--the circumstances in connection with the steamship "californian." it is here necessary to consider the circumstances relating to the steamship _californian_. on the 14th of april the steamship _californian_, of the leyland line, mr. stanley lord, master, was on her passage from london, which port she left on april 5, to boston, united states, where she subsequently arrived on april 19. she was a vessel of 6,223 tons gross and 4,038 net. her full speed was 12-1/2 to 13 knots. she had a passenger certificate, but was not carrying any passengers at the time. she belonged to the international mercantile marine co., the owners of the _titanic_. at 7.30 p.m., ship's time, on april 14, a wireless message was sent from this ship to the _antillian_: * * * * * to captain, _antillian_: six thirty p.m., apparent ship's time, latitude 42° 3´ n., longitude 49° 9´ w. three large bergs, 5 miles to southward of us. regards. lord. * * * * * the message was intercepted by the _titanic_, and when the marconi operator (evans) of the _californian_ offered this ice report to the marconi operator of the _titanic_, shortly after 7.30 p. m., the latter replied: it is all right. i heard you sending it to the _antillian_, and i have got it. the _californian_ proceeded on her course s. 89° w. true until 10.20 p. m., ship's time, when she was obliged to stop and reverse engines because she was running into field ice, which stretched as far as could then be seen to the northward and southward. the master told the court that he made her position at that time to be 42° 5´ n., 57° 7´ w. this position is recorded in the log book, which was written up from the scrap log book by the chief officer. the scrap log is destroyed. it is a position about 19 miles n. by e. of the position of the _titanic_ when she foundered, and is said to have been fixed by dead reckoning and verified by observations. i am satisfied that this position is not accurate. the master "twisted her head" to e. n. e. by the compass and she remained approximately stationary until 5.15 a. m. on the following morning. the ship was slowly swinging around to starboard during the night. at about 11 p. m. a steamer's light was seen approaching from the eastward. the master went to evans's room and asked what ships he had. the latter replied: "i think the _titanic_ is near us. i have got her." the master said: "you had better advise the _titanic_ we are stopped and surrounded with ice." this evans did, calling up the _titanic_ and sending: "we are stopped and surrounded by ice." the _titanic_ replied: "keep out." the _titanic_ was in communication with cape race, which station was then sending messages to her. the reason why the _titanic_ answered "keep out" was that her marconi operator could not hear what cape race was saying, as from her proximity the message from the _californian_ was much stronger than any message being taken in by the _titanic_ from cape race, which was much farther off. evans heard the _titanic_ continuing to communicate with cape race up to the time he turned in at 11.30 p. m. the master of the _californian_ states that when observing the approaching steamer as she got nearer he saw more lights, a few deck lights, and also her green side light. he considered that at 11 o'clock she was approximately 6 or 7 miles away, and at some time between 11 and 11.30 he first saw her green light; she was then about 5 miles off. he noticed that about 11.30 she stopped. in his opinion this steamer was of about the same size as the _californian_--a medium-sized steamer, "something like ourselves." from the evidence of mr. groves, third officer of the _californian_, who was the officer of the first watch, it would appear that the master was not actually on the bridge when the steamer was sighted. mr. groves made out two masthead lights; the steamer was changing her bearing slowly as she got closer, and as she approached he went to the chart room and reported this to the master; he added, "she is evidently a passenger steamer." in fact, mr. groves never appears to have had any doubt on this subject. in answer to a question during his examination, "had she much light?" he said, "yes, a lot of light. there was absolutely no doubt of her being a passenger steamer, at least in my mind." gill, the assistant donkey man of the _californian_, who was on deck at midnight, said, referring to this steamer: "it could not have been anything but a passenger boat, she was too large." by the evidence of mr. groves, the master, in reply to his report, said: "call her up on the morse lamp, and see if you can get any answer." this he proceeded to do. the master came up and joined him on the bridge and remarked: "that does not look like a passenger steamer." mr. groves replied: "it is, sir. when she stopped her lights seemed to go out, and i suppose they have been put out for the night." mr. groves states that these lights went out at 11.40, and remembers that time because "one bell was struck to call the middle watch." the master did not join him on the bridge until shortly afterwards, and consequently after the steamer had stopped. in his examination mr. groves admitted that if this steamer's head was turning to port after she stopped, it might account for the diminution of lights, by many of them being shut out. her steaming lights were still visible and also her port side light. the captain only remained upon the bridge for a few minutes. in his evidence he stated that mr. groves had made no observations to him about the steamer's deck lights going out. mr. groves's morse signaling appears to have been ineffectual (although at one moment he thought he was being answered), and he gave it up. he remained on the bridge until relieved by mr. stone, the second officer, just after midnight. in turning the _californian_ over to him, he pointed out the steamer and said: "she has been stopped since 11.40; she is a passenger steamer. at about the moment she stopped she put her lights out." when mr. groves was in the witness box the following questions were put to him by me: speaking as an experienced seaman and knowing what you do know now, do you think that steamer that you know was throwing up rockets, and that you say was a passenger steamer, was the _titanic_?--do i think it? yes. from what i have heard subsequently? yes. most decidedly i do, but i do not put myself as being an experienced man. but that is your opinion as far as your experience goes?--yes, it is, my lord. mr. stone states that the master, who was also up (but apparently not on the bridge), pointed out the steamer to him with instructions to tell him if her bearings altered or if she got any closer; he also stated that mr. groves had called her up on the morse lamp and had received no reply. mr. stone had with him during the middle watch an apprentice named gibson, whose attention was first drawn to the steamer's lights at about 12.20 a. m. he could see a masthead light, her red light (with glasses), and a "glare of white lights on her afterdeck." he first thought her masthead light was flickering and next thought it was a morse light, "calling us up." he replied, but could not get into communication, and finally came to the conclusion that it was, as he had first supposed, the masthead light flickering. sometime after 12.30 a. m., gill, the donkey man, states that he saw two rockets fired from the ship which he had been observing, and about 1.10 a. m., mr. stone reported to the captain by voice pipe, that he had seen five white rockets from the direction of the steamer. he states that the master answered, "are they company's signals?" and that he replied, "i do not know, but they appear to me to be white rockets." the master told him to "go on morsing," and, when he received any information, to send the apprentice down to him with it. gibson states that mr. stone informed him that he had reported to the master, and that the master had said the steamer was to be called up by morse light. this witness thinks the time was 12.55; he at once proceeded again to call the steamer up by morse. he got no reply, but the vessel fired three more white rockets; these rockets were also seen by mr. stone. both mr. stone and the apprentice kept the steamer under observation, looking at her from time to time with their glasses. between 1 o'clock and 1.40 some conversation passed between them. mr. stone remarked to gibson: "look at her now, she looks very queer out of water, her lights look queer." he also is said by gibson to have remarked, "a ship is not going to fire rockets at sea for nothing;" and admits himself that he may possibly have used that expression. mr. stone states that he saw the last of the rockets fired at about 1.40, and after watching the steamer for some 20 minutes more he sent gibson down to the master. i told gibson to go down to the master, and be sure and wake him, and tell him that altogether we had seen eight of these white lights like white rockets in the direction of this other steamer; that this steamer was disappearing in the southwest, that we had called her up repeatedly on the morse lamp and received no information whatsoever. gibson states that he went down to the chart room and told the master; that the master asked him if all the rockets were white, and also asked him the time. gibson stated that at this time the master was awake. it was five minutes past two, and gibson returned to the bridge to mr. stone and reported. they both continued to keep the ship under observation until she disappeared. mr. stone describes this as "a gradual disappearing of all her lights, which would be perfectly natural with a ship steaming away from us." at about 2.40 a. m. mr. stone again called up the master by voice pipe and told him that the ship from which he had seen the rockets come had disappeared bearing sw. 1/2 w., the last he had seen of the light; and the master again asked him if he was certain there was no color in the lights. "i again assured him they were all white, just white rockets." there is considerable discrepancy between the evidence of mr. stone and that of the master. the latter states that he went to the voice pipe at about 1.15, but was told then of a white rocket (not five white rockets). moreover, between 1.30 and 4.30, when he was called by the chief officer (mr. stewart), he had no recollection of anything being reported to him at all, although he remembered gibson opening and closing the chart-room door. mr. stewart relieved mr. stone at 4 a. m. the latter told him he had seen a ship 4 or 5 miles off when he went on deck at 12 o'clock, and at 1 o'clock he had seen some white rockets, and that the moment the ship started firing them she started to steam away. just at this time (about 4 a. m.) a steamer came in sight with two white masthead lights and a few lights amidships. he asked mr. stone whether he thought this was the steamer which had fired rockets, and mr. stone said he did not think it was. at 4.30 he called the master and informed him that mr. stone had told him he had seen rockets in the middle watch. the master said, "yes, i know; he has been telling me." the master came at once on to the bridge, and apparently took the fresh steamer for the one which had fired rockets, and said, "she looks all right; she is not making any signals now." this mistake was not corrected. he, however, had the wireless operator called. at about 6 a. m. capt. lord heard from the _virginian_ that the "_titanic_ had struck a berg, passengers in boats, ship sinking;" and he at once started through the field ice at full speed for the position given. capt. lord stated that about 7.30 a. m. he passed the _mount temple_, stopped, and that she was in the vicinity of the position given him as where the _titanic_ had collided (lat. 41° 46´ n.; long. 50° 14´ w.). he saw no wreckage there, but did later on near the _carpathia_, which ship he closed soon afterwards, and he stated that the position where he subsequently left this wreckage was 41° 33´ n.; 50° 1´ w. it is said in the evidence of mr. stewart that the position of the _californian_ was verified by stellar observations at 7.30 p. m. on the sunday evening, and that he verified the captain's position given when the ship stopped (42° 5´ n.; 50° 7´ w.) as accurate on the next day. the position in which the wreckage was said to have been seen on the monday morning was verified by sights taken on that morning. all the officers are stated to have taken sights, and mr. stewart in his evidence remarks that they all agreed. if it is admitted that these positions were correct, then it follows that the _titanic_'s position as given by that ship when making the cqd. signal was approximately s. 16° w. (true), 19 miles from the _californian_; and further that the position in which the _californian_ was stopped during the night, was 30 miles away from where the wreckage was seen by her in the morning, or that the wreckage had drifted 11 miles in a little more than five hours. there are contradictions and inconsistencies in the story as told by the different witnesses. but the truth of the matter is plain. the _titanic_ collided with the berg at 11.40. the vessel seen by the _californian_ stopped at this time. the rockets sent up from the _titanic_ were distress signals. the _californian_ saw distress signals. the number sent up by the _titanic_ was about eight. the _californian_ saw eight. the time over which the rockets from the _titanic_ were sent up was from about 12.45 to 1.45 o'clock. it was about this time that the _californian_ saw the rockets. at 2.40 mr. stone called to the master that the ship from which he had seen the rockets had disappeared. at 2.20 a. m. the _titanic_ had foundered. it was suggested that the rockets seen by the _californian_ were from some other ship, not the _titanic_. but no other ship to fit this theory has ever been heard of. these circumstances convince me that the ship seen by the _californian_ was the _titanic_, and if so, according to capt. lord, the two vessels were about 5 miles apart at the time of the disaster. the evidence from the _titanic_ corroborates this estimate, but i am advised that the distance was probably greater, though not more than 8 to 10 miles. the ice by which the _californian_ was surrounded was loose ice extending for a distance of not more than 2 or 3 miles in the direction of the _titanic_. the night was clear and the sea was smooth. when she first saw the rockets, the _californian_ could have pushed through the ice to the open water without any serious risk and so have come to the assistance of the _titanic_. had she done so she might have saved many if not all of the lives that were lost. vi.--the board of trade's administration. the court was invited by the board of trade- "to report upon the rules and regulations made under the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of those acts, and of such rules and regulations so far as the consideration thereof is material to this casualty" (no. 26 of the questions submitted to the court by the board of trade). charges were made against the board of trade during the progress of the inquiry of a twofold kind. first, it was said that the board had been negligent in that they had failed to keep up to date their rules and regulations relating generally to the provision of life-saving appliances at sea, and, secondly, it was said that their officials had in the particular instance of the _titanic_ failed to exercise due care in the supervision of the vessel's plans and the inspection of the work done upon her. with reference to the first of these charges, it was reduced in the course of the inquiry to a charge of neglect to keep the board's scale for the provision of lifeboat accommodation up to date. the circumstances are these: in march, 1886, the board appointed a departmental committee, consisting of three of their principal officers, to inquire into the question of boats, rafts, and life-saving apparatus carried by sea-going merchant ships. in their report this committee pointed out that, as regards boats for ocean-going steamers carrying large numbers of passengers, the boats would be of little use in saving life (although they might for a time prolong its existence) unless succor were at hand from other ships or from proximity to shore; and speaking with special reference to passenger steam vessels carrying emigrants across the atlantic to ports on the east coast of north america, they said as follows: considering the number of vessels employed in this trade, and the large number of passengers they carry, and also taking into consideration the stormy character of the ocean they have to cross, and the thick and foggy weather encountered, we think this class is the most important of any, and we can not pass over the fact that of late years this traffic has been carried on with remarkable immunity from loss of life. the boat accommodation these vessels are forced to carry when sailing with emigrants is regulated by the scale in the passengers act, 1855, which provides for boat accommodation for 216 people as a maximum, so that, supposing a vessel leaves with 1,000 passengers and 200 crew under the present statutory requirements, she need only carry sufficient boat accommodation for 216 of these people. thus it will be seen that the boats carried by this class of vessels are also quite inadequate as an effectual means of saving life should a disaster happen to a ship with her full complement of passengers on board. we are glad to be able to say that there are many liberal and careful shipowners who do all in their power to provide for the safety of their passengers by equipping their vessels with boats far in excess of the number required by statute. but, at the same time, there are others carrying large numbers of emigrants who do no more than they are required to do by law. we have gone into this question with reference to this class of vessels very fully, and have visited many of them, and we think that the boats required by act should be increased 100 per cent., and in addition to them that the owners should be induced to carry sufficient collapsible boats and approved rafts, so that each ship shall have sufficient life-saving gear for all on board at any one time, provided, as said before, that no ship need carry more boat accommodation than is sufficient for all on board at that time. in 1887 a select committee of the house of commons, of which lord charles beresford was the chairman, was appointed to report on saving life at sea, and they found in their report- that many passenger ships could not, without great inconvenience, carry so many of the ordinary wooden boats as would suffice to carry the whole of the passengers and crew with safety in bad weather. under such circumstances the crew would not be sufficient to man so many boats; nor could they all be got into the water in sufficient time in the event of very rapid foundering. having regard, however, to the fact that accidents occur probably as often in moderate weather as in bad, and having regard also to the fact that the very cause of the accident frequently incapacitates many of the boats, and to the further fact that an insufficiency of boats undoubtedly tends to cause panic, we are of opinion that all sea-going passenger ships should be compelled by law to carry such boats, and other life-saving apparatus, as would in the aggregate best provide for the safety of all on board in moderate weather. as a result of these reports, the merchant shipping (life-saving appliances) act, 1888, appears to have been passed, under which rules were made by the board of trade at different dates. the merchant shipping act, 1894, repealed the act of 1888, and substituted therefor sections 427 to 431 and the seventeenth schedule of the new act. under this act (1894) a table showing the minimum number of boats to be placed under davits and their minimum cubic contents was issued by the board. it was dated march 9, 1894, and came into operation on june 1 of that year. this table was based on the gross tonnage of the vessels to which it was to apply, and not upon the numbers carried, and it provided that the number of boats and their capacity should increase as the tonnage increased. the table, however, stopped short at the point where the gross tonnage of the vessels reached "10,000 and upwards." as to all such vessels, whatever their size might be, the minimum number of boats under davits was fixed by the table at 16, with a total minimum capacity of 5,500 cubic feet. but as regarded emigrant steamships there was a rule which provided that if the boats under davits required by the table did not furnish sufficient accommodation for all on board, then additional boats of approved description (whether under davits or not) or approved life rafts should be carried, and that these additional boats or rafts should be of at least such carrying capacity that they and the boats required by the table should provide together in vessels of 5,000 tons and upwards three-fourths more than the minimum cubic contents required by the table, so that in the case of an emigrant ship such as the _titanic_ the requirements under the rules and table together exacted a provision of 9,625 cubic feet of lifeboat and raft accommodation (5,500 feet in boats under davits with three-fourths, namely, 4,125, added). taken at 10 cubic feet per person, this would be equivalent to a provision for 962 persons. no doubt at the time these rules were made and this table was drawn up it was thought that, having regard to the size of vessels then built and building, it was unnecessary to carry the table further. the largest emigrant steamer then afloat was the _lucania_, of 12,952 tons. in the report of the select committee of the house of commons a reference to water-tight bulkheads had been made, which was in the following terms: though the question of construction was clearly not included in the reference to the committee, still they think it only right to state, after having heard the evidence, that the proper placing of bulkheads, so as to enable a ship to keep afloat for some length of time after an accident has occurred, is most important for saving life at sea, and a thing upon which the full efficiency of life-saving appliances largely depends. this passage probably explains the insertion in the board of trade's rules for life-saving appliances of rule no. 12, which is as follows: _water-tight compartments._--when ships of any class are divided into efficient water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the board of trade, they shall only be required to carry additional boats, rafts and buoyant apparatus of one-half of the capacity required by these rules, but the exemption shall not extend to life jackets or similar approved articles of equal buoyancy suitable to be worn on the person. if this rule had become applicable to the _titanic_, then the total cubical lifeboat or raft accommodation which she would have been required to carry would not have been more than 7,562 (equivalent to accommodation for 756 persons). it did not, however, become applicable for the owners never required the board of trade to express any opinion under the rule as to the efficiency of the water-tight compartments. the _titanic_, in fact, carried boat accommodation for 1,178 persons, a number far in excess of the requirements of the table and rules, and therefore no concession under rule 12 was needed. speaking generally, recourse to this rule (12) by shipowners has been so insignificant that the rule itself may be regarded as of no practical account. the foregoing rules with the table were laid before parliament in the usual way, and so received the required statutory sanction. after 1894 steamers were built of a much larger tonnage than 10,000, the increase culminating in the _titanic_, with a gross tonnage of 46,328. as the vessels built increased in size, one would have thought the necessity for increased lifeboat accommodation would grow; but the rules and table remained stationary and nothing was done to them by way of change. the explanation of this long delay (from 1894-1912) was given before me by sir alfred chalmers, who had served under the board of trade as nautical adviser from 1896 to august, 1911. he is now retired. i think it will be well if i give his explanation in his own words. he says: i considered the matter very closely from time to time. i first of all considered the record of the trade--that is to say, the record of the casualties--and to see what immunity from loss there was. i found it was the safest mode of travel in the world, and i thought it was neither right nor the duty of a state department to impose regulations upon that mode of travel as long as the record was a clean one. secondly, i found that as ships grew bigger there were such improvements made in their construction that they were stronger and better ships, both from the point of view of water-tight compartments and also absolute strength, and i considered that that was the road along which the shipowners were going to travel, and that they should not be interfered with. i then went to the maximum that is down in the table, 16 boats and upward, together with the supplementary boats, and i considered from my experience that that was the maximum number that could be rapidly dealt with at sea and that could be safely housed without incumbering the vessel's decks unduly. in the next place i considered that the traffic was very safe on account of the routes, the definite routes being agreed upon by the different companies, which tended to lessen the risk of collision and to avoid ice and fog. then again, there was the question of wireless telegraphy, which had already come into force on board of these passenger ships. i was seized of the fact that in july, 1901, the _lucania_ had been fitted with wireless telegraphy, and the cunard line generally fitted it during that year to all their ships. the allan line fitted it in 1902, and i am not sure that in 1904 it had not become quite general on the trans-atlantic ships. that, of course, entered into my consideration as well. then another point was the manning. it was quite evident to me that if you went on crowding the ships with boats you would require a crew which were not required otherwise for the safe navigation of the ship, or for the proper upkeep of the ship, but you are providing a crew which would be carried uselessly across the ocean, that never would be required to man the boats. then the last point, and not the least, was this, that the voluntary action of the owners was carrying them beyond the requirements of our scale, and when voluntary action on the part of shipowners is doing that, i think that any state department should hold its hand before it steps in to make a hard and fast scale for that particular type of shipping. i considered that that scale fitted all sizes of ships that were then afloat, and i did not consider it necessary to increase it, and that was my advice to sir walter howell. i appreciate this explanation, and i think there is much force in it. at the same time, it seems to me that it does not justify the delay. even taking all these matters into consideration, it can not be that the provision for boat accommodation made in 1894 for vessels of 10,000 tons and upward remained sufficient to 1910, when vessels of 45,000 tons were being built. two considerations demonstrate this. the first is that some shipowners recognized the insufficiency of the requirements of the board of trade, and voluntarily exceeded those requirements by providing larger boat accommodation than the old rules and table exacted. the second is that shortly before sir alfred chalmers left the board of trade, the board had begun to direct attention to the amending of their rules in this connection. it appears that in november, 1910, a question was asked in the house of commons as to whether the attention of the president of the board of trade had been called to the fact that the _olympic_, a sister ship of the _titanic_, was provided with 14 lifeboats only. the answer given was that the _olympic_ (which was then in course of construction) would carry 14 lifeboats and two ordinary boats of an aggregate capacity of 9,752 cubic feet, which was in excess of the requirements of the statutory rules. on february 15, 1911, a further question was asked as to the date of the last regulations, and whether, having regard to the increased tonnage of modern ships, the desirability of revising the regulations would be considered by the board of trade. the answer by the president was: those regulations were last revised in 1894. the question of their further revision is engaging the serious attention of the board of trade, and i have decided to refer the matter to the merchant shipping advisory committee for consideration and advice. three days afterwards, namely, on february 18, 1911, a circular letter was sent out by the board of trade to the board's principal officers at liverpool, london, and glasgow asking each of those gentlemen to draft such an extension of the existing boat scale as he might think satisfactory and reasonable for the conditions of large passenger steamers. this circular letter was answered by the principal officer in glasgow (mr. harris) on february 24, 1911, by the principal officer in london (mr. park) on february 27, 1911, and by the principal officer in liverpool (mr. young) on march 3, 1911. it is sufficient to say of these answers that they all suggested a large extension of the statutory requirements. meanwhile, namely, on february 28, 1911, mr. archer, the board of trade's principal ship surveyor, had also drawn up a scale. this was a more exacting scale than that of any of the three principal officers. by his scale a vessel of the tonnage of the _titanic_ would have had to carry boat accommodation equivalent to at least 24,937 cubic feet, which would have been sufficient to hold all and more than all the persons who were on board at the time of the disaster (2,201). it would not, however, have been nearly sufficient to have held all that the vessel might lawfully have carried, viz, 3,547, and it is to be observed with reference to mr. archer's scale that in it he suggests an extension of rule 12, by which (if the vessel were divided into efficient water-tight compartments) the total boat accommodation might be reduced much more than rule 12 as it stands would permit. if this reduction be taken into account, the boat accommodation would fall so that it would be sufficient only for 1,750 persons. mr. archer's view was that shipowners should be encouraged to increase the floatability of the ships they built, and that the way to encourage them was to relax the legal requirements as to boats as their plans advanced in that direction. the great object was so to build the ship that in the event of a disaster she would be her own lifeboat.[4] having obtained these four reports, the board of trade, on april 4, 1911, submitted the matter to their advisory committee, and obtained the committee's report on july 4, 1911. the following are copies (with omissions of immaterial passages) of the board of trade's letter of april 4, 1911, and of the advisory committee's report of july 4, 1911: * * * * * board of trade, marine department, 7 whitehall gardens, _london, sw., april 4, 1911_. sir: i am directed by the board of trade to inclose herewith, for the information of the merchant shipping advisory committee, a copy of a question asked in the house of commons on february 15 and of the answer given by the president of the board of trade with reference to the life-saving appliances rules made under section 427 of the merchant shipping act, 1894. the board are of opinion that the table in the appendix to the rules should be extended upward in the form indicated in the accompanying scale, so as to provide for vessels of tonnage up to 50,000 tons gross and upward. it appears to the board that the number of boats and the boat capacity need not necessarily increase in a regular proportion according to the increase in tonnage, and that due regard should be paid to what is reasonable and practicable in passenger steamers exceeding 10,000 tons. * * * i am to state that the board would be obliged if the merchant shipping advisory committee would be so good as to suggest in what manner the scale (see accompanying copy) should be continued upward, having due regard to the considerations indicated above. i am further to state that the board would be glad to learn whether the advisory committee are of opinion that rule 12 should or should not be revised so as to exempt altogether from the requirement of additional boats or rafts those vessels which are divided into efficient water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the board of trade. * * * i am, etc., walter j. howell. the secretary, _merchant shipping advisory committee_ * * * * * merchant shipping advisory committee, _july 4, 1911_. sir: we have the honor to report that your letter of april 4 with reference to the minimum number of lifeboats to be earned on vessels of 10,000 tons gross tonnage and upward, and your letter of may 17 on the subject of the depth of lifeboats, have been very carefully considered by the merchant shipping advisory committee and that it was unanimously decided at a meeting held on the 29th ultimo to adopt the report of a subcommittee which was specially appointed to inquire into these questions. a copy of the report is accordingly forwarded herewith, and the committee desire us to suggest for the consideration of the board of trade that effect should be given to the recommendations contained in it. we are, etc., norman hill, _chairman_. r. w. matthew, _secretary_. sir walter j. howell, _assistant secretary marine department, board of trade_. * * * * * report of the life-saving appliances subcommittee to the merchant shipping advisory committee. in accordance with the decision of the merchant shipping advisory committee, at their meeting on friday, april 28, we have given careful consideration to the latter of april 4 from the board of trade, in which the committee were asked to advise: (1) as to the manner in which the table in the appendix to the life-saving appliances rules should be extended so as to provide for vessels of tonnage up to 50,000 tons gross and upward; and (2) as to whether rule 12 should or should not be revised so as to exempt altogether from the requirement of additional boats and (or) rafts, those vessels which are divided into efficient water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the board of trade. in considering these questions, we have had specially in mind the fact that the number of passengers carried does not necessarily increase in proportion to the increase in the tonnage of the vessel. this is particularly true in the case of vessels exceeding 10,000 tons, a type of vessel which is practically only built to provide special accommodation for large numbers of first and second class passengers. similarly there is no fixed relation between the tonnage of vessels and the deck space available for the carrying of lifeboats under davits. increase in the length of a vessel is only one of the factors, and often not the most material factor contributing to the increase in its tonnage, and it should also be remembered, in estimating the space available for the launching of lifeboats, that it is impossible to place davits forward of the bridge, and very undesirable to have them on the quarters of the vessel. we are strongly of opinion that every encouragement should be given to secure the provision of vessels which by their construction have been rendered as unsinkable as possible, and which are provided with efficient means for communicating with the shore or with other vessels in case of disaster. in view of these considerations, we have agreed upon the following recommendations: 1. that it is questionable whether it is practicable to increase the number of davits. 2. that any increase in the number of lifeboats to be carried can probably be best effected by providing for the launching of further boats from the existing davits. 3. that the table should be extended in the manner indicated below, viz.: -------------------------+-------------+---------------+--------------- | | minimum | | | number of | total minimum | minimum | additional | cubic | number of | boats to be | contents of gross tonnage. | boats to be | readily | boats required | placed under| available | by | davits. | for attachment| columns | | to davits. | 2 and 3. -------------------------+-------------+---------------+--------------- | | | _cubic feet._ 10,000 and under 12,000 | 16 | --- | 5,500 12,000 and under 20,000 | 16 | 2 | 6,200 20,000 and under 35,000 | 16 | 4 | 6,900 35,000 and under 45,000 | 16 | 6 | 7,600 45,000 and upward | 16 | 8 | 8,300 -------------------------+-------------+---------------+---------------it is further recommended that all passenger vessels of 10,000 tons gross tonnage and upward should be required to be fitted with wireless telegraphy apparatus. 4. that the rules should be amended so as to admit of decked lifeboats of an approved type being stowed on top of one another or under an open lifeboat, subject to suitable arrangements being made for launching promptly the boats so stowed. 5. that the additional boats and rafts required under the provisions of division a, class 1(d) of the life-saving appliances rules shall be of at least such carrying capacity that they, and the boats required by columns 2 and 3 of the above table, provide together three-fourths more than the minimum cubic contents required by column 4 of that table. 6. that vessels divided into efficient water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the board of trade should (provided they are fitted with wireless telegraphy apparatus) be exempt from the requirement of additional boats and (or) rafts. the committee suggest, in this connection, that the board of trade should review the requirements designed to attain the standards as to water-tight compartments at present enforced by them under rule 12, having regard to the developments of shipbuilding since the report of the committee on the spacing and construction of water-tight bulkheads. we have also had before us the board's further letter of may 17 inquiring whether, in the opinion of the advisory committee, it would be advisable to prescribe a maximum depth for lifeboats as compared with their breadth, and, if so, what that proportion should be. in connection with this letter we have been supplied by the board of trade with reports from their principal officers in great britain, giving the dimensions and cubic capacities of the various kinds of boats on five typical ships in each of eight ports. we recommend that the board should be advised to alter the life-saving appliances rules so as to provide that, in future, the depth of lifeboats supplied to a british merchant vessel shall not exceed 44 per cent. of their breadth. norman hill. s. cross. geo. n. hampson. t. royden. thomas spencer. a. m. carlisle. wm. theodore doxford. robert a. ogilvie. t. rome. j. havelock wilson. * * * * * it will be observed that if effect had been given by the board of trade to the report of the advisory committee the requirements for a vessel of the size of the _titanic_ would have reached 14,525 cubic feet (8,300 plus three-fourths of 8,300, namely, 6,225), with, however, this qualification that if the vessel were divided into efficient water-tight compartments (as she probably was) and fitted with wireless telegraphy (as she certainly was) a provision of a boat capacity of 8,300 cubic feet, equivalent to space for 830 persons, would have been legally sufficient. this would have been much less than the accommodation with which the _titanic_ when she put to sea was, in fact, provided (namely, for 1,178 persons). effect, however, was not given to the report. a question arose with reference to the dimensions of lifeboats, and it was thought better to get that question settled before proceeding to revise the rules. the examination of this question involved making several experiments which caused delay; and it was not until april 16, 1912, that a reply was sent by the board of trade to the advisory committee. it will be noticed that the date of this reply is just after the disaster to the _titanic_ became known. i am, however, quite satisfied that instructions for the preparation of this letter had been given in the offices of the board of trade some days before the 16th, and that the letter was not sent in consequence of the disaster. it is desirable to set it out. * * * * * board of trade, marine department, 7 whitehall gardens, _london, s. w., april 16, 1912_. sir: with reference to your letter of the 4th july last respecting certain questions raised in connection with the proposed revision of the life-saving appliances rules, i am directed by the board of trade to state, for the information of the advisory committee, that they have given very careful consideration to the report of the life-saving appliances subcommittee which was forwarded with your letter. as regards the recommendations with reference to the proposed extension of the table (appendix to the life saving appliances rules) showing the minimum number of boats to be placed under davits, the board are glad to observe that the committee agree that alterations and additions are now necessary to meet the changed conditions due to recent developments in the size of passenger steamships and in the number of persons which these vessels can accommodate. the board of trade note that the gradations of tonnage in the extension of the scale suggested by the advisory committee are not the same as those in the form of scale submitted to them by the board; while the increase in the number of boats is not in the number to be placed under davits, but in the number of additional boats required to be readily available for attachments to davits. it is observed that the committee hold the view that "it is questionable whether it is practicable to increase the number of davits," and "that any increase in the number of lifeboats to be carried can probably be best effected by providing for the launching of further boats from the existing davits." the board presume that, in arriving at these conclusions, the committee have had regard to ships already built rather than to new ships, as they see no reason why there would be any difficulty in having more than eight pairs of davits on each side of the ship, provided that the requirements of life-saving appliances rules were known before the plans were prepared. the board are of opinion that a very careful and thorough revision of the table should now be made, and i am to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum and tables prepared by the professional advisor to the marine department, containing a full and considered opinion on the subject of the extension of the boat scale and cognate questions. as regards the proposed amendment of the rules, so as to admit of decked lifeboats of an approved type being stowed one above another, or under an open lifeboat, i am to state that this question is now under consideration, and a communication will be addressed to you shortly on the subject. with reference to the advisory committee's recommendation regarding the amendment of rule 12 of the general rules, the board desire me to state that the questions raised in the recommendation are of wide application and of such importance that the board do not think that they can be adequately considered except by a committee of equal standing to the committee which reported in 1891 on the spacing and construction of water-tight bulkheads in the mercantile marine. the board have the question of the appointment of a committee under consideration. in connection with the advisory committee's recommendation that the depth of lifeboats shall not exceed 44 per cent. of their breadth, i am to transmit herewith, for their consideration, a draft amendment of rules nos. 1, 2, and 3 of the general rules with reference to the construction of ships' boats. the board have made full inquiry into the question of the construction of ships' boats, and obtained some useful information as to the average depth of boat which is deemed desirable for safety and utility, and the ratio of that depth to the breadth, and they attach so much importance to this element of boat construction that they think it should receive the careful attention of the committee. the board think that the committee, in the light of this additional information, may reconsider the opinions expressed on this point in their letter of july 4. i am therefore to transmit herewith copies of memoranda by the professional adviser to the marine department and the acting principal ship surveyor. the board desire me to state that they would be glad to be furnished with the advisory committee's views as to the application of the proposed new rules and boat scale, e. g., whether they should apply to ships already built, and if so, to what extent. they regard it as of great importance, on the one hand, that all british vessels should be provided with a proper and sufficient equipment of life-saving appliances, and, on the other, that regulations should not be enforced without notice which would necessitate important structural alterations and consequent heavy expense in vessels already built. i am to add that in order to make the constitution of the committee, when considering this question, agree with that of the statutory life-saving appliances committee indicated in the seventeenth schedule to the merchant shipping act, 1894, the board have followed the course adopted on previous occasions, and have invited lloyd's register of british and foreign shipping and the institute of london underwriters to select a representative who will be available to sit on the advisory committee when the question is under consideration. i am, etc., walter j. howell. the secretary, _merchant shipping advisory committee_, _7, whitehall gardens, s. w_. * * * * * extension of life-saving apparatus tables. it will be seen that i have given priority in importance to the form of ships' boats rather than to their number on the principle that a few reliable boats are of greater value than a large number of indifferent ones; but if the former desirable condition can be obtained by the proposed alterations in our rules as to measurement, etc., we are freer to approach the question of adding to the number of boats provided for in the existing tables. as with the question of ratio d: b dealt with by the advisory committee last year, so with the question of boat increase and relative increase of cubic capacity dealt with by them on the same occasion, perhaps the board might inform the committee that they are not satisfied that a slightly different recommendation might not have been made had the matter been still further considered at the time. referring to the table of boat capacities computed by them particularly it might be helpful if the board laid before them for consideration the table, which i attach hereto and submit, as showing a more reasonable proportionate increase in capacity than appears so far, in my opinion, in the other papers before us. it will be seen in this statement that the number of boats recommended by the advisory committee is practically retained, but the unit of increase in capacity is put at 300 cubic feet. perhaps i should state here what actuated me in fixing upon this rate of increase. i realized that in all probability it would become the practice on these large liners to provide boats under davits which would contain the entire cubic feet required by the l. s. a. rules, that is--the quantity required by rule under davits plus the addition of three-fourths and it occurred to me that if, after the figure 5,500 cubic feet the increase of capacity were uniform and moderate it would result in a total at 1-3/4 which would by incidence fit in with the scale of boats already recommended as requisite in the report of the advisory committee and in my own, i. e., assuming that the boats are of 500 cubic feet. example: take a vessel of 30,000 tons and under 35,000 tons, according to the table i submit she would be required to have by the 1-3/4 rule a total boat capacity of 12,500 cubic feet which at 500 cubic feet per boat equals 24 boats nearly. there should be no difficulty on the large ships in carrying this quantity under davits, i. e., 18 directly under davits and six boats inboard. please see incidental table attached. (mr. a. h. young, professional adviser of the board of trade.) march 28, 1912. * * * * * _proposed extension of boat scale._ ---------------------------+----------+----------------- | | minimum | | total cubic | | contents of gross tons. | boats. | boats | | required to | | be carried | | under | | davits. ---------------------------+----------+----------------- | | _cubic feet._ 10,000 and under 12,000 | 16 | 5,500 12,000 and under 15,000 | 18 | 5,800 15,000 and under 20,000 | 20 | 6,100 20,000 and under 25,000 | 22 | 6,400 25,000 and under 30,000 | 24 | 6,700 30,000 and under 35,000 | 24 | 7,000 35,000 and under 40,000 | 24 | 7,300 40,000 and under 45,000 | 24 | 7,600 45,000 and under 50,000 | 26 | 7,900 50,000 and upward | 26 | 8,200 ---------------------------+----------+-----------------please see the accompanying incidental table showing how this number of boats can provide for the three-quarters additional capacity also, if of about 500 cubic feet per boat to 600 cubic feet. a. h. y. * * * * * _table of incidence (informative)._ -----------------------+------+-----+-----------+------+---------- | | | | |equivalent | | | | | boats. |number|cubic|cubic feet |total |-----+---- gross tons. | of |feet.|additional.|cubic | at | at |boats.| | | feet | 500 | 600 | | | | at |cubic|cubic | | | |1-3/4.|feet.|feet. -----------------------+------+-----+-----------+------+-----+---- 10,000 and under 12,000| 16 |5,500| 4,125 | 9,625| 19 | 16 12,000 and under 15,000| 18 |5,800| 4,350 |10,150| 20 | 16 15,000 and under 20,000| 20 |6,100| 4,575 |10,675| 21 | 18 20,000 and under 25,000| 22 |6,400| 4,800 |11,200| 22 | 19 25,000 and under 30,000| 24 |6,700| 5,025 |11,725| 24 | 20 30,000 and under 35,000| 24 |7,000| 5,250 |12,250| 24 | 20 35,000 and under 40,000| 24 |7,300| 5,475 |12,775| 25 | 21 40,000 and under 45,000| 24 |7,600| 5,700 |13,300| 26 | 22 45,000 and under 50,000| 26 |7,900| 5,925 |13,825| 27 | 23 50,000 and upward | 26 |8,200| 6,150 |14,350| 28 | 24 -----------------------+------+-----+-----------+------+-----+----one-fourth of the above boats may be carried inboard, but they should not exceed 500 cubic feet in capacity, so that they may be readily drawn up to the davits. a. h. y. march 30, 1912. * * * * * draft amendment of general rules. (1) _boats._--all boats shall be constructed and properly equipped as provided by these rules, and shall be of such form and proportions that they shall have sufficient freeboard, and ample stability in a seaway, when loaded with their full complement of persons and equipment. all thwart and side seats must be fitted as low in the boat as practicable, and bottom boards must be fitted so that the thwarts shall not be more than 2 feet 9 inches above them. all boats and other life-saving appliances are to be kept ready for use to the satisfaction of the board of trade. internal buoyancy apparatus may be constructed of wood, or of copper or yellow metal of not less than 18 ounces to the superficial foot, or of other durable material. section (a). a boat of this section shall be a lifeboat of whaleboat form, properly constructed of wood or metal, having for every 10 cubic feet of her capacity, computed as in rule (2), at least 1 cubic foot of strong and serviceable inclosed air-tight compartments, so constructed that water can not find its way into them. in the case of metal boats an addition will have to be made to the cubic capacity of the air-tight compartments, so as to give them buoyancy equal to that of the wooden boat. sec. (b). a boat of this section shall be a lifeboat, of whaleboat form properly constructed of wood or metal, having inside and outside buoyancy apparatus together equal in efficiency to the buoyancy apparatus provided for a boat of section (a). at least one-half of the buoyancy apparatus must be attached to the outside of the boat. sec. (c). a boat of this section shall be a lifeboat, properly constructed of wood or metal, having some buoyancy apparatus attached to the inside and (or) outside of the boat, equal in efficiency to one-half of the buoyancy apparatus provided for a boat of section (a) or section (b). at least one-half of the buoyancy apparatus must be attached to the outside of the boat. sec. (d). a boat of this section shall be a properly constructed boat of wood or metal. sec. (e). a boat of this section shall be a boat of approved construction, form, and material, and may be collapsible. (2) _cubic capacity._--the cubic capacity of an open boat and of a deck boat of section (d) or section (e) shall be ascertained by multiplying the product of the length, breadth, and depth by 6, subject, however, to the following provisions: the length shall be measured from the foreside of the rabbet on the stem to the afterside of the rabbet on the sternpost, and the breadth shall be measured from the outside of plank to the outside of plank amidships. the actual depth shall be measured from the top of the gunwale to the top of the bottom plank next to the keel, but the depth used in calculating the cubic capacity shall not in any case exceed 3.6 feet; and if the actual depth measured is equal to or less than 3.6 feet, the depth used in calculating the cubic capacity shall not exceed 45 per cent of the breadth measured, as indicated above. if the oars are pulled in rowlocks, the bottom of the rowlock is to be considered as the gunwale in measuring the depth of the boat. if any question is raised requiring absolute accuracy, the cubic capacity of a boat shall be ascertained by stirling's rule, subject to the foregoing provisions as to depth. (3) _number of persons for boats._--(_a_) subject to the provisions of paragraphs (_b_) (_c_) and (_d_) of this clause the number of persons[5] an open boat of section (a) shall be deemed fit to carry shall be the number of cubic feet ascertained as in rule (2) divided by 10, and the number of persons[6] an open boat of section (b) or section (c), or an open or decked boat of section (d) or section (e) shall be deemed fit to carry shall be the number of cubic feet ascertained as in rule (2) divided by 8. the space in the boat shall be sufficient for the seating of the persons carried in it and for the proper use of the oars. (_b_) an open boat of section (a) or section (b) or section (c) or section (d) or section (e) shall not be deemed to be fit to carry the number of persons ascertained as in paragraph (_a_) of this clause unless the boat is so constructed that it has a mean sheer of at least half an inch for each foot of its length and that the boat's half-girth amidships measured outside the planking from the side of the keel to the top of the gunwale is at least equal to nine-tenths of the sum of the boat's depth inside and half its maximum breadth amidships, and that the mean of the half-girths measured in the same manner at two points, one-quarter of the length of the boat from the stem and sternpost, respectively, is at least equal to eight-tenths of the sum of the depth inside and half the maximum breadth amidships. (_c_)--a decked boat of section (d) or section (e) shall not be deemed to be fit to carry the number of persons ascertained as in paragraph (_a_) of this clause, unless the top of the deck amidships is at a height above the water approved by the board of trade, when the boat is so loaded. (_d_)--if the surveyor is doubtful as to the number of persons any open or decked boat is fit to carry, he may require the boat to be tested afloat with the intended number of persons on board. (_e_)--the rules numbers 1, 2, and 3, as now amended, are not to be retrospective, and are to apply only to boats built after. ship's boats. the salient feature of the reports of the board's officers on this subject is the consensus of opinion that the form of a boat is the chief factor to be considered in determining its value as a life-saving appliance. it has been found that while there are many boats of good form supplied to ships, there is yet a large proportion where the boats are not only not so good, but which can only be regarded as unsafe if they had on board anything approaching the number of persons for which they measure. it is the latter type we are chiefly concerned with; how is it that the form has so deteriorated as to create this concern in our minds? i think the cause is not far to seek; it appears to be the outcome of (1) the shipowner's desire to carry the maximum number of persons in the minimum number of boats; (2) in the efforts of the ship-builder, as a rule, to carry out the specification in which he has contracted to supply the owners with boats at a price, often very low, and naturally he does not sublet his contract with the boatbuilder at a loss; (3) the aim of the competing boatbuilder, which is to build his boats at as little cost price as possible, and yet to provide accommodation for the prescribed number of persons. he is probably limited as to length, and therefore relies on the breadth and depth; in this direction, he is unintentionally assisted by the board's rule for measurement, viz, l × b × d × .6/10 or 8; so long, therefore, as he can obtain his breadth at one point for measurement purposes, it is quite immaterial to him how soon he fines away to the ends, with the result that the stability of the boat becomes almost entirely dependent upon the form of a very limited midship section, or the still smaller proportion of same that would be under water when in the loaded condition. the boatbuilder may be further restricted as to breadth, and, therefore, he again detracts from the form a boat should have by dispensing with sheer and increasing the depth from keel to gunwale amidships. this method of building boats enables him to obtain the capacity required by the owner at the expense of the boat's stability and utility. no doubt when the life-saving appliances rules came into being the divisors 10 and 8 for the different sections were deemed safe on the supposition that the usual full form of boat would not be largely departed from. experience has shown, however, that form is frequently sacrificed for the unworthy objects referred to above, and it follows, therefore, that either the form should be improved or a heavier divisor laid down. it would, i think, be more effective to deal with form and devise a rule by which we can insure that a boat will be reasonably safe with its load, not merely in smooth water, as in our recent test, but in a seaway. it is essential, therefore, to draw the attention of the advisory committee to the value the board attach to form, and particularly to that part of it under water, emphasizing the great necessity there is for an increase to the bearing surface of the under-water portion of boats, and this end can, no doubt, be best attained by the putting into practice of the suggestions made by the principal ship surveyor for amending the rules and which aim at prolonging the form or fullness of dimension of the midship body under water well toward the ends of the boat. it is well known that by extending the body in this way greater buoyancy and stability are secured without materially affecting the speed. it is often supposed that defective stability due to bad form can be rectified by the disposition of the persons or things, but anyone with real experience of boats in a seaway can not fail to realize that this is the wrong principle to work on. granted, therefore, that the question of form must take priority, how can it be best attained? and if we refer to mr. archer's method of measurement, as stated in his amendment to the rules, it will be seen how simple and effective it is. for the purpose of illustration, we might take the model of a ship's boat obtained through the board's surveyors at glasgow, the dimensions of which enlarged to scale represent a boat of l b d/30.0 × 8.5 × 3.5 and is an embodiment of the proportions amidships and at quarter distance from each end proposed by mr. archer. it can not be too strongly urged that for a ship's lifeboat to be fit to carry the number of persons it measures for in any degree of safety, whenever it may be required at sea, the under-water or bearing surface should be carried out to the ends as much as possible and all straight lines avoided. the bows of many of the existing types of boat are examples of the worst possible form for safety, and the counters are as bad, if they can be said to have any. _depth._--it appears from the reports that the most generally approved ratio of depth to the breadth is 4/10. this has been established not only by our long experience, but by the numerous tests recently conducted by the board's surveyors at various ports, and the attention of the advisory committee might be drawn to this fact. it is, of course, necessary also to have a good freeboard, but a well-proportioned boat does not require so much freeboard as the commoner type, as with proper sheer and under-water surface she is easy in a seaway. if the gunwale is too high, there is loss of power over the oars, which is serious when for the safety of the boat she is required to be kept head-on to sea, and with a fresh breeze, even in a good boat, this is not always an easy matter. it is a matter for consideration that at the tests made by our surveyors the conditions were most favorable, being usually in smooth water of a sheltered dock, and, in not a few instances, considerable anxiety was felt for the safety of those on board when crowded in accordance to the existing rules. if it was thus in smooth water, one dare hardly contemplate the results in a seaway. if the shipowner does not see to it that a safe type of boat is provided, then the number of persons to be accommodated in boats which do not come up to the proportions deemed safe by the board of trade should be very considerably curtailed. a. h. y. march 23, 1912. * * * * * construction of ship's boats. it will, i think, be useful to consider the principal factors that govern the dimensions of boats forming part of the life-saving apparatus in merchant ships. the minimum number and capacity of boats are determined by the regulations, and the capacity is determined by the product of the length, breadth, and depth of the boats. as the space on the ship in which to stow the boats is generally limited, it is generally found easier to increase their depth than the length or breadth, and this is further encouraged, i believe, by the cost of boats being quoted at so much per foot in length. the builder or owner determines the dimensions of the boat; the boatbuilder is concerned merely with the construction and, in most cases, usually their form or lines. attention has been called by the mark lane surveyors to the form and proportions of the boats used in the royal navy. the proportion of depth to breadth is greater than is apparent from the particulars given, as all boats larger than a 30-foot gig have 6-1/2-inch washboards above the gunwale, and even the gigs and many of the smaller boats have portable washboards. it must also be remembered that all the navy boats are square-sterned, except the whaleboat, and are designed with easy lines so as to make good sailers; no air cases are fitted, and the seats are kept very low. the boats are not provided simply as life-saving appliances; as a matter of fact, the life-saving equipment of a warship is extremely small. it is true that each type of boat is given a certain "life-saving capacity," which is ascertained by crowding in as many men as practicable with boat in still water and all equipment on board. this number agrees closely with that obtained by the board's rule l × b × d × .6/8. these boats, moreover, have a much smaller freeboard than is considered desirable in the merchant navy; but the occupants are all under discipline and in charge of experienced seamen. in the mercantile marine it may, and often does, happen, that the boats are crowded with panic-stricken men, women, and children, and instances have occurred, i believe, wherein there has not been a single man in the boat who has ever handled an oar before. having these points in view, i do not agree that the navy type of boat is the most suitable for our purpose. the chief desiderata in a ship's boat as a life-saving appliance are, (1) to carry the maximum number of people without overcrowding; and with (2) a reasonable amount of stability and freeboard; (3) and without undue interference with the use of oars. (1) is almost wholly dependent on the length and breadth of the boat; provided (2) is satisfied; depth has very little influence on it. for example, take a boat 30 × 9 × 3.5, 567 cubic feet by our rule, as a section (d) or (e) boat it should carry 567/8 = 72 people; such a boat should allow 30 × 9 × 8/72 = 3 square feet of area per person at the gunwale, which should be ample if all sit in the bottom who can not find seating room on the side benches or thwarts. (2) stability and freeboard are dependent upon the boat's breadth, depth, and form. the element of length does not enter into it, and it would be most unreasonable to limit the ratio of length to breadth, as suggested from liverpool, or to limit the depth to the cube root of the length, as proposed by one of the london surveyors. mr. gemmell gives particulars, m. 26,298, of four boats tested, which proved to have ample accommodation and stability for the complements allowed by the regulations; the ratio of depth to breadth varied from 0.41 to 0.45. capt. o'sullivan also reported five boats which he tested with ratios of d to b, varying from 0.4 to 0.44, all except one being satisfactory, the exception being rather tender and overcrowded, due to poor lines. the freeboards of all these boats when loaded were, i think, sufficient. the depth in no case exceeded 3.6, and only in one case did the ratio exceed 0.44. the surveyors, liverpool, tested a boat 3.75 deep and having a ratio of d/b = 0.41, which proved satisfactory. capt. griffiths tested a boat 4.1 deep, having a ratio d/b = 0.455, which he considered to be unsafe with the full complement on board. the consensus of opinion is that the depth should not exceed 3 feet 5 inches or 3 feet 6 inches, and the ratio of d/b should not exceed 0.44. this, however, is not sufficient to guarantee sufficient seating and stability. capt. clarke tested a boat 24.4 × 6.55 × 2.45, which was very unsafe with the rule complement on board. the ratio d/b is only 0.38 in this case. it will be seen, however, that this craft has exceptionally fine lines and is evidently quite unsuited to carry the rule complement. it is quite evident that the form of the boat must be taken into account. the dimensions of boats vary so greatly that generally the boat builder builds his boats "to the eye," using only a midship mold; it follows that the forms of boats of the same dimensions will vary considerably and with different workmen. something more is required than a limitation in the ratio of depth to breadth. it is desirable that the sheer should be ample, and the form not unduly fined away within the midship half length. from consideration of the particulars and lines of the boats mentioned in the surveyor's reports, i think a simple rule to regulate the form may be devised such as i will indicate later. it is, i think, necessary to limit the depth as a factor for ascertaining the number to be accommodated. the increase of depth beyond a certain point, while unduly increasing the number of people that may be carried, increases proportionately the required air case capacity, to meet which the seats have to be raised with a corresponding increase in the height of the center of gravity and decrease in the stability and difficulty in rowing. a boat 3.6 deep would have the thwarts about 3 feet above the bottom, and any increase in this height makes it very difficult for any ordinary man to row when sitting down. in rough sea the men would have very little control over the oars if standing up. a further objection to the very deep boat is its small stability in the light condition. it is not, i believe, an unusual occurrence for such boats to capsize in rough weather, before the passengers or crew can be got into them, and i have myself seen such a boat capsize in dock with only two men in it; due to lumpy water and a stiff breeze catching it on the beam when coming out of the shelter afforded by the dock wall. i do not think, however, any limit of depth should be imposed, except as a measure of capacity. any rules that may be devised should be such as are of easy and ready application, and which will not bear harshly on the boats that have already been accepted. i therefore suggest that the present rules will sufficiently meet the case, with the following modification. in no case should the depth to be used in general rule (2) exceed 3.6 feet and 45 per cent of the breadth. in all cases where the actual depth is 45 per cent of the breadth or less, the maximum number of persons, as ascertained by rule (3) should not be allowed unless the boat has been found capable of carrying that number by actual test in the water, or unless the boat has at least 1/2 inch of sheer per foot of length, and the half-girth amidships, measured outside the plank, from the side of the keel to the top of the gunwale, is at least 90 per cent of the sum of the depth and the half breadth, and the mean of the half girths as similarly measured at one quarter the boat's length from the stem and stern post are at least 80 per cent of the sum of the midship depth and half breadth. the thwarts and side benches should be kept as low as practicable, and the bottom boards should be so fitted that the height of the thwarts above them will not exceed 2 feet 9 inches. a. j. d. january 27, 1912. (mr. a. j. daniel, acting principal ship surveyor to the board of trade.) * * * * * it should be stated that the new committee on bulkheads mentioned in the paragraphs of this letter which deals with rule 12 has now been formed. subsequently sir walter howell wrote and sent three letters to the advisory committee which were as follows: board of trade, marine department, 7 whitehall gardens, _london, s. w., april 20, 1912_. sir: with reference to previous correspondence between the department and your committee respecting the revision of the statutory rules for life-saving appliances on british ships, and particularly to the letter from this department of april 16, i am directed by the board of trade to state that as an entirely new situation has been created by the recent disaster to the steamship _titanic_ they assume that the committee, in reconsidering the matter in connection with the suggestions already put before them by the board will have full regard to this new situation, and the facts of the disaster so far as ascertained. as you are doubtless aware, suggestions have been made in the house of commons and elsewhere to the effect that, in view of the loss of the _titanic_, action should be taken by the board of trade in regard to certain questions other than those expressly dealt with in the life-saving appliances rules, e.g., in regard to (1) steamship routes in the north atlantic; (2) the speed of steamers where there may be dangers to navigation; and (3) the provision and use of searchlights on large passenger steamers; and the board would be glad to know the committee's views in regard to these, and any other suggestions which may have come to their knowledge, intended to diminish the risk, or to mitigate the effects of accidents to passenger vessels at sea. i am, etc., walter j. howell. the secretary, _merchant shipping advisory committee_. * * * * * board of trade, marine department, _7 whitehall gardens, london, s. w., april 24, 1912_. sir: with reference to previous correspondence between this department and your committee respecting the revision of the statutory rules for life-saving appliances on british ships, and particularly to the letter from this department of april 16, in which you were informed that the question of the proposed amendment of the rules so as to admit of decked lifeboats being stowed one above another or one under an open lifeboat, was under consideration, i am directed by the board of trade to state, for the information of your committee, that the board of trade will be glad if the committee will consider whether any, and if so what, amendments of the rules, and in particular of the rule of april 19, 1910, and the rule of june 14, 1911, are, in their opinion, desirable with the object of supplementing the boats immediately under davits by as much additional boat accommodation as is practicable, having regard to the new situation which has been created by the recent disaster to the steamship _titanic_. a plan illustrating the principle is being prepared so as to be in readiness for your committee by friday. i am, etc., walter j. howell. the secretary, _merchant shipping advisory committee_. * * * * * board of trade, marine department, 7, whitehall gardens, _london, s. w., april 25, 1912_. sir: with reference to previous correspondence respecting the proposed revision of the statutory regulations as to boats and life-saving appliances on ships, i am directed by the board of trade to state, for the information of the merchant shipping advisory committee, that, apart from the questions which have been raised regarding the boat accommodation on vessels over 10,000 tons, it seems desirable to consider whether the provision of boats and other life-saving appliances required by the rules in the case of vessels under 10,000 tons is satisfactory, or whether the rules or the boat scale should be altered in respect of their application to such vessels; and the board would be glad to be favored with the observations of the committee on this point in addition to those that have already been referred to them. i am, etc., walter j. howell. the secretary, _merchant shipping advisory committee_. * * * * * to these letters the advisory committee sent the following answer: * * * * * merchant shipping advisory committee, 7, whitehall gardens, _london, s. w., april 27, 1912_. sir: we are desired by the merchant shipping advisory committee to inform you that your letters of the 16th, 20th, 24th, and 25th instant were brought before the committee at a meeting held yesterday. the committee fully recognize that the proved impossibility of keeping such a vessel as the _titanic_ afloat after a collision with ice until the arrival of outside succor has created an entirely new situation which was neither in the contemplation of the board of trade nor of the committee in the consideration of the extension of the existing boat scale in regard to vessels of 10,000 tons and upward. in advising on such extension in july last, the committee aimed at providing ample boat accommodation on large passenger vessels in accordance with the principles that were adopted by the original life-saving appliances committee, and which principles had apparently been fully justified by many years of experience. it is with satisfaction that the committee note that the board of trade, apart from the new possibilities demonstrated by the loss of the _titanic_, agreed in the essentials with the recommendation of the committee. in face of the new facts, the committee at their meeting yesterday reopened entirely the question of the revision of the boat scale for large passenger vessels with a view of providing the maximum of protection for the passengers and crew in the event of an overwhelming disaster, whilst at the same time maintaining the principles in regard to the stability and sea-going qualities of the ship itself, and to the prompt and efficient handling of the boats carried under the existing scale, which hitherto have proved not only essential to safety, but also adequate for all ordinary emergencies. the questions involved are not free from difficulty, but they will receive the immediate attention of the committee. pending their consideration, the committee note that assurances have been received by the board of trade from representatives of most of the large passenger lines to the effect that every effort will be made to equip their vessels, at the earliest possible moment, with boats and rafts sufficient to accommodate all persons on board. in regard to the recommendation forwarded with the committee's letter of july 4 last, that the board of trade should, having regard to the developments in ship building since the report of the committee of 1891 on spacing and construction of water-tight bulkheads, review the requirements designed to attain the standards at present enforced under rule 12, the advisory committee note that the board of trade have under consideration the appointment of a committee of equal standing to that of the committee of 1891. in view of the great importance of this question the advisory committee desire us respectfully to urge that such a committee be appointed at as early a date as possible. the subject of the general revision of the statutory regulations as to boats and life-saving appliances on all ships, which, apart from the questions regarding the boat accommodation on vessels over 10,000 tons, is for the first time referred to the advisory committee by the letter of the 25th instant, together with the particular questions raised in the letters of the 16th, 20th, and 24th instant, are also receiving the immediate attention of the committee. at yesterday's meeting subcommittees were appointed to give immediate consideration to the subjects requiring detailed examination. these subcommittees will pursue their inquiries concurrently, and we are desired by the advisory committee to inform you that their investigation into the revision of the life-saving appliances rules will be proceeded with as expeditiously as possible. we are, etc., norman hill, _chairman_. r. w. matthew, _secretary_. sir walter j. howell, k. c. b., _assistant secretary marine department, board of trade_. * * * * * this letter was acknowledged by the board of trade on may 10, 1912, as follows: * * * * * board of trade, marine department, 7, whitehall gardens, _london, s. w., may 10, 1912_. sir: i am directed by the board of trade to acknowledge the receipt of, and to thank you for, your letter of april 27, stating that their letters of april 16, 20, 24, and 25 have been considered by the merchant shipping advisory committee. the board observes with satisfaction that, in view of the entirely new situation which has arisen, the advisory committee have decided to reopen the question of the revision of the table in the life-saving appliances rules in so far as it governs the boat accommodation in vessels over 10,000 tons gross. the board are further glad to observe that the question of a general revision of the life-saving appliances rules is also under consideration by the committee, and in this connection they presume that, in considering the question of a general revision of the rules including the table, the committee will consider the principles on which the requirements as to boat accommodation should be based, including, inter alia, whether the table should continue to be based on tonnage. any conclusion reached by the committee on this question would naturally affect the revision of the present table as applying to vessels of more than 10,000 tons, upon which the committee has already been engaged. the board agree with the view expressed by the advisory committee that the appointment of another committee on the spacing and construction of water-tight bulkheads is desirable. steps have already been taken by the president to form such a committee, and he hopes to be able to announce the names within a few days. a further communication on this point will be addressed to the committee in the course of a few days. the board are glad to note that subcommittees have been appointed to deal concurrently with the subjects requiring detailed consideration in connection with the revision of the life-saving appliances rules. the board desire me to add that they assume that the committee, in considering the matters referred to them, will have regard to all important aspects of the question of life-saving appliances, whether expressly dealt with in the statutory rules or not, and in particular to the essential question of the adequacy of the provision for lowering and manning the boats and rafts carried by vessels. i am, etc., walter j. howell. the secretary, _merchant shipping advisory committee, 7, whitehall gardens, s. w._ * * * * * this finishes the history of the action of the board of trade in relation to the provision of boat accommodation on emigrant ships. the outstanding circumstance in it is the omission, during so many years, to revise the rules of 1894 and this, i think, was blameable, notwithstanding the excuse or explanation put forward by sir alfred chalmers. i am, however, doubtful whether even if the rules had been revised the change would have been such as to have required boat accommodation which would have increased the number of lives saved. having regard to the recommendations of the advisory committee, the board of trade would probably not have felt justified in making rules which would have required more boat accommodation than that with which the _titanic_ was actually provided; and it is not to be forgotten that the _titanic_ boat accommodation was utilized to less than two-thirds of its capacity. these considerations, however, afford no excuse for the delay of the board of trade. the gross tonnage of a vessel is not, in my opinion, a satisfactory basis on which to calculate the provision of boat accommodation. hitherto, i believe, it has been accepted as the best basis by all nations. but there seems much more to be said in favor of making the number of lives carried the basis and for providing boat or raft accommodation for all on board. rule 12 of the life-saving appliances rules of 1902, which deals with water-tight compartments and boat accommodation, ought to be abolished. the provision of such compartments is of supreme importance, but it is clear that it should not be sought at the expense of a decrease in boat accommodation. when naval architects have devised practical means for rendering ships unsinkable, the question of boat accommodation may have to be reconsidered, but until that time arrives boat accommodation should, where practicable, be carried for all on board. this suggestion may be thought by some to be extravagant. it has never been enforced in the mercantile marine of great britain, nor as far as i know in that of any foreign nation. but it appears, nevertheless, to be admitted by all that it is possible without undue inconvenience or undue interference with commerce to increase considerably in many cases the accommodation hitherto carried, and it seems, therefore, reasonable that the law should require an increase to be made. as far as foreign-going passenger and emigrant steamships are concerned, i am of opinion that, unless justification be shown for deviating from this course, such ships should carry boats or rafts for all on board. with reference to the second branch of the complaint against the board of trade, namely that their officials had failed to exercise due care in the supervision of the vessel's plans and in the inspection of the work done upon her, the charges broke down. suggestions were made that the board's requirements fell short of those of lloyd's registry; but no evidence was forthcoming to support the suggestions. the investigation of the charges took much time, but it only served to show that the officials had discharged their duties carefully and well. powers of the board of trade as regards the supervision of designs of vessels. the _titanic_ was efficiently designed and constructed to meet the contingencies which she was intended to meet. the bulkheads were of ample strength. they were sufficiently closely spaced and were carried up in the vessel to a height greater than sufficient to meet the requirements of the 1891 bulkheads committee. but i am advised that the ship could have been further subdivided so that she would probably have remained afloat longer than she did. the board of trade have, however, apparently no power to exercise any real supervision in the matter of subdivision. all they have express power to insist upon in this connection with respect to any steam vessel is that there shall be four water-tight bulkheads--a provision quite inadequate for safety in a collision damaging the vessel abaft the collision bulkhead. they can also, if invited by the shipowner (but not otherwise), exercise supervision under rule 12. this supervision, i am told, they have been invited to exercise in only 103 cases over a period of 18 years. in 69 of these cases the board have expressed their satisfaction with the subdivision provided. it seems to me that the board should be empowered to require the production of the designs of all passenger steamers at an early period of their construction and to direct such alterations as may appear to them to be necessary and practicable for the purpose of securing proper water-tight subdivision. vii. finding of the court. it is now convenient to answer the 26 questions submitted by the board of trade. 1. when the _titanic_ left queenstown on or about april 11 last: (_a_) what was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board her, and what were their respective ratings? (_b_) what was the total number of her passengers, distinguishing sexes and classes, and discriminating between adults and children? answer. (_a_) the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board the _titanic_ was 885. the respective ratings of these persons were as follows: deck department 66 engine department 325 victualing department 494 -- 885 n. b.--the eight bandsmen are not included in this number, as their names appear in the second class passenger list. (_b_) the total number of passengers was 1,316. of these: ------------------+---------+----------+------- | male. | female. | total. ------------------+---------+----------+------- first class | 180 | 145 | 325 second class | 179 | 106 | 285 third class | 510 | 196 | 706 | | +------- | | | 1,316 ------------------+---------+----------+-------of the above, 6 children were in the first class, 24 in the second class and 79 in the third class. total, 109. 2. before leaving queenstown on or about april 11 last did the _titanic_ comply with the requirements of the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of "passenger steamers" and "emigrant ships?" answer. yes. 3. in the actual design and construction of the _titanic_ what special provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those on board in the event of collisions and other casualties? answer. these have been already described. 4. (_a_) was the _titanic_ sufficiently and efficiently officered and manned? (_b_) were the watches of the officers and crew usual and proper? (_c_) was the _titanic_ supplied with proper charts? answer. (_a_) yes. (_b_) yes. (_c_) yes. 5. (_a_) what was the number of the boats of any kind on board the _titanic_? (_b_) were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the _titanic_ in case of emergency proper and sufficient? (_c_) had a boat drill been held on board, and if so, when? (_d_) what was the carrying capacity of the respective boats? answer. (_a_) 2 emergency boats, 14 lifeboats, 4 engelhardt boats. (_b_) no, but see page 38. (_c_) no. (_d_) the carrying capacity of the 2 emergency boats was for 80 persons; 14 lifeboats was for 910 persons; 4 engelhardt boats was for 188 persons; or a total of 1,178 persons. 6. (_a_) what installations for receiving and transmitting messages by wireless telegraphy were on board the _titanic_? (_b_) how many operators were employed on working such installations? (_c_) were the installations in good and effective working order, and were the number of operators sufficient to enable messages to be received and transmitted continuously by day and night? answer. (_a_) a marconi 5-kilowatt motor generator with two complete sets of apparatus supplied from the ship's dynamos, with an independent storage battery and coil for emergency, was fitted in a house on the boat deck. (_b_) two. (_c_) yes. 7. (_a_) at or prior to the sailing of the _titanic_ what, if any, instructions as to navigation were given to the master or known by him to apply to her voyage? (_b_) were such instructions, if any, safe, proper, and adequate, having regard to the time of year and dangers likely to be encountered during the voyage? answer. (_a_) no special instructions were given, but he had general instructions contained in the book of rules and regulations supplied by the company. (see p. 24.) (_b_) yes, but having regard to subsequent events they would have been better if a reference had been made to the course to be adopted in the event of reaching the region of ice. 8. (_a_) what was in fact the track taken by the _titanic_ in crossing the atlantic ocean? (_b_) did she keep to the track usually followed by liners on voyages from the united kingdom to new york in the month of april? (_c_) are such tracks safe tracks at that time of the year? (_d_) had the master any, and if so, what discretion as regards the track to be taken? answer. (_a_) the outward southern track from queenstown to new york, usually followed in april by large steam vessels. (see page 24.) (_b_) yes, with the exception that instead of altering her course on approaching the position 42° n. 47° w., she stood on on her previous course for some 10 miles farther southwest, turning to s. 86° w. true at 5.50 p.m. (_c_) the outward and homeward bound southern tracks were decided on as the outcome of many years' experience of the normal movement of ice. they were reasonably safe tracks for the time of year, provided, of course, that great caution and vigilance when crossing the ice region were observed. (_d_) yes. capt. smith was not fettered by any orders to remain on the track should information as to the position of ice make it, in his opinion, undesirable to adhere to it. the fact, however, of lane routes having been laid down for the common safety of all would necessarily influence him to keep on (or very near) the accepted route, unless circumstances as indicated above should induce him to deviate largely from it. 9. (_a_) after leaving queenstown on or about the 11th april last, did information reach the _titanic_ by wireless messages or otherwise by signals of the existence of ice in certain latitudes? (_b_) if so, what were such messages or signals and when were they received, and in what position or positions was the ice reported to be, and was the ice reported in or near the track actually being followed by the _titanic_? (_c_) was her course altered in consequence of receiving such information, and, if so, in what way? (_d_) what replies to such messages or signals did the _titanic_ send, and at what times? answer. (_a_) yes. (_b_) see particulars of ice messages already set out (pp. 26-28). (_c_) no; her course was altered as hereinbefore described, but not in consequence of the information received as to ice. (_d_) the material answers were-at 12.55 p.m. steamship _titanic_: * * * * * to commander, _baltic_. thanks for your message and good wishes. had fine weather since leaving. smith. * * * * * at 1.26 p.m. steamship _titanic_: * * * * * to captain, _caronia_. thanks for message and information. have had variable weather throughout. smith. * * * * * 10. (_a_) if at the times referred to in the last preceding question or later the _titanic_ was warned of or had reason to suppose she would encounter ice, at what time might she have reasonably expected to encounter it? (_b_) was a good and proper lookout for ice kept on board? (_c_) were any, and, if so, what, directions given to vary the speed--if so, were they carried out? answer. (_a_) at, or even before, 9.30 p.m. ship's time, on the night of the disaster. (_b_) no. the men in the crow's nest were warned at 9.30 p.m. to keep a sharp lookout for ice; the officer of the watch was then aware that he had reached the reported ice region, and so also was the officer who relieved him at 10 p.m. without implying that those actually on duty were not keeping a good lookout, in view of the night being moonless, there being no wind and perhaps very little swell, and especially in view of the high speed at which the vessel was running, it is not considered that the lookout was sufficient. an extra lookout should, under the circumstances, have been placed at the stemhead, and a sharp lookout should have been kept from both sides of the bridge by an officer. (_c_) no directions were given to reduce speed. 11. (_a_) were binoculars provided for and used by the lookout men? (_b_) is the use of them necessary or usual in such circumstances? (_c_) had the _titanic_ the means of throwing searchlights around her? (_d_) if so, did she make use of them to discover ice? (_e_) should searchlights have been provided and used? answer. (_a_) no. (_b_) no. (_c_) no. (_d_) no. (_e_) no; but searchlights may at times be of service. the evidence before the court does not allow of a more precise answer. 12. (_a_) what other precautions were taken by the _titanic_ in anticipation of meeting ice? (_b_) were they such as are usually adopted by vessels being navigated in waters where ice may be expected to be encountered? answer. (_a_) special orders were given to the men in the crow's nest to keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers. the fore-scuttle hatch was closed to keep everything dark before the bridge. (_b_) yes; though there is evidence to show that some masters would have placed a lookout at the stemhead of the ship. 13. (_a_) was ice seen and reported by anybody on board the _titanic_ before the casualty occurred? (_b_) if so, what measures were taken by the officer on watch to avoid it? (_c_) were they proper measures and were they promptly taken? answer. (_a_) yes; immediately before the collision. (_b_) the helm was put hard astarboard and the engines were stopped and put full speed astern. (_c_) yes. 14. (_a_) what was the speed of the _titanic_ shortly before and at the moment of the casualty? (_b_) was such speed excessive under the circumstances? answer. (_a_) about 22 knots. (_b_) yes. 15. (_a_) what was the nature of the casualty which happened to the _titanic_ at or about 11.45 p.m. on april 14 last? (_b_) in what latitude and longitude did the casualty occur? answer. (_a_) a collision with an iceberg which pierced the starboard side of the vessel in several places below the water line between the forepeak tank and no. 4 boiler room. (_b_) in latitude 41° 46´ n., longitude 50° 14´ w. 16. (_a_) what steps were taken immediately on the happening of the casualty? (_b_) how long after the casualty was its seriousness realized by those in charge of the vessel (_c_) what steps were then taken? (_d_) what endeavors were made to save the lives of those on board, and to prevent the vessel from sinking? answer. (_a_) the 12 water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms were closed from the bridge, some of the boiler fires were drawn, and the bilge pumps abaft no. 6 boiler room were started. (_b_) about 15 to 20 minutes. (_c_) and (_d_) the boats were ordered to be cleared away. the passengers were roused and orders given to get them on deck, and life belts were served out. some of the water-tight doors, other than those in the boiler and engine rooms, were closed. marconigrams were sent out asking for help. distress signals (rockets) were fired, and attempts were made to call up by morse a ship whose lights were seen. eighteen of the boats were swung out and lowered, and the remaining two floated off the ship and were subsequently utilized as rafts. 17. was proper discipline maintained on board after the casualty occurred? answer. yes. 18. (_a_) what messages for assistance were sent by the _titanic_ after the casualty, and at what times respectively? (_b_) what messages were received by her in response, and at what times respectively? (_c_) by what vessels were the messages that were sent by the _titanic_ received, and from what vessels did she receive answers? (_d_) what vessels other than the _titanic_ sent or received messages at or shortly after the casualty in connection with such casualty? (_e_) what were the vessels that sent or received such messages? (_f_) were any vessels prevented from going to the assistance of the _titanic_ or her boats owing to messages received from the _titanic_ or owing to any erroneous messages being sent or received? (_g_) in regard to such erroneous messages, from what vessels were they sent and by what vessels were they received, and at what times respectively? (_a_) (_b_) (_c_) (_d_) and (_e_) are answered together. (_f_) several vessels did not go, owing to their distance. (_g_) there were no erroneous messages. -----------+---------------+---------------------------------------------- new york | titanic time | time. |(approximated).| communications. -----------+---------------+---------------------------------------------- 10.25 p. m.| 12.15 a. m. | la provence receives titanic distress signals. | | do | do | mount temple heard titanic sending cqd. | | says require assistance. gives | | position. can not hear me. advise | | my captain his position 41.46 n., | | 50.24 w. | | do | do | cape race hears titanic giving position | | on cqd. 41.44 n., 50.24 w. | | 10.28 p. m.| 12.18 a. m. | ypiranga hears cqd. from titanic. titanic | | gives cqd. here. position 41.44 n., | | 50.24 w. require assistance (calls | | about 10 times). | | 10.35 p. m.| 12.25 a. m. | cqd. call received from titanic by carpathia. | | titanic said, "come at once. we have | | struck a berg. it's a cqd. om. position | | 41.46 n., 50.14 w." | | do | do | cape race hears m. g. y. (titanic) give | | corrected position 41.46 n., 50.14 w. | | calling him; no answer. | | 10.36 p. m.| 12.25 a. m. | m. g. y. (titanic) says cqd. here corrected | | position 41.46 n., 50.14 w. | | require immediate assistance. we have | | collision with iceberg. sinking. | | can nothing hear for noise of steam. | | sent about 15 to 20 times to ypiranga. | | 10.37 p. m.| 12.27 a. m. | titanic sends following: "i require | | assistance immediately. struck by iceberg | | in 41.46 n., 50.14 w." | | 10.40 p. m.| 12.30 a. m. | titanic gives his position to frankfurt, | | and says, "tell your captain to come | | to our help. we are on the ice." | | do | do | caronia sent cq message to m. b. c. (baltic) | | and cqd: m. g. y. (titanic) struck | | iceberg, require immediate assistance. | | do | | mount temple hears m. g. y. (titanic) still | | calling cqd. our captain reverses | | ship. we are about 50 miles off. | | 10.46 p. m.| 12.36 a. m. | d. k. f. (prinz friedrich wilhelm) calls | | m. g. y. (titanic) and gives position | | at 12 a. m. 39.47 n., 50.10 w. m. g. y. | | (titanic) says, "are you coming to our?" | | d. f. t. (frankfurt) says, "what is the | | matter with u?" m. g. y. (titanic) "we have | | collision with iceberg. sinking. please | | tell captain to come." d. f. t. | | (frankfurt) says, "o. k. will tell." | | 10.48 p. m.| 12.38 a. m. | mount temple hears frankfurt give m. g. y. | | (titanic) his position, 39.47 n., 52.10 w. 10.55 p. m.| 12.45 a. m. | titanic calls olympic sos. | | 11 p. m. | 12.50 a. m. | titanic calls cqd. and says, "i | | require immediate assistance. position | | 41.46 n., 50.14 w." received by celtic. 11.03 p. m.| 12.53 a. m. | caronia to m. b. c. (baltic) and sos., | | m. g. y.(titanic) cqd. in 41.46 n., | | 50.14 w. wants immediate assistance." | | 11.10 p. m.| 1 a. m. | m. g. y. gives distress signal. d. d. c. | | replies. m. g. y.'s position 41.46 n., | | 50.14 w. assistance from d. d. c. not | | necessary, as m. k. c. shortly | | afterwards answers distress call. | | do. | do. | titanic replies to olympic, and gives | | his position as 41.46 n., 50.14 w., and | | says, "we have struck an iceberg." | | 11.12 p. m.| 1.02 a. m. | titanic calls asian and said, "want | | immediate assistance." asian answered | | at once and received titanic's position | | as 41.46 n., 50.14 w., which he immediately | | takes to the bridge. captain instructs | | operator to have titanic's position repeated. | | do. | do. | virginian calls titanic, but gets no response. | | cape race tells virginian to report to his | | captain the titanic has struck iceberg | | and requires immediate assistance. | | 11.20 p. m.| 1.10 a. m. | titanic to m. k. c. (olympic), "we are in | | collision with berg. sinking head | | down; 41.46 n., 50.14 w. come soon | | as possible." | | do. | do. | titanic to m. k. c. (olympic), captain says, | | "get your boats ready. what is | | your position?" | | 11.25 p. m.| 1.15 a. m. | baltic to caronia, "please tell titanic | | we are making toward her." | | 11.30 p. m.| 1.20 a. m. | virginian hears m. c. e. (cape race) inform | | m. g. y. (titanic) "that we are going to | | his assistance. our position 170 miles | | north of titanic." | | 11.35 p. m.| 1.25 a. m. | caronia tells titanic, "baltic coming | | to your assistance." | | do. | do. | olympic sends position to titanic 4.24 | | a. m. gmt. 40.52 n., 61.18 w. | | "are you steering southerly to meet us?" | | titanic replies, "we are putting | | the women off in the boats." | | do. | do. | titanic and olympic work together. | | 11.37 p. m.| 1.27 a. m. | m. g. y. (titanic) says, "we are putting | | the women off in the boats." | | 11.40 p. m.| 1.30 a. m. | titanic tells olympic, "we are putting | | passengers off in small boats." | | 11.45 p. m.| 1.35 a. m. | olympic asks titanic what weather he had. | | titanic replies, "clear and calm." | | do. | do. | baltic hears titanic say "engine room | | getting flooded." | | do. | do. | mount temple hears dft. (frankfurt) ask | | "are there any boats around | | you already." no reply. | | 11.47 p. m.| 1.37 a. m. | baltic tells titanic, "we are rushing | | to you." | | 11.50 p. m.| 1.40 a. m. | olympic to titanic, "am lighting up | | all possible boilers as fast as can." | | do. | do. | cape race says to virginian: "please | | tell your captain this: 'the olympic | | is making all speed for titanic, but | | his (olympic's) position is 40.32 n., | | 61.18 w. you are much nearer to titanic. | | the titanic is already putting women off | | in the boats, and he says the weather | | there is calm and clear.' the olympic is | | the only ship we have heard say, 'going to | | the assistance of the titanic. the others | | must be a long way from the titanic.'" | | 11.55 p. m.| 1.45 a. m. | last signals heard from titanic by | | carpathia, "engine-room full up to | | boilers." | | do. | do. | mount temple hears dft. (frankfurt) | | calling mgy. (titanic). no reply. | | 11.57 p. m.| 1.47 a. m. | caronia hears mgy. (titanic), | | though signals unreadable still. | | 11.58 p. m.| 1.48 a. m. | asian heard titanic call sos. asian | | answers titanic but receives no | | answer. | | midnight. | 1.50 a. m. | caronia hears frankfurt working to | | titanic. frankfurt according to position | | 172 miles from mgy. (titanic) at time | | first sos. sent out. | | 12.05 a. m.| 1.55 a. m. | cape race says to virginian "we have not | | heard titanic for about half | | an hour. his power may be gone." | | 12.10 a. m.| 2 a. m. | virginian hears titanic calling very | | faintly, his power being very greatly | | reduced. | | 12.20 a. m.| 2.10 a. m. | virginian hears 2 v's signaled faintly | | in spark similar to titanic's, probably | | adjusting spark. | | 12.27 a. m.| 2.17 a. m. | virginian hears titanic call cq, but unable | | to read him. titanic's signals end very | | abruptly, as power suddenly switched off. | | his spark rather blurred or ragged. called | | mgy. (titanic) and suggested he should try | | emergency set, but heard no response. | | 12.30 a. m.| 2.20 a. m. | olympic, his sigs. strong, asked him if he | | had heard anything about mgy. (titanic). he | | says, "no. keeping strict watch, but hear | | nothing more from mgy. (titanic)." no reply | | from him. | | 12.52 a. m.| | this was the official time the titanic | | foundered 41.46 n., 50.14 w., as given | | by the carpathia in message to the olympic; | | about 2.20 a. m. | | 1.15 a. m.| | virginian exchanges signals baltic. he | | tries send us msg. for mgy. (titanic), | | but his signals died utterly away. | | 1.25 a. m.| | mount temple hears mpa. (carpathia) send, | | "if you are there we are firing rockets." | | 1.35 a. m.| | baltic sent 1 msg, to virginian for titanic. | | 1.40 a. m.| | mpa. (carpathia) calling mgy. (titanic). | | 1.58 a. m.| | sba. (birma) thinks he hears titanic so | | sends, "steaming full speed for you. shall | | arrive you 6 in morning. hope you are | | safe. we are only 50 miles now." | | 2 a. m. | | mpa. (carpathia) calling mgy. (titanic). | | do. | | have not heard titanic since 11.50 p. m. | | received from ypiranga. | | 2.28 a. m.| | la provence to celtic, "nobody has heard the | | titanic for about 2 hours." | | 3.24 a. m.| | sba. (birma) says we are 30 miles s. w. off | | titanic. | | 3.36 a. m.| | celtic sends message to caronia for the | | titanic. caronia after trying for two | | hours to get through to the titanic tells | | the celtic impossible to clear his message | | to titanic. celtic then cancels message. 3.45 a. m. | | californian exchanges signals with mlq. | | (mount temple). he gave position | | of titanic. | | 4.10 a. m. | | californian receives msg. from mgn. | | (virginian). | | 5.5 a. m. | | baltic signals mpa. (carpathia). | | 5.40 a. m. | | parisian hears weak signals from mpa. | | (carpathia) or some station saying | | titanic struck iceberg. carpathia | | has passengers from lifeboats. | | do. | | olympic tr asian, with german oil tank | | in tow for halifax asked what | | news of mgy. (titanic). sends | | service later saying heard mgy. (titanic) | | _v._ faint wkg. c. race up to 10 p. m., | | local time. finished calling sos. | | midnight. | | 6.5 a. m. | | parisian exchanges trs virginian o. k. nil. | | informed capt. haines what i heard passing | | between ships regarding titanic, and he | | decided not to return as m. p. a. | | (carpathia) was there, and californian | | was 50 miles astern of us, but requested | | me to stand by in case required. | | 6.45 a. m. | | mount temple hears m. p. a. (carpathia) | | report rescued 20 boat loads. | | 7.7 a. m. | | baltic sends following to carpathia: "can | | i be of any assistance to you as | | regards taking some of the passengers | | from you? will be in position about 4.30. | | let me know if you alter your position." | | 7.10 a. m. | | baltic in communication with m. p. a. | | (carpathia). exchanged traffic _re_ | | passengers, and get instructions to | | proceed to liverpool. | | 7.15 a. m. | | baltic turns round for liverpool, having | | steamed 134 miles w. toward titanic. | | 7.40 a. m. | | mount temple hears m. p. a. (carpathia) | | call cq. and say, "no need to std. bi | | him. advise my captain, who has been | | cruising round the icefield | | with no result. ship reversed." | | 7.45 a. m. | | olympic sent m. s. g. to owners, new | | york via sable island, saying | | "have not communicated with titanic | | since midnight." | | 7.55 a. m. | | carpathia replies to baltic, "am | | proceeding to halifax or new york | | full speed. you had better proceed to | | liverpool. have about 800 passengers | | on board." | | 8 a. m. | | carpathia to virginian: "we are leaving | | here with all on board about 800 | | passengers. please return to your | | northern course." -----------+---------------+-------------------------------------------19. (_a_) was the apparatus for lowering the boats on the _titanic_ at the time of the casualty in good working order? (_b_) were the boats swung out, filled, lowered, or otherwise put into the water and got away under proper superintendence? (_c_) were the boats sent away in seaworthy condition and properly manned, equipped, and provisioned? (_d_) did the boats, whether those under davits or otherwise, prove to be efficient and serviceable for the purpose of saving life? answer. (_a_) yes. (_b_) yes. (_c_) the 14 lifeboats, 2 emergency boats, and c and d collapsible boats were sent away in a seaworthy condition, but some of them were possibly undermanned. the evidence on this point was unsatisfactory. the total number of crew taken on board the _carpathia_ exceeded the number which would be required for manning the boats. the collapsible boats a and b appear to have floated off the ship at the time she foundered. the necessary equipment and provisions for the boats were carried in the ship, but some of the boats, nevertheless, left without having their full equipment in them. (_d_) yes. 20. (_a_) what was the number of (_a_) passengers, (_b_) crew taken away in each boat on leaving the vessel? (_b_) how was this number made up, having regard to (1) sex, (2) class, and (3) rating? (_c_) how many were children and how many adults? (_d_) did each boat carry its full load and, if not, why not? answer. (_a_) (_b_) (_c_) it is impossible exactly to say how many persons were carried in each boat or what was their sex, class, and rating, as the totals given in evidence do not correspond with the numbers taken on board the _carpathia_. the boats eventually contained in all 712 persons, made up as shown in the answer to question 21. (_d_) no. at least 8 boats did not carry their full loads for the following reasons: (1) many people did not realize the danger or care to leave the ship at first. (2) some boats were ordered to be lowered with an idea of their coming around to the gangway doors to complete loading. (3) the officers were not certain of the strength and capacity of the boats in all cases (and see p. 39). 21. (_a_) how many persons on board the _titanic_ at the time of the casualty were ultimately rescued and by what means? (_b_) how many lost their lives prior to the arrival of the steamship _carpathia_ in new york? (_c_) what was the number of passengers, distinguishing between men and women and adults and children of the first, second, and third classes, respectively, who were saved? (_d_) what was the number of the crew, discriminating their ratings and sex, that were saved? (_e_) what is the proportion which each of these numbers bears to the corresponding total number on board immediately before the casualty? (_f_) what reason is there for the disproportion, if any? answer. (_a_) seven hundred and twelve, rescued by _carpathia_ from the boats. (_b_) one. (_c_) (_d_) and (_e_) are answered together. the following is a list of the saved: first class: adult males 57 out of 175, or 32.57 per cent. adult females 140 out of 144, or 97.22 per cent. male children (all saved) 5 female children (all saved) 1 --- 203 out of 325, or 62.46 per cent. ==== second class: adult males 14 out of 168, or 8.33 per cent. adult females 80 out of 93, or 86.02 per cent. male children (all saved) 11 female children (all saved) 13 -- 118 out of 285, or 41.40 per cent. ==== third class: adult males 75 out of 462, or 16.23 per cent. adult females 76 out of 165, or 46.06 per cent. male children 13 out of 48, or 27.08 per cent. female children 14 out of 31, or 45.16 per cent. -- 178 out of 706, or 25.21 per cent. ==== total passengers 499 out of 1,316, or 37.94 per cent. ==== crew saved: deck department 43 out of 66, or 65.15 per cent. engine-room department 72 out of 325, or 22.15 per cent. victualing department 97 out of 494, or 19.63 per cent. including women 20 out of 23, or 86.95 per cent. -- 212 out of 885, or 23.95 per cent. ==== total on board saved 711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent. (_f_) the disproportion between the numbers of the passengers saved in the first, second, and third classes is due to various causes, among which the difference in the position of their quarters and the fact that many of the third-class passengers were foreigners, are perhaps the most important. of the irish emigrants in the third class a large proportion was saved. the disproportion was certainly not due to any discrimination by the officers or crew in assisting the passengers to the boats. the disproportion between the numbers of the passengers and crew saved is due to the fact that the crew, for the most part, all attended to their duties to the last, and until all the boats were gone. 22. what happened to the vessel from the happening of the casualty until she foundered? answer. a detailed description has already been given (see pp. 32-34). 23. where and at what time did the _titanic_ founder? answer. two twenty a. m. (ship's time) april 15. latitude 41° 46´ n., longitude 50° 14´ w. 24. (_a_) what was the cause of the loss of the _titanic_ and of the loss of life which thereby ensued or occurred? (_b_) what vessels had the opportunity of rendering assistance to the _titanic_ and, if any, how was it that assistance did not reach the _titanic_ before the steamship _carpathia_ arrived? (_c_) was the construction of the vessel and its arrangements such as to make it difficult for any class of passenger or any portion of the crew to take full advantage of any of the existing provisions for safety? answer. (_a_) collision with an iceberg and the subsequent foundering of the ship. (_b_) the _californian_. she could have reached the _titanic_ if she had made the attempt when she saw the first rocket. she made no attempt. (_c_) no. 25. when the _titanic_ left queenstown on or about april 11 last was she properly constructed and adequately equipped as a passenger steamer and emigrant ship for the atlantic service? answer. yes. 26. the court is invited to report upon the rules and regulations made under the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of those acts and of such rules and regulations, so far as the consideration thereof is material to this casualty, and to make any recommendations or suggestions that it may think fit, having regard to the circumstances of the casualty, with a view to promoting the safety of vessels and persons at sea. answer. an account of the board of trade's administration has already been given and certain recommendations are subsequently made. viii. recommendations. the following recommendations are made. they refer to foreign-going passenger and emigrant steamships: water-tight subdivision. 1. that the newly appointed bulkhead committee should inquire and report, among other matters, on the desirability and practicability of providing ships with (_a_) a double skin carried up above the water line, or, as an alternative, with (_b_) a longitudinal, vertical, water-tight bulkhead on each side of the ship, extending as far forward and aft as convenient, or (_c_) with a combination of (_a_) and (_b_). any one of the three (_a_), (_b_), and (_c_) to be in addition to water-tight transverse bulkheads. 2. that the committee should also inquire and report as to the desirability and practicability of fitting ships with (_a_) a deck or decks at a convenient distance or distances above the water line which shall be water-tight throughout a part or the whole of the ship's length; and should in this connection report upon (_b_) the means by which the necessary openings in such deck or decks should be made water-tight, whether by water-tight doors or water-tight trunks or by any other and what means. 3. that the committee should consider and report generally on the practicability of increasing the protection given by subdivision, the object being to secure that the ship shall remain afloat with the greatest practicable proportion of her length in free communication with the sea. 4. that when the committee has reported upon the matters before mentioned, the board of trade should take the report into their consideration and to the extent to which they approve of it should seek statutory powers to enforce it in all newly built ships, but with a discretion to relax the requirements in special cases where it may seem right to them to do so. 5. that the board of trade should be empowered by the legislature to require the production of the designs and specifications of all ships in their early stages of construction and to direct such amendments of the same as may be thought necessary and practicable for the safety of life at sea in ships. (this should apply to all passenger-carrying ships.) lifeboats and rafts. 6. that the provision of lifeboat and raft accommodation on board such ships should be based on the number of persons intended to be carried in the ship and not upon tonnage. 7. that the question of such accommodation should be treated independently of the question of the subdivision of the ship into water-tight compartments. (this involves the abolition of rule 12 of the life saving appliances rules of 1902.) 8. that the accommodation should be sufficient for all persons on board with, however, the qualification that in special cases where, in the opinion of the board of trade, such provision is impracticable, the requirements may be modified as the board may think right. (in order to give effect to this recommendation changes may be necessary in the sizes and types of boats to be carried and in the method of stowing and floating them. it may also be necessary to set apart one or more of the boat decks exclusively for carrying boats and drilling the crew, and to consider the distribution of decks in relation to the passengers' quarters. these, however, are matters of detail to be settled with reference to the particular circumstance affecting the ship.) 9. that all boats should be fitted with a protective continuous fender, to lessen the risk of damage when being lowered in a seaway. 10. that the board of trade should be empowered to direct that one or more of the boats be fitted with some form of mechanical propulsion. 11. that there should be a board of trade regulation requiring all boat equipment (under secs. 5 and 6, p. 15, of the rules, dated february, 1902, made by the board of trade under sec. 427, merchant shipping act, 1894) to be in the boats as soon as the ship leaves harbor. the sections quoted above should be amended so as to provide also that all boats and rafts should carry lamps and pyrotechnic lights for purposes of signaling. all boats should be provided with compasses and provisions, and should be very distinctly marked in such a way as to indicate plainly the number of adult persons each boat can carry when being lowered. 12. that the board of trade inspection of boats and life-saving appliances should be of a more searching character than hitherto. manning the boats and boat drills. 13. that in cases where the deck hands are not sufficient to man the boats enough other members of the crew should be men trained in boat work to make up the deficiency. these men should be required to pass a test in boat work. 14. that in view of the necessity of having on board men trained in boat work, steps should be taken to encourage the training of boys for the merchant service. 15. that the operation of section 115 and section 134 (_a_) of the merchant shipping act, 1894, should be examined, with a view to amending the same so as to secure greater continuity of service than hitherto. 16. that the men who are to man the boats should have more frequent drills than hitherto. that in all ships a boat drill, a fire drill, and a water-tight door drill should be held as soon as possible after leaving the original port of departure and at convenient intervals of not less than once a week during the voyage. such drills to be recorded in the official log. 17. that the board of trade should be satisfied in each case before the ship leaves port that a scheme has been devised and communicated to each officer of the ship for securing an efficient working of the boats. general. 18. that every man taking a lookout in such ships should undergo a sight test at reasonable intervals. 19. that in all such ships a police system should be organized so as to secure obedience to orders, and proper control and guidance of all on board in times of emergency. 20. that in all such ships there should be an installation of wireless telegraphy, and that such installation should be worked with a sufficient number of trained operators to secure a continuous service by night and day. in this connection regard should be had to the resolutions of the international conference on wireless telegraphy recently held under the presidency of sir h. babington smith. that where practicable a silent chamber for "receiving" messages should form part of the installation. 21. that instruction should be given in all steamship companies' regulations that when ice is reported in or near the track the ship should proceed in the dark hours at a moderate speed or alter her course so as to go well clear of the danger zone. 22. that the attention of masters of vessels should be drawn by the board of trade to the effect that under the maritime conventions act, 1911, it is a misdemeanor not to go to the relief of a vessel in distress when possible to do so. 23. that the same protection as to the safety of life in the event of casualty which is afforded to emigrant ships by means of supervision and inspection should be extended to all foreign-going passenger ships. 24. that (unless already done) steps should be taken to call an international conference to consider and as far as possible to agree upon a common line of conduct in respect of (_a_) the subdivision of ships; (_b_) the provision and working of life-saving appliances; (_c_) the installation of wireless telegraphy and the method of working the same; (_d_) the reduction of speed or the alteration of course in the vicinity of ice; and (_e_) the use of searchlights. mersey, _wreck commissioner_. we concur. arthur gough-calthorpe, a. w. clarke, f. c. a. lyon, j. h. biles, edward c. chaston, _assessors_. july 30, 1912. footnotes: [1] there was another water-tight door at the after end of the water-tight passage through the bunker immediately aft of d bulkhead. this door and the one on the d bulkhead formed a double protection to the forward boiler room. [2] the water-tight doors for these bulkheads were not on them, but were at the end of a water-tight passage (about 9 feet long), leading from the bulkhead through the bunker into the compartment. [3] floated off when the ship sank and was utilized as a raft. [4] it may be mentioned that mr. archer stated in the witness box that since the disaster to the titanic he had modified his views and thought that rule 12 should be discontinued. [5] see rule of june 14, 1911. [6] see rule of june 14, 1911. sinking of the titanic and great sea disasters by various edited by logan marshall pre-frontispiece caption: the titanic the largest and finest steamship in the world; on her maiden voyage, loaded with a human freight of over 2,300 souls, she collided with a huge iceberg 600 miles southeast of halifax, at 11.40 p.m. sunday april 14, 1912, and sank two and a half hours later, carrying over 1,600 of her passengers and crew with her. frontispiece caption: captain e. j. smith of the ill-fated giant of the sea; a brave and seasoned commander who was carried to his death with his last and greatest ship. sinking of the titanic and great sea disasters a detailed and accurate account of the most awful marine disaster in history, constructed from the real facts as obtained from those on board who survived.......... only authoritative book including records of previous great disasters of the sea, descriptions of the developments of safety and life-saving appliances, a plain statement of the causes of such catastrophes and how to avoid them, the marvelous development of shipbuilding, etc. with a message of spiritual consolation by rev. henry van dyke, d.d. edited by logan marshall author of "life of theodore roosevelt," etc. illustrated with numerous authentic photographs and drawings dedication to the 1635 souls who were lost with the ill-fated titanic, and especially to those heroic men, who, instead of trying to save themselves, stood aside that women and children might have their chance; of each of them let it be written, as it was written of a greater one--"he died that others might live" "i stood in unimaginable trance and agony that cannot be remembered."--coleridge dr. van dyke's spiritual consolation to the survivors of the titanic the titanic, greatest of ships, has gone to her ocean grave. what has she left behind her? think clearly. she has left debts. vast sums of money have been lost. some of them are covered by insurance which will be paid. the rest is gone. all wealth is insecure. she has left lessons. the risk of running the northern course when it is menaced by icebergs is revealed. the cruelty of sending a ship to sea without enough life-boats and life-rafts to hold her company is exhibited and underlined in black. she has left sorrows. hundreds of human hearts and homes are in mourning for the loss of dear companions and friends. the universal sympathy which is written in every face and heard in every voice proves that man is more than the beasts that perish. it is an evidence of the divine in humanity. why should we care? there is no reason in the world, unless there is something in us that is different from lime and carbon and phosphorus, something that makes us mortals able to suffer together- "for we have all of us an human heart." but there is more than this harvest of debts, and lessons, and sorrows, in the tragedy of the sinking of the titanic. there is a great ideal. it is clearly outlined and set before the mind and heart of the modern world, to approve and follow, or to despise and reject. it is, "women and children first!" whatever happened on that dreadful april night among the arctic ice, certainly that was the order given by the brave and steadfast captain; certainly that was the law obeyed by the men on the doomed ship. but why? there is no statute or enactment of any nation to enforce such an order. there is no trace of such a rule to be found in the history of ancient civilizations. there is no authority for it among the heathen races to-day. on a chinese ship, if we may believe the report of an official representative, the rule would have been "men first, children next, and women last." there is certainly no argument against this barbaric rule on physical or material grounds. on the average, a man is stronger than a woman, he is worth more than a woman, he has a longer prospect of life than a woman. there is no reason in all the range of physical and economic science, no reason in all the philosophy of the superman, why he should give his place in the life-boat to a woman. where, then, does this rule which prevailed in the sinking titanic come from? it comes from god, through the faith of jesus of nazareth. it is the ideal of self-sacrifice. it is the rule that "the strong ought to bear the infirmities of those that are weak." it is the divine revelation which is summed up in the words: "greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." it needs a tragic catastrophe like the wreck of the titanic to bring out the absolute contradiction between this ideal and all the counsels of materialism and selfish expediency. i do not say that the germ of this ideal may not be found in other religions. i do not say that they are against it. i do not ask any man to accept my theology (which grows shorter and simpler as i grow older), unless his heart leads him to it. but this i say: the ideal that the strength of the strong is given them to protect and save the weak, the ideal which animates the rule of "women and children first," is in essential harmony with the spirit of christ. if what he said about our father in heaven is true, this ideal is supremely reasonable. otherwise it is hard to find arguments for it. the tragedy of facts sets the question clearly before us. think about it. is this ideal to survive and prevail in our civilization or not? without it, no doubt, we may have riches and power and dominion. but what a world to live in! only through the belief that the strong are bound to protect and save the weak because god wills it so, can we hope to keep self-sacrifice, and love, and heroism, and all the things that make us glad to live and not afraid to die. henry van dyke. princeton, n. j., april 18, 1912. contents chapter i first news of the greatest marine disaster in history "the titanic in collision, but everybody safe"--another triumph set down to wireless telegraphy--the world goes to sleep peacefully--the sad awakening chapter ii the most sumptuous palace afloat dimensions of the titanic--capacity--provisions for the comfort and entertainment of passengers--mechanical equipment--the army of attendants required chapter iii the maiden voyage of the titanic preparations for the voyage--scenes of gayety--the boat sails--incidents of the voyage--a collision narrowly averted--the boat on fire--warned of icebergs chapter iv some of the notable passengers sketches of prominent men and women on board, including major archibald butt, john jacob astor, benjamin guggenheim, isidor straus, j. bruce ismay, geo. d. widener, colonel washington roebling, 2d, charles m. hays, w. t. stead and others chapter v the titanic strikes an iceberg! tardy attention to warning responsible for accident--the danger not realized at first--an interrupted card game--passengers joke among themselves--the real truth dawns--panic on board--wireless calls for help. chapter vi "women and children first" cool-headed officers and crew bring order out of chaos--filling the life-boats--heartrending scenes as families are parted--four life-boats lost--incidents of bravery--"the boats are all filled!" chapter vii left to their fate coolness and heroism of those left to perish--suicide of murdock--captain smith's end--the ship's band plays a noble hymn as the vessel goes down. chapter viii the call for help heard the value of the wireless--other ships alter their course--rescuers on the way. chapter ix in the drifting life-boats sorrow and suffering--the survivors see the titanic go down with their loved ones on board--a night of agonizing suspense--women help to row--help arrives--picking up the life-boats. chapter x on board the carpathia aid for the suffering and hysterical--burying the dead--vote of thanks to captain rostron of the carpathia--identifying those saved--communicating with land--the passage to new york. chapter xi preparations on land to receive the sufferers police arrangements--donations of money and supplies--hospital and ambulances made ready--private houses thrown open--waiting for the carpathia to arrive--the ship sighted! chapter xii the tragic home-coming the carpathia reaches new york--an intense and dramatic moment--hysterical reunions and crushing disappointments at the dock--caring for the sufferers--final realization that all hope for others is futile--list of survivors--roll of the dead. chapter xiii the story of charles f. hurd how the titanic sank--water strewn with dead bodies--victims met death with hymn on their lips. chapter xiv thrilling account by l. beasley collision only a slight jar--passengers could not believe the vessel doomed--narrow escape of life-boats--picked up by the carpathia. chapter xv jack thayer's own story of the wreck seventeen-year-old son of pennsylvania railroad official tells moving story of his rescue--told mother to be brave--separated from parents--jumped when vessel sank--drifted on overturned boat--picked up by carpathia. chapter xvi incidents related by james mcgough women forced into the life-boats--why some men were saved before women--asked to man life-boats. chapter xvii wireless operator praises heroic work story of harold bride, the surviving wireless operator of the titanic, who was washed overboard and rescued by life-boat--band played ragtime and "autumn". chapter xviii story of the steward passengers and crew dying when taken aboard carpathia--one woman saved a dog--english colonel swam for hours when boat with mother aboard capsized. chapter xix how the world received the news nations prostrate with grief--messages from kings and cardinals--disaster stirs world to necessity of stricter regulations. chapter xx bravery of the officers and crew illustrious career of captain e. j. smith--brave to the last--maintenance of order and discipline--acts of heroism--engineers died at posts--noble-hearted band. chapter xxi searching for the dead sending out the mackay-bennett and minia--bremen passengers see bodies--identifying bodies--confusion in names--recoveries. chapter xxii criticism of ismay criminal and cowardly conduct charged--proper caution not exercised when presence of icebergs was known--should have stayed on board to help in work of rescue--selfish and unsympathetic actions on board the carpathia--ismay's defense--william e. carter's statement. chapter xxiii the financial loss titanic not fully insured--valuable cargo and mail--no chance for salvage--life insurance loss--loss to the carpathia. chapter xxiv opinions of experts captain e. k. roden, lewis nixon, general greely and robert h. kirk point out lessons taught by titanic disaster and needed changes in construction. chapter xxv other great marine disasters. deadly danger of icebergs--dozens of ships perish in collision--other disasters. chapter xxvi development of shipbuilding evolution of water travel--increases in size of vessels--is there any limit?--achievements in speed--titanic not the last word. chapter xxvii safety and life-saving devices wireless telegraphy--water-tight bulkheads--submarine signals--life-boats and rafts--nixon's pontoon--life-preservers and buoys--rockets. chapter xxviii time for reflection and reform speed and luxury overemphasized--space needed for life-boats devoted to swimming pools and squash-courts--mania for speed records compels use of dangerous routes and prevents proper caution in foggy weather--life more valuable than luxury--safety more important than speed--an aroused public opinion necessary--international conference recommended--adequate life-saving equipment should be compulsory--speed regulations in bad weather--co-operation in arranging schedules to keep vessels within reach of each other--legal regulations. chapter xxix the senatorial investigation prompt action of the government--senate committee probes disaster and brings out details--testimony of ismay, officers, crew passengers and other witnesses. facts about the wreck of the titanic number of persons aboard, 2340. number of life-boats and rafts, 20. capacity of each life-boat, 50 passengers and crew of 8. utmost capacity of life-boats and rafts, about 1100. number of life-boats wrecked in launching, 4. capacity of life-boats safely launched, 928. total number of persons taken in life-boats, 711. number who died in life-boats, 6. total number saved, 705. total number of titanic's company lost, 1635. the cause of the disaster was a collision with an iceberg in latitude 41.46 north, longitude 50.14 west. the titanic had had repeated warnings of the presence of ice in that part of the course. two official warnings had been received defining the position of the ice fields. it had been calculated on the titanic that she would reach the ice fields about 11 o'clock sunday night. the collision occurred at 11.40. at that time the ship was driving at a speed of 21 to 23 knots, or about 26 miles, an hour. there had been no details of seamen assigned to each boat. some of the boats left the ship without seamen enough to man the oars. some of the boats were not more than half full of passengers. the boats had no provisions, some of them had no water stored, some were without sail equipment or compasses. in some boats, which carried sails wrapped and bound, there was not a person with a knife to cut the ropes. in some boats the plugs in the bottom had been pulled out and the women passengers were compelled to thrust their hands into the holes to keep the boats from filling and sinking. the captain, e. j. smith, admiral of the white star fleet, went down with his ship. chapter i. first news of the greatest marine disaster in history "the titanic in collision, but everybody safe"--another triumph set down to wireless telegraphy--the world goes to sleep peacefully--the sad awakening. like a bolt out of a clear sky came the wireless message on monday, april 15, 1912, that on sunday night the great titanic, on her maiden voyage across the atlantic, had struck a gigantic iceberg, but that all the passengers were saved. the ship had signaled her distress and another victory was set down to wireless. twenty-one hundred lives saved! additional news was soon received that the ship had collided with a mountain of ice in the north atlantic, off cape race, newfoundland, at 10.25 sunday evening, april 14th. at 4.15 monday morning the canadian government marine agency received a wireless message that the titanic was sinking and that the steamers towing her were trying to get her into shoal water near cape race, for the purpose of beaching her. wireless despatches up to noon monday showed that the passengers of the titanic were being transferred aboard the steamer carpathia, a cunarder, which left new york, april 13th, for naples. twenty boat-loads of the titanic's passengers were said to have been transferred to the carpathia then, and allowing forty to sixty persons as the capacity of each life-boat, some 800 or 1200 persons had already been transferred from the damaged liner to the carpathia. they were reported as being taken to halifax, whence they would be sent by train to new york. another liner, the parisian, of the allan company, which sailed from glasgow for halifax on april 6th, was said to be close at hand and assisting in the work of rescue. the baltic, virginian and olympic were also near the scene, according to the information received by wireless. while badly damaged, the giant vessel was reported as still afloat, but whether she could reach port or shoal water was uncertain. the white star officials declared that the titanic was in no immediate danger of sinking, because of her numerous water-tight compartments. "while we are still lacking definite information," mr. franklin, vice-president of the white star line, said later in the afternoon, "we believe the titanic's passengers will reach halifax, wednesday evening. we have received no further word from captain haddock, of the olympic, or from any of the ships in the vicinity, but are confident that there will be no loss of life." with the understanding that the survivors would be taken to halifax the line arranged to have thirty pullman cars, two diners and many passenger coaches leave boston monday night for halifax to get the passengers after they were landed. mr. franklin made a guess that the titanic's passengers would get into halifax on wednesday. the department of commerce and labor notified the white star line that customs and immigration inspectors would be sent from montreal to halifax in order that there would be as little delay as possible in getting the passengers on trains. monday night the world slept in peace and assurance. a wireless message had finally been received, reading: "all titanic's passengers safe." it was not until nearly a week later that the fact was discovered that this message had been wrongly received in the confusion of messages flashing through the air, and that in reality the message should have read: "are all titanic's passengers safe?" with the dawning of tuesday morning came the awful news of the true fate of the titanic. chapter ii. the most sumptuous palace afloat dimensions of the titanic--capacity--provisions for the comfort and entertainment of passengers--mechanical equipment the army of attendants required. the statistical record of the great ship has news value at this time. early in 1908 officials of the white star company announced that they would eclipse all previous records in shipbuilding with a vessel of staggering dimensions. the titanic resulted. the keel of the ill-fated ship was laid in the summer of 1909 at the harland & wolff yards, belfast. lord pirrie, considered one of the best authorities on shipbuilding in the world, was the designer. the leviathan was launched on may 31, 1911, and was completed in february, 1912, at a cost of $10,000,000. sister ship of olympic the titanic, largest liner in commission, was a sister ship of the olympic. the registered tonnage of each vessel is estimated as 45,000, but officers of the white star line say that the titanic measured 45,328 tons. the titanic was commanded by captain e. j. smith, the white star admiral, who had previously been on the olympic. she was 882 1/2 long, or about four city blocks, and was 5000 tons bigger than a battleship twice as large as the dreadnought delaware. like her sister ship, the olympic, the titanic was a four-funneled vessel, and had eleven decks. the distance from the keel to the top of the funnels was 175 feet. she had an average speed of twenty-one knots. the titanic could accommodate 2500 passengers. the steamship was divided into numerous compartments, separated by fifteen bulkheads. she was equipped with a gymnasium, swimming pool, hospital with operating room, and a grill and palm garden. carried crew of 860 the registered tonnage was 45,000, and the displacement tonnage 66,000. she was capable of carrying 2500 passengers and the crew numbered 860. the largest plates employed in the hull were 36 feet long, weighing 43 1/2 tons each, and the largest steel beam used was 92 feet long, the weight of this double beam being 4 tons. the rudder, which was operated electrically, weighed 100 tons, the anchors 15 1/2 tons each, the center (turbine) propeller 22 tons, and each of the two "wing" propellers 38 tons each. the after "boss-arms," from which were sus-pended the three propeller shafts, tipped the scales at 73 1/2 tons, and the forward "boss-arms" at 45 tons. each link in the anchor-chains weighed 175 pounds. there were more than 2000 side-lights and windows to light the public rooms and passenger cabins. nothing was left to chance in the construction of the titanic. three million rivets (weighing 1200 tons) held the solid plates of steel together. to insure stability in binding the heavy plates in the double bottom, half a million rivets, weighing about 270 tons, were used. all the plating of the hulls was riveted by hydraulic power, driving seven-ton riveting machines, suspended from traveling cranes. the double bottom extended the full length of the vessel, varying from 5 feet 3 inches to 6 feet 3 inches in depth, and lent added strength to the hull. most luxurious steamship not only was the titanic the largest steamship afloat but it was the most luxurious. elaborately furnished cabins opened onto her eleven decks, and some of these decks were reserved as private promenades that were engaged with the best suites. one of these suites was sold for $4350 for the boat's maiden and only voyage. suites similar, but which were without the private promenade decks, sold for $2300. the titanic differed in some respects from her sister ship. the olympic has a lower promenade deck, but in the titanic's case the staterooms were brought out flush with the outside of the superstructure, and the rooms themselves made much larger. the sitting rooms of some of the suites on this deck were 15 x 15 feet. the restaurant was much larger than that of the olympic and it had a novelty in the shape of a private promenade deck on the starboard side, to be used exclusively by its patrons. adjoining it was a reception room, where hosts and hostesses could meet their guests. two private promenades were connected with the two most luxurious suites on the ship. the suites were situated about amidships, one on either side of the vessel, and each was about fifty feet long. one of the suites comprised a sitting room, two bedrooms and a bath. these private promenades were expensive luxuries. the cost figured out something like forty dollars a front foot for a six days' voyage. they, with the suites to which they are attached, were the most expensive transatlantic accommodations yet offered. the engine room the engine room was divided into two sections, one given to the reciprocating engines and the other to the turbines. there were two sets of the reciprocating kind, one working each of the wing propellers through a four-cylinder triple expansion, direct acting inverted engine. each set could generate 15,000 indicated horse-power at seventy-five revolutions a minute. the parsons type turbine takes steam from the reciprocating engines, and by developing a horse-power of 16,000 at 165 revolutions a minute works the third of the ship's propellers, the one directly under the rudder. of the four funnels of the vessel three were connected with the engine room, and the fourth or after funnel for ventilating the ship including the gallery. practically all of the space on the titanic below the upper deck was occupied by steam-generating plant, coal bunkers and propelling machinery. eight of the fifteen water-tight compartments contained the mechanical part of the vessel. there were, for instance, twenty-four double end and five single end boilers, each 16 feet 9 inches in diameter, the larger 20 feet long and the smaller 11 feet 9 inches long. the larger boilers had six fires under each of them and the smaller three furnaces. coal was stored in bunker space along the side of the ship between the lower and middle decks, and was first shipped from there into bunkers running all the way across the vessel in the lowest part. from there the stokers handed it into the furnaces. one of the most interesting features of the vessel was the refrigerating plant, which comprised a huge ice-making and refrigerating machine and a number of provision rooms on the after part of the lower and orlop decks. there were separate cold rooms for beef, mutton, poultry, game, fish, vegetables, fruit, butter, bacon, cheese, flowers, mineral water, wine, spirits and champagne, all maintained at different temperatures most suitable to each. perishable freight had a compartment of its own, also chilled by the plant. comfort and stability two main ideas were carried out in the titanic. one was comfort and the other stability. the vessel was planned to be an ocean ferry. she was to have only a speed of twenty-one knots, far below that of some other modern vessels, but she was planned to make that speed, blow high or blow low, so that if she left one side of the ocean at a given time she could be relied on to reach the other side at almost a certain minute of a certain hour. one who has looked into modern methods for safeguarding {illust. caption = life-boat and davits on the titanic this diagram shows very clearly the arrangement of the life-boats and the manner in which they were launched.} a vessel of the titanic type can hardly imagine an accident that could cause her to founder. no collision such as has been the fate of any ship in recent years, it has been thought up to this time, could send her down, nor could running against an iceberg do it unless such an accident were coupled with the remotely possible blowing out of a boiler. she would sink at once, probably, if she were to run over a submerged rock or derelict in such manner that both her keel plates and her double bottom were torn away for more than half her length; but such a catastrophe was so remotely possible that it did not even enter the field of conjecture. the reason for all this is found in the modern arrangement of water-tight steel compartments into which all ships now are divided and of which the titanic had fifteen so disposed that half of them, including the largest, could be flooded without impairing the safety of the vessel. probably it was the working of these bulkheads and the water-tight doors between them as they are supposed to work that saved the titanic from foundering when she struck the iceberg. these bulkheads were of heavy sheet steel and started at the very bottom of the ship and extended right up to the top side. the openings in the bulkheads were just about the size of the ordinary doorway, but the doors did not swing as in a house, but fitted into water-tight grooves above the opening. they could be released instantly in several ways, and once closed formed a barrier to the water as solid as the bulkhead itself. in the titanic, as in other great modern ships, these doors were held in place above the openings by friction clutches. on the bridge was a switch which connected with an electric magnet at the side of the bulkhead opening. the turning of this switch caused the magnet to draw down a heavy weight, which instantly released the friction clutch, and allowed the door to fall or slide down over the opening in a second. if, however, through accident the bridge switch was rendered useless the doors would close automatically in a few seconds. this was arranged by means of large metal floats at the side of the doorways, which rested just above the level of the double bottom, and as the water entered the compartments these floats would rise to it and directly release the clutch holding the door open. these clutches could also be released by hand. it was said of the titanic that liner compartments could be flooded as far back or as far forward as the engine room and she would float, though she might take on a heavy list, or settle considerably at one end. to provide against just such an accident as she is said to have encountered she had set back a good distance from the bows an extra heavy cross partition known as the collision bulkhead, which would prevent water getting in amidships, even though a good part of her bow should be torn away. what a ship can stand and still float was shown a few years ago when the suevic of the white star line went on the rocks on the british coast. the wreckers could not move the forward part of her, so they separated her into two sections by the use of dynamite, and after putting in a temporary bulkhead floated off the after half of the ship, put it in dry dock and built a new forward part for her. more recently the battleship maine, or what was left of her, was floated out to sea, and kept on top of the water by her water-tight compartments only. chapter iii. the maiden voyage of the titanic preparations for the voyage--scenes of gayety--the boat sails--incidents of the voyage---a collision narrowly averted--the boat on fire--warned of icebergs. ever was ill-starred voyage more auspiciously begun than when the titanic, newly crowned empress of the seas, steamed majestically out of the port of southampton at noon on wednesday, april 10th, bound for new york. elaborate preparations had been made for the maiden voyage. crowds of eager watchers gathered to witness the departure, all the more interested because of the notable people who were to travel aboard her. friends and relatives of many of the passengers were at the dock to bid godspeed to their departing loved ones. the passengers themselves were unusually gay and happy. majestic and beautiful the ship rested on the water, marvel of shipbuilding, worthy of any sea. as this new queen of the ocean moved slowly from her dock, no one questioned her construction: she was fitted with an elaborate system of {illust. caption = steamer "titanic" compared with the largest structures in the world 1. bunker hill monument. boston, 221 feet high. 2. public {illust. caption = j. bruce ismay managing director of the international mercantile marine, and managing director of the white....} {illust. caption = charles m. hays president of the grand trunk pacific railways, numbered among the heroic men....} water-tight compartments, calculated to make her unsinkable; she had been pronounced the safest as well as the most sumptuous atlantic liner afloat. there was silence just before the boat pulled out--the silence that usually precedes the leave-taking. the heavy whistles sounded and the splendid titanic, her flags flying and her band playing, churned the water and plowed heavily away. then the titanic, with the people on board waving handkerchiefs and shouting good-byes that could be heard only as a buzzing murmur on shore, rode away on the ocean, proudly, majestically, her head up and, so it seemed, her shoulders thrown back. if ever a vessel seemed to throb with proud life, if ever a monster of the sea seemed to "feel its oats" and strain at the leash, if ever a ship seemed to have breeding and blue blood that would keep it going until its heart broke, that ship was the titanic. and so it was only her due that as the titanic steamed out of the harbor bound on her maiden voyage a thousand "god-speeds" were wafted after her, while every other vessel that she passed, the greatest of them dwarfed by her colossal proportions, paid homage to the new queen regnant with the blasts of their whistles and the shrieking of steam sirens. the ship's captain in command of the titanic was captain e. j. smith, a veteran of the seas, and admiral of the white star line fleet. the next six officers, in the order of their rank, were murdock, lightollder,{sic} pitman, boxhall, lowe and moody. dan phillips was chief wireless operator, with harold bride as assistant. from the forward bridge, fully ninety feet above the sea, peered out the benign face of the ship's master, cool of aspect, deliberate of action, impressive in that quality of confidence that is bred only of long experience in command. from far below the bridge sounded the strains of the ship's orchestra, playing blithely a favorite air from "the chocolate soldier." all went as merry as a wedding bell. indeed, among that gay ship's company were two score or more at least for whom the wedding bells had sounded in truth not many days before. some were on their honeymoon tours, others were returning to their motherland after having passed the weeks of the honeymoon, like colonel john jacob astor and his young bride, amid the diversions of egypt or other old world countries. what daring flight of imagination would have ventured the prediction that within the span of six days that stately ship, humbled, shattered and torn asunder, would lie two thousand fathoms deep at the bottom of the atlantic, that the benign face that peered from the bridge would be set in the rigor of death and that the happy bevy of voyaging brides would be sorrowing widows? almost in a collision the big vessel had, however, a touch of evil fortune before she cleared the harbor of southampton. as she passed down stream her immense bulk--she displaced 66,000 tons--drew the waters after her with an irresistible suction that tore the american liner new york from her moorings; seven steel hawsers were snapped like twine. the new york floated toward the white star ship, and would have rammed the new ship had not the tugs vulcan and neptune stopped her and towed her back to the quay. when the mammoth ship touched at cherbourg and later at queenstown she was again the object of a port ovation, the smaller craft doing obeisance while thousands gazed in wonder at her stupendous proportions. after taking aboard some additional passengers at each port, the titanic headed her towering bow toward the open sea and the race for a record on her maiden voyage was begun. new burst of speed each day the titanic made 484 miles as her first day's run, her powerful new engines turning over at the rate of seventy revolutions. on the second day out the speed was hit up to seventy-three revolutions and the run for the day was bulletined as 519 miles. still further increasing the speed, the rate of revolution of the engines was raised to seventy-five and the day's run was 549 miles, the best yet scheduled. but the ship had not yet been speeded to her capacity she was capable of turning over about seventy-eight revolutions. had the weather conditions been propitious, it was intended to press the great racer to the full limit of her speed on monday. but for the titanic monday never came. fire in the coal bunkers unknown to the passengers, the titanic was on fire from the day she sailed from southampton. her officers and crew knew it, for they had fought the fire for days. this story, told for the first time by the survivors of the crew, was only one of the many thrilling tales of the fateful first voyage. "the titanic sailed from southampton on wednesday, april 10th, at noon," said j. dilley, fireman on the titanic. "i was assigned to the titanic from the oceanic, where i had served as a fireman. from the day we sailed the titanic was on fire, and my sole duty, together with eleven other men, had been to fight that fire. we had made no headway against it." passengers in ignorance "of course," he went on, "the passengers knew nothing of the fire. do you think we'd have let them know about it? no, sir. "the fire started in bunker no. 6. there were hundreds of tons of coal stored there. the coal on top of the bunker was wet, as all the coal should have been, but down at the bottom of the bunker the coal had been permitted to get dry. "the dry coal at the bottom of the pile took fire, and smoldered for days. the wet coal on top kept the flames from coming through, but down in the bottom of the bunkers the flames were raging. "two men from each watch of stokers were tolled off, to fight that fire. the stokers worked four hours at a time, so twelve of us were fighting flames from the day we put out of southampton until we hit the iceberg. "no, we didn't get that fire out, and among the stokers there was talk that we'd have to empty the big coal bunkers after we'd put our passengers off in new york, and then call on the fire-boats there to help us put out the fire. "the stokers were alarmed over it, but the officers told us to keep our mouths shut--they didn't want to alarm the passengers." usual diversion until sunday, april 14th, then, the voyage had apparently been a delightful but uneventful one. the passengers had passed the time in the usual diversions of ocean travelers, amusing themselves in the luxurious saloons, promenading on the boat deck, lolling at their ease in steamer chairs and making pools on the daily runs of the steamship. the smoking rooms and card rooms had been as well patronized as usual, and a party of several notorious professional gamblers had begun reaping their usual easy harvest. as early as sunday afternoon the officers of the titanic must have known that they were approaching dangerous ice fields of the kind that are a perennial menace to the safety of steamships following the regular transatlantic lanes off the great banks of newfoundland. an unheeded warning on sunday afternoon the titanic's wireless operator forwarded to the hydrographic office in washington, baltimore, philadelphia and elsewhere the following dispatch: "april 14.--the german steamship amerika (hamburg-american line) reports by radio-telegraph passing two large icebergs in latitude 41.27, longitude 50.08.--titanic, br. s. s." despite this warning, the titanic forged ahead sunday night at her usual speed--from twenty-one to twenty-five knots. chapter iv. some of the notable passengers sketches of prominent men and women on board, including major archibald butt, john jacob astor, benjamin guggenheim, isidor straws, j. bruce ismay, george d. widener, colonel washington roebling, 2d, charles m. hays, w. t. stead and others the ship's company was of a character befitting the greatest of all vessels and worthy of the occasion of her maiden voyage. though the major part of her passengers were americans returning from abroad, there were enrolled upon her cabin lists some of the most distinguished names of england, as well as of the younger nation. many of these had purposely delayed sailing, or had hastened their departure, that they might be among the first passengers on the great vessel. there were aboard six men whose fortunes ran into tens of millions, besides many other persons of international note. among the men were leaders in the world of commerce, finance, literature, art and the learned professions. many of the women were socially prominent in two hemispheres. wealth and fame, unfortunately, are not proof against fate, and most of these notable personages perished as pitiably as the more humble steerage passengers. the list of notables included colonel john jacob astor, head of the astor family, whose fortune is estimated at $150,000,000; isidor straus, merchant and banker ($50,000,000); j. bruce ismay, managing director of the international mercantile marine ($40,000,000); benjamin guggenheim, head of the guggenheim family ($95,000,000): george d. widener, son of p. a. b. widener, traction magnate and financier ($5,000,000); colonel washington roebling, builder of the great brooklyn bridge; charles m. hays, president of the grand trunk railway; w. t. stead. famous publicist; jacques futrelle, journalist; henry s. harper, of the firm of harper & bros.; henry b. harris, theatrical manager; major archibald butt, military aide to president taft; and francis d. millet, one of the best-known american painters. major butt major archibald butt, whose bravery on the sinking vessel will not soon be forgotten, was military aide to president taft and was known wherever the president traveled. his recent european mission was apparently to call on the pope in behalf of president taft; for on march 21st he was received at the vatican, and presented to the pope a letter from mr. taft thanking the pontiff for the creation of three new american cardinals. major butt had a reputation as a horseman, and it is said he was able to keep up with president roosevelt, be the ride ever so far or fast. he was promoted to the rank of major in 1911. he sailed for the mediterranean on march 2d with his friend francis d. millet, the artist, who also perished on the titanic. colonel astor john jacob astor was returning from a trip to egypt with his nineteen-year-old bride, formerly miss madeline force, to whom he was married in providence, september 9, 1911. he was head of the family whose name he bore and one of the world's wealthiest men. he was not, however, one of the world's "idle rich," for his life of forty-seven years was a well-filled one. he had managed the family estates since 1891; built the astor hotel, new york; was colonel on the staff of governor levi p. morton, and in may, 1898, was commissioned colonel of the united states volunteers. after assisting major-general breckinridge, inspector-general of the united states army, he was assigned to duty on the staff of major-general shafter and served in cuba during the operations ending in the surrender of santiago. he was also the inventor of a bicycle brake, a pneumatic road-improver, and an improved turbine engine. benjamin guggenheim next to colonel astor in financial importance was benjamin guggenheim, whose father founded the famous house of m. guggenheim and sons. when the various guggen-heim interests were consolidated into the american smelting and refining company he retired from active business, although he later became interested in the power and mining machinery company of milwaukee. in 1894 he married miss floretta seligman, daughter of james seligman, the new york banker. isidor straus isidor straus, whose wife elected to perish with him in the ship, was a brother of nathan and oscar straus, a partner with nathan straus in r. h. macy & co. and l. straus & sons, a member of the firm of abraham & straus in brooklyn, and has been well known in politics and charitable work. he was a member of the fifty-third congress from 1893 to 1895, and as a friend of william l. wilson was in constant consultation in the matter of the former wilson tariff bill. mr. straus was conspicuous for his works of charity and was an ardent supporter of every enterprise to improve the condition of the hebrew immigrants. he was president of the educational alliance, vice-president of the j. hood wright memorial hospital, a member of the chamber of commerce, on one of the visiting committees of harvard university, and was besides a trustee of many financial and philanthropic institutions. mr. straus never enjoyed a college education. he was, however, one of the best informed men of the day, his information having been derived from extensive reading. his library, said to be one of the finest and most extensive in new york, was his pride and his place of special recreation. {illust. caption = actual photograph of the iceberg that sunk the titanic lady duff gordon, a prominent english woman who was aboard the...} {illust. caption = heart-breaking farewells both men and women were loaded into the first boats, but soon the cry of "women first" was raised. then came the real note of tragedy. husbands and wives clung to each other in farewell; some refused to be separated.} george d. widener the best known of philadelphia passengers aboard the titanic were mr. and mrs. george d. widener. mr. widener was a son of peter a. b. widener and, like his father, was recognized as one of the foremost financiers of philadelphia as well as a leader in society there. mr. widener married miss eleanor elkins, a daughter of the late william l. elkins. they made their home with his father at the latter's fine place at eastbourne, ten miles from philadelphia. mr. widener was keenly interested in horses and was a constant exhibitor at horse shows. in business he was recognized as his father's chief adviser in managing the latter's extensive traction interests. p. a. b. widener is a director of the international mercantile marine. mrs. widener is said to be the possessor of one of the finest collections of jewels in the world, the gift of her husband. one string of pearls in this collection was reported to be worth $250,000. the wideners went abroad two months previous to the disaster, mr. widener desiring to inspect some of his business interests on the other side. at the opening of the london museum by king george on march 21st last it was announced that mrs. widener had presented to the museum thirty silver plates once the property of nell gwyn. mr. widener is survived by a daughter, eleanor, and a son, george d. widener, jr. harry elkins widener was with his parents and went down on the ship. colonel roebling colonel washington augustus roebling was president of the john a. roebling sons' company, manufacturers of iron and steel wire rope. he served in the union army from 1861 to 1865, resigning to assist his father in the construction of the cincinnati and covington suspension bridge. at the death of his father in 1869 he took entire charge of the construction of the brooklyn bridge, and it is to his genius that the success of that great work may be said to be due. william t. stead one of the most notable of the foreign passengers was william t. stead. few names are more widely known to the world of contemporary literature and journalism than that of the brilliant editor of the review of reviews. matthew arnold called him "the inventor of the new journalism in england." he was on his way to america to take part in the men and religion forward movement and was to have delivered an address in union square on the thursday after the disaster, with william jennings bryan as his chief associate. mr. stead was an earnest advocate of peace and had written many books. his commentary "if christ came to chicago" raised a storm twenty years ago. when he was in this country in 1907 he addressed a session of methodist clergymen, and at one juncture of the meeting remarked that unless the methodists did something about the peace movement besides shouting "amen" nobody "would care a damn about their amens!" other englishmen aboard other distinguished englishmen on the titanic were norman c. craig, m.p., thomas andrews, a representative of the firm of harland & wolff, of belfast, the ship's builders, and j. bruce ismay, managing director of the white star line. j. bruce ismay mr. ismay is president and one of the founders of the international mercantile marine. he has made it a custom to be a passenger on the maiden voyage of every new ship built by the white star line. it was mr. ismay who, with j. p. morgan, consolidated the british steamship lines under the international mercantile marine's control; and it is largely due to his imagination that such gigantic ships as the titanic and olympic were made possible jacques futrelle jacques futrelle was an author of short stories, some of which have appeared in the saturday evening post, and of many novels of the same general type as "the thinking machine," with which he first gained a wide popularity. newspaper work, chiefly in richmond, va., engaged his attention from 1890 to 1909, in which year he entered the theatrical business as a manager. in 1904 he returned to his journalistic career. henry b. harris henry b. harris, the theater manager, had been manager of may irwin, peter dailey, lily langtry, amelia bingham, and launched robert edeson as star. he became the manager of the hudson theater in 1903 and the hackett theater in 1906. among his best known productions are "the lion and the mouse," "the traveling salesman" and "the third degree." he was president of the henry b. harris company controlling the harris theater. young harris had a liking for the theatrical business from a boy. twelve years ago mr. harris married miss rene wallach of washington. he was said to have a fortune of between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000. he owned outright the hudson and the harris theaters and had an interest in two other show houses in new york. he owned three theaters in chicago, one in syracuse and one in philadelphia. henry s. harper henry sleeper harper, who was among the survivors, is a grandson of john wesley harper, one of the founders of the harper publishing business. h. sleeper harper was himself an incorporator of harper & brothers when the firm became a corporation in 1896. he had a desk in the offices of the publishers, but his hand of late years in the management of the business has been very slight. he has been active in the work of keeping the adirondack forests free from aggression. he was in the habit of spending about half of his time in foreign travel. his friends in new york recalled that he had a narrow escape about ten years ago when a ship in which he was traveling ran into an iceberg on the grand banks. francis david millet millet was one of the best-known american painters and many of his canvasses are found in the leading galleries of the world. he served as a drummer boy with the sixtieth massachusetts volunteers in the civil war, and from early manhood took a prominent part in public affairs. he was director of the decorations for the chicago exposition and was, at the time of the disaster, secretary of the american academy in rome. he was a wide traveler and the author of many books, besides translations of tolstoi. charles m. hays another person of prominence was charles melville hays, president of the grand trunk and the grand trunk pacific railways. he was described by sir wilfrid laurier at a dinner of the canadian club of new york, at the hotel astor last year, as "beyond question the greatest railroad genius in canada, as an executive genius ranking second only to the late edward h. harriman." he was returning aboard the titanic with his wife and son-in-law and daughter; mr. and mrs. thornton davidson, of montreal. chapter v. the titanic strikes an iceberg! tardy attention to warning responsible for accident--the danger not realized at first--an interrupted card game--passengers joke among themselves--the real truth dawns--panic on board--wireless calls for help sunday night the magnificent ocean liner was plunging through a comparatively placid sea, on the surface of which there was much mushy ice and here and there a number of comparatively harmless-looking floes. the night was clear and stars visible. first officer william t. murdock was in charge of the bridge the first intimation of the presence of the iceberg that he received was from the lookout in the crow's nest. three warnings were transmitted from the crow's nest of the titanic to the officer on the doomed steamship's bridge 15 minutes before she struck, according to thomas whiteley, a first saloon steward. whiteley, who was whipped overboard from the ship by a rope while helping to lower a life-boat, finally reported on the carpathia aboard one of the boats that contained, he said, both the crow's nest lookouts. he heard a conversation between them, he asserted, in which they discussed the warnings given to the titanic's bridge of the presence of the iceberg. whiteley did not know the names of either of the lookout men and believed that they returned to england with the majority of the surviving members of the crew. {illust. caption = a graphic illustration of the force with which a vessel strikes an iceberg} "i heard one of them say that at 11.15 o'clock, 15 minutes before the titanic struck, he had reported to first officer murdock, on the bridge, that he fancied he saw an iceberg!" said whiteley. "twice after that, the lookout said, he warned murdock that a berg was ahead. they were very indignant that no attention was paid to their warnings." tardy attention to warning responsible for accident murdock's tardy answering of a telephone call from the crow's nest is assigned by whiteley as the cause of the disaster. when murdock answered the call he received the information that the iceberg was due ahead. this information was imparted just a few seconds before the crash, and had the officer promptly answered the ring of the bell it is probable that the accident could have been avoided, or at least, been reduced by the lowered speed. the lookout saw a towering "blue berg" looming up in the sea path of the titanic, and called the bridge on the ship's telephone. when, after the passing of those two or three fateful minutes an officer on the bridge lifted the telephone receiver from its hook to answer the lookout, it was too late. the speeding liner, cleaving a calm sea under a star-studded sky, had reached the floating mountain of ice, which the theoretically "unsinkable" ship struck a crashing, if glancing, blow with her starboard bow. murdock paid with life had murdock, according to the account of the tragedy given by two of the titanic's seamen, known how imperative was that call from the lookout man, the men at the wheel of the liner might have swerved the great ship sufficiently to avoid the berg altogether. at the worst the vessel would probably have struck the mass of ice with her stern. murdock, if the tale of the titanic sailor be true, expiated his negligence by shooting himself within sight of all alleged victims huddled in life-boats or struggling in the icy seas. when at last the danger was realized, the great ship was so close upon the berg that it was practically impossible to avoid collision with it vain trial to clear berg the first officer did what other startled and alert commanders would have done under similar circumstances, that is {illust. caption = the location of the disaster} he made an effort by going full speed ahead on the starboard propeller and reversing his port propeller, simultaneously throwing his helm over, to make a rapid turn and clear the berg. the maneuver was not successful. he succeeded in saving his bows from crashing into the ice-cliff, but nearly the entire length of the underbody of the great ship on the starboard side was ripped. the speed of the titanic, estimated to be at least twenty-one knots, was so terrific that the knife-like edge of the iceberg's spur protruding under the sea cut through her like a can-opener. the titanic was in 41.46 north latitude and 50.14 west longitude when she was struck, very near the spot on the wide atlantic where the carmania encountered a field of ice, studded with great bergs, on her voyage to new york which ended on april 14th. it was really an ice pack, due to an unusually severe winter in the north atlantic. no less than twenty-five bergs, some of great height, were counted. the shock was almost imperceptible. the first officer did not apparently realize that the great ship had received her death wound, and none of the passengers had the slightest suspicion that anything more than a usual minor sea accident had happened. hundreds who had gone to their berths and were asleep were unawakened by the vibration. bridge game not disturbed to illustrate the placidity with which practically all the men regarded the accident it is related that pierre marechal, son of the vice-admiral of the french navy, lucien smith, paul chevre, a french sculptor, and a. f. ormont, a cotton broker, were in the cafe parisien playing bridge. the four calmly got up from the table and after walking on deck and looking over the rail returned to their game. one of them had left his cigar on the card table, and while the three others were gazing out on the sea he remarked that he couldn't afford to lose his smoke, returned for his cigar and came out again. they remained only for a few moments on deck, and then resumed their game under the impression that the ship had stopped for reasons best known to the captain and not involving any danger to her. later, in describing the scene that took place, m. marechal, who was among the survivors, said: "when three-quarters of a mile away we stopped, the spectacle before our eyes was in its way magnificent. in a very calm sea, beneath a sky moonless but sown with millions of stars, the enormous titanic lay on the water, illuminated from the water line to the boat deck. the bow was slowly sinking into the black water." the tendency of the whole ship's company except the men in the engine department, who were made aware of the danger by the inrushing water, was to make light of and in some instances even to ridicule the thought of danger to so substantial a fabric. the captain on deck when captain smith came from the chart room onto the bridge, his first words were, "close the emergency doors." "they're already closed, sir," mr. murdock replied. "send to the carpenter and tell him to sound the ship," was the next order. the message was sent to the carpenter, but the carpenter never came up to report. he was probably the first man on the ship to lose his life. the captain then looked at the communicator, which shows in what direction the ship is listing. he saw that she carried five degrees list to starboard. the ship was then rapidly settling forward. all the steam sirens were blowing. by the captain's orders, given in the next few minutes, the engines were put to work at pumping out the ship, distress signals were sent by the marconi, and rockets were sent up from the bridge by quartermaster rowe. all hands were ordered on deck. passengers not alarmed the blasting shriek of the sirens had not alarmed the great company of the titanic, because such steam calls are an incident of travel in seas where fogs roll. many had gone to bed, but the hour, 11.40 p. m., was not too late for the friendly contact of saloons and smoking rooms. it was sunday night and the ship's concert had ended, but there were many hundreds up and moving among the gay lights, and many on deck with their eyes strained toward the mysterious west, where home lay. and in one jarring, breath-sweeping moment all of these, asleep or awake, were at the mercy of chance. few among the more than 2000 aboard could have had a thought of danger. the man who had stood up in the smoking room to say that the titanic was vulnerable or that in a few minutes two-thirds of her people would be face to face with death, would have been considered a fool or a lunatic. no ship ever sailed the seas that gave her passengers more confidence, more cool security. within a few minutes stewards and other members of the crew were sent round to arouse the people. some utterly refused to get up. the stewards had almost to force the doors of the staterooms to make the somnolent appreciate their peril, and many of them, it is believed, were drowned like rats in a trap. astor and wife strolled on deck colonel and mrs. astor were in their room and saw the ice vision flash by. they had not appreciably felt the gentle shock and supposed that nothing out of the ordinary had happened. they were both dressed and came on deck leisurely. william t. stead, the london journalist, wandered on deck for a few minutes, stopping to talk to frank millet. "what do they say is the trouble?" he asked. "icebergs," was the brief reply. "well," said stead, "i guess it is nothing serious. i'm going back to my cabin to read." from end to end on the mighty boat officers were rushing about without much noise or confusion, but giving orders sharply. captain smith told the third officer to rush downstairs and see whether the water was coming in very fast. "and," he added, "take some armed guards along to see that the stokers and engineers stay at their posts." in two minutes the officer returned. "it looks pretty bad, sir," he said. "the water is rushing in and filling the bottom. the locks of the water-tight compartments have been sprung by the shock." "give the command for all passengers to be on deck with life-belts on." through the length and breadth of the boat, upstairs and downstairs, on all decks, the cry rang out: "all passengers on deck with life-preservers." a sudden tremor of fear for the first time, there was a feeling of panic. husbands sought for wives and children. families gathered together. many who were asleep hastily caught up their clothing and rushed on deck. a moment before the men had been joking about the life-belts, according to the story told by mrs. vera dick, of calgary, canada. "try this one," one man said to her, "they are the very latest thing this season. everybody's wearing them now." another man suggested to a woman friend, who had a fox terrier in her arms, that she should put a life-saver on the dog. "it won't fit," the woman replied, laughing. "make him carry it in his mouth," said the friend. confusion among the immigrants below, on the steerage deck, there was intense confusion. about the time the officers on the first deck gave the order that all men should stand to one side and all women should go below to deck b, taking the children with them, a similar order was given to the steerage passengers. the women were ordered to the front, the men to the rear. half a dozen healthy, husky immigrants pushed their way forward and tried to crowd into the first boat. "stand back," shouted the officers who were manning the boat. "the women come first." shouting curses in various foreign languages, the immigrant men continued their pushing and tugging to climb into the boats. shots rang out. one big fellow fell over the railing into the water. another dropped to the deck, moaning. his jaw had been shot away. this was the story told by the bystanders afterwards on the pier. one husky italian told the writer on the pier that the way in which the men were shot down was horrible. his sympathy was with the men who were shot. "they were only trying to save their lives," he said. wireless operator died at his post on board the titanic, the wireless operator, with a life-belt about his waist, was hitting the instrument that was sending out c. q. d., messages, "struck on iceberg, c. q. d." "shall i tell captain to turn back and help?" flashed a reply from the carpathia. "yes, old man," the titanic wireless operator responded. "guess we're sinking." an hour later, when the second wireless man came into the boxlike room to tell his companion what the situation was, he found a negro stoker creeping up behind the operator and saw him raise a knife over his head. he said afterwards--he was among those rescued--that he realized at once that the negro intended to kill the operator in order to take his life-belt from him. the second operator pulled out his revolver and shot the negro dead. "what was the trouble?" asked the operator. "that negro was going to kill you and steal your life-belt," the second man replied. "thanks, old man," said the operator. the second man went on deck to get some more information. he was just in time to jump overboard before the titanic went down. the wireless operator and the body of the negro who tried to steal his belt went down together. on the deck where the first class passengers were quartered, known as deck a, there was none of the confusion that was taking place on the lower decks. the titanic was standing without much rocking. the captain had given an order and the band was playing. {illust. caption = waiting for the news a bird's eye view of the great crowds...} {illust. caption = wireless station at cape race where the first news of the titanic disaster was received.} chapter vi. "women and children first!" cool-headed officers and crew bring order out of chaos--filling the life-boats--heartrending scenes as families are parted--four life-boats lost--incidents of bravery--"the boats are all filled!" once on the deck, many hesitated to enter the swinging life-boats. tho glassy sea, the starlit sky, the absence, in the first few moments, of intense excitement, gave them the feeling that there was only some slight mishap; that those who got into the boats would have a chilly half hour below and might, later, be laughed at. it was such a feeling as this, from all accounts, which caused john jacob astor and his wife to refuse the places offered them in the first boat, and to retire to the gymnasium. in the same way h. j. allison, a montreal banker, laughed at the warning, and his wife, reassured by him, took her time dressing. they and their daughter did not reach the carpathia. their son, less than two years old, was carried into a life-boat by his nurse, and was taken in charge by major arthur peuchen. the life-boats lowered the admiration felt by the passengers and crew for the matchlessly appointed vessel was translated, in those first few moments, into a confidence which for some proved deadly. the pulsing of the engines had ceased, and the steamship lay just as though she were awaiting the order to go on again after some trifling matter had been adjusted. but in a few minutes the canvas covers were lifted from the life-boats and the crews allotted to each standing by, ready to lower them to the water. nearly all the boats that were lowered on the port side of the ship touched the water without capsizing. four of the others lowered to starboard, including one collapsible, were capsized. all, however, who were in the collapsible boats that practically went to pieces, were rescued by the other boats. presently the order was heard: "all men stand back and all women retire to the deck below." that was the smoking-room deck, or the b deck. the men stood away and remained in absolute silence, leaning against the rail or pacing up and down the deck slowly. many of them lighted cigars or cigarettes and began to smoke. loading the boats the boats were swung out and lowered from the a deck above. the women were marshaled quietly in lines along the b deck, and when the boats were lowered down to the level of the latter the women were assisted to climb into them. as each of the boats was filled with its quota of passengers the word was given and it was carefully lowered down to the dark surface of the water. nobody seemed to know how mr. ismay got into a boat, but it was assumed that he wished to make a presentation of the case of the titanic to his company. he was among those who apparently realized that the splendid ship was doomed. all hands in the life-boats, under instructions from officers and men in charge, were rowed a considerable distance from the ship herself in order to get far away from the possible suction that would follow her foundering. coolest men on board captain smith and major archibald butt, military aide to the president of the united states, were among the coolest men on board. a number of steerage passengers were yelling and screaming and fighting to get to the boats. officers drew guns and told them that if they moved towards the boats they would be shot dead. major butt had a gun in his hand and covered the men who tried to get to the boats. the following story of his bravery was told by mrs. henry b. harris, wife of the theatrical manager: "the world should rise in praise of major butt. that man's conduct will remain in my memory forever. the american army is honored by him and the way he taught some of the other men how to behave when women and children were suffering that awful mental fear of death. major butt was near me and i noticed everything that he did. "when the order to man the boats came, the captain whispered something to major butt. the two of them had become friends. the major immediately became as one in supreme command. you would have thought he was at a white house reception. a dozen or more women became hysterical all at once, as something connected with a life-boat went wrong. major butt stepped over to them and said: "'really, you must not act like that; we are all going to see you through this thing.' he helped the sailors rearrange the rope or chain that had gone wrong and lifted some of the women in with a touch of gallantry. not only was there a complete lack of any fear in his manner, but there was the action of an aristocrat. "when the time came he was a man to be feared. in one of the earlier boats fifty women, it seemed, were about to be lowered, when a man, suddenly panic-stricken, ran to the stern of it. major butt shot one arm out, caught him by the back of the neck and jerked him backward like a pillow. his head cracked against a rail and he was stunned. "'sorry,' said major butt, 'women will be attended to first or i'll break every damned bone in your body.' forced men usurping places to vacate "the boats were lowered one by one, and as i stood by, my husband said to me, 'thank god, for archie butt.' perhaps major butt heard it, for he turned his face towards us for a second and smiled. just at that moment, a young man was arguing to get into a life-boat, and major butt had a hold of the lad by the arm, like a big brother, and was telling him to keep his head and be a man. "major butt helped those poor frightened steerage people so wonderfully, so tenderly and yet with such cool and manly firmness that he prevented the loss of many lives from panic. he was a soldier to the last. he was one of god's greatest noblemen, and i think i can say he was an example of bravery even to men on the ship." last words of major butt miss marie young, who was a music instructor to president roosevelt's children and had known major butt during the roosevelt occupancy of the white house, told this story of his heroism. "archie himself put me into the boat, wrapped blankets about me and tucked me in as carefully as if we were starting on a motor ride. he, himself, entered the boat with me, performing the little courtesies as calmly and with as smiling a face as if death were far away, instead of being but a few moments removed from him. "when he had carefully wrapped me up he stepped upon the gunwale of the boat, and lifting his hat, smiled down at me. 'good-bye, miss young,' he said. 'good luck to you, and don't forget to remember me to the folks back home.' then he stepped back and waved his hand to me as the boat was lowered. i think i was the last woman he had a chance to help, for the boat went down shortly after we cleared the suction zone." colonel astor another hero colonel astor was another of the heroes of the awful night. effort was made to persuade him to take a place in one of the life-boats, but he emphatically refused to do so until every woman and child on board had been provided for, not excepting the women members of the ship's company. one of the passengers describing the consummate courage of colonel astor said: "he led mrs. astor to the side of the ship and helped her to the life-boat to which she had been assigned. i saw that she was prostrated and said she would remain and take her chances with him, but colonel astor quietly insisted and tried to reassure her in a few words. as she took her place in the boat her eyes were fixed upon him. colonel astor smiled, touched his cap, and when the boat moved safely away from the ship's side he turned back to his place among the men." mrs. ida s. hippach and her daughter jean, survivors of the titanic, said they were saved by colonel john jacob astor, who forced the crew of the last life-boat to wait for them. "we saw colonel astor place mrs. astor in a boat and assure her that he would follow later," said mrs. hippach. "he turned to us with a smile and said, 'ladies, you are next.' the officer in charge of the boat protested that the craft was full, and the seamen started to lower it. "colonel astor exclaimed, 'hold that boat,' in the voice of a man accustomed to be obeyed, and they did as he ordered. the boat had been lowered past the upper deck and the colonel took us to the deck below and put us in the boat, one after the other, through a port-hole." {illust. caption = loading the life-boats here occurred the heart-rending separation of husbands and wives, as the women were given precedence in the boats.} heart-breaking scenes there were some terrible scenes. fathers were parting from their children and giving them an encouraging pat on the shoulders; men were kissing their wives and telling them that they would be with them shortly. one man said there was absolutely no danger, that the boat was the finest ever built, with water-tight compartments, and that it could not sink. that seemed to be the general impression. a few of the men, however, were panic-stricken even when the first of the fifty-six foot life-boats was being filled. fully ten men threw themselves into the boats already crowded with women and children. these men were dragged back and hurled sprawling across the deck. six of them, screamed with fear, struggled to their feet and made a second attempt to rush to the boats. about ten shots sounded in quick succession. the six cowardly men were stopped in their tracks, staggered and collapsed one after another. at least two of them vainly attempted to creep toward the boats again. the others lay quite still. this scene of bloodshed served its purpose. in that particular section of the deck there was no further attempt to violate the rule of "women and children first." "i helped fill the boats with women," said thomas whiteley, who was a waiter on the titanic. "collapsible boat no. 2 on the starboard jammed. the second officer was hacking at the ropes with a knife and i was being dragged around the deck by that rope when i looked up and saw the boat, with all aboard, turn turtle. in some way i got overboard myself and clung to an oak dresser. i wasn't more than sixty feet from the titanic when she went down. her big stern rose up in the air and she went down bow first. i saw all the machinery drop out of her." henry b. harris henry b. harris, of new york, a theatrical manager, was one of the men who showed superb courage in the crisis. when the life-boats were first being filled, and before there was any panic, mr. harris went to the side of his wife before the boat was lowered away. "women first," shouted one of the ship's officers. mr. harris glanced up and saw that the remark was addressed to him. "all right," he replied coolly. "good-bye, my dear," he said, as he kissed his wife, pressed her a moment to his breast, and then climbed back to the titanic's deck. three explosions up to this time there had been no panic; but about one hour before the ship plunged to the bottom there were three separate explosions of bulkheads as the vessel filled. these were at intervals of about fifteen minutes. from that time there was a different scene. the rush for the remaining boats became a stampede. the stokers rushed up from below and tried to beat a path through the steerage men and women and through the sailors and officers, to get into the boats. they had their iron bars and shovels, and they struck down all who stood in their way. the first to come up from the depths of the ship was an engineer. from what he is reported to have said it is probable that the steam fittings were broken and many were scalded to death when the titanic lifted. he said he had to dash through a narrow place beside a broken pipe and his back was frightfully scalded. right at his heels came the stokers. the officers had pistols, but they could not use them at first for fear of killing the women and children. the sailors fought with their fists and many of them took the stoke bars and shovels from the stokers and used them to beat back the others. many of the coal-passers and stokers who had been driven back from the boats went to the rail, and whenever a boat was filled and lowered several of them jumped overboard and swam toward it trying to climb aboard. several of the survivors said that men who swam to the sides of their boats were pulled in or climbed in. dozens of the cabin passengers were witnesses of some of the frightful scenes on the steerage deck. the steerage survivors said that ten women from the upper decks were the only cool passengers in the life-boat, and they tried to quiet the steerage women, who were nearly all crazed with fear and grief. other heroes among the chivalrous young heroes of the titanic disaster were washington a. roebling, 2d, and howard case, london representative of the vacuum oil company. both were urged repeatedly to take places in life-boats, but scorned the opportunity, while working against time to save the women aboard the ill-fated ship. they went to their death, it is said by survivors, with smiles on their faces. both of these young men aided in the saving of mrs. william t. graham, wife of the president of the american can company, and mrs. graham's nineteen-year-old daughter, margaret. afterwards relating some of her experiences mrs. graham said: "there was a rap at the door. it was a passenger whom we had met shortly after the ship left liverpool, and his name was roebling--washington a. roebling, 2d. he was a gentleman and a brave man. he warned us of the danger and told us that it would be best to be prepared for an emergency. we heeded his warning, and i looked out of my window and saw a great big iceberg facing us. immediately i knew what had happened and we lost no time after that to get out into the saloon. "in one of the gangways i met an officer of the ship. "'what is the matter?' i asked him. "'we've only burst two pipes,' he said. 'everything is all right, don't worry.' "'but what makes the ship list so?' i asked. "'oh, that's nothing,' he replied, and walked away. "mr. case advised us to get into a boat. "'and what are you going to do?' we asked him. "'oh,' he replied, 'i'll take a chance and stay here.' "just at that time they were filling up the third life-boat on the port side of the ship. i thought at the time that it was the third boat which had been lowered, but i found out later that they had lowered other boats on the other side, where the people were more excited because they were sinking on that side. "just then mr. roebling came up, too, and told us to hurry and get into the third boat. mr. roebling and mr. case bustled our party of three into that boat in less time than it takes to tell it. they were both working hard to help the women and children. the boat was fairly crowded when we three were pushed into it, and a few men jumped in at the last moment, but mr. roebling and mr. case stood at the rail and made no attempt to get into the boat. "they shouted good-bye to us. what do you think mr. case did then? he just calmly lighted a cigarette and waved us good-bye with his hand. mr. roebling stood there, too--i can see him now. i am sure that he knew that the ship would go to the bottom. but both just stood there." in the face of death scenes on the sinking vessel grew more tragic as the remaining passengers faced the awful certainty that death must be the portion of the majority, death in the darkness of a wintry sea studded with its ice monuments like the marble shafts in some vast cemetery. in that hour, when cherished illusions of possible safety had all but vanished, manhood and womanhood aboard the titanic rose to their sublimest heights. it was in that crisis of the direst extremity that many brave women deliberately rejected life and chose rather to remain and die with the men whom they loved. death fails to part mr. and mrs. straus "i will not leave my husband," said mrs. isidor straus. "we are old; we can best die together," and she turned from those who would have forced her into one of the boats and clung to the man who had been the partner of her joys and sorrows. thus they stood hand in hand and heart to heart, comforting each other until the sea claimed them, united in death as they had been through a long life. "greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." miss elizabeth evans fulfilled this final test of affection laid down by the divine master. the girl was the niece of the wife of magistrate cornell, of new york. she was placed in the same boat with many other women. as it was about to be lowered away it was found that the craft contained one more than its full quota of passengers. the grim question arose as to which of them should surrender her place and her chance of safety. beside miss evans sat mrs. j. j. brown, of denver, the mother of several children. miss evans was the first to volunteer to yield to another. girl steps back to doom "your need is greater than mine," said she to mrs. brown. "you have children who need you, and i have none." so saying she arose from the boat and stepped back upon the deck. the girl found no later refuge and was one of those who went down with the ship. she was twenty-five years old and was beloved by all who knew her. mrs. brown thereafter showed the spirit which had made her also volunteer to leave the boat. there were only three men in the boat and but one of them rowed. mrs. brown, who was raised on the water, immediately picked up one of the heavy sweeps and began to pull. in the boat which carried mrs. cornell and mrs. appleton there were places for seventeen more than were carried. this too was undermanned and the two women at once took their places at the oars. the countess of rothes was pulling at the oars of her boat, likewise undermanned because the crew preferred to stay behind. miss bentham, of rochester, showed splendid courage. she happened to be in a life-boat which was very much crowded--so much so that one sailor had to sit with his feet dangling in the icy cold water, and as time went on the sufferings of the man from the cold were apparent. miss bentham arose from her place and had the man turn around while she took her place with her feet in the water. scarcely any of the life-boats were properly manned. two, filled with women and children, capsized immediately, while the collapsible boats were only temporarily useful. they soon filled with water. in one boat eighteen or twenty persons sat in water above their knees for six hours. {illust. caption = in the darkness and confusion, punctuated by screams, sobs and curses, the boats were lowered after being filled with women, children and a few men. the sketch, drawn from description of eye-witnesses, shows the lofty side of the stricken vessel and the laden boats descending. the life-boats being lowered} {illust. caption = copyright by underwood & underwood, n. y. {illust. caption = copyright by underwood & underwood, n. y. life-boats, as seen from the carpathia photographs taken from the rescue ship as she reached the first boats carrying the titanic's sufferers.} heard it, but have forgotten it. but i saw an order for five pounds which this man gave to each of the crew of his boat after they got aboard the carpathia. it was on a piece of ordinary paper addressed to the coutts bank of england. "we called that boat the 'money boat.' it was lowered from the starboard side and was one of the first off. our orders were to load the life-boats beginning forward on the port side, working aft and then back on the starboard. this man paid the firemen to lower a starboard boat before the officers had given the order." whiteley's own experience was a hard one. when the uncoiling rope, which entangled his feet, threw him into the sea, it furrowed the flesh of his leg, but he did not feel the pain until he was safe aboard the carpathia. "i floated on my life-preserver for several hours," he said, "then i came across a big oak dresser with two men clinging to it. i hung on to this till daybreak and the two men dropped off. when the sun came up i saw the collapsible raft in the distance, just black with men. they were all standing up, and i swam to it--almost a mile, it seemed to me--and they would not let me aboard. mr. lightoller, the second officer, was one of them. "'it's thirty-one lives against yours,, he said, 'you can't come aboard. there's not room.'" "i pleaded with him in vain, and then i confess i prayed that somebody might die, so i could take his place. it was only human. and then some one did die, and they let me aboard. "by and by, we saw seven life-boats lashed together, and we were taken into them." men shot down the officers had to assert their authority by force, and three foreigners from the steerage who tried to force their way in among the women and children were shot down without mercy. robert daniel, a philadelphia passenger, told of terrible scenes at this period of the disaster. he said men fought and bit and struck one another like madmen, and exhibited wounds upon his face to prove the assertion. mr. daniel said that he was picked up naked from the ice-cold water and almost perished from exposure before he was rescued. he and others told how the titanic's bow was completely torn away by the impact with the berg. k. whiteman, of palmyra, n. j., the titanic's barber, was lowering boats on deck after the collision, and declared the officers on the bridge, one of them first officer murdock, promptly worked the electrical apparatus for closing the water-tight compartments. he believed the machinery was in some way so damaged by the crash that the front compartments failed to close tightly, although the rear ones were secure. whiteman's manner of escape was unique. he was blown off the deck by the second of the two explosions of the boilers, and was in the water more than two hours before he was picked up by a raft. "the explosions," whiteman said; "were caused by the rushing in of the icy water on the boilers. a bundle of deck chairs, roped together, was blown off the deck with me, and i struck my back, injuring my spine, but it served as a temporary raft. "the crew and passengers had faith in the bulkhead system to save the ship and we were lowering a collapsible boat, all confident the ship would get through, when she took a terrific dip forward and the water swept over the deck and into the engine rooms. "the bow went clean down, and i caught the pile of chairs as i was washed up against the rim. then came the explosions which blew me fifteen feet. "after the water had filled the forward compartments, the ones at the stern could not save her, although they did delay the ship's going down. if it wasn't for the compartments hardly anyone could have got away." a sad message one of the titanic's stewards, johnson by name, carried this message to the sorrowing widow of benjamin guggenheim: "when mr. guggenheim realized that there was grave danger," said the room steward, "he advised his secretary, who also died, to dress fully and he himself did the same. mr. guggenheim, who was cool and collected as he was pulling on his outer garments, said to the steward:-prepared to die bravely "'i think there is grave doubt that the men will get off safely. i am willing to remain and play the man's game, if there are not enough boats for more than the women and children. i won't die here like a beast. i'll meet my end as man.' "there was a pause and then mr. guggenheim continued: "'tell my wife, johnson, if it should happen that my secretary and i both go down and you are saved, tell her i played the game out straight and to the end. no woman shall be left aboard this ship because ben guggenheim was a coward. "'tell her that my last thoughts will be of her and of our girls, but that my duty now is to these unfortunate women and children on this ship. tell her i will meet whatever fate is in store for me, knowing she will approve of what i do.'" in telling the story the room steward said the last he saw of mr. guggenheim was when he stood fully dressed upon the upper deck talking calmly with colonel astor and major butt. before the last of the boats got away, according to some of the passengers' narratives, there were more than fifty shots fired upon the decks by officers or others in the effort to maintain the discipline that until then had been well preserved. the sinking vessel richard norris williams, jr., one of the survivors of the titanic, saw his father killed by being crushed by one of the tremendous funnels of the sinking vessel. "we stood on deck watching the life-boats of the titanic being filled and lowered into the water," said mr. williams. "the water was nearly up to our waists and the ship was about at her last. suddenly one of the great funnels fell. i sprang aside, endeavoring to pull father with me. a moment later the funnel was swept overboard and the body of father went with it. "i sprang overboard and swam through the ice to a life-raft, and was pulled aboard. there were five men and one woman on the raft. occasionally we were swept off into the sea, but always managed to crawl back. "a sailor lighted a cigarette and flung the match carelessly among the women. several screamed, fearing they would be set on fire. the sailor replied: 'we are going to hell anyway and we might as well be cremated now as then.'" a huge cake of ice was the means of aiding emile portaleppi, of italy, in his hairbreadth escape from death when the titanic went down. portaleppi, a second class passenger, was awakened by the explosion of one of the bulkheads of the ship. he hurried to the deck, strapped a life-preserver around him and leaped into the sea. with the aid of the preserver and by holding to a cake of ice he managed to keep afloat until one of the life-boats picked him up. there were thirty-five other people in the boat, he said, when he was hauled aboard. the coward somewhere in the shadow of the appalling titanic disaster slinks--still living by the inexplicable grace of god--a cur in human shape, to-day the most despicable human being in all the world. in that grim midnight hour, already great in history, he found himself hemmed in by the band of heroes whose watchword and countersign rang out across the deep--"women and children first!" what did he do? he scuttled to the stateroom deck, put on a woman's skirt, a woman's hat and a woman's veil, and picking his crafty way back among the brave and chivalric men who guarded the rail of the doomed ship, he filched a seat in one of the life-boats and saved his skin. his name is on that list of branded rescued men who were neither picked up from the sea when the ship went down nor were in the boats under orders to help get them safe away. his identity is not yet known, though it will be in good time. so foul an act as that will out like murder. the eyes of strong men who have read this crowded record of golden deeds, who have read and re-read that deathless roll of honor of the dead, are still wet with tears of pity and of pride. this man still lives. surely he was born and saved to set for men a new standard by which to measure infamy and shame. it is well that there was sufficient heroism on board the titanic to neutralize the horrors of the cowardice. when the first order was given for the men to stand back, there were a dozen or more who pushed forward and said that men would be needed to row the life-boats and that they would volunteer for the work. the officers tried to pick out the ones that volunteered merely for service and to eliminate those who volunteered merely to save their own lives. this elimination process however, was not wholly successful. the doomed men as the ship began to settle to starboard, heeling at an angle of nearly forty-five degrees, those who had believed it was all right to stick by the ship began to have doubts, and a few jumped into the sea. they were followed immediately by others, and in a few minutes there were scores swimming around. nearly all of them wore life-preservers. one man, who had a pomeranian dog, leaped overboard with it and striking a piece of wreckage was badly stunned. he recovered after a few minutes and swam toward one of the life-boats and was taken aboard. said one survivor, speaking of the men who remained on the ship. "there they stood--major butt, colonel astor waving a farewell to his wife, mr. thayer, mr. case, mr. clarence moore, mr. widener, all multimillionaires, and hundreds of other men, bravely smiling at us all. never have i seen such chivalry and fortitude. such courage in the face of fate horrible to contemplate filled us even then with wonder and admiration." why were men saved? ask: others who seek to make the occasional male survivor a hissing scorn; and yet the testimony makes it clear that for a long time during that ordeal the more frightful position seemed to many to be in the frail boats in the vast relentless sea, and that some men had to be tumbled into the boats under orders from the officers. others express the deepest indignation that 210 sailors were rescued, the testimony shows that most of these sailors were in the welter of ice and water into which they had been thrown from the ship's deck when she sank; they were human beings and so were picked up and saved. "women and children first" the one alleviating circumstance in the otherwise immitigable tragedy is the fact that so many of the men stood aside really with out the necessity for the order, "women and children first," and insisted that the weaker sex should first have places in the boats. there were men whose word of command swayed boards of directors, governed institutions, disposed of millions. they were accustomed merely to pronounce a wish to have it gratified. thousands "posted at their bidding"; the complexion of the market altered hue when they nodded; they bought what they wanted, and for one of the humblest fishing smacks or a dory they could have given the price that was paid to build and launch the ship that has become the most imposing mausoleum that ever housed the bones of men since the pyramids rose from the desert sands. but these men stood aside--one can see them!--and gave place not merely to the delicate and the refined, but to the scared czech woman from the steerage, with her baby at her breast; the croatian with a toddler by her side, coming through the very gate of death and out of the mouth of hell to the imagined eden of america. to many of those who went it was harder to go than to stay there on the vessel gaping with its mortal wounds and ready to go down. it meant that tossing on the waters they must wait in suspense, hour after hour even after the lights of the ship were engulfed in appalling darkness, hoping against hope for the miracle of a rescue dearer to them than their own lives. it was the tradition of anglo-saxon heroism that was fulfilled in the frozen seas during the black hours of sunday night. the heroism was that of the women who went, as well as of the men who remained! chapter vii. left to their fate coolness and heroism of those left to perish--suicide of murdock--captain smith's end--the ship's band plays a noble hymn as the vessel goes down the general feeling aboard the ship after the boats had left her sides was that she would not survive her wound, but the passengers who remained aboard displayed the utmost heroism. william t. stead, the famous english journalist, was so litt{l}e alarmed that he calmly discussed with one of the passengers the probable height of the iceberg after the titanic had shot into it. confidence in the ability of the titanic to remain afloat doubtlessly led many of the passengers to death. the theory that the great ship was unsinkable remained with hundreds who had entrusted themselves to the gigantic hulk, long after the officers knew that the vessel could not survive. the captain and officers behaved with superb gallantry, and there was perfect order and discipline among those who were aboard, even after all hope had been abandoned for the salvation of the ship. many women went down, steerage women who were unable to get to the upper decks where the boats were launched, maids who were overlooked in the confusion, cabin passengers who refused to desert their husbands or who reached the decks after the last of the life-boats was gone and the ship was settling for her final plunge to the bottom of the atlantic. narratives of survivors do not bear out the supposition that the final hours upon the vessel's decks were passed in darkness. they say the electric lighting plant held out until the last, and that even as they watched the ship sink, from their places in the floating life-boats, her lights were gleaming in long rows as she plunged under by the head. just before she sank, some of the refugees say, the ship broke in two abaft the engine room after the bulkhead explosions had occurred. colonel astor's death to colonel astor's death philip mock bears this testimony. "many men were hanging on to rafts in the sea. william t. stead and colonel astor were among them. their feet and hands froze and they had to let go. both were drowned." the last man among the survivors to speak to colonel astor was k. whiteman, the ship's barber. "i shaved colonel astor sunday afternoon," said whiteman. "he was a pleasant, affable man, and that awful night when i found myself standing beside him on the passenger deck, helping to put the women into the boats, i spoke to him. "'where is your life-belt?' i asked him. "'i didn't think there would be any need of it,' he said. "'get one while there is time,' i told him. 'the last boat is gone, and we are done for.' "'no,' he said, 'i think there are some life-boats to be launched, and we may get on one of them.' "'there are no life-rafts,' i told him, 'and the ship is going to sink. i am going to jump overboard and take a chance on swimming out and being picked up by one of the boats. better come along.' "'no, thank you,' he said, calmly, 'i think i'll have to stick.' "i asked him if he would mind shaking hands with me. he said, 'with pleasure,' gave me a hearty grip, and then i climbed up on the rail and jumped overboard. i was in the water nearly four hours before one of the boats picked me up." captain washed overboard murdock's last orders were to quartermaster moody and a few other petty officers who had taken their places in the rigid discipline of the ship and were lowering the boats. captain smith came up to him on the bridge several times and then rushed down again. they spoke to one another only in monosyllables. there were stories that captain smith, when he saw the ship actually going down, had committed suicide. there is no basis for such tales. the captain, according to the testimony of those who were near him almost until the last, was admirably cool. he carried a revolver in his hand, ready to use it on anyone who disobeyed orders. "i want every man to act like a man for manhood's sake," he said, "and if they don't, a bullet awaits the coward." with the revolver in his hand--a fact that undoubtedly gave rise to the suicide theory--the captain moved up and down the deck. he gave the order for each life-boat to make off and he remained until every boat was gone. standing on the bridge he finally called out the order: "each man save himself." at that moment all discipline fled. it was the last call of death. if there had been any hope among those on board before, the hope now had fled. the bearded admiral of the white star line fleet, with every life-saving device launched from the decks, was returning to the deck to perform the sacred office of going down with his ship when a wave dashed over the side and tore him from the ladder. the titanic was sinking rapidly by the head, with the twisting sidelong motion that was soon to aim her on her course two miles down. murdock saw the skipper swept out; but did not move. captain smith was but one of a multitude of lost at that moment. murdock may have known that the last desperate thought of the gray mariner was to get upon his bridge and die in command. that the old man could not have done this may have had something to do with murdock's suicidal inspiration. of that no man may say or safely guess. the wave that swept the skipper out bore him almost to the thwart of a crowded life-boat. hands reached out, but he wrenched himself away, turned and swam back toward the ship. some say that he said, "good-bye, i'm going back to the ship." he disappeared for a moment, then reappeared where a rail was slipping under water. cool and courageous to the end, loyal to his duty under the most difficult circumstances, he showed himself a noble captain, and he died a noble death. saw both officers perish quartermaster moody saw all this, watched the skipper scramble aboard again onto the submerged decks, and then vanish altogether in a great billow. as moody's eye lost sight of the skipper in this confusion of waters it again shifted to the bridge, and just in time to see murdock take his life. the man's face was turned toward him, moody said, and he could not mistake it. there were still many gleaming lights on the ship, flickering out like little groups of vanishing stars, and with the clear starshine on the waters there was nothing to cloud or break the quartermaster's vision. "i saw murdock die by his own hand," said moody, "saw the flash from his gun, heard the crack that followed the flash and then saw him plunge over on his face." others report hearing several pistol shots on the decks below the bridge, but amid the groans and shrieks and cries, shouted orders and all that vast orchestra of sounds that broke upon the air they must have been faint periods of punctuation band played its own dirge the band had broken out in the strains of "nearer, my god, to thee," some minutes before murdock lifted the revolver to his head, fired and toppled over on his face. moody saw all this in a vision that filled his brain, while his ears drank in the tragic strain of the beautiful hymn that the band played as their own dirge, even to the moment when the waters sucked them down. wherever murdock's eye swept the water in that instant, before he drew his revolver, it looked upon veritable seas of drowning men and women. from the decks there came to him the shrieks and groans of the caged and drowning, for whom all hope of escape was utterly vanished. he evidently never gave a thought to the possibility of saving himself, his mind freezing with the horrors he beheld and having room for just one central idea--swift extinction. the strains of the hymn and the frantic cries of the dying blended in a symphony of sorrow. led by the green light, under the light of stars, the boats drew away, and the bow, then the quarter, then the stacks and last the stern of the marvel ship of a few days before passed beneath the waters. the great force of the ship's sinking was unaided by any violence of the elements, and the suction, not so great as had been feared, rocked but mildly the group of boats now a quarter of a mile distant from it. just before the titanic disappeared from view men and women leaped from the stern. more than a hundred men, according to colonel gracie, jumped at the last. gracie was among the number and he and the second officer were of the very few who were saved. as the vessel disappeared, the waves drowned the majestic {illust. caption = depth of ocean where the titanic went down the above etching shows a diagram of the ocean depths between the shore of newfoundland (shown at the top to the left, by the heavily shaded part) to 800 miles out, where the titanic struck an iceberg and sank. over the great bank of newfoundland the greatest depth is about 35 fathoms, or 210 feet. then there is a sudden drop to 105 fathoms, or 630 feet, and then there is a falling away to 1650 fathoms or 9900 feet, then 2000 fathoms or 12,000 feet, and about where the titanic sank 2760 fathoms or 16,560 feet.} hymn which the musicians played as they went to their watery grave. the most authentic accounts agree that this hymn was not "nearer, my god, to thee," which it seems had been {illust. caption = carpathia the cunard liner which brought the survivors of the titanic to new york.} {illust. caption = the hero wireless operator of the titanic photograph of harold...} played shortly before, but "autumn," which is found in the episcopal hymnal and which fits appropriately the situation on the titanic in the last moments of pain and darkness there. one line, "hold me up in mighty waters," particularly may have suggested the hymn to some minister aboard the doomed vessel, who, it has been thought, thereupon asked the remaining passengers to join in singing the hymn, in a last service aboard the sinking ship, soon to be ended by death itself. following is the hymn: god of mercy and compassion! look with pity on my pain: hear a mournful, broken spirit prostrate at thy feet complain; many are my foes, and mighty; strength to conquer i have none; nothing can uphold my goings but thy blessed self alone. saviour, look on thy beloved; triumph over all my foes; turn to heavenly joy my mourning, turn to gladness all my woes; live or die, or work or suffer, let my weary soul abide, in all changes whatsoever sure and steadfast by thy side. when temptations fierce assault me, when my enemies i find, sin and guilt, and death and satan, all against my soul combined, hold me up in mighty waters, keep my eyes on things above, righteousness, divine atonement, peace, and everlasting love. it was a little lame schoolmaster, tyrtaeus, who aroused the spartans by his poetry and led them to victory against the foe. it was the musicians of the band of the titanic--poor men, paid a few dollars a week--who played the music to keep up the courage of the souls aboard the sinking ship. "the way the band kept playing was a noble thing," says the wireless operator. "i heard it first while we were working the wireless, when there was a rag-time tune for us, and the last i saw of the band, when i was floating, struggling in the icy water, it was still on deck, playing 'autumn.' how those brave fellows ever did it i cannot imagine." perhaps that music, made in the face of death, would not have satisfied the exacting critical sense. it may be that the chilled fingers faltered on the pistons of the cornet or at the valves of the french horn, that the time was irregular and that by an organ in a church, with a decorous congregation, the hymns they chose would have been better played and sung. but surely that music went up to god from the souls of drowning men, and was not less acceptable than the song of songs no mortal ear may hear, the harps of the seraphs and the choiring cherubim. under the sea the music-makers lie, still in their fingers clutching the broken and battered means of melody; but over the strident voice of warring winds and the sound of many waters there rises their chant eternally; and though the musicians lie hushed and cold at the sea's heart, their music is heard forevermore. last moments that great ship, which started out as proudly, went down to her death like some grime silent juggernaut, drunk with carnage and anxious to stop the throbbing of her own heart at the bottom of the sea. charles h. lightoller, second officer of the titanic, tells the story this way: "i stuck to the ship until the water came up to my ankles. there had been no lamentations, no demonstrations either from the men passengers as they saw the last life-boat go, and there was no wailing or crying, no outburst from the men who lined the ship's rail as the titanic disappeared from sight. "the men stood quietly as if they were in church. they knew that they were in the sight of god; that in a moment judgment would be passed upon them. finally, the ship took a dive, reeling for a moment, then plunging. i was sucked to the side of the ship against the grating over the blower for the exhaust. there was an explosion. it blew me to the surface again, only to be sucked back again by the water rushing into the ship "this time i landed against the grating over the pipes, which furnish a draught for the funnels, and stuck there. there was another explosion, and i came to the surface. the ship seemed to be heaving tremendous sighs as she went down. i found myself not many feet from the ship, but on the other side of it. the ship had turned around while i was under the water. "i came up near a collapsible life-boat and grabbed it. many men were in the water near me. they had jumped at the last minute. a funnel fell within four inches of me and killed one of the swimmers. thirty clung to the capsized boat, and a life-boat, with forty survivors in it already, finally took them off. "george d. widener and harry elkins widener were among those who jumped at the last minute. so did robert williams daniel. the three of them went down together. daniel struck out, lashing the water with his arms until he had made a point far distant from the sinking monster of the sea. later he was picked up by one of the passing life-boats. "the wideners were not seen again, nor was john b. thayer, who went down on the boat. 'jack' thayer, who was literally thrown off the titanic by an explosion, after he had refused to leave the men to go with his mother, floated around on a raft for an hour before he was picked up." afloat with jack thayer graphic accounts of the final plunge of the titanic were related by two englishmen, survivors by the merest chance. one of them struggled for hours to hold himself afloat on an overturned collapsible life-boat, to one end of which john b. thayer, jr., of philadelphia, whose father perished, hung until rescued. the men gave their names as a. h. barkworth, justice of the peace of east riding, yorkshire, england, and w. j. mellers, of christ church terrace, chelsea, london. the latter, a young man, had started for this country with his savings to seek his fortune, and lost all but his life. mellers, like quartermaster moody, said captain smith did not commit suicide. the captain jumped from the bridge, mellers declares, and he heard him say to his officers and crew: "you have done your duty, boys. now every man for himself." mellers and barkworth, who say their names have been spelled incorrectly in most of the lists of survivors, both declare there were three distinct explosions before the titanic broke in two, and bow section first, and stern part last, settled with her human cargo into the sea. her four whistles kept up a deafening blast until the explosions, declare the men. the death cries from the shrill throats of the blatant steam screechers beside the smokestacks so rent the air that conversation among the passengers was possible only when one yelled into the ear of a fellow-unfortunate. "i did not know the thayer family well," declared mr. barkworth, "but i had met young thayer, a clear-cut chap, and his father on the trip. the lad and i struggled in the water for several hours endeavoring to hold afloat by grabbing to the sides and end of an overturned life-boat. now and again we lost our grip and fell back into the water. i did not recognize young thayer in the darkness, as we struggled for our lives, but i did recall having met him before when we were picked up by a life-boat. we were saved by the merest chance, because the survivors on a life-boat that rescued us hesitated in doing so, it seemed, fearing perhaps that additional burdens would swamp the frail craft. "i considered my fur overcoat helped to keep me afloat. i had a life preserver over it, under my arms, but it would not have held me up so well out of the water but for the coat. the fur of the coat seemed not to get wet through, and retained a certain amount of air that added to buoyance. i shall never part with it. "the testimony of j. bruce ismay, managing director of the white star line, that he had not heard explosions before the titanic settled, indicates that he must have gotten some distance from her in his life-boat. there were three distinct explosions and the ship broke in the center. the bow settled headlong first, and the stern last. i was looking toward her from the raft to which young thayer and i had clung." how captain smith died barkworth jumped, just before the titanic went down. he said there were enough life-preservers for all the passengers, but in the confusion many may not have known where to look for them. mellers, who had donned a life-preserver, was hurled into the air, from the bow of the ship by the force of the explosion, which he believed caused the titanic to part in the center. "i was not far from where captain smith stood on the bridge, giving full orders to his men," said mellers. "the brave old seaman was crying, but he had stuck heroically to the last. he did not shoot himself. he jumped from the bridge when he had done all he could. i heard his final instructions to his crew, and recall that his last words were: 'you have done your duty, boys. now every man for himself.' "i thought i was doomed to go down with the rest. i stood on the deck, awaiting my fate, fearing to jump from the ship. then came a grinding noise, followed by two others, and i was hurled into the deep. great waves engulfed me, but i was not drawn toward the ship, so that i believe there was little suction. i swam about for more than one hour before i was picked up by a boat." a faithful officer charles herbert lightoller, previously mentioned, stood by the ship until the last, working to get the passengers away, and when it appeared that he had made his last trip he went up high on the officers' quarters and made the best dive he knew how to make just as the ship plunged down to the depths. this is an excerpt from his testimony before the senate investigating committee: "what time did you leave the ship?" "i didn't leave it." "did it leave you?" "yes, sir." children shall hear that episode sung in after years and his own descendants shall recite it to their bairns. mr. lightoller acted as an officer and gentleman should, and he was not the only one. a message from a notorious gambler that jay yates, gambler, confidence man and fugitive from justice, known to the police and in sporting circles as j. h. rogers, went down with the titanic after assisting many women aboard life-boats, became known when a note, written on a blank page torn from a diary: was delivered to his sister. here is a fac-simile of the note: {illust.} this note was given by rogers to a woman he was helping into a life-boat. the woman, who signed herself "survivor," inclosed the note with the following letter. "you will find note that was handed to me as i was leaving the titanic. am stranger to this man, but think he was a card player. he helped me aboard a life-boat and i saw him help others. before we were lowered i saw him jump into the sea. if picked up i did not recognize him on the carpathia. i don't think he was registered on the ship under his right name." rogers' mother, mrs. mary a. yates, an old woman, broke down when she learned son had perished. "thank god i know where he is now," she sobbed. "i have not heard from him for two years. the last news i had from him he was in london." fifty lads met death among the many hundreds of heroic souls who went bravely and quietly to their end were fifty happy-go-lucky youngsters shipped as bell boys or messengers to serve the first cabin passengers. james humphreys, a quartermaster, who commanded life-boat no. 11, told a li{t}tle story that shows how these fifty lads met death. humphreys said the boys were called to their regular posts in the main cabin entry and taken in charge by their captain, a steward. they were ordered to remain in the cabin and not get in the way. throughout the first hour of confusion and terror these lads sat quietly on their benches in various parts of the first cabin. then, just toward the end when the order was passed around that the ship was going down and every man was free to save himself, if he kept away from the life-boats in which the women {illust. caption = "who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand."--isaiah xl:xii} were being taken, the bell boys scattered to all parts of the ship. humphreys said he saw numbers of them smoking cigarettes and joking with the passengers. they seemed to think that their violation of the rule against smoking while on duty was a sufficient breach of discipline. not one of them attempted to enter a life-boat. not one of them was saved. the heroes who remained the women who left the ship; the men who remained--there is little to choose between them for heroism. many of the women compelled to take to the boats would have stayed, had it been possible, to share the fate of their nearest and dearest, without whom their lives are crippled, broken and disconsolate. the heroes who remained would have said, with grenville. "we have only done our duty, as a man is bound to do." they sought no palms or crowns of martyrdom. "they also serve who only stand and wait," and their first action was merely to step aside and give places in the boats to women and children, some of whom were too young to comprehend or to remember. there was no debate as to whether the life of a financier, a master of business, was rated higher in the scale of values than that of an ignorant peasant mother. a woman was a woman, whether she wore rags or pearls. a life was given for a life, with no assertion that one was priceless and the other comparatively valueless. many of those who elected to remain might have escaped. "chivalry" is a mild appellation for their conduct. some of the vaunted knights of old were desperate cowards by comparison. a fight in the open field, or jousting in the tournament, did not call out the manhood in a man as did the waiting till the great ship took the final plunge, in the knowledge that the seas round about were covered with loving and yearning witnesses whose own salvation was not assured. when the roll is called hereafter of those who are "purged of pride because they died, who know the worth of their days," let the names of the men who went down with the titanic be found written there in the sight of god and men. the obvious lesson and, whatever view of the accident be taken, whether the moralist shall use it to point the text of a solemn or denunciatory warning, or whether the materialist, swinging to the other extreme, scouts any other theory than that of the "fortuitous concurrence of atoms," there is scarcely a thinking mortal who has heard of what happened who has not been deeply stirred, in the sense of a personal bereavement, to a profound humility and the conviction of his own insignificance in the greater universal scheme. many there are whom the influences of religion do not move, and upon whose hearts most generous sentiments knock in vain, who still are overawed and bowed by the magnitude of this catastrophe. no matter what they believe about it, the effect is the same. the effect is to reduce a man from the swaggering braggart--the vainglorious lord of what he sees--the self-made master of fate, of nature, of time, of space, of everything--to his true microscopic stature in the cosmos. he goes in tears to put together again the fragments of the few, small, pitiful things that belonged to him. "though love may pine, and reason chafe, there came a voice without reply." the only comfort, all that can bring surcease of sorrow, is that men fashioned in the image of their maker rose to the emergency like heroes, and went to their grave as bravely as any who have given their lives at any time in war. the hearts of those who waited on the land, and agonized, and were impotent to save, have been laid upon the same altars of sacrifice. the mourning of those who will not be comforted rises from alien lands together with our own in a common broken intercession. how little is the 882 feet of the "monster" that we launched compared with the arc of the rainbow we can see even in our grief spanning the frozen boreal mist! "the best of what we do and are, just god, forgive!" the ancient sacrifice and still our work must go on. it is the business of men and women neither to give way to unavailing grief nor to yield to the crushing incubus of despair, but to find hope that is at the bottom of everything, even at the bottom of the sea where that glorious virgin of the ocean is dying. "and when she took unto herself a mate she must espouse the everlasting sea." even so, for any progress of the race, there must be the ancient sacrifice of man's own stubborn heart, and all his pride. he must forever "lay in dust life's glory dead." he cannot rise to the height it was intended he should reach till he has plumbed the depths, till he has devoured the bread of the bitterest affliction, till he has known the ache of hopes deferred, of anxious expectation disappointed, of dreams that are not to be fulfilled this side of the river that waters the meads of paradise. there still must be a reason why it is not an unhappy thing to be taken from "the world we know to one a wonder still," and so that we go bravely, what does it matter, the mode of our going? it was not only those who stood back, who let the women and children go to the boats, that died. there died among us on the shore something of the fierce greed of bitterness, something of the sharp hatred of passion, something of the mad lust of revenge and of knife-edge competition. though we are not aware of it, perhaps, we are not quite the people that we were before out of the mystery an awful hand was laid upon us all, and what we had thought the colossal power of wealth was in a twinkling shown to be no more than the strength of an infant's little finger, or the twining tendril of a plant. "lest we forget; lest we forget!" {"illustration", really "music" lyrics = god of mercy and compassion, look with pity on my pain; hear a mournful, broken spirit prostrate at thy feet complain; many are my foes and mighty; strength to conquer i have none; nothing can uphold my goings but they blessed self alone. amen {2nd stanza} saviour, look on thy beloved, triumph over all my foes, turn to heavenly joy my mourning, turn to gladness all my woes; live or die, or work or suffer let my weary soul abide, in all changes whatsoever, sure and steadfast by thy side: {3rd stanza} when temptations fierce assault me, when my enemies i find, sin and guilt, and death and satan, all against my soul combined, hold me up in mighty waters, keep my eyes on things above--rightousness,{sic} divine atonement peace and everlasting love,} {illust. caption = latitude 41.46 north, longitude 50.14 west where manhood perished not} {illust. caption = lowering of the life-boats from the titanic it is easy to understand why...} {illust. caption = passengers leaving the titanic in the life-boats the agony and despair which possessed the occupants of these boats as they were carried away from the doomed giant, leaving husbands and brothers behind, is almost beyond description. it is little wonder that the strain of these moments, with the physical and mental suffering which followed during the early morning hours, left many of the women still hysterical when they reached new york.} where manhood perished not where cross the lines of forty north and fifty-fourteen west there rolls a wild and greedy sea with death upon its crest. no stone or wreath from human hands will ever mark the spot where fifteen hundred men went down, but manhood perished not. old ocean takes but little heed of human tears or woe. no shafts adorn the ocean graves, nor weeping willows grow. nor is there need of marble slab to keep in mind the spot where noble men went down to death, but manhood perished not! those men who looked on death and smiled, and trod the crumbling deck, have saved much more than precious lives from out that awful wreck. though countless joys and hopes and fears were shattered at a breath, 'tis something that the name of man did not go down to death. 'tis not an easy thing to die, e'en in the open air, twelve hundred miles from home and friends, in a shroud of black despair. a wreath to crown the brow of man, and hide a former blot will ever blossom o'er the waves where manhood perished not. harvey p. thew {spelling uncertain due to poor printing} chapter viii. the call for help heard the value of the wireless--other ships alter their course--rescuers on the way "we have struck an iceberg. badly damaged. rush aid." seaward and landward, j. g. phillips, the titanic's wireless man, had hurled the appeal for help. by fits and starts--for the wireless was working unevenly and blurringly--phillips reached out to the world, crying the titanic's peril. a word or two, scattered phrases, now and then a connected sentence, made up the message that sent a thrill of apprehension for a thousand miles east, west and south of the doomed liner. the early despatches from st. john's, cape race, and montreal, told graphic tales of the race to reach the titanic, the wireless appeals for help, the interruption of the calls, then what appeared to be a successful conclusion of the race when the virginian was reported as having reached the giant liner. many lines hear the call other rushing liners besides the virginian heard the call and became on the instant something more than cargo carriers and passenger greyhounds. the big baltic, 200 miles to the eastward and westbound, turned again to save life, as she did when her sister of the white star fleet, the republic, was cut down in a fog in january, 1909. the titanic's mate, the olympic, the mightiest of the seagoers save the titanic herself, turned in her tracks. all along the northern lane the miracle of the wireless worked for the distressed and sinking white star ship. the hamburg-american cincinnati, the parisian from glasgow, the north german lloyd prinz friedrich wilhelm, the hamburg-american liners prinz adelbert and amerika, all heard the c. q. d. and the rapid, condensed explanation of what had happened. virginian in desperate haste but the virginian was nearest, barely 170 miles away, and was the first to know of the titanic's danger. she went about and headed under forced draught for the spot indicated in one of the last of phillips' messages--latitude 41.46 n. and longitude 50.14 w. she is a fast ship, the allan liner, and her wireless has told the story of how she stretched through the night to get up to the titanic in time. there was need for all the power of her engines and all the experience and skill of her captain. the final fluttering marconigrams that were released from the titanic made it certain that the great ship with 2340 souls aboard was filling and in desperate peril. further out at sea was the cunarder, carpathia, which left new york for the mediterranean on april 13th. round she went and plunged back westward to take a hand in saving life. and the third steamship within short sailing of the titanic was the allan liner parisian away to the eastward, on her way from glasgow to halifax. while they sped in the night with all the drive that steam could give them, the titanic's call reached to cape race and the startled operator there heard at midnight a message which quickly reached new york: "have struck an iceberg. we are badly damaged. titanic latitude 41.46 n., 50.14 w." cape race threw the appeal broadcast wherever his apparatus could carry. then for hours, while the world waited for a crumb of news as to the safety of the great ship's people, not one thing more was known save that she was drifting, broken and helpless and alone in the midst of a waste of ice. and it was not until seventeen hours after the titanic had sunk that the words came out of the air as to her fate. there was a confusion and tangle of messages--a jumble of rumors. good tidings were trodden upon by evil. and no man knew clearly what was taking place in that stretch of waters where the giant icebergs were making a mock of all that the world knew best in ship-building. titanic sent out no more news it was at 12.17 a. m., while the virginian was still plunging eastward, that all communication from the titanic ceased. the virginian's operator, with the virginian's captain at his elbow, fed the air with blue flashes in a desperate effort to know what was happening to the crippled liner, but no message came back. the last word from the titanic was that she was sinking. then the sparking became fainter. the call was dying to nothing. the virginian's operator labored over a blur of signals. it was hopeless. so the allan ship strove on, fearing that the worst had happened. it was this ominous silence that so alarmed the other vessels hurrying to the titanic and that caused so much suspense here. chapter ix. in the drifting life-boats sorrow and suffering--the survivors see the titanic go down with their loved ones on board--a night of agonizing suspense--women help to row--help arrives--picking up the life-boats sixteen boats were in the procession which entered on the terrible hours of rowing, drifting and suspense. women wept for lost husbands and sons, sailors sobbed for the ship which had been their pride. men choked back tears and sought to comfort the widowed. perhaps, they said, other boats might have put off in another direction. they strove, though none too sure themselves, to convince the women of the certainty that a rescue ship would appear. in the distance the titanic looked an enormous length, her great bulk outlined in black against the starry sky, every port-hole and saloon blazing with light. it was impossible to think anything could be wrong with such a leviathan, were it not for that ominous tilt downwards in the bows, where the water was now up to the lowest row of port-holes. presently, about 2 a. m., as near as can be determined, those in the life-boats observed her settling very rapidly with the bows and the bridge completely under water, and concluded it was now only a question of minutes before she went. so it proved she slowly tilted straight on end with the stern vertically upwards, and as she did, the lights in the cabins and saloons, which until then had not flickered for a moment, died out, came on again for a single flash, and finally went altogether. at the same time the machinery roared down through the vessel with a rattle and a groaning that could be heard for miles, the weirdest sound surely that could be heard in the middle of the ocean, a thousand miles away from land. but this was not yet quite the end. titanic stood upright to the amazement of the awed watchers in the life-boats, the doomed vessel remained in that upright position for a time estimated at five minutes; some in the boat say less, but it was certainly some minutes that at least 150 feet of the titanic towered up above the level of the sea and loomed black against the sky. saw last of big ship then with a quiet, slanting dive she disappeared beneath the waters, and the eyes of the helpless spectators had looked for the last time upon the gigantic vessel on which they had set out from southampton. and there was left to the survivors only the gently heaving sea, the life-boats filled with men and women in every conceivable condition of dress and undress, above the perfect sky of brilliant stars with not a cloud, all tempered with a bitter cold that made each man and woman long to be one of the crew who toiled away with the oars and kept themselves warm thereby--a curious, deadening; bitter cold unlike anything they had felt before. "one long moan" and then with all these there fell on the ear the most appalling noise that human being has ever listened to--the cries of hundreds of fellow-beings struggling in the icy cold water, crying for help with a cry that could not be answered. third officer herbert john pitman, in charge of one of the boats, described this cry of agony in his testimony before the senatorial investigating committee, under the questioning of senator smith: "i heard no cries of distress until after the ship went down," he said. "how far away were the cries from your life-boat?" "several hundred yards, probably, some of them." "describe the screams." "don't, sir, please! i'd rather not talk about it." "i'm sorry to press it, but what was it like? were the screams spasmodic?" "it was one long continuous moan." the witness said the moans and cries continued an hour. those in the life-boats longed to return and pick up some of the poor drowning souls, but they feared this would mean swamping the boats and a further loss of life. some of the men tried to sing to keep the women from hearing the cries, and rowed hard to get away from the scene of the wreck, but the memory of those sounds will be one of the things the rescued will find it difficult to forget. the waiting sufferers kept a lookout for lights, and several times it was shouted that steamers' lights were seen, but they turned out to be either a light from another boat or a star low down on the horizon. it was hard to keep up hope. women tried to commit suicide "let me go back--i want to go back to my husband--i'll jump from the boat if you don't," cried an agonized voice in one life-boat. "you can do no good by going back--other lives will be lost if you try to do it. try to calm yourself for the sake of the living. it may be that your husband will be picked up somewhere by one of the fishing boats." the woman who pleaded to go back, according to mrs. vera dick, of calgary, canada, later tried to throw herself from the life-boat. mrs. dick, describing the scenes in the life-boats, said there were half a dozen women in that one boat who tried to commit suicide when they realized that the titanic had gone down. "even in canada, where we have such clear nights," said mrs. dick, "i have never seen such a clear sky. the stars were very bright and we could see the titanic plainly, like a great hotel on the water. floor after floor of the lights went out as we watched. it was horrible, horrible. i can't bear to think about it. from the distance, as we rowed away, we could hear the band playing 'nearer, my god to thee.' "among the life-boats themselves, however, there were scenes just as terrible, perhaps, but to me nothing could outdo the tragic grandeur with which the titanic went to its death. to realize it, you would have to see the titanic as i saw it the day we set sail--with the flags flying and the bands playing. everybody on board was laughing and talking about the titanic being the biggest and most luxurious boat on the ocean and being unsinkable. to think of it then and to think of it standing out there in the night, wounded to death and gasping for life, is almost too big for the imagination. scantily clad women in life-boats "the women on our boat were in nightgowns and bare feet--some of them--and the wealthiest women mingled with the poorest immigrants. one immigrant woman kept shouting: 'my god, my poor father! he put me in this boat and would not save himself. oh, why didn't i die, why didn't i die? why can't i die now?' "we had to restrain her, else she would have jumped over-board. it was simply awful. some of the men apparently had said they could row just to get into the boats. we paid no attention to cowardice, however. we were all busy with our own troubles. my heart simply bled for the women who were separated from their husbands. "the night was frightfully cold, although clear. we had to huddle together to keep warm. everybody drank sparingly of the water and ate sparingly of the bread. we did not know when we would be saved. everybody tried to remain cool, except the poor creatures who could think of nothing but their own great loss. those with the most brains seemed to control themselves best." philadelphia women heroines how mrs. george d. widener, whose husband and son perished after kissing her good-bye and helping her into one of the boats, rowed when exhausted seamen were on the verge of collapse, was told by emily geiger, maid of mrs. widener, who was saved with her. the girl said mrs. widener bravely toiled throughout the night and consoled other women who had broken down under the strain. mrs. william e. carter and mrs. john b. thayer were in the same life-boat and worked heroically to keep it free from the icy menace. although mrs. thayer's husband remained aboard the titanic and sank with it, and although she had no knowledge of the safety of her son until they met, hours later, aboard the carpathia, mrs. thayer bravely labored at the oars throughout the night. in telling of her experience mrs. carter said: "when i went over the side with my children and got in the boat there were no seamen in it. then came a few men, but there were oars with no one to use them. the boat had been filled with passengers, and there was nothing else for me to do but to take an oar. "we could see now that the time of the ship had come. she was sinking, and we were warned by cries from the men above to pull away from the ship quickly. mrs. thayer, wife of the vice-president of the pennsylvania railroad, was in my boat, and she, too, took an oar. "it was cold and we had no time to clothe ourselves with warm overcoats. the rowing warmed me. we started to pull away from the ship. we could see the dim outlines of the decks above, but we could not recognize anybody." many women rowing mrs. william r. bucknell's account of the part women played in the rowing is as follows: "there were thirty-five persons in the boat in which the captain placed me. three of these were ordinary seamen, supposed to manage the boat, and a steward. "one of these men seemed to think that we should not start away from the sinking ship until it could be learned whether the other boats would accommodate the rest of the women. he seemed to think that; more could be crowded into ours, if necessary. "'i would rather go back and go down with the ship than leave under these circumstances.' he cried. "the captain shouted to him to obey orders and to pull for a little light that could just be discerned miles in the distance. i do not know what this little light was. it may have been a passing fishing vessel, which, of course could not know our predicament. anyway, we never reached it. "we rowed all night, i took an oar and sat beside the countess de rothes. her maid had an our and so did mine. the air was freezing cold, and it was not long before the only man that appeared to know anything about rowing commenced to complain that his hands were freezing: a woman back of him handed him a shawl from about her shoulders. "as we rowed we looked back at the lights of the titanic. there was not a sound from her, only the lights began to get lower and lower, and finally she sank. then we heard a muffled explosion and a dull roar caused by the great suction of water. "there was not a drop of water on our boat. the last minute before our boat was launched captain smith threw aboard a bag of bread. i took the precaution of taking a good drink of water before we started, so i suffered no inconvenience from thirst." mrs. lucien smith, whose young husband perished, was another heroine. it is related by survivors that she took turns at the oars, and then, when the boat was in danger of sinking, stood ready to plug a hole with her finger if the cork stopper became loose. in another boat mrs. cornell and her sister, who had a slight knowledge of rowing, took turns at the oars, as did other women. the boat in which mrs. j. j. brown, of denver, col., was saved contained only three men in all, and only one rowed. he was a half-frozen seaman who was tumbled into the boat at the last minute. the woman wrapped him in blankets and set him at an oar to start his blood. the second man was too old to be of any use. the third was a coward. strange to say, there was room in this boat for ten other people. ten brave men would have received the warmest welcome of their lives if they had been there. the coward, being a quartermaster and the assigned head of the boat, sat in the stern and steered. he was terrified, and the women had to fight against his pessimism while they tugged at the oars. the women sat two at each oar. one held the oar in place, the other did the pulling. mrs. brown coached them and cheered them on. she told them that the exercise would keep the chill out of their veins, and she spoke hopefully of the likelihood that some vessel would answer the wireless calls. over the frightful danger of the situation the spirit of this woman soared. the pessimist and the coward sat in his stern seat, terrified, his tongue loosened with fright. he assured them there was no chance in the world. he had had fourteen years' experience, and he knew. first, they would have to row one and a half miles at least to get out of the sphere of the suction, if they did not want to go down. they would be lost, and nobody would ever find them. "oh, we shall be picked up sooner or later," said some of the braver ones. no, said the man, there was no bread in the boat, no water; they would starve--all that big boatload wandering the high seas with nothing to eat, perhaps for days. "don't," cried mrs. brown. "keep that to yourself, if you feel that way. for the sake of these women and chil-dren, be a man. we have a smooth sea and a fighting chance. be a man." but the coward only knew that there was no compass and no chart aboard. they sighted what they thought was a fishing smack on the horizon, showing dimly in the early dawn. the man at the rudder steered toward it, and the women bent to their oars again. they covered several miles in this way--but the smack faded into the distance. they could not see it any longer. and the coward said that everything was over. they rowed back nine weary miles. then the coward thought they must stop rowing, and lie in the trough of the waves until the carpathia should appear. the women tried it for a few moments, and felt the cold creeping into their bodies. though exhausted from the hard physical labor they thought work was better than freezing. "row again!" commanded mrs. brown. "no, no, don't," said the coward. "we shall freeze," cried several of the women together. "we must row. we have rowed all this time. we must keep on or freeze." when the coward still demurred, they told him plainly and once for all that if he persisted in wanting them to stop rowing, they were going to throw him overboard and be done with him for good. something about the look in the eye of that mississippi-bred oarswoman, who seemed such a force among her fellows, told him that he had better capitulate. and he did. countess rothes an expert oarswoman miss alice farnam leader, a new york physician, escaped from the titanic on the same boat which carried the countess rothes. "the countess is an expert oarswoman," said doctor leader, "and thoroughly at home on the water. she practically took command of our boat when it was found that the seaman who had been placed at the oars could not row skilfully. several of the women took their place with the countess at the oars and rowed in turns, while the weak and unskilled stewards sat quietly in one end of the boat." men could not row "with nothing on but a nightgown i helped row one of the boats for three hours," said mrs. florence ware, of bristol, england. "in our boat there were a lot of women, a steward and a fireman. none of the men knew anything about managing a small boat, so some of the women who were used to boats took charge. "it was cold and i worked as hard as i could at an oar until we were picked up. there was nothing to eat or drink on our boat." deaths on the life-boats "the temperature must have been below freezing," testified another survivor, "and neither men nor women in my boat were warmly clothed. several of them died. the officer in charge of the life-boat decided it was better to bury the {illust. caption = survivors of the great marine disaster the first authentic photograph,...} {illust. caption = copyright by campbell studio. n. y. colonel and mrs. john jacob astor mrs. astor, nee miss madeline force, was rescued. colonel astor who bravely refused to take a place in the life-boats, went down with the titanic.} bodies. soon they were weighted so they would sink and were put overboard. we could also see similar burials taking place from other life-boats that were all around us." gamblers were polite in one boat were two card sharps. with the same cleverness that enabled them to win money on board they obtained places in the boats with the women. in the boat with the gamblers were women in their night-gowns and women in evening dress. none of the boats were properly equipped with food, but all had enough bread and water to keep the rescued from starving until the expected arrival of help. to the credit of the gamblers who managed to escape, it should be said that they were polite and showed the women every courtesy. all they wanted was to be sure of getting in a boat. that once accomplished, they reverted to their habitual practice of politeness and suavity. they were even willing; to do a little manual labor, refusing to let women do any rowing. the people on that particular boat were a sad group. fathers had kissed their daughters good-bye and husbands had parted from their wives. the card sharps, however philosophized wonderfully about the will of the almighty and how strange his ways. they said that one must be prepared for anything; that good always came from evil, and that every cloud had a silvery lining{.} "who knows?" said one. "it may be that everybody on board will be saved." another added: "our duty is to the living. you women owe it to your relatives and friends not to allow this thing to wreck your reason or undermine your health." and they took pains to see that all the women who were on the life-boat had plenty of covering to keep them from the icy blasts of the night. help in sight the survivors were in the life-boats until about 5.30 a. m. about 3 a. m. faint lights appeared in the sky and all rejoiced to see what was supposed to be the coming dawn, but after watching for half an hour and seeing no change in the intensity of the light, the disappointed sufferers realized it was the northern lights. presently low down on the horizon they saw a light which slowly resolved itself into a double light, and they watched eagerly to see if the two lights would separate and so prove to be only two of the boats, or whether these lights would remain together, in which case they should expect them to be the lights of a rescuing steamer. to the inexpressible joy of all, they moved as one! immediately the boats were swung around and headed for the lights. someone shouted: "now, boys, sing!" and everyone not too weak broke into song with "row for the shore, boys." tears came to the eyes of all as they realized that safety was at hand. the song was sung, but it was a very poor imitation of the real thing, for quavering voices make poor songs. a cheer was given next, and that was better--you can keep in tune for a cheer. the "lucky thirteen" "our rescuer showed up rapidly, and as she swung round we saw her cabins all alight, and knew she must be a large steamer. she was now motionless and we had to row to her. just then day broke, a beautiful quiet dawn with faint pink clouds just above the horizon, and a new moon whose crescent just touched the horizon. 'turn your money over, boys,' said our cheery steersman, 'that is, if you have any with you,' he added. "we laughed at him for his superstition at such a time, but he countered very neatly by adding: 'well, i shall never say again that 13 is an unlucky number; boat 13 has been the best friend we ever had.' certainly the 13 superstition is killed forever in the minds of those who escaped from the titanic in boat 13. "as we neared the carpathia we saw in the dawning light what we thought was a full-rigged schooner standing up near her, and presently behind her another, all sails set, and we said: 'they are fisher boats from the newfoundland bank and have seen the steamer lying to and are standing by to help.' but in another five minutes the light shone pink on them and we saw they were icebergs towering many feet in the air, huge, glistening masses, deadly white, still, and peaked in a way that had easily suggested a schooner. we glanced round the horizon and there were others wherever the eye could reach. the steamer we had to reach was surrounded by them and we had to make a detour to reach her, for between her and us lay another huge berg." a wonderful dawn speaking of the moment when the carpathia was sighted. mrs. j. j. brown, who had cowed the driveling quartermaster, said: "then, knowing that we were safe at last, i looked about me. the most wonderful dawn i have ever seen came upon us. i have just returned from egypt. i have been all over the world, but i have never seen anything like this. first the gray and then the flood of light. then the sun came up in a ball of red fire. for the first time we saw where we were. near us was open water, but on every side was ice. ice ten feet high was everywhere, and to the right and left and back and front were icebergs. some of them were mountain high. this sea of ice was forty miles wide, they told me. we did not wait for the carpathia to come to us, we rowed to it. we were lifted up in a sort of nice little sling that was lowered to us. after that it was all over. the passengers of the carpathia were so afraid that we would not have room enough that they gave us practically the whole ship to ourselves." it had been learned that some of the passengers, in fact all of the women passengers of the titanic who were rescued, refer to "lady margaret," as they called mrs. brown as the strength of them all. transferring the rescued officers of the carpathia report that when they reached the scene of the titanic's wreck there were fifty bodies or more floating in the sea. only one mishap attended the transfer of the rescued from the life-boats. one large collapsible life-boat, in which thirteen persons were seated, turned turtle just as they were about to save it, and all in it were lost. the dog hero not the least among the heroes of the titanic disaster was rigel, a big black newfoundland dog, belonging to the first officer, who went down with the ship. but for rigel the fourth boat picked up might have been run down by the carpathia. for three hours he swam in the icy water where the titanic went down, evidently looking for his master, and was instrumental in guiding the boatload of survivors to the gangway of the carpathia. jonas briggs, a seaman abroad the carpathia, now has rigel and told the story of the dog's heroism. the carpathia was moving slowly about, looking for boats, rafts or anything which might be afloat. exhausted with their efforts, weak from lack of food and exposure to the cutting wind and terror-stricken, the men and women in the fourth boat had drifted under the carpathia's starboard bow. they were dangerously close to the steamship, but too weak to shout a warning loud enough to reach the bridge. the boat might not have been seen were it not for the sharp barking of rigel, who was swimming ahead of the craft, and valiantly announcing his position. the barks attracted the attention of captain rostron; and he went to the starboard end of the bridge to see where they came from and saw the boat. he immediately ordered the engines stopped, and the boat came alongside the starboard gangway. care was taken to get rigel aboard, but he appeared little affected by his long trip through the ice-cold water. he stood by the rail and barked until captain rostron called briggs and had him take the dog below. a thrilling account of rescue mr. wallace bradford, of san francisco, a passenger aboard the carpathia, gave the following thrilling account of the rescue of the titanic's passengers. "since half-past four this morning i have experienced one of those never-to-be-forgotten circumstances that weighs heavy on my soul and which shows most awfully what poor things we mortals are. long before this reaches you the news will be flashed that the titanic has gone down and that our steamer, the carpathia, caught the wireless message when seventy-five miles away, and so far we have picked up twenty boats estimated to contain about 750 people. "none of us can tell just how many, as they have been hustled to various staterooms and to the dining saloons to be warmed up. i was awakened by unusual noises and imagined that i smelled smoke. i jumped up and looked out of my port-hole, and saw a huge iceberg looming up like a rock off shore. it was not white, and i was positive that it was a rock, and the thought flashed through my mind, how in the world can we be near a rock when we are four days out from new york in a southerly direction and in mid-ocean. "when i got out on deck the first man i encountered told me that the titanic had gone down and we were rescuing the passengers. the first two boats from the doomed vessel were in sight making toward us. neither of them was crowded. this was accounted for later by the fact that it was impossible to get many to leave the steamer, as they would not believe that she was going down. it was a glorious, clear morning and a quiet sea. off to the starboard was a white area of ice plain, from whose even surface rose mammoth forts, castles and pyramids of solid ice almost as real as though they had been placed there by the hand of man. "our steamer was hove to about two and a half miles from the edge of this huge iceberg. the titanic struck about 11.20 p. m. and did not go down until two o'clock. many of the passengers were in evening dress when they came aboard our ship, and most of these were in a most bedraggled condition. near me as i write is a girl about eighteen years old in a fancy dress costume of bright colors, while in another seat near by is a women in a white dress trimmed with lace and covered with jaunty blue flowers. "as the boats came alongside after the first two all of them contained a very large proportion of women. in fact, one of the boats had women at the oars, one in particular containing, as near as i could estimate, about forty-five women and only about six men. in this boat two women were handling one of the oars. all of the engineers went down with the steamer. four bodies have been brought aboard. one is that of a fireman, who is said to have been shot by one of the officers because he refused to obey orders. soon after i got on deck i could, with the aid of my glasses, count seven boats headed our way, and they continued to come up to half past eight o'clock. some were in sight for a long time and moved very slowly, showing plainly that the oars were being handled by amateurs or by women. "no baggage of any kind was brought by the survivors. in fact, the only piece of baggage that reached the carpathia from the titanic is a small closed trunk about twenty-four inches square, evidently the property of an irish female immigrant. while some seemed fully dressed, many of the men having their overcoats and the women sealskin and other coats, others came just as they had jumped from their berths, clothed in their pajamas and bath robes." the sorrow of the living of the survivors in general it may be said that they escaped death and they gained life. life is probably sweet to them as it is to everyone, but what physical and mental torture has been the price of life to those who were brought back to land on the carpathia--the hours in life-boats, amid the crashing of ice, the days of anguish that have succeeded, the horrors of body and mind still experienced and never to be entirely absent until death affords them its relief. the thought of the nation to-day is for the living. they need our sympathy, our consolation more than do the dead, and, perhaps, in the majority of the cases they need our protecting care as well. chapter x. on board the carpathia aid for the suffering and hysterical--burying the dead--vote of thanks to captain rostron of the carpathia--identifying those saved--communicating with land--the passage to new york. if the scenes in the life-boats were tear-bringing, hardly less so was the arrival of the boats at the carpathia with their bands of terror-stricken, grief-ridden survivors, many of them too exhausted to know that safety was at hand. watchers on the carpathia were moved to tears. "the first life-boat reached the carpathia about half-past five o'clock in the morning," recorded one of the passengers on the carpathia. "and the last of the sixteen boats was unloaded before nine o'clock. some of the life-boats were only half filled, the first one having but two men and eleven women, when it had accommodations for at least forty. there were few men in the boats. the women were the gamest lot i have ever seen. some of the men and women were in evening clothes, and others among those saved had nothing on but night clothes and raincoats." after the carpathia had made certain that there were no more passengers of the titanic to be picked up, she threaded her way out of the ice fields for fifty miles. it was dangerous work, but it was managed without trouble. aid for the suffering and hysterical the shrieks and cries of the women and men picked up in life-boats by the carpathia were horrible. the women were clothed only in night robes and wrappers. the men were in their night garments. one was lifted on board entirely nude. all the passengers who could bear nourishment were taken into the dining rooms and cabins by captain rostron and given food and stimulants. passengers of the carpathia gave up their berths and staterooms to the survivors. as soon as they were landed on the carpathia many of the women became hysterical, but on the whole they behaved splendidly. men and women appeared to be stunned all day monday, the full force of the disaster not reaching them until tuesday night. after being wrapped up in blankets and filled with brandy and hot coffee, the first thoughts were for their husbands and those at home. most of them imagined that their husbands had been picked up by other vessels, and they began flooding the wireless rooms with messages. it was almost certain that those who were not on board the carpathia had gone down to death. one of the most seriously injured was a woman who had lost both her children. her limbs had been severely torn; but she was very patient. women seeking news in the first cabin library women of wealth and refinement mingled their grief and asked eagerly for news of the possible arrival of a belated boat, or a message from other steamers telling of the safety of their husbands. mrs. henry b. harris, wife of a new york theatrical manager, checked her tears long enough to beg that some message of hope be sent to her father-in-law. mrs. g. thorne, miss marie young, mrs emil taussig and her daughter, ruth, mrs. martin rothschild, mrs. william augustus spencer, mrs. j. stewart white and mrs. walter m. clark were a few of those who lay back, exhausted, on the leather cushions and told in shuddering sentences of their experiences. mrs. john jacob astor and the countess of rothes had been taken to staterooms soon after their arrival on shipboard. before noon, at the captain's request, the first cabin passengers of the titanic gathered in the saloon and the passengers of other classes in corresponding places on the rescue ship. then the collecting of names was begun by the purser and the stewards. a second table was served in both cabins for the new guests, and the carpathia's second cabin, being better filled than its first, the second class arrivals had to be sent to the steerage. tears their only relief mrs. jacques futrelle, wife of the novelist, herself a writer of note, sat dry eyed in the saloon, telling her friends that she had given up hope for her husband. she joined with the rest in inquiries as to the chances of rescue by another ship, and no one told her what soon came to be the fixed opinion of the men--that all those saved were on the carpathia. "i feel better," mrs. futrelle said hours afterward, "for i can cry now." among the men conversation centered on the accident and the responsibility for it. many expressed the belief that the titanic, in common with other vessels, had had warning of the ice packs, but that in the effort to establish a record on the maiden run sufficient heed had not been paid to the warnings. "god knows i'm not proud to be here," said a rich new york man. "i got on a boat when they were about to lower it and when, from delays below, there was no woman to take the vacant place. i don't think any man who was saved is deserving of censure, but i realize that, in contrast with those who went down, we may be viewed unfavorably." he showed a picture of his baby boy as he spoke. pitiful scenes of grief as the day passed the fore part of the ship assumed some degree of order and comfort, but the crowded second sabin and rear decks gave forth the incessant sound of lamentation. a bride of two months sat on the floor and moaned her widowhood. an italian mother shrieked the name of her lost son. a girl of seven wept over the loss of her teddy bear and two dolls, while her mother, with streaming eyes, dared not tell the child that her father was lost too, and that the money for which their home in england had been sold had gone down with him. other children clung to the necks of the fathers who, because carrying them, had been permitted to take the boats. in the hospital and the public rooms lay, in blankets, several others who had been benumbed by the water. mrs. rosa abbott, who was in the water for hours, was restored during the day. k. whiteman, the titanic's barber, who declared he was blown off the ship by the second of the two explosions after the crash, was treated for bruises. a passenger, who was thoroughly ducked before being picked up, caused much amusement on this ship, soon after the doctors were through with him, by demanding a bath. survivors aid the destitute storekeeper prentice, the last man off the titanic to reach this ship, was also soon over the effects of his long swim in the icy waters into which he leaped from the poop deck. the physicians of the carpathia were praised, as was chief steward hughes, for work done in making the arrivals comfortable and averting serious illness. monday night on the carpathia was one of rest. the wailing and sobbing of the day were hushed as widows and orphans slept. tuesday, save for the crowded condition of the ship, matters took somewhat their normal appearance. the second cabin dining room had been turned into a hospital to care for the injured, and the first, second and third class dining rooms were used for sleeping rooms at night for women, while the smoking rooms were set aside for men. all available space was used, some sleeping in chairs and some on the floor, while a few found rest in the bathrooms. every cabin had been filled, and women and children were sleeping on the floors in the dining saloon, library and smoking rooms. the passengers of the carpathia had divided their clothes with the shipwrecked ones until they had at least kept warm. it is true that many women had to appear on deck in kimonos and some in underclothes with a coat thrown over them, but their lives had been spared and they had not thought of dress. some children in the second cabin were entirely without clothes, but the women had joined together, and with needles and thread they could pick up from passenger to passenger, had made warm clothes out of the blankets belonging to the carpathia. women befriended one another the women aboard the carpathia did what they could by word and act to relieve the sufferings of the rescued. most of the survivors were in great need of clothing, and this the women of the carpathia supplied to them as long as their surplus stock held out. j. a. shuttleworth, of louisville, ky., befriended mrs. lucien smith, whose husband went down with the titanic. mrs. smith was formerly miss eloise hughes, daughter of representative and mrs. james a. hughes, of huntington, w. va., and was on her wedding trip. mr. shuttleworth asked her if there wasn't something he could do for her. she said that all the money she had was lost on the titanic, so mr. shuttleworth gave her $500 deaths on the carpathia two of the rescued from the titanic died from shock and exposure before they reached the carpathia, and another died a few minutes after being taken on board. the dead were w. h. hoyte, first cabin; abraham hormer, third class, and s. c. sirbert, steward, and they were buried at sea the morning of april 15th, latitude 41.14 north, longitude 51.24 west. p. lyon, able seaman, died and was buried at sea the following morning. an assistant steward lost his mind upon seeing one of the titanic's rescued firemen expire after being lifted to the deck of the carpathia. an episcopal bishop and a catholic priest from montreal read services of their respective churches over the dead. the bodies were sewed up in sacks, heavily weighted at the feet, and taken to an opening in the side of the ship on the lower deck not far above the water line. a long plank tilted at one end served as the incline down which the weighted sacks slid into the sea. "after we got the titanic's passengers on board our ship," said one of the carpathia's officers, "it was a question as to where we should take them. some said the olympic would come out and meet us and take them on to new york, but others said they would die if they had to be lowered again into small boats to be taken up by another, so we finally turned toward new york, delaying the carpathia's passengers eight days in reaching gibraltar." survivors watch new boats there were several children on board, who had lost their parents--one baby of eleven months with a nurse who, coming on board the carpathia with the first boat, watched with eagerness and sorrow for each incoming boat, but to no avail. the parents had gone down. there was a woman in the second cabin who lost seven children out of ten, and there were many other losses quite as horrible. mr. ismy "pitiable sight" among the rescued ones who came on board the carpathia was the president of the white star line. "mr. ismay reached the carpathia in about the tenth life-boat," said an officer. "i didn't know who he was, but afterward heard the others of the crew discussing his desire to get something to eat the minute he put his foot on deck. the steward who waited on him, mcguire, from london, says mr. ismay came dashing into the dining room, and throwing himself in a chair, said: 'hurry, for god's sake, and get me something to eat; i'm starved. i don't care what it costs or what it is; bring it to me.' "mcguire brought mr. ismay a load of stuff and when he had finished it, he handed mcguire a two dollar bill. 'your money is no good on this ship,' mcguire told him. 'take it.' {illust. caption = diagram of the titanic's arrangement and equipment the titanic was far and away the largest and finest vessel ever built, excepting only her sister-ship, the olympic. her dimensions were: length, 882 1/2 feet; beam, 92 feet, depth (from keel to tops of funnels), 175 feet tonnage, 45,000. her huge hull, divided into thirty watertight compartments, contained nine steel decks, and provided accommodation for 2,500 passengers, besides a crew of 890.} {illust. caption = upper deck of the titanic, looking forward} insisted mr. ismay, shoving the bill in mcguire's hand. i am well able to afford it. i will see to it that the boys of the carpathia are well rewarded for this night's work.' this promise started mcguire making inquiries as to the identity of the man he had waited on. then we learned that he was mr. ismay. i did not see mr. ismay after the first few hours. he must have kept to his cabin." a passenger on the carpathia said there was no wonder that none of the wireless telegrams addressed to mr. ismay were answered until the one that he sent yesterday afternoon to his line, the white star. "mr. ismay was beside himself," said this woman passenger, "and on most of the voyage after we had picked him up he was being quieted with opiates on orders of the ship's doctor. five dogs and one pig saved "five women saved their pet dogs, carrying them in their arms. another woman saved a little pig, which she said was her mascot. though her husband is an englishman and she lives in england she is an american and was on her way to visit her folks here. how she cared for the pig aboard ship i do not know, but she carried it up the side of the ship in a big bag. i did not mind the dogs so much, but it seemed to me to be too much when a pig was saved and human beings went to death. "it was not until noon on monday that we cleared the last of the ice, and monday night a dense fog came up and continued until the following morning, then a strong wind, a heavy sea, a thunderstorm and a dense fog tuesday night, caused some uneasiness among the more unnerved, the fog continuing all of tuesday. "a number of whales were sighted as the carpathia was clearing the last of the ice, one large one being close by, and all were spouting like geysers." vote of thanks to carpathia "on tuesday afternoon a meeting of the uninjured survivors was called in the main saloon for the purpose of devising means of assisting the more unfortunate, many of whom had lost relatives and all their personal belongings, and thanking divine providence for their deliverance. the meeting was called to order and mr. samuel goldenberg was elected chairman. resolutions were then passed thanking the officers, surgeons, passengers and crew of the carpathia for their splendid services in aiding the rescued and like resolutions for the admirable work done by the officers, surgeons and crew of the titanic. "a committee was then appointed to raise funds on board the carpathia to relieve the immediate wants of the destitute and assist them in reaching their destinations and also to present a loving cup to the officers of the carpathia and also a loving cup to the surviving officers of the titanic. "mr. t. g. frauenthal, of new york, was made chairman of the committee on subscriptions. "a committee, consisting of mrs. j. j. brown, mrs william bucknell and mrs. george stone, was appointed to look after the destitute. there was a subscription taken up and up to wednesday the amount contributed totaled $15,000. "the work of the crew on board the carpathia in rescuing was most noble and remarkable, and these four days that the ship has been overcrowded with its 710 extra passengers could not have been better handled. the stewards have worked with undying strength--although one was overcome with so much work and died and was put to his grave at sea. "i have never seen or felt the benefits of such royal treatment. i have heard the captain criticised because he did not answer telegrams, but all that i can say is that he showed us every possible courtesy, and if we had been on our own boats, having paid our fares there, we could not have had better food or better accommodations. "men who had paid for the best staterooms on the carpathia left their rooms so that we might have them. they fixed up beds in the smoking rooms, and mattresses everywhere. all the women who were rescued were given the best staterooms, which were surrendered by the regular passengers. none of the regular passengers grumbled because their trip to europe was interrupted, nor did they complain that they were put to the inconvenience of receiving hundreds of strangers. "the women on board the carpathia were particularly kind. it shows that for every cruelty of nature there is a kindness, for every misfortune there is some goodness. the men and women took up collections on board for the rescued steerage passengers. mrs. astor, i believe, contributed $2000, her check being cashed by the carpathia. altogether something like $15,000 was collected and all the women were provided with sufficient money to reach their destination after they were landed in new york." under any other circumstances the suffering would have been intolerable. but the good samaritans on the carpathia gave many women heart's-ease. the spectacle on board the carpathia on the return trip to new york at times was heartrending, while at other times those on board were quite cheerful. chapter xi. preparations on land to receive the sufferers police arrangements--donations of money and supplies--hospitals and ambulances made ready--private houses thrown open--waiting for the carpathia to arrive--the ship sighted! new york city, touched to the heart by the great ocean calamity and desiring to do what it could to lighten the woes and relieve the sufferings of the pitiful little band of men and women rescued from the titanic, opened both its heart and its purse. the most careful and systematic plans were made for the reception and transfer to homes, hotels or institutions of the titanic's survivors. mayor gaynor, with police commissioner waldo, arranged to go down the bay on the police boat patrol, to come up with the carpathia and take charge of the police arrangements at the pier. in anticipation of the enormous number that would, for a variety of reasons, creditable or otherwise, surge about the cunard pier at the coming of the carpathia, mayor gaynor and the police commissioner had seen to it that the streets should be rigidly sentineled by continuous lines of policemen under inspector george mcclusky, the man of most experience, perhaps, in handling large crowds, there were 200 men, including twelve mounted men and a number in citizens' clothes. for two blocks to the north, south and east of the docks lines were established through which none save those bearing passes from the government and the cunard line could penetrate. with all arrangements made that experience or information could suggest, the authorities settled down to await the docking of the carpathia. no word had come to either the white star line or the cunard line, they said, that any of the titanic's people had died on that ship or that bodies had been recovered from the sea, but in the afternoon mayor gaynor sent word to the board of coroners that it might be well for some of that body to meet the incoming ship. coroners feinberg and holtzhauser with coroner's physician weston arranged to go down the bay on the patrol, while coroner hellenstein waited at the pier. an undertaker was notified to be ready if needed. fortunately there was no such need. every possible measure thought of every possible measure of relief for the survivors that could be thought of by officials of the city, of the federal government, by the heads of hospitals and the red cross and relief societies was arranged for. the municipal lodging house, which has accommodations for 700 persons, agreed to throw open its doors and furnish lodging and food to any of the survivors as long as they should need it. commissioner of charities drummond did not know, of course, just how great the call would be for the services of his department. he went to the cunard pier to direct his part of the work in person. meanwhile he had twenty ambulances ready for instant movement on the city's pier at the foot of east twenty-sixth street. they were ready to take patients to the reception hospital connected with bellevue or the metropolitan hospital on blackwell's island. ambulances from the kings county hospital in brooklyn were also there to do their share. all the other hospitals in the city stood ready to take the titanic's people and those that had ambulances promised to send them. the charities ferryboat, thomas s. brennan, equipped as a hospital craft, lay off the department pier with nurses and physicians ready to be called to the cunard pier on the other side of the city. st. vincent's hospital had 120 beds ready, new york hospital twelve, bellevue and the reception hospital 120 and flower hospital twelve. the house of shelter maintained by the hebrew sheltering and immigrant aid society announced that it was able to care for at least fifty persons as long as might be necessary. the german society of new york, the irish immigrant society, the italian society, the swedish immigrant society and the young men's christian association were among the organizations that also offered to see that no needy survivor would go without shelter. mrs. w. a. bastede, whose husband is a member of the staff of st. luke's hospital, offered to the white star line the use of the newly opened ward at st. luke's, which will accommodate from thirty to sixty persons. she said the hospital would send four ambulances with nurses and doctors and that she had collected clothing enough for fifty persons. the line accepted her offer and said that the hospital would be kept informed as to what was needed. a trustee of bellevue also called at the white star offices to offer ambulances. he said that five or six, with two or three doctors and nurses on each, would be sent to the pier if required. many other hospitals as well as individuals called at the mayor's office, expressing willingness to take in anybody that should be sent to them. a woman living in fiftieth street just off fifth avenue wished to put her home at the disposal of the survivors. d. h. knott, of 102 waverley place, told the mayor that he could take care of 100 and give them both food and lodging at the arlington, holly and earl hotels. commissioner drummond visited the city hall and arranged with the mayor the plans for the relief to be extended directly by the city. mr. drummond said that omnibuses would be provided to transfer passengers from the ship to the municipal lodging house. mrs. vanderbilt's efforts mrs. w. k. vanderbilt, jr., spent the day telephoning to her friends, asking them to let their automobiles be used to meet the carpathia and take away those who needed surgical care. it was announced that as a result of mrs. vanderbilt's efforts 100 limousine automobiles and all the fifth avenue and riverside drive automobile buses would be at the cunard pier. immigration commissioner williams said that he would be at the pier when the carpathia came in. there was to be no inspection of immigrants at ellis island. instead, the commissioner sent seven or eight inspectors to the pier to do their work there and he asked them to do it with the greatest possible speed and the least possible bother to the shipwrecked aliens. the immigrants who had no friends to meet them were to be provided for until their cases could be disposed of. mr. williams thought that some of them who had lost everything might have to be sent back to their homes. those who were to be admitted to the united states were to be cared for by the women's relief committee. red cross relief robert w. de forest, chairman of the red cross relief committee of the charity organization society, after conferring with mayor gaynor, said that in addition to an arrangement that all funds received by the mayor should be paid to jacob h. schiff, the new york treasurer of the american red cross, the committee had decided that it could turn over all the immediate relief work to the women's relief committee. the red cross committee announced that careful plans had been made to provide for every possible emergency. the emergency committee received a telegram that ernest p. bicknell, director of the american red cross, was coming from washington. the red cross emergency relief committee was to have several representatives at the pier to look out for the passengers on the carpathia. mr. persons and dr. devine were to be there and it was planned to have others. the salvation army offered, through the mayor's office, accommodation for thirty single men at the industrial home, 533 west forty-eighth street, and for twenty others at its hotel, 18 chatham square. the army's training school at 124 west fourteenth street was ready to take twenty or thirty survivors. r. h. farley, head of the white star line's third class department, said that the line would give all the steerage passengers railroad tickets to their destination. mayor gaynor estimated that more than 5000 persons could be accommodated in quarters offered through his orders. most of these offers of course would have to be rejected. the mayor also said that colonel conley of the sixty-ninth regiment offered to turn out his regiment to police the pier, but it was thought that such service would be unnecessary. crowds at the docks long before dark on thursday night a few people passed the police lines and with a yellow card were allowed to go on the dock; but reports had been published that the carpathia would not be in till midnight, and by 8 o'clock there were not more than two hundred people on the pier. in the next hour the crowd with passes trebled in number. by 9 o'clock the pier held half as many as it could comfortably contain. the early crowd did not contain many women relatives of the survivors. few nervous people could be seen, but here and there was a woman, usually supported by two male escorts, weeping softly to herself. on the whole it was a frantic, grief-crazed crowd. laborers rubbed shoulders with millionaires. the relatives of the rich had taxicabs waiting outside the docks. the relatives of the poor went there on foot in the rain, ready to take their loved ones. a special train was awaiting mrs. charles m. hays, widow of the president of the grand trunk railroad. a private car also waited mrs. george d. widener. early arrivals at pier among the first to arrive at the pier was a committee from the stock exchange, headed by r. h. thomas, and composed of charles knoblauch, b. m. w. baruch, charles holzderber and j. carlisle. mr. thomas carried a long black box which contained $5000 in small bills, which was to be handed out to the needy steerage survivors of the titanic as they disembarked. with the early arrivals at the pier were the relatives of frederick white, who was not reported among the survivors, though mrs. white was; harry mock, who came to look for a brother and sister; and vincent astor, who arrived in a limousine with william a. dobbyn, colonel astor's secretary, and two doctors. the limousine was kept waiting outside to take mrs. astor to the astor home on fifth avenue. eight limousine cars the waldorf-astoria had sent over eight limousine car to convey to the hotel these survivors: mrs. mark fortune and three daughters, mrs. lucien p. smith, mrs. j. stewart white, mrs. thornton davidson, mrs. george c. douglass, mrs. george d. widener and maid, mrs. george wick, miss bonnell, miss e. ryerson, mrs. susan p. ryerson, mrs. arthur ryerson, miss mary wick, the misses howell, mrs. john p. snyder and mr. and mrs. d. h. bishop. thirty-five ambulances at the pier at one time there were thirty-five ambulances drawn up; outside the cunard pier. every hospital in manhattan, brooklyn and the bronx was represented. several of the ambulances came from as far north as the lebanon hospital, in the bronx, and the brooklyn hospital, in brooklyn. accompanying them were seventy internes and surgeons from the staffs of the hospitals, and more than 125 male and female nurses. st. vincent's sent the greatest number of ambulances, at one time, eight of them from this hospital being in line at the pier. miss eva booth, direct head of the salvation army, was at the pier, accompanied by miss elizabeth nye and a corps of her officers, ready to aid as much as possible. the sheltering society and various other similar organizations also were represented, all ready to take care of those who needed them. an officer of the sixty-ninth regiment, n. g. n. y., offered the white star line officials, the use of the regiment's armory for any of the survivors. mrs. thomas hughes, mrs. august belmont and mgrs. lavelle and mcmahon, of st. patrick's cathedral, together with a score of black-robed sisters of charity, representing the association of catholic churches, were on the pier long before the carpathia was made fast, and worked industriously in aiding the injured and ill. the rev. dr. william carter, pastor of the madison avenue reformed church, was one of those at the pier with a private ambulance awaiting miss sylvia caldwell, one of the survivors, who is known in church circles as a mission worker in foreign fields free railroad transportation the pennsylvania railroad sent representatives to the pier, who said that the railroad had a special train of nine cars in which it would carry free any passenger who wanted to go immediately to philadelphia or points west. the pennsylvania also had eight taxicabs at the pier for conveyance of the rescued to the pennsylvania station, in thirty-third street. among those who later arrived at the pier before the carpathia docked were p. a. b. widener, of philadelphia, two women relatives of j. b. thayer, william harris, jr., the theatrical man, who was accompanied by dr dinkelspiel, and henry arthur jones, the playwright. relatives of saved and lost commander booth, of the salvation army, was there especially to meet mrs. elizabeth nye and mrs. rogers abbott, both titanic survivors. mrs. abbott's two sons were supposed to be among the lost. miss booth had received a cablegram from london saying that other salvation army people were on the titanic. she was eager to get news of them. also on the pier was major blanton, u. s. a., stationed at washington, who was waiting for tidings of major butt, supposedly at the instance of president taft. senator william a. clark and mrs. clark were also in the company. dr. john r. mackenty was waiting for mr. and mrs. henry s. harper. ferdinand w. roebling and carl g. roebling, cousins of washington a. roebling, jr., whose name is among the list of dead, went to the pier to see what they could learn of his fate. j. p. morgan, jr., arrived at the pier about half an hour before the carpathia docked. he said he had many friends on the titanic and was eagerly awaiting news of all of them. fire commissioner johnson was there with john peel, of atlanta, gal, a brother of mrs. jacques futrelle. mrs. futrelle has a son twelve years old in atlanta, and a daughter virginia, who has been in school in the north and is at present with friends in this city, ignorant of her father's death. a man in hysterics there was one man in that sad waiting company who startled those near him about 9 o'clock by dancing across the pier and back. he seemed to be laughing, but when he was stopped it was found that he was sobbing. he said that he had a relative on the titanic and had lost control of his nerves. h. h. brunt, of chicago, was at the gangplank waiting for a. saalfeld, head of the wholesale drug firm of sparks, white & co., of london, who was coming to this country on the titanic on a business trip and whose life was saved. waiting for carpathia during the afternoon and evening tugboats, motor boats and even sailing craft, had been waiting off the ambrose light for the appearance of the carpathia. some of the waiting craft contained friends and anxious relatives of the survivors and those reported as missing. the sea was rough and choppy, and a strong east wind was blowing. there was a light fog, so that it was possible to see at a distance of only a few hundred yards. this lifted later in the evening. first to discover the incoming liner with her pitiful cargo was one of the tugboats. from out of the mist there loomed far out at sea the incoming steamer. rescue boat sighted "liner ahead!" cried the lookout on the tug to the captain. "she must be the carpathia," said the captain, and then he turned the nose of his boat toward the spot on t he horizon. then the huge black hull and one smokestack could be distinguished. "it's the carpathia," said the captain. "i can tell her by the stack." the announcement sent a thrill through those who heard it. here, at the gate of new york, was a ship whose record for bravery and heroic work would be a famuliar{sic} name in history. {illust. caption = copyright by g. v. buck. mrs. lucien p. smith formerly miss eloise hughes, daughter of representative and mrs. james a. hughes, of west virginia. mrs. smith and her husband were passengers on the titanic. mrs. smith was saved, but her husband went to a watery grave. mr. and mrs. smith were married only a few months ago.} {illust. caption = major archibald butt military aide to president taft. of major butt, who was one of the victims of the titanic, one of the survivors said: "major butt was the real leader in all of that rescue work. he made the men stand back and helped the women and children into the boats. he was surely one of god's noblemen."} chapter xii. the tragic home-coming the carpathia reaches new york--an intense and dramatic moment--hysterical reunions and crushing disappointments at the dock--caring for the sufferers--final realization that all hope for others is futile--list of survivors--roll of the dead it was a solemn moment when the carpathia heaved in sight. there she rested on the water, a blur of black--huge, mysterious, awe-inspiring--and yet withal a thing to send thrills of pity and then of admiration through the beholder. it was a few minutes after seven o'clock when she arrived at the entrance to ambrose channel. she was coming fast steaming at better than fifteen knots an hour, and she was sighted long before she was expected. except for the usual side and masthead lights she was almost dark, only the upper cabins showing a glimmer here and there. then began a period of waiting, the suspense of which proved almost too much for the hundreds gathered there to greet friends and relatives or to learn with certainty at last that those for whom they watched would never come ashore. there was almost complete silence on the pier. doctors and nurses, members of the women's relief committee, city and government officials, as well as officials of the line, moved nervously about. seated where they had been assigned beneath the big customs letters corresponding to the initials of the names of the survivors they came to meet, sat the mass of 2000 on the pier. women wept, but they wept quietly, not hysterically, and the sound of the sobs made many times less noise than the hum and bustle which is usual on the pier among those awaiting an incoming liner. slowly and majestically the ship slid through the water, still bearing the details of that secret of what happened and who perished when the titanic met her fate. convoying the carpathia was a fleet of tugs bearing men and women anxious to learn the latest news. the cunarder had been as silent for days as though it, too, were a ship of the dead. a list of survivors had been given out from its wireless station and that was all. even the approximate time of its arrival had been kept a secret. nearing port there was no response to the hail from one tug, and as others closed in, the steamship quickened her speed a little and left them behind as she swung up the channel. there was an exploding of flashlights from some of the tugs, answered seemingly by sharp stabs of lightning in the northwest that served to accentuate the silence and absence of light aboard the rescue ship. five or six persons, apparently members of the crew or the ship's officers, were seen along the rail; but otherwise the boat appeared to be deserted. off quarantine the carpathia slowed down and, hailing the immigration inspection boat, asked if the health officer wished to board. she was told that he did, and came to a stop while dr. o'connell and two assistants climbed on board. again the newspaper men asked for some word of the catastrophe to the titanic, but there was no answer, and the carpathia continued toward her pier. as she passed the revenue cutter mohawk and the derelict destroyer seneca anchored off tompkinsville the wireless on the government vessels was seen to flash, but there was no answering spark from the carpathia. entering the north river she laid her course close to the new jersey side in order to have room to swing into her pier. by this time the rails were lined with men and women. they were very silent. there were a few requests for news from those on board and a few answers to questions shouted from the tugs. the liner began to slacken her speed, and the tugboat soon was alongside. up above the inky blackness of the hull figures could be made out, leaning over the port railing, as though peering eagerly at the little craft which was bearing down on the carpathia. some of them, perhaps, had passed through that inferno of the deep sea which sprang up to destroy the mightiest steamship afloat. "carpathia, ahoy!" was shouted through a megaphone. there was an interval of a few seconds, and then, "aye, aye," came the reply. "is there any assistance that can be rendered?" was the next question. "thank you, no," was the answer in a tone that carried emotion with it. meantime the tugboat was getting nearer and nearer to the carpathia, and soon the faces of those leaning over the railing could be distinguished. talk with survivors more faces appeared, and still more. a woman who called to a man on the tugboat was asked? "are you one the titanic survivors?" "yes," said the voice, hesitatingly. "do you need help?" "no," after a pause. "if there is anything you want done it will be attended to." "thank you. i have been informed that my relatives will meet me at the pier." "is it true that some of the life-boats sank with the titanic?" "yes. there was some trouble in manning them. they were not far enough away from her." all of this questioning and receiving replies was carried on with the greatest difficulty. the pounding of the liner's engines, the washing of the sea, the tugboat's engines, made it hard to understand the woman's replies. all cared for on board "were the women properly cared for after the crash?" she was asked. "oh, yes," came the shrill reply. "the men were brave--very brave." here her voice broke and she turned and left the railing, to reappear a few moments later and cry: "please report me as saved." "what name?" was asked. she shouted a name that could not be understood, and, apparently believing that it had been, turned away again and disappeared. "nearly all of us are very ill," cried another woman. here several other tugboats appeared, and those standing at the railing were besieged with questions. "did the crash come without warning?" a voice on one of the smaller boats megaphoned. "yes," a woman answered. "most of us had retired. we saved a few of our belongings." "how long did it take the boat to sink?" asked the voice. titanic crew heroes "not long," came the reply? "the crew and the men were very brave. oh, it is dreadful--dreadful to think of!" "is mr. john jacob astor on board?" "no." "did he remain on the titanic after the collision?" "i do not know." questions of this kind were showered at the few survivors who stood at the railing, but they seemed too confused to answer them intelligibly, and after replying evasively to some they would disappear. rushes on to dock "are you going to anchor for the night?" captain rostron was asked by megaphone as his boat approached ambrose light. it was then raining heavily. "no," came the reply. "i am going into port. there are sick people on board." "we tried to learn when she would dock," said dr. walter kennedy, head of the big ambulance corps on the mist-shrouded pier, "and we were told it would not be before midnight and that most probably it would not be before dawn to-morrow. the childish deception that has been practiced for days by the people who are responsible for the titanic has been carried up to the very moment of the landing of the survivors." she proceeded past the cunard pier, where 2000 persons were waiting her, and steamed to a spot opposite the white star piers at twenty-first street. the ports in the big inclosed pier of the cunard line were opened, and through them the waiting hundreds, almost frantic with anxiety over what the carpathia might reveal, watched her as with nerve-destroying leisure she swung about in the river, dropping over the life-boats of the titanic that they might be taken to the piers of the white star line. the titanic life-boats it was dark in the river, but the lowering away of the life-boats could be seen from the carpathia's pier, and a deep sigh arose from the multitude there as they caught this first glance of anything associated with the titanic. then the carpathia started for her own pier. as she approached it the ports on the north side of pier 54 were closed that the carpathia might land there, but through the two left open to accommodate the forward and after gangplanks of the big liner the watchers could see her looming larger and larger in the darkness till finally she was directly alongside the pier. as the boats were towed away the picture taking and shouting of questions began again. john badenoch, a buyer for macy & co., called down to a representative of the firm that neither mr. nor mrs. isidor straus were among the rescued on board the carpathia. an officer of the carpathia called down that 710 of the titanic's passengers were on board, but refused to reply to other questions. the heavy hawsers were made fast without the customary shouting of ship's officers and pier hands. from the crowd on the pier came a long, shuddering murmur. in it were blended sighs and hundreds of whispers. the burden of it all was: "here they come." anxious men and women about each gangplank a portable fence had been put in place, marking off some fifty feet of the pier, within which stood one hundred or more customs officials. next to the fence, crowded close against it, were anxious men and women, their gaze strained for a glance of the first from the ship, their mouths opened to draw their breaths in spasmodic, quivering gasps, their very bodies shaking with suppressed excitement, excitement which only the suspense itself was keeping in subjection. these were the husbands and wives, children, parents, sweethearts and friends of those who had sailed upon the titanic on its maiden voyage. they pressed to the head of the pier, marking the boats of the wrecked ship as they dangled at the side of the carpathia and were revealed in the sudden flashes of the photographers upon the tugs. they spoke in whispers, each group intent upon its own sad business. newspaper writers, with pier passes showing in their hat bands, were everywhere. a sailor hurried outside the fence and disappeared, apparently on a mission for his company. there was a deep-drawn sigh as he walked away, shaking his head toward those who peered eagerly at him. then came a man and woman of the carpathia's own passengers, as their orderly dress showed them to be. again a sigh like a sob swept over the crowd, and again they turned back to the canopied gangplank. the first survivors several minutes passed and then out of the first cabin gangway; tunneled by a somber awning, streamed the first survivors. a young woman, hatless, her light brown hair disordered and the leaden weight of crushing sorrow heavy upon eyes and sensitive mouth, was in the van. she stopped, perplexed, almost ready to drop with terror and exhaustion, and was caught by a customs official. "a survivor?" he questioned rapidly, and a nod of the head answering him, he demanded: "your name." the answer given, he started to lead her toward that section of the pier where her friends would be waiting. when she stepped from the gangplank there was quiet on the pier. the answers of the woman could almost be heard by those fifty feet away, but as she staggered, rather than walked, toward the waiting throng outside the fence, a low wailing sound arose from the crowd. "dorothy, dorothy!" cried a man from the number. he broke through the double line of customs inspectors as though it was composed of wooden toys and caught the woman to his breast. she opened her lips inarticulately, weakly raised her arms and would have pitched forward upon her face had she not been supported. her fair head fell weakly to one side as the man picked her up in his arms, and, with tears streaming down his face, stalked down the long avenue of the pier and down the long stairway to a waiting taxicab. the wailing of the crowd--its cadences, wild and weird--grew steadily louder and louder till they culminated in a mighty shriek, which swept the whole big pier as though at the direction of some master hand. rumors afloat the arrival of the carpathia was the signal for the most sensational rumors to circulate through the crowd on the pier. first, mrs. john jacob astor was reported to have died at 8.06 o'clock, when the carpathia was on her way up the harbor. captain smith and the first engineer were reported to have shot themselves when they found that the titanic was doomed to sink. afterward it was learned that captain smith and the engineer went down with their ship in perfect courage and coolness. major archibald butt, president taft's military aide, was said to have entered into an agreement with george d. widener, colonel john jacob astor and isidor straus to kill them first and then shoot himself before the boat sank. it was said that this agreement had been carried out. later it was shown that, like many other men on the ship, they had gone down without the exhibition of a sign of fear. mrs. cornell safe magistrate cornell's wife and her two sisters were among the first to leave the ship. they were met at the first cabin pier entrance by magistrate cornell and a party of friends. none of the three women had hats. one of those who met them was magistrate cornell's son. one of mrs. cornell's sisters was overheard to remark that "it would be a dreadful thing when the ship began really to unload." the three women appeared to be in a very nervous state. their hair was more or less dishevelled. they were apparently fully dressed save for their hats. clothing had been supplied them in their need and everything had been done to make them comfortable. one of the party said that the collision occurred at 9.45. following closely the cornell party was h. j. allison of montreal, who came to meet his family. one of the party, who was weeping bitterly as he left the pier, explained that the only one of the family that was rescued was the young brother. mrs. astor appeared in a few minutes young mrs. astor with her maid appeared. she came down the gangplank unassisted. she was wearing a white sweater. vincent astor and william dobbyn, colonel astor's secretary, greeted her and hurried her to a waiting limousine which contained clothing and other necessaries of which it was thought she might be in need. the young woman was white-faced and silent. nobody cared to intrude upon her thoughts. her stepson said little to her. he did not feel like questioning her at such a time, he said. last seen of colonel astor walter m. clark, a nephew of the senator, said that he had seen colonel astor put his wife in a boat, after assuring her that he would soon follow her in another. mr. clark and others said that colonel and mrs. astor were in their suite when the crash came, and that they appeared quietly on deck a few minutes afterward. here and there among the passengers of the carpathia and from the survivors of the titanic the story was gleaned of the rescue. nothing in life will ever approach the joy felt by the hundreds who were waiting in little boats on the spot where the titanic foundered when the lights of the carpathia were first distinguished. that was at 4 o'clock on monday morning. dr. frauenthal welcomed efforts were made to learn from dr. henry franenthal{sic} something about the details of how he was rescued. just then, or as he was leaving the pier, beaming with evident delight, he was surrounded by a big crowd of his friends. "there's harry! there he is!" they yelled and made a rush for him. all the doctor's face that wasn't covered with red beard was aglow with smiles as his friends hugged him and slapped him on the back. they rushed him off bodily through the crowd and he too was whirled home. a sad story how others followed--how heartrending stories of partings and of thrilling rescues were poured out in an amazing stream--this has all been told over and over again in the news that for days amazed, saddened and angered the entire world. it is the story of a disaster that nations, it is hoped, will make impossible in the years to come. in the stream of survivors were a peer of the realm, sir cosmo duff gordon, and his secretary, side by side with plain jack jones, of birmingham, able seaman, millionaires and paupers, women with bags of jewels and others with nightgowns their only property. more than seventy widows more than seventy widows were in the weeping company. the only large family that was saved in its entirety was that of the carters, of philadelphia. contrasting with this remarkable salvage of wealthy pennsylvanians was the sleeping eleven-months-old baby of the allisons, whose father, mother and sister went down to death after it and its nurse had been placed in a life-boat. millionaire and pauper, titled grandee and weeping immigrant, ismay, the head of the white star company, and jack jones from the stoke hole were surrounded instantly. some would gladly have escaped observation. every man among the survivors acted as though it were first necessary to explain how he came to be in a life-boat. some of the stories smacked of munchausen. others were as plain and unvarnished as a pike staff. those that were most sincere and trustworthy had to be fairly pulled from those who gave their sad testimony. far into the night the recitals were made. they were told in the rooms of hotels, in the wards of hospitals and upon trains that sped toward saddened homes. it was a symposium of horror and heroism, the like of which has not been known in the civilized world since man established his dominion over the sea. steerage passengers the two hundred and more steerage passengers did not leave the ship until 11 o'clock. they were in a sad condition. the women were without wraps and the few men there were wore very little clothing. a poor syrian woman who said she was mrs. habush, bound for youngstown, ohio, carried in her arms a six-year-old baby girl. this woman had lost her husband and three brothers. "i lost four of my men folks," she cried. two little boys among the survivors who elicited a large measure of sympathy were two little french boys who were dropped, almost naked, from the deck of the sinking titanic into a life-boat. from what place in france did they come and to what place in the new world were they bound? there was not one iota of information to be had as to the identity of the waifs of the deep, the orphans of the titanic. the two baby boys, two and four years old, respectively, were in charge of miss margaret hays, who is a fluent speaker of french, and she had tried vainly to get from the lisping lips of the two little ones some information that would lead to the finding of their relatives. miss hays, also a survivor of the titanic, took charge of the almost naked waifs on the carpathia. she became warmly attached to the two boys, who unconcernedly played about, not understanding the great tragedy that had come into their lives. the two little curly-heads did not understand it all. had not their pretty nineteen-year-old foster mother provided them with pretty suits and little white shoes and playthings a-plenty? then, too, miss hays had a pom dog that she brought with her from paris and which she carried in her arms when she left the titanic and held to her bosom through the long night in the life-boat, and to which the children became warmly attached. all three became aliens on an alien shore. miss hays, unable to learn the names of the little fellows, had dubbed the older louis and the younger "lump." "lump" was all that his name implies, for he weighed almost as much as his brother. they were dark-eyed and brown curly-haired children, who knew how to smile as only french children can. on the fateful night of the titanic disaster and just as the last boats were pulling away with their human freight, a man rushed to the rail holding the babes under his arms. he cried to the passengers in one of the boats and held the children aloft. three or four sailors and passengers held up their arms. the father dropped the older boy. he was safely caught. then he dropped the little fellow and saw him folded in the arms of a sailor. then the boat pulled away. the last seen of the father, whose last living act was to save his babes, he was waving his hand in a final parting. then the titanic plunged to the ocean's bed. baby travers still more pitiable in one way was the lot of the baby survivor, eleven-months-old travers allison, the only member of a family of four to survive the wreck. his father, h. j. allison, and mother and lorraine, a child of three, were victims of the catastrophe. baby travers, in the excitement following the crash, was separated from the rest of the family just before the titanic went down. with the party were two nurses and a maid. major arthur peuchen, of montreal, one of the survivors, standing near the little fellow, who, swathed in blankets, lay blinking at his nurse, described the death of mrs. allison. she had gone to the deck without her husband, and, frantically seeking him, was directed by an officer to the other side of the ship. she failed to find mr. allison and was quickly hustled into one of the collapsible life-boats, and when last seen by major peuchen she was toppling out of the half-swamped boat. j. w. allison, a cousin of h. j. allison, was at the pier to care for baby travers and his nurse. they were taken to the manhattan hotel. describing the details of the perishing of the allison family, the rescued nurse said they were all in bed when the titanic hit the berg. "we did not get up immediately," said she, "for we had {illust. caption = white star steamer titanic gymnasium} {illust. caption = copyright, 1912, underwood & underwood. captain a. h. rostrom commander of the carpathia, which rescued the survivors of the titanic from the life-boats in the open sea and brought them to new york. after the senatorial investigating committee had examined captain rostrom, at which time this specially posed photograph was taken, senator william alden smith, chairman of the committee, said of captain rostrom: "his conduct of the rescue shows that he is not only an efficient seaman, but one of nature's noblemen."} not thought of danger. later we were told to get up, and i hurriedly dressed the baby. we hastened up on deck, and confusion was all about. with other women and children we clambered to the life-boats, just as a matter of precaution, believing that there was no immediate danger. in about an hour there was an explosion and the ship appeared to fall apart. we were in the life-boat about six hours before we were picked up." the ryerson family probably few deaths have caused more tears than arthur ryerson's, in view of the sad circumstances which called him home from a lengthy tour in europe. mr. ryerson's eldest son, arthur larned ryerson, a yale student, was killed in an automobile accident easter monday, 1912. a cablegram announcing the death plunged the ryerson family into mourning and they boarded the first steamship for this country. if{sic} happened to be the titanic, and the death note came near being the cause of the blotting out of the entire family. the children who accompanied them were miss susan p. ryerson, miss emily b. ryerson and john ryerson. the latter is 12 years old. they did not know their son intended to spend the easter holidays at their home at haverford, pa. until they were informed of his death. john lewis hoffman, also of haverford and a student of yale, was killed with young ryerson. the two were hurrying to philadelphia to escort a fellow-student to his train. in turning out of the road to pass a cart the motor car crashed into a pole in front of the entrance to the estate of mrs. b. frank clyde. the college men were picked up unconscious and died in the bryn mawr hospital. g. heide norris of philadelphia, who went to new york to meet the surviving members of the ryerson family, told of a happy incident at the last moment as the carpathia swung close to the pier. there had been no positive information that young "jack" ryerson was among those saved--indeed, it was feared that he had gone down with the titanic, like his father, arthur ryerson. mr. norris spoke of the feeling of relief that came over him as, watching from the pier, he saw "jack" ryerson come from a cabin and stand at the railing. the name of the boy was missing from some of the lists and for two days it was reported that he had perished. captain rostron's report less than 24 hours after the cunard line steamship carpathia came in as a rescue ship with survivors of the titanic disaster, she sailed again for the mediterranean cruise which she originally started upon last week. just before the liner sailed, h. s. bride, the second marconi wireless operator of the titanic, who had both of his legs crushed on a life-boat, was carried off on the shoulders of the ship's officers to st. vincent's hospital. captain a. h. rostron, of the carpathia, addressed an official report, giving his account of the carpathia's rescue work, to the general manager of the cunard line, liverpool. the report read: "i beg to report that at 12.35 a. m. monday 18th inst. i was informed of urgent message from titanic with her position. i immediately ordered ship turned around and put her in course for that position, we being then 58 miles s. 52--e. 't' from her; had heads of all departments called and issued what i considered the necessary orders, to be in preparation for any emergency. "at 2.40 a. m. saw flare half a point on port bow. taking this for granted to be ship, shortly after we sighted our first iceberg. i had previously had lookouts doubled, knowing that titanic had struck ice, and so took every care and precaution. we soon found ourselves in a field of bergs, and had to alter course several times to clear bergs; weather fine, and clear, light air on sea, beautifully clear night, though dark. "we stopped at 4 a. m., thus doing distance in three hours and a half, picking up the first boat at 4.10 a. m.; boat in charge of officer, and he reported that titanic had foundered. at 8.30 a. m. last boat picked up. all survivors aboard and all boats accounted for, viz., fifteen life-boats, one boat abandoned, two berthon boats alongside (saw one floating upwards among wreckage), and according to second officer (senior officer saved) one berthon boat had not been launched, it having got jammed, making sixteen life-boats and four berthon boats accounted for. by the time we had cleared first boat it was breaking day, and i could see all within area of four miles. we also saw that we were surrounded by icebergs, large and small, huge field of drift ice with large and small bergs in it, the ice field trending from n. w. round w. and s. to s. e., as far as we could see either way. "at 8 a. m. the leyland s. s. california came up. i gave him the principal news and asked him to search and i would proceed to new york; at 8.50 proceeded full speed while researching over vicinity of disaster, and while we were getting people aboard i gave orders to get spare hands along and swing in all our boats, disconnect the fall and hoist up as many titanic boats as possible in our davits; also get some on forecastle heads by derricks. we got thirteen lifeboats, six on forward deck and seven in davits. after getting all survivors aboard and while searching i got a clergyman to offer a short prayer of thankfulness for those saved, and also a short burial service for their loss, in saloon. "before deciding definitely where to make for, i conferred with mr. ismay, and as he told me to do what i thought best, i informed him, i considered new york best. i knew we should require clean blankets, provisions and clean linen, even if we went to the azores, as most of the passsengers{sic} saved were women and children, and they hysterical, not knowing what medical attention they might require. i thought it best to go to new york. i also thought it would be better for mr. ismay to go to new york or england as soon as possible, and knowing i should be out of wireless communication very soon if i proceeded to azores, it left halifax, boston and new york, so i chose the latter. "again, the passengers were all hysterical about ice, and i pointed out to mr. ismay the possibilities of seeing ice if i went to halifax. then i knew it would be best to keep in touch with land stations as best i could. we have experienced great difficulty in transmitting news, also names of survivors. our wireless is very poor, and again we have had so many interruptions from other ships and also messages from shore (principally press, which we ignored). i gave instructions to send first all official messages, then names of passengers, then survivors' private messages. we had haze early tuesday morning for several hours; again more or less all wednesday from 5.30 a. m. to 5 p. m.; strong south-southwesterly winds and clear weather thursday, with moderate rough sea. "i am pleased to say that all survivors have been very plucky. the majority of women, first, second and third class, lost their husbands, and, considering all, have been wonderfully well. tuesday our doctor reported all survivors physically well. our first class passengers have behaved splendidly, given up their cabins voluntarily and supplied the ladies with clothes, etc. we all turned out of our cabins and gave them to survivors--saloon, smoking room, library, etc., also being used for sleeping accommodation. our crew, also turned out to let the crew of the titanic take their quarters. i am pleased to state that owing to preparations made for the comfort of survivors, none were the worse for exposure, etc. i beg to specially mention how willing and cheerful the whole of the ship's company behaved, receiving the highest praise from everybody. and i can assure you i am very proud to have such a company under my command. "a. h. rostron." the following list of the survivors and dead contains the latest revisions and corrections of the white star line officials, and was furnished by them exclusively for this book. list of survivors first cabin anderson, harry. antoinette, miss. appieranelt, miss. appleton. mrs. e. d. abbott, mrs. rose. allison, master, and nurse. andrews, miss cornelia i. allen, miss. e. w. astor, mrs. john jacob, and maid. aubeart, mme. n., and maid. barratt, karl b. besette, miss. barkworth, a. h. bucknell, mrs. w. bowerman, miss e. brown, mrs. j. j. burns, miss c. m. bishop, mr. and mrs. d. h. blank, h. bessina, miss a. baxter, mrs. james. brayton, george. bonnell, miss lily. brown, mrs. j. m. bowen, miss g. c. beckwith, mr. and mrs. r. l. bisley, mr. and mrs. bonnell, miss c. cassebeer, mrs. h. a. cardeza, mrs. j. w. candell, mrs. churchill. case, howard b. camarion, kenard. casseboro, miss d. d. clark, mrs. w. m. chibinace, mrs. b. c. charlton, w. m. crosby, mrs e. g. carter, miss lucille. calderhead, e. p. chandanson, miss victotrine. cavendish, mrs. turrell, and maid. chafee, mrs. h. i. cardeza, mr. thomas. cummings, mrs. j. chevre, paul. cherry, miss gladys. chambers, mr. and mrs. n. c. carter, mr. and mrs. w. e. carter, master william. compton, mrs. a. t. compton, miss s. r. crosby, mrs. e. g. crosby, miss harriet. cornell, mrs. r. c. chibnall, mrs. e. douglas, mrs. fred. de villiers, mme. daniel, miss sarah. daniel, robert w. davidson, mr. and mrs. thornton, and family. douglas, mrs. walter, and maid. dodge, miss sarah. dodge, mrs. washington, and son. dick, mr. and mrs. a. a. daniell, h. haren. drachensted, a. daly, peter d. endres, miss caroline. ellis, miss list of survivors--first cabin (continued) earnshaw, mrs. boulton. eustis, miss e. emmock, philip e. flagenheim, mrs. antoinette. franicatelli, misy. fynn, j. i. fortune, miss alice fortune, miss ethel. fortune, mrs. mark. fortune, miss mabel. frauenthal, dr. and mrs. h. w. frauenthal, mr. and mrs. t. g frolicher, miss margaret. frolicher, may and mrs. frolicher, miss n. futrelle, mrs. jacques. gracie, colonel archibald. graham, mr. and mrs. william. graham, miss m. gordon, sir cosmo duff. gordon, lady. gibson, miss dorothy. goldenberg, mr. and mrs. samuel. goldenberg, miss ella. greenfield, mrs. l. p. greenfield, g. b. greenfield, william. gibson, mrs. leonard. googht, james. haven, mr. henry b. harris, mrs. h. b. holverson, mrs. alex. hogeboom, mrs. j. c. hawksford, w. j. harper, henry, and man servant. harper, mrs. h. s. hold, miss j. a. hope, nina. hoyt, mr. and mrs. fred. horner, henry r. harder, mr. and mrs. george. hays, mrs. charles m., and daughter. hippach, miss jean. hippach, mrs. ida s. ismay, j. bruce. jenasco, mrs. j. kimball, mr. and mrs. ed. n. kennyman, f. a. kenchen, miss emile. longley, miss g. f. leader, mrs. a. f. leahy, miss nora. lavory, miss bertha. lines, mrs. ernest. lines, miss mary. lindstrom, mrs. singird. lesneur, gustave, jr. madill, miss georgette a. mahan, mrs. melicard, mme. menderson, miss letta. maiaimy, miss roberta. marvin, mrs. d. w. marechell, pierre. maroney, mrs. r. meyer, mrs. e. i. mock, mr. p. e. middle, mme. m. olive. minahan, miss daisy. minahan, mrs. w. e. mcgough, james. newell, miss alice. newell, miss madeline. newell, washington. newson, miss helen. o'connell, miss r. ostby, e. c. list of survivors--first cabin (continued) ostby, miss helen. omund, fieunam. panhart, miss ninette. pears, mrs. e. pomroy, miss ellen. potter, mrs. thomas, jr. peuchen, major arthur. peercault, miss a. ryerson, john. renago, mrs. mamam. ranelt, miss appie. rothschild, mrs. lord martin. rosenbahm, miss edith. rheims, mr. and mrs george. rosible, miss h. rothes, countess. robert, mrs. edna. rolmane, c. ryerson, aliss susan p. ryerson, miss emily. ryerson, mrs. arthur, and maid. stone, mrs. george m. skeller, mrs. william. segesser, miss emma. seward, fred. k. shutter, miss. sloper, william t. swift, mrs. f. joel. schabert, mrs. paul. sheddel, robert douglass. snyder, mr. and mrs. john. serepeca, aliss aughsta. silverthorn, r. spencer. saalfeld, adolf. stahelin, max. simoinus, alfonsius. smith, mrs. lucien p. stephenson, mrs. walter. solomon, abraham. silvey, mrs. william b stenmel, mr. and mrs. heleery spencer, mrs. w. a., and maid. slayter, miss hilda. spedden, mr. and mrs. f. o., and child. steffanson, h. b. straus, mrs., maid of. schabert, mrs. emma. slinter, mrs. e. simmons, a. taylor, miss. tucker, mrs., and maid. thayer, mrs. j. b. thayer, j. b., jr. taussig, miss ruth. taussig. mrs. e. thor, miss ella. thorne, mrs. g. taylor, mr. and mrs. e. z trout, miss jessie. tucker, gilbert. woolner, hugh. ward, miss anna. williams, richard m., jr. warren, mrs. p. wilson, miss helen a. williard, miss c. wick, miss mary. wick, geo. widener, valet of. widener, mrs. george d., and maid. white, mrs. j. stuart. young, miss marie. list of survivors--second cabin abesson, mrs. manna. abbott, mrs. r. argenia, mrs., and two children. angel, f. angle, william. baumthorpe, mrs. l. balls, mrs. ada e. buss, miss kate. becker, mrs. a. o., and three children beane, edward. beane, mrs. ethel, bryhi, miss d. beesley, mr. l. brown, mr. t. w. s. brown, miss e. brown, mrs. benthan, lillian w. bystron, karolina bright, dagmar. bright, daisy. clarke, mrs. ada. cameron, miss. c. caldwell, albert f. caldwell, mrs. sylvan caldwell, alden, infant. cristy, mr. and mrs. collyer, mrs. charlotte. collyer, miss marjorie christy, mrs. alice. collet, stitart. christa, miss dijcia. charles, william. croft, millie mall. doling, mrs. elsie. drew, mrs. lulu. davis, mrs. agnes. davis, miss mary. davis, john m. duvan, florentine. duvan, mrs. a. davidson, miss mary. doling, miss ada. driscoll, mrs. b. deystrom, caroline. emcarmacion, mrs. rinaldo. faunthorpe, mrs. lizzie formery, miss ellen. garside, ethel. gerrecai, mrs. marcy. genovese, angere. hart, mrs. esther. hart, eva. harris, george. hewlett, mrs. mary. hebber, miss s. hoffman, lola. hoffman, louis. harper, nina. hold, stephen. hold, mrs. anna. hosono, masabtjmi. hocking, mr. and mrs. george. hocking, miss nellie. herman, mrs. jane, 2 daughters healy, nora. hanson, jennie. hamatainen, w. hamatainen, anna. harnlin, anna, and child ilett, bertha. jackson, mrs. amy. juliet, luvche. jerwan, mary. juhon, podro. jacobson, mrs. keane, miss nora h. kelly, mrs. f. kantar, mrs. s. leitch, jessie. laroche, mrs. and miss simmone. list of survivors--second cabin (continited) laroche, miss louise. lehman, bertha. lauch, mrs. alex. laniore, amelia. lystrom, mrs. c. mellinger, elizabeth. mellinger, child. marshall, mrs. kate. mallett, a. mallett, mrs. and child. mange, paula. mare, mrs. florence. mellor, w. j. mcdearmont, miss lela. mcgowan, anna. nye, elizabeth. nasser, mrs. delia. nussa, mrs. a. oxenham, percy j. phillips, alice. pallas, emilio. padro, jitlian. prinsky, rosa. portalttppi, emilio. parsh, mrs. l. plett, b. quick, mrs. jane. quick, mrs. vera w. quick, miss phyllis. reinardo, miss e. ridsdale, lucy. renouf, mrs. lily. rugg, miss emily. richards, m. rogers, miss selina. richards, mrs. emilia, two boys, and mr. richards, jr. simpson, miss. sincock, miss maude. sinkkonnen, anna. smith, miss marion. silven, lylle. trant, mrs j. toomey, miss. e. troutt, miss e. troutt, miss cecelia. ware, miss h. watter, miss n. wilhelm, c. wat, mrs. a., and two children. williams, richard m., jr. weisz, mathilde. webber, miss sijsdd. wright, miss marion. watt, miss bessie. watt, miss bertha. west, mrs. e. a. west, miss constance. west, miss barbara. wells, addie. wells, master. a list of surviving third cabin passengers and crew is omitted owing to the impossibility of obtaining the correct names of many. roll of the dead first cabin allison, h. j. allison, mrs., and maid. allison, miss. andrews, thomas. artagaveytia, mr. ramon. astor, col. j. j., and servant. anderson, walker. roll of the dead--first cabin (continued) beattie, t. brandeis, e. bucknell, mrs. william, maid of. bahmann, j. baxter, mr. and mrs. quigg. bjornstrom, h. birnbahm, jacob. blackwell, s. w. borebank, j. j. bowen, miss. brady, john b. brewe, arlblir j. butt, major a. clark, walter m. clifford, george q. colley, e. p. cardeza, t. d. m., servant of. cardeza, mrs. j. w., maid of. carlson, frank. corran, f. m. corran, j. p. chafee, mr. h. i. chisholm, robert. compton, a. t. crafton, john b. crosby, edward g. cummings, john bradley. dulles, william c. douglas, w. d. douglas, master r., nurse of. evans, miss e. fortune, mark. foreman, b. l. fortune, charles. franklin, t. p. futrelle, j. gee, arthur. goldenberg, e. l. goldschmidt, g. b. giglio, victor. guggenheim, benjamin. hays, charles m. hays, mrs. charles, maid of. head, christopher. hilliard, h. h. hipkins, w. e. hogenheim, mrs. a. harris, henry b. harp, mr. and mrs. charles m. harp, miss margaret, and maid. holverson, a. m. islam, miss a. e. ismay, j. bruce, servant of. julian, h. f. jones, c. c. kent, edward a. kenyon, mr. and mrs. f. r. klaber, herman. lamberth, william, f. f. lawrence, arthur. long, milton. lewy, e. g. loping, j. h. lingrey, edward. maguire, j. e. mccaffry, t. mccaffry, t., jr. mccarthy, t. middleton, j. c. millet, frank d. minahan, dr. meyer, edgar j. molson, h. m. moore, c., servant. natsch, charles. newall, miss t. nicholson, a. s. ovies, s. obnout, alfred t. roll of the dead--first cabin (continued) parr, m. h. w. pears, mr. and mrs. thomas. penasco, mr. and mrs. victor. partner, m. a. payne, y. pond, florence, and maid. porter, walter. puffer, c. c. reuchlin, j. robert, mrs. e., maid of. roebling, washington a., 2d. rood, hugh r. roes, j. hugo. rothes, countess, maid of. rothschild, m. rowe, arthur. ryerson, a. silvey, william b. spedden, mrs. f. o., maid of spencer, w. a. stead, w. t. stehli, mr. and mrs. max frolicher. stone, mrs. george, maid of. straus, mr. and mrs. isidor. sutton, frederick. smart, john m. smith, clinch. smitet, r. w. smith, l. p. taussic, emil. thayer, mrs., maid of. thayer, john b. thorne, g. vanderhoof, wyckoff. walker, w. a. warren, f. m. white, percival a. white, richard f. widener, g. d. widener, harry. wood, mr. and mrs. frank p. weir, j. williams, duane. wright, george. second cabin abelson, samson. andrew, frank. ashby, john. aldworth, c. andrew, edgar. bracken, james h. brown, mrs. banfield, fred. bright, narl. braily, bandsman. breicoux, bandsman. bailey, percy. bainbridge, c. r. byles, the rev. thomas. beauchamp, h. j. berg, miss e. benthan, i. bateman, robert j. butler, reginald. botsford, hull. boweener, solomon. berriman, william. clarke, charles. clark, bandsman. corey, mrs. c. p. carter, the rev. ernest. carter, mrs. coleridge, reginald, chapman, charles. cunningham, alfred. campbell, william. collyer, harvey. corbett, mrs. irene. roll of the dead--second cabin (continued) chapman, john e. chapman, mrs. e. colander, eric. cotterill, harby. deacon, percy. davis, charles. dibben, william. de brito, jose. denborny, h. drew, james. drew, master m. david, master j. w. dounton, w. j. del varlo, s. del varlo, mrs. enander, ingvar. eitemiller, g. f. frost, a. fynnery, mr. faunthorpe, h. fillbrook, c. funk, annie. fahlstrom, a. fox, stanley w. greenberg, s. giles, ralph. gaskell, alfred. gillespie, william. gilbert, william. gall, s. gill, john. giles, edgar. giles, fred. gale, harry. gale, phadruch. garvey, lawrence. hickman, leonard. hickman, lenvis. hume, bandsman. hickman, stanley. hood, ambrose, hodges, henry p. hart, benjamin. harris, walter. harper, john. harbeck, w. h. hoffman, mr. herman, mrs. s. howard, b. howard, mrs. e. t. hale, reginald. hiltunen, m. hunt, george. jacobson, mr. jacobson, sydney. jeffery, clifford. jeffery, ernest. jenkin, stephen. jarvis, john d. keane, daniel. kirkland, rev. c. karnes, mrs. f. g. keynaldo, miss. krillner, j. h. krins, bandsman. karines, mrs. kantar, selna. knight, r. lengam, john. levy, r. j. lahtiman, william. lauch, charles. leyson, r. w. n. laroche, joseph. lamb, j. j mckane, peter. milling, jacob. mantoila, josepei, malachard, noll. moraweck, dr. roll of the dead--second cabin (continued) mangiovacchi, e. mccrae, arthur g. mccrie, james m. mckane, peter d. mudd, thomas. mack, mrs. mary. marshall, henry. mayberg, frank h. meyer, august. myles, thomas. mitchell, henry. matthews, w. j. nessen, israel. nicholls, joseph c. norman, robert d. otter, richard. phillips, robert. ponesell, martin. pain, dr. alfred. parkes, frank. pengelly, f. pernot, rene. peruschitz, rev. parker, clifford. pulbaum, frank renouf, peter h. rogers, harry. reeves, david. slemen, r. j. sobey, hayden. slatter, miss h. m. stanton, ward. sword, hans k. stokes, philip j. sharp, percival. sedgwick, mr. f. w. smith, augustus. sweet, george. sjostedt, ernst. taylor, bandsman. turpin, william j. turpin, mrs. dorothy. turner, john h. troupiansky, m. tirvan, mrs. a. veale, james. watson, e. woodward, bandsman. ware, william j. weisz, leopold. wheadon, edward. ware, john j. west, e. arthur. wheeler, edwin. werman, samuel. the total death list was 1635. third cabin passengers and crew are not included in the list here given owing to the impossibility of obtaining the exact names of many. chapter xiii. the story of charles f. hurd how the titanic sank--water strewn with dead bodies--victims met death with hymn on their lips the story of how the titanic sank is told by charles f. hurd, who was a passenger on the carpathia. he praised highly the courage of the crew, hundreds of whom gave their lives with a heroism which equaled but could not exceed that of john jacob astor, henry b. harris, jacques futrelle and others in the long list of first-cabin passengers. the account continues: "the crash against the iceberg, which had been sighted at only a quarter mile distance, came almost simultaneously with the click of the levers operated from the bridge, which stopped the engines and closed the water-tight doors. captain smith was on the bridge a moment later, summoning all on board to put on life preservers and ordering the life-boats lowered. "the first boats had more male passengers, as the men were the first to reach the deck. when the rush of frightened men and women and crying children to the decks began, the 'women first' rule was rigidly enforced. "officers drew revolvers, but in most cases there was no use for them. revolver shots heard shortly before the titanic went down caused many rumors, one that captain smith had shot himself, another that first officer murdock had ended his life, but members of the crew discredit these rumors. "captain smith was last seen on the bridge just before the ship sank, leaping only after the decks had been washed away. "what became of the men with the life-preservers was a question asked by many since the disaster. many of these with life-preservers were seen to go down despite the preservers, and dead bodies floated on the surface as the boats moved away. "facts which i have established by inquiries on the carpathia, as positively as they could be established in view of the silence of the few surviving officers, are: "that the titanic's officers knew, several hours before the crash, of the possible nearness of the icebergs. "that the titanic's speed, nearly 23 knots an hour, was not slackened. "that the number of life-boats on the titanic was insufficient to accommodate more than one-third of the passengers, to say nothing of the crew. most members of the crew say there were sixteen life-boats and two collapsibles; none say there were more than twenty boats in all. the 700 escaped filled most of the sixteen life-boats and the one collapsible which got away, to the limit of their capacity. "had the ship struck the iceberg head on at whatever {illust. caption = mrs. george d. widener mrs. widener was saved,....} {illust. caption = george d. widener who with his son....} {illust. caption = copyright by underwood & underwood, n. y. william t. stead the great english writer, who was a passenger on board the ill-fated white star line steamer titanic.} speed and with whatever resulting shock, the bulkhead system of water-tight compartments would probably have saved the vessel. as one man expressed it, it was the impossible that happened when, with a shock unbelievably mild, the ship's side was torn for a length which made the bulkhead system ineffective." after telling of the shock and the lowering of the boats the account continues: "some of the boats, crowded too full to give rowers a chance, drifted for a time. few had provisions or water, there was lack of covering from the icy air, and the only lights were the still undimmed arcs and incandescents of the settling ship, save for one of the first boats. there a steward, who explained to the passengers that he had been shipwrecked twice before, appeared carrying three oranges and a green light. "that green light, many of the survivors say, was to the shipwrecked hundreds as the pillar of fire by night. long after the ship had disappeared, and while confusing false lights danced about the boats, the green lantern kept them together on the course which led them to the carpathia. "as the end of the titanic became manifestly but a matter of moments, the oarsmen pulled their boats away, and the chilling waters began to echo splash after splash as passengers and sailors in life-preservers leaped over and started swimming away to escape the expected suction. "only the hardiest of constitutions could endure for more than a few moments such a numbing bath. the first vigorous strokes gave way to heart-breaking cries of 'help! help!' and stiffened forms were seen floating on the water all around us. "led by the green light, under the light of the stars, the boats drew away, and the bow, then the quarter, then the stacks and at last the stern of the marvel-ship of a few days before, passed beneath the waters. the great force of the ship's sinking was unaided by any violence of the elements, and the suction, not so great as had been feared, rocked but mildly the group of boats now a quarter of a mile distant from it. "early dawn brought no ship, but not long after 5 a. m. the carpathia, far out of her path and making eighteen knots, instead of her wonted fifteen, showed her single red and black smokestack upon the horizon. in the joy of that moment, the heaviest griefs were forgotten. "soon afterward captain rostron and chief steward hughes were welcoming the chilled and bedraggled arrivals over the carpathia's side. "terrible as were the san francisco, slocum and iroquois disasters, they shrink to local events in comparison with this world-catastrophe. "true, there were others of greater qualifications and longer experience than i nearer the tragedy--but they, by every token of likelihood, have become a part of the tragedy. the honored--must i say the lamented--stead, the adroit jacques futrelle, what might they not tell were their hands able to hold pencil? "the silence of the carpathia's engines, the piercing cold, the clamor of many voices in the companionways, caused me to dress hurriedly and awaken my wife, at 5.40 a. m. monday. our stewardess, meeting me outside, pointed to a wailing host in the rear dining room and said. 'from the titanic. she's at the bottom of the ocean.' "at the ship's side, a moment later, i saw the last of the line of boats discharge their loads, and saw women, some with cheap shawls about their heads, some with the costliest of fur cloaks, ascending the ship's side. and such joy as the first sight of our ship may have given them had disappeared from their faces, and there were tears and signs of faltering as the women were helped up the ladders or hoisted aboard in swings. for lack of room to put them, several of the titanic's boats, after unloading, were set adrift. "at our north was a broad ice field, the length of hundreds of carpathias. around us on other sides were sharp and glistening peaks. one black berg, seen about 10 a. m., was said to be that which sunk the titanic." chapter xiv. thrilling account by l. beasley collision only a slight jar--passengers could not believe the vessel doomed--narrow escape of life-boats--picked up by the carpathia among the most connected and interesting stories related by the survivors was the one told by l. beasley, of cambridge, england. he said: "the voyage from queenstown had been quite uneventful; very fine weather was experienced, and the sea was quite calm. the wind had been westerly to southwesterly the whole way, but very cold, particularly the last day; in fact after dinner on saturday evening it was almost too cold to be out on deck at all. only a slight jar "i had been in my berth for about ten minutes, when, at about 11.15 p. m., i felt a slight jar, and then soon after a second one, but not sufficiently violent to cause any anxiety to anyone, however nervous they may have been. however, the engines stopped immediately afterward, and my first, thought was, 'she has lost a propeller.' "i went up on the top (boat) deck in a dressing gown, and found only a few persons there, who had come up similarly to inquire why we had stopped, but there was no sort of anxiety in the minds of anyone. "we saw through the smoking room window a game of cards going on, and went in to inquire if they knew anything; it seems they felt more of the jar, and, looking through the window, had seen a huge iceberg go by close to the side of the boat. they thought we had just grazed it with a glancing blow, and that the engines had been stopped to see if any damage had been done. no one, of course, had any conception that the vessel had been pierced below by part of the submerged iceberg. "the game went on without any thought of disaster and i retired to my cabin, to read until we went on again. i never saw any of the players or the onlookers again. some were awakened "a little later, hearing people going upstairs, i went out again and found everyone wanting to know why the engines had stopped. no doubt many were awakened from sleep by the sudden stopping of a vibration to which they had become accustomed during the four days we had been on board. naturally, with such powerful engines as the titanic carried, the vibration was very noticeable all the time, and the sudden stopping had something the same effect as the stopping of a loud-ticking grandfather's clock in a room. "on going on deck again i saw that there was an undoubted list downward from stern to bows, but, knowing nothing of what had happened, concluded some of the front compartments had filled and weighed her down. i went down again to put on warmer clothing, and as i dressed heard an order shouted, 'all passengers on deck with life-belts on.' "we all walked slowly up, with the belts tied on over our clothing, but even then presumed this was only a wise precaution the captain was taking, and that we should return in a short time and retire to bed. "there was a total absence of any panic or any expressions of alarm, and i suppose this can be accounted for by the exceedingly calm night and the absence of any signs of the accident. "the ship was absolutely still, and except for a gentle tilt downward, which i don't think one person in ten would have noticed at that time, no signs of the approaching disaster were visible. she lay just as if she were waiting the order to go on again when some trifling matter had been adjusted. "but in a few moments we saw the covers lifted from the boats and the crews allotted to them standing by and coiling up the ropes which were to lower them by the pulley blocks into the water. "we then began to realize it was more serious than had been supposed, and my first thought was to go down and get some more clothing and some money, but, seeing people pouring up the stairs, decided it was better to cause no confusion to people coming up. presently we heard the order: "'all men stand back away from the boats, and all ladies retire to next deck below'--the smoking-room deck or b deck. men stood back "the men all stood away and remained in absolute silence leaning against the end railings of the deck or pacing slowly up and down. "the boats were swung out and lowered from a deck. when they were to the level of b deck, where all the women were collected, they got in quietly, with the exception of some who refused to leave their husbands. "in some cases they were torn from them and pushed into the boats, but in many instances they were allowed to remain because there was no one to insist they should go. "looking over the side, one saw boats from aft already in the water, slipping quietly away into the darkness, and presently the boats near me were lowered, and with much creaking as the new ropes slipped through the pulley blocks down the ninety feet which separated them from the water. an officer in uniform came up as one boat went down and shouted, "when you are afloat row round to the companion ladder and stand by with the other boats for orders.' "'aye, aye, sir,' came up the reply; but i don't think any boat was able to obey the order. when they were afloat and had the oars at work, the condition of the rapidly settling boat was so much more a sight for alarm for those in the boats than those on board, that in common prudence the sailors saw they could do nothing but row from the sinking ship to save at any rate some lives. they no doubt anticipated that suction from such an enormous vessel would be more dangerous than usual to a crowded boat mostly filled with women. "all this time there was no trace of any disorder; no panic or rush to the boats and no scenes of women sobbing hysterically, such as one generally pictures as happening at such times everyone seemed to realize so slowly that there was imminent danger. when it was realized that we might all be presently in the sea with nothing but our life-belts to support us until we were picked up by passing steamers, it was extraordinary how calm everyone was and how completely self-controlled. "one by one, the boats were filled with women and children, lowered and rowed away into the night. presently the word went round among the men, 'the men are to be put in boats on the starboard side.' "i was on the port side, and most of the men walked across the deck to see if this was so i remained where i was and soon heard the call: "'any more ladies?' "looking over the side of the ship, i saw the boat, no. 13, swinging level with b deck, half full of ladies. again the call was repeated, 'any more ladies?' "i saw none come on, and then one of the crew, looking up, said: "'any more ladies on your deck, sir?' "'no,' i replied. "'then you had better jump.' "i dropped in, and fell in the bottom, as they cried 'lower away.' as the boat began to descend two ladies were pushed hurriedly through the crowd on b deck and heaved over into the boat, and a baby of ten months passed down after them. down we went, the crew calling to those lowering each end to 'keep her level,' until we were some ten feet from the water, and here occurred the only anxious moment we had during the whole of our experience from leaving the deck to reaching the carpathia. "immediately below our boat was the exhaust of the condensers, a huge stream of water pouring all the time from the ship's side just above the water line. it was plain we ought to be quickly away from this, not to be swamped by it when we touched water. no officer aboard "we had no officer aboard, nor petty officer or member of the crew to take charge. so one of the stokers shouted: 'someone find the pin which releases the boat from the ropes and pull it up!' no one knew where it was. we felt on the floor and sides, but found nothing, and it was hard to move among so many people--we had sixty or seventy on board. "down we went and presently floated, with our ropes still holding us, the exhaust washing us away from the side of the vessel and the swell of the sea urging us back against the side again. the result of all these forces was an impetus which carried us parallel to the ship's side and directly under boat 14, which had filled rapidly with men and was coming down on us in a way that threatened to submerge our boat. "'stop lowering 14,' our crew shouted, and the crew of no. 14, now only twenty feet above, shouted the same. but the distance to the top was some seventy feet and the creaking pulleys must have deadened all sound to those above, for down she came, fifteen feet, ten feet, five feet and a stoker and i reached up and touched her swinging above our heads. the next drop would have brought her on our heads, but just before she dropped another stoker sprang to the ropes, with his knife. just escaped another boat "'one,' i heard him say, 'two,' as his knife cut through the pulley ropes, and the next moment the exhaust stream had carried us clear, while boat 14 dropped into the water, into the space we had the moment before occupied, our gunwales almost touching. "we drifted away easily, as the oars were got out, and headed directly away from the ship. the crew seemed to me to be mostly stewards or cooks in white jackets, two to an oar, with a stoker at the tiller. there was a certain amount of shouting from one end of the boat to the other, and discussion as to which way we should go, but finally it was decided to elect the stoker, who was steering, as captain, and for all to obey his orders. he set to work at once to get into touch with the other boats, calling to them and getting as close as seemed wise, so that when the search boats came in the morning to look for us, there would be more chance for all to be rescued by keeping together. "it was now about 1 a. m.; a beautiful starlight night, with no moon, and so not very light. the sea was as calm as a pond, just a gentle heave as the boat dipped up and down in the swell; an ideal night, except for the bitter cold, for anyone who had to be out in the middle of the atlantic ocean in an open boat. and if ever there was a time when such a night was needed, surely it was now, with hundreds of people, mostly women and children, afloat hundreds of miles from land. watched the titanic "the captain-stoker told us that he had been at sea twenty-six years, and had never yet seen such a calm night on the atlantic. as we rowed away from the titanic, we looked back from time to time to watch her, and a more striking spectacle it was not possible for anyone to see. "in the distance it looked an enormous length, its great bulk outlined in black against the starry sky, every port-hole and saloon blazing with light. it was impossible to think anything could be wrong with such a leviathan, were it not for that ominous tilt downward in the bows, where the water was by now up to the lowest row of port-holes. "presently, about 2 a. m., as near as i can remember, we observed it settling very rapidly, with the bows and the bridge completely under water, and concluded it was now only a question of minutes before it went; and so it proved." mr. beasley went on to tell of the spectacle of the sinking of the titanic, the terrible experiences of the survivors in the life-boats and their final rescue by the carpathia as already related. chapter xv. jack thayer's own story of the wreck seventeen-year-old son of pennsylvania railroad official tells moving story of his rescue--told mother to be brave--separated from parents--jumped when vessel sank--drifted on overturned boat picked up by carpathia one of the calmest of the passengers was: young jack thayer, the seventeen-year-old son of mr. and mrs. john b. thayer. when his mother was put into the life-boat he kissed her and told her to be brave, saying that he and his father would be all right. he and mr. thayer stood on the deck as the small boat in which mrs. thayer was a passenger made off from the side of the titanic over the smooth sea. the boy's own account of his experience as told to one of his rescuers is one of the most remarkable of all the wonderful ones that have come from the tremendous catastrophe: "father was in bed, and mother and myself were about to get into bed. there was no great shock, i was on my feet at the time and i do not think it was enough to throw anyone down. i put on an overcoat and rushed up on a deck on the port side. i saw nothing there. i then went forward to the bow to see if i could see any signs of ice. the only ice i saw was on the well deck. i could not see very far ahead, having just come out of a brightly lighted room. "i then went down to our room and my father and mother came on deck with me, to the starboard side of a deck. we could not see anything there. father thought he saw small pieces of ice floating around, but i could not see any myself. there was no big berg. we walked around to the port side, and the ship had then a fair list to port. we stayed there looking over the side for about five minutes. the list seemed very slowly to be increasing. "we then went down to our rooms on c deck, all of us dressing quickly, putting on all our clothes. we all put on life-preservers, and over these we put our overcoats. then we hurried up on deck and walked around, looking out at different places until the women were all ordered to collect on the port side. separated from parents "father and i said good-bye to mother at the top of the stairs on a deck. she and the maid went right out on a deck on the port side and we went to the starboard side. as at this time we had no idea the boat would sink we walked around a deck and then went to b deck. then we thought we would go back to see if mother had gotten off safely, and went to the port side of a deck. we met the chief steward of the main dining saloon and he told us that mother had not yet taken a boat, and he took us to her. "father and mother went ahead and i followed. they went down to b deck and a crowd got in front of me and i was not able to catch them, and lost sight of them. as soon as i could get through the crowd i tried to find them on b deck, but without success. that is the last time i saw my father. this was about one half an hour before she sank. i then went to the starboard side, thinking that father and mother must have gotten off in a boat. all of this time i was with a fellow named milton c. long, of new york, whom i had just met that evening. "on the starboard side the boats were getting away quickly. some boats were already off in a distance. we thought of getting into one of the boats, the last boat to go on the forward part of the starboard side, but there seemed to be such a crowd around i thought it unwise to make any attempt to get into it. he and i stood by the davits of one of the boats that had left. i did not notice anybody that i knew except mr. lindley, whom i had also just met that evening. i lost sight of him in a few minutes. long and i then stood by the rail just a little aft of the captain's bridge. thought ship would float "the list to the port had been growing greater all the time. about this time the people began jumping from the stern. i thought of jumping myself, but was afraid of being stunned on hitting the water. three times i made up my mind to jump out and slide down the davit ropes and try to make the boats that were lying off from the ship, but each time long got hold of me and told me to wait a while. he then sat down and i stood up waiting to see what would happen. even then we thought she might possibly stay afloat. "i got a sight on a rope between the davits and a star and noticed that she was gradually sinking. about this time she straightened up on an even keel and started to go down fairly fast at an angle of about 30 degrees. as she started to sink we left the davits and went back and stood by the rail about even with the second funnel. "long and myself said good-bye to each other and jumped up on the rail. he put his legs over and held on a minute and asked me if i was coming. i told him i would be with him in a minute. he did not jump clear, but slid down the side of the ship. i never saw him again. "about five seconds after he jumped i jumped out, feet first. i was clear of the ship; went down, and as i came up i was pushed away from the ship by some force. i came up facing the ship, and one of the funnels seemed to be lifted off and fell towards me about 15 yards away, with a mass of sparks and steam coming out of it. i saw the ship in a sort of a red glare, and it seemed to me that she broke in two just in front of the third funnel. "this time i was sucked down, and as i came up i was pushed out again and twisted around by a large wave, coming up in the midst of a great deal of small wreckage. as i pushed my hand from my head it touched the cork fender of an over{illust. caption = reading room of the titanic} {illust. caption = copyright, 1912. international news service. the senatorial investigation--ismay on the grill j. bruce ismay, managing director of the........} turned life-boat. i looked up and saw some men on the top and asked them to give me a hand. one of them, who was a stoker, helped me up. in a short time the bottom was covered with about twenty-five or thirty men. when i got on this i was facing the ship. {illust. caption = sketches of the titanic by "jack" thayer these sketches were outlined by john b. thayer, jr., on the day of the disaster, and afterwards filled in by l. d. skidmon, of brooklyn.} "the stern then seemed to rise in the air and stopped at about an angle of 60 degrees. it seemed to hold there for a time and then with a hissing sound it shot right down out of sight with people jumping from the stern. the stern either pivoted around towards our boat, or we were sucked towards it, and as we only had one oar we could not keep away. there did not seem to be very much suction and most of us managed to stay on the bottom of our boat. "we were then right in the midst of fairly large wreckage, with people swimming all around us. the sea was very calm and we kept the boat pretty steady, but every now and then a wave would wash over it. said the lord's prayer "the assistant wireless operator was right next to me, holding on to me and kneeling in the water. we all sang a hymn and said the lord's prayer, and then waited for dawn to come. as often as we saw the other boats in a distance we would yell, 'ship ahoy!' but they could not distinguish our cries from any of the others, so we all gave it up, thinking it useless. it was very cold and none of us were able to move around to keep warm, the water washing over her almost all the time. "toward dawn the wind sprang up, roughening up the water and making it difficult to keep the boat balanced. the wireless man raised our hopes a great deal by telling us that the carpathia would be up in about three hours. about 3.30 or 4 o'clock some men on our boat on the bow sighted her mast lights. i could not see them, as i was sitting down with a man kneeling on my leg. he finally got up and i stood up. we had the second officer, mr. lightoller, on board. we had an officer's whistle and whistled for the boats in the distance to come up and take us off. "it took about an hour and a half for the boats to draw near. two boats came up. the first took half and the other took the balance, including myself. we had great difficulty about this time in balancing the boat, as the men would lean too far, but we were all taken aboard the already crowded boat, and in about a half or three-quarters of an hour later we were picked up by the carpathia. "i have noticed second officer lightoller's statement that 'j. b. thayer was on our overturned boat,' which would give the impression that it was father, when he really meant it was i, as he only learned my name in a subsequent conversation on the carpathia, and did not know i was 'junior'." chapter xvi. incidents related by james mcgough women forced into the life-boats--why some men were saved before women--asked to man life-boats surrounded by his wife and members of his family, james mcgough, of philadelphia, a buyer for the gimbel brothers, whose fate had been in doubt, recited a most thrilling and graphic picture of the disaster. as the carpathia docked, mrs. mcgough, a brother and several friends of the buyer, met him, and after the touching reunion had taken place the party proceeded to philadelphia. vivid in detail, mr. mcgough's story differs essentially from one the imagination would paint. he declared that the boat was driving at a high rate of speed at the time of the accident, and seemed impressed by the calmness and apathy displayed by the survivors as they tossed on the frozen seas in the little life-boats until the carpathia picked them up. the titanic did not plunge into the water suddenly, he declared, but settled slowly into the deep with its hundreds of passengers. "the collision occurred at 20 minutes of 12," said mr. mcgough. "i was sleeping in my cabin when i felt a wrench, not severe or terrifying. "it seemed to me to be nothing more serious than the racing of the screw, which often occurs when a ship plunges her bow deep into a heavy swell, raising the stern out of water. we dressed hurriedly and ran to the upper deck. there was little noise or tumult at the time. "the promenade decks being higher from the base of the ship and thus more insecure, strained and creaked; so we went to the lower decks. by this time the engines had been reversed, and i could feel the ship backing off. officers and stewards ran through the corridors, shouting for all to be calm, that there was no danger. we were warned, however, to dress and put life-preservers on us. i had on what clothing i could find and had stuffed some money in my pocket. parting of astor and bride "as i passed the gymnasium i saw colonel astor and his young wife together. she was clinging to him, piteously pleading that he go into the life-boat with her. he refused almost gruffly and was attempting to calm her by saying that all her fears were groundless, that the accident she feared would prove a farce. it proved different, however. "none, i believe, knew that the ship was about to sink. i did not realize it just then. when i reached the upper deck and saw tons of ice piled upon our crushed bow the full realization came to me. "officers stood with drawn guns ordering the women into the boats. all feared to leave the comparative safety of a broad and firm deck for the precarious smaller boats. women clung to their husbands, crying that they would never leave without them, and had to be torn away. "on one point all the women were firm. they would not enter a life-boat until men were in it first. they feared to trust themselves to the seas in them. it required courage to step into the frail crafts as they swung from the creaking davits. few men were willing to take the chance. an officer rushed behind me and shouted: "'you're big enough to pull an oar. jump into this boat or we'll never be able to get the women off.' i was forced to do so, though i admit that the ship looked a great deal safer to me than any small boat. "our boat was the second off. forty or more persons were crowded into it, and with myself and members of the crew at the oars, were pulled slowly away. huge icebergs, larger than the pennsylvania depot at new york, surrounded us. as we pulled away we could see boat after boat filled and lowered to the waves. despite the fact that they were new and supposedly in excellent working order, the blocks jammed in many instances, tilting the boats, loaded with people, at varying angles before they reached the water. band continued playing "as the life-boats pulled away the officers ordered the bands to play, and their music did much to quell panic. it was a heart-breaking sight to us tossing in an eggshell three-fourths of a mile away, to see the great ship go down. first she listed to the starboard, on which side the collision had occurred, then she settled slowly but steadily, without hope of remaining afloat. "the titanic was all aglow with lights as if for a function. first we saw the lights of the lower deck snuffed out. a while later and the second deck illumination was extinguished in a similar manner. then the third and upper decks were darkened, and without plunging or rocking the great ship disappeared slowly from the surface of the sea. "people were crowded on each deck as it lowered into the water, hoping in vain that aid would come in time. some of the life-boats caught in the merciless suction were swallowed with her. "the sea was calm--calm as the water in a tumbler. but it was freezing cold. none had dressed heavily, and all, therefore, suffered intensely. the women did not shriek or grow hysterical while we waited through the awful night for help. we men stood at the oars, stood because there was no room for us to sit, and kept the boat headed into the swell to prevent her capsizing. another boat was at our side, but all the others were scattered around the water. "finally, shortly before 6 o'clock, we saw the lights of the carpathia approaching. gradually she picked up the survivors in the other boats and then approached us. when we were lifted to the deck the women fell helpless. they were carried to whatever quarters offered themselves, while the men were assigned to the smoking room. "of the misery and suffering which was witnessed on the rescue ship i know nothing. with the other men survivors i was glad to remain in the smoking room until new york was reached, trying to forget the awful experience. "to us aboard the carpathia came rumors of misstatements which were being made to the public. the details of the wreck were wofully misunderstood. "let me emphasize that the night was not foggy or cloudy. there was just the beginning of the new moon, but every star in the sky was shining brightly, unmarred by clouds. the boats were lowered from both sides of the titanic in time to escape, but there was not enough for all. chapter xvii. wireless operator praises heroic work story of harold bride, the surviving wireless operator of the titanic, who was washed overboard and rescued by life-boat--band played rag-time and "autumn" one of the most connected and detailed accounts of the horrible disaster was that told by harold bride, the wireless operator. mr. bride said: "i was standing by phillips, the chief operator, telling him to go to bed, when the captain put his head in the cabin. "'we've struck an iceberg,' the captain said, 'and i'm having an inspection made to tell what it has done for us. you better get ready to send out a call for assistance. but don't send it until i tell you.' "the captain went away and in ten minutes, i should estimate the time, he came back. we could hear a terrific confusion outside, but there was not the least thing to indicate that there was any trouble. the wireless was working perfectly. "'send the call for assistance,' ordered the captain, barely putting his head in the door. "'what call shall i send?' phillips asked. "'the regulation international call for help. just that.' "then the captain was gone phillips began to send 'c. q. d.' he flashed away at it and we joked while he did so. all of us made light of the disaster. "the carpathia answered our signal. we told her our position and said we were sinking by the head. the operator went to tell the captain, and in five minutes returned and told us that the captain of the carpathia, was putting about and heading for us great scramble on deck "our captain had left us at this time and phillips told me to run and tell him what the carpathia had answered. i did so, and i went through an awful mass of people to his cabin. the decks were full of scrambling men and women. i saw no fighting, but i heard tell of it. "i came back and heard phillips giving the carpathia fuller directions. phillips told me to put on my clothes. until that moment i forgot that i was not dressed. "i went to my cabin and dressed. i brought an overcoat to phillips. it was very cold. i slipped the overcoat upon him while he worked. "every few minutes phillips would send me to the captain with little messages. they were merely telling how the carpathia was coming our way and gave her speed. "i noticed as i came back from one trip that they were putting off women and children in life-boats. i noticed that the list forward was increasing. "phillips told me the wireless was growing weaker. the captain came and told us our engine rooms were taking water and that the dynamos might not last much longer. we sent that word to the carpathia. "i went out on deck and looked around. the water was pretty close up to the boat deck. there was a great scramble aft, and how poor phillips worked through it right to the end i don't know. "he was a brave man. i learned to love him that night and i suddenly felt for him a great reverence to see him standing there sticking to his work while everybody else was raging about. i will never live to forget the work of phillips for the last awful fifteen minutes. "i thought it was about time to look about and see if there was anything detached that would float. i remembered that every member of the crew had a special life-belt and ought to know where it was. i remembered mine was under my bunk. i went and got it. then i thought how cold the water was. "i remembered i had an extra jacket and a pair of boots, and i put them on. i saw phillips standing out there still sending away, giving the carpathia details of just how we were doing. "we picked up the olympic and told her we were sinking by the head and were about all down. as phillips was sending the message i strapped his life-belt to his back. i had already put on his overcoat. every minute was precious, so i helped him all i could. band plays in rag-time "from aft came the tunes of the band. it was a rag-time tune, i don't know what. then there was 'autumn.' phillips ran aft and that was the last i ever saw of him. "i went to the place where i had seen a collapsible boat on the boat deck, and to my surprise i saw the boat and the men still trying to push it off. i guess there wasn't a sailor in the crowd. they couldn't do it. i went up to them and was just lending a hand when a large wave came awash of the deck. "the big wave carried the boat off. i had hold of a row-lock and i went off with it. the next i knew i was in the boat. "but that was not all. i was in the boat and the boat was upside down and i was under it. and i remember realizing i was wet through, and that whatever happened i must not breathe, for i was under water. "i knew i had to fight for it and i did. how i got out from under the boat i do not know, but i felt a breath of air at last. "there were men all around me hundreds of them. the sea was dotted with them, all depending on their life-belts. i felt i simply had to get away from the ship. she was a beautiful sight then. "smoke and sparks were rushing out of her funnel, and there must have been an explosion, but we had heard none. we only saw the big stream of sparks. the ship was gradually turning on her nose just like a duck does that goes down for a dive. i had one thing on my mind--to get away from the suction. the band was still playing, and i guess they all went down. "they were playing 'autumn' then. i swam with all my might. i suppose i was 150 feet away when the titanic, on her nose, with her after-quarter sticking straight up in the air, began to settle slowly. "when at last the waves washed over her rudder there wasn't the least bit of suction i could feel. she must have kept going just as slowly as she had been. "i forgot to mention that, besides the olympic and carpathia, we spoke some german boat, i don't know which, and told them how we were. we also spoke the baltic. i remembered those things as i began to figure what ships would be coming toward us. "i felt, after a little while, like sinking. i was very cold. i saw a boat of some kind near me and put all my strength into an effort to swim to it. it was hard work. i was all done when a hand reached out from the boat and pulled me aboard. it was our same collapsible. "there was just room for me to roll on the edge. i lay there, not caring what happened. somebody sat on my legs; they were wedged in between slats and were being wrenched. i had not the heart left to ask the man to move. it was a terrible sight all around--men swimming and sinking. "i lay where i was, letting the man wrench my feet out of shape. others came near. nobody gave them a hand. the bottom-up boat already had more men than it would hold and it was sinking. "at first the larger waves splashed over my head and i had to breathe when i could. "some splendid people saved us. they had a right-side-up boat, and it was full to its capacity. yet they came to us and loaded us all into it. i saw some lights off in the distance and knew a steamship was coming to our aid. "i didn't care what happened. i just lay, and gasped when i could and felt the pain in my feet. at last the carpathia was alongside and the people were being taken up a rope ladder. our boat drew near, and one b{y} one the men were taken off of it. "the way the band kept playing was a noble thing. i heard it first while we were working wireless, when there was a rag-time tune for us, and the last i saw of the band, when i was floating out in the sea, with my life-belt on, it was still on deck playing 'autumn.' how they ever did it i cannot imagine. "that and the way phillips kept sending after the captain told him his life was his own, and to look out for himself, are two things that stand out in my mind over all the rest." chapter xviii. story of the steward passengers and crew dying when taken aboard carpathia--one woman saved a dog--english colonel swam for hours when boat with mother capsized some of the most thrilling incidents connected with the rescue of the titanic's survivors are told in the following account given by a man trained to the sea, a steward of the rescue ship carpathia: "at midnight on sunday, april 14th, i was promenading the deck of the steamer carpathia, bound for the mediterranean and three days out from new york, when an urgent summons came to my room from the chief steward, e. harry hughes. i then learned that the white star liner titanic, the greatest ship afloat, had struck an iceberg and was in serious difficulties. "we were then already steaming at our greatest power to the scene of the disaster, captain rostron having immediately given orders that every man of the crew should stand by to exert his utmost efforts. within a very few minutes every preparation had been made to receive two or three thousand persons. blankets were placed ready, tables laid with hot soups and coffee, bedding, etc., prepared, and hospital supplies laid out ready to attend to any injured. "the men were then mustered in the saloon and addressed by the chief steward. he told them of the disaster and appealed to them in a few words to show the world what stuff britishers were made of, and to add a glorious page to the history of the empire; and right well did the men respond to the appeal. every life-boat was manned and ready to be launched at a moment's notice. nothing further could be done but anxiously wait and look out for the ship's distress signal. "our marconi operator, whose unceasing efforts for many hours deserve the greatest possible praise, was unable at this time to get any reply to the urgent inquiries he was sending out, and he feared the worst. "at last a blue flare was observed, to which we replied with a rocket. day was just dawning when we observed a boat in the distance. iceberg and first boat sighted "eastward on the horizon a huge iceberg, the cause of the disaster, majestically reared two noble peaks to heaven. rope ladders were already lowered and we hove to near the life-boat, which was now approaching us as rapidly as the nearly exhausted efforts of the men at the oars could bring her. "under the command of our chief officer, who worked indefatigably at the noble work of rescue, the survivors in {illust. caption = above: main stairway on titanic. top e deck below: second landing. c deck. grand stairway} {illust. caption = mrs. john b. thayer mrs. thayer and her son were....} {illust. caption = john b. thayer second vice-president of the...} the boat were rapidly but carefully hauled aboard and given into the hands of the medical staff under the organization of dr. mcgee. "we then learned the terrible news that the gigantic vessel, the unsinkable titanic, had gone down one hour and ten minutes after striking. "from this time onward life-boats continued to arrive at frequent intervals. every man of the carpathia's crew was unsparing in his efforts to assist, to tenderly comfort each and every survivor. in all, sixteen boatloads were receives, containing altogether 720 persons, many in simply their night attire, others in evening dress, as if direct from an after-dinner reception, or concert. most conspicuous was the coolness and self-possession, particularly of the women. "pathetic and heartrending incidents were many. there was not a man of the rescue party who was not moved almost to tears. women arrived and frantically rushed from one gangway to another eagerly scanning the fresh arrivals in the boats for a lost husband or brother. a capsized boat "one boat arrived with the unconscious body of an english colonel. he had been taking out his mother on a visit, to three others of her sons. he had succeeded in getting her away in one of the boats and he himself had found a place in another. when but a few-yards from the ill-fated ship the boat containing his mother capsized before his eyes. "immediately he dived into the water and commenced a frantic search for her. but in vain. boat after boat endeavored to take him aboard, but he refused to give up, continuing to swim for nearly three hours until even his great strength of body and mind gave out and he was hauled unconscious into a passing boat and brought aboard the carpathia. the doctor gives little hope of his recovery. "there were, i understand, twelve newly married couples aboard the big ship. the twelve brides have been saved, but of the husbands all but one have perished. that one would not have been here, had he not been urged to assist in manning a life-boat. think of the self-sacrifice of these eleven heroes, who stood on the doomed vessel and parted from their brides forever, knowing full well that a few brief minutes would end all things for themselves. "many similar pathetic incidents could be related. sad-eyed women roam aimlessly about the ship still looking vainly for husband, brother or father. to comfort them is impossible. all human efforts are being exerted on their behalf. their material needs are satisfied in every way. but who can cure a broken heart? saved her pomeranian "one of the earliest boats to arrive was seen to contain a woman tenderly clasping a pet pomeranian. when assisted to the rope ladder and while the rope was being fastened around her she emphatically refused to give up for a second the dog which was evidently so much to her. he is now receiving as careful and tender attention as his mistress. "a survivor informs me that there was on the ship a lady who was taking out a huge great dane dog. when the boats were rapidly filling she appeared on deck with her canine companion and sadly entreated that he should be taken off with her. it was impossible. human lives, those of women and children, were the first consideration. she was urged to seize the opportunity to save her own life and leave the dog. she refused to desert him and, i understand, sacrificed her life with him. "one elderly lady was bewailing to a steward that she had lost everything. he indignantly replied that she should thank god her life was spared, never mind her replaceable property. the reply was pathetic: "'i have lost everything--my husband,' and she broke into uncontrollable grief. four boats adrift he says "one incident that impressed me perhaps more than any other was the burial on tuesday afternoon of four of the poor fellows who succeeded in safely getting away from the doomed vessel only to perish later from exhaustion and exposure as a result of their gallant efforts to bring to safety the passengers placed in their charge in the life-boats. they were: "w. h. hoyte, esq., first class passenger. "abraham hornner, third class passenger. "s. c. siebert, steward. "p. lyons, sailor. "the sailor and steward were unfortunately dead when taken aboard. the passengers lived but a few minutes after. they were treated with the greatest attention. the funeral service was conducted amid profound silence and attended by a large number of survivors and rescuers. the bodies, covered by the national flag, were reverently consigned to the mighty deep from which they had been, alas, vainly, saved. "most gratifying to the officers and men of the carpathia is the constantly expressive appreciation of the survivors." he then told of the meeting of the survivors in the cabin of the carpathia and of the resolution adopted, a statement of which has already been given in another chapter. chapter xix. how the world received the news nations prostrate with grief--messages from kings and cardinals--disaster stirs world to necessity of stricter regulations young and old, rich and poor were prostrated by the news of the disaster. even wall street was neglected. nor was the grief confined to america. european nations felt the horror of the calamity and sent expressions of sympathy. president taft made public cablegrams received from the king and queen of england, and the king of belgium, conveying their sympathy to the american people in the sorrows which have followed the titanic disaster. the president's responses to both messages were also made public. the following was the cablegram from king george, dated at sandringham: "the queen and i are anxious to assure you and the american nation of the great sorrow which we experienced at the terrible loss of life that has occurred among the american citizens, as well as among my own subjects, by the foundering of the titanic. our two countries are so intimately allied by ties of friendship and brotherhood that any misfortunes which affect the one must necessarily affect the other, and on the present terrible occasion they are both equally sufferers. "george r. and i." president taft's reply was as follows: "in the presence of the appalling disaster to the titanic the people of the two countries are brought into community of grief through their common bereavement. the american people share in the sorrow of their kinsmen beyond the sea. on behalf of my countrymen i thank you for your sympathetic message. "william h. taft." the message from king albert of belgium was as follows: "i beg your excellency to accept my deepest condolences on the occasion of the frightful catastrophe to the titanic, which has caused such mourning in the american nation." the president's acknowledgment follows: "i deeply appreciate your sympathy with my fellow-countrymen who have been stricken with affliction through the disaster to the titanic." message prom spain king alfonso and queen victoria sent the following cablegram to president taft: "we have learned with profound grief of the catastrophe to the titanic, which has plunged the american nation in mourning. we send you our sincerest condolence, and wish to assure you and your nation of the sentiments of friendship and sympathy we feel toward you." a similar telegram was sent to the king of england. the many expressions of grief to reach president taft included one signed jointly by the three american cardinals, who were in new york attending the meeting of the trustees of the catholic university. it said: "to the president of the united states: "the archbishops of the country, in joint session with the trustees of the catholic university of america, beg to offer to the president of the united states their expression of their profound grief at the awful loss of human lives attendant upon the sinking of the steamship titanic, and at the same time to assure the relatives of the victims of this horrible disaster of our deepest sympathy and condolence. "they wish also to attest hereby to the hope that the law-makers of the country will see in this sad accident the obvious necessity of legal provisions for greater security of ocean travel. "james cardinal gibbons," archbishop of baltimore. "john cardinal farley," archbishop of new york. "william cardinal o'connell," archbishop of boston. house adjourned formal tribute to the titanic's dead was paid by the house of representatives when it adjourned for twenty-four hours. the prayer of the rev. henry n. couden in opening the house session was, in part: "we thank thee that though in the ordinary circumstances of life selfishness and greed seem to be in the ascendancy, yet in times of distress and peril, then it is that the nobility of soul, the godlike in man, asserts itself and makes heroes." the flags on the white house and other government buildings throughout the country were at half-staff. rome mourned major butt a special telegram from rome stated that one of the victims most regretted was major butt, whose jovial, bright character made many friends there. besides autograph letters from the pope and cardinal merry del vai{sic?} to president taft, the major had with him a signed photograph of the pontiff, given by him personally. cardinal merry del val had several conversations with major butt, who declared that the cardinal was "the first gentleman of europe." shortly before he was leaving rome, regretting that he had not a signed picture of cardinal merry del val, major butt entrusted a friend to ask for one. the cardinal willingly put an autograph dedication on a picture, recalling their pleasant intercourse. london newspapers condemn laxity of law british indignation, which is not easily excited, was aroused over the knowledge that an antiquated law enables steamship companies to fail to provide sufficient life-boats to accommodate the passengers and crew of the largest liners in the event of such a disaster as that which occurred to the titanic. it will be insisted that there be an investigation of the loss of life in the titanic and that the shortage of boats be gone into thoroughly. the newspapers commented adversely on the lack of boats and their views were emphasized by the knowledge that no attempt has been made to change the regulations in the face of the fact that the inadequacy of boats in such an emergency was called to the attention of parliament at the time of the collision between the white star liner olympic and the cruiser hawke. it was pointed out at this time that german vessels, much smaller in size than the olympic, carried more boats and also that these boats were of greater capacity. t. w. moore, secretary of the merchant service guild, when seen at the guild's rooms in liverpool, said: "the titanic disaster is an example, on a colossal scale, of the pernicious and supine system of officials, as represented by the board of trade. modern liners are so designed that they have no accommodations for more life-boats. among practical seamen it has long been recognized that the modern passenger ship has nothing like adequate boat capacity. "the board of trade has its own views, and the shipowners also have their views, which are largely based upon the economical factor. the naval architects have their opinions, but the practical merchant seaman is not consulted. "the titanic disaster is a complete substantiation of the agitation that our guild has carried on for nearly twenty years against the scheme that has precluded practical seamen from being consulted with regard to boat capacity and life-saving appliances. house of commons investigation immediate and searching inquiry into the titanic disaster was promised on the floor of the house of commons april 18th, by president sidney buxton, of the board of trade, which controls all sea-going vessels. buxton, in discussing the utterly inadequate life-saving equipment of the big liner, declared that the committee of the board in charge of life-saving precautions had recently recommended increased life-boats, rafts and life-preservers on all big ships, but that the requirements had been found unsatisfactory and had not been put in force. he frankly admitted the necessity for increased equipment without delay. the board, he said, was utterly unable to compel the transatlantic vessels to reduce their speed in the contest for "express train" ships. he also said the board could not force ships to take the southerly passage in the spring to avoid ice. the regulations under which the titanic carried life-boat accommodations for only about one-third of her passengers and crew had not been revised by the committee since 1894. at that time the regulations were made for ships of "10,000 tons or more." the titanic's tonnage was 45,000, for which the present requirements are altogether insufficient. work of raising relief funds prompt several foreign governments telegraphed to the british government messages of condolence for the sufferers. the king sent a donation of $2625 to the mansion house fund. queen mary donated $1310 and queen alexandra $1000 to the same fund. oscar hammerstein proffered, and the lord mayor accepted, the use of his opera house for an entertainment in aid of the fund. the shipping federation donated $10,500 to the mayor of southampton's fund, taking care to explain that the white star line was not affiliated with the federation. some public institutions also offered to take care of the orphaned children of the crew. large firms contributed liberally to the various relief funds, while covent garden and other leading theaters prepared special performances to aid in the relief work. indignant germany demands reforms all germany as well as england was stunned and grieved by the magnitude of the horror of the titanic catastrophe. anglo-german recriminations for the moment ceased, as far as the fatherland was concerned, and profound and sincere compassion for the nation on whom the blow had fallen more heavily was the supreme note of the hour. the kaiser, with his characteristic promptitude, was one of the first to communicate his sympathy by telegraph to king george and to the white star line. admiral prince henry of prussia did likewise, and the first act of the reichstag, after reassembling on tuesday, was to pass a standing vote of condolence with the british people in their distress. german laws also inadequate the german laws, governing the safety appliances on board trans-oceanic vessels, seem to be as archaic and inadequate as those of the british board of trade. the maximum provision contained in the german statutes refers to vessels with the capacity of 50,000 cubic metres, which must carry sixteen life-boats. the law also says that if this number of life-boats be insufficient to accommodate all the persons on board, including the crew, there shall be carried elsewhere in the vessel a correspondingly additional number of collapsible life-boats, suitable rafts, floating deck-chairs and life-buoys, as well as a generous supply of life-belts. a vessel of 10,000 tons was a "leviathan" in the days when the german law was passed, and it appears to have undergone no change to meet the conditions, imposed by the construction of vessels twice or three times 10,000 tons, like the hamburg-american kaiserin auguste victoria, or the north german lloyd george washington, to say nothing of the 50,000-ton imperator, which is to be added to the hamburg fleet next year. the german lines seem, like the white star company, to have reckoned simply with the practical impossibility of a ship like the titanic succumbing to the elements personal anxiety although germany's and berlin's direct interest in the passengers aboard the titanic was less than that of london, new york or paris, there was the utmost concern for their fate. ambassador leishman and other members of the american embassy were particularly interested in hearing about major "archie" butt, who passed through berlin, less than a month before the disaster, en route from russia and the far east. vice-president john b. thayer and family, of philadelphia, were also in berlin a fortnight ago and were guests of the american consul general and mrs. thackara. a score of other lesser known passengers had recently stayed in berlin hotels, and it was local friends or kinsmen of theirs who were in a state of distressing unrest over their fate. their anxiety was aggravated by the old-fogey methods of the german newspapers, which are invariably twelve or fifteen hours later than journals elsewhere in europe on world news events. although new york, london and paris had the cruel truth with their morning papers on tuesday, it was not until the middle of the forenoon that "extras" made the facts public in berlin. william t. stead was well and favorably known in germany, and his fate was keenly and particularly mourned. germans have also noted that many americans of direct teutonic ancestry or origin were among the shining marks in the death list. colonel john jacob astor is claimed as of german, extraction, as well as isidor straus, benjamin guggenheim, washington roebling and henry b. harris. all of them had been in germany frequently and had a wide circle of friends and acquaintances. only one well-known resident of berlin was aboard the titanic, frau antoinette flegenheim, whose name appears among the rescued. chapter xx. bravery of the officers and crew illustrious career of captain e. j. smith--brave to the last--maintenance of order and discipline--acts of heroism--engineers died at posts--noble-hearted band in the anxious hours of uncertainty, when the air cracked and flashed with the story of disaster, there was never doubt in the minds of men ashore about the master of the titanic. captain smith would bring his ship into port if human power could mend the damage the sea had wrought, or if human power could not stay the disaster he would never come to port. there is something calvinistic about such men of the old-sea breed. they go down with their ships, of their own choice. into the last life-boat that was launched from the ship captain smith with his own hand lifted a small child into a seat beside its mother. as the gallant, officer performed his simple act of humanity several who were already in the boat tried to force the captain to join them, but he turned away resolutely toward the bridge. that act was significant. courteous, kindly, of quiet demeanor and soft words, he was known and loved by thousands of travelers. when the english firm, a. gibson & co.9 of liverpool, purchased the american clipper, senator weber, in 1869, captain smith, then a boy, sailed on her. for seven years he was an apprentice on the senator weber, leaving that vessel to go to the lizzie fennell, a square rigger, as fourth officer. from there he went to the old celtic of the white star line as fourth officer and in 1887 he became captain of that vessel. for a time he was in command of the freighters cufic and runic; then he became skipper of the old adriatic. subsequently he assumed command of the celtic, britannic, coptic (which was in the australian trade), germanic, baltic, majestic, olympic and titanic, an illustrious list of vessels for one man to have commanded during his career. it was not easy to get captain smith to talk of his experiences. he had grown up in the service, was his comment, and it meant little to him that he had been transferred from a small vessel to a big ship and then to a bigger ship and finally to the biggest of them all. "one might think that a captain taken from a small ship and put on a big one might feel the transition," he once said. "not at all. the skippers of the big vessels have grown up to them, year after year, through all these years. first there was the sailing vessel and then what we would now call small ships--they were big in the days gone by--and finally the giants to-day." {illust. caption = vessel with bottom of hull ripped open a view of the torpedo destroyer tiger, taken in drydock after her collision with the portland breakwater last september; the damage to the tiger, which is plainly shown in the photograph, is of the same character, though on a smaller scale, as that which was done to the titanic.} {illust. caption = a view of the olympic the sister-ship of the titanic, showing the damage done to her hull in the collision with british war vessel, hawke, in the british channel.} disaster to olympic only once during all his long years of service was he in trouble, when the olympic, of which he was in command, was rammed by the british cruiser hawke in the solent on september 20, 1911. the hawke came steaming out of portsmouth and drew alongside the giantess. according to some of the passengers on the olympic the hawke swerved in the direction of the big liner and a moment later the bow of the hawke was crunching steel plates in the starboard quarter of the olympic, making a thirty-foot hole in her. she was several months in dry dock. the result of a naval court inquiry was to put all the blame for the collision on the olympic. captain smith, in his testimony before the naval court, said that he was on the bridge when he saw the hawke overhauling him. the olympic began to draw ahead later or the hawke drop astern, the captain did not know which. then the cruiser turned very swiftly and struck the olympic at right angles on the quarter. the pilot gave the signal for the olympic to port, which was to minimize the force of the collision. the olympic's engines had been stopped by order of the pilot. up to the moment the hawke swerved, captain smith said, he had no anxiety. the pilot, bowyer, corroborated the testimony of captain smith. that the line did not believe captain smith was at fault, notwithstanding the verdict of the board of naval inquiry, was shown by his retention as the admiral of the white star fleet and by his being given the command of the titanic. up to the time of the collision with the hawke captain smith when asked by interviewers to describe his experiences at sea would say one word, "uneventful." then he would add with a smile and a twinkle of his eyes: "of course there have been winter gales and storms and fog and the like in the forty years i have been on the seas, but i have never been in an accident worth speaking of. in all my years at sea (he made this comment a few years ago) i have seen but one vessel in distress. that was a brig the crew of which was taken off in a boat by my third officer. i never saw a wreck. i never have been wrecked. i have never been in a predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort." the captain's love of the sea once the interviewer stopped asking personal questions, captain smith would talk of the sea, of his love for it, how its appeal to him as a boy had never died. "the love of the ocean that took me to sea as a boy has never died." he once said. "when i see a vessel plunging up and down in the trough of the sea, fighting her way through and over great waves, and keeping her keel and going on and on--the wonder of the thing fills me, how she can keep afloat and get safely to port. i have never outgrown the wild grandeur of the sea." when he was in command of the adriatic, which was built before the olympic, captain smith said he did not believe a disaster with loss of life could happen to the adriatic. "i cannot conceive of any vital disaster happening to the adriatic," he said. "modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that. there will be bigger boats. the depth of harbors seems to be the great drawback at present. i cannot say, of course, just what the limit will be, but the larger boat will surely come. but speed will not develop with size, so far as merchantmen are concerned. "the traveling public prefers the large comfortable boat of average speed, and anyway that is the boat that pays. high speed eats up money mile by mile, and extreme high speed is suicidal. there will be high speed boats for use as transports and a wise government will assist steamship companies in paying for them, as the english government is now doing in the cases of the lusitania and mauretania, twenty-five knot boats; but no steamship company will put them out merely as a commercial venture." captain smith believed the titanic to be unsinkable. brave to the last and though the ship turned out to be sinkable, the captain, by many acts of bravery in the face of death, proved that his courage was equal to any test. captain inman sealby, commander of the steamer republic, which was the first vessel to use the wireless telegraph to save her passengers in a collision, spoke highly of the commander of the wrecked titanic, calling him one of the ablest seamen in the world. "i am sure that captain smith did everything in his power to save his passengers. the disaster is one about which he could have had no warning. things may happen at sea that give no warning to ships' crews and commanders until the harm comes. i believe from what i read that the titanic hit an iceberg and glanced off, but that the berg struck her from the bottom and tore a great hole." many survivors have mentioned the captain's name and narrated some incident to bring out his courage and helpfulness in the emergency; but it was left to a fireman on board the titanic to tell the story of his death and to record his last message. this man had gone down with the white star giantess and was clinging to a piece of wreckage for about half an hour before he finally joined several members of the titanic's company on the bottom of a boat which was floating about among other wreckage near the titanic. harry senior, the fireman, with his eight or nine companions in distress, had just managed to get a firm hold in the upturned boat when they saw the titanic rearing preparatory to her final plunge. at that moment, according to the fireman's story, captain smith jumped into the sea from the promenade deck of the titanic with a little girl clutched in his arms. it took only a few strokes to bring him to the upturned boat, where a dozen hands were stretched out to take the little child from his arms and drag him to a point of safety. "captain smith was dragged onto the upturned boat," said the fireman. "he had a life-buoy and a life-preserver. he clung there for a moment and then he slid off again. for a second time he was dragged from the icy water. then he took off his life-preserver, tossed the life-buoy on the inky waters, and slipped into the water again with the words: "i will follow the ship." other faithful men nor was the captain the only faithful man on the ship. of the many stories told by survivors all seem to agree that both officers and crew behaved with the utmost gallantry and that they stuck by the ship nobly to the last. "immediately after the titanic struck the iceberg," said one of the survivors, "the officers were all over the ship reassuring the passengers and calming the more excitable. they said there was no cause for alarm. when everything was quieted they told us we might go back to bed, as the ship was safe. there was no confusion and many returned to their beds. "we did not know that the ship was in danger until a comparatively short time before she sank. then we were called on deck and the life-boats were filled and lowered. "the behavior of the ship's officers at this time was wonderful. there was no panic, no scramble for places in the boats." later there was confusion, and according to most of the passengers' narratives, there were more than fifty shots fired upon the deck by officers or others in the effort to maintain the discipline. fifth officer lowe a young english woman who requested that her name be omitted told a thrilling story of her experience in one of the collapsible boats which had been manned by eight of the crew from the titanic. the boat was in command of the fifth officer, h. lowe, whose actions she described as saving the lives of many people. before the life-boat was launched he passed along the port deck of the steamer, commanding the people not to jump in the boats, and otherwise restraining them from swamping the craft. when the collapsible was launched officer lowe succeeded in putting up a mast and a small sail. he collected the other boats together, in some cases the boats were short of adequate crews, and he directed an exchange by which each was adequately manned. he threw lines connecting the boats together, two by two, and thus all moved together. later on he went back to the wreck with the crew of one of the boats and succeeded in picking up some of those who had jumped overboard and were swimming about. on his way back to the carpathia he passed one of the collapsible boats which was on the point of sinking with thirty passengers aboard, most of them in scant night-clothing. they were rescued just in the nick of time. engineers died at posts there were brave men below deck, too. "a lot has been printed in the papers about the heroism of the officers," said one survivor, "but little has been said of the bravery of the men below decks. i was told that seventeen enginemen who were drowned side by side got down on their knees on the platform of the engine room and prayed until the water surged up to their necks. then they stood up, clasped hands so as to form a circle and died together. all of these men helped rake the fires out from ten of the forward boilers after the crash. this delayed the explosion and undoubtedly permitted the ship to remain afloat nearly an hour longer, and thus saved hundreds of lives." in the list of heroes who went down on the titanic the names of her engineers will have a high place, for not a single engineer was saved. many of them, no doubt, could not get to the deck, but they had equally as good a chance as the firemen, sixty-nine of whom were saved. the supposition of those who manned the titanic was that the engineers, working below, were the first to know the desperate character of the titanic's injury. the watch called the others, and from that time until the vessel was ready for her last plunge they were too hard at work to note more than that there was a constant rise of water in the hull, and that the pumps were useless. it was engineers who kept the lights going, saw to the proper closing of bulkhead doors and kept the stoke hole at work until the uselessness of the task was apparent. most of them probably died at their post of duty. the titanic carried a force of about sixty engineers, and in addition she had at least twenty-five "guarantee" engineers, representatives of harland and wolff, the builders, and those who had the contract for the engineering work. this supplementary force was under archie frost, the builders' chief engineer, and the regular force was under chief engineer william bell, of the white star line. on the line's ships there is the chief engineer, senior and junior second, senior and junior third, and senior and junior fourth engineers. the men are assigned each to his own task. there are hydraulic, electric, pump and steam packing men, and the "guarantee" engineers, representing the builders and the contractors. the duty of the "guarantee" engineers is to watch the working of the great engines, and to see that they are tuned up and in working order. they also watch the working of each part of the machinery which had nothing to do with the actual speed of the ship, principally the electric light dynamos and the refrigerating plant. noble-hearted band "but what of the bandsmen? who were they?" this question was asked again and again by all who read the story of the titanic's sinking and of how the brave musicians played to the last, keeping up the courage of those who were obliged to go down with the ship. many efforts were made to find out who the men were, but little was made public until the members of the orchestra of the steamship celtic reached shore for the first time after the disaster. one of their first queries was about the musicians of the titanic. their anxiety was greater than that of any new yorker, for the members of the band of the celtic knew intimately the musicians of the ill-fated liner. "not one of them saved!" cried john s. carr, 'cellist on the celtic. "it doesn't seem possible they have all gone. "we knew most of them well. they were englishmen, you know--every one of them, i think. nearly all the steamship companies hire their musicians abroad, and the men interchange between the ships frequently, so we get a chance to know one another pretty well. the musicians for the titanic were levied from a number of other white star ships, but most of the men who went down with the titanic had bunked with us at some time." "the thing i can't realize is that happy 'jock' hume is dead," exclaimed louis cross, a player of the bass viol. "he was the merriest, happiest young scotchman you ever saw. his family have been making musical instruments in scotland for generations. i heard him say once that they were minstrels in the old days. it is certainly hard to believe that he is not alive and having his fun somewhere in the world." at least he helped to make the deaths of many less cruel. chapter xxi. searching for the dead sending out the mackay-bennett and minia--bremen passengers see bodies--identifying bodies--confusion in names--recoveries a few days after the disaster the cable steamer mackay-bennett was sent out by the white star line to cruise in the vicinity of the disaster and search for missing bodies. two wireless messages addressed to j. bruce ismay, president of the international mercantile marine company, were received on april 21st at the offices of the white star line from the cable ship mackay-bennett, via cape race, one of which reported that the steamship rhein had sighted bodies near the scene of the titanic wreck. the first message, which was dated april 20th, read: "steamer rhein reports passing wreckage and bodies 42.1 north, 49.13 west, eight miles west of three big icebergs. now making for that position. expect to arrive 8 o'clock to-night. (signed) "mackay-bennett." the second message read: "received further information from bremen (presumably steamship bremen) and arrived on ground at 8 o'clock p. m. start on operation to-morrow. have been considerably delayed on passage by dense fog. (signed) "mackay-bennett." after receiving these messages mr. ismay issued the following statement: "the cable ship mackay-bennett has been chartered by the white star line and ordered to proceed to the scene of the disaster and do all she could to recover the bodies and glean all information possible. "every effort will be made to identify bodies recovered, and any news will be sent through immediately by wireless. in addition to any such message as these, the mackay-bennett will make a report of its activities each morning by wireless, and such reports will be made public at the offices of the white star line. "the cable ship has orders to remain on the scene of the wreck for at least a week, but should a large number of bodies be recovered before that time she will return to halifax with them. the search for bodies will not be abandoned until not a vestige of hope remains for any more recoveries. "the mackay-bennett will not make any soundings, as they would not serve any useful purpose, because the depth where the titanic sank is more than 2000 fathoms." on april 22d the first list of twenty-seven names of bodies recovered was made public. it contained that of frederick sutton, a well-known member of the union league of philadelphia. it did not contain the name of any other prominent man who perished, although it was thought that the name "george w. widen" might refer to george d. widener, son of p. a. b. widener, of philadelphia. the original passenger lists of the titanic did not mention "widen," which apparently established the identity of the body as that of mr. widener, who, together with his son, harry, was lost. the wireless message, after listing the names, concluded, "all preserved," presumably referring to the condition of the bodies. a number of the names in the list did not check up with the titanic's passenger list, which led to the belief that a number of the bodies recovered were members of the titanic's crew. minia sent to assist at noon, april 23d, there was posted on the bulletin in the white star office this message from the mackay-bennett dated sunday, april 21st: "latitude, 41.58; longitude, 49.21. heavy southwest swell has interfered with operations. seventy-seven bodies recovered. all not embalmed will be buried at sea at 8 o'clock to-night with divine service. can bring only embalmed bodies to port." to captain lardner, master of the mackay-bennett, p. a. s. franklin, vice-president of the white star line, sent an urgent message asking that the company be advised at once of all particulars concerning the bodies identified, and also given any information that might lead to the identification of others. he said it was very important that every effort be made to bring all of the bodies possible to port. mr. franklin then directed a. g. jones, the halifax agent of the white star line, to charter the minia and send her to the assistance of the mackay-bennett. mr. jones answered this telegram, and said that the minia was ready to proceed to sea, but that a southeast gale, which generally brings fog, might delay her departure. she left for halifax. names badly garbled on april 24th no wireless message was received from the mackay-bennett, but the white star line officials and telegraphers familiar with the wireless alphabet were busy trying to reconcile some of the names received with those of persons who went down on the titanic. that the body of william t. stead, the english journalist and author, had been recovered by the mackay-bennett, but through a freakish error in wireless transmission the name of another was reported instead, was one of the theories advanced by persons familiar with the morse code. bremen sighted more than a hundred bodies when the german liner bremen reached new york the account of its having sighted bodies of the titanic victims was obtained. from the bridge, officers of the ship saw more than a hun-dred bodies floating on the sea, a boat upside down, together with a number of small pieces of wood, steamer chairs and other wreckage. as the cable ship mackay-bennett was in sight, and having word that her mission was to look for bodies, no attempt was made by the bremen's crew to pick up the corpses. in the vicinity was seen an iceberg which answered the description of the one the titanic struck. smaller bergs were sighted the same day, but at some distance from where the titanic sank. the officers of the bremen did not care to talk about the tragic spectacle, but among the passengers several were found who gave accounts of the dismal panorama through which their ship steamed. mrs. johanna stunke, a first-cabin passenger, described the scene from the liner's rail. "it was between 4 and 5 o'clock, saturday, april 20th," she said, "when our ship sighted an iceberg off the bow to the starboard. as we drew nearer, and could make out small dots floating around in the sea, a feeling of awe and sadness crept over everyone on the ship. "we passed within a hundred feet of the southernmost drift of the wreckage, and looking down over the rail we distinctly saw a number of bodies so clearly that we could make out what they were wearing and whether they were men or women. "we saw one woman in her night dress, with a baby clasped closely to her breast. several women passengers screamed and left the rail in a fainting condition. there was another woman, fully dressed, with her arms tight around the body of a shaggy dog. "the bodies of three men in a group, all clinging to one steamship chair, floated near by, and just beyond them were a dozen bodies of men, all of them encased in life-preservers, clinging together as though in a last desperate struggle for life. we couldn't see, but imagined that under them was some bit of wreckage to which they all clung when the ship went down, and which didn't have buoyancy enough to support them. "those were the only bodies we passed near enough to distinguish, but we could see the white life-preservers of many more dotting the sea, all the way to the iceberg. the officers told us that was probably the berg hit by the titanic, and that the bodies and ice had drifted along together." mrs. stunke said a number of the passengers demanded that the bremen stop and pick up the bodies, but the officers assured them that they had just received a wireless message saying the cable ship mackay-bennett was only two hours away fron{sic} the spot, and was coming for that express purpose. other passengers corroborated mrs. stunke. the identifed{sic} dead. on april 25th the white star line officials issued a corrected list of the identified dead. while the corrected list cleared up two or more of the wireless confusions that caused so much speculation in the original list, there still remained a few names that so far as the record of the titanic showed were not on board that ship when she foundered. the new list, however, established the fact that the body of george d. widener, of philadelphia, was among those on the mackay-bennett, and two of the bodies were identified as those of men named butt. the mackay-bennett returns to port after completing her search the mackay-bennett steamed for halifax, reaching that port on tuesday, april 30th. with her flag at half mast, the death ship docked slowly. her crew manned the rails with bared heads, and on the aft deck were stacked the caskets with the dead. the vessel carried on board 190 bodies, and announcement was made that 113 other bodies had been buried at sea. everybody picked up had been in a life-belt and there were no bullet holes in any. among those brought to port were the bodies of two women. the minia gives up the search when at last the minia turned her bow toward shore only thirteen additional bodies had been recovered, making a total of 316 bodies found by the two ships. further search seemed futile. not only had the two vessels gone thoroughly over as wide a field as might likely prove fruitful, but, in addition, the time elapsed made it improbable that other bodies, if found, could be brought to shore. thus did the waves completely enforce the payment of their terrible toll. {illust. caption = isador straus the new york millionaire merchant and philanthropist who lost his life when the giant titanic foundered at sea after hitting an iceberg.} {illust. caption = iceberg photographed near scene of disaster this photograph shows what is quite...} list of identified dead following is a list of those whose identity was wholly or partially established: astor, john jacob. adonis, j. ale, william. artagaveytia, ramon. ashe, h. w. adahl, mauritz. anderson, thomas. adams, j. aspalande, carl. allen, h. anderson, w. y. allison, h. j. butt, w. (seaman). butt, w. (may be major butt). butterworth, abelj. bailey, g. f. barker, e. t. butler, reginald. birnbaum, jacob. bristow, r. c. buckley, katherine. chapman, john h. chapman, charles. connors, p. clong, milton. cox, denton. cavendish, tyrrell w. carbines, w. dutton, f. dashwood, william. dulles, w. c. douglas, w. d. drazenoui, yosip (referring probably to joseph draznovic). donati, italo (waiter). engineer, a. e. f. elliott, edward. farrell, james. faunthorpe, h. gill, j. h. greenberg, h. gilinski, leslie. graham, george. giles, ralph. givard, hans c. hansen, henry d. haytor, a. hays, chales m. hodges, h. p. hell, j. c. hewitt, t. harrison, h. h. hale, reg. hendekeric, toznai. hinton, w. harbeck, w. h. holverdon, a. o. (probably a. m. halverson of troy). hoffman, louis m. hinckley, g. hospital attendant, no name given. johansen, malcolm. johansen, eric. johansson, gustaf j. johansen, a. f. jones, c. c. kelly, james. laurence, a. louch, charles. long, milton c. lilly, a. linhart, wenzell. marriortt, w. h. (no such name appears on the list of passengers or crew). mangin, mary. mcnamee, mrs. n. (probably miss elleen mcnamee.) mack, mrs. monroe, jean. mccaffry, thomas. morgan, thomas. moen, segurd h. newell, t. h. nasser, nicolas. norman, robert d. petty, edwin h. partner, austin. penny, olsen f. poggi, ----. ragozzi, a. boothby. rice, j. r. robins, a. robinson, j. m. rosenshine, george. stone, j. steward, 76. stokes, philip j. stanton, w. straus, isidor. sage, william. shea, ----. sutton, frederick. sother, simon. schedid, nihil. swank, george. sebastiano, del carlo. stanbrocke, a. tomlin, etnest p. talbot, g. villner, hendrick k. vassilios, catalevas (thought to be a confusion of two surnames). vear, w. (may be w. j. ware or w. t. stead). widener, george w. williams, leslie. wirz, albert wiklund, jacob a. wailens, achille. white, f. f. woody, o. s. wersz, leopold. zacarian, mauri der. chapter xxii. criticism of ismay criminal and cowardly conduct charged--proper caution not exercised when presence of icebergs was known--should have stayed on board to help in work of rescue--selfish and unsympathetic actions on board the carpathia--ismay's defense--william e. carter's statement from the moment that bruce ismay's name was seen among those of the survivors of the titanic he became the object of acrid attacks in every quarter where the subject of the disaster was discussed. bitter criticism held that he should have been the last to leave the doomed vessel. his critics insisted that as managing director of the white star line his responsibility was greater even than captain smith's, and while granting that his survival might still be explained, they condemned his apparent lack of heroism. even in england his survival was held to be the one great blot on an otherwise noble display of masculine courage. a prominent official of the white star line shook his head meaningly when asked what he thought of ismay's escape with the women and children. the general feeling seemed to be that he should have stayed aboard the sinking vessel, looking out for those who were left, playing the man like major butt and many another and going down with the ship like captain smith. he was also charged with urging a speed record and with ignoring information received with regard to icebergs. feeling in england the belief in england was that the captain of the carpathia had acted under ismay's influence in refusing to permit any account of the disaster to be transmitted previous to the arrival of the vessel in new york. ismay's telegram making arrangements for the immediate deportation of the survivors among the titanic's crew was taken to be part of the same scheme to delay if not to prevent their stories of the wreck from being obtained in new york. another circumstance which created a damaging impression was ismay's failure to give the names of the surviving crew, whose distraught families were entitled to as much consideration as those whose relatives occupied the most expensive suites on the titanic. the anguish endured by the families of members of the crew was reported as indescribable, and southampton was literally turned into a city of weeping and tragic pathos. the wives of two members of the crew died of shock and suspense. cried for food mr. ismay's actions while on the carpathia were also criticised as selfish and unwarrantable. "for god's sake get me something to eat, i'm starved. i don't care what it costs or what it is. bring it to me." this was the first statement made by mr. ismay a few minutes after he was landed on the carpathia. it is vouched for by an officer of the carpathia who requested that his name be withheld. this officer gave one of the most complete stories of the events that took place on the carpathia from the time she received the titanic's appeal for assistance until she landed the survivors at the cunard line pier. "ismay reached the carpathia in about the seventh life-boat," said the officer. "i didn't know who he was, but afterward i heard the other members of the crew discussing his desire to get something to eat the minute he put his foot on deck. the steward who waited on him reported that ismay came dashing into the dining room and said. "'hurry, for god's sake, and get me something to eat, i'm starved. i don't care what it costs or what it is. bring it to me.'" "the steward brought ismay a load of stuff and when he had finished it he handed the man a two dollar bill. 'your money is no good on this ship,' the steward told him. "'take it,' insisted ismay. 'i am well able to afford it. i will see to it that the boys of the carpathia are well rewarded for this night's work.' "this promise started the steward making inquiries as to the identity of the man he had waited on. then we learned that he was ismay. i did not see ismay after the first few hours. he must have kept to his cabin." reply to charges mr. ismay's plans had been to return immediately to england, and he had wired that the steamer cedric be held for himself and officers and members of the crew; but public sentiment and subpoenas of the senate's investigating committee prevented. in the face of the criticism aimed against him mr. ismay issued a long statement in which he not only disclaimed responsibility for the titanic's fatal collision, but also sought to clear himself of blame for everything that happened after the big ship was wrecked. he laid the responsibility for the tragedy on captain smith. he expressed astonishment that his own conduct in the disaster had been made the subject of inquiry. he denied that he gave any order to captain smith. his position aboard was that of any other first cabin passenger, he insisted, and he was never consulted by the captain. he denied telling anyone that he wished the ship to make a speed record. he called attention to the routine clause in the instructions to white star captains ordering them to think of safety at all times. he did not dine with the captain, he said, and when the ship struck the berg, he was not sitting with the captain in the saloon. the managing director added that he was in his stateroom when the collision occurred. he told of helping to send women and children away in life-boats on the starboard side, and said there was no woman in sight on deck when he and william e. carter, of bryn mawr, pa., entered the collapsible boat--the last small craft left on that side of the vessel. he asserted that he pulled an oar and denied that in sending the three messages from the carpathia, urging the white star officials to hold the cedric for the survivors of the titanic's officers and crew, he had any intention to block investigation of the tragedy. ismay asserted that he did not know there was to be an investigation until the cunarder docked. mr. william e. carter, of bryn mawr, who, with his family, was saved, confirmed mr. ismay's assertions. "mr. ismay's statement is absolutely correct," said mr. carter. "there were no women on the deck when that boat was launched. we were the very last to leave the deck, and we entered the life-boat because there were no women to enter it. "the deck was deserted when the boat was launched, and mr. ismay and myself decided that we might as well enter the boat and pull away from the wreck. if he wants me, i assume that he will write to me. "i can say nothing, however, that he has not already said, as our narratives are identical; the circumstances under which we were rescued from the titanic were similar. we left the boat together and were picked up together, and, further than that, we were the very last to leave the deck. "i am ready to go to washington to testify to the truth of mr. ismay's statement, and also to give my own account at any time i may be called upon. if mr. ismay writes to me, asking that i give a detailed account of our rescue i will do so." chapter xxiii. the financial loss titanic not fully insured--valuable cargo and mail--no chance for salvage--life insurance loss--loss to the carpathia so great was the interest in the tragedy and so profound the grief at the tremendous loss of life that for a time the financial loss was not considered. it was, however, the biggest ever suffered by marine insurance brokers. the value of the policy covering the vessel against all ordinary risks was $5,000,000, but the whole of this amount was not insured, because british and continental markets were not big enough to swallow it. the actual amount of insurance was $3,700,000, of which the owners themselves held $750,000. as to the cargo, it was insured by the shippers. the company has nothing to do with the insurance of the cargo, which, according to the company's manifest, was conservatively estimated at about $420,000. cargo, however, was a secondary matter, so far as the titanic was concerned. the ship was built for high-priced passengers, and what little cargo she carried was also of the kind that demanded quick transportation. the titanic's freight was for the most part what is known as high-class package freight, consisting of such articles as fine laces, ostrich feathers, wines, liquors and fancy food commodities. lost mail may cost millions prior to the sailing of the vessel the postal authorities of southampton cabled the new york authorities that 3435 bags of mail matter were on board. "in a load of 3500 bags," said postmaster morgan, of new york, "it is a safe estimate to say that 200 contained registered mail. the size of registered mail packages varies greatly, but 1000 packages for each mail bag should be a conservative guess. that would mean that 200,000 registered packages and letters went down with the titanic. "this does not mean, however, that great britain will be held financially responsible for all these losses. there were probably thousands of registered packages from the continent, and in such cases the countries of origin will have to reimburse the senders. moreover, in the case of money being sent in great quantities, it is usual to insure the registry over and above the limit of responsibility set by the country of origin. "probably if there were any shipping of securities mounting up to thousands of dollars, it will be the insurance companies which will bear the loss, and not the european post-offices at all." in the case of money orders, the postmaster explained, there would be no loss, except of time, as duplicates promptly would be shipped without further expense. the postmaster did not know the exact sum which the various european countries set as the limit of their guarantee in registered mail. in america it is $50. underwriters will probably have to meet heavy claims of passengers for luggage, including jewelry. pearls of one american woman insured in london were valued at $240,000. no chance for salvage the titanic and her valuable cargo can never be recovered, said the white star line officials. "sinking in mid-ocean, at the depth which prevails where the accident occurred," said captain james parton, manager of the company, "absolutely precludes any hopes of salvage." life insurance loss in the life insurance offices there was much figuring over the lists of those thought to be lost aboard the titanic. nothing but rough estimates of the company's losses through the wreck were given out. loss to the carpathia the loss to the carpathia, too, was considerable. it is, of course, the habit of all good steamship lines to go out of their way and cheerfully submit to financial loss when it comes to succoring the distressed or the imperiled at sea. therefore, the cunard line in extending the courtesies of the sea to the survivors of the titanic asked for nothing more than the mere acknowledgment of the little act of kindness. the return of the carpathia cost the line close to $10,000. she was delayed on her way to the mediterranean at least ten days and was obliged to coal and provision again, as the extra 800 odd passengers she was carrying reduced her large allowance for her long voyage to the mediterranean and the adriatic very much. chapter xxiv. opinions of experts captain e. k. roden, lewis nixon, general greely and robert h. kirk point out lessons taught by titanic disaster and needed changes in construction the tremendous loss of life necessarily aroused a discussion as to the cause of the disaster, and the prevailing opinion seemed to be that the present tendency in shipbuilding was to sacrifice safety to luxury. captain roden, a well-known swedish navigator, had written an article maintaining this theory in the navy, a monthly service magazine, in november, 1910. with seeming prophetic insight he had mentioned the titanic by name and portrayed some of the dangers to which shipbuilding for luxury is leading. he pointed out that the new steamships, the olympic and titanic, would be the finest vessels afloat, no expense being spared to attain every conceivable comfort for which men or women of means could possibly ask--staterooms with private shower-baths, a swimming pool large enough for diving, a ballroom covering an entire upper deck, a gymnasium, elaborate cafes, a sun deck representing a flower garden, and other luxuries. after forcibly pointing out the provisions that should be made for the protection of life, captain roden wrote in conclusion: "if the men controlling passenger ships, from the ocean liner down to the excursion barge, were equally disposed to equip their vessels with the best safety appliances as they are to devise and adopt implements of comfort and luxury, the advantage to themselves as well as to their patrons would be plainly apparent." view of lewis nixon lewis nixon, the eminent naval architect and designer of the battleship oregon, contributed a very interesting comment. he said in part: "here was a vessel presumed, and i think rightly so, to be the perfection of the naval architect's art, yet sunk in a few hours by an accident common to north atlantic navigation. the unsinkable ship "an unsinkable ship is possible, but it would be of little use except for flotation. it may be said that vessels cannot be built to withstand such an accident. "we might very greatly subdivide the forward compartments, where much space is lost at best, making the forward end, while amply strong for navigation purposes, of such construction that it would collapse and take up some of the energy of impact; then tie this to very much stronger sections farther aft. many such plans will be proposed by those who do not realize the momentum of a great vessel which will snap great cables like ribbons, when the motion of the vessel is not perceptible to the eye. "the proper plan is to avoid the accident, and if an accident is unavoidable to minimize the loss of life and property." view of robert h. kirk the titanic disaster was discussed by robert h. kirk, who installed the compartment doors in the ships of the united states navy. mr. kirk's opinion follows: "the titanic's disaster will cause endless speculation as to how similar disasters may be avoided in the future. bulkhead doors probably open "the titanic had bulkheads, plenty of them, for the rules of the british board of trade and of lloyds are very specific and require enough compartments to insure floating of the ship though several may be flooded. she also had doors in the bulkheads, and probably plenty of them, for she was enormous and needed easy access from one compartment to another. it will probably never be known how _few_ of these doors were closed when she struck the iceberg, but the probability is that many were open, for in the confusion attending such a crash the crews have a multitude of duties to perform, and closing a door with water rushing through it is more of a task than human muscle and bravery can accomplish. "a lloyds surveyor in testing one of these hand-operated doors started two men on the main deck to close it. they worked four hours before they had carried out his order. if all the doors on the ship had worked as badly as this one, what would have happened in event of accident?" mania for speed general adolphus w. greely, u. s. a., noted american traveler and arctic explorer, vehemently denounced the sinking of the titanic and the loss of over 1600 souls as a terrible sacrifice to the american mania for speed. he gave his opinion that the titanic came to grief through an attempt on the part of the steamship management to establish a new record by the vessel on her maiden voyage. the titanic, general greely declared, had absolutely no business above cape race and north of sable island on the trip on which she went to her doom. choosing the northern route brought about the dire disaster, in his mind, and it was the saving of three hours for the sake of a new record that ended in the collision with the tragic victory for the ghostlike monster out of the far north. it was the opinion of general greely, capable of judging after his many trips in quest of the pole, that neither captain smith nor any of his officers saw the giant iceberg which encompassed their ruin until they were right upon it. then, the ship was plunging ahead at such frightful velocity that the titanic was too close to avert striking the barrier lined up across its path. chapter xxv. other great marine disasters deadly danger of icebergs--dozens of ships perish in collision--other disasters the danger of collision with icebergs has always been one of the most deadly that confront the mariner. indeed, so well recognized is this peril of the newfoundland banks, where the labrador current in the early spring and summer months floats southward its ghostly argosy of icy pinnacles detached from the polar ice caps, that the government hydrographic offices and the maritime exchanges spare no pains to collate and disseminate the latest bulletins on the subject. the arizona a most remarkable case of an iceberg collision is that of the guion liner, arizona, in 1879. she was then the greyhound of the atlantic, and the largest ship afloat--5750 tons except the great eastern. leaving new york in november for liverpool, with 509 souls aboard, she was coursing across the banks, with fair weather but dark, when, near midnight, about 250 miles east of st. john's, she rammed a monster ice island at full speed eighteen knots. terrific was the impact. the welcome word was passed along that the ship, though sorely stricken, would still float until she could make harbor. the vast white terror had lain across her course, {illust. caption = the shape of an iceberg showing the bulk and formation under water and the consequent danger to vessels even without actual contact with the visible part of the iceberg.} stretching so far each way that, when described, it was too late to alter the helm. its giant shape filled the foreground, towering high above the masts, grim and gaunt and ghastly, immovable as the adamantine buttresses of a frowning seaboard, while the liner lurched and staggered like a wounded thing in agony as her engines slowly drew her back from the rampart against which she had flung herself. she was headed for st. john's at slow speed, so as not to strain the bulkhead too much, and arrived there thirty-six hours later. that little port--the crippled ship's hospital--has seen many a strange sight come in from the sea, but never a more astounding spectacle than that which the arizona presented the sunday forenoon she entered there. "begob, captain!" said the pilot, as he swung himself over the rail. "i've heard of carrying coals to newcastle, but this is the first time i've seen a steamer bringing a load of ice into st. john's." they are a grim race, these sailors, and, the danger over, the captain's reply was: "we were lucky, my man, that we didn't all go to the bottom in an ice box." dozens of ships perish but to the one wounded ship that survives collision with a berg, a dozen perish. presumably, when the shock comes, it loosens their bulkheads and they fill and founder, or the crash may injure the boilers or engines, which explode and tear out the sides, and the ship goes down like a plummet. as long ago as 1841, the steamer president, with 120 people aboard, crossing from new york to liverpool in march, vanished from human ken. in 1854, in the same month, the city of glasgow left liverpool for philadelphia with 480 souls, and was never again heard of. in february, 1856, the pacific, from liverpool for new york, carrying 185 persons, passed away down to a sunless sea. in may, 1870, the city of boston, from that port for liverpool, mustering 191 souls, met a similar fate. it has always been thought that these ships were sunk by collision with icebergs or floes. as shipping traffic has expanded, the losses have been more frequent. in february, 1892, the naronic, from liverpool for new york; in the same month in 1896, the state of georgia, from aberdeen for boston; in february, 1899, the alleghany, from new york for dover; and once more in february, 1902, the huronian, from liverpool for st. john's--all disappeared without leaving a trace. between february and may, the grand banks are most infested with ice, and collision therewith is' the most likely explanation of the loss of these steamers, all well manned and in splendid trim, and meeting only the storms which scores of other ships have braved without a scathe. toll of the sea among the important marine disasters recorded since 1866 are the following: 1866, jan. 11.--steamer london, on her way to melbourne, foundered in the bay of biscay; 220 lives lost. 1866, oct. 3.--steamer evening star, from new york to new orleans, foundered; about 250 lives lost. 1867, oct. 29.--royal mail steamers rhone and wye and about fifty other vessels driven ashore and wrecked at st thomas, west indies, by a hurricane; about 1,000 lives lost. 1873, jan. 22.--british steamer northfleet sunk in collision off dungeness; 300 lives lost 1873, nov. 23.--white star liner atlantic wrecked off nova scotia; 547 lives lost. 1873, nov. 23.--french line ville du havre, from new york to havre, in collision with ship locharn and sunk in sixteen minutes; 110 lives lost. 1874, dec. 24.--emigrant vessel cospatrick took fire and sank off auckland; 476 lives lost. 1875, may 7.--hamburg mail steamer schiller wrecked in fog on scilly islands; 200 lives lost. 1875, nov. 4.--american steamer pacific in collision thirty miles southwest of cape flattery; 236 lives lost. 1878, march 24.--british training ship eurydice, a frigate, foundered near the isle of wight; 300 lives lost. 1878, sept. 3.--british iron steamer princess alice sunk in the thames river; 700 lives lost. 1878, dec. 18.--french steamer byzantin sunk in collision in the dardanelles with the british steamer rinaldo; 210 lives lost. 1879, dec. 2.--steamer borussia sank off the coast of spain; 174 lives lost. 1880, jan. 31.--british trading ship atlanta left bermuda with 290 men and was never heard from. 1881, aug. 30.--steamer teuton wrecked off the cape of good hope; 200 lives lost. 1883, july 3.--steamer daphne turned turtle in the clyde; 124 lives lost. 1884, jan. 18.--american steamer city of columbus wrecked off gay head light, massachusetts; 99 lived lost. 1884, july 23.--spanish steamer gijon and british steamer lux in collision off finisterre; 150 lives lost. 1887, jan. 29.--steamer kapunda in collision with bark ada melore off coast of brazil; 300 lives lost. 1887, nov. 15.--british steamer wah young caught fire between canton and hong kong; 400 lives lost. 1888, sept. 13.--italian steamship sud america and steamer la france in collision near the canary islands; 89 lives lost. 1889, march 16.--united states warships trenton, vandalia and nipsic and german ships adler and eber wrecked on samoan islands; 147 lives lost. 1890, jan. 2.--steamer persia wrecked on corsica; 130 lives lost. 1890, feb. 17.--british steamer duburg wrecked in the china sea; 400 lives lost. 1890, march 1.--british steamship quetta foundered in torres straits; 124 lives lost. 1890, dec. 27.--british steamer shanghai burned in china seas; 101 lives lost. 1891, march 17.--anchor liner utopia in collision with british steamer anson off gibraltar and sunk; 574 lives lost. 1892, jan. 13.--steamer namehow wrecked in china sea; 414 lives lost. 1892, oct. 28.--anchor liner romania, wrecked off portugal; 113 lives lost. 1893, feb. 8.--anchor liner trinairia, wrecked off spain; 115 lives lost. 1894, june 25.--steamer norge, wrecked on rockall reef, in the north atlantic; nearly 600 lives lost. 1895, jan. 30.--german steamer elbe sunk in collision with british steamer crathie in north sea; 335 lives lost. 1898, july 4.--french line steamer la bourgogne in collision with british sailing vessel cromartyshire; 571 lives lost. 1898, nov. 27.--american steamer portland, wrecked off cape cod, mass.; 157 lives lost. 1901, april 1.--turkish transport aslam wrecked in the red sea; over 180 lives lost. 1902, july 21.--steamer primus sunk in collision with the steamer hansa on the lower elbe; 112 lives lost. 1903, june 7.--french steamer libau sunk in collision with steamer insulerre near marseilles; 150 lives lost. 1904, june 15. general slocum, excursion steamboat, took fire going through hell gate, east river; more than 1000 lives lost. 1906, jan. 21.--brazilian battleship aquidaban sunk near rio janeiro by an explosion of the powder magazines; 212 lives lost. 1906, jan. 22.--american steamer valencia lost off cloose, pacific coast; 140 lives lost. 1906, aug. 4.--italian emigrant ship sirio struck a rock off cape palos; 350 lives lost. 1906, oct. 21.--russian steamer variag, on leaving vladivostock, struck by a torpedo and sunk; 140 lives lost. 1907, feb. 12.--american steamer larchmond sunk in collision off rhode island coast; 131 lives lost. 1907, july 20.--american steamers columbia and san pedro collided on the californian coast; 100 lives lost. 1907, nov. 26.--turkish steamer kaptain foundered in the north sea; 110 lives lost. 1908, march 23.--japanese steamer mutsu maru sunk in collision near hakodate; 300 lives lost. 1908, april 30.--japanese training cruiser matsu shima sunk off the pescadores owing to an explosion; 200 lives lost. 1909, jan. 24.--collision between the italian steamer florida and the white star liner republic, about 170 miles east of new york during a fog; a large number of lives were saved by the arrival of the steamer baltic, which received the "c. q. d.," or distress signal sent up by wireless by the republic january 22. the republic sank while being towed; 6 lives lost. 1910, feb. 9.--french line steamer general chanzy off minorca; 200 lives lost. 1911, sept. 25.--french battleship liberte sunk by explosion in toulon harbor; 223 lives lost. chapter xxvi. development of shipbuilding evolution of water travel--increases in size of vessels--is there any limit?--achievements in speed--titanic not the last word. the origin of travel on water dates back to a very early period in human history, men beginning with the log, the inflated skin, the dug-out canoe, and upwards through various methods of flotation; while the paddle, the oar, and finally the sail served as means of propulsion. this was for inland water travel, and many centuries passed before the navigation of the sea was dreamed of by adventurous mariners. the paintings and sculptures of early egypt show us boats built of sawn planks, regularly constructed and moved both by oars and sails. at a later period we read of the phoenicians, the most daring and enterprising of ancient navigators, who braved the dangers of the open sea, and are said by herodotus to have circumnavigated africa as early as 604 b. c. starting from the red sea, they followed the east coast, rounded the cape, and sailed north along the west coast to the mediterranean, reaching egypt again in the third year of this enterprise. the carthaginians and romans come next in the history of shipbuilding, confining themselves chiefly to the mediterranean, and using oars as the principal means of propulsion. their galleys ranged from one to five banks of oars. the roman vessels in the first punic war were over 100 feet long and had 300 rowers, while they carried 120 soldiers. they did not use sails until about the beginning of the fourteenth century b. c. portugal was the first nation to engage in voyages of discovery, using vessels of small size in these adventurous journeys. spain, which soon became her rival in this field, built larger ships and long held the lead. yet the ships with which columbus made the discovery of america were of a size and character in which few sailors of the present day would care to venture far from land. england was later in coming into the field of adventurous navigation, being surpassed not only by the portuguese and spanish, but by the dutch, in ventures to far lands. europe long held the precedence in shipbuilding and enterprise in navigation, but the shores of america had not long been settled before the venturous colonists had ships upon the seas. the first of these was built at the mouth of the kennebec river in maine. this was a staunch little two-masted vessel, which was named the virginia, supposed to have been about sixty feet long and seventeen feet in beam. next in time came the restless, built in 1614 or 1615 at new york, by adrian blok, a dutch captain whose ships had been burned while lying at manhattan island. this vessel, thirty-eight feet long and of eleven feet beam, was employed for several years in exploring the atlantic coast. with the advent of the nineteenth century a new ideal in naval architecture arose, that of the ship moved by steam-power instead of wind-power, and fitted to combat with the seas alike in storm and calm, with little heed as to whether the wind was fair or foul. the steamship appeared, and grew in size and power until such giants of the wave as the titanic and olympic were set afloat. to the development of this modern class of ships our attention must now be turned. as the reckless cowboy of the west is fast becoming a thing of the past, so is the daring seaman of fame and story. in his place is coming a class of men miscalled sailors, who never reefed a sail or coiled a cable, who do not know how to launch a life-boat or pull an oar, and in whose career we meet the ridiculous episode of the life-boats of the titanic, where women were obliged to take the oars from their hands and row the boats. thus has the old-time hero of the waves been transformed into one fitted to serve as a clown of the vaudeville stage. the advent of steam navigation came early in the nineteenth century, though interesting steps in this direction were taken earlier. no sooner was the steam-engine developed than men began to speculate on it as a moving power on sea and land. early among these were several americans, oliver evans, one of the first to project steam railway travel, and james rumsey and john fitch, steamboat inventors of early date. there were several experimenters in europe also, but the first to produce a practical steamboat was robert fulton, a native of pennsylvania, whose successful boat; the clermont, made its maiden trip up the hudson in 1807. a crude affair was the clermont, with a top speed of about seven miles an hour; but it was the dwarf from which the giant steamers of to-day have grown. boats of this type quickly made their way over the american rivers and before 1820 regular lines of steamboats were running between england and ireland. in 1817 james watt, the inventor of the practical steam-engine, crossed in a steamer from england to belgium. but these short voyages were far surpassed by an american enterprise, that of the first ocean steamship, the savannah, which crossed the atlantic from savannah to liverpool in 1819. twelve years passed before this enterprise was repeated, the next steam voyage being in 1831, when the royal william crossed from quebec to england. she used coal for fuel, having utilized her entire hold to store enough for the voyage. the savannah had burned pitch-pine under her engines, for in america wood was long used as fuel for steam-making purposes. as regards this matter, the problem of fuel was of leading importance, and it was seriously questioned if a ship could be built to cross the atlantic depending solely upon steam power. steam-engines in those days were not very economical, needing four or five times as much fuel for the same power as the engines of recent date. it was not until 1838 that the problem was solved. on april 23d of that year a most significant event took place. two steamships dropped anchor in the harbor of new york, the sirius and the great western. both of these had made the entire voyage under steam, the sirius, in eighteen and a half and the great western in fourteen and a half days, measuring from queenstown. the sirius had taken on board 450 tons of coal, but all this was burned by the time sandy hook was reached, and she had to burn her spare spars and forty-three barrels of rosin to make her way up the bay. the great western, on the contrary, had coal to spare. two innovations in shipbuilding were soon introduced. these were the building of iron instead of wooden ships and the replacing of the paddle wheel by the screw propeller. the screw-propeller was first successfully introduced by the famous swede, john ericsson, in 1835. his propeller was tried in a small vessel, forty-five feet long and eight wide, which was driven at the rate of ten miles an hour, and towed a large packet ship at fair speed. ericsson, not being appreciated in england, came to america to experiment. other inventors were also at work in the same line. their experiments attracted the attention of isambard brunel, one of the greatest engineers of the period, who was then engaged in building a large paddle-wheel steamer, the great britain. appreciating the new idea, he had the engines of the new ship changed and a screw propeller introduced. this ship, a great one for the time, 322 feet long and of 3443 tons, made her first voyage from liverpool to new york in 1845, her average speed being 12 1/4 knots an hour, the length of the voyage 14 days and 21 hours. by the date named the crossing of the atlantic by steamships had become a common event. in 1840 the british and royal mail steam packet company was organized, its chief promoter being samuel cunard, of halifax, nova scotia, whose name has long been attached to this famous line. the first fleet of the cunard line comprised four vessels, the britannia, acadia, caledonia and columbia. the unicorn, sent out by this company as a pioneer, entered boston harbor on june 2, 1840, being the first steamship from europe to reach that port. regular trips began with the britannia, which left liverpool on july 4, 1840. for a number of years later this line enjoyed a practical monopoly of the steam carrying trade between england and the united states. then other companies came into the field, chief among them being the collins line, started in 1849, and of short duration, and the inman line, instituted in 1850. we should say something here of the comforts and conveniences provided for the passengers on these early lines. they differed strikingly from those on the leviathans of recent travel and were little, if any, superior to those on the packet ships, the active rivals at that date of the steamers. then there were none of the comfortable smoking rooms, well-filled libraries, drawing rooms, electric lights, and other modern improvements. the saloons and staterooms were in the extreme after part of the vessel, but the stateroom of that day was little more than a closet, with two berths, one above the other, and very little standing room between these and the wall. by paying nearly double fare a passenger might secure a room for himself, but the room given him did not compare well even with that of small and unpretentious modern steamers. other ocean steamship companies gradually arose, some of which are still in existence. but no especial change in ship-building was introduced until 1870, when the oceanic company, now known as the white star line, built the britannic and germanic. these were the largest of its early ships. they were 468 feet long and 35 feet wide, constituting a new type of extreme length as compared with their width. in the first white star ship, the oceanic, the improvements above mentioned were introduced, the saloons and staterooms being brought as near as possible to the center of the ship. all the principal lines built since that date have followed this example, thus adding much to the comfort of the first-class passengers. speed and economy in power also became features of importance, the tubular boiler and the compound engine being introduced. these have developed into the cylindrical, multitubular boiler and the triple expansion engine, in which a greater percentage of the power of the steam is utilized and four or five times the work obtained from coal over that of the old system. the side-wheel was continued in use in the older ships until this period, but after 1870 it disappeared. it has been said that the life of iron ships, barring disasters at sea, is unlimited, that they cannot wear out. this statement has not been tested, but the fact remains that the older passenger ships have gone out of service and that steel has now taken the place of iron, as lighter and more durable. something should also be said here of the steam turbine engine, recently introduced in some of the greatest liners, and of proven value in several particulars, an important one of these being the doing away with the vibration, an inseparable accompaniment of the old style engines. the olympic and titanic engines were a combination of the turbine and reciprocating types. in regard to the driving power, one of the recent introductions is that of the multiple propeller. the twin screw was first applied in the city of new york, of the inman line, and enabled her to make in 1890 an average speed of a little over six days from new york to queenstown. the best record up to october, 1891, was that of the teutonic, of five days, sixteen hours, and thirty minutes. triple-screw propellers have since then been introduced in some of the greater ships, and the record speed has been cut down to the four days and ten hours of the lusitania in 1908 and the four days, six hours and forty-one minutes of the mauretania in 1910. the titanic was not built especially for speed, but in every other way she was the master product of the shipbuilders' art. progress through the centuries has been steady, and perhaps the twentieth century will prepare a vessel that will be unsinkable as well as magnificent. until the fatal accident the titanic and olympic were considered the last words on ship-building; but much may still remain to be spoken. chapter xxvii. safety and life-saving devices wireless telegraphy--water-tight bulkheads--submarine signals--life-boats and rafts--nixon's pontoon--life-preservers and buoys--rockets the fact that there are any survivors of the titanic left to tell the story of the terrible catastrophe is only another of the hundreds of instances on record of the value of wireless telegraphy in saving life on shipboard. without marconi's invention it is altogether probable that the world would never have known of the nature of the titanic's fate, for it is only barely within the realm of possibility that any of the titanic's passengers' poorly clad, without proper provisions of food and water, and exposed in the open boats to the frigid weather, would have survived long enough to have been picked up by a transatlantic liner in ignorance of the accident to the titanic. speaking (since the titanic disaster) of the part which wireless telegraphy has played in the salvation of distressed ships, guglielmo marconi, the inventor of this wonderful science, has said: "fifteen years ago the curvature of the earth was looked upon as the one great obstacle to wireless telegraphy. by various experiments in the isle of wight and at st. john's i finally succeeded in sending the letter s 2000 miles. "we have since found that the fog and the dull skies in the vicinity of england are exceptionally favorable for wireless telegraphy." then the inventor told of wireless messages being transmitted 2500 miles across the abyssinian desert, and of preparation for similar achievements. "the one necessary requirement for continued success is that governments keep from being enveloped in political red tape," said he. "the fact that a message can be flashed across the wide expanse of ocean in ten minutes has exceeded my fondest expectations. some idea of the progress made may be had by citing the fact that in eleven years the range of wireless telegraphy has increased from 200 to 3000 miles. "not once has wireless telegraphy failed in calling and securing help on the high seas. a recognition of this is shown in the attitude of the united states government in compelling all passenger-carrying vessels entering our ports to be equipped with wireless apparatus." of the titanic tragedy, marconi said: "i know you will all understand when i say that i entertain a deep feeling of gratitude because of the fact that wireless telegraphy has again contributed to the saving of life." water-tight bulkheads one of the most essential factors in making ships safe is the construction of proper bulkheads to divide a ship into water-tight compartments in case of injury to her hull. of the modern means of forming such compartments, and of the complete and automatic devices for operating the watertight doors which connect them, a full explanation has already been given in the description of the titanic's physical features, to which the reader is referred. a wise precaution usually taken in the case of twin and triple screw ships is to arrange the bulkheads so that each engine is in a separate compartment, as is also each boiler or bank of boilers and each coal bunker. submarine signals then there are submarine signals to tell of near-by vessels or shores. this signal arrangement includes a small tank on either side of the vessel, just below the water line. within each is a microphone with wires leading to the bridge. if the vessel is near any other or approaching shore, the sounds; conveyed through the water from the distant object are heard through the receiver of the microphone. these arrangements are called the ship's ears, and whether the sounds come from one side of the vessel or the other, the officers can tell the location of the shore or ship near by. if both ears record, the object is ahead. lifeboats and rafts the construction of life-boats adapts them for very rough weather. the chief essentials, of course, are ease in launching, strength in withstanding rough water and bumping when beached; also strength to withstand striking against wreckage or a ship's side; carrying capacity and lightness. those carried on board ship are lighter than those used in life-saving service on shore. safety is provided by air-tight tanks which insure buoyancy in case the boat is filled with water. they have also self-righting power in case of being overturned; likewise self-emptying power. life-boats are usually of the whaleboat type, with copper air-tight tanks along the side beneath the thwarts, and in the ends. life-boats range from twenty-four to thirty feet in length and carry from thirty to sixty persons. the rafts carry from twenty to forty persons. the old-fashioned round bar davits can be got for $100 to $150 a set. the new style davits, quick launchers in type, come as low as $400 a set. according to some naval constructors, an ocean steamship can carry in davits enough boats to take care of all the passengers and crew, it being simply a question as to whether the steamship owners are willing to take up that much deck room which otherwise would be used for lounging chairs or for a promenade. nowadays all life-boats are equipped with air tanks to prevent sinking, with the result that metal boats are as unsinkable as wooden ones. the metal boats are considered in the united states navy as superior to wooden ones, for several reasons: they do not break or collapse; they do not, in consequence of long storage on deck, open at the seams and thereby spring a leak; and they are not eaten by bugs, as is the case with wooden boats. comparatively few of the transatlantic steamships have adopted metal life-boats. most of the boats are of wood, according to the official united states government record of inspection. the records show that a considerable proportion of the entire number of so-called "life-boats" carried by atlantic ocean liners are not actually life-boats at all, but simply open boats, without air tanks or other special equipment or construction. {illust. caption = chambers collapsible life raft} life-rafts are of several kinds. they are commonly used on large passenger steamers where it is difficult to carry sufficient life-boats. in most cases they consist of two or more hollow metal or inflated rubber floats which support a wooden deck. the small rafts are supplied with life-lines and oars, and the larger ones with life-lines only, or with life-lines and sails. the collapsible feature of the chambers raft consists of canvas-covered steel frames extending up twenty-five inches from the sides to prevent passengers from being pitched off. when the rafts are not in use these side frames are folded down on the raft. the collapsible rafts are favored by the ship-owners because such boats take up less room; they do not have to be carried in the davits, and they can be stowed to any number required. some of the german lines stack their collapsible rafts one above another on deck. nixon's pontoon lewis nixon, the well-known ship designer, suggests the construction of a pontoon to be carried on the after end of the vessel and to be made of sectional air-tight compartments. one compartment would accommodate the wireless outfit. another compartment would hold drinking water, and still another would be filled with food. the pontoon would follow the line of the ship and seem to be a part of it. the means for releasing it before the sinking of the vessel present no mechanical problem. it would be too large and too buoyant to be sucked down with the wreck. the pontoon would accommodate, not comfortably but safely, all those who failed to find room in the life-boats. it is mr. nixon's plan to instal a gas engine in one of the compartments. with this engine the wireless instrument would remain in commission and direct the rescuers after the ship itself had gone down. life preservers and buoys life-preservers are chiefly of the belt or jacket type, made to fit about the body and rendered buoyant by slabs of cork sewed into the garment, or by rubber-lined air-bags. the use of cork is usually considered preferable, as the inflated articles are liable to injury, and jackets are preferable to belts as they can be put on more quickly. life-buoys are of several types, but those most common are of the ring type, varying in size from the small one designed to be thrown by hand to the large hollow metal buoy capable of supporting several people. the latter are usually carried by sea-going vessels and are fitted with lamps which are automatically lighted when the buoy is dropped into the water. rockets american ocean-going steamers are required to have some approved means of firing lines to the shore. cunningham rockets and the hunt gun are largely used. the inaccuracy of the rocket is of less importance when fired from a ship than when fired from shore. chapter xxviii. time for reflection and reforms speed and luxury overemphasized--space needed for life-boats devoted to swimming pools and squash-courts--mania for speed records compels use of dangerous routes and prevents proper caution in foggy weather--life more valuable than luxury--safety more important than speed--an aroused public opinion necessary--international conference recommended--adequate life-saving equipment should be compulsory--speed regulations in bad weather--cooperation in arranging schedules to keep vessels within reach of each other--legal regulations it is a long time since any modern vessel of importance has gone down under nature's attack, and in general the floating city of steel laughs at the wind and waves. she is not, however, proof against disaster. the danger lies in her own power--in the tens of thousands of horse power with which she may be driven into another ship or into an iceberg standing cold and unyielding as a wall of granite. in view of this fact it is of the utmost importance that present-day vessels should be thoroughly provided with the most efficient life-saving devices. these would seem more important than fireplaces, squash-courts and many other luxuries with which the titanic was provided. the comparatively few survivors of the ill-fated titanic were saved by the life-boats. the hundreds of others who went down with the vessel perished because there were no life-boats to carry them until rescue came. survivors urge reform the survivors urge the need of reform. in a resolution drawn up after the disaster they said: "we feel it our duty to call the attention of the public to what we consider the inadequate supply of life-saving appliances provided for the modern passenger steamships and recommend that immediate steps be taken to compel passenger steamers to carry sufficient boats to accommodate the maximum number of people carried on board. the following facts were observed and should be considered in this connection: the insufficiency of life-boats, rafts, etc.; lack of trained seamen to man same (stokers, stewards, etc., are not efficient boat handlers); not enough officers to carry out emergency orders on the bridge and superintend the launching and control of life-boats; the absence of search lights. "the board of trade allows for entirely too many people in each boat to permit the same to be properly handled. on the titanic the boat deck was about seventy-five feet from the water and consequently the passengers were required to embark before lowering the boats, thus endangering the operation and preventing the taking on of the maximum number the boats would hold. boats at all times should be properly equipped with provisions, water, lamps, compasses, lights, etc. life-saving boat drills should be more frequent and thoroughly carried out and officers should be armed at both drills. there should be greater reduction of speed in fog and ice, as damage if collision actually occurs is liable to be less. international conference recommended "in conclusion we suggest that an international conference be called to recommend the passage of identical laws providing for the safety of all at sea, and we urge the united states government to take the initiative as soon as possible." that ocean liners take chances with their passengers, though known to the well informed, is newly revealed and comes with a shock of surprise and dismay to most people. if boats are unsinkable as well as fireproof there is no need of any life-boats at all. but no such steamship has ever been constructed. that it is realized that life-boats may be necessary on the best and newest steamships is proved by the fact that they carry them even beyond the law's requirements. but if life-boats for one-third of those on the ship are necessary, life-boats for all on board are equally necessary. the law of the united states requires this, but the law and trade regulations of england do not, and these controlled the titanic and caused the death of over sixteen hundred people. true, a steamship is rarely crowded to her capacity, and ordinarily accommodations in life-boats for a full list would not be needed. but that is no argument against maximum safety facilities, for when disaster comes it comes unexpectedly, and it might come when every berth was occupied. so there must be life-boats for use in every possible emergency. places must be found for them and methods for handling them promptly. suppose a vessel to be thus equipped, would safety be insured? in calm weather such as the titanic had, yes, for all that would be needed would be to keep the small boats afloat until help came. the titanic could have saved everyone aboard. in heavy weather, no. as at present arranged, if a vessel has a list, or, in non-nautical language, has tipped over on one side, only the boats upon the lower side can be dropped, for they must be swung clear of the vessel to be lowered from the davits. so there is a problem which it is the duty of marine designers to solve. they have heretofore turned their attention to the invention of some new contrivance for comfort and luxury. now let them grasp the far more important question of taking every soul from a sinking ship. they can do it, and while they are about it, it would be well to supplement life-boats with other methods. we like to think and to say that nothing is impossible in these days of ceaseless and energetic progress. certainly it is possible for the brains of marine designers to find a better way for rescue work. lewis nixon, ship-builder and designer for years, is sure that we can revolutionize safety appliances. he has had a plan for a long time for the construction of a considerable section of deck that could be detached and floated off like an immense raft. he figures that such a deck-raft could be made to carry the bulk of the passengers. that may seem a bit chimerical to laymen, but nixon is no layman. his ideas are worthy of every consideration. certain it is that something radical must be done, and that the maritime nations must get together, not only in the way of providing more life-saving facilities, but in agreeing upon navigation routes and methods. captain william s. sims, of the united states navy, who is in a position to know what he is talking about, has made some very pointed comments on the subject. he says: "the truth of the matter is that in case any large passenger steamship sinks, by reason of collision or other fatal damage to her flotability, more than half of her passengers are doomed to death, even in fair weather, and in case there is a bit of a sea running none of the loaded boats can long remain afloat, even if they succeed in getting safely away from the side, and one more will be added to the long list of 'the ships that never return.' "most people accept this condition as one of the inevitable perils of the sea, but i believe it can be shown that the terrible loss of life occasioned by such disasters as overtook the bourgogne and the titanic and many other ships can be avoided or at least greatly minimized. moreover, it can be shown that the steamship owners are fully aware of the danger to their passengers; that the laws on the subject of life-saving appliances are wholly inadequate; that the steamship companies comply with the law, though they oppose any changes therein, and that they decline to adopt improved appliances; because there is no public demand for them, the demand being for high schedule speed and luxurious conditions of travel. "in addition to installing efficient life-saving appliances, if the great steamship lines should come to an agreement to fix a maximum speed for their vessels of various classes and fix their dates and hours of steaming so that they would cross the ocean in pairs within supporting distances of each other, on routes clear of ice, all danger of ocean travel would practically be eliminated. "the shortest course between new york and the english channel lies across nova scotia and newfoundland. consequently the shortest water route is over seas where navigation is dangerous by reason of fog and ice. it is a notorious fact that the transatlantic steamships are not navigated with due regard to safety; that they steam at practically full speed in the densest fogs. but the companies cannot properly be blamed for this practice, because if the 'blue liners' slow down in a fog or take a safe route, clear of ice, the public will take passage on the 'green liners,' which take the shortest route, and keep up their schedule time; regardless of the risks indicated." prompt reforms the terrible sacrifice of the titanic, however, is to have its fruit in safety for the future. the official announcement is {illust. caption = a diagrammatic map showing how...} made by the international mercantile marine that all its ships will be equipped with sufficient life-boats and rafts for every passenger and every member of the crew, without regard to the regulations in this country and england or belgium. one of the german liners already had this complement of life-boats, though the german marine as a whole is sufficiently deficient at this point to induce the reichstag to order an investigation. prompt, immediate and gratifying reform marks this action of the international mercantile marine. it is doubtless true that this precaution ought to have been taken without waiting for a loss of life such as makes all previous marine disasters seem trivial. but the public itself has been inert. for thirty years, since plimsoll's day, every intelligent passenger knew that every british vessel was deficient in life-boats, but neither public opinion nor the public press took this matter up. there were no questions in parliament and no measures introduced in congress. even the legislation by which the united states permitted english vessels reaching american ports to avoid the legal requirements of american statute law (which requires a seat in the life-boats for every passenger and every member of the crew) attracted no public attention, and occasional references to the subject by those better informed did nothing to awake action. but this is past. those who died bravely without complaint and with sacrificing regard for others did not lose their lives in vain. the safety of all travelers for all times to come under every civilized flag is to be greater through their sac-rifice. under modern conditions life can be made as safe at sea as on the land. it is heartrending to stop and think that thirty-two more life-boats, costing only about $16,000, which could have been stowed away without being noticed on the broad decks of the titanic, would have saved every man, woman and child on the steamer. there has never been so great a disaster in the history of civilization due to the neglect of so small an expenditure. it would be idle to think that this was due simply to parsimony. it was really due to the false and vicious notion that life at sea must be made showy, sumptuous and magnificent. the absence of life-boats was not due to their cost, but to the demand for a great promenade deck, with ample space to look out on the sea with which a continuous row of life-boats would have interfered, and to the general tendency to lavish money on the luxuries of a voyage instead of first insuring its safety. chapter xxix. the senatorial investigation prompt action of the government--senate committee probes disaster and brings out details--testimony of ismay, officers, crew, passengers and other witnesses public sentiment with regard to the titanic disaster was reflected in the prompt action of the united states government. on april 17th the senate, without a dissenting vote, ordered an investigation of the wreck of the titanic, with particular reference to the inadequacy of life-saving boats and apparatus. the resolution also directed inquiry into the use by the titanic of the northern course "over a route commonly regarded as dangerous from icebergs." besides investigating the disaster, the committee was directed to look into the feasibility of international agreements for the further protection of ocean traffic. the senate committee on commerce, in whose charge the investigation was placed, immediately appointed the following sub-committee to conduct the gathering of evidence and the examination of witnesses: senator william alden smith of michigan, chairman; senator francis newlands of nevada, senator jonathan bourne, jr., of oregon, senator george c. perkins of california, senator theodore e. burton of ohio, senator furnifold mcl. simmons of north carolina and senator duncan u. fletcher of florida. the senate committee began its investigation in new york on friday, april 19th, the morning after the arrival of the carpathia. ismay, the first witness, came to the witness chair with a smile upon his face. he was sworn and then told the committee that he made the voyage on the titanic only as a voluntary passenger. nobody designated him to come to see how the newly launched monster would behave on the initial trip. he said that no money was spared in the construction, and as she was built on commission there was no need for the builders to slight the work for their own benefit. the accident had happened on sunday night, april 14th. "i was in bed and asleep," he said. "the ship was not going at full speed, as has been printed, because full speed would be from seventy-eight to eighty revolutions, and we were making only seventy-five. after the impact with the iceberg i dressed and went on deck. i asked the steward what the matter was and he told me. then i went to captain smith and asked him if the ship was in danger and he told me he thought she was." ismay said that he went on the bridge and remained there for some time and then lent a hand in getting the life-boats ready. he helped to get the women and children into the boats. ismay said that no other executive officer of the steamship company was on board, which practically made him the sole master of the vessel the minute it passed beyond the control of the captain and his fellow-officers. but ismay, seeming to scent the drift of the questions, said that he never interfered in any way with the handling of the ship. ismay was asked to give more particulars about his departure from the ship. he said: "the boat was ready to be lowered away and the officer called out if there were any more women or children to go or any more passengers on deck, but there was none, and i got on board." captain rostron's testimony captain rostron, of the carpathia, followed mr. ismay. he said the first message received from the titanic was that she was in immediate danger. "i gave the order to turn the ship around as soon as the titanic had given her position. i set a course to pick up the titanic, which was fifty-eight miles west of my position. i sent for the chief engineer, told him to put on another watch of stokers and make all speed for the titanic. i told the first officer to stop all deck work, get out the life-boats and be ready for any emergency. the chief steward and doctors of the carpathia i called to my office and instructed as to their duties. the english doctor was assigned to the first class dining room, the italian doctor to the second class dining room, the hungarian doctor to the third class dining room. they were instructed to be ready with all supplies necessary for any emergency." {illust. caption = diagram showing the proximity of other steamships to the titanic on night of disaster.} the captain told in detail of the arrangements made to prepare the life-boats and the ship for the receipt of the survivors. weeps as he tells story then with tears filling his eyes, captain rostron said he called the purser. "i told him," said captain rostron, "i wanted to hold a service of prayer--thanksgiving for the living and a funeral service for the dead. i went to mr. ismay. he told me to take full charge. an episcopal clergyman was found among the passengers and he conducted the services." titanic was a "life-boat." captain rostron said that the carpathia had twenty lifeboats of her own, in accordance with the british regulations. "wouldn't that indicate that the regulations are out of date, your ship being much smaller than the titanic, which also carried twenty life-boats?" senator smith asked. "no. the titanic was supposed to be a life-boat herself." wireless failed why so few messages came from the carpathia was gone into. captain rostron declared the first messages, all substantially the same, were sent to the white star line, the cunard line and the associated press. then the first and second cabin passenger lists were sent, when the wireless failed. senator smith said some complaint had been heard that the carpathia had not answered president taft's inquiry for major butt. captain rostron declared a reply was sent, "not on board." captain rostron declared he issued orders for no messages to be sent except upon orders from him, and for official business to go first, then private messages from the titanic survivors in order of filing. absolutely no censorship was exercised, he said. the wire-less continued working all the way in, the marconi operator being constantly at the key. guglielmo marconi, the wireless inventor, was the next witness. marconi said he was chairman of the british marconi company. under instructions of the company, he said, operators must take their orders from the captain of the ship on which they are employed. "do the regulations prescribe whether one or two operators should be aboard the ocean vessels?" "yes, on ships like the late titanic and olympic two are carried," said marconi. "the carpathia, a smaller boat, carries one. the carpathia's wireless apparatus is a short-distance equipment." titanic well equipped "do you consider that the titanic was equipped with the latest improved wireless apparatus?" "yes; i should say that it had the very best." "did you hear the captain of the carpathia say, in his testimony, that they caught this distress message from the titanic almost providentally?" asked senator smith. "yes, i did. it was absolutely providential." "is there any signal for the operator if he is not at his post?'{'} "i think there is none," said marconi. "ought it not be incumbent upon ships to have an operator always at the key?" "yes; but ship-owners don't like to carry two operators when they can get along with one. the smaller boat owners do not like the expense of two operators." second officer testifies charles herbert lightoller, second officer of the titanic, followed marconi on the stand. mr. lightoller said he understood the maximum speed of the titanic, as shown by its trial tests, to have been twenty-two and a half to twenty-three knots. senator smith asked if the rule requiring life-saving apparatus to be in each room for each passenger was complied with. "everything was complete," said lightoller. "sixteen life-boats, of which four were collapsible, were on the titanic," he added. during the tests, he said, captain clark, of the british board of trade, was aboard the titanic to inspect its life-saving equipment. "how thorough are these captains of the board of trade in inspecting ships?" asked senator smith. "captain clark is so thorough that we called him a nuisance." titanic killed rapidly after testifying to the circumstances under which the life-boats were filled and lowered, lightoller continued. "the boat's deck was only ten feet from the water when i lowered the sixth boat. when we lowered the first, the distance to the water was seventy feet." "if the same course was pursued on the starboard side as you pursued on the port, in filling boats, how do you account for so many members of the crew being saved?" asked chairman smith. "i have inquired especially and have found that for every six persons picked up, five were either firemen or stewards." cottam tells his story thomas cottam, of liverpool, the marconi operator on the carpathia, was the next witness. cottam said that he was about ready to retire sunday night, having partially removed his clothes, and was waiting for a reply to a message to the parisian when he heard cape cod trying to call the titanic. cottam called the titanic operator to inform him of the fact, and received the reply. 'come at once; this is a distress message. c. q. d.' " "what did you do then?" "i confirmed the distress message by asking the titanic if i should report the distress message to the captain of the carpathia." "how much time elapsed after you received the titanic's distress message before you reported it to captain rostron?" "about a couple of minutes," cottam answered. cottam recalled when the committee resumed the investigation on april 20th, cottam was recalled to the stand. senator smith asked the witness if he had received any messages from the time the carpathia left the scene of the disaster until it reached new york. the purpose of this question was to discover whether any official had sought to keep back the news of the disaster. "no, sir," answered cottam. "i reported the entire matter myself to the steamship baltic at 10.30 o'clock monday morning. i told her we had been to the wreck and had picked up as many of the passengers as we could." cottam denied that he had sent any message that all passengers had been saved, or anything on which such a report could be based. cottam said he was at work monday and until wednesday. he repeated his testimony of the previous day and said he had been without sleep throughout sunday, monday, tuesday and until late wednesday afternoon when he had been relieved by bride. "did you or bride send any message declaring that the titanic was being towed into halifax?" "no, sir," said the witness, with emphasis. marconi explains in an effort to determine whether the signal "c. q. d." might not have been misunderstood by passing ships, senator smith called upon mr. marconi. "the 'c. q.,'" said marconi, "is an international signal which meant that all stations should cease sending except the one using the call. the 'd.' was added to indicate danger. the call, however, now has been superseded by the universal call, 's. o. s.'" bride on the stand harold s. bride, the sole surviving operator of the titanic, was then called. bride said he knew the frankfurt was nearer than the carpathia when he called for assistance, but that he ceased his efforts to communicate with the former because her operator persisted in asking, "what is the matter?" despite bride's message that the ship was in distress. time after time senator smith asked in varying forms why the titanic did not explain its condition to the frankfurt. "any operator receiving 'c. q. d.' and the position of the ship, if he is on the job," said bride, "would tell the captain at once." marconi again testified to the distress signals, and said that the frankfurt was equipped with marconi wireless. he said that the receipt of the signal "c. q. d." by the frankfurt's operator should have been all-sufficient to send the frankfurt to the immediate rescue. all appeals received under questioning by senator smith, bride said that undoubtedly the frankfurt received all of the urgent appeals for help sent subsequently to the carpathia. investigation carried to washington the first witness when the investigation was resumed in washington on april 22d was p. a. s. franklin, vice-president of the international mercantile marine company. franklin testified that he had had no communication with captain smith during the titanic's voyage, nor with ismay, except one cable from southampton. senator smith then showed mr. franklin the telegram received by congressman hughes, of west virginia, from the white star line, dated new york, april 15th, and addressed to j. a. hughes, huntington, w. va., as follows: "titanic proceeding to halifax. passengers probably land on wednesday. all safe. (signed) "the white star line. " telegram a mystery "i ask you," continued the senator, "whether you know about the sending of that telegram, by whom it was authorized and from whom it was sent?" "i do not, sir," said franklin. "since it was mentioned at the waldorf saturday we have had the entire passenger staff examined and we cannot find out." asked when he first knew that the titanic had sunk, franklin said he first knew it about 6.27 p.m., monday. mr. franklin then produced a thick package of telegrams which he had received in relation to the disaster. "about twenty minutes of two on monday morning," said he, "i was awakened by a telephone bell, and was called by a reporter for some paper who informed me that the titanic had met with an accident and was sinking. i asked him where he got the information. he told me that it had come by wireless from the steamship virginian, which had been appealed to by the titanic for aid." mr. franklin said he called up the white star docks, but they had no information, and he then appealed to the associated press, and there was read to him a dispatch from cape race advising him of the accident. "i asked the associated press," said mr. franklin, "not to send out the dispatch until we had more detailed information, in order to avoid causing unnecessary alarm. i was told, however, that the story already had been sent." the reassuring statements sent out by the line in the early hours of the disaster next were made the subject of inquiry. "tell the committee on what you based those statements," directed senator smith. "we based them on reports and rumors received at cape race by individuals and by the newspapers. they were rumors, and we could not place our finger on anything authentic." first definite news "at 6.20 or 6.30 monday evening," mr. franklin continued, "a message was received telling the fateful news that the carpathia reached the titanic and found nothing but boats and wreckage; that the titanic had foundered at 2.20 a.m. in 41.16 north, 50.14 west; that the carpathia picked up all the boats and had on board about 675 titanic survivors--passengers and crew. "it was such a terrible shock that it took me several moments to think what to do. then i went downstairs to the reporters, i began to read the message, holding it high in my hand. i had read only to the second line, which said that the titanic had sunk, when there was not a reporter left--they were so anxious to get to the telephones. safety equipment "the titanic's equipment was in excess of the law," said the witness. "it carried its clearance in the shape of a certificate from the british board of trade. i might say that no vessel can leave a british port without a certificate that it is equipped to care for human lives aboard in case of accident. it is the law." "do you know of anyone, any officer or man or any official, whom you deem could be held responsible for the accident and its attendant loss of life?" "positively not. no one thought such an accident could happen. it was undreamed of. i think it would be absurd to try to hold some individual responsible. every precaution was taken; that the precautions were of no avail is a source of the deepest sorrow. but the accident was unavoidable." fourth officer testifies j. b. boxhall, the fourth officer, was then questioned. "were there any drills or any inspection before the titanic sailed?" he was asked. "both," said the witness. "the men were mustered and the life-boats lowered in the presence of the inspectors from the board of trade." "how many boats were lowered?" "just two, sir." "one on each side of the ship?" "no, sir. they were both on the same side. we were lying in dock." the witness said he did not know whether the lowering tackle ran free or not on that occasion. "in lowering the life-boats at the test, did the gear work satisfactorily?" "so far as i know." in lowering a life-boat, he said, first the boat has to be cleared, chocks knocked down and the boat hangs free. then the davits are screwed out to the ship's side and the boat lowered. at the time of the tests all officers of the titanic were present. boxhall said that under the weather conditions experienced at the time of the collision the life-boats were supposed to carry sixty-five persons. under the regulations of the british board of trade, in addition to the oars, there were in the boats water breakers, water dippers, bread, bailers, mast and sail and lights and a supply of oil. all of these supplies, said boxhall, were in the boats when the titanic left belfast. he could not say whether they were in when the vessel left southampton. "now," repeated senator smith, "suppose the weather was clear and the sky unruffled, as it was at the time of the disaster, how many would the boat hold?" "really, i don't know. it would depend largely upon the people who were to enter. if they did as they were told i believe each boat could accommodate sixty-five persons." boxhall testified to the sobriety and good habits of his superior and brother officers. no trace of damage inside boxhall said he went down to the steerage, inspected all the decks in the vicinity of where the ship had struck, found no traces of any damage and went directly to the bridge and so reported. carpenter found leaks "the captain ordered me to send a carpenter to sound the ship, but i found a carpenter coming up with the announcement that the ship was taking water. in the mail room i found mail sacks floating about while the clerks were at work. i went to the bridge and reported, and the captain ordered the life-boats to be made ready." boxhall testified that at captain smith's orders he took word of the ship's position to the wireless operators. "what position was that?" "forty-one forty-six north, fifty fourteen west." "was that the last position taken?" "yes, the titanic stood not far from there when she sank." after that boxhall went back to the life-boats, where there were many men and women. he said they had been provided with life-belts. {illust. caption = the effects of striking an iceberg (1) shows normal....} distress rockets fired "after that i was on the bridge most of the time sending out distress signals, trying to attract the attention of boats ahead," he said. "i sent up distress rockets until i left the ship, to try to attract the attention of a ship directly ahead. i had seen her lights. she seemed to be meeting us and was not far away. she got close enough, so she seemed to me, to read our morse electric signals." "suppose you had a powerful search light on the titanic, could you not have thrown a beam on the vessel and have compelled her attention?" "we might." h. j. pitman, the third officer of the ship, was the first witness on april 23d. by a series of searching questions senator fletcher brought out the fact that when the collision occurred the titanic was going at the greatest speed attained during the trip, even though the ship was entering the grand banks and had been advised of the presence of ice. frederick fleet, a sailor and lookout man on the titanic, followed pitman on the stand. fleet said he had had five or six years' experience at sea and was lookout on the oceanic prior to going on the titanic. he was in the crow's nest at the time of the collision. fleet stated that he had kept a sharp lookout for ice, and testified to seeing the iceberg and signaling the bridge. fleet acknowledged that if he had been aided in his observations by a good glass he probably could have spied the berg into which the ship crashed in time to have warned the bridge to avoid it. major arthur peuchen, of toronto, a passenger who followed fleet on the stand, also testified to the much greater sweep of vision afforded by binoculars and, as a yachtsman, said he believed the presence of the iceberg might have been detected in time to escape the collision had the lookout men been so equipped. had asked for binoculars it was made to appear that the blame for being without glasses did not rest with the lookout men. fleet said they had asked for them at southampton and were told there were none for them. one glass, in a pinch, would have served in the crow's nest. the testimony before the committee on april 24th showed that the big steamship was on the verge of a field of ice twenty or thirty miles long, if she had not actually entered it, when the accident occurred. the committee tried to discover whether it would add to human safety if the ships were fitted with search lights so that at night objects could be seen at a greater distance. the testimony so far along this line had been conflicting. some of the witnesses thought it would be no harm to try it, but they were all skeptical as to its value, as an iceberg would not be especially distinguishable because its bulk is mostly below the surface. one of the witnesses said that much dependence is not placed upon the lookout, and that those lookouts who used binoculars constantly found them detrimental. harold g. lowe, fifth officer of the titanic, told the committee his part in the struggle of the survivors for life following the catastrophe. the details of this struggle have have already been told in a previous chapter. authorized to sell story in great detail guglielmo marconi, on april 25th, explained the operations of his system and told how he had authorized operator bride of the titanic, and operator cottam, of the carpathia, to sell their stories of the disaster after they came ashore. in allowing the operator's to sell their stories, said mr. marconi, there was no question of suppressing or monopolizing the news. he had done everything he could, he said, to have the country informed as quickly as possible of the details of the disaster. that was why he was particularly glad for the narratives of such important witnesses as the operators to receive publication, regardless of the papers that published them. he repeated the testimony of cottam that every effort had been made to get legitimate dispatches ashore. the cruiser chester, he said, had been answered as fully as possible, though it was not known at the time that its queries came from the president of the united states. the salem, he said, had never got in touch with the carpathia operator. senator newlands suggested that the telegrams, some signed by the name of mr. sammis and some with the name of marconi, directing cottam to "keep his mouth shut" and hold out for four figures on his story, was sent only as the carpathia was entering new york harbor, when there was no longer need for sending official or private messages from the rescuing ship. there had been an impression before, he said, that the messages had been sent to cottam when the ship was far at sea, when they might have meant that he was to hold back messages relieving the anxiety of those on shore. saw distress rockets ernest gill, a donkey engineman on the steamship californian, was the first witness on april 26th. he said that captain stanley lord, of the californian, refused later to go to the aid of the titanic, the rockets from which could be plainly seen. he says the captain was apprised of these signals, but made no effort to get up steam and go to the rescue. the californian was drifting with the floe. so indignant did he become, said gill, that he endeavored to recruit a committee of protest from among the crew, but the men failed him. captain lord entered a sweeping denial of gill's accusations and read from the californian's log to support his contention. cyril evans, the californian's wireless operator, however, told of hearing much talk among the crew, who were critical of the captain's course. gill, he said, told him he expected to get $500 for his story when the ship reached boston. evans told of having warned the titanic only a brief time before the great vessel crashed into the berg that the sea was crowded with ice. the titanic's operators, he said, at the time were working with the wireless station at cape race, and they told him to "shut up" and keep out. within a half hour the pride of the sea was crumpled and sinking. members of the committee who examined individually the british sailors and stewards of the titanic's crew prepared a report of their investigations for the full committee. this testimony was ordered to be incorporated in the record of the hearings. most of this testimony was but a repetition of experiences similar to the many already related by those who got away in the life-boats. on april 27th captain james h. moore, of the steamship mount temple, who hurried to the titanic in response to wireless calls for help, told of the great stretch of field ice which held him off. within his view from the bridge he discerned, he said, a strange steamship, probably a "tramp," and a schooner which was making her way out of the ice. the lights of this schooner, he thought, probably were those seen by the anxious survivors of the titanic and which they were frantically trying to reach. women at hearing weep steward crawford also related a thrilling story in regard to loading the life-boats with women first. he told of several instances that came under his observation of women throwing their arms around their husbands and crying out that they would not leave the ship without them. the pathetic recital caused several women at the hearing to weep, and all within earshot of the steward's story were thrilled. andrews was brave stories that mr. andrews, the designer of the ship, had tried to disguise the extent of danger were absolutely denied by henry samuel etches, his bedroom steward, who told the committee how mr. andrews urged women back to their cabins to dress more warmly and to put on life-belts. the steward, whose duty it was to serve major butt and his party, told how he did not see the major at dinner the evening of the disaster as he was dining with a private party in the restaurant. william burke, a first class steward, told of serving dinner at 7.15 o'clock to mr. and mrs. straus, and later mrs. straus' refusal to leave her husband was again told to the committee. a bedroom steward told of a quiet conversation with benjamin guggenheim, senator guggenheim's brother, after the accident and shortly before the titanic settled in the plunge that was to be his death. on april 29th marconi produced copies of several messages which passed between the marconi office and the carpathia in an effort to get definite information of the wreck and the survivors. marconi and f. m. sammis, chief engineer of the american marconi company, both acknowledged that a mistake had been made in sending messages to bride and cottam on board the carpathia not to give out any news until they had seen marconi and sammis. the senatorial committee investigating the titanic disaster has served several good purposes. it has officially established the fact that all nations are censurable for insufficient, antiquated safety regulations on ocean vessels, and it has emphasized the imperative necessity for united action among all maritime countries to revise these laws and adapt them to changed conditions. the committee reported its findings as follows: general conclusions no particular person is named as being responsible, though attention is called to the fact that on the day of the disaster three distinct warnings of ice were sent to captain smith. j. bruce ismay, managing director of the white star line, is not held responsible for the ship's high speed. in fact, he is barely mentioned in the report. ice positions, so definitely reported to the titanic just preceding the accident, located ice on both sides of the lane in which she was traveling. no discussion took place among the officers, no conference was called to consider these warnings, no heed was given to them. the speed was not relaxed, the lookout was not increased. the supposedly water-tight compartments of the titanic were not water-tight, because of the non-water-tight condition of the decks where the transverse bulkheads ended. the steamship californian, controlled by the same concern as the titanic, was nearer the sinking steamship than the nineteen miles reported by her captain, and her officers and crew saw the distress signals of the titanic and failed to respond to them in accordance with the dictates of humanity, international usage and the requirements of law. had assistance been promptly proffered the californian might have had the proud distinction of rescuing the lives of the passengers and crew of the titanic. the mysterious lights on an unknown ship, seen by the passengers on the titanic, undoubtedly were on the californian, less than nineteen miles away. eight ships, all equipped with wireless, were in the vicinity of the titanic, the olympic farthest away--512 miles. the full capacity of the titanic's life-boats was not utilized, because, while only 705 persons were saved, the ship's boats could have carried 1176. no general alarm was sounded, no whistle blown and no systematic warning was given to the endangered passengers, and it was fifteen or twenty minutes after the collision before captain smith ordered the titanic's wireless operator to send out a distress message. the titanic's crew were only meagerly acquainted with their positions and duties in an accident and only one drill was held before the maiden trip. many of the crew joined the ship only a few hours before she sailed and were in ignorance of their positions until the following friday. many more lives could have been saved had the survivors been concentrated in a few life-boats, and had the boats thus released returned to the wreck for others. the first official information of the disaster was the message from captain haddock, of the olympic, received by the white star line at 6.16 p. m., monday, april 15. in the face of this information a message reporting the titanic being towed to halifax was sent to representative j. a. hughes, at huntington, w. va., at 7.51 p. m. that day. the message was delivered to the western union office in the same building as the white star line offices. "whoever sent this message," says the report, "under the circumstances, is guilty of the most reprehensible conduct." the wireless operator on the carpathia was not duly vigilant in handling his messages after the accident. the practice of allowing wireless operators to sell their stories should be stopped. recommendations. it is recommended that all ships carrying more than 100 passengers shall have two searchlights. that a revision be made of steamship inspection laws of foreign countries to conform to the standard proposed in the united states. that every ship be required to carry sufficient life-boats for all passengers and crew. that the use of wireless be regulated to prevent interference by amateurs, and that all ships have a wireless operator on constant duty. detailed recommendations are made as to water-tight bulkhead construction on ocean-going ships. bulkheads should be so spaced that any two adjacent compartments of a ship might be flooded without sinking. transverse bulkheads forward and abaft the machinery should be continued watertight to the uppermost continuous structural deck, and this deck should be fitted water-tight. 